Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.01

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of employment and arise out of employment.

Chappell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 9-08-43 (2-9-2009) · filed 2009-02-09(C)

In order for an injury to be compensable under workers' compensation law, the injury must have been in the course of the employment and arising out of the employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur both in the course of and arising out of employment; disputed facts about an employee’s early arrival and the injury site can prevent summary judgment on compensability.

Buck v. Melco, Inc. · filed 2009-12-28(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) defines a compensable injury under the Worker’s Compensation Act as the following: “Injury” includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. ... In sum, despite the parties’ stipulation to certain facts, we find that there still remain genuine issues of material fact as to all of the foregoing issues that we believe are crucial to the determination of whether this injury was compensable under the law pertaining to workers compensation.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a causal connection between an injury and employment; a traveling employee’s injury during a personal bathroom trip at a hotel did not satisfy the “arising out of” requirement.

Woodard v. Cassens Transport Co. · filed 2012-09-04(C)

Viewing the undisputed facts in light of Lord, Lewis, Jones, and Cline, we conclude that Woodard’s injury did not “arise out of” his employment with Cassens as a matter of law.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of employment; food poisoning from an independent caterer did not qualify where the employer lacked control over the activities that caused it.

Serraino v. Fauster-Cameron, Inc. · filed 2013-02-04(C)

Given the Clinic’s lack of control over that which gave rise to Serraino’s injury, we find, as a matter of law, that there is an insufficient causal ... connection between her poisoning and her employment. Consequently, her poisoning did not arise out of her employment.

Under § 4123.01(C), an injury sustained while returning to a fixed work site from an extended personal trip is outside the course of employment and is not compensable.

Luciano v. NCC Solutions, Inc. · filed 2013-02-14(C)

Generally, to be entitled to receive Ohio Workers’ Compensation Fund payments, one must sustain an injury “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... The mere fact that he was returning to a different employment location than the one where he briefly began the day does not change the fact that his deviation from work for personal reasons took him well outside the course of his employment and extinguished any protection he might have enjoyed had he been injured while traveling as a job function.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to be received both in the course of and arising out of employment; a visiting nurse’s injury during paid travel to a patient’s home satisfied both requirements before she made a personal detour.

Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Assn. of Mid-Ohio · filed 2013-04-19(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) provides that in order for an employee’s injury to be compensable under the workers’ compensation fund, the injury must be “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” ... Thus, as a matter of law, appellant’s injury was received in the course of her employment with appellee. ... Accordingly, we find, as a matter of law, appellant has established the causation prong of Fisher.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur both in the course of and arising out of employment to be compensable; approved, paid union duties can satisfy those requirements.

Elyria v. Scott · filed 2015-11-09(C)

In order for an employee's injury to be compensable by the state workers' compensation fund it must be “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). This test is conjunctive; both prongs of the formula must be satisfied before compensation will be allowed. ... Based upon the undisputed facts and drawing all inferences in the City’s favor, reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion that Scott’s injury arose in the course of his employment. ... Thus, the injury arose out of Scott’s employment because there is a causal connection between the injury and his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to arise out of and occur in the course of employment; evidence linking a knee injury to work activities can create a factual issue even when pain begins during a break.

Crisster v. Zimmer Surgical, Inc. · filed 2015-11-13(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) defines "injury" for purposes of workers' compensation benefits as: "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." ... We find appellant's affidavit, filed February 27, 2015, created an issue of fact on whether he sustained the left knee injury in the course of his employment: ... We accept the affidavit under the summary judgment standards, and find genuine issues of material facts exist to survive the motion for summary judgment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; an ordinary commute to a fixed job site does not qualify absent an applicable exception.

Cunningham v. Bone Dry Waterproofing, Inc. · filed 2016-06-09(C)

For purposes of the Ohio Workers' Compensation statutes, " '[i]njury' includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01(C). Thus, to be compensable under the workers' compensation fund, an employee's injury must be (1) received in the course of, and (2) arising out of, his or her employment.

An injury may arise out of employment when the evidence permits an inference that an unidentified workplace risk caused it.

Aho v. RTI Internatl. Metals, Inc. · filed 2017-05-15(C)

The dispute in this case centers on whether Mr. Aho’s injury arose out of his employment. ... Because Mr. Aho could not identify the origin of his knee injury, other than his foot hit the stair tread “awkwardly,” an inference arises that it is traceable to some ordinary, yet unidentified, risk, to which Mr. Aho was exposed on RTI’s premises. ... RTI did not meet its initial summary judgment burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.

An idiopathic injury is not compensable under section 4123.01(C) unless a condition or hazard of employment increased the risk or severity of the injury.

Miller v. Horizons Health Servs., L.L.C. · filed 2017-02-09(C)

Furthermore, there is no evidence demonstrating that a condition or hazard of Miller’s employment created an increased risk of injury such that her idiopathic injuries would be compensable.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; for an unexplained workplace fall, the claimant must eliminate idiopathic causes before employment causation may be inferred.

White v. Buehrer · filed 2017-10-20(C)

Both the “received in the course of” and “arising out of” conjuncts in this formula must be satisfied, and “it is ‘axiomatic’ that the formula be liberally construed ‘in favor of awarding benefits.’ ” ... Pursuant to Waller, because the cause of the fall was not clear, White bore the burden of eliminating idiopathic conditions as the cause of her fall; the burden did not rest with Five Rivers or the BWC to disprove the effects of these conditions.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained during a lunch break in an employer’s parking lot when the injury occurs in the course of and arises out of employment.

White v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. · filed 2018-10-24(C)

To be compensable under the workers’ compensation system, an injury must have occurred “in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court correctly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Ms. White’s injuries were compensable as a matter of law.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury received in the course of and arising out of employment when the employee's travel furthers the employer's business.

Stewart v. Bear's Tire · filed 2019-05-13(C)

Construing the statute liberally in Stewart's favor, cognizant that no one factor is controlling and applying the Fisher rule that the factors be adapted to each case in a fact-specific manner, this court concludes that substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Stewart's injuries were received in the course of and arose out of his employment with Bear's.

Section 4123.01(C) treats an injury as arising out of employment when the circumstances establish a causal connection between the injury and the employee’s work.

Stamperv. Belle Tire Distribs., Inc. · filed 2019-10-15(C)

Accordingly, we conclude that on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, there is a causal connection between the employment and the injury that satisfied the “arising out of” prong of R.C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment to qualify for workers’ compensation.

McAlpine v. McCloud · filed 2021-07-16(C)

Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation Act, R.C. Chapter 4123, provides coverage for injuries that are received “in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C); Osten v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2017-Ohio-9315, 102 N.E.3d 1189, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). ... Regardless of the location of McAlpine’s injury, she was required to present evidence that her injuries occurred in the course of and arising out of her employment. In our view, the evidence does not support a conclusion that McAlpine’s injury occurred within the course of her employment and arising out of her employment.

An employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an injury occurred in the course of and arose out of employment.

Shields v. Bur. of Workers' Comp. · filed 2023-04-27(C)

To prevail on a workers’ compensation claim, the employee must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his or her injury occurred “in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of employment; for a workplace assault, the assault must originate in work and the claimant must not have instigated it.

Dayton v. Parson · filed 2023-05-05(C)

But pursuant to Foster, Parson still had to demonstrate that her injury arose out of her employment in order for her claim to be compensable, meaning that she had to show that the origin of the assault was work-related and that she was not the instigator. Based on the uncontroverted evidence, the origin of the assault was not work-related but instead was based on personal matters brought to fruition in the employment setting.

Section 4123.01(C)’s “arising out of” requirement calls for the unexplained-fall analysis when an employee falls on the employer’s premises.

Vega v. Grafton Corr. Inst. · filed 2024-09-23(C)

Instead, the appropriate consideration is whether Ms. Vega’s injury was caused by an “unexplained slip or fall.”

Section 4123.01(C) requires a causal connection between an injury and employment, and whether that connection exists must be assessed under a liberal construction favoring the employee.

Judice v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. · filed 2025-03-26(C)

Minimally, when construing the “arising out of” prong liberally in favor of Judice, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Judice’s injury arose out his employment with FedEx.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to arise out of employment; conflicting medical opinions about that connection can create a factual issue for trial.

Lang v. THK Mfg. of Am., Inc. · filed 2025-10-21(C)

For an employee to receive compensation for an injury under Ohio’s workers’-compensation system, the injury “must have occurred ‘in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.’” Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Assn. of Mid-Ohio, 2014-Ohio-4531, ¶ 12, quoting R.C. 4123.01(C). ... We find that the conflicting expert opinions in Lang’s case created a genuine issue of material fact that precluded the award of summary judgment to THK.

Section 4123.01(C)’s requirement that an injury arise out of employment can be satisfied for an unexplained workplace fall when the claimant eliminates idiopathic causes, allowing an inference that an ordinary workplace risk caused the fall.

Vega v. Granton Corr. Facility · filed 2026-04-06(C)

As illustrated by Waller and the cases noted above, this scenario is consistent with the Supreme Court’s explanation of an “unexplained fall” for purposes of workers’ compensation: it arose from a neutral risk which had “no particular employment or personal character.” Waller, 37 Ohio St.3d at 122. Consequently, Ms. Vega bore the burden of eliminating idiopathic causes for the fall.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; an assault over a personal dispute is not compensable solely because it occurs in an employee parking lot.

Garner v. Bureau of Workers' Comp. · filed 2018-08-24(C)

Also, the assault here did not involve another employee, and the dispute leading up to the assault was not related to Garner’s work duties. ... Similarly, Garner’s injury is not compensable solely because it occurred in the employee parking lot.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to be received in the course of and arise out of the employee’s employment.

Ritchie v. Dravo Corp. · filed 1984-02-02(C)

As has already been noted, in order to be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an employee’s injury must be “received in the course of, and [arise] out of .... the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C).

An injury from a workplace assault is compensable only if the assault arose from work and the claimant did not instigate it.

Lowe v. Cox Paving, Inc. · filed 2010-08-16(C)

To receive workers’ compensation benefits for an injury, an employee must establish that the injury resulted in the course of and arising out of his employment; both requirements must be met. ... In workers’ compensation cases involving fights and assaults at the place of employment, Ohio courts have consistently focused on two factors: (1) whether the origin of the assault was work-related, and (2) whether the claimant was not the instigator. ... The unopposed facts in the record establish that appellant was an instigator of the fight in this matter, having shoved Merz at the beginning of the argument.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) permits employee status to rest on an implied contract of hire, even when no written contract covered the date of injury.

Farren v. Baltimore Ravens, Inc. · filed 1998-11-23(A)(1)(b)

There is sufficient evidence in the record to allow reasonable minds to conclude that appellant was directed by appellee to participate in off-season conditioning in expectation of appellant’s playing on appellee’s team during the 1992 season. Moreover, there is also evidence to support the conclusion that an implied contract may have existed. Appellant had not signed with another team as of April 1, 1992, he had received notification from appellee on April 2, 1992, that appellee wished to re-sign him, and he was invited to partake in, and was compensated for, his attendance at a minicamp in June 1992. When construing the evidence most strongly in appellant’s favor, reasonable minds may conclude that appellant was an employee at the time of his injury.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) covers a private golf course ranger whose agreement to enforce course rules in exchange for noncash benefits constitutes a contract of hire.

Anderson v. Linkscorp, Inc., Unpublished Decision (3-16-1999) · filed 1999-03-16(A)(1)(b)

Based on the evidence before the trial court, the trial court correctly concluded that a contract of hire existed because Anderson entered into an agreement with Rickenbacker to police the golf course and enforce its rules in exchange for remuneration in the form of free golf, free use of a golf cart, free use of the driving range, and discounted food and beverages.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) defines an employee as a person in the service of an employer; a worker leaving the worksite after a shift can still meet that definition.

Donnelly v. Herron, Unpublished Decision (1-21-1999) · filed 1999-01-21(A)(1)(b)

Under R.C. 4123.01 (A)(1)(b), in order to be considered an employee, one must simply be in the service of the employer.

A company that supervises a temporary worker may be her employer under the workers' compensation statute even when a staffing agency handles her pay and workers' compensation premiums.

Lindsey v. Auto Temp, Inc., Unpublished Decision (2-16-1999) · filed 1999-02-16

Upon a thorough review of the record and evidentiary material, we find that the trial court did not err in its well-reasoned finding that appellee was Debra's employer pursuant to the workers compensation statute.

Section 4123.01(B)(2) permits an employment agency’s customer to be treated as a temporary worker’s employer when it controls the work and pays the workers’ compensation premiums through the agency, even without a written obligation to pay them.

Carr v. Central Printing Co., Unpublished Decision (10-13-2000) · filed 2000-10-13(B)(2)

Thus, these cases lead us to conclude that Central Printing should be treated as Carr's employer for workers' compensation purposes and should be immune from liability notwithstanding its apparent failure to put into writing its obligation to pay workers' compensation premiums on behalf of Carr.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) covers a worker as an employee based on the substance of the working relationship, including who has the right to control how the work is done; a contract’s label does not settle that status.

Walker v. Lahoski, Unpublished Decision (7-28-1999) · filed 1999-07-28(A)(1)(b)

The trial court must look to the substance of the relationship, not merely to a label attached to the relationship. ... The record below contains disputed facts and several indicia of employee status, such as hourly payment, control of hours worked, and control over the manner or means the work was performed.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(a)’s definition of employee applies equally to an injured employee seeking compensation and a coemployee seeking immunity.

Donnelly v. Herron · filed 2000-05-17(A)(1)(a)

The definition of “employee” set forth in R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(a), as “[e]very person in the service of” a qualifying employer, is equally applicable to both employees who form the subject of R.C. 4123.741. Thus, nothing more is required of the employee seeking immunity to be “in the service of” the employer than is required of the injured employee in obtaining compensation coverage.

Section 4123.01(B)(2) defines an employer to include a company with an employee in its service under an express or implied contract of hire.

Linden v. Cincinnati Cyclones Hockey Club, L.P. · filed 2000-06-30(B)(2)

Without the C-112, the Panthers would qualify as an employer under R.C. 4123.01(B)(2), which states that all employers are subject to its provisions and defines an “employer” as “[e]very person, firm, and private corporation * * * that (a) has in service one or more employees regularly in the same business or in or about the same establishment under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written * * *.”

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(c) treats a person working under a construction contract as an employee when at least ten of its twenty criteria are met.

Slauter v. Klink, Unpublished Decision (8-18-2000) · filed 2000-08-18(A)(1)(c)

Under R.C. 4123.01 (A)(1)(c), persons who perform labor or provide services under construction contracts are "employees" if at they meet at least ten of the statutory criteria.

A worker is an employee when the employer controls how he performs his work, provides his tools and materials, and pays him weekly, where those facts are undisputed.

Fuhrman v. Garrison Feist Const. Co., Unpublished Decision (12-15-2000) · filed 2000-12-15(A)(1)(c)

Here, the evidence demonstrated, without conflict, that Fuhrman was Garrison Feist's employee. Most notably, the evidence reflected that Garrison Feist controlled the manner in which Fuhrman performed his work, that Garrison Feist provided his tools and materials, and that it paid him on weekly basis. Given these facts, and the other relevant, undisputed facts, the trial court was entitled to conclude as a matter of law that Fuhrman was an employee.

Section 4123.01(B)(2) requires proof of payment into the state workers' compensation fund to establish employer status.

Lawson v. May Dept. Store, Unpublished Decision (11-27-2001) · filed 2001-11-27(B)(2)

Accordingly, summary judgment was only proper here if Appellee could demonstrate that it was an "employer" as contemplated by R.C. § 4123.01 (B)(2), by showing that it had paid into the state's workers compensation fund in accordance with R.C. § 4123.35 .

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) includes a person working under an oral contract for hire, even when compensation takes the form of free rent and services rather than a paycheck.

Beets v. Walborn, Unpublished Decision (12-13-2001) · filed 2001-12-13(A)(1)(b)

The evidence attached to Walborn's motion indicated that Walborn was indeed an employee of CSI because he had an oral contract of employment with his son. Although Walborn did not receive a paycheck in the traditional sense, he did receive compensation in the form of free rent and free telephone and secretarial services. This was not a typical employment arrangement; however, it did constitute an oral contract for hire.

Section 4123.01(A)(2)(a)’s clergy exclusion guides workers’ compensation coverage and payroll reporting; it does not permit a minister to receive wages and permanent total disability compensation at the same time.

State ex rel. Jerdo v. Pride Cast Metals, Inc. · filed 2002-04-03(A)(2)(a)

Claimant is seeking to create a definition in R.C. 4123.01 that was intended to guide employers on obtaining coverage and reporting payroll for premium coverage purposes. It was not intended as a method for permitting a claimant to receive both wages and PTD. There is no justification for dual receipt, and the suggestion that claimant’s occupation creates a special exception is without merit.

An independent contractor cannot obtain workers’ compensation coverage as the employee of his own uninsured subcontractor.

Archibald v. Gold Key Inc., Unpublished Decision (10-21-2002) · filed 2002-10-21(A)(2)

Appellant is not in the service of another therefore, the protection offered by the 4123.01 (A)(2) does not apply.

The definition of “employee” includes every person in an employer’s service regardless of supervisory or management rank.

Jessop v. Angelo Benedetti, Inc., Unpublished Decision (1-2-2003) · filed 2003-01-02(A)(1)(b)

Under the plain language of the statute, regardless of an employee's rank, The Workers Compensation Act's definition of "employee" applies to "every person" in the service of an employer * * *."

Section 4123.01(B)(2) defines an employer to include a private corporation that has employees under a contract of hire or is contractually bound to pay workers’ compensation premiums.

Smith v. Air-Ride, Unpublished Decision (3-27-2003) · filed 2003-03-27(B)(2)

R.C. 4123.01 (B)(2) defines "employer" to mean "[e]very person, firm, and private corporation * * * that (a) has in service one or more employees regularly in the same business or in or about the same establishment under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, or (b) is bound by any such contract of hire or by any other written contract, to pay into the insurance fund the premiums provided by this chapter." ... Regarding plaintiffs' claim that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of BAX, we find no genuine issues of material fact as to whether BAX was an employer of Joan Huston.

A jury may find that at least ten construction-worker criteria apply even if the same jurors do not agree on every criterion.

Leavers v. Conrad · filed 2004-02-19(A)(1)(c)

In the case sub judice, although a juror found ten or fewer factors, the same juror was not precluded from finding that 11 of the factors had been answered affirmatively by the jury as a whole.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) includes unauthorized aliens in its definition of employee.

Rajeh v. Steel City Corp. · filed 2004-06-15(A)(1)(b)

Ohio’s statute, on the other hand, includes “aliens” with no comment on whether they are authorized to work. These differences lend further support to allowing appellant to collect workers’ compensation. Because Ohio’s definition of “employee” includes aliens, we can only conclude that all aliens are included.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) can cover a worker injured during her first shift even though she earned less than $160 and the employer called her a casual worker.

Raymond v. Shaker Prod., Unpublished Decision (4-7-2005) · filed 2005-04-07(A)(1)(b)

After a review of the record presented, we agree with the trial court that Raymond was an employee of Shaker Produce, as defined by R.C. 4123.01 (A), at the time she was injured.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) defines an employee as a person in the service of a person, firm, or private corporation.

Herron v. Dtj Ents., Inc., Unpublished Decision (3-8-2006) · filed 2006-03-08(A)(1)(b)

{¶ 10} R.C. 4123.01 (A)(1)(b) defines "employee" as: "[e]very person in the service of any person, firm, or private corporation[.]" ... {¶ 13} After reviewing the record, this Court concludes that, at the time of his discharge, appellant was employed by DTJ and not by Cavanaugh.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(c) applies to construction workers when the issue is whether they are independent contractors, but does not govern whether a worker is a loaned employee.

Rogan v. Brown, Unpublished Decision (10-23-2006) · filed 2006-10-23(A)(1)(c)

In light of the foregoing, we find that R.C. 4123.01 (A)(1)(c) applies to a person working pursuant to a construction contract only if there is an issue as to whether the person is an independent contractor.

A household or casual worker’s employee status depends in part on whether the worker earned, or would have earned but for an injury, $160 in a quarter.

Clark v. Dolence, 2007-L-027 (10-19-2007) · filed 2007-10-19(A)(1)(b)(i)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Dolence as the non-moving party, there is "sufficient evidence relating to an essential issue," i.e. whether Clark earned, or would have earned, had he not been injured, $160 per quarter, which would permit "reasonable minds to reach different conclusions," based upon the aforementioned testimony. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of directed verdict was error.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(c) treats a worker performing services under a construction contract as an employee if at least ten listed criteria apply.

Billman v. Massillon Dev. Group, L.L.C., 2007-Ca-00169 (1-28-2008) · filed 2008-01-28(A)(1)(c)

We have reviewed the record, and we find regardless of whether the facts and circumstances are analyzed under R.C. 4123.01 or the common law test, as a matter of law appellant has failed to present evidence sufficient to demonstrate he was an employee rather than an independent contractor. We conclude the trial court did not err in finding appellant is not entitled to participate in the Workers' Compensation fund.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) does not exclude a corporate officer or shareholder from being an employee if that person serves the corporation.

Carter v. R B Pizza Co., Inc., 06 Je 5 (3-18-2008) · filed 2008-03-18(A)(1)(b)

This definition does not on its face exclude an officer, a shareholder or a shareholder's wife from being considered an employee if they were in the service of the corporation.

Section 4123.01(A)(1) provides alternative ways to qualify as an employee; a worker need satisfy only one of its listed divisions.

Jakob v. Eckhart · filed 2011-09-30(A)(1)

A plain reading of the statute reveals that divisions (a), (b), (c), and (d) of R.C. 4123.01 provide alternative criteria and that to be considered an employee under the statute, an individual must establish the applicability of just one of the four listed options.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(c)(xiii) treats “expenses” as the worker’s personal expenses.

Soloman v. Dayton Window & Door Co., L.L.C. · filed 2011-12-02(A)(1)(c)(xiii)

“Expenses” here refers to personal expenses, which is how the court understood the word and how, as his testimony shows, Soloman too understood it.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)’s definition of employee applies within Chapter 4123 and does not govern a common law negligence claim.

Snyder v. Stevens · filed 2012-08-30(A)(1)

However, R.C. 4123.01(A)(1) begins by stating “[a]s used in this chapter: ‘[e]mployee’ means * * *.” Because the Snyders did not bring a claim under R.C. 4123 and do not cite any case law incorporating this standard into a common law negligence claim, that standard is inapplicable to this case.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(a) and (b) require a contract of hire for employee status; unpaid volunteer service without an obligation to compensate does not qualify.

Margello v. Parachute & Special Advocates for Children · filed 2013-03-25(A)(1)(a)-(b)

Turning instead to R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(a) and (b), we note that both subdivisions involve language requiring "a contract for hire."

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) defines an employee as a person in an employer's service; a co-worker seeking immunity must be in that service when the injury occurs.

Sanders v. Fridd · filed 2013-09-30(A)(1)(b)

An "employee" under the workers' compensation statutes means "[e]very person in the service of any person, firm, or private corporation." R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(b). Thus, a co-employee seeking immunity must be "in the service of" their employer at the time the injury to the other employee occurs. Donnelly at 428.

Section 4123.01 defines “employee” for workers’ compensation purposes and serves as a template when deciding employment status under an insurance policy.

Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Laughlin · filed 2013-10-08(A)(1)

We concur because R.C. Chapter 4123 sets forth Ohio's statutory scheme for workers' compensation; therefore, R.C. 4123.01 defines an "employee" for purposes of workers' compensation.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(c) defines employees who perform services under construction contracts for workers’ compensation claims only.

Hartings v. Xu · filed 2014-04-28(A)(1)(c)

Thus, the definition of employee contained in R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c) is limited to claims filed under Chapter 4123.

Section 4123.01(A)(2)(c) excludes individuals who have incorporated themselves from employee status unless they elect self-coverage in writing with the BWC.

Ferrari v. Jamestown Transp. · filed 2013-11-27(A)(2)(c)

Therefore, as an incorporated independent contractor who did not properly elect self-coverage pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(A)(2)(c), Ferrari is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits in Ohio.

Section 4123.01(A)(2)(c) excludes individuals who have incorporated themselves from the definition of employee unless they notify the BWC in writing that they elect self-coverage.

Ferrari v. Top Flight Driver Leasing, L.L.C. · filed 2013-11-27(A)(2)(c)

R.C. 4123.01(A)(2)(c) excludes from the definition of “employee” an individual who has incorporated himself or herself. Such individuals must notify the BWC in writing that they want to elect self-coverage in order to fall within the Ohio workers’ compensation system.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(c)(xx)'s contract-liability factor does not require a written agreement; an agreement to provide labor for money can be a contract.

State ex rel. WFAL Constr. v. Buehrer · filed 2013-12-24(A)(1)(c)(xx)

Relator's argument is flawed because relator misconstrues the meaning of factor No. 10. This factor does not require a written contract. An agreement to provide labor in exchange for money is a contract even though not in writing.

A person working under a construction contract is an employee for workers’ compensation purposes if at least ten of the twenty listed criteria apply.

State ex rel. WFAL Construction v. Buehrer · filed 2015-06-16(A)(1)(c)

R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c) provides that every person who performs labor or provides services'pursuant to a construction contract, as defined in R.C. 4123.79, is an employee for purposes of workers’ compensation, if the individual meets at least ten of the 20 enumerated statutory criteria.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) permits consideration other than a paycheck to establish an employment relationship, but the claimant must prove a contract for hire existed.

Beal v. Bauer · filed 2014-02-21(A)(1)(b)

While Mr. Beal correctly asserts that forms of consideration other than a paycheck can serve to establish an employment relationship, he misunderstands the trial court’s decision.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) requires a contract of hire, express or implied, for employee status under the definition applied here.

Cornett v. Admr., Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. · filed 2014-08-18(A)(1)(b)

When determining whether a person is an employee, the proper focus is whether a contract of hire, either express or implied, oral or written, exists between the individual and the employer. ... There is no evidence of a contract for hire, express or implied, oral or written.

A temporary worker’s employee status depends on who had the right to control the worker’s work.

Mills v. Enviro-Tank Clean, Inc. · filed 2014-09-08(A)(1)(b)

Thus, in determining whether a temporary worker is actually an employee of his or her temporary agency’s customer, the key inquiry is who had the right to control the employee.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(c) limits its employee-status factor test to people performing labor or services under construction contracts.

State ex rel. Ugicom Ents., Inc. v. Buehrer · filed 2014-11-06(A)(1)(c)

As R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c) expressly and unambiguously limits the factor test therein to construction contracts, we are not at liberty to expand the application of R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c) to other types of cases.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(c) requires at least 10 of its 20 listed criteria to establish that a person performing labor under a construction contract is an employee.

State v. Scaggs · filed 2014-12-15(A)(1)(c)

In order to demonstrate that an employer-employee relationship exists when labor is performed pursuant to a construction contract, the state must prove that 10 of the 20 criteria listed in R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c) exist.

In a felony workers’ compensation fraud prosecution, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least 10 of the 20 construction-worker criteria in § 4123.01(A)(1)(c) apply.

State v. Diebert · filed 2014-12-15(A)(1)(c)

Evidence, including conclusory “expert” testimony from a BWC auditor about the existence of an employer-employee relationship based upon assumptions not supported by the factual record is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least 10 of the criteria specified under R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c) were met.

An injured worker must be an employee to receive workers’ compensation benefits; the principal test is whether the alleged employer retains the right to control how the work is done.

Green v. Admr., Ohio Bur. of Workers Comp. · filed 2018-06-26(C)

Under Ohio’s workers’ compensation law, there must be an employer-employee relationship before an injured worker may participate in the benefits of Ohio’s workers’ compensation fund. ... In sum, competent and credible evidence supports the conclusion that Chapman did not exert the requisite control over the work being performed by Green necessary to establish an employer-employee relationship.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) includes within its definition of employee a person serving a private corporation under a contract of hire; the Browns’ team physicians qualified.

Greco v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., L.L.C. · filed 2020-10-01(A)(1)(b)

The facts reveal that the doctors were in the service of the Browns, a private corporation, which employs one or more people regularly in the medical business under a contract of hire.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(c) applies to construction contracts; the common-law right-to-control test governs worker classification outside that setting.

State ex rel. Ugicom Ents., Inc. v. Morrison, Admr., Bur. of Workers' Comp. · filed 2021-04-13(A)(1)(c)

This court has previously determined that the common law right to control test should be applied in the instant case, not R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c), as this case does not address a construction contract.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) does not require a salary, workers’ compensation coverage, or proof of the employer’s degree of control for employee status.

Gundel v. Whalen Lawn & Landscaping, L.L.C. · filed 2022-06-06(A)(1)(b)

This definition does not require evidence that the person was paid a salary, was covered under a workers’ compensation policy, nor does it require analysis of the degree of control exercised by the employer and we are without authority to add such terms.

Section 4123.01(A)(1)(b) does not require proof of salary, workers’ compensation coverage, or employer control to establish employee status.

Gundel v. Whalen Lawn & Landscaping, L.L.C. · filed 2022-08-10(A)(1)(b)

While these factors can play a role in determining the status of employees in other circumstances, in the case before us we are bound to apply the definition provided by the legislature in R.C. 4123.01 and the elements cited by Gundel are not part of that definition. ... This definition does not require evidence that the person was paid a salary, was covered under a workers’ compensation policy, nor does it require analysis of the degree of control exercised by the employer and we are without authority to add such terms.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes a psychiatric condition from compensable injuries unless it arises from an earlier work-related physical injury.

Administrator v. U.P.S., Unpublished Decision (4-27-2001) · filed 2001-04-27(C)(1)

Accordingly, before a claim for workers' compensation benefits can be allowed pursuant to R.C. 4123 for a worker's psychiatric condition, the claimant must demonstrate that a nexus exists between that condition and some physical injury which is not self-inflicted, and which arose in the course of employment.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes psychiatric conditions from compensable injuries unless they arise from an injury or occupational disease.

State ex rel. Clark v. Indus. Comm. · filed 2001-08-15(C)(1)

Moreover, for the purposes of R.C. 4123.54, “injury” does not include psychiatric conditions “except where the conditions have arisen from an injury or occupational disease.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). A psychological injury without a corresponding physical injury is not compensable under the workers’ compensation system.

A psychiatric condition arising after a work injury qualifies as an injury only if the work injury is at least one proximate cause of the condition.

Jones v. Medical Mutual of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (2-19-2004) · filed 2004-02-19(C)(1)

While there may be several proximate causes for the dysthymia, in order for appellant to recover under the Workers' Compensation Act, at least one of those proximate causes must be the original work injury.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable psychological injury to arise from a contemporaneous physical injury.

Martin v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (6-8-2001) · filed 2001-06-08(C)

Appellant correctly states that in order to be compensable, a psychological injury must arise from a contemporaneous physical injury. R.C. § 4123.01 (C); Bunger v. Lawson Co . (1998) 82 Ohio St.3d 463 , 464 .

Section 4123.01(C)(1) allows a psychiatric condition to qualify as an injury when it arises from a compensable work injury.

Pitts v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, Unpublished Decision (4-26-2002) · filed 2002-04-26(C)(1)

R.C. 4123.01 (C)(1), amended in 1986, defines "injury" in the context of workers' compensation as follows: "Injury" includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. "Injury" does not include: Psychiatric conditions except where the conditions have arisen from an injury or occupational disease. ... As the judgment of the trial court was supported by competent, credible evidence illicited from the expert witnesses, Children's Hospital's assignment of error is overruled.

The June 30, 2006 amendment to § 4123.01(C)(1) does not apply retroactively to bar a psychological injury claim diagnosed and filed before its effective date.

Sanden v. City of Cincinnati · filed 2007-12-21(C)(1)

While we agree that Sanderis psychiatric condition would no longer qualify as a compensable injury under the current version of R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) absent a contemporaneous physical injury, this version of the statute did not become effective until June 30, 2006, almost three years after Sanden was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder and two years after he had applied for workers’ compensation benefits. Because the General Assembly did not intend for the current version of the statute to apply retroactively, we must agree with Sanden that the current statute did not bar his claim.

A coworker's rape is not an accident within Section 4123.01(C)'s definition of injury.

Prewitt v. Alexson Servs., Inc., Ca2007-09-218 (8-25-2008) · filed 2008-08-25(C)

A similar analysis in this case demonstrates that the rape did not occur "in the course of" or "arise out of" appellant's employment as a rape is not a "natural and probable consequence" of the nature of the employment. Moreover, the rape does not constitute an "accident" included in the definition of "injury."

A psychiatric condition is compensable when the claimant’s physical injury is a proximate cause of it, even if other factors also contributed.

Jones v. Catholic Healthcare Partners, Inc. · filed 2012-12-31(C)(1)

The two depositions of Appellee’s treating physician provide consistent testimony that the physical injury to Appellee is a proximate cause of her PTSD, although concededly not the sole proximate cause. ... Accordingly, applying the principles of causation prescribed by the Ohio Supreme Court in Murphy and its progeny, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A psychiatric condition arising from an employee’s work injury can qualify as an injury under Section 4123.01(C)(1).

Wasinski v. PECO II, Inc. · filed 2009-06-08(C)(1)

Based on the foregoing, we find that the jury instructions given on “aggravation” and “flow through” were proper statements of the law.

A psychiatric condition is compensable only if it arises from a physical injury or occupational disease sustained by the claimant.

Armstrong v. John R. Jurgenson Co. · filed 2011-12-23(C)(1)

The required nexus between a compensable psychiatric condition and an injury sustained by the claimant that R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) imposes is that the psychiatric condition must have “arisen from” the injury.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) includes psychiatric conditions arising from a workplace injury within the definition of compensable injury.

Simonelli v. Fligner · filed 2012-12-26(C)(1)

Therefore, at issue here is whether Mr. Simonelli alleged that his emotional injuries were related to the physical injury that he sustained in the course of and arising from his employment. See R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). ... Therefore, Mr. Simonelli alleged that his emotional injuries were the direct consequences of the physical injury that he sustained through his employment. However, he failed to set forth a legally cognizable claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, as his exclusive remedy for negligently inflicted emotional injuries resulting from his physical injury lay within the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) includes psychiatric conditions arising from a work-related injury within the definition of injury.

Haas v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr. · filed 2013-04-12(C)(1)

“(1) Psychiatric conditions except where the claimant's psychiatric conditions have arisen from an injury or occupational disease.” ... In this case, the evidence shows that both plaintiff’s physical and psychological injuries were a direct consequence of the assault by Dr. Rees.

A psychiatric condition is compensable only if it arises from the claimant’s compensable physical injury or occupational disease; occurring during the same accident is insufficient.

Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co. · filed 2013-06-04(C)(1)

For Armstrong’s PTSD to qualify as a compensable injury under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1), however, more is required; he must establish that his PTSD was causally related to his compensable physical injuries and not simply to his involvement in the accident.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes psychiatric conditions unless they arise from a work-related injury or occupational disease.

Bradley v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. · filed 2014-07-22(C)

As appellant's claim for RSD was previously disallowed, and appellant failed to rebut appellees' evidence that her psychological claim did not arise from her March 10, 2005 injury, appellant no longer had a compensable physical injury on which to base her claim for depression.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) includes a psychiatric condition as an injury when it arises from the claimant’s injury or occupational disease.

Hoelscher v. KBO, Inc. · filed 2017-07-07(C)(1)

A psychiatric condition is not an “injury” except when the condition has “arisen from an injury or occupational disease sustained by th[e] claimant.” R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). ... A genuine issue of material fact plainly exists, precluding summary judgment.

A psychiatric condition may qualify as an injury when caused by a claimant’s physical injury, even if it arises years later.

Coleman v. KBO, Inc. · filed 2018-03-02(C)(1)

Armstrong holds that there must be a causal connection between the physical and psychological injuries in order to obtain workers’ compensation for the psychological injury, but it does not discuss or in any way suggest that the psychological injury must occur contemporaneously with or within a certain period of time of the physical injury to be compensable.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) permits compensation for a psychiatric condition when a claimant’s physical injury contributes to that condition.

Johnson v. ContiTech USA, Inc. · filed 2022-05-09(C)(1)

To be compensable, a psychiatric condition must have arisen from an injury and therefore, there must be a causal connection between a claimant’s physical injury and the claimant’s mental condition.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes psychiatric conditions from the definition of injury unless they arise from an injury or occupational disease.

Crihfield v. Monsanto Co. · filed 1994-02-11(C)

We can turn once again to Kerans v. Porter Paint for the response to the Defendants’ argument. In that ease the Ohio Supreme Court directs us to Ohio Revised Code § 4123.01(C). That section states that injury under the workers’ compensation statute “does not include: (1) Psychiatric conditions except where the conditions have arisen from an injury or occupational disease; .... ” Ohio Rev.Code § 4123.01(C). In light of this statutory language, the Ohio court was “not prepared to assume that psychological disturbances arising solely from emotional stress in the workplace fit within the definition of ‘injury’ in R.C. 4123.01.”

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes psychiatric conditions from the definition of injury unless they arise from an injury or occupational disease.

Retterer v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 1996-07-05(C)(1)

We first reject appellees’ claim that the Ohio Workers’ Compensation Act conclusively bars appellant’s negligent supervision claim. R.C. 4123.74 provides that employers have no liability “to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, * * * or bodily condition, received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment.” The definition of injury excludes any “[pjsychiatric conditions except where the conditions have arisen from an injury or occupational disease.” R.C. 4123.01(C)(1).

Section 4123.01(C) covers a physical injury caused by workplace stress when the stress is greater than workers ordinarily encounter and medically causes the injury.

Henry v. Lincoln Elec. Holdings, 90182 (7-10-2008) · filed 2008-07-10(C)

In Ryan , the Ohio Supreme Court held that a physical injury occasioned by mental or emotional stress, received in the course of, and arising out of, an injured employee's employment, is an injury compensable under R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Nonetheless, we agree with Dena Henry, that considering this part of the instruction, in conjunction with the previous instruction regarding the "unusual" prong, is a correct statement of the law, but does not rise to the level of reversible error.

An employee injured in an employer's parking lot while returning to clock in is within the zone of employment; no separate showing of benefit to the employer is required.

Rock v. Parma Board of Education, Unpublished Decision (11-1-2001) · filed 2001-11-01(C)

Our de novo review of the Bureau's motion also indicates that summary judgment was not proper because Rock was within the zone of employment at the time she was injured. Ohio's workers' compensation statute covers any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment * * *. R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Therefore, Rock was clearly within the zone of employment when she sustained her injury. Although the Bureau argues that there must be some type of benefit to the employer by the employee's action, we do not read MTD as requiring this when the employee is within the zone of employment.

An employee remains within the zone of employment when a minor purchase after clocking out does not change her route through an area controlled by her employer.

Packer v. the Kroger Company, Unpublished Decision (3-15-2002) · filed 2002-03-15(C)

For the purposes of a BWC claim, a workplace "injury" is any injury "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... In our view, such a minor deviation did not remove her from the "zone of employment." Consequently, we conclude that appellant was within the zone of employment when she fell and suffered her injury.

An injury on a sidewalk may satisfy § 4123.01(C)'s course-of-employment requirement if the employer assumed control of the sidewalk by salting it and directing employees to do so.

Tucker v. Michael's Store Inc., Unpublished Decision (3-28-2003) · filed 2003-03-28(C)

The Ohio Revised Code defines a workplace "injury" as any injury "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Thus, although Michael's may not have been contractually obligated to maintain the sidewalk in front of its store, if it assumed control over the sidewalk by salting it and instructing its employees to do so, then Tucker's injuries could be allowable as having occurred within the zone of employment. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Michael's had control of the sidewalk at the time of Tucker's injuries thus making the zone of employment exception applicable.

Section 4123.01(C) includes an injury sustained within the employer’s zone of employment before a shift, even when the employee intends to leave for a personal errand.

Remer v. Conrad · filed 2003-08-01(C)

An employee is entitled to participate in the workers’ compensation fund if the employee sustains an injury, “whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Thus, we conclude that Remer was in the course of her employment at the time of her injury.

An employee required to use an off-site parking lot is within the zone of employment while crossing the road between that lot and work.

Shafer v. Tri-Arch 14, Unpublished Decision (6-9-2005) · filed 2005-06-09(C)

For an injury to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, the claimant must meet both prongs of the test established in R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Because Tri-Arch mandated that she park in the funeral home's parking lot, she had no option but to cross Cook Road to get to and from her automobile. Thus, Shafer was within the "zone of employment" and entitled to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund.

Section 4123.01(C) can cover an injury sustained while crossing a public street to reach a free employee parking lot, even when other parking options are available.

Janicki v. Kforce.Com, Inc. · filed 2006-06-30(C)

Moreover, the fact that Janieki chose to park in the employee parking lot rather than the hospital parking garage, where employee parking was also provided, does not remove the parking lot — and the public street she necessarily had to cross in order to reach the hospital — from the zone of employment.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an employee's injury while leaving a company event through an employer-controlled garage because the garage is within the zone of employment.

Pursley v. Mbna Corp., Unpublished Decision (3-29-2007) · filed 2007-03-29(C)

Because Pursley was injured in an MBNA garage, we conclude Pursley was clearly within the zone of employment when she sustained her injury. The fact that the injury did not occur at the picnic, but as Pursley was leaving the event does not prevent her from qualifying for workers' compensation.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained after an employee reaches an employer-owned parking garage and follows the customary route to work, even if the injury occurs on a public sidewalk the employer does not control.

Collins v. W. S. Life Ins. Co., C-070189 (5-2-2008) · filed 2008-05-02(C)

For an injury to be compensable, the claimant must meet both prongs of the test established in the statute: the injury must be received "in the course of employment," as well as "arise out of" the employment. ... Thus, we uphold the trial court's determination that Collins's injuries were received in the course of, and arose out of, her employment with Western Southern.

An injury on the direct route from a client's home to a nearby vehicle may arise out of employment when the worker still has an assigned duty to complete.

Kershner v. High Point Home Health, Ltd. · filed 2013-04-05(C)

Because her duties did not end upon exiting the home, Kershner was within the zone of her employment when she fell.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained within the zone of employment when it arises out of and occurs in the course of employment.

Hicks v. Safelite Group, Inc. · filed 2021-09-02(C)

Under the particular facts of this case, we conclude that, as a matter of law, Hicks was within the zone of employment when she slipped and fell in the parking lot adjacent to Safelite's leased office building. Consequently, Hicks' alleged injuries arose out ... of, and in the course of, her employment, and the trial court erred in determining Hicks is not entitled to participate in the workers' compensation fund.

Section 4123.01(K) excludes sexual contact without penetration from its definition of sexual conduct.

L.E.P. v. Cuyahoga Cty. · filed 2023-02-16(K)

But contact, even in a sexual manner, is not sufficient to satisfy the worker’s compensation definition of sexual conduct as defined in R.C. 4123.01(K).