12 Okla. Stat. § 95

Section 95(A)(3) provides a two-year limitations period for negligence actions; a timely motion for leave to add a defendant tolls that period absent gamesmanship or sharp practice.

Meason v. Seely · filed 2021-05-19(A)(3)

However, relying upon Pearson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 701 F. Supp. 195, 196 (N.D. Okla. 1988), plaintiff argues the filing of his motion for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint tolled the two-year limitations period. The court agrees.

Section 95 provides a two-year limitations period, and a timely application to amend filed within that period tolls the statute of limitations.

Pearson v. Niagara MacHine & Tool Works · filed 1988-12-19

Plaintiff was injured May 29, 1986. The Oklahoma statute of limitations allows Plaintiff to file his claim within two years. Okla.Stat. tit. 12, § 95. ... Defendant’s motion to dismiss is overruled as the application filed May 31, 1988 tolled the statute of limitations.

Section 95(3)’s limitation period does not bar a compensation insurer from intervening to assert its joint interest when the injured employee filed the personal injury action within the period.

Travelers Insurance Company v. Leedy · filed 1969-02-25(3)

The filing by Leedy of his common-law action within the limitation period operates to suspend the bar of limitations, 12 O.S.1961, § 95(3), against Travelers asserting its joint interest in the cause of action being pursued by Leedy.

Section 95 gives a plaintiff three years to bring an action on an oral contract; the limitations period can expire while a timely filed action is pending.

Herren v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. · filed 1946-02-19

This contention would be correct in the absence of an allegation in plaintiff’s petition tolling the statute. ... The bar of the statute had then fallen.

Section 95 supplies the three-year Oklahoma statute of limitations for federal claims when no specific federal limitations period applies.

Farmers & Merchants National Bank v. Bryan · filed 1990-05-10

In the absence of a specific federal statute of limitations to apply to plaintiffs’ claims, the trial court correctly borrowed the three-year Oklahoma statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95 (1981), to determine whether plaintiffs’ claims were barred.

Section 95(3) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Oklahoma because it is the forum state's personal-injury limitations period.

Martin v. Punches · filed 1999-02-23(3)

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the forum state’s statute for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 461 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); see also Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988). In Oklahoma, that limitations period is two years. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3).

Section 95 provides a two-year limitations period for analogous tort actions, which governs § 1983 claims in Oklahoma.

Bedford v. Rivers · filed 1999-05-10

As the court noted, the statute of limitations in a § 1983 action filed in Oklahoma is two years from the time the cause of action accrued. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985) (holding that the statute of limitations for § 1983 is based upon the applicable state law limitations for a private tort action); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95 (establishing a two-year statute of limitations period for analogous tort actions). ... Because Bedford’s bags were searched in September 1995 and he filed his action in May 1998, the district court correctly found his claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on tort claims, running from accrual of the claim.

Trinity Baptist Church v. Guideone Elite Insurance · filed 2009-08-28(A)(3)

By its Motion, Defendant seeks a determination of an issue previously raised under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), namely, whether Plaintiffs tort claim is time-barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). ... The two-year limitations clock began to run when Plaintiffs claim of insurer’s bad faith accrued. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of its defense that Plaintiffs bad faith claim asserted in the First Amended Complaint is time-barred, except to the extent Plaintiffs claim is based on Defendant’s alleged bad faith conduct with regard to “ordinance and law” coverage due under the policy.

Section 95(A)(3) provides a two-year limitations period that bars claims brought more than two years after the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts giving rise to them.

Bryer v. Phillips · filed 2018-02-21(A)(3)

The parties agree on the applicability of Oklahoma’s two-year period of limitations for all of Mr. Bryer’s claims. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). ... Given these facts, Mr. Bryer was on notice before 2013 of the facts giving rise to his claim. Therefore, the 2015 suit is barred by Oklahoma’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(3) supplies a two-year limitations period for claims governed by Oklahoma’s personal-injury statute.

First v. Hockett · filed 2022-02-23(A)(3)

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is governed by the forum state’s personal injury statute, Mondragon v. Thompson, 519, F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008), which is two years in Oklahoma. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). ... As a result, the Court finds that plaintiff timely filed her § 1983 malicious prosecution claim on December 10, 2018.

Section 95(3) imposes a two-year statute of limitations applicable to the claims at issue.

Garneau v. Children's Hospital · filed 2024-10-02(3)

Plaintiff’s claims are also barred by the state of limitations. His claims all concern actions taken in connection with his 1999 state court conviction, which is well outside the two-year statute of limitations that applies in this case. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3).

Section 95(A)(3) gives a two-year limitations period for non-contract claims, with accrual potentially deferred under the discovery rule until the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury.

HiTex, LLC v. Vorel · filed 2025-06-13(A)(3)

Looking to Oklahoma law, the statute of limitations for each of Plaintiff’s non-contract claims is two years. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3); ... Oklahoma also follows the discovery rule, which allows statutes of limitation in certain tort cases to be tolled “until the injured party knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the injury.” ... For these reasons, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have discovered sufficient facts to state a cause of action no later than July 2, 2019. But Plaintiff did not file this action until July 28, 2021. Its claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligence are thus barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 95(a)'s three-year limitations period applies to non-fraud breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In Re Tronox Inc.) · filed 2011-05-11(a)

The parties agree that a three-year statute of limitations applies to the amended claims of breach of fiduciary duty to the extent that they are not based in fraud. Since none of the allegations in Count IV of the Amended Complaint is grounded in fraud, the Court applies a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 95(2) bars an oral-contract claim for services when the action is filed after the limitations period measured from the last services performed.

White v. Mitchell · filed 1951-10-16(2)

According to the claim the last services performed were rendered June 3, 1944. The contract was oral. The claim was first presented June 26, 1948, and the cause of action was filed the 6th day of October, 1948, and was barred by the statute of limitations. 12 O. S. 1941 §95, subd. 2.

Section 95 gives a property owner three years to sue a municipality for consequential damage caused by proper construction of a public improvement without negligence.

City of Oklahoma City v. Daly · filed 1957-09-24(2)

So we hold that an action by the owner of property against a municipality under Sec. 24, Art. 2 of the Constitution, for consequential damages caused by the construction of a public improvement, where the damages occur without negligence in making the construction, but as a result of doing the work in a proper manner, is governed by the three-year statute of limitations under 12 O.S.1951 § 95, subdivision 2.

Section 95(2) sets a three-year limitations period for an action on an oral contract.

Coston v. Kamp · filed 1976-03-23(2)

The oral contract sued upon will be governed by the three-year statutory period prescribed in 12 O.S.1971 § 95(2), while the fact of failing to file a claim earlier than he did may have probative materiality with reference to the viability of plaintiff’s claim.

Section 95(Second)’s three-year limit applies to a claim that a lawyer breached a specific oral promise to search and report title records.

Great Plains Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Dabney · filed 1993-01-26(Second)

We simply hold on the facts alleged in the petition, with attached documents, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, the allegations are sufficiently like the abstractor situation under the cases cited in the text to call for use of the three year limitation period for oral contracts.

Section 95 (Second) allows three years from accrual to sue on an unwritten contract; for a loan without a specific repayment time, the period begins after a reasonable time for performance.

Olson v. Reavis · filed 1993-07-20(Second)

The applicable statutory limitation for bringing an action to enforce an unwritten express or implied contract is three years from the date the cause of action accrues. 12 O.S.1991 § 95 (Second). With respect to a loan agreement, a cause of action does not accrue until repayment is due, which in this case was sometime after Reavis graduated from dental school. And where, as here, the agreement does not establish a specific time for repayment, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until expiration of a reasonable time for performance.

Section 95 gives a claim to recover overpaid fees as money had and received a three-year limitations period.

Sholer v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety · filed 1995-05-23Second

A claim for a fee refund is no less such an action. The applicable statute of limitations for the action is the three-year provision in section 95, second, for “[a]n action upon a contract express or implied not in writing.”

Section 95 (Second) provides a three-year limitation for claims based on liability created by a Corporation Commission rule.

Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Norris Sucker Rods · filed 1995-07-18(Second)

The Commission found guidance in 12 O.S.Supp.1994 § 95 (Second), which provides a three-year limitation for actions based upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty. This appears to be a correct analysis, as Norris’ claim is clearly based upon PSO’s liability for violating a Commission rule, and a Commission rale has the full force and effect of law.

Section 95, second, gives three years to bring an action for money had and received to recover overpaid fees.

Sholer v. STATE EX REL. DEPT. PUB. SAF. · filed 1997-08-14Second

A claim for a fee refund is no less such an action. The applicable statute of limitations for the action is the three-year provision in section 95, second, for "[a]n action upon a contract express or implied not in writing." See, e.g., Grider v. USX Corp., 847 P.2d 779, 785 (Okla.1993). The trial court erred in applying the five-year provision.

Section 95(2) requires a breach-of-contract action based on an implied contract to be brought within three years.

Garst v. University of Oklahoma · filed 2001-10-19(2)

Assuming arguendo that the guides did form the basis of an implied contract, we find that Garst's action for breach of contract is time barred because it was not brought within three years as required by 12 O.S. Supp. 1996 § 95(2). Further, we find no Oklahoma authority that would sanction "tolling" of the statute of limitations under the facts of this case.

Section 95(A)(2) provides a three-year limitations period for claims arising from an express contract not in writing.

Osage Energy Resources, LLC v. Pemco, LLC · filed 2016-09-09(A)(2)

These breaches are governed by 12 O.S.2011 § 95(A)(2) pertaining to actions on express contracts not in writing, arising from Goody’s employment as Plaintiffs COO. In the absence of any quest for a constructive trust, Plaintiffs claims without question arose in May or June 2008 when it learned of the commission and the pump yard deed, and suit was filed in November 2010, clearly within the three-year statute of limitations delineated in 12 O.S. 2011 § 95(A)(2).

Section 95(a)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period for trespass on real property, injury to personal property, injury to another's rights outside contract, and fraud.

Bristow First Assembly of God v. BP p.l.c. · filed 2020-09-10(a)(3)

Oklahoma law imposes a two-year statute of limitations for an action for trespass upon real property, injury to personal property, injury to the rights of another not arising out of contract and fraud.

Section 95(a)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period for trespass upon real property, injury to personal property, injury to another’s rights not arising in contract, and fraud.

Lane v. BP America Production Company · filed 2020-09-10(a)(3)

Oklahoma law imposes a two-year statute of limitations for an action for trespass upon real property, injury to personal property, injury to the rights of another not arising out of contract and fraud.

Section 95 gives a party three years after accrual to bring an action on a contract that is not in writing.

Alvin J. Watson, Inc., and Control Power, Inc. v. Emerson Electric Co., a Missouri Corporation · filed 1992-11-23

12 O.S. § 95 provides that an action upon a contract, express or implied, not in writing, can only be brought within 3 years "after the cause of action shall have accrued." ... Hence, the district court's use of Oklahoma's 3-year statute was proper.

Section 95’s two-year period for a surviving pain-and-suffering claim runs from the injury, even when the injured worker’s lifetime remedy lay before the Industrial Commission.

Landry v. Acme Flour Mills Co. · filed 1949-07-19par. 3

This action, therefore, was barred by the statute of limitations (12 O.S. 1941 §95, par. 3) two years after the injury and prior to the filing of plaintiff’s petition in the court below, unaffected by any provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Section 95(3) bars recovery for permanent injury to land when the injury became obvious more than two years before suit was filed.

Skelly Oil Co. v. Humphrey · filed 1945-04-03(3)

There is no evidence in the record reasonably tending to disclose a cause of action arising within the immediate two years prior to February 9, 1942, the date on which the plaintiff filed his petition. The permanent injury to the freehold under the evidence in the case at bar was occasioned prior to the two years before suit was commenced and the statute of limitations, 12 O.S. 1941 § 95, subd. 3, barred any right of action for recovery.

Section 95(3)’s two-year limitations period begins when injury from a permanent improvement becomes obvious, even if the resulting flooding occurs later.

City of Stillwater v. Robertson · filed 1943-03-16(3)

Plaintiffs, however, neglected to institute any action to compel payment when same was refused and in so doing for more than two years after their cause of action accrued allowed the bar of the statute to operate to defeat the maintenance of such action thereafter. ... Under the uncontradicted facts as disclosed by the record, we conclude that plaintiffs’ cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations (12 O. S. 1941 § 95, subd. 3), and that the trial court erred as a matter of law in not so holding.

Section 95's two-year limitations period for tort claims begins when the tortious act occurs, not when resulting damages are suffered.

Metro Oil Company, Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation v. Sun Refining and Marketing Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation · filed 1991-06-24

On appeal, Metro argues the statute of limitations did not commence until April 1988—the date when it actually suffered damages. Oklahoma law fails to support Metro’s contention. Under Oklahoma case law, a cause of action accrues upon the date the tortious act, or the happening of the breach, and not the date of the resulting damage.

For negligence claims, § 95 begins to run when the plaintiff's injury is certain rather than merely speculative.

Blocker v. Conocophillips Co. · filed 2019-05-06

"[F]or purposes of [ title 12, section 95 of the Oklahoma Statutes ], a negligence claim accrues when any injury to the plaintiff, for which an action could proceed, is certain and not merely speculative."

Section 95(A)(3) gives a bad-faith tort claim a two-year limitations period, running from when the claim could first have been successfully maintained.

Concept Ventures LLC v. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2023-05-24(A)(3)

A bad-faith tort claim “must be brought within two years ‘after the cause of action shall have accrued,’” and an action accrues “when a litigant first could have maintained his action to a successful conclusion.” ... Because Plaintiff filed this action within two years of the alleged bad-faith denial, the claim is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(3) gives a bad-faith tort claim two years, so a claim filed within that period is not barred by limitations.

Gaddy · filed 2025-11-07(A)(3)

Here, even using the date of loss of June 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on June 12, 2025, clearly within the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). ... Because Plaintiffs’ bad faith claim was timely filed, it is not subject to dismissal.

Section 95(3)’s limitations period for a fraud claim begins when a recorded decree gives constructive notice of the alleged fraud; actual notice is unnecessary.

Matthewson v. Hilton · filed 1958-01-21(3)

We are of the opinion that the cause of action based on fraud is barred by the statute of limitations which the defendant asserted. Tit. 12 O.S.1951 § 95(3). When the decree of distribution was entered of record in the county court in 1939, constructive notice of any fraud practiced in obtaining the decree was imparted to plaintiff. This constructive notice was sufficient to establish the time from which the period of the statute must be computed, and this period has long since expired. It is not necessary that plaintiff have had actual notice of the fraud.

The two-year limitations period for permanent damage to real property begins when the damage becomes apparent and its permanent character is obvious.

Peppers Refining Company v. Spivey · filed 1955-07-19(3)

However, it' is an equally settled rule that the two year period of limitations does not commence to run against a cause of action for permanent damage to realty until the damage is apparent and it becomes obvious such damage is of a permanent character.

Section 95(3)'s two-year limit for personal injury actions applies to a compensation insurer's assigned claim against the person who caused the injury.

State Insurance Fund v. Taron · filed 1958-11-25(3)

We conclude that the trial court ruled correctly in applying the two-year statute.

Section 95’s two-year period for an alienation of affections claim begins when the spouse’s loss of affection is complete, as shown here by permanent departure from the marital home.

Harmon v. Harmon · filed 1974-09-10

The consequence of these undisputed facts therefore is that Elizabeth’s cause of action against Margaret accrued as a matter of law on July 29, 1969. It follows that the two-year statute of limitations began to run on that date there appearing no other facts or circumstances to toll it.

Section 95(3) imposes a two-year limitation on negligence and manufacturers’ product liability claims.

Hester v. PUREX CORPORATION LTD. · filed 1975-04-01(3)

Two theories of recovery outside the UCC are retained in Oklahoma; negligence and manufacturers’ product’s liability. See Kirkland v. General Motors, 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl.1974). Both theories are governed by the two year limitation under 12 O.S.1971, § 95(3).

Section 95, Third bars a personal-injury tort claim filed more than two years after the injury.

Barker v. Allied Supermarket · filed 1979-06-18Third

Plaintiff here was barred by the statute of limitations (12 O.S.1961, § 95, Third) from proceeding with a cause of action sounding in tort.

Section 95(3rd) sets a two-year limitations period for an automobile-accident damages action.

Fleming v. Hall · filed 1981-12-15(3rd)

On June 18, 1979, plaintiff brought suit against defendant for damages resulting from an automobile accident occurring on July 28, 1978. ... The two year statute of limitations under 12 O.S.1971, § 95(3rd) expired on July 28, 1980.

Section 95(3) gives fraud claims a two-year limitation period that does not begin until discovery of the fraud; pleading discovery can defeat a limitations-based demurrer.

Hughes v. Fidelity Bank, N. A. · filed 1982-04-06(3)

12 O.S.1971 § 95(3) provides an action for fraud must be brought within two (2) years, however, “the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud.” ... By pleading an exception to the bar of limitations, namely, the discovery of fraud, appellants petition is not demurrable.

Section 95(3) gives two years to bring a conversion claim, with the period starting separately for each installment collected and retained.

Chapman v. Chapman · filed 1984-12-18(3)

Each installment collected and retained by the husband triggered the running of a two-year statute of limitations that governs actions for conversion. 12 O.S. 1981 § 95(3).

Section 95(3)'s two-year limitation period applies to an insured's tort claim for bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim.

Lewis v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. · filed 1983-10-26(3)

We find that the homeowner’s alleged cause of action is founded in tort, and that the two-year statute of limitations is applicable.

Section 95’s shorter tort limitations period does not bar recovery of contract damages arising from the same faulty performance, though it may limit damages recoverable only in tort.

Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Benham-Blair & Affiliates, Inc. · filed 1989-03-28(First)

There the Court did not hold that the defendant might nevertheless have been liable for some damages for breach of his agreement. The recovery of those damages would not have been affected by the shorter statute of limitations.

Section 95 Third’s two-year limitation period for a negligence claim begins when the plaintiff sustains an injury that is certain rather than speculative.

MBA Commercial Construction, Inc. v. Roy J. Hannaford Co. · filed 1991-09-17Third

We hold that for purposes of 12 O.S.1981, § 95 Third, a negligence claim accrues when any injury to the plaintiff, for which an action could proceed, is certain and not merely speculative.

Section 95 Third gives a fraud claim a two-year limitations period that begins when the claimant discovers a loss and has reason to suspect fraud; later discovery of additional damage from the same cause does not restart the period.

Mud Trans, Inc. v. Foster-Dickenson & Co. · filed 1993-07-06Third

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is 12 O.S.1981 § 95 Third. The statute of limitations, therefore, is two years and started to run on Mud Trans’s claim when it first discovered the fraud. ... We hold that Mud Trans’s claim for its lost investment and its claim for damages caused by its lost tax deduction are part of the same cause of action. The statute of limitations on Mud Trans’s cause of action started to run when Hutson learned of Mud Trans’s loss of that investment and became suspicious of the partnership’s management.

Section 95’s five-year contract limitations period applies to a non-negotiable certificate of deposit and begins when the depositor demands payment and the bank fails to pay.

Allied Fidelity Insurance Co. v. Bank of Oklahoma, National Ass'n · filed 1995-04-11(first)

The limitations period did not begin until a demand was made. Only on September 21, 1991, when Allied, through its agent in liquidation, first made demand for the funds, and that demand was unsatisfied, did Allied’s claim against the bank start the limitations period.

Section 95 Third’s two-year limitations period for a negligence action begins only after the negligent act occurs and the plaintiff suffers damages.

Marshall v. Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon, P.C. · filed 1995-06-27Third

As previously stated, however, the statute of limitations for a negligence action begins to run only after two events have transpired: (1) the negligent act has occurred and (2) the plaintiff has suffered damages.

Section 95 gives a bad faith tort claim brought outside the Governmental Tort Claims Act a two-year limitations period.

McGehee v. State Insurance Fund · filed 1995-07-18

A bad faith tort claim which is not brought under the Act is governed by 12 O.S.1991 § 95, the two-year tort limitation period.

Section 95(3)'s two-year limitation applies to an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Williams v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. · filed 1984-09-25(3)

The tort of intentional infliction of mental distress must, therefore, be governed by the more general two-year statute set forth in § 95(3) which applies to “an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated.”

Section 95(3) gives an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim a two-year limitations period.

Miller v. Miller · filed 1998-03-24(3)

The statute of limitations for an action based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is also two years. See 12 O.S. Supp 1997 § 95(3); Williams v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 1984 OK 64, ¶7, 688 P.2d 1294, 1297.

Section 95(3) gives a plaintiff two years to file a conversion claim after it accrues; a later final refusal does not delay accrual when the plaintiff already knows of the wrongful control over her property.

Tillman v. Shofner · filed 2004-03-25(3)

These events occurred more than two years before the conversion claim was filed. Thus, while Tillman may claim that Shofner’s “final refusal” occurred in December 1998, it is clear that, according to Tillman, she knew that Shofner was exercising control and dominion over her funds in his trust account, contrary to her wishes. That is sufficient to demonstrate conversion. Based on these facts, neither tolling nor estoppel would be applicable to this claim. Tillman’s conversion claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(3) bars recovery for recurring temporary property damage that occurred more than two years before suit; the period for permanent damage begins when its permanent character becomes apparent.

Moneypenney v. Dawson · filed 2006-07-05(A)(3)

For such temporary damage a plaintiff may bring successive actions each time the wrong occurs ... and the statute of limitations would bar recovery only for damage occurring more than two years prior to a suit’s filing. ... As to any permanent damage Plaintiff claims was caused, the period of limitation would not commence for such “permanent damage to realty until the damage is apparent and it becomes obvious that such damage is of a permanent character.”

Section 95(A)(3) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a negligence claim, beginning when the plaintiff’s injury becomes certain rather than speculative.

Cabinet Solutions, L.L.C. v. Kelley · filed 2012-04-19(A)(3)

The certainty required by the statute of limitations arose either upon the date Nautilus filed suit against Cabinet-August 16, 2006-or upon the date Cabinet reached a settlement with Nautilus-October 5, 2007. Both events fall within two years of Cabinet filing suit against Kelley. ... Therefore, we find Cabinet's negligence claim against Kelley is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in § 95(A)(3).

Section 95(A)(3) gives a negligence claim a two-year limitations period that does not begin until the plaintiff's injury is certain rather than speculative.

Cabinet Solutions, L.L.C. v. Kelley · filed 2012-04-19(A)(3)

The statute of limitations period applicable to Cabinet's claim of negligence is two years. ... As in MBA and Marshall, although Cabinet discovered Kelley's negligence more than two years prior to filing suit against Kelley, the fact that Cabinet would have to pay Nautilus any amount of damages as a result of Kelley's negligence was speculative and did not become certain until within two years of Cabinet filing suit against Kelley.

Section 95(3) applies a two year limitations period to professional negligence claims sounding in tort.

Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P. · filed 2011-02-08(3)

Furthermore, a claim of professional negligence sounds in tort, and is governed by the two year statute of limitations, 12 O.S. § 95(3).

Section 95(A)(3)'s limitations period for negligence involving a mistaken deed begins when the deed is filed if the mistake was discoverable through ordinary diligence.

CALVERT v. SWINFORD · filed 2016-10-04(A)(3)

The record supports but a single conclusion, that the statute of limitations began to accrue when the deed was filed and that the discovery rule is inapplicable to this cause.

Section 95’s limitations period for a bad faith tort claim based on an adverse judgment begins when the judgment becomes final on appeal; for breach of contract, it begins at breach regardless of later damages or discovery, subject to tolling for fraudulent concealment.

MORGAN v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSUR. CO. · filed 2021-05-25(A)

A bad faith action based on an adverse or excess judgment does not accrue until the judgment is affirmed on appeal and mandated. A breach of contract action accrues when the contract is breached, not when damages result. The discovery rule does not apply to an action for breach of contract. However, the statute of limitations may be tolled if the plaintiff can show the defendant fraudulently concealed the cause of action.

Section 95’s limitation period for foreclosure runs from the note’s extended maturity date; an earlier missed interest payment did not start it.

Campbell v. Dascomb-Daniel Lbr. Co. · filed 1943-09-28(1)

The fallacy of this argument rests in the major premise that the default in payment of the interest coupon which fell due on January 1, 1933, matured the debt and started the statute of limitations running thereon.

Section 95’s limitations period does not begin to run on a note and mortgage while the Secretary of the Interior holds them as trustee.

Rodgers v. Darks · filed 1943-11-02subd. I

Since under the above rulings the statute of limitation did not begin to run while the note and mortgage was held by the Secretary of Interior, said statute of limitation would only begin to run after the Secretary of Interior surrendered possession and dominion over said note and mortgage.

Section 95(1)’s five-year period for an action to redeem property held under a deed as a mortgage begins when the mortgagee’s possession becomes adverse, rather than when the deed is recorded.

Exchange Bank of Perry v. Nichols · filed 1945-11-13(1)

It is not the fact of possession but the adverse character thereof which requires action to avoid the bar of the statute. In the instant case the Bank was entitled to the possession until the rents and revenues had made it whole, and hence nothing short of an assertion of an absolute title would characterize such possession as adverse.

Under § 95(4), the one-year limitations period for a taxpayer suit begins when the cause of action accrues after a demand for suit.

State Ex Rel. v. Board of Com'rs of Lincoln County · filed 1946-10-22(4)

Another question is whether the petition shows the cause of action to be barred by the one-year statute of limitations, 12 O. S. 1941 §95, and subsection 4 thereof. ... This action could not have been brought by these plaintiffs until after the demand for the suit was given, as no cause accrued to plaintiffs until after such demand was made, and the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the accrual of the cause of action.

Section 95(3)'s two-year period bars a claim for permanent injury when the plaintiff knew of the injury and its source more than two years before filing; the plaintiff need not understand the scientific explanation for the injury.

Shell Oil Co. v. Vanderslice · filed 1943-03-23(3)

Under the rule announced in H. F. Wilcox Oil and Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okla. 382, 101 P. 2d 1050, it is clear that plaintiff’s injury came from a permanent source and that the injury done was of a permanent nature, and that it was observed by him and known to him more than two years before he filed the action that he was being thus injured from such a source. ... Plaintiff does not cite and we are not aware of any rule of law that permits a party who knows he is being damaged by the pollution of natural streams on his land to wait until he knows and understands the scientific explanation of the injury that is being done to him.

Section 95(3)’s two-year period does not bar a land-damage claim as a matter of law when the principal injury occurred within two years of filing and the damage was not obvious earlier.

North v. Evans · filed 1947-10-21(3)

The action was commenced as against defendant October 2, 1945, well within two years after the time plaintiff testified his principal injury occurred. Aside from that, the jury, in answer to a special interrogatory submitted at the request of defendant, specifically found that the damages caused by the flow of salt water over plaintiff’s land did not become obvious to plaintiff before October 2, 1943. Therefore, it cannot be said as a matter of law that plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

For a tort injury concealed from the plaintiff without her negligence, the two-year limitations period under § 95(3) begins when she discovers the harm, rather than when the injury occurs.

McVay v. Rollings Construction, Inc. · filed 1991-10-16(3)

This Court held that, because the plaintiffs failure to discover the injury was not a result of negligence on his part, title 12, section 95, subsection 3 did not prevent the plaintiff from recovering. ... This reasoning is equally applicable to the present facts. ... McVay’s failure to discover the injury was not a result of her negligence. ... The two-year statute of limitations did not begin to run against McVay until she learned of the harm on July 19, 1987. McVay filed this action on April 11, 1988, within the two year limitations period. This action is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Under § 95(3)'s discovery rule, a negligence claim's limitations period begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury, and knowledge of unrelated defects alone does not establish constructive knowledge of later hidden defects.

Delashaw v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2004-06-07(3)

Under Oklahoma law, “[a] cause of action for an injury based on negligence must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.” ... “The statute is, however, subject in certain instances to a ‘discovery rule.’ The discovery rule provides that the limitations period does not begin to run until the date the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.” ... As a starting point, it is clear from the Oklahoma cases that the purpose of Oklahoma’s discovery rule is to postpone the accrual of a tort claim until the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of sufficient facts to prosecute the claim. Consequently, the two-year limitations period will not begin to run with respect to “hidden defects” until the defects are discovered or should have been discovered by the plaintiff. ... We conclude that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the district court’s constructive knowledge determination. To begin with, the mere fact that plaintiffs were aware of a number of other significant problems with the swine barns as early as 1994, without more, does not end the constructive knowledge inquiry. Rather, it is simply the starting point.

Section 95 imposes a two-year limitations period on invasion-of-privacy and misrepresentation claims for injury to another’s rights not arising under contract, with accrual governed by Oklahoma’s discovery rule.

Erikson v. Farmers Group, Inc. · filed 2005-10-18

Under Oklahoma law, claims for invasion of privacy and misrepresentation are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95 (two-year statute of limitations applies to actions for injury to the rights of another, not arising under contract); Colbert v. World Publ’g Co., 747 P.2d 286, 288-89 (Okla. 1987) (holding that Title 12, Section 95 applies to claims for false light invasion of privacy). Oklahoma courts apply the so-called “discovery rule” to determine when the two-year statute of limitations accrues. Smith v. Baptist Found. of Okla., 50 P.3d 1132, 1137 (Okla. 2002).

Section 95(A)(3) gives fraud claims two years and delays accrual until the fraud is discovered.

Legacy Crossing, L.L.C. v. Travis Wolff & Co. · filed 2007-04-09(A)(3)

Beginning with Legacy Crossing’s fraud claim, the Oklahoma statute of limitations provides that “an action for relief on the ground of fraud” shall be brought within two years “after the cause of action shall have accrued,” but that “the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud.” O kla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3) (2004); see Sade v. N. Natural Gas Co., 483 F.2d 230, 235 (10th Cir. 1973).

Section 95(A)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period for common-law fraud claims in Oklahoma, running from discovery of the fraud.

Avington v. Bank of America · filed 2021-05-24(A)(3)

and the statute of limitations for the Avingtons’ common-law fraud claim is two years, see Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). ... The limitations period for a common-law fraud claim in Oklahoma begins to run upon “discovery of the fraud.” tit. 12, § 95(A)(3).

Section 95's two-year product-liability limitations period follows Oklahoma's discovery rule, beginning when the plaintiff knows or should know the condition and its cause.

Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc. · filed 2013-08-28

Oklahoma follows the “discovery rule,” under which “the statute [of limitations in product liability cases] does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows, or as a reasonably prudent person should know, that he has the condition for which his action is brought and that the defendant caused it.”

Section 95 establishes a two-year limitations period for Oklahoma tort, negligence, product-liability, and fraud claims.

Mallow v. Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2022-03-21(A)(3)

Title 12, § 95 of the Oklahoma Statutes establishes that “civil actions for torts may only be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.”

Section 95(2)’s three-year period for foreclosing delinquent street improvement assessments begins twelve months after the bonds mature.

Lucas v. City of Checotah Ex Rel. Hall · filed 1944-11-14(2)

The three-year statute, 12 O. S. 1941 §95 (2), began to run twelve months after the bonds matured in 1934, and had run before this action was filed.

Section 95’s two-year limitations period for land damage caused by salt-water overflow begins when the land damage occurs, even if the stream was polluted earlier.

Carter Oil Co. v. Jackson · filed 1944-12-12

It is next contended that the action of plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations, 12 O. S. 1941 §95. ... But the action here is for damage to land following overflow and by reason of salt water escaping within two years previous to the action. We have heretofore held that such an action is independent of that for permanent pollution of the stream and does not arise until the damage occurs.

Section 95(3)’s two-year period can begin when later plant operations cause injury, rather than when the plant was first built.

Big Four Foundry Co. v. Hagens · filed 1946-06-25(3)

The testimony of plaintiff reasonably supports her theory that her cause of action did not accrue until after Pearl Harbor, when the excessive operations of defendant’s plant caused the damage.

Section 95’s five-year period for an action on a written contract begins when the plaintiff can first maintain the action successfully.

Turk v. French · filed 1949-09-28First

However, the rule is that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a cause of action accrues, and the test for determining when a cause of action arose is to ascertain when plaintiff first could have maintained an action successfully.

For the limitations issue under § 95, any cause of action alleged in the pleadings accrued when the second judgment was entered.

McBride v. Bridges · filed 1950-01-31

We agree with the trial court that under the pleadings any cause of action accrued on the date judgment was entered the second time for Bridges.

The limitations period for a claim to recover a deceased stockholder’s funds from a building and loan association begins only after a demand for payment is unconditionally refused.

Hillers v. Local Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1951-03-06

No statute of limitation would begin to run on the claim for this fixed statutory liability until a demand for payment is made and refused unconditionally.

The five-year limitations period for deed reformation based on mutual mistake does not begin while the parties recognize the intended interest; it begins when the grantee’s rights are disputed.

Good v. Cohlmia · filed 1958-10-07(6)

In this situation, we perceive of no more reason why any period of limitations should begin to run against plaintiffs’ right to reformation— until their rights were disputed — than would be the case if they were defendants in the action. ... We therefore hold, as the trial court did, that this action was not barred by the five-year period of limitations asserted as a defense herein.

When reasonable people could differ, whether a plaintiff had enough notice to investigate and discover a claim is a fact question for the trial court under Section 95.

Flowers v. Stanley · filed 1957-10-15

We think the rule properly applicable to this case is the general one applying to all cases (even those of fraud, assuming, without deciding, that this is such a case) where reasonable men may differ as to their conclusions from the facts, disputed or undisputed — that is, that whether plaintiffs have used diligence in discovery, or should, as reasonably prudent persons have been put on inquiry and investigation from what they heard, or knew, was a question to be determined in the trial court, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

Section 95(3) gives two years to bring an action for damage to real property, but the period for permanent damage begins when the damage and its permanent character become apparent.

Harper-Turner Oil Company v. Bridge · filed 1957-05-28(3)

As its first proposition, defendant Harper-Turner contends that plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations set forth in 12 O.S.1951 § 95, subd. 3. Such statute provides that an action for trespassing on real property can only be brought within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued. It is well settled that the cited statute is applicable to actions of this type. However, it is equally well settled that the two year period of limitations does not commence to run against a cause of action for permanent damage to real property until the damage is apparent and it becomes obvious that such damage is of a permanent character.

Section 95(6)'s limitations period for an equitable action to reform a deed based on a mistake about a mineral reservation's legal effect does not begin until that effect is questioned or disputed.

Nelson v. Daugherty · filed 1960-10-04(6)

The defense of the statute of limitation interposed in this case is without merit. No evidence was offered as to the statute of limitation. Only the unexplored mineral interests are involved in this action. The mistake which the plaintiffs seek to reform is a mistake in the legal effect of mineral reservations. In such case the statute does not begin to run against an equitable right to reform a deed (before or) until the legal effect is questioned or disputed.

Section 95(3) requires an action to cancel a deed procured by fraud to be commenced within two years after discovery of the fraud.

Clovis v. Clovis · filed 1969-10-28(3)

Under 12 O.S.1961 § 95(3), cause of action for cancellation of a deed procured by fraud must be commenced within two years from discovery of the fraud. Plaintiff’s evidence was that not until 1966 did she actually discover the instrument executed was in reality a deed and not a will. Whether the fraud was discovered earlier was a question to be determined by the court, which was resolved in plaintiff’s favor.

Section 95’s two-year limitations period applies to a workers’ compensation insurer’s subrogated claim against a third-party tortfeasor; the period is not delayed until the tortfeasor’s liability to the worker is finally determined.

Hardware Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Skelly Oil Co. · filed 1965-03-09

The obligation of Darling’s employer, Barnett, and/or his insurance carrier, Hardware Mutual, being one of statutory subrogation, rather than of indemnification, its accrual was not delayed until defendant’s liability was finally determined in Skelly Oil Co. v. Darling, supra. ... We find no fact, or legal element, in the present case to effect an obstacle to, or tolling of, the running of the two-year Statute of Limitations in regard to plaintiff’s recovery against defendant before institution of this action.

Section 95’s three-year period for an oral agreement does not begin before the defendant recoups its expenses when the agreement makes reimbursement a condition of the plaintiff’s interest; advances on the proceeds toll the period.

McLaughlin v. Laffoon Oil Company · filed 1968-05-07(Second)

In our view, plaintiff’s cause of action accrued no earlier than the date, not established by the evidence herein, on which defendant’s drilling and development expenses incurred on the Sohio and Stewart leases were fully reimbursed. This is in accordance with the terms of the oral agreement. However, the failure to establish the date such expenses were reimbursed does not restrain us from holding herein that plaintiff’s cause of action is not barred by the three year statute of limitation. As defendant continued until several months prior to commencement of plaintiff’s action to make advancements on the proceeds of such interests, it is our opinion that such statute of limitation was tolled. See 12 O.S.1961, § 101.

Section 95’s two-year limitation period begins when the injury occurs and the cause of action accrues.

Patricia Gates, on Behalf of Herself v. Ford Motor Company, a Corporation · filed 1974-04-08

The applicable statute, 12 O.S. § 95 (Supp. 1971), which provides for a two year limitation period, does not begin to run until injury occurs and the cause of action accrues. Thus the action is not barred.

Section 95, subdivision Third, sets a two-year limitations period that is not tolled by a defendant’s move out of Oklahoma when substituted service is available.

McCullough v. Boyd · filed 1970-09-22Third

We hold that the action from which this appeal arises was not commenced in the sense contemplated by applicable statutes, either on October 26, 1962, or within sixty days thereafter and that the running of the applicable statute (12 O.S. 1961 § 95, subdivision Third, within two (2) years,) was not tolled by Mr. Boyd’s removal to Montana.

Section 95 Second’s three-year period for an oral loan agreement with no specified repayment date begins after a reasonable time for repayment has elapsed.

Stromblad v. Wilderness Adventurer, Inc. · filed 1978-03-17Second

The statute of limitations, 12 O.S.1971, § 95 Second does not begin to run until a reasonable time for the performance of the agreement has lapsed.

Section 95 Third does not begin to run on a lessee’s claim to remove oil and gas equipment until the lessee’s right is asserted and denied.

Garr-Woolley v. Martin · filed 1978-04-17Third

Appellees’ contention that appellant’s cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations is without merit. Prior to the time of the assertion and denial of the right of the lessee to remove equipment, there is no cause of action upon which the statute could run.

Section 95’s two-year period for a tort claim involving a hidden hazardous defect begins when the injured person learns of the harm or should have learned of it through reasonable care and diligence.

Smith v. Johnston · filed 1978-10-24Third

We hold the limitation period of two years did not begin to run until learning of or, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have learned of the harm through discovery of the hazardous condition caused by the hidden defect.

Section 95’s two-year period for personal injury actions is not tolled merely because the plaintiff discovers the injury after the accident.

Moore v. Delivery Services, Inc. · filed 1980-08-22(8)

The statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions is found in Title 12 O.S.1971, § 95(8), which provides in part as follows: ... The operative words of the statute are “after the cause of action shall have accrued.” ... We conclude that in the circumstances herein presented the statute of limitations was not tolled for the four months it took Plaintiff to discover her injuries.

Section 95’s two-year period for a claim involving occupational disease from cumulative exposure begins when the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, of the condition and the defendant’s role in causing it.

Williams v. Borden, Inc., and Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Inc. · filed 1981-02-10Third

We are persuaded that a similar rule on accrual would be applied by the Oklahoma courts in a case like this, namely, that the statute of limitations for such a claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows, or as a reasonably prudent person should know, that he has the condition for which his action is brought and that the defendant caused it.

Section 95(3)’s two-year period for a products liability injury claim begins when the plaintiff knows, or reasonable inquiry would reveal, the injury and its cause.

Daugherty v. Farmers Cooperative Ass'n · filed 1984-10-16(3)

Under the facts of this case on motion for summary judgment it is undisputed that the means of knowledge existed, and as it appears from the record, the circumstances were such as to put a reasonable man upon inquiry. Then plaintiff is chargeable with the knowledge such inquiry would have produced, and the discovery rule does not, under this record, bar the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 95’s two-year period for an occupational injury claim begins when a reasonably prudent person should know of the condition and its cause.

prod.liab.rep.(cch)p 11,622 Nettie Florence Huff, Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph L. Huff, Deceased v. Fibreboard Corporation · filed 1987-12-30Third

We agree with the district judge that, on the basis of the record before him, the statute commenced to run no later than September 21, 1975, the date of his treatment for an inflamed left elbow by Dr. Jay, on which occasion the patient reported a long history of lung trouble resulting from his work with asbestos.

The limitations period for an equitable apportionment claim begins when ownership of the taxed assets and the actual amount of estate tax liability have been determined.

Phillips v. Cash · filed 1992-10-13

In an action for equitable apportionment of estate taxes, the statute of limitations begins to run when tax liability is established. Tax liability is established when both of the following have been determined: (1) Ownership interests in those assets subject to taxation, and (2) the actual amount of tax liability.

Section 95 (3rd) gives a plaintiff two years from accrual to bring a negligence claim; under the discovery rule, the period begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation, Inc. v. Vick · filed 1992-10-13(3rd)

A cause of action for an injury based on negligence must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. 12 O.S.1991 § 95 (3rd). The statute is, however, subject in certain instances to a “discovery rule.” The discovery rule provides that the limitations period does not begin to run until the date the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Section 95 Sixth allows five years to seek reformation of a deed for mistake; recording the deed gives constructive notice of an omitted mineral reservation and starts the period.

Overholt v. Independent School District No. 2, Tulsa County · filed 1993-04-20Sixth

The parties agree that the five year statute of limitations in 12 O.S.1991 § 95 Sixth (now 12 O.S.Supp.1992 § 95 Seventh) is applicable to this action to reform a deed. We agree. ... We hold that the recording of the Warranty Deed being attacked here, constituted constructive notice of the alleged mistake. Recording the deed and making it a public record afforded “means of discovery” of the mistake. Overholt was charged with notice at that time and he should have discovered the omission of the mineral reservation. It follows, and we hold that the statute of limitations commenced to run on the date the deed was recorded in 1976.

Section 95’s two-year limitations period for negligence and deceit claims runs from when the plaintiffs knew or should have known the material facts supporting their claims.

Cleveland v. Dyn-A-Mite Pest Control, Inc. · filed 2002-04-30

The testimony by Larry Cleveland supports the jury’s finding that the Cleve-lands did not know of the full treatment history until 1995. Because the Clevelands filed their last amended petition on October 3, 1996, it was filed within the two-year time frame.

Section 95(3)'s limitations period for a breach-of-trust claim does not begin until the beneficiary discovers the trustee's conduct or could have discovered it through due diligence.

Smith v. Baptist Foundation of Oklahoma · filed 2002-06-25(3)

Where a trustee mishandles the subject matter of a trust or where the actions taken by the trustee are self-concealing, a cause of action will not accrue until the trustee-instituted actions are discovered or until they could have been unearthed by the exercise of due diligence.

Section 95(3) provides a two-year limitations period for insurance bad faith claims, subject to the discovery rule.

Miller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. · filed 2008-03-04(3)

It is undisputed that the applicable limitations period is two years, 12 O.S.2001 § 95(3), and that Miller filed his bad faith claim more than two years after his initial claim was resolved. Nonetheless, summary judgment based on application of the statute of limitations is precluded in this case. As Miller correctly argues, the discovery rule applies to the two-year statute applicable to bad faith claims.

Section 95(A)(1)’s five-year limitations period for deed reformation begins when filing the deed gives the grantor notice that it omits a mineral reservation.

SCOTT v. PETERS · filed 2016-10-25(A)(1)

The record supports but a single conclusion, that the statute of limitations began to accrue when the 2001 deed from Scott to Russell was filed because he was on notice that the deed did not contain any reservation of mineral interests whatsoever. It is this notice, constructive or actual, that triggers the accrual of the statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on legal malpractice claims, subject to Oklahoma’s discovery rule when the plaintiff could not reasonably have known of the injury.

Galesi v. Seymour · filed 2010-03-30(A)(3)

Because he knew or should have known by November of 2003 that appellees did not challenge the Olcott proposal, he may not invoke the discovery rule based on allegations stemming from the same omission. The two-year limitations period thus expired well before the complaint was filed in this action on October 3, 2007.

Section 95(A)(4) requires assault-and-battery actions to be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Doe v. Oologah-Talala Independent School District No. 4 of Rogers County, Oklahoma · filed 2024-03-29(A)(4)

Mr. Winters argues that these claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations which requires actions for assault and battery to be brought within one year from the time the cause of action accrued. Dkt. 31 at 10-12 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(4)). ... Jane Doe No. 2 has asserted enough information to suggest that her assault and battery claims were brought within the one-year statute of limitations. 7 Mr. Winters’s motion to dismiss the assault and battery claims based on the statute of limitations is DENIED.

Section 95(A)(3) gives negligent-procurement claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the claim’s elements, including injury, arise.

Brilll River Investment Company LLC v. Covington Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2025-06-25(A)(3)

In Oklahoma, claims for negligent procurement are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). ... However, under Oklahoma law, “[t]he limitation periods in § 95 begin[] to run from the time the elements of a cause of action arise.” ... And in a claim for negligence—and in this case, negligent procurement—one of the elements of a cause of action is injury or harm. ... But until Plaintiff’s insurance claim was partially denied by Defendant Covington on February 7, 2023, Plaintiff suffered no injury or harm from Defendant R&C’s alleged negligent procurement. So the limitation period did not begin running until Plaintiff’s claim was partially denied, which is within the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 95 imposes a one-year limitation on an assault and battery claim, even when the plaintiff seeks damages for the resulting injuries.

Thomas v. Casford · filed 1961-06-13(4)

Plaintiff’s amended petition alleged a cause of action for assault and battery and the one year limitation set forth in 12 O.S. Supp.1953 § 95, par. 4, is controlling as to limitation of action.

Section 95(4) requires civil actions for assault and battery to be brought within one year.

Eckels v. Traverse · filed 1961-06-06(4)

The alleged assault occurred on June 2, 1957, according to the petition. The suit was filed on June 27, 1958. The face of the petition therefore .revealed that plaintiff’s cause of action for assault and battery was barred under 12 O.S.1951 § 95, subd. 4, which provides that civil actions for assault and battery must be brought within one year.

Section 95(Fourth) covers battery claims generally, but the more specific limitation period in 76 O.S. § 18 governs battery claims arising from patient care.

Rosson v. Coburn · filed 1994-02-15(Fourth)

Rosson’s battery claim also comes within the language of 12 O.S. 1981 § 95 (Fourth). ... Here, § 18, which provides a limitation period for only those battery claims arising out of patient care, is more specific than § 95 (Fourth), which limits battery claims among claims for other tortious conduct.

Section 95(A)(3) gives two years to bring a civil action for injury to another’s rights that does not arise from a contract.

Cardenas v. Ever Fresh Farms Transportation, Inc. · filed 2023-11-02(A)(3)

A two-year statute of limitations applies to civil actions “for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract.” 12 O.S. § 95(A)(3).

Section 95(3) provides a two-year limitations period for negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims.

STATE ex rel. DOAK v. BMSI HOLDINGS · filed 2023-02-10(3)

The parties appear to agree that a two-year statute of limitations originally applied to Receiver's claims for negligent misrepresentation and negligence pursuant to 12 O.S.2011, § 95(3).8 ... Receiver's October 2016 action was therefore untimely under the original two-year statute of limitations.

Section 95(3) sets a two-year limitations period for negligence actions in Oklahoma.

Byrd v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2022-07-14(3)

In Oklahoma, negligence actions have a two-year statute of limitations. See, 12 O.S. 2021 § 95(3).

Section 95 provides a two-year limitations period for injury to the rights of another and supplies the applicable limitations period for analogous § 1983 claims in Oklahoma.

Ciszkowski v. Rector · filed 1995-11-02

The most analogous Oklahoma statute is the two-year limitation period provided in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95 (1991) for injury to the rights of another. See Abbitt, 731 F.2d at 663. ... The events underlying Mr. Ciszkowski’s section 1983 claim took place on August 13, 1992. He filed the instant action on December 7, 1994, after the applicable two-year period had run.

Section 95(3) supplies a two-year limitations period for a § 1983 action in Oklahoma, running from the time the action accrues.

Hill v. Gilliam · filed 1999-02-01(3)

Under Oklahoma law, that period is two years from the time the action accrues. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3); Meade v. Grubbs , 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988).

Section 95(A)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period for a civil action for injury to another’s rights that does not arise on contract.

Alvarez v. Ashcroft · filed 2005-11-10(A)(3)

Based on applicable Oklahoma law two years were available during which Alvarez could have brought his claim. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3) (2004) (imposing a two-year limitations period for a civil “action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract . . . .”).

Section 95(A)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury actions, running from accrual.

Meadows v. Whetsel · filed 2007-05-22(A)(3)

Thus, the district court correctly applied the limitations period from Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3), which provides (1) a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and (2) that such actions must be brought within two years “after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards.”

Section 95(3)'s two-year period governs § 1983 and Title IX claims for injury to personal rights in Oklahoma.

Nunley v. Pioneer Pleasant Vale School District 56 · filed 2002-01-28(3)

The statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 claims is the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3). ... Therefore, the same two-year state statute of limitations, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3) (for “an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract”), which applies to Title VI and § 1983 claims in Oklahoma, is applicable to Plaintiffs claim under Title IX.

Section 95 supplies Oklahoma's two-year limitations period for a § 1983 action alleging injury to another's rights.

Kripp v. Luton · filed 2006-10-26

For a § 1983 action, state law determines the applicable statute of limitations. ... Oklahoma law prescribes a two-year statute of limitations period for “an action for injury to the rights of another.”

Section 95(Third)'s personal-injury limitations period also bars a § 1982 claim.

W.M. Scheerer v. Rose State College Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Donald Burris, and Evan Kemp · filed 1991-12-04(Third)

apply with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1982 claim and, therefore, that section 95 (Third) barred its assertion as well.

Section 95(A)(3) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 excessive-force claims treated as general personal-injury claims.

Watkins v. Craft · filed 2012-01-04(A)(3)

“State statutes of limitations applicable to general personal injury claims supply the limitations period for § 1983 claims, but federal law governs the time of accrual of § 1983 claims.” ... “In this case, Oklahoma’s two-year statute governs Mr. Watkins’s excessive force claim. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988).”

Section 95(A)(3) gives two years from accrual to bring a tort action for injury to another’s rights that does not arise on contract.

Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co LP · filed 2019-06-04(A)(3)

First, Plaintiffs’ tort claims of products liability/strict liability and negligence fail because they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Oklahoma law imposes a two-year statute of limitations from accrual upon tort claims. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ tort claims against Barksdale were filed too late—the statute of limitations expired on July 27, 2017, so Plaintiffs’ claims of products liability/strict liability and negligence against Barksdale fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and are dismissed.

Section 95(A)(3) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims.

Simmons v. CoreCivic, Inc. · filed 2019-09-30(A)(3)

The limitations period for personal injury actions under Oklahoma law is two years, see Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3), making Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims subject to the same two-year statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(3) provides a two-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Pedernal Properties, LLC v. Marsh USA, Inc. · filed 2022-11-16(A)(3)

Further, the statute of limitation period for Pedernal’s negligence claim is two years. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). A negligence claim accrues when any injury to a plaintiff for which an action could proceed is certain, Cabinet Solutions, LLC v. Kelley, 288 P.3d 254, 257 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012), and she knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the injury. Builders, Digital Design Group, Inc. v. Info Inc., 24 P.3d 834, 841 (Okla. 2001). The requirement of “certainty” applies only to the fact of damages, not the amount. Id. Whether the discovery rule applies to certain professional negligence actions is a judicial determination made on a case-by-case basis. Castens v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., 2012 WL 610001, at *3. Therefore, Pedernal’s negligence cause of action against Marsh, as its broker, could be subject to a statute of limitations argument later in the proceedings if Marsh were not included in the Complaint at this time. Id.

Section 95(A)(3) provides a two-year statute of limitations for an action for injury to the rights of another.

Meadows v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 2024-02-15(A)(3)

Section 1983 claims are governed by the most analogous limitation period provided by state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Oklahoma, that is the two-year statute of limitations period for “an action for injury to the rights of another.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3); see Brewer v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Corr., No. CIV-06-204-RAW, 2006 WL 8459185, at *1 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2006).

Section 95(3) requires an action for injury arising in tort to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Johnson v. Metropolitan Property · filed 2024-04-08(3)

Under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3), actions for injury arising in tort must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. ... MetLife denied Bryar coverage on March 7, 2019, which gave him until March 7, 2021, to bring his bad-faith claim. ... Even if Bryar’s bad-faith claim is now viable, based on our favorable resolution of the summary-judgment motions, the claim is still time-barred.

Section 95(A)(3) provides a two-year limitations period for general personal injury claims.

Richardson v. Philpott · filed 2024-06-04(A)(3)

Oklahoma’s statute of limitations for general personal injury claims is two years. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2013).

Section 95(A)(3) supplies a two-year limitations period for actions for injury to another’s rights, running after the cause of action accrues.

Whitten v. McCurtain County Jail Trust · filed 2025-06-13(A)(3)

The statute of limitations for § 1983 cases is determined by state law; in Oklahoma, it is two years. ... (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3) (“Civil actions . . . can only be brought within [two years] after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards . . . for injury to the rights of another.”). ... The undersigned Magistrate Judge therefore finds Plaintiff knew or should have known of the available cause(s) of action against Sivard on January 1, 2022, and that the statute of limitations ran on January 2, 2024. ... Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds Plaintiff’s claims as to Sivard should be dismissed with prejudice as outside the statute of limitations.

Section 95(A)(3) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on claims for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation, estoppel, and unjust enrichment or quantum meruit.

Abira Medical Laboratories LLC v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Oklahoma · filed 2025-09-16(A)(3)

Claims Four and Five (the “Tort Claims”)—for negligent / fraudulent misrepresentation, estoppel, and unjust enrichment / quantum meruit—are subject to a two-year limitation period. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3).

Section 95(3) provides a two-year limitations period for this Oklahoma wrongful death action.

Fenton v. Sinclair Refining Company · filed 1955-02-23(3)

The action was filed within the applicable Oklahoma 2-year period of limitations, 12 O.S.1951 § 95, subd. 3.

Section 95, subdivision 3, applies a two-year limitations period to a personal-injury claim arising from an automobile collision.

Jones v. Hammond · filed 1966-10-25(3)

The petition alleged the accident occurred on May 30, 1962, and under Title 12 O.S. 1961, § 95, subdivision 3, the two year statute of limitations would be applicable.

Section 95(Third) applies a two-year limitations period when statutes invoked by a plaintiff do not create a new cause of action.

Mullendore v. Sohio Petroleum Co. · filed 1971-03-02(Third)

It was not the intent of these statutes to create a new cause of action not otherwise available, and the two-year limitations period contained in 12 O.S.1961, § 95 (Third) applies.

Section 95 sets a two-year limitations period for tortious injuries.

Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. · filed 1978-04-18

The Oklahoma statute of limitations for tortious injuries is two years. 12 O.S.1971, §95.

Section 95(3) provides a two-year limitations period for negligence and products-liability claims.

Eaton v. Weaver Manufacturing Co. · filed 1978-09-05(3)

However, at the time of dismissal, the two year statute of limitations, 12 O.S. § 95(3), had run as to plaintiffs' claims based upon negligence and/or products liability, and these claims are therefore saved by 12 O.S. § 100.

Section 95 gives plaintiffs two years from the events giving rise to a state tort claim to sue individual officers.

Howell Ex Rel. Patterson v. City of Catoosa · filed 1990-01-03

Any individual claim against Garber and Combs, on a state tort claim, would have had to be filed within two years from the pivotal events, i.e., May 2, 1987, 12 O.S. § 95, which was done.

Section 95 sets a two-year limitations period for professional negligence actions; lack of awareness of all injuries does not by itself stop the period from running.

Lovelace v. Keohane · filed 1992-04-20Third

The limitations period applicable to Lovelace’s professional negligence action is two years. Contrary to Lovelace’s position, her actual awareness of all her injuries does not exempt her negligence claim from the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 95 (Third) gives two years to bring an action for injury to another's rights that does not arise from contract and is not otherwise enumerated.

Higgs v. Streets Service Center, Inc., and Jerry Lecentburg, Owner · filed 1992-12-09(Third)

The most analogous Oklahoma statute of limitations to an action for injury to personal rights is 12 O.S. § 95 (Third). This statute provides that an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated, can only be brought within two (2) years. As plaintiff's action was not brought until almost five (5) years after it accrued, it must be deemed untimely under 12 O.S. § 95 (Third).

Section 95 requires fraud actions to be brought within two years; a later pleading that repeats the same allegations does not restart that period.

Bennett v. McKibben · filed 1996-03-19

12 O.S. 1991, § 95 requires civil actions based on fraud to be brought within two years. ... Bennett’s contention the two-year period should run from the date the second amended petition was filed in C-93-95 (March 1,1994), is without merit. The substance of the second amended petition was the same as the May 12, 1993, amended petition.

Section 95(8)’s two-year period for trespass to land applies to claims for damages, not an action seeking only removal of an encroachment.

Russell v. Williams · filed 1998-06-01(8)

The Williams and Poors assert that the encroachment is a trespass which has a two year limitations period. 12 O.S.1991 § 95(8). This argument is erroneous. It is true that the statute of limitations for trespass to land is two years. However, that statute of limitations applies only to actions for damages resulting from trespass.

Section 95 gives plaintiffs two years after a tort claim accrues to bring a civil action, including a products liability action.

Fuchs v. Fleetwood Homes of Texas · filed 2006-10-31

Title 12 O.S.2001 § 95 states that civil actions for torts may only be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. This statute also applies to products liability cases.

Section 95 gives two years to bring an unauthorized-use claim for injury to the rights of another.

Woods v. Prestwick House, Inc. · filed 2011-02-08(A)(3)

Therefore, we hold that causes of action arising under 12 0.8.2001 § 1449 for misappropriation of a person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness are governed by 12 0.8. Supp.2009 § 95(A)(8), providing for a two-year limitations period for an action for injury to the rights of another.

Section 95(A)(3) supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma.

McCarty v. Gilchrist · filed 2011-07-14(A)(3)

The statute of limitations period for a § 1983 claim is dictated by the personal injury statute of limitations in the state in which the claim arose, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007), and in Oklahoma, that period is two years. 12 Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3).

Section 95(3) gives a plaintiff two years to bring an action for injury to rights that does not arise from a contract, measured from when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

City of Tulsa v. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. · filed 2011-10-11(3)

The discovery rule provides the limitations period does not begin to run until the date the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury. BOK knew of its injury on July 22, 2004, but did not add the City of Tulsa as a defendant until March of 2008. According to 12 O0.S8.Supp.2002, § 95, BOK had two years to add the City of Tulsa as a defendant in "an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract," as the City of Tulsa was not a party to the Loan Agreement that bound the parties in the instant action.

Section 95 provides a two-year limitations period for actions alleging injury to the rights of another.

Scheerer v. Rose State College · filed 1991-04-05

Under these holdings, the most analogous Oklahoma statute is the two-year limitations period for injury to the rights of another. See Okla.Stat. tit. 12, § 95. ... The record reflects that Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on January 17, 1990, well outside the two-year limitations period.

Section 95 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims alleging injury to the rights of another.

Kripp v. Luton · filed 2006-10-26

Either date puts the filing of his complaint clearly within the two-year statute of limitations for bringing § 1983 actions.

Section 95(9) provides a five-year limitations period for an action for relief not otherwise provided for, but it does not apply when another § 95 provision governs.

Sun Co., Inc.(R & M) v. Browning-Ferris, Inc. · filed 1996-03-20(9)

Plaintiffs contend that the appropriate statute of limitations is provided by a residual catch-all provision in title 12 which establishes a five-year limitations period for "[a]n action for relief, not hereinbefore provided for...." Okla.Stat. tit. 12, § 95(9) (1996). Since section 95(2) clearly provides the statute of limitations in the instant case, the residual provision does not apply.

Section 95(4) gives a plaintiff one year from the date of an alleged slanderous statement to bring a slander claim.

Bolin v. Oklahoma Conference of the United Methodist Church · filed 2005-10-21(4)

Plaintiffs final claim of slander is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(4) (2001). Under that provision, a plaintiff has one year from the date of the alleged slanderous statement in which to bring a claim for slander.

Section 95(A)(3) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma.

Heuston v. Ballard · filed 2014-10-09(A)(3)

The district court properly determined that Oklahoma’s two-year statute of limitations, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3), applied to Mr. Heuston’s action.

Section 95(A)(3) provides the two-year limitations period applicable to a § 1983 excessive-force claim through Oklahoma’s general personal-injury limitations rule.

Starr v. Kober · filed 2016-03-11(A)(3)

Oklahoma law establishes the relevant two-year statute of limitations for Mr. Starr’s excessive force claim. See Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999) (“State statutes of limitations applicable to general personal injury claims supply the limitations periods for § 1983 claims.”); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3) (two-year statute of limitations).

Section 95(A)(3) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for the claims at issue.

Craft v. Galutza · filed 2021-05-24(A)(3)

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint includes claims that are barred by Oklahoma’s two-year statute of limitations. See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). ... Considering the complaint as “filed” on December 17, 2020, any claims arising prior to December 17, 2018, are barred.

Section 95(A)(3) provides a two-year limitations period for fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims, while § 95(A)(2) provides a three-year period for Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act claims, subject to tolling under Oklahoma's discovery rule.

McGinnis v. Nationwide Life and Annuity Insurance Co · filed 2024-09-27(A)(3), (A)(2)

Under Oklahoma law, a two-year limitations period applies to Plaintiff’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3); LL Ark Props. LLC v. David Stanley Fam. Realty, LLC, No. CIV-19-464-SLP, 2022 WL 5245205, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2022). A three-year limitations period applies to Plaintiff’s OCPA claim. See Legacy Crossing, L.L.C. v. Travis Wolff & Co., 229 F. App’x 672, 682 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(2)).1 “[U]nder Oklahoma’s ‘discovery rule,’ a statute of limitations is tolled ‘until the injured party knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the injury.’” LL Ark Props., 2022 WL 5245205, at *3 (quoting Calvert v. Swinford, 382 P.3d 1028, 1033 (Okla. 2016)).

Paragraph seventh of § 95 provides a five year limitation period for an improper stock registration claim when no other paragraph provides a specific period.

Reinhard v. Textron, Inc. · filed 1973-03-06seventh

We do not find anything in the language of paragraph “third” or any other paragraph of 12 O.S.1961 § 95 that provides a specific statute of limitations for an action of this nature. We conclude, therefore, that paragraph “seventh”, providing a five year limitation period for actions not otherwise provided for in the statute, must control.