36 Okla. Stat. § 3636

Section 3636(C) may treat an employer-owned truck as uninsured when workers’ compensation immunity bars an injured employee from suing the employer.

Keene v. Berkley Casualty Company · filed 2024-08-30(C)

... the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s holding in Anaya-Smith, the subject truck may be an “uninsured motor vehicle,” because the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy provision bars the plaintiff from suing the truck’s owner, Louis Lepak, for his injury.

Section 3636(c) treats an insured vehicle as uninsured when its liability insurer is not legally required to pay the injured party at least the per-person limit of applicable uninsured motorist coverage, allowing recovery of the difference.

Heavner v. Farmers Insurance Co. · filed 1983-05-10(c)

Applying this statute to the instant case, Sturms’ vehicle comes within its definition of an “uninsured motor vehicle”. Because the liability insurer (Farmers) is not legally required to pay at least the per person coverage limits ($10,000.00) with respect to the legal liability of its insured, applicable to any injured party (appellant) under any uninsured motorist coverage covering such injured party, the Sturms’ vehicle is considered to be uninsured. Farmers was legally obligated to pay to appellant only $4,500.00 under the liability coverage while the per person uninsured motorist coverage limit of the Farmers policy applicable to the appellant is $10,000.00. Thus, appellant is entitled to receive $5,500.00 from Farmers under the uninsured motorist coverage.

Section 3636(C) treats a motorist as uninsured when the motorist’s liability insurer cannot or is not legally required to pay as much as the injured person’s uninsured motorist coverage provides; equal coverage limits give the injured person no claim under that coverage.

Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Theus · filed 1979-04-09(C)

Under the amendment a motorist is “uninsured” if his liability carrier cannot or is not legally obligated to pay as much of his liability as would be available to the injured person under the injured’s uninsured motorist coverage. ... Insured’s uninsured motorist coverage is the same as tortfeasor’s liability coverage. ... On the facts alleged, insured has no cause of action on her uninsured motorist coverage, and her action against the carrier constituted an attempt to make unauthorized application of judicial force and should be prohibited by this Court.

Section 3636's uninsured motorist coverage must follow § 6092's limits on subrogation and set-off for medical payments to a named insured or resident relative.

Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. STATE BD., ETC. · filed 1981-12-15

Although there is language in § 3636 which suggests the insurer's right to subrogation [9] , we hold that § 3636 must be construed to conform to § 6092 under the general rule of statutory construction that the specific controls the general. [10] The legislature has indicated by the enactment of § 6092 that medical payment coverage is to be afforded special treatment; that special treatment should also be given in regards to such coverage in Uninsured Motorist provisions. This same logic applies to set-off, though it specifically is prohibited under 36 O.S. 1971, § 3636.

Section 3636’s uninsured motorist medical payment coverage must follow § 6092’s prohibition on subrogation and set-off against a named insured or resident relative.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. State Board for Property & Casualty Rates · filed 1981-12-15

36 O.S.1971, § 6092 applies to medical payment provisions in all automobile liability policies and stipulates that “No provision in an automobile liability policy or endorsement” shall allow subrogation or set-off as to the named insured or resident relative. The broad language of § 6092, coupled with the narrow scope of its subject matter, i.e., medical payment provisions, indicates legislative intent that 36 O.S.1971, § 3636 (Uninsured Motorist Insurance) follow its dictates.

Section 3636(C) treats a motorist whose liability coverage is insufficient to pay the injured person’s damages as an uninsured motorist.

Rogers v. Goad · filed 1987-07-07(C)

Because the amount of Goad’s coverage was insufficient to pay for all the damages, he is an uninsured motorist as defined by 36 O.S.1981 § 3636(C).

Section 3636(C) treats an insured vehicle as uninsured when its liability limits are less than the injured person’s claim.

Russell v. American States Insurance · filed 1987-03-05(C)

The last sentence of the 1979 amendment to § 3636(C) expanded the definition to include an insured vehicle for which the liability limits of the policy when fully available to the injured party were less than the injured party’s claim.

Section 3636 does not treat a driver with liability insurance as an uninsured motorist.

Vincent v. Tri-State Insurance Co. · filed 1994-02-15

On this record, the facts shown by the evidentiary material, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, are consistent only with the conclusions that Springer was driving the car which the Plaintiffs say caused the accident and that Springer was not an uninsured motorist as that term is defined by Oklahoma law.

Section 3636(C) does not treat a government vehicle as uninsured merely because the government self-insures instead of buying liability insurance.

Newberry v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1998-05-26(C)

A governmental entity is not “uninsured” for purposes of the UM statute merely because it has not purchased liability insurance from an insurance company.

Section 3636 does not treat an insured vehicle as uninsured merely because the injured person let the time to sue the driver expire.

Gates Ex Rel. Gates v. Eller · filed 2001-04-24(C)

Stated otherwise, an insured motor vehicle does not become an uninsured motor vehicle simply because the insured allows the statute of limitation to expire causing the tortfeasor's liability insurance to become unavailable.

Section 3636(C) does not count excess liability policies when determining a vehicle’s liability limits for uninsured motorist coverage.

Geico General Insurance Co. v. Northwestern Pacific Indemnity Co. · filed 2005-06-14(C)

Title 36 O.S.2001 § 3636 does not contemplate that excess liability policies of the sort issued by NPIC are to be included in determining the “liability limits” of “an insured motor vehicle,” as those terms are used in § 3636.

Section 3636(C) requires evidence of actual losses to support a claim that a vehicle’s liability limits are less than the amount of the claim.

Lamfu v. Guideone Insurance Co. · filed 2005-09-09(C)

We find that the phrase in § 3636 defining an uninsured motor vehicle as one with liability limits which are less than the amount of the claim, is to be interpreted to mean a claim reasonably supported by evidence of the actual losses sustained, not just a conclusory allegation.

Section 3636(C) permits an underinsured motorist claim even when the insured settles for less than the tortfeasor’s liability limit, if the claim’s value exceeds that limit.

CSAA General Insurance Company v. Branum · filed 2024-12-19(C)

The Court is therefore persuaded that settling for less than a tortfeasor’s liability ... limit is not necessarily determinative of the amount of an injured party’s claim.

Section 3636(B) excludes medical charges written off by providers from damages the insured is legally entitled to recover.

Willis v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company · filed 2023-12-21(B)

Although it is not clear every “adjustment” was a contractual write-off made pursuant to an agreement with BCBS, Plaintiff provides no justification which would warrant departure from the conclusion the Court reached above: that the amounts written off by the providers are not damages that Plaintiff is “legally entitled to recover” under Oklahoma law.

Section 3636(B) requires an insured to prove the uninsured motorist’s fault and resulting damages; the two-year tort limitations period does not bar the insured’s claim.

Uptegraft v. Home Insurance Co. · filed 1983-04-20(B)

The words “legally entitled to recover” simply mean that the insured must be able to establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and prove the extent of those damages. The phrase does not subject the insured’s claim to the two-year statute of limitations applicable to an action ex delicto.

Section 3636(B) makes legal entitlement to recover from an uninsured motorist a condition of coverage, but the insured need not prove every element of a viable tort claim.

Bill Hodges Truck Co. v. Humphrey · filed 1985-04-05(B)

The actions of the tortfeasor are relevant only to establish that the insured is “legally entitled to recover” from an uninsured motorist, a condition of the insurer’s promise 36 O.S. 1981 § 3636(B). That the uninsured motorist carrier does not stand in the shoes of the tortfeasor is shown by the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s denying to the uninsured motorist carrier certain technical statutory defenses that would be available to the tortfeasor and holding that the condition of recovery can be satisfied even if the insured does not prove all the elements of a viable tort claim against the uninsured motorist.

Section 3636(B) permits an insured to recover proven automobile accident losses from a UM insurer above a municipal tortfeasor’s statutory liability limit, subject to the policy’s terms.

Karlson v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 1985-05-28(B)

The problem raised by the instant case is to determine the effect of the limitation of liability found in 51 O.S. 1981, § 154 on the key requirement of 36 O.S. 1981, § 3636(B) that the persons to be protected by uninsured motorist insurance are persons "legally entitled to recover" for the damages they have sustained. ... In summary, we hold that in a situation where the liability of a tortfeasor is limited by the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, to an amount which will not compensate an insured for all his proven losses suffered in an automobile accident, that insured may recover from his insurer through the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions of his automobile liability insurance, according to the terms thereof.

Section 3636(B) makes a UM insurer liable, up to its policy limit, for damages left unpaid after the primary insurer’s limits are exhausted, including prejudgment interest.

Mellenberger v. Sweeney · filed 1990-10-16(B)

Further, a UM carrier, is liable for any excess "damages" left unpaid after exhaustion of the primary insurer's liability limits, not to exceed the UM carrier's limits of liability. 36 O.S. § 3636(B). Therefore, because Oklahoma case law treats pre-judgment interest as an element of "damages," we hold that UM insurers are statutorily liable for pre-judgment interest.

Section 3636 permits an insured to recover UM benefits by proving the uninsured motorist’s fault and the resulting damages, even when parent-child tort immunity prevents a tort action.

Rose v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1991-12-10

To make a successful claim against her UM coverage in Policy Two, Rose is not required to be entitled to maintain an action against her son. She need only establish his fault and the extent of the resultant damages. The parent-child tort immunity doctrine is not applicable to this action.

Section 3636(B) does not require a UM insurer to pay prejudgment interest beyond a $200,000 policy limit.

Carney v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1994-06-21(B)

We reject the reasoning in Phillips. The legislature intended that liability policies and UM policies, which are not rejected, cany the minimum of $10,000.00 coverage, exclusive of interest and costs. ... There is no public policy that would make the coverage $200,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.

Section 3636(B) allows an insured passenger to recover uninsured motorist benefits by proving the uninsured motorist’s fault and the resulting damages, even when workers’ compensation law makes the motorist immune from suit.

Torres v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Insurance Co. · filed 1993-03-30(B)

Accordingly, we expressly hold even where the insured is a Class 2 insured by virtue of his occupancy in a covered vehicle the phrase legally entitled to recover damages means only that such insured be required to show fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and the extent of those damages.

Section 3636 requires an insured seeking UM/UIM benefits to have both a legal right to recover from the tort-feasor and a claim exceeding the available liability coverage at the same time.

Boyer v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1995-07-25(B), (C)

Thus, before an insured can proceed in an action to recover UM/UIM benefits under the contract, he must prove the existence of two simultaneous conditions precedent: 1) that he has a legal right to recover against the tort-feasor, and 2) that his claim exceeds the available liability coverage of the tort-feasor.

Section 3636(B) requires fault by an uninsured motorist before uninsured motorist coverage applies.

Martin v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. · filed 1996-04-23(B)

Clearly, there must be a tortfeasor, someone who has committed a wrong from which the insured has suffered damage, before uninsured motorist coverage can come into play. Here, there was no tortfeasor because three-year old Katie Martin was, as a matter of law, innocent of any wrongdoing, as she was too young to understand the risk that moving the shift lever might cause the car to roll and injure Betty Martin.

Section 3636 does not require uninsured motorist benefits when an insured lets a claim against a government tortfeasor expire and the claim is undisputedly below the government's liability limit.

Carlos v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1996-09-24(B), (C)

We therefore hold that, when the tortfeasor is the state or a political subdivision whose sovereign immunity has been waived to the extent of the liability limits imposed by 51 O.S.1991 § 154, and the insured allows his claim under GTCA to expire, if the claim indisputedly is less than the liability limits of section 154, then no obligation to pay UM benefits arises pursuant to 36 O.S.1991 & Supp.1995 § 3636.

Section 3636 requires fault by the uninsured vehicle’s owner or operator before an insured can recover uninsured motorist benefits.

Great West Casualty Co. v. Boroughs · filed 2007-01-17

Ultimately, based on the entire summary judgment record, a rational trier of fact could not find that Elliott provided negligent instructions regarding the flour loading and unloading process. Thus, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Elliott’s negligence. It follows that Boroughs is not “legally entitled to recover” from Elliott under § 3636, and is not entitled to UM benefits.

Section 3636 protects insureds injured by unidentified hit-and-run drivers and permits them to sue their insurer without first obtaining a judgment against the driver.

High v. Southwestern Insurance Company · filed 1974-03-19

If this Court were to require the claim against a hit-and-run driver' to be liquidated before a suit was brought against the insurance company under the insurance contract, the purpose of both the uninsured motorist clause in the policy and 36 O.S.1971, § 3636, requiring the uninsured motorist clause would be obviated.

Section 3636(B) covers injuries caused by a hit-and-run driver even without physical contact, so an insurer cannot require impact as a condition of coverage.

Biggs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1977-07-05(B)

Since the purpose of our uninsured motorist statute is to afford the same protection to a person injured by an uninsured motorist as he would have had if the negligent motorist had carried liability insurance, it would defeat the purpose of the statute to allow insurance contracts to require impact before coverage would be extended to their insured.

Section 3636(B)'s hit-and-run uninsured motorist coverage can apply when a person is accidentally shot from an unidentified vehicle, even without physical contact between vehicles.

Hulsey v. Mid-America Preferred Insurance Co. · filed 1989-07-11(B)

The death could have been caused by a hit-and-run driver or occupant who, while target shooting from a moving or stationary vehicle, missed his intended mark and, instead, wounded the insured. [17] This scenario would unveil prima facie an unintentional act within the ambit of the insurance policy's hit-and-run UM coverage mandated by the provisions of 36 O.S. 1981 § 3636. [18] The law requires no physical contact with the offending vehicle for recovery under the hit-and-run UM protection.

Section 3636(B)(2) allows an insured to sue the insurer directly without first obtaining a judgment against the uninsured motorist.

Associated Indemnity Corporation v. Cannon · filed 1975-06-10(B)(2)

Title 36 O.S. § 3636 contains the requirement for compulsory uninsured motorist coverage in Oklahoma. ... We agree that the company’s obligation to insured is a direct contractual obligation and we hold that the insured had a right to sue the insurer without first obtaining a judgment against the uninsured motorist tort-feasor.

Section 3636 permits an insured who satisfies subsection (B) to sue the uninsured motorist insurer directly without first exhausting other available liability coverage.

Everaard v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. · filed 1988-03-24(B)

Thus, we hold that Okla.Stat. tit. 36, § 3636, permits the holder of an UM policy to bring a direct action against its insurer upon the satisfaction of the conditions in subsection (B). While this sequencing is not exclusive, it is a permissible option when the limits of the UM coverage are sufficient to satisfy the claimant’s proved damages.

Section 3636 permits an insured to join the uninsured motorist carrier in a suit against the alleged tortfeasor; when insurance evidence cannot resolve a disputed issue, the insurers’ identities and policy terms should be withheld from the jury.

Tidmore v. Fullman · filed 1982-06-08

We therefore hold that plaintiff's insurer is a proper party to the lawsuit. However, evidence as to the names of both insurers and the terms of their respective policies should be withheld from the jury.

Section 3636(C) allows recovery of underinsured motorist benefits for a claim exceeding the tortfeasor’s liability limits without requiring those limits to be exhausted first.

Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. · filed 1991-12-03(C)

No specific requirements of the exhaustion of liability limits appears in the statute, nor is there any mention of exhaustion of limits as a condition precedent to recovery. Our statute makes it clear that the UM insurer is responsible only for the amount of the claim which exceeds that available from the liability carrier.

Section 3636 does not require an insured to sue the tortfeasor before seeking uninsured motorist benefits.

Assalone v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. · filed 1994-04-19(E)

Under the authority cited above, she clearly was within her rights to expect payment of her UM claim by Hartford without first pursuing Dyer.

Section 3636 does not specify when the limitations period begins for a claim for uninsured motorist benefits.

Wille v. Geico Casualty Co. · filed 2000-02-15

Nor does the statute creating UM insurance benefits specify a specific period which begins the running of the statute of limitations. See, 36 O.S. Supp.1994 § 3636.

Section 3636(B) does not support judgment on the pleadings based on its stacking restriction when the policy may expressly permit aggregation of UIM benefits.

Irby · filed 2026-02-20(B)

Assuming without deciding that § 3636(B)’s default prohibition on stacking of UIM benefits is applicable here, and resolving all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that CSAA has not established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Indeed, in viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a material issue as to whether the Policy permits the aggregation or stacking of UIM benefits.

Section 3636's uninsured motorist coverage requirement prevents an “other insurance” clause from barring recovery under a separate policy, so long as the insured does not recover more than the actual loss.

Biles v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1974-03-19

We therefore content ourselves with the short statement that this is not a sufficient defense and will not support the judgment on the pleadings for the defendant. In a jurisdiction which requires uninsured motorist coverage if the insured wants liability coverage (as does Oklahoma), such provisions have been construed for various reasons not to preclude recovering the maximum uninsured motorist coverage under separate policies so long as the insured does not recover more than his actual loss or damage.

Section 3636 permits an insured who paid separate premiums for uninsured motorist coverage under multiple policies to combine their limits, up to the insured's actual damages.

Keel v. MFA Insurance Company · filed 1976-06-29(B)

We, therefore, hold where an insured has been issued multiple automobile policies containing uninsured motorist coverage for which a premium has been paid, the extent of the coverage is the combined total amount of such policies. "Other insurance clauses" are applicable to priority of payment. Actual damages of the insured are recoverable to the full amount of the combined limits of all policies.

Section 3636 forbids excluding uninsured motorist coverage because an insured was occupying a household-owned vehicle that was not listed in the policy.

Cothren Ex Rel. Grissom v. Emcasco Insurance Co. · filed 1976-10-12

However, in the absence of any more specific legislative guidance, we interpret our statute, 36 O.S.1971 § 3636, as forbidding the attempted exclusion of coverage in question here.

Section 3636 allows uninsured motorist coverage under one policy to be stacked when the insured pays separate premiums for multiple covered vehicles.

Richardson v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1980-10-21

We hold that where an insured has paid three premiums for uninsured motorist insurance contained in a single policy covering three vehicles, the extent of uninsured motorist coverage is the aggregate limit of coverages corresponding to the number of separate uninsured motorist insurance premiums paid by the insured.

Section 3636(B) does not require stacking uninsured motorist coverage when a policy expressly prohibits it.

Lake v. Wright · filed 1982-09-14(B)

We find nothing in the language of 36 O.S.1981 § 3636 requiring “stacking” in the face of an express provision of a policy providing to the contrary.

Section 3636 covers a hit-and-run accident when the driver is unidentified even if the owner is known; the insurer bears the burden of identifying the driver, while the insured bears the burden of proving that a known-driver vehicle was uninsured.

Brown v. United Services Automobile Ass'n · filed 1984-07-24

An insurance policy provision which denies uninsured motorist coverage to the victim of an unknown hit-and-run driver, merely because the identity of the owner of the hit-and-run vehicle has been ascertained, is contrary to the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute and is unenforceable in Oklahoma. ... In light of the foregoing analysis, we hold that the insurer, not the insured, has the burden of proof, and the risk of nonpersuasion, on this issue. ... We hold that the burden of proving that the other vehicle was uninsured falls upon the insured who is seeking to recover under his uninsured motorist endorsement (unless his insurer has contractually assumed the burden of proving that the other vehicle was insured).

Section 3636 does not entitle a passenger to stack uninsured motorist coverage under policies for other vehicles unless the passenger also qualifies as an insured under those policies.

Babcock v. Adkins · filed 1984-11-20

In reaching this result, we reject appel-lees’ arguments that the legislative intent embodied in 36 O.S.1981, § 3636, would require a different result. ... Nothing in this stated purpose requires that an injured passenger be given the benefit of another’s insurance policies which do not cover the vehicle he was in when injured.

Section 3636(F) requires a written rejection of minimum uninsured motorist coverage, but not of optional higher limits.

Prideaux v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1987-10-06(F)

Finally, we hold that a written rejection of the maximum uninsured motorist limits is not required. The uninsured motorist statute simply does not require such a rejection to be in writing.

Section 3636 requires an insurer that adds a separately insured vehicle for an additional premium to offer uninsured motorist coverage and obtain a written rejection, or that coverage becomes part of the policy by operation of law.

Beauchamp Ex Rel. Beauchamp v. Southwestern National Insurance Co. · filed 1987-11-10(A), (F)

In furtherance of the policy of section 3636, we now adopt the view espoused by the dissent in Hicks, and find that the coverage of the 1974 Jeep constituted a policy distinct from that issued by petitioner on August 13, 1983. As such, the mandate of 36 O.S.1981 § 3636(A), required that uninsured motorist coverage be offered in conjunction with the coverage of the 1974 Jeep. Petitioner’s failure to offer uninsured motorist coverage with the new policy, and the attendant failure to obtain a written rejection required by 36 O.S.1981 § 3636(F), resulted in the inclusion of uninsured motorist coverage as part of the policy by operation of law.

Section 3636(F) requires a named insured to reject uninsured motorist coverage in writing; a rental fleet owner’s rejection does not bind a renter who purchases insurance.

Moon v. Guarantee Insurance Co. · filed 1988-10-11(F)

By the mandate of Okla.Stat. tit. 36, § 3636 (1981), uninsured motorist coverage was written into the policy and could be waived only by written rejection. Because Mr. Moon made no written rejection, he is entitled to the legislatively conferred coverage. The car rental proprietor’s rejection of uninsured motorist coverage on his fleet of rental cars was not binding upon his customer who ultimately operated the vehicle.

Section 3636(F) permits a named insured to reject uninsured motorist coverage in writing without first receiving a detailed explanation from the insurer.

Silver v. Slusher · filed 1989-02-28(F)

Because § 3636 contains no language which alters the basic, arms' length nature of the insured-insurer relationship, we decline to read into the UM statute a duty charging insurers with the responsibility of detailed and formalistic explanation as an indispensable precondition for securing from the named insured a statutorily effective rejection of uninsured motorist coverage.

Section 3636 permits an uninsured motorist’s intentional act to count as an accident from the injured insured’s viewpoint, but coverage requires a causal connection between the vehicle’s use and the injury.

Stucky v. Long · filed 1989-11-14(B)

We hold that intentional acts of an uninsured tortfeasor causing injury to an insured may be considered an “accident” for purposes of uninsured motorist protection when viewed from the viewpoint of the injured person. ... The causal connection required for uninsured motorist coverage may not be a remote cause.

Section 3636 sets mandatory Oklahoma uninsured motorist coverage requirements, which a policy cannot limit or dilute.

Ray Rush Shellie Rush, Cross-Appellees v. The Travelers Indemnity Company, a Corporation, Cross-Appellant · filed 1989-12-08

The endorsement simply indicates that the policy will provide uninsured motorist coverage in accordance with the mandatory requirements of the Oklahoma uninsured motorist statute. See Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 36, § 3636. Indeed, any provision in the insurance policy which would have purported to limit or dilute the provisions of the uninsured motorist statute would have been void and unenforceable.

Section 3636(C) compares the tortfeasor’s liability limit with stacked uninsured motorist limits when separate premiums were paid, and § 3636(B) gives an insurer’s failure to offer increased limits no effect when the insured knew they were available and chose minimum coverage.

Cofer v. Morton · filed 1989-12-12(C), (B)

When determining whether the tortfeasor's vehicle is uninsured the total amount of uninsured motorist coverage for which the insured has paid must be compared with the total liability coverage of the tortfeasor. ... Thus, if an insured selects the minimum uninsured motorist coverage and is aware that increased limits of coverage may be purchased if desired but chooses not to purchase these increased limits then the requirement of an offer by an insurer is meaningless and of no consequence.

Section 3636 requires a UM insurer to deal fairly with its injured insured and promptly pay undisputed damages without waiting for another insurer to pay.

Pentz v. Davis · filed 1996-07-16

We hold that 36 O.S.1991, § 3636 imposes a responsibility upon the UM insurer to protect its insured by good faith and fair dealing from and after the time of injury and that the insurer may not withhold payment to its injured insured on the sole basis that some other insurer has not paid.

Section 3636(C) does not allow a UM insurer to withhold payment to its injured insured solely because other insurance has not been exhausted.

Mustain v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1996-09-17(C)

Accordingly, we conclude that 36 O.S.1991, § 3636 imposes a responsibility upon the UM insurer to protect its insured by good faith and fair dealing from and after the time of injury and the insurer may not withhold payment to its injured insured on the sole basis that some other insurance has not been exhausted. We therefore hold that as between the insurer and its insured UM insurance is primary coverage.

Section 3636 protects full uninsured motorist coverage for each premium paid and makes a foreign policy's setoff of Oklahoma uninsured motorist benefits unenforceable in an Oklahoma forum.

Bohannan v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1991-07-02

Such application would offend the legislative policy expressed in § 3636. Thus, any provision in the California UM contract which prohibits stacking of Oklahoma UM coverage with the California coverage or which allows Oklahoma UM benefits to be a credit or set off against the UM benefits under the California contract violates Oklahoma public policy and is unenforceable in an Oklahoma forum.

Section 3636 treats uninsured motorist coverage as primary between the insurer and insured; the insurer cannot withhold payment solely because other insurance has not been exhausted.

Mustain v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. · filed 1996-12-24

The court then proceeded to determine that as between the insurer and its insured, uninsured motorist insurance is primary coverage, id. at 535, and that the insurer "may not withhold payment to its insured on the sole basis that some other insurance has not been exhausted." Id. at 536. ... The state supreme court's answer is thus contrary to the district court's holding, which granted summary judgment to American on the ground that plaintiffs' failure to exhaust the limits of the primary policy precluded their claim for uninsured motorist benefits against any secondarily liable insurance carrier. ... Based on Mustain v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings in light of that opinion.

Section 3636 does not require an insurer to give advance notice that a policy prohibits stacking UM/UIM coverage when the insurer provides a compliant coverage form, charges one premium for multiple vehicles, and limits recovery in the policy.

Spears v. Glens Falls Insurance Co. · filed 2005-05-17(I)

Pursuant to these opinions and under the facts presented, where the UM/ UIM coverage form provided to the insured conforms with the requirements of 36 O.S. Supp.2004 § 3636, ... the policy is renewed annually over a ten-year period with the insured being provided coverage summaries at each renewal, a single premium is charged for multiple vehicles having UM/UIM coverage, and policy language provides that liability for UM/UIM coverage is limited to the maximum amount payable for all damages regardless of the number of vehicles insured, an insurance company need not provide insureds with pre-policy notice that stacking of UM/UIM coverage is prohibited.

Section 3636(F) does not require uninsured motorist coverage in a renewal policy when the insured rejected it in writing under an earlier policy from the same insurer and has not requested it in writing.

Hicks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1977-07-26(F)

Here, the named insured, Appellant Hicks, failed to request such coverage in writing in order to establish his right to uninsured motorist coverage, and under the above statute such coverage need not be provided in a renewal policy when earlier rejected in a policy previously issued.

Section 3636(F) permits the named insured to reject uninsured motorist coverage in writing; under the law applicable to this claim, that rejection remained effective when a vehicle was added to the policy.

Marshall v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1990-11-05(F)

Section 3636(F) of Title 36, Oklahoma Statutes, 1981, states that the named insured, not the owner of the vehicle, will have the right to reject uninsured motorist coverage in writing. Mr. Marshall did so on August 10, 1983. Under the law in effect in 1985, when the Marshalls filed this action, a second rejection of uninsured motorist coverage was not necessary when adding a vehicle to an existing policy. Hicks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 568 P.2d 629 (Okla.1977). Since Mr. Marshall was the named insured, his waiver was effective as to the added vehicle.

Section 3636 does not require an insured to reject higher uninsured motorist limits in writing when the insurer offers those limits and the policy already provides minimum coverage.

Mann Ex Rel. Mann v. Farmers Insurance Co. · filed 1988-05-10(B), (F)

Because we find error in the trial court's ruling as to the necessity of a written rejection to be effective as to the acceptance of uninsured motorist coverage with limits less than the liability limits of a motor vehicle liability policy, and because of the erroneous reliance on Shepard v. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc ., we REVERSE the trial court's ruling on summary judgment.

Section 3636(F) requires each named insured to reject uninsured motorist coverage in writing; a rejection by fewer than all named insureds does not remove coverage from the policy, though it binds those who signed.

Plaster v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1989-09-19(F)

We therefore hold that where an automobile insurance policy lists more than one individual as a “named insured”, a written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage by less than all named insureds is not a complete rejection of that coverage within the four corners of the policy. However, such partial rejection does operate to estop an individual named insured who signs the rejection from asserting the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy.

Section 3636 does not require an insurer to offer stackable uninsured motorist coverage for multiple vehicles insured under one policy.

Withrow v. Pickard · filed 1995-11-07

Furthermore, nothing in § 3636 requires an insurer to sell (or offer to sell) stackable UM coverage in a single insurance policy which covers multiple vehicles.

Section 3636 does not require an insurer to offer uninsured motorist coverage above the policy’s liability limits.

Breakfield v. OKLAHOMA FARMERS UNION MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. · filed 1995-12-12

As we held in Withrow, the insurer was not required by § 3636 to offer more UM coverage than that amount equal to liability limits.

Section 3636(G)(2) requires an insurer to provide the statutory uninsured motorist coverage form and obtain a written rejection when an additional vehicle is added to a policy.

Perkins v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. · filed 1994-10-25(G)(2)

We therefore hold Hartford was required but failed to tender the mandated statutory form affecting uninsured motorist coverage to Perkins and obtain a written rejection thereof no later than February 1991.

Section 3636 treats a policy with a material change in liability coverage as a new policy, requiring an offer of uninsured motorist coverage and a written rejection to avoid imputed coverage.

May v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 1996-05-30(F)

Since the 1989 Policy was tantamount to a new policy, National Union was required by § 3636 to offer uninsured motorist coverage and obtain from Gypsum a written rejection of such coverage. Okla. Stat. tit. 36 § 3636. National Union did not satisfy these duties; therefore, the district court properly concluded that uninsured motorist coverage should be imputed to the Policy by operation of law.

Section 3636 requires an uninsured motorist carrier to pay the insured's entire covered loss from the first dollar up to the policy limits.

Burch v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1999-01-05

We hold § 3636 mandates that when the preconditions for the loss under uninsured motorist coverage exist, an uninsured motorist coverage carrier is obligated to pay the entire loss of its injured insured from the first dollar up to the policy limits.

Section 3636(G) allows an applicant to reject uninsured motorist coverage, and the rejection is valid for all insureds under the policy.

Hartline v. Hartline · filed 2001-02-13(G)

Pursuant to the provisions of 36 O.S.1991 § 3636(G), an applicant for automobile liability insurance may reject the insurer's statutorily mandated offer of uninsured motorist protection and that rejection "... shall be valid for all insureds under the policy...."

Section 3636 requires uninsured motorist coverage for each vehicle under a new multivehicle policy, and the insured may stack that coverage when the insurer gave no advance notice of a per policy limit.

Mid-Continent Group v. Henry · filed 2003-03-04(A)

Where multiple vehicles are insured, there must be uninsured motorist coverage for each vehicle. In the instant case, uninsured motorist coverage is imputed by operation of law to all three vehicles, because the policy was a new policy as to all three vehicles. ... Where uninsured motorist coverage of multiple vehicles is imputed as a matter of law, and the insurer has not given any notice to the insured prior to the issuance of the policy of its intent to avoid stacking and limit its uninsured motorist coverage to per policy coverage, there can be no informed choice or intent to agree that uninsured motorist coverage on multiple vehicles will not be stacked. In such instances, the insured is entitled to stack uninsured motorist coverage on multiple vehicles insured by the policy.

Section 3636 permits uninsured motorist benefits when an insured can establish fault by the vehicle's owner or operator, including an employer's negligent instructions, or injury caused by earlier negligent vehicle maintenance.

Ply v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. · filed 2003-11-12

According to the statute, an insured who has suffered an injury caused by an accident arising out of the use of an uninsured motor vehicle may recover UM benefits if the insured can demonstrate that he or she is "legally entitled to recover damages" from either the owner or the operator of the uninsured motor vehicle. ... Our extant jurisprudence compels us to reject an interpretation of § 3636 that would exclude from UM coverage injury resulting from non-contemporaneous negligent maintenance of a motor vehicle.

Section 3636(A) requires uninsured motorist coverage when a policy is delivered in Oklahoma for a vehicle registered or principally garaged there.

National Interstate Insurance v. Phillips · filed 2005-02-15(A)

We also agree with the district court that under Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3636(A) 3 the Phillips are entitled to Oklahoma uninsured motorist coverage ... because the motor home was “registered or principally garaged in” Oklahoma. ... In addition, the Phillips are entitled to uninsured motorist coverage because the policy was “delivered” in Oklahoma.

Section 3636 limits uninsured motorist coverage to the policy’s bodily injury liability limits, including its per-person limit.

Argonaut Insurance v. Earnest · filed 2012-03-21

Thus, based on Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3636, the uninsured motorist coverage must also be limited to $125,000 per person and $1,000,000 per accident.

Section 3636(J) permits an effective rejection of uninsured motorist coverage when the selection form otherwise matches the statutory form but includes an outdated introductory sentence.

Davis v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co. · filed 2012-10-05(J)

The form provided to Ms. McWilliams was identical to the form provided in the statute, exeept between item 4 and the listed choices of coverage, Ms. MeWilliams' form said, "Please indicate what Uninsured Motorist coverage you want:" (see bracketed text indicated above), a sentence that had been required for forms offered prior to April 1, 2005, but was no longer indicated for selection forms offered after April 1, 2005. In all other respects, the form contained in the statute and Ms. McWilliams' form were the same. ... We find the form was an effective rejection of UM/UIM coverage.

Section 3636 bars an insurer from denying purchased uninsured motorist coverage merely because the insured received at least the statutory minimum in liability coverage.

LANE v. PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE CO. · filed 2021-06-29(B)

We conclude that Progressive's UM Exclusion contravenes section 3636 and is therefore void as against public policy.

Section 3636’s public policy invalidates an exclusion that effectively erases uninsured motorist coverage purchased by the policyholder.

McKinney v. Progressive Direct Insurance · filed 2021-12-09

The district court’s denial of Progressive’s motion for summary judgment on McKinney’s breach of contract claim is affirmed because the UM exclusion in Progressive’s policy is void as a matter of law, and UM coverage therefore applies to McKinney. ... A panel of this court certified a question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, asking whether the public policy underlying Oklahoma’s UM insurance statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3636, prohibits Progressive’s UM exclusion. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded it did.

Section 3636(F) gives the named insured or applicant the right to reject uninsured motorist coverage.

Farber v. State Farm Mutual · filed 1997-08-01(F)

The applicable statute confers the right to reject such coverage on a “named insured or applicant.” Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3636(F). Under the uncontested facts, Mr. Farber does not fit into either category.

Section 3636(B) bars automatic stacking of uninsured motorist coverage for policies issued, renewed, or reinstated after November 1, 2014, unless the insurer expressly provides for it.

Sharp v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2024-02-16(B)

Because claimants’ policies renewed after November 1, 2014, the amendment prohibiting automatic stacking applied to each of their policies with State Farm.

Section 3636 treats a vehicle as uninsured when workers’ compensation immunity prevents recovery under its liability policy, and requires a named insured’s UM coverage election to apply equally to all insureds.

ANAYA-SMITH v. FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. · filed 2024-05-14(C), (G)

The vehicle involved in the subject accident qualifies as an uninsured motor vehicle pursuant to 36 O.S.Supp.2014, § 3636(C). ... The language in subsection G clearly requires a named insured to either select, reject or exercise an option not to purchase UM coverage under a policy; yet, whatever choice is made must apply to all insureds equally under the policy.

Section 3636(C)’s 1976 expansion of uninsured motorist coverage to underinsured vehicles affects substantive rights and does not apply retroactively.

MFA Insurance Co. v. Hankins · filed 1980-04-22(C)

The 1976 amendment to 36 O.S. § 3636(C) does just that — it increases the damage limitations covered by uninsured motorist protection, and thus affects the substantive rights of litigants. It is, therefore, not purely procedural. Thus, we hold that the statute before us is not effective retroactively.

Section 3636(C)'s 1976 expansion of uninsured motorist coverage does not change a policy that became effective before the amendment.

McKinley v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. · filed 1980-09-26(C)

Had the legislature intended to effect an immediate change in contractual obligations as asserted by Appellant, the legislature would not have made provision for the coverage to be included in all policies to be delivered, renewed, or extended in this state.

The 1989 amendment to § 3636 does not apply to a policy issued or last renewed before the amendment took effect.

Sexton v. Continental Casualty Co. · filed 1991-09-10

Continental also suggests the question has been made moot by a 1989 amendment to section 3636 of Title 36. That amendment does not apply to the present controversy since it was not in effect on the date of issuance, or date of last renewal, of the policy under which the Sextons’ brought their claims.

Section 3636(E) recognizes an uninsured motorist insurer’s right to recoup its loss from the responsible tortfeasor.

Porter v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1982-02-16(E)

We agree with MFA’s contention that said statute specifically recognizes the rights of MFA as the uninsured motorist insurer to recoupment of its loss from the third party tortfeasor.

Section 3636(E) gives an uninsured motorist insurer a subrogation claim limited to the insured’s tort claim; a covenant not to sue the sole tortfeasor without reserving the insurer’s rights extinguishes that claim.

Frey v. Independence Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1985-04-02(E)

The insurer’s right to be subrogated is derived from, and limited to, the tort claim of the insured. If the insured releases the wrongdoer from liability, the insurer’s subrogation rights may be viewed, with some exceptions not applicable here, as having been destroyed.

Section 3636(E) bars an uninsured motorist carrier from recovering against a tortfeasor deemed uninsured because of insurer insolvency only up to the limits of the tortfeasor’s liability policy.

Welch v. Union Mutual Insurance Co. of Providence · filed 1989-06-27(E)

Therefore, we hold that an uninsured motorist carrier is prohibited from asserting claims against those considered “uninsured” because of subsection (C) only up to the limits of the policy between insolvent insurer and its insured.

Section 3636(E) does not allow an uninsured motorist insurer to credit the tort-feasor’s liability coverage against the insured’s recovery or require the insured to sue the tort-feasor first.

Roberts v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co. · filed 1989-11-07(E)

We find that 36 O.S.1981 § 3636(E) is clear that the legislature intended that payments made by a tort-feasor should not diminish the injured party’s recovery under his own policy and the uninsured motorist insured is not required to sue the tort-fea-sor before recovery can be had under his own policy. Therefore, we hold that Appellant is not entitled to a credit for the amount of liability coverage held by the tort-feasor, i.e. $10,000.

Under the 1981 version of § 3636(E), a tortfeasor's payment did not reduce the insured's uninsured motorist coverage limits or create a duty for the tortfeasor's insurer to report its investigation to the uninsured motorist carrier.

Niemeyer v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1990-04-03(E)

The Amick principle applies here because: 1) there is no contract between American General and USF & G; 2) Niemeyer is not a third party beneficiary; 3) if subrogation were allowed, American General would stand in the same shoes as Niemeyer, and it would be subject to the defense that a third party claimant cannot bring a bad faith action; [14] and 4) there was no statutory duty under the applicable version of § 3636(E) because the 1981 statute specifically provided that any payment made by the insured tort-feasor would not reduce or be credited against the total liability limits of the insured's uninsured motorist coverage.

Section 3636 bars an insurer that failed to offer uninsured motorist coverage and obtain a written rejection from asserting loss of subrogation when the insured settled without knowing of the coverage.

Robertson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1992-07-14(F)

We find that consistent with our recent line of eases, an insurance company who does not offer UM coverage and obtain a written rejection from its insured, may not subsequently raise in a later suit by the insured to recover UM benefits, the Porter/Frey defense where an insured has settled, ignorant of the insurance company’s failure to comply with its statutory duty under § 3636.

Section 3636(E) does not let a UIM insurer preserve subrogation rights by treating a payment substituted for the tortfeasor’s settlement as a credit against UIM benefits.

Barnes ex rel. Barnes v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1993-10-26(E)

Farm Bureau’s requirement that Barnes execute the Release, which provides she released them for the $10,000.00 under her UIM policy, was an attempt to do what the statute explicitly provides the UIM insurer may not do. The tendered $10,000.00 was not a “substitution” of Donaldson’s insurer’s settlement but a tender of only a portion of the uninsured motorist benefits which Barnes was due.

Section 3636(E) gives a paying uninsured motorist insurer a subrogation interest in the insured’s recovery, but does not preclude an award of attorney fees and costs under an implied contract.

Wendell Phillips and Wanda Phillips v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation · filed 1996-01-22(E)

Second, there is no meaningful difference between the relevant statute in Carter, the version of Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 44, effective in 1974, and the relevant statute in this case, Okla.Stat. tit. 36, § 3636(E). ... Both provide an insurer has a right to, subrogation under the circumstances present in Carter and in this case, and neither specifically allow for a pro rata allocation of attorney fees and costs.

Section 3636(E)(2) does not create or modify a claim against a tort-feasor when a UIM insurer substitutes payment for a proposed settlement.

Farmers Insurance Co. v. Estate of Stark · filed 1996-04-30(E)(2)

We also reject the contention that 36 O.S. 1991 § 3636, creates a cause of action so that 12 O.S.1991 § 95 (Second), and its three-year limitation period for “an action upon a liability created by statute” would be applicable. The statute governs the relationship between an UIM insurer and its insured but does not create or purport to modify in any manner the claim against the tort-feasor. The tort-feasor’s liability, if any, is not “created” by this statute.

Section 3636(E) gives an uninsured motorist carrier a subrogation right that it may waive, with the insured receiving the benefit of the waiver.

Weatherly v. Flournoy · filed 1996-09-10(E)

Even under Flournoy’s argument, upon settlement or judgment, the UM carrier would have been entitled to recover its $200,000.00 payment from its insured pursuant to 36 O.S.1991 § 3636(E). ... Here, there is simply a waiver of the UM carrier’s subrogation interest. Under existing law, the insured, rather than the tortfeasor, receives the benefit of that waiver.

Section 3636(E) bars a UM insurer from recovering from a tortfeasor amounts it paid to settle the insured’s bad faith claim.

Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest v. Dyer · filed 2002-09-12(E)

Moreover, because Assalone is not allowed to recover for bad faith from Dyer, Hartford is prohibited from recovering from Dyer any damages Hartford paid to Assalone in settlement of Assalone’s bad faith claim. See 36 O.S.1991 § 3636(E).

Section 3636(F) generally gives a UM insurer subrogation rights for benefits paid, but § 44 governs division of a workers' compensation claimant's third-party settlement.

FORD v. GARY · filed 2015-06-03(F)

Section 3636 of title 36, 0.S., grants to the UM insurer the right of subrogation to recover from the defendant tortfeasor UM payments to its insured in its capacity as the insured's representative. It applies generally to all UM payments made by the insurer to its insured. ... That said, this case is governed by the specific provision of § 44, not the general provision of § 3636.

Section 3636(F) limits a UM carrier’s subrogation for an underinsured motorist payment to the tort-feasor’s primary insurer unless the carrier substitutes payment for a tentative limits settlement.

RAYMOND v. TAYLOR · filed 2017-10-10(F)

We hold that under Section 3636(F), Mercury was limited to subrogation from the primary insurer and is not entitled to subrogation from any assets of the tort-feasor, including the excess liability policy.

Section 3636(F) does not require a UM insurer that waives subrogation to duplicate a payment the insured already received from the tortfeasor’s liability insurer.

Phillips v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc. · filed 2019-07-23(F)

Farmers’s waiver of that subrogation right under § 3636(F) does not obligate it to pay the insured portion ($100,000) of Ms. Phillips’s damages that was already paid by the tortfeasor’s insurer.

Section 3636(F) protects a UM insurer’s subrogation rights by requiring notice of a tentative settlement; an insured who knowingly settles with and releases the tortfeasor without notice may lose the right to UM benefits.

Brooks v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company · filed 2020-02-28(F)

The facts as outlined above do reflect that Plaintiff signed these releases regarding a vehicle covered under Defendant’s Policy, without notifying Defendant of any “tentative agreement[s]” as contemplated by Oklahoma Statute and the Policy. Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3636(F); see supra. The law outlined above supports the proposition that such conduct would destroy Defendant’s subrogation rights and preclude Plaintiff’s instant legal claim under Porter, such that Defendant generally would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 3636(A) mandates uninsured motorist coverage only for a vehicle registered or principally garaged in Oklahoma.

Wichert v. Ohio Security Insurance Company · filed 2022-09-22(A)

The legal authority on which Defendant relies holds that Oklahoma’s UM statute mandates coverage only for “a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state.” Bernal, 2009 OK 28, ¶ 14, 209 P.3d at 316 (emphasis in original; quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3636(A)). Defendant treats its evidence presented through the affidavit of Mr. Follette as dispositive on these points. But Mr. Follette’s statements are conclusory and unsupported by any facts or evidence establishing the vehicle was registered in Missouri or principally garaged in Missouri at the time of the accident.

Section 3636 permits an uninsured motorist policy to exclude a resident of the named insured’s household who owns an automobile from coverage as an insured.

Shepard v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. · filed 1983-11-01(B)

Contract language which excludes a resident of the named insured’s household who owns an automobile from coverage as an insured under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy contravenes neither the express language of the Oklahoma Uninsured Motorist Act nor its underlying policy of providing coverage for tortious conduct which would otherwise go uncompensated.

Section 3636 requires uninsured motorist coverage for a person insured under a policy and voids policy exclusions that impermissibly limit that coverage.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Wendt · filed 1985-10-22(B)

We today reiterate and re-emphasize the viability of our prior decisions, which hold to the principle that once a person is insured under an uninsured motorist policy, subsequent exclusions inserted by the insurer in the policy which dilute and impermissively limit uninsured motorist coverage are void as violative of the public policy espoused by 36 O.S. 1981 § 3636, supra.

Section 3636(C) makes a policy exclusion for government-owned vehicles void when it limits the required uninsured motorist coverage.

State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Greer · filed 1989-07-18(C)

An insured must be allowed to look to the insurer when the liability limits of a negligent motorist prevent the insured from recovering fully from the injuries suffered. Allowing a provision such as the one before us to thwart that objective would be a major deviation from the original legislative intent of 36 O.S. 1981 § 3636(C). This provision is a blatant attempt to limit the effect of 36 O.S. 1981 § 3636. As such we must find it to be against public policy and, therefore, void and unenforceable.

Section 3636 prohibits reducing uninsured motorist coverage by workers’ compensation benefits, including a partial reduction of coverage above the statutory minimum.

Chambers v. Walker · filed 1982-11-02

In accord with the rationales above stated, we hold that the limitation provision (set out in Footnote 1) is void since if given effect it would reduce the amount of coverage available under the uninsured motorist provisions to less than the amount required by statute and hence is violative of the statute. For the same reasons we reject the appellee’s subsidiary argument that it be allowed a partial set-off insofar as its coverage liability ($10,000) exceeds the 1977 statutory minimum required uninsured motorist coverage ($5,000).

Section 3636 permits an insured to recover uninsured motorist benefits when workers' compensation immunity bars a tort action against the at-fault coworker.

Barfield v. Barfield · filed 1987-07-21

It would be manifestly unjust to permit the insurer to avoid its contractual duty, as well as its statutorily imposed liability under 36 O.S. 1981 § 3636, by its assertion of entitlement to third party tort immunity which would deny the insured's widow receipt of that for which the decedent has paid a premium.

Section 3636's public policy makes an underinsured motorist exclusion unenforceable when it denies coverage to insured passengers solely because the vehicle has liability coverage under the same policy.

Lewis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1992-10-23

We further find the conclusions of law of the trial court in its Judgment attached hereto, adequately explain its decision. ... The Court further finds that the only provision of Endorsement 6885Y relied upon by Defendant (cited above), which denies U.M. coverage to Plaintiffs, violates the public policy of Oklahoma as discussed above and is thus void and unenforceable in this Court.

Section 3636 permits a named driver exclusion to bar uninsured motorist coverage for that driver while operating a vehicle.

O'BRIEN v. Dorrough · filed 1996-03-26

Section 3636 requires automobile policies to include uninsured motorist coverage unless an insured rejects it. Because the failure of a motorist to carry any uninsured motorist coverage at all does not violate the expressed public policy of this state, we refuse to hold that this named driver exclusion, which excludes UM coverage as to only one named individual, violates public policy.

Section 3636 bars a policy from denying an insured person uninsured motorist coverage based on the vehicle occupied at the time of injury.

Ameen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. · filed 2004-11-19(B)

Therefore, Ameen is insured under his parents’ automobile liability policy and is entitled to UM benefits under the policy. Insurer may not dilute the legislatively mandated UM coverage by restricting coverage based upon the particular vehicle the insured is occupying at the time of injury. The policy provisions purporting to do so violate the public policy of § 3636.

Section 3636(A) does not require uninsured motorist coverage when the insured vehicle is neither registered nor principally garaged in Oklahoma.

Fowler v. American Family · filed 2000-07-14(A)

We agree with the district court that Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3636(A) and the public policy embedded therein do not dictate that plaintiff is entitled to UM coverage in this case, because the insured vehicle was neither registered nor garaged in Oklahoma.

Section 3636(B) permits a commercial auto policy to limit UM/UIM coverage to company-owned vehicles even when liability coverage extends to employees driving their own vehicles.

Graham v. Travelers Insurance Co. · filed 2002-12-17(B)

The phrase "persons insured thereunder" in § 3636(B), despite their literal import, does not overcome CKE's specific limitation of UM/UIM coverage to owned vehicles.

Section 3636(A) does not govern a policy issued in Texas for a vehicle registered and principally garaged there.

Bernal v. Charter County Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2009-05-12(A)

By legislative force, the terms of § 3636 do not reach all insurance contracts enforceable within the state. Its provisions are inapplicable to a policy issued in Texas that insures a vehicle registered and principally garaged in that state.

Section 3636(E) permits an insurer to exclude UM coverage for a resident relative injured on a vehicle the insurer does not insure when that vehicle has no UM coverage through another insurer.

Conner v. American Commerce Insurance · filed 2009-07-10(E)

Thus, the policy exclusion which does not allow UM coverage from extending to a vehicle which Defendant does not insure and which is not otherwise covered for UM by any other insurer is not inconsistent with the purpose of § 3636(E).

Section 3636(E) does not exclude purchased UM coverage for an injury involving the insured's own vehicle when that vehicle is covered by a separate liability policy.

COATES v. PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE CO. · filed 2022-05-03(E)

The plain language of the statute -- "a motor vehicle insurance policy" -- means what it says. It may include either, or both, liability and UM coverage. Both parties agree that the Triumph was covered by a liability policy. Therefore, since the UM coverage follows the person, and a liability policy was purchased, Progressive must offer some other justification for denying UM coverage.

Section 3636(E) does not exclude UM coverage when the occupied vehicle has liability insurance, even if its owner declined UM coverage on that vehicle.

Johnson v. Metropolitan Property · filed 2024-04-08(E)

We follow the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s direction to interpret “motor vehicle insurance policy” as meaning “either, or both, liability and UM coverage.”

Section 3636 does not apply to umbrella policies that provide excess uninsured-motorist coverage.

Desmet v. Scottsdale Insurance Company · filed 2022-06-24

Unfortunately for DeSmet, § 3636 does not apply to the Scottsdale umbrella policy.

Section 3636's uninsured motorist mandate does not require insurers to offer medical payment coverage or allow that coverage to be stacked.

Frank v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1986-07-31

The UM coverage stacking rule is based upon the public-policy mandate of 36 O.S.1981 § 3636, the statute that specifically governs UM protection. There exist no statutory or other public-policy requirements which would provide a basis for either invalidating or modifying the medical payment provisions of the insurance policy here in contest.

Section 3636 requires uninsured motorist coverage in primary automobile liability policies but does not extend that requirement to umbrella policies covering excess liability.

Moser v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1986-12-09(A)

Our answer to the first question posed is that the excess coverage in a comprehensive public liability policy is beyond the contemplation, scope and intent of 36 O.S. 1981 § 3636, which we find to be limited in application to policies insuring against primary liability, [16] and therefore is not deemed to have provided uninsured motorist coverage in this situation as a result of the carrier's failure to obtain a written rejection of such coverage.

Section 3636 requires insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage but does not require medical payment coverage.

Starrett v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1993-03-30

Our holding in Chambers was grounded upon the legislative purpose of § 3636 and statutory mandate therein for all automobile liability insurance carriers to offer uninsured motorist coverage. No such mandate exists for medical payment provisions.

Section 3636 does not govern an insurance contract issued in another state for a vehicle neither registered nor principally garaged in Oklahoma.

Roby v. Bailey · filed 1993-05-11

The Oklahoma law Roby seeks to apply to this case, 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 applies to insurance contracts “issued, delivered, renewed or extended in this state with respect to a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state.” Unlike the statute involved in Pate, this statute makes no attempt to control insurance contracts issued in other states for vehicles not registered or principally garaged in Oklahoma.

Section 3636 does not require a self-insured car rental company to offer uninsured motorist coverage when no insurance policy exists.

McSorley v. Hertz Corp. · filed 1994-11-08(A)

Accordingly, we find that a self-insured car rental company is not required to offer uninsured motorist coverage to a car renter — under the facts presented — uninsured motorist coverage did not arise by operation of law.

Section 3636 requires insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage but does not require stacking medical expense coverage.

Simpson v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. · filed 1999-05-25

We expressly rejected the notion that public policy required the stacking of medical expense coverages in Frank because § 3636 requires only that UM coverages be offered.

Section 3636 covers an injury when it is connected to an uninsured motorist's use of a vehicle for transportation.

Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Sanders · filed 1990-12-07(B)

Accordingly, we hold that the use of an uninsured motor vehicle is causally connected to the injury, and the injury is within the mandated UM coverage of § 3636, where the facts establish that the use of an uninsured motor vehicle is related to its transportation nature and injury is connected to that use.

Section 3636 does not provide uninsured motorist coverage when an assault unrelated to a vehicle’s transportation use severs the causal connection between the vehicle and the injury.

Estate of Williams ex rel. Williams v. Preferred Risk Group Insurance Co. · filed 1993-12-21

Our review of the record confirms the court’s finding that the UM provisions do not furnish coverage to Appellant. Priller’s attack and beating of Williams, actions which directly caused Williams’ death, are tortious. For the purpose of UM, however, they are independent acts of significance, unrelated to the transportation nature of the vehicle, which severed the causal connection.

Section 3636 does not require uninsured motorist coverage for injuries caused by setting a car on fire after its transportation use has ended.

Whitmire v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co. · filed 1996-09-17(B)

In the instant case, the kidnapper was even less of an operator when she poured gasoline from a can, brought for that purpose, over Whitmire and the car. Such activity was not related to the transportation use of the automobile, “and injury resulting therefrom is not within the UM coverage mandated by § 3636.”

Under § 3636(B), a passenger who shoots from an uninsured vehicle qualifies as its operator only if the passenger exercises coercive control over the driver.

Byus v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. · filed 1996-02-27(B)

Under section 3636(B) and the language of the contract, UM coverage applies to insureds "who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles." ... Applying the definition to this case, the shooter was the operator of the vehicle only if he exercised such coercive control over Cooper, the driver, that Cooper did not exercise his own will.

Section 3636 requires a causal connection between an injury and the uninsured vehicle’s transportation function for uninsured motorist coverage.

Mayer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1997-05-20(B)

The automobile’s employment, at the critical time, as a weapon, firebomb or implement of destruction in a manner completely incongruous with its transportation function and without a causal link to locomotion is not within UM coverage.

Section 3636 requires a connection between an uninsured vehicle’s transportation use and the insured’s injury for uninsured motorist coverage.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Narvaez · filed 1997-07-01

The requirement in Oklahoma’s uninsured motorist statute that the insured be legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle implies an intent that there be a connection between the motoring or transportation use (use related to the inherent nature of a motor vehicle) by an uninsured motorist and the injury to the insured. ... Here, the facts do not establish a connection between the transportation use (use as a motor vehicle) of defendant’s vehicle and the injuries to defendant.

Section 3636 requires an injury arising from the use of an uninsured vehicle to be connected to its transportation function, whether the claim is based on owner or operator fault.

Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Pollard · filed 2013-01-25(B)

And the requirement applies regardless of whether the insured is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or the operator of the uninsured motor vehicle under § 3636(B).

Section 3636(B) requires an uninsured motorist claimant to have suffered bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death; uninjured survivors have only the decedent’s rights under the policy’s per person limit.

White v. Equity Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1991-05-30(B)

They suffered no bodily injury due to the uninsured motorist’s negligence. To recover under 36 O.S.1981 § 3636, a “claimant”, must have suffered “bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death”.

Section 3636(B) treats survivors’ uninsured motorist claims arising from one person’s death as derivative claims subject to the policy’s per person limit.

Hardin v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co. · filed 1992-04-07(B)

In this case, we are not dealing with Appellant’s own claim for personal injury she sustained in the accident, but strictly with her claim stemming from her husband’s death. Appellant is entitled only to the $200,000 “each person” limit under the policy, which Appellee has fully paid.

Section 3636 permits recovery for a derivative loss of consortium claim under uninsured motorist coverage but leaves the applicable liability limit to the policy.

Littlefield v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1993-07-20

Section 3636 does not identify which limit of liability must cover derivative claims such as loss of consortium. Insurers are free to set limits of liability in individual policies.

Section 3636(B) allows recovery under uninsured motorist coverage for death-related losses only to the extent the insured is legally entitled to recover wrongful-death damages from the tortfeasor.

Ouellette v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1994-06-28(B)

The UM insurer’s ex contractu liability for death-related losses is measured by the regime of damages legally recovered or recoverable in wrongful death. When this standard is applied to the parents’ claim now before us, it is clear the trial judge was correct in giving summary judgment to the insurer. No wrongful-death damages have been or may be recovered for these parents’ alleged death loss.

Section 3636(B) permits survivors entitled to bring a wrongful death action to recover uninsured motorist proceeds for an insured’s death, regardless of the policy’s payment terms.

Forbes v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1995-09-12(B)

We conclude that in the context of an insured’s death by an uninsured negligent driver, UM insurance proceeds represent damages which may be recovered by those entitled by § 1053(B) to bring a wrongful death action regardless of what the insurance contract provides. Any other interpretation would not only disregard the legislative purpose behind § 3636 but also that of § 1053— to compensate all of decedent’s survivors through a single cause of action. Gleason, 666 P.2d at 789.

Section 3636(B) does not require uninsured motorist coverage for the death of a person who is not insured under the claimant’s policy.

London v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. · filed 2002-10-11(B)

Although 36 O.S. Supp.1994 § 3636(B) specifically requires coverage for insured persons who are legally entitled to recover damages because of “bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death”, it does not require coverage for the death of one who is not an “insured person”.

Section 3636 does not allow a corporate insured that purchases uninsured motorist coverage to provide it to some people who qualify as insureds while excluding others.

Anaya-Smith v. Federated Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2024-05-23

The Oklahoma Supreme Court next held that, once a corporate insured purchases a UM policy under a general automotive liability policy, it cannot elect to purchase UM coverage for some individuals who qualify as insureds under the policy but not for others pursuant to § 3636. ... The ruling from the Oklahoma Supreme Court has resolved this appeal. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Federated and REMAND the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this court’s order or the opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court.

Section 3636 requires uninsured motorist coverage only for persons insured under the policy; it does not prescribe the class of insured persons.

St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Dallarosa · filed 1991-09-18

Section 3636 only mandates uninsured motorist coverage for "persons insured thereunder." The decedent was not an insured within the meaning of the St. Paul policy, and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of St. Paul.

Section 3636 is satisfied by imputing the statutory minimum UM coverage when an insurer fails to meet its requirements.

Anaya-Smith v. Federated Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2025-02-20

The Court finds that May and Boerstler are controlling for the proposition that if an insurer does not satisfy the requirements of § 3636, the statute is satisfied with the imputation of statutory minimum coverage.

Section 3636 does not require an insurer to offer uninsured motorist coverage above the policy's bodily injury liability limit.

Davis v. EQUITY FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY · filed 1992-12-15

In the instant case, each vehicle under the policy had a 10/20 bodily injury liability limit, and therefore, it was not necessary for the insurer to offer a choice to increase UM coverage beyond the 10/20 amount that it provided.

Section 3636 does not require a written refusal of optional increased uninsured motorist coverage.

Burwell v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1995-03-21(B)

The language of section 3636 is not so demanding regarding refusal of optional increased coverage, and does not require a written rejection.

Section 3636(I) required insurers to notify existing policyholders about higher uninsured motorist coverage by the first policy renewal after August 31, 1991.

Fields v. Farmers Insurance · filed 1993-05-24(I)

The statute required notice be given to plaintiff, who was an existing policyholder, no later than the first renewal date after August 31, 1991.

Section 3636(I) requires insurers to send existing policyholders the prescribed uninsured motorist coverage offer by the first policy renewal after the phase-in period.

Perry Fields v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc. Government Employees Hospital Association · filed 1994-02-23(I)

Subsection I of the statute requires insurers to provide all existing policyholders with “the notice provided in subsection H.” § 3636(1). ... That date is “the next policy renewal following the phase-in period.” § 3636(1). Farmers sent plaintiff the specified form during the phase-in period. The statutory language simply does not support plaintiffs argument that Farmers should have offered increased UM coverage sooner than it did.

Subsection B’s minimum uninsured motorist coverage requirement is satisfied when the policy’s uninsured motorist limits equal its personal injury liability limits.

Coker v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1994-04-19(B)

The policy limits for the UM coverage is an amount equal to the policy limits for liability for personal injury. This complies with the minimum requirement of 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 B.

Section 3636 limits uninsured motorist coverage imputed for an insurer's failure to offer coverage or obtain a written rejection to the statutory minimum.

May v. NAT. UNION FIRE INS. CO. · filed 1996-04-09(B)

Where an insurer fails to offer in writing or obtain a written rejection of UM coverage such that UM coverage is imputed to an insured's policy as a matter of law, we hold that the mandate of § 3636 is satisfied by imputation of the minimum limits of UM coverage required by statute.

Section 3636(B) limits uninsured motorist coverage to the liability limit applicable to the driver, including a reduced limit for a non-designated driver.

Gray Ex Rel. Gray v. Midland Risk Insurance Co. · filed 1996-10-01(B)

Section 3636(B) provides that uninsured motorist coverage shall not exceed the liability limits, which we interpret in this case as resulting in uninsured motorist coverage for the non-designated drivers of $10,000.00, the statutory minimum.

Section 3636(H)’s required offer form does not increase uninsured motorist coverage unless the insured accepts the offer of higher limits.

Perkins v. USAA Casualty Ins. · filed 1997-03-12(H)

USAA’s form, as required by § 3636(H), not only notified plaintiff of his choices concerning UM coverage, but directed him to indicate what UM coverage he wanted. ... Absent plaintiff’s acceptance of this offer, the policy terms remained as reflected on the declarations page.

Section 3636 requires only the statutory minimum uninsured motorist coverage to be imputed when an insurer fails to meet its written offer or rejection requirements.

Boerstler v. Hoover · filed 1997-07-15

Neither the pre-1990 version nor the amended version of § 3636 prescribe how much coverage should be imputed in the event an insurer does not satisfy the statute’s requirements. ... The issues in the present case have been previously addressed in May, and as the employer’s insurer has paid minimum combined single limit of $20,000.00, for which the employer was charged a premium, to Boerstler, the portion of the Court of Civil Appeals opinion dealing with it is reversed.

Section 3636 requires an offer of uninsured motorist coverage when a vehicle is added to a policy, but does not require an offer of stackable coverage.

Kinder v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1997-07-15(G)(2)

We recognize that the addition of a vehicle to an existing policy constitutes a new policy distinct from the original and, as such, § 3636 requires that UM coverage be offered in conjunction with the coverage of the new vehicle. ... Oklahoma law does not require an insurer to offer stackable UM coverage when a new vehicle is added to an existing insurance policy.