Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.01

Section 4123.01(C) does not treat a mental injury caused by mental or emotional stress as a compensable injury.

Harover v. City of Norwood · filed 1988-06-22(C)

We overrule the assignment of error because the record does not demonstrate that appellant suffered an “injury” as defined in R.C. 4123.01(C). That section does not include as a com-pensable injury a mental injury caused by mental or emotional stress.

Under the version of § 4123.01(C) in force in 1983, a mental condition caused solely by mental or emotional stress was not a compensable injury.

Hayes v. City of Toledo · filed 1989-04-28(C)

Our analysis of existing case law indicates that a mental condition caused solely by mental or emotional stress has never been a compensable injury under R.C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C)(1) permits compensation for an emotional injury only when a physical injury causes it; a contemporaneous physical injury alone is insufficient.

Dunn v. Mayfield · filed 1990-03-12(C)(1)

Furthermore, Ryan does not change established Ohio law that an emotional injury is not compensable, despite a contemporaneous physical injury, unless that physical injury causes the emotional injury. See R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) and Lengel v. Griswold (Nov. 25, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 53054, unreported, 1987 WL 20459.

Under § 4123.01(C), a claimed injury from work stress must arise out of and occur in the course of employment; stomach pain without evidence of a qualifying injury does not suffice.

Barnes v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1990-08-15(C)

Our review of the record convinces us that whatever injury the plaintiff may have suffered did not result “from greater emotional strain or tension than that to which all workers are occasionally subjected.” Beyond this, if there was some injury present under the circumstances, the evidence fails to show that the plaintiff suffered an “injury” in the course of, and arising out of, his employment. It is undisputed that Dr. Minkin was unable to discover a physical injury for the plaintiffs pain, and that, in his expert opinion, the plaintiff had not, in fact, suffered an injury.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an initial injury received in the course of and arising out of employment for dependents to recover benefits after an employee’s suicide.

Borbely v. Prestole Everlock, Inc. · filed 1991-01-16(C)

Therefore, in overruling Brubaker, supra, to the extent inconsistent herewith, we hold that in order for dependents to recover workers’ compensation benefits for a death by suicide, they must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there was initially an injury received in the course of, and arising out of, the employee’s employment as defined by R.C. 4123.01(C); (2) the work-related injury caused the employee to become dominated by a disturbance of the mind of such severity as to override normal rational judgment; and (3) the disturbance resulted in the employee’s suicide.

Section 4123.01(C) permits compensation for a physical injury proximately caused by gradually developing workplace stress that exceeds the strain workers occasionally experience.

Kennedy v. City of Toledo · filed 1991-07-19(C)

Applying the law as stated to the facts set forth above, this court finds as to appellant’s first assignment of error that, when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of appellee, reasonable minds could conclude that the stress experienced by appellee was not the same stress “to which all workers are occasionally subjected” and that appellee’s heart attack was proximately caused by the job-related stress to which appellee was subjected between June and November 1983.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes psychiatric conditions caused solely by job-related stress from the definition of compensable injury.

Rambaldo v. Accurate Die Casting · filed 1992-12-11(C)(1)

We conclude that by specifically excluding claims for mental conditions based solely on job-related stress from the definition of “injury,” the General Assembly intended that this type of claim not be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, whether it is denominated as an injury claim or an occupational disease claim.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes psychiatric conditions caused solely by job-related stress from compensable injuries, and its specific exclusion prevails over the general rule of liberal construction.

Andolsek v. City of Kirtland · filed 1994-11-14(C)(1)

Clearly, R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) is the special provision and R.C. 4123.95 is the general provision. There can be no question that it was not the legislature’s manifest intent to have the general provision prevail over the special provision.

For injuries predating the 1986 amendment, a mental condition resulting from a contemporaneous physical injury and a physical condition caused by emotional trauma may be compensable if proved.

Grant v. Ohio Department of Liquor Control · filed 1993-01-29(C)

Grant’s physical-mental claim and mental-physical claim are both compensable, as long as the claimant can sustain her burden of proof.

A stress-related physical injury is compensable under § 4123.01(C) only when the employee experienced greater stress than workers generally occasionally experience.

Small v. Defiance Public Library · filed 1993-02-26(C)

In objectively considering whether work-related stress is compensable, it is necessary to view the stress experienced by the injured employee in comparison to the stress encountered by every member of the work force.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an objective showing that the stress causing a physical injury was greater than the stress workers ordinarily experience.

Howell v. Euclid & Wickliffe Services · filed 1994-12-27(C)

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held “that a physical injury occasioned solely by mental or emotional stress, received in the course of, and arising out of, an injured employee’s employment, is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C).” ... We agree with the reasoning in Small and hold that the first part of the test established in Ryan requires an objective standard.

Section 4123.01(C) allows compensation for a physical injury caused solely by workplace mental or emotional stress only when the stress exceeds what workers occasionally experience, judged objectively.

Pence v. McSwain Carpets, Inc. · filed 1993-07-14(C)

A physical injury occasioned solely by mental or emotional stress, received in the course of, and arising out of, an injured employee’s employment, is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C). ... The trial court, therefore, properly held that Pence was not entitled to participate in the Workers’ Compensation Fund because she failed to demonstrate that her injury resulted from greater emotional strain or tension than that to which all employees are occasionally subjected.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes psychiatric injuries without contemporaneous physical or traumatic injury from workers’ compensation, and that exclusion does not exceed the legislature’s authority under the Ohio Constitution.

Connors v. Sterling Milk Co. · filed 1993-11-04(C)(1)

Furthermore, as Section 35, Article II grants the state the authority to determine the terms and conditions of payment under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the General Assembly did not exceed its authority by excluding psychiatric injuries without contemporaneous physical or traumatic injury as being not compensable.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) includes psychiatric conditions proximately caused by a physical injury received in the course of employment.

Karavolos v. Brown Derby, Inc. · filed 1994-12-19(C)(1)

Because psychiatric conditions which arise from an initial compensable physical injury fall within the definition of “injury” pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C)(1), we conclude that the exceptions provided for in R.C. 4123.54(A) and (B) do not, as a matter of law, preclude appellant’s claims for dysthymia and cocaine delusional disorder under the factual predicate present in this case.

Section 4123.01(C) permits compensation for a mental condition caused by a work-related physical injury when the resulting disturbance of the mind is severe enough to override normal behavior.

Banks v. Ltv Steel Co. · filed 1995-02-22(C)

Thus, in order to recover workers’ compensation benefits for a mental condition, the employee must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there was an injury received in the course of, and arising out of, the employee’s employment as defined by R.C. 4123.01(C); and (2) the work-related injury caused the employee to become dominated by a disturbance of the mind of such severity as to override normal behavior.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes psychiatric conditions that do not result from a physical injury from the definition of “injury” under the workers’ compensation chapter.

Bunger v. Lawson Co. · filed 1998-08-05(C)(1)

Thus, for the purposes of R.C. Chapter 4123, psychiatric conditions that do not result from a physical injury do not constitute an “injury.”

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes psychiatric conditions from the definition of injury unless they arise from an injury or occupational disease.

State v. Industrial Commission, Unpublished Decision (9-30-1999) · filed 1999-09-30(C)(1)

"Injury" does not include "psychiatric conditions except where the conditions have arisen from an injury or occupational disease." R.C. 4123.01 (C) (1). Thus, unless an employee suffers a physical injury, a psychiatric condition resulting from employment is not compensable under Ohio law.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes purely mental or emotional conditions that do not arise from a physical injury.

Crutcher v. Butler Township · filed 1999-11-12(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) specifically excludes purely mental or emotional conditions that do not arise from a physical injury.

Psychological injuries that arise from a work-related physical injury are compensable, even if they manifest later.

Harrison v. Franklin Cy. Sheriff's Dept., Unpublished Decision (12-12-2000) · filed 2000-12-12(C)(1)

Her psychological injuries, even though partly manifesting themselves later, were all a direct consequence of the attack on her by Campbell, and compensable, in total, through the state workers' compensation system. Psychological injuries often arise later; yet, if related to the work-connected injury, they are compensable.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) includes psychological injuries arising from a compensable injury in the workers' compensation claim.

Estate of New v. Dairy Mart Conv. Stores, Unpublished Decision (7-16-2001) · filed 2001-07-16(C)(1)

R.C. 4123.01 (C)(1) includes recovery for psychological injuries that arise from an injury within the workers' compensation scheme. Any psychological injuries that arise as part of an injury that is compensable under the workers' compensation system should be included together as part of the same claim.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes psychological conditions that do not arise from a compensable physical injury, and that exclusion is permitted by Article II, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution.

Wood v. Ohio State Highway Patrol · filed 2004-04-01(C)(1)

This is evidenced by the fact that the General Assembly chose to define the terms “injury” and “occupational disease” in such a way as to exclude psychological conditions not arising from compensable physical injury. This decision is within the General Assembly’s discretion. Thus, R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) does not violate Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

Section 4123.01(C) covers a physical injury caused solely by workplace mental or emotional stress when the stress exceeds what all workers occasionally experience and substantially causes the injury.

Bishop v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation · filed 2001-12-04(C)

Plaintiffs claim for workers’ compensation benefits is premised on the contention that her heart attack resulted from a work-related “injury” as that term is defined in R.C. 4123.01(C). ... To satisfy this test, the claimant must distinguish the job stress at issue from the normal, everyday stress that all workers experience from time to time. ... The claimant must demonstrate a “substantial causal relationship between the stress and the injury for which compensation is sought.”

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes psychological or psychiatric conditions that do not arise from a compensable physical injury or occupational disease from workers’ compensation coverage, and that exclusion does not violate equal protection.

McCrone v. Bank One Corp. · filed 2005-12-28(C)(1)

We accept the appellant Bureau of Workers’ Compensation’s position and hold that R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions by excluding from the definition of “injury” psychological or psychiatric conditions that do not arise from a compensable physical injury or occupational disease.

Section 4123.01(C)(1) excludes a psychological condition from the definition of injury when no compensable physical injury occurred, even if the employee perceived a threat to a coworker.

Ireland v. S. Ohio Correctional Facility, Unpublished Decision (6-22-2006) · filed 2006-06-22(C)(1)

Adhering to the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in McCrone v. Bank One Corp. (2005), 107 Ohio St.3d 272 , 839 N.E.2d 1 , 2005-Ohio-6505 , we conclude that psychological conditions that do not arise from a compensable physical injury are excluded from the statutory definition of "injury".

Section 4123.01(C)(1) requires a causal connection between a covered physical injury and psychological trauma; the physical injury need not be the sole cause.

Jones v. Catholic Healthcare Partners, Inc. · filed 2013-09-11(C)(1)

Appellee, in compliance with R.C. 4123.01(C)(1), is required to demonstrate a causal connection between her covered physical injury and her psychological trauma. Appellee has satisfied this burden with the deposition testimony of her treating physician.

Section 4123.01(C) generally excludes injuries sustained while traveling to a fixed workplace unless the zone of employment or special hazard exception applies.

Tudor v. Mayfield · filed 1989-04-27(C)

An injury sustained by an employee is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act only if it is "* * * received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C); Bralley v. Daugherty (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 302 , 303 , 15 O.O.3d 359, 360, 401 N.E.2d 448 , 449 . ... Generally, where an employee, having a fixed and limited place of employment, sustains an injury while travelling to and from his place of employment, such injury does not evidence the required causal connection to the employment; it therefore does not arise out of and in the course of his employment and is not compensable. ... Accordingly, Tudor's injury did not arise out of his employment, and it is not compensable.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes injuries sustained while commuting from a fixed workplace unless the travel involves a work-related risk or another exception.

Kunze v. City of Columbus Police Department · filed 1991-07-11(C)

Under R.C. 4123.01(C), an injury is not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act unless it occurred in the course of and arising out of employment. ... In sum, we find that the traditional going-and-coming rule bars compensation in this case and that no exception can be made for appellant by virtue of his status as a police officer or because of any special hazard or risk associated with his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) can cover an injury during travel to a temporary job site when that travel is a substantial part of the employee’s work.

Fletcher v. Northwest Mechanical Contractors, Inc. · filed 1991-08-09(C)

Upon consideration of the evidence that was before the trial court and the law as set forth above, this court finds that: (1) it is undisputed that the decedent’s employment involved his working at various job sites, that such job sites were temporary, that he was dispatched to work at job sites at times and places designated by his employer, and he was not required to report to a fixed situs each day prior to traveling to his job sites; (2) there remains no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (3) when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of appellant, reasonable minds could conclude that the decedent was a semi-fixed employee whose travel to work was a substantial part of his employment, and that he was “in the course of” his employment when he was fatally injured.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes an injury sustained while driving home when the employee fails to show a sufficient causal connection to employment.

Moffitt v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation · filed 1991-12-23(C)

Appellant has failed to demonstrate any causal connection between his injury and the activities, conditions and environment of employment to fall within the zone of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to arise out of and occur in the course of employment; an assault during an ordinary commute does not satisfy the course of employment requirement.

Slagle v. White Castle Systems, Inc. · filed 1992-04-09(C)

To be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an injury which arises out of the employment must also be sustained during the course of employment. ... As Ty’s injury was not sustained in the course of employment, the injury is not compensable and defendant is not entitled to immunity under R.C. 4123.74.

An injury on the direct route from an employer’s parking lot to its plant entrance can occur in the course of employment, even when the route crosses a public street.

Blair v. Daugherty · filed 1978-09-26(C)

At that point, his activities were hampered and controlled by the requirements of his job, and his movement along the direct route from the employer’s parking area to the employer’s nearest gate was a necessary incident of his employment. In other words, Blair sustained his injury in the usual and ordinary course of a day’s work.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a causal connection between an injury and employment; an injury on the employee’s commute over a public road more than one-third of a mile from work lacked that connection.

Bralley v. Daugherty · filed 1980-03-12(C)

Appellee’s injuries did not arise out of and in the course of her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; carrying work supplies on an ordinary commute did not meet that standard.

Monjar v. Mayfield · filed 1987-02-23(C)

The conclusion that we reach is that appellant’s injury did not occur in the course of, and arising out of, her employment and she is not entitled to benefits.

An injury during an unauthorized trip several miles from the work site for food falls outside the course of employment under section 4123.01(C).

Fox v. Mayfield · filed 1988-02-01(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) ... requires that in order for an individual to recover for an injury under the workers’ compensation law the injury must have occurred “in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” ... The evidence indicates as a matter of law that Fox was outside the scope of his employment and thus not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes injuries sustained on a purely personal errand from the course of employment, even during a work-related trip.

Marbury v. Industrial Commission · filed 1989-05-10(C)

However, reasonable minds can only come to the conclusion that when she left the bus and entered a souvenir shop in Washington for the purpose of purchasing a T-shirt for her daughter, she was on a purely personal mission of her own, having nothing to do with her employer’s purposes, and was therefore outside the course of her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) generally excludes an injury sustained while traveling to or from lunch away from the employer’s premises unless the injury has a sufficient connection to employment.

Hill v. General Metal Heat Treating, Inc. · filed 1988-05-09(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) defines an “injury” for which death benefits are payable under R.C. 4123.59: ... Similarly, an employee’s injury is generally not compensable if the employee sustains it while traveling to or from lunch away from the employer’s premises.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained in employer-paid temporary lodging when the injury occurs in the course of and arises out of employment.

Weaver v. Eaton Corp. · filed 1990-05-03(C)

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we conclude that Robert Weaver sustained his fatal carbon monoxide exposure in the course of and arising out of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to be received in the course of and arising out of employment; an off-duty trip far from the driver’s delivery point and motel lacked that connection.

Elsass v. Commercial Carriers, Inc. · filed 1992-01-10(C)

In the case sub judice, under the foregoing authority, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, we find that appellant’s injuries were not received “in the course of and arising out of” his employment with appellee.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; a fixed worksite employee’s commute generally falls outside the course of employment.

Silvers v. Elco Steel Company, Unpublished Decision (12-15-1997) · filed 1997-12-15(C)

In order for an injury to be compensable, both prongs of the test set out by R.C. 4123.01 (C) must be satisfied: The injury must be received (1) "in the course of" employment, and (2) it must have arisen out of employment. ... Accordingly, we find that reasonable minds could only conclude that appellant was a "fixed situs" employee, traveling was not part of his employment, and therefore, he was not in the course of his employment when the accident occurred.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; whether a slight detour during paid travel between job sites meets that requirement can be a question of fact.

Gerdes v. Super America Group, Unpublished Decision (4-21-1997) · filed 1997-04-21(C)

Workers' compensation is provided for individuals and their dependents, for "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Based upon these facts, we find that a reasonable person could conclude that appellant was within the scope of her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained during required travel between job sites when the injury is causally connected to the employment.

Brown v. Bernen's Medical, Unpublished Decision (11-17-1997) · filed 1997-11-17(C)

Thus, the "going and coming" rule is not applicable and an employee is acting "in the course of" employment where an employee, who is required to travel as an integral part of his job, sustains an injury while travelling between various job sites to perform services on behalf of his employer. ... Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Brown's injuries occurred in the course of and arose out of her employment with Bernens.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes a commuting injury when it occurs outside the employee’s zone of employment and involves no special hazard.

Smith v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation · filed 1997-10-27(C)

Course and scope of employment is the standard to be used when a claimant wishes to participate in the Workers’ Compensation Fund under R.C. 4123.01(C). ... The collision did not come about as the result of the plaintiffs exposure to a “special hazard” and, therefore, the injury did not arise out of the scope and course of the plaintiffs employment.

A work-related special errand may keep an employee’s trip home within the course of employment when it alters normal travel and the injury occurs close in time and place to the errand.

Fleming v. Morgan Local School Bd. of Ed., Unpublished Decision (11-25-1998) · filed 1998-11-25(C)

In order to be entitled to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund, appellant must demonstrate that his accident arose out of and in the course of his employment, pursuant to R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Further, an injury incurring on the way home after completing a work-related errand may still be within the scope of employment. ... Appellant was still close enough in time and space to the original errand to allow reasonable minds to conclude that he was completing his work-related errand and returning home when the accident occurred.

Section 4123.01(C) does not cover an employee’s injury while leaving work on a public street when the employment created no special hazard.

Vincent v. Administrator, Workers' Comp., Unpublished Decision (5-27-1999) · filed 1999-05-27(C)

The Ohio workers' compensation statute generally covers "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and results, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... The risk of the appellant falling in a public crosswalk was not a "special hazard" created by the appellee, but rather was the identical risk as would face any pedestrian choosing to cross Cornell Road at the location where this incident occurred. Accordingly, appellant's claim should not have been allowed.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; crossing a public street without a special hazard created by the employment does not qualify, and picking up a paycheck creates no exception.

Rates v. Cuyahoga County Commissioners, Unpublished Decision (7-8-1999) · filed 1999-07-08(C)

In order for an injury to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, both prongs of the test set forth in R.C. 4123.01 (C) must be satisfied. ... Because appellant's employment did not create a special hazard, his injury is not compensable under the zone of employment exception to the coming-and-going rule. ... This court is unwilling to expand the law in Ohio to recognize a paycheck exception to the coming-and-going rule.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an employee's injury in a collision with a coworker on an employer-controlled access road after work when the injury arises out of and occurs in the course of employment.

Maienza v. Conrad., Unpublished Decision (9-20-2000) · filed 2000-09-20(C)

"The coming-and-going rule is a tool used to determine whether an injury suffered by an employee in a traffic accident occurs 'in the course of' and 'arises out of' the employment relationship so as to constitute a compensable injury under R.C. 4123.01 (C)." ... We find that an access road maintained and controlled by an employer for its exclusive benefit is not significantly different from a parking lot maintained and controlled by an employer exclusively for its employees. ... Thus, we find that the Marlow syllabus applies in this case and Maienza is entitled to participate in the Fund as a matter of law.

An employee injured within the zone of employment need not also show a special hazard to qualify for workers’ compensation.

Marks v. Kroger Company, Unpublished Decision (9-2-1999) · filed 1999-09-02

If an employee is in the "zone of employment", then the employee need not show any special hazard exists contributing to the injury. The special hazard rule is applied when the employee is outside the "zone of employment", but nevertheless encounters a risk either distinctive in nature or qualitatively greater than the risk common to the public.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of and occur in the course of employment; a commuting injury on a public curb is not covered when the employer did not control the area or create a special hazard.

Weiss v. University Hospitals of Cleveland · filed 2000-05-01(C)

Ohio’s workers’ compensation statute covers “any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, we find no causal connection between appellant’s injury and her employment.

An injury sustained while traveling home from a fixed place of employment does not qualify as occurring in the course of employment when the travel creates no risk greater than those common to the public.

Bartley v. Bagshaw Enterprises, Inc., Unpublished Decision (4-26-2004) · filed 2004-04-26(C)

For the purposes of workers' compensation, R.C. 4123.01 (C) defines an "injury" as "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." ... Thus, Bartley did not demonstrate that she sustained her injuries in the course of her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) does not cover a commuting injury on a public sidewalk outside the employer’s control when the employee could choose how to travel to work.

Johnston v. Case Western Reserve University · filed 2001-08-06(C)

Ohio’s workers’ compensation statute covers “any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Accordingly, because CWRU did not have control over the public area where decedent was injured and decedent had a choice as to how to travel to and from work, she was not in the zone of employment when she was injured.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; a worker’s duties away from assigned job sites can affect whether the coming-and-going rule bars benefits.

Werden v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation · filed 2003-03-13(C)

Given these facts and Beardman’s affidavit stating that appellant had no job duties to perform away from his assigned work site, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether appellant was a fixed-situs employee.

Section 4123.01(C) does not cover a fixed-situs employee's ordinary commute when the travel does not serve the employer's business.

Avery v. Manitowoc Nevada Group Toledo, Unpublished Decision (7-3-2003) · filed 2003-07-03(C)

The coming-and-going rule is a tool used to determine whether an injury suffered by an employee in a traffic accident occurs "in the course of" and "arise[s] out of" the employment relationship so as to constitute a compensable injury under R.C. 4123.01 (c). ... Therefore, the travel leading to the accident was not related to Avery's employment. As a result, Avery is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; a fixed-situs employee’s ordinary commute is not compensable without a sufficient connection to the employment.

Smith v. Carnegie Auto Parts, Unpublished Decision (3-8-2007) · filed 2007-03-08(C)

In order to be compensable by workers' compensation benefits, an employee's injury must be one "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C) (Emphasis added). ... Application of the Lord factors to the present case does not support compensation.

Section 4123.01(C) does not cover an employee’s trip to an assigned workplace under the special mission exception when the employer did not send the employee on an additional mission.

Bowden v. Cleveland Hts.-Univ., Unpublished Decision (12-20-2007) · filed 2007-12-20(C)

The Ohio Workers' Compensation statute covers injuries that are "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Since CHUHS did not send Bowden on some additional "mission" that was the major factor of her journey, the special mission exception does not apply in the instant case.

Section 4123.01(C) does not cover an injury suffered by a fixed-situs employee while traveling home after finishing work, unless an exception to the coming and going rule applies.

Mitchell v. Cambridge Home Health Care, 24163 (9-10-2008) · filed 2008-09-10(C)

R.C. Chapter 4123 permits an employee to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund if the employee's injury, "whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, [was] received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... The rule hinges upon whether an employee's injury occurs outside of her fixed situs, regardless of the situs' location. ... She admitted that she was in the process of leaving for home when her injury occurred. ... As such, the trial court did not err in determining that Mitchell was subjected to the "coming and going rule."

Under § 4123.01(C), whether the coming-and-going rule bars compensation depends on the employee’s overall duties and whether they establish a fixed work site.

Klamert v. City of Cleveland · filed 2010-02-11(C)

Generally, to be entitled to receive Workers’ Compensation Fund payments, one must sustain an injury “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... The determination of whether one is a fixed-situs or nonfixed-situs employee must be made in light of the overall employment duties, not from an overly constrained examination of the activities on one day when an accident happens to occur.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur both in the course of and arising out of employment; an ordinary commute home does not satisfy the course-of-employment requirement when the employee was not required to drive for work.

Guzauskas v. Ryan · filed 2010-03-12(C)

Since both course-of-employment and arising-out-of-employment elements are required and the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first requirement, the court finds that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; an ordinary commute by a fixed-situs employee does not qualify unless an exception applies.

Price v. Goodwill Industries of Akron, Ohio, Inc. · filed 2011-02-18(C)

The coming-and-going rule is used to determine whether an injury suffered by an employee in a traffic accident occurs “in the course of” and “arise[s] out of” the employment relationship so as to constitute a compensable injury under R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Appellant herein was not performing any special task, mission, or errand for her employer when she sustained her injuries.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained in the course of and arising out of employment, including a traveling employee’s fall while entering a hotel needed for work.

Lippolt v. Hague, 08ap-140 (9-30-2008) · filed 2008-09-30(C)

Thus, to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Fund, an employee's injury must be received in the course of, and arising out of, his or her employment. ... Having determined that no genuine issues of material fact remain and that the trial court appropriately concluded that Lippolt's injury occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment, we find that the trial court did not err in granting Lippolt's motion for summary judgment or in denying Hague's motion for summary judgment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; whether the coming-and-going rule applies depends on the worker’s fixed-situs status.

Gullie v. Cuyahoga Cty. · filed 2014-10-02(C)

We note that the coming-and-going rule “is a tool used to determine whether an injury suffered by an employee in a traffic accident occurs ‘in the course of’ and ‘arises out of’ the employment relationship so as to constitute a compensable injury under R.C. 4123.01(C).” ... Based on the circumstances of the instant case, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Gullie is a fixed-situs employee. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in the County’s favor.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes an injury sustained while traveling home after work when the circumstances show no causal connection to employment.

Molton v. Kroger Co. · filed 2017-02-17(C)

An employee is generally entitled to workers’ compensation for injuries “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... The coming-and-going rule precludes recovery of workers’ compensation benefits as a result of Byrd’s injury and death.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; an employee’s dual personal and work purposes do not replace those tests.

Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Assn. of Mid-Ohio (Slip Opinion) · filed 2014-10-21(C)

An injury compensable under the workers’ compensation system must have occurred “in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). This court has recognized that both prongs of this statutory definition must be met. ... The proper way to analyze workers’ compensation claims, even for employees traveling for both personal and employment purposes, is to apply the “in the course of” and “arising out of” tests described in Fisher and its progeny, including the totality-of-the-circumstances tests for causation described in Lord and Ruckman. Even when work creates the necessity for travel and the travel includes a personal purpose, workers’ compensation benefits are available only for an injury that occurs in the course of and arising out of the employment.

An employee's commute injury may qualify for workers' compensation when the employment creates a special hazard that makes the travel risk greater than the risk faced by the public.

Petry v. Kilbarger Constr., Inc. · filed 2015-11-06(C)

The analysis now is whether appellant created the "special hazard." Under the facts of this case, we answer in the affirmative for the following reasons. ... Therefore, appellee is entitled to participate in the workers' compensation fund.

Section 4123.01(C) covers a commute injury when the employment creates a special hazard that makes the travel risk greater than the risk faced by the public.

Perry v. Kilbarger Constr., Inc. · filed 2015-11-06(C)

The analysis now is whether appellant created the "special hazard." Under the facts of this case, we answer in the affirmative for the following reasons.

A commuting injury can arise out of employment under § 4123.01(C) when the job creates a special hazard that makes the travel risk greater than the risk common to the public.

McMasters v. Kilbarger Constr., Inc. · filed 2015-11-06(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) defines "injury" for purposes of workers' compensation benefits as: "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." ... The analysis now is whether appellant created the "special hazard." Under the facts of this case, we answer in the affirmative for the following reasons. ... Therefore, appellee is entitled to participate in the workers' compensation fund.

Under § 4123.01(C), occasional travel to other work sites does not establish a special hazard when the commute creates no risk distinct from or greater than risks faced by the public.

Green v. Marc Glassman, Inc. · filed 2017-12-29(C)

Even construing the evidence most strongly in Green's favor, the risks created by the additional responsibility for installing cash registers were not distinctive in nature from or quantitatively greater than risks common to the public.

Section 4123.01(C) does not cover a commuting injury when neither the zone of employment nor the totality of the circumstances establishes a connection to employment.

Parrish v. Cavaliers Holding, L.L.C. · filed 2019-01-10(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C), Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation statute, encompasses “any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” ... Therefore, we find that Parrish was not in the zone of employment when he was injured and, accordingly, his claim is not compensable under this exception to the coming-and-going rule.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; an ordinary commute without a special hazard does not qualify.

Mangan v. Texas Roadhouse Mgt. Corp. · filed 2021-06-29(C)

Although we are sympathetic to the great loss resulting from Lopez- Hernandez's death, the workers' compensation system is not the proper venue for appellants' claim as the circumstances of this case do not meet the statutory definition of injury pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C) excludes a fixed-site employee’s commute injury from compensation under the coming and going rule unless an exception applies.

Hurley v. Group Mgt. Servs., Inc. · filed 2022-12-27(C)

R.C. 4123.01(C) provides that in order for an employee’s injury to be compensable under the workers’ compensation fund, the injury must be “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” ... Applying the Ruckman, test, we find the trial court properly concluded appellant was a fixed-situs employee and there is no genuine issue of material fact as to appellant’s status as a fixed-situs employee subject to the coming and going rule.

Section 4123.01 covers an injury during employer-sponsored recreation when the employer receives a business-related benefit sufficiently connected to the employment, even if that benefit is intangible.

Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Sommer · filed 1974-06-14(C)

We find from the stipulations that the company sustained a business-related benefit, although such was intangible and not immediately measurable, and. the benefit was sufficiently related to the employment to impose upon the company a risk incidental to the activity; therefore, the employee’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury that arises out of employment when the employee is within the zone of employment and engaged in an activity consistent with that employment.

Bauder v. Mayfield · filed 1988-02-19(C)

The evidentiary matters before the court of common pleas on the motion for summary judgment herein would indicate that appellee was within the zone of her employment and engaged in an undertaking consistent with her employment at the time she was injured. We conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellee’s injuries arose out of her employment and that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in appellee’s favor.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an accidental injury during a paid break when the employee acts within the employer’s permitted practices and is injured by a device under the employer’s control on its premises.

Lemming v. University of Cincinnati · filed 1987-08-12(C)

There is no question that Lemming suffered an injury “accidental in character” under R.C. 4123.01(C), and contrary to the administrative and judicial rulings below, we hold it was received in the course of, and arising out of, her employment. The determinative factors, in our judgment, are that she was on a paid break, she was conducting herself within the permissive instructions and customs of her employer, and she was injured by a device under her employer’s control while still on her employer’s premises.

Section 4123.01(C)’s course-of-employment requirement can cover injuries outside scheduled work hours.

Delker v. Ohio Edison Co. · filed 1989-04-05(C)

By so finding, the trial court appears to have ignored that substantial body of well-settled workers’ compensation law which broadens the definition of “course of employment” to include occurrences outside scheduled work hours.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury caused by a sneeze when the employee’s position while operating a press contributes to the injury and the causal evidence is undisputed.

Grimes v. Mayfield · filed 1989-01-19(C)

An injury sustained by an employee that is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act “includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). It is undisputed in the case at bar that employee sustained his injury while in the course of his employment. ... We therefore conclude, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Waller, that a motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence in the case at bar should have been granted.

Section 4123.01(C) permits compensation for an injury that arises out of and occurs in the course of employment, including an injury on employment premises the employer does not own or control.

Faber v. R.J. Frazier Co. · filed 1991-01-02(C)

We agree with the trial court that the fenced CEI property which includes the plant, parking lots, and access road, comprised the employment premises Of the decedent, regardless of its actual ownership, maintenance and control. ... Applying the principles of liberal construction, the totality of the circumstances and the factors set forth in Lord, supra, to the case sub judice, we find that decedent's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and is, therefore, compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C).

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to arise out of and occur in the course of employment; an employee’s injury while repairing his own vehicle during work hours did not qualify.

Tamarkin Co. v. Wheeler · filed 1992-01-02(C)

A compensable “injury” must be “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... The combined facts that (1) the vandal chose the Giant Eagle parking lot as the scene of the crime, and (2) Wheeler decided to attempt the hazardous repair during his working hours, are not sufficient to justify participation in the Worker’s Compensation Fund.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; whether a rest-break injury meets that standard may require a factual determination of its connection to the employment.

Pilar v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation · filed 1992-10-05(C)

Here, we likewise find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Pilar’s injuries were sustained in the course of and arising out of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) excludes an injury from compensation when the employee’s conduct creates a hazard unrelated to the employee’s job duties.

Carrick v. Riser Foods, Inc. · filed 1996-10-21(C)

In applying the foregoing law regarding the element “in the course of’ to the facts before this court, we analogize appellant’s act of rocking the soda machine to horseplay. The hazard created by appellant’s tipping the soda machine was not a hazard incident to the performance of his duties as a stocker.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of employment; an assault after work at an off-site restaurant, while the employee was performing no work duties, does not meet that requirement.

Stivison v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1997-12-31(C)

The assault which injured Stivison occurred neither during his working hours, nor at his place of employment, nor while he was fulfilling his working duties. Stivison’s injuries were, therefore, not sustained “in the course of” his employment, as that phrase is interpreted by Ohio law.

Section 4123.01(C) does not cover an injury sustained while picketing during a union strike, even on the employer’s premises.

Koger v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1993-09-22(C)

The issue raised in Roger’s only assignment of error is whether an injury sustained on the employer’s premises by an employee while walking a picket line, during a strike organized by his union, is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C). We hold that it is not.

Section 4123.01(C) does not cover an injury during an after-hours bowling league when the employer did not control or sponsor the activity or benefit from it.

Henderson v. Gould, Inc. · filed 1994-08-01(C)

In this case, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that plaintiff did not sustain her injury in the course of and arising out of her employment. ... The evidence indicated that participation in the bowling league involved only a small fraction of Gould’s employees, bowling occurred after work hours and away from Gould’s premises, paperwork for the league was not to be completed during work hours, and the company did not supervise, pay for, or sponsor the recreational pursuit.

A recreational waiver under § 4123.01(C)(3) does not remove an injury from the course of employment or the workers’ compensation system.

Jones v. Multi-Color Corp. · filed 1995-12-29(C)(3)

We do not agree with appellees that by virtue of R.C. 4123.01(C)(3), Jones’s injury is not in the course of or arising out of employment. ... Thus, we first hold that the waiver which Jones signed does not remove his injury from the course of his employment and thus from the workers’ compensation system.

Section 4123.01(C)'s “arising out of” requirement can be satisfied when an off-duty police officer is injured while trying to prevent a violent felony outside his jurisdiction.

Luketic v. University Circle, Inc. · filed 1999-08-19(C)

The second prong of R.C. 4123.01(C), ie., “arising out of,” contemplates a causal connection between the employment and the injury sustained. ... Although the zone-of-employment and special-hazard rules have generally been used as exceptions to the coming-and-going rule, we find that the exceptions are equally applicable to satisfy the causal connection/“arising out of’ prong when an off-duty police officer is injured attempting to prevent a violent felony outside his jurisdiction.

An assault injury may arise out of employment when a work-related quarrel exacerbates a personal dispute and causally contributes to the injury.

Coleman v. Apcoa, Inc., Unpublished Decision (9-28-1999) · filed 1999-09-28(C)

Rather, an injury that results from an animosity fueled by both personal and work-related quarrels should be compensable when the work-related quarrel exacerbated the situation and, thus, establishes a causal connection between the injury and the employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a claimant to show that an injury occurred in the course of employment and arose from it; disputed facts about an off-duty officer’s conduct may leave that question for a jury.

Smith v. City of Cleveland, Unpublished Decision (12-13-2001) · filed 2001-12-13(C)

In order to receive benefits from the Bureau, a claimant, such as Smith here, must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) his injury arose out of the course and scope of his employment and (2) a direct and proximate causal relationship exists between the injury and the employment. R.C. 4123.01 (C); Fisher v. Mayfield (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 275 , 551 N.E.2d 1271 . ... Given the above, we find that there remain genuine issues of material fact about whether Smith's death occurred within the course of and arising out of his employment as a City of Cleveland police officer.

Section 4123.01(C) permits compensation for an intentional assault by a co-worker when the injury occurs in the course of and arises out of employment.

Luo v. Gao, Unpublished Decision (3-7-2007) · filed 2007-03-07(C)

The correct inquiry in determining whether appellant is entitled to participate in the workers' compensation program is whether appellant's injuries were sustained during the course of and arising out of his employment. R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Appellant's assignments of error are sustained in that this Court finds that appellant received his injuries from Co-Worker during the course of and within the scope of his employment with appellee and that appellant did nothing to remove himself from his scope of employment.

Section 4123.01(C) allows an inference that an unexplained fall arose out of employment when the claimant eliminates idiopathic causes, while retaining the burden of proving a causal connection to employment.

Waller v. Mayfield · filed 1988-06-08(C)

An injury sustained by an employee that is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act “includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Therefore, we also hold that in a workers’ compensation case where idiopathic causes for an unexplained fall have been eliminated, an inference arises that the fall was traceable to some ordinary risk, albeit unidentified, to which the employee was exposed on the employment premises.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of employment; a claimant’s sworn statement of good health may suffice to eliminate idiopathic causes of an unexplained fall and prevent summary judgment.

Smith v. Apex Division, Cooper Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-06-14(C)

Workers’ compensation is available to an employee who is accidentally injured if her injury was “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). ... Expert medical testimony may be appropriate in cases where an idiopathic cause is at issue, but we hold that the claimant’s own sworn statement of good health may be sufficient to eliminate idiopathic causes under the facts in this record, and will certainly save the cause from being summarily dismissed.

Section 4123.01(C) permits an inference that an unexplained workplace injury arose out of employment when the claimant eliminates idiopathic causes.

Stewart v. B.F. Goodrich Co. · filed 1993-06-18(C)

Therefore, Dr. Dennis’s deposition testimony was sufficient, when construing it most strongly in appellant’s favor, to eliminate idiopathic causes for appellant’s injuries and raise the inference that the unexplained syncopal episode arose out of appellant’s employment, i.e., appellant’s injuries were compensable under the workers’ compensation act.

An injury caused by a worker's preexisting condition is compensable under § 4123.01(C) when a condition or hazard of employment increases the risk of injury.

Duvall v. J J Refuse, Unpublished Decision (1-18-2005) · filed 2005-01-18(C)

For an injury to be compensable, it must be ". . . received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... However, if an idiopathic injury occurs and there was some condition or hazard of the employee's employment that created an increased risk of injury, then the idiopathic injury is compensable. ... Appellant's actions in "hurrying" down the stairs clearly do not amount to a condition or hazard of his employment, but rather constitute a condition or hazard created by appellant himself.

Section 4123.01(F) permits an occupational disease claim when the disease meets the general criteria of work-related causation, a distinctive employment hazard, and greater risk than the public generally, even if the disease is also listed in the statutory schedule.

Hutchinson v. Ohio Ferro Alloys Corp. · filed 1994-08-09(F)

Proof of the three definitional criteria of "occupational disease" -- causal connection, hazard and risk -- creates a compensable claim, regardless of whether the disease is scheduled or non-scheduled.

Section 4123.01(F) defines an occupational disease by its connection to employment and the greater, distinct risk the employment creates compared with work generally and the public.

Howell v. Dayton Power & Light Co. · filed 1995-03-21(F)

We believe the above testimony easily establishes substantial competent evidence from which reasonable minds could find that appellee met all the criteria to prove an occupational disease.

Section 4123.01(F) can cover carpal tunnel syndrome and ulnar neuropathy when employment creates a distinct hazard and a greater risk of contracting the diseases than the public generally faces.

Frye v. Weber & Sons Service Repair, Inc. · filed 1998-02-02(F)

In light of the overall record, it is our opinion that appellee presented evidence indicating that she contracted carpal tunnel syndrome and ulnar neuropathy in the course of her employment with appellant, “which by its causes and characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of employment results in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally.”

Section 4123.01 sets different requirements for a compensable injury and an occupational disease.

McCabe v. Zeller Corp. · filed 1997-01-16(C), (F)

Clearly, the facts necessary to establish an injury claim versus an occupational injury claim are different in that each claim requires demonstration of different elements. To demonstrate an injury, a claimant must show an injury caused by accidental means, received in the course of, and arising out of, the claimant’s employment. R.C. 4123.01(C). ... The standard for receiving compensation for an occupational disease is different, however. In occupational disease cases, the burden is on the claimant to show (1) that the disease was contracted in the course of employment, (2) that the disease, by its causes and characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of the employment, results from a hazard that distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally, and (3) that the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in greater degree than and in a different manner from the public generally. R.C. 4123.01(F).

Section 4123.01(F) requires a claimant with an unscheduled occupational disease to prove that the disease arose in the course of the named employment, involved a distinctive occupational hazard, and posed a greater risk than it did to the public.

Carrera v. Becdir Construction Co., Unpublished Decision (4-20-2000) · filed 2000-04-20(F)

As such, according to R.C. § 4123.01 (F) Appellee had the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he: ""1) Contracted the alleged disease in the course of his named employment; 2) The disease by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of the named employment result in a hazard which distinguishes the named employment in character from employment generally; and 3) The named employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in greater degree and in a different manner from the public in general." ... Thus, in combination this testimony is sufficient to support the conclusion that Appellee contracted the disease in November of 1993 while working for his only employer, Becdir Construction.

Section 4123.01(F) allows an unscheduled occupational disease claim when the disease was contracted in the course of employment, the work presents a distinctive hazard, and the work creates a greater risk than the public generally faces.

White v. Center Manufacturing Co. · filed 1998-03-20(F)

Alternatively, an employee may prove that he has an occupational disease if he satisfies the three elements set forth in R.C. 4123.01(F). These are (1) the disease was contracted in the course of employment, (2) the employment by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of the employment results in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally, and (3) the employment creates a greater risk of contracting the disease in greater degree and in a.different manner from the public in general.

Section 4123.01(F) requires an occupational disease to be peculiar to the employment and to pose a greater and different risk than the public generally faces.

Ingram v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (12-20-2001) · filed 2001-12-20(F)

Appellant also has failed to establish the third criterion — whether the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in a greater degree and in a different manner than in the public generally. Pneumonia is a common illness to which the general public is exposed.

Sleep deprivation is not an occupational disease under § 4123.01(F) when it is not peculiar to the employment and the employment does not create a greater, distinct risk of it than the public faces.

MacKell v. Armco, Incorporated, Unpublished Decision (6-24-2002) · filed 2002-06-24(F)

We find that the trial court did not err in holding that sleep deprivation is not an occupational disease. Assuming, arguendo , that Mackell contracted sleep deprivation in the course of his employment with appellee, we find that appellant has failed to demonstrate that sleep deprivation is peculiar to Mackell's employment or that Mackell's employment created a risk of contracting the "disease" of sleep deprivation in greater degree and in a different manner from the public in general.

Section 4123.01(F) defines an occupational disease as one contracted through employment that creates a distinct hazard and a greater risk than the public generally faces.

Byrd v. Midland ross/grimes Aerospace, Unpublished Decision (12-19-2003) · filed 2003-12-19(F)

An "occupational disease" is statutorily defined as: "a disease contracted in the course of employment, which by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of the employment results in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally, and the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in greater degree and in a different manner than the public in general." R.C. 4123.68 (now R.C. 4123.01 [F]). ... Based on this testimony, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Aerospace, a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of whether appellee's employment created a hazard that actually led to the development of his alleged occupational disease.

Section 4123.01(F)’s comparative-risk element defines an occupational disease but does not relax the requirement to prove general and specific causation.

Valentine v. PPG Industries, Inc. · filed 2004-08-20(F)

R.C. 4123.01(F) defines an “occupational disease” as one that satisfies the following three elements: “(1) the disease is contracted in the course of employment; (2) the disease is peculiar to the claimant’s employment by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the conditions of the employment result in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally; and (3) the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in a greater degree and in a different manner than in the public generally.” ... Appellant construes the statutory requirement that a claimant must establish a risk of contracting a disease that is greater that that of the public generally as a liberalized causation standard. We disagree. The requirement dealing with comparative risk is simply a necessary predicate to participation in the worker’s compensation system; it is a definitional component of the term “occupational disease” that is intended to ensure that the injury to be compensated is truly workplace-related. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Murphy negates the contention that it is intended to abrogate the standard principles of proximate cause that require proof of both general and specific causation within a reasonable degree of expert certainty.

Section 4123.01(F) defines an occupational disease as one arising from a hazard distinctive to the employment that creates a greater and different risk than the public generally faces.

Googash v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (10-15-2004) · filed 2004-10-15(F)

An occupational disease is defined as "a disease contracted in the course of employment, which by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the conditions of the employment result in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally, and the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in a greater degree and in a different manner than the public generally." R.C. § 4123.01 (F).

Section 4123.01(F) requires proof of all three occupational disease elements, including a hazard that distinguishes the employment from other work and a greater, different risk than the public faces.

Diaz v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (5-18-2006) · filed 2006-05-18(F)

At trial, Diaz was required to prove three elements to show a compensable workers' compensation claim: (1) that her carpal tunnel syndrome was contracted in the course of her employment; (2) that her carpal tunnel syndrome, by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of the employment, results in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally; and (3) the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in greater degree and in a different manner from the public in general. See R.C. 4123.01 (F). Each and every element must be met in order to prove an occupational disease eligible for workers' compensation benefits.

Section 4123.01(F) requires proof that an occupational disease meets the statutory requirements for a distinct employment hazard and a greater and different risk than the public generally faces.

Brophey v. Admr., Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., 07 Ma 24 (2-12-2008) · filed 2008-02-12(F)

Here, it is clear from the responses to the jury interrogatories that Brophey did not meet his burden of establishing prongs two and three of the statutory requirements in R.C. 4123.01 (F).

Section 4123.01(F) covers an unscheduled occupational disease when it arises in the course of employment, is peculiar to the claimant’s work, and presents a greater and different risk than the public generally faces.

Stoneman v. Zimmer Orthopaedic Surgical Prods., 2007 Ap 08 0046 (10-2-2008) · filed 2008-10-02(F)

Although the conditions for which Appellee seeks benefits are not scheduled occupational diseases under R.C. 4123.68 , such conditions will qualify as occupational diseases if each of the prongs of the following test is satisfied: {¶ 161} "(1) The disease is contracted in the course of employment; (2) the disease is peculiar to the claimant's employment by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the conditions of the employment result in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally; and (3) the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in a greater degree and in a different manner than in the public generally." State, ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Krise (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 247 , 327 N.E.2d 756 , at syllabus. ... Appellee provided sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between her conditions and her employment to warrant the trial court's denial of Appellants' JNOV.

Section 4123.01(F) requires a claimant with a disease that is not listed as an occupational disease to prove that it was contracted in the course of employment, is peculiar to that employment, and presents a greater and different risk than the public generally.

McRoberts v. Gen. Elec. Co. · filed 2013-07-15(F)

Therefore, McRoberts had to prove that his "non-scheduled condition" of left carpal tunnel syndrome qualifies as an "occupational disease" under the three-prong test in State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Krise, 42 Ohio St.2d 247, 253-254 (1975), codified in R.C. 4123.01(F).

Section 4123.01(F) defines an occupational disease as one contracted in the course of employment where the work creates a distinctive hazard and a greater, different risk than the public faces.

Walker v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2014-09-25(F)

R.C. 4123.01(F) defines an “occupational disease” as a disease contracted in the course of employment, which by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of the employment results in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally, and the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in greater degree and in a different manner from the public in general.

Section 4123.01(F) defines an occupational disease as one contracted through employment that creates a distinct hazard and a greater, different risk than the public generally faces.

Bryant v. Gen. Motors Corp. · filed 2015-11-30(F)

R.C. 4123.01(F) defines an “occupational disease” as a disease contracted in the course of employment, which by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of the employment results in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally, and the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in greater degree and in a different manner from the public in general.

Section 4123.01(F) requires a claimant alleging an occupational disease from toxic exposure to prove that the toxin can cause the disease and that it caused the claimant’s disease.

Rusin v. Buehrer · filed 2017-11-03(F)

R.C. 4123.01(F) provides a definition of “occupational disease” that the Ohio Supreme Court has restated as a three-part test: ... Rusin had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that ALS can be caused by exposure to heavy metals and/or organophosphates, that his ALS was caused by such exposure, and that the exposure occurred during the course of his employment as a firefighter. ... However, Rusin must establish general and specific causation, and the trial court’s holding that Rusin did not prove specific causation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Section 4123.01(F) requires an occupational disease to arise from employment that creates a greater risk of contracting the disease, in a different manner, than the risk faced by the public generally.

Yeager v. Arconic Inc. · filed 2022-06-13(F)

Because Yeager did not meet his reciprocal summary judgment burden as to the third requirement of “occupational disease,” that his employment as a furnace operator creates a risk of contracting COVID-19 in greater degree and in a different manner from the public in general, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Arconic.

Section 4123.01(F) requires an occupational disease claimant to show that employment created a greater risk of contracting the disease, and in a different manner, than the public generally faces.

Wilhelm v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc. · filed 2024-02-05(F)

“Occupational disease” is defined by R.C. 4123.01(F) as “a disease contracted in the course of employment, which by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of the employment results in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally, and the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in greater degree and in a different manner from the public in general.” ... Therefore, Wilhelm failed to present any facts via his medical expert’s deposition testimony that demonstrate a genuine issue for trial as to whether COVID-19 is an occupational disease in this case, specifically as to whether the ... employment created a risk of contracting the disease in a greater degree and in a different manner than in the public generally.

Section 4123.01(F) defines an occupational disease by its connection to employment and the distinct, greater risk the employment creates compared with the public generally.

Hunter v. Canton Drop Forge, Inc. · filed 2024-07-18(F)

An “occupational disease” is “a disease contracted in the course of employment, which by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the condition of the employment results in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally, and the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in greater degree and in a different manner from the public in general.” R.C. §4123.01(F). ... He testified to the presence of asbestos everywhere in the plant, specifically near where the decedent worked, within feet. Therefore, we find the appellee adduced substantial competent evidence supporting her argument, and reasonable minds could reach different conclusions about the evidence.

Section 4123.01(F) defines occupational disease as a disease contracted in the course of employment; an injury sustained during rehabilitation does not fall within that definition.

Richardson v. Bwc State Rehab., Unpublished Decision (2-22-2007) · filed 2007-02-22(F)

R.C. 4123.61 applies to injuries and disabilities due to "occupational disease," which is defined by R.C. 4123.01 (F) as a disease contracted in the course of employment. Thus, R.C. 4123.61 does not apply to injuries due to rehabilitation, which Ohio Adm. Code 4123-18-14 was specifically enacted to address.

An injury is compensable only if it occurs in the course of employment and arises out of employment; an idiopathic injury requires a work condition that significantly increased its danger.

Grubbs v. Administrator, Unpublished Decision (4-9-1998) · filed 1998-04-09(C)

For an injury to be compensable, it must be "* * * received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). Both prongs of this test must be satisfied.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of employment as well as occur in its course; a truck driver’s fall while leaving a hotel bathtub does not satisfy the arising-out-of-employment requirement.

Lewis v. Tnt Holland Motor Express, Inc. · filed 1998-07-22(C)

Employees may receive workers’ compensation benefits only for an injury “received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). Both prongs of the test must be met in order for the injury to be compensable. ... We find that Lewis has not met the “arising out of’ prong.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of employment and arise out of it; required travel to a distant training session can satisfy both requirements.

Wade v. Scheib, Unpublished Decision (1-29-1999) · filed 1999-01-29(C)

An employee's injury is compensable under the state worker's compensation fund only when it is "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R. C. 4123.01 (C). Both prongs of the formula must be satisfied before compensation will be allowed. ... Accordingly, no question of fact existed as to whether Wade was acting in the course of his employment at the time he was injured. ... For the foregoing reasons, there was no question of fact that a causal connection existed between the injury and the decedent's employment.

An injury during a personal trip to buy snacks does not arise out of employment when the employer has no control over the accident site and gains no benefit from the employee’s presence there.

Liddic v. Trimble, Unpublished Decision (5-21-1999) · filed 1999-05-21(C)

To summarize, after careful consideration of the record before us and the parties' arguments, and construing the facts most favorably to Liddic, we conclude that as a matter of law her injury did not "arise out of" her employment with LabCorp. The injury occurred off LabCorp's premises in an adjacent parking lot over which it had no control whatsoever. In addition, LabCorp derived no benefit from Liddic's presence in the service station parking lot and no other circumstances or facts surrounding the accident militate in favor of Liddic's claim of entitlement to participate in the Workers' Compensation fund.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to be received both in the course of and arising out of employment.

Chain v. Kohler Coating MacHinery Corp., Unpublished Decision (9-2-1999) · filed 1999-09-02(C)

Pursuant to R.C. 4123.01 (C), in order to prove that a compensable injury occurred which resulted in the death of an employee, it must be established that the injury was "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment".

An injury must have a causal connection to employment to arise out of that employment under subsection (C).

Coleman v. University Hosp. of Cleveland, Unpublished Decision (12-16-1999) · filed 1999-12-16(C)

Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, we find no causal connection between appellee's injury and her place of employment. In conclusion, appellee's injuries were not sustained "in the course of and arising out of" her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an employee’s injury to arise out of and occur in the course of employment to be compensable.

Blankenship v. Goodman, Unpublished Decision (12-16-1999) · filed 1999-12-16(C)

R.C. 4123, et seq. provides that an injury sustained by an employee is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act only if it was received in the course of and arising out of the injured employee's employment. R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Thus, in this case, reasonable minds could only come to one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to appellant; he was not involved in an employer-sponsored event at the time of his injuries and, therefore, he was not entitled to participation in the fund.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur both in the course of and arising out of employment; an injury during a personal excursion does not qualify.

Slack v. Karrington Operating Company, Unpublished Decision (9-28-2000) · filed 2000-09-28(C)

R.C. 4123.01 (C) provides that in order for an employee's injury to be compensable under the workers' compensation fund, the injury must be "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." ... Since, based on the foregoing, reasonable minds could only conclude that appellant's injury did not occur in the course of and arising out of her employment with appellee Karrington Operating Company, Inc., the trial court did not err in granting appellees' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment while overruling that filed by appellant.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; a fall on a mall walkway during a lunch break did not qualify where the employer did not control the walkway and the hazard was shared by the public.

Jobe v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (1-26-2001) · filed 2001-01-26(C)

The Ohio Revised Code defines a workplace "injury" as any injury "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... To summarize, after careful consideration of the record before us and the parties' arguments, and construing the facts most favorably to Jobe, we conclude that as a matter of law her injury did not occur "in the course of, and [arise] out of" her employment with DeClark's.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of employment to be compensable; an ordinary commute by a fixed-situs employee does not satisfy that requirement.

Barber v. Buckeye Masonry & Construction Co. · filed 2001-10-09(C)

Under the Act, “injury” is limited only to those injuries that are received “in the course of’ and “arising out of’ the injured employee’s employment. R.C. 4123.01(C). ... As a matter of law, appellant was a fixed-situs employee whose injuries did not “arise out of’ his employment with Buckeye Masonry because he was commuting to his place of employment on that day.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury from a co-worker's intentional assault on the employer's premises just before a shift when the injury occurs in the course of and arises out of employment.

Thompson v. Crestmont Nursing Home N., Unpublished Decision (11-21-2001) · filed 2001-11-21(C)

At the outset of our analysis, we recognize that, under R.C. 4123.01 (C), to be compensable, a work-related injury must occur in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. ... As in Griffin, therefore, we have concluded Thompson sustained injuries in the course of and arising out of her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a causal connection between an injury and the activities, conditions, or environment of employment.

Riley v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (11-30-2001) · filed 2001-11-30(C)

The Ohio Revised Code defines a workplace "injury" as any injury "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... And, there is no basis in the record to find that with respect to the injuries she suffered there is a causal connection between the injury and the activities, conditions, and environment of her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; an injury during an activity pursued solely for personal benefit does not qualify.

Wissman v. Pro-Fab Industries, Unpublished Decision (6-19-2002) · filed 2002-06-19(C)

At the time of his injury, Wissman was not performing an activity for the benefit of his employer; instead, he was acting solely on his own behalf. Therefore, Wissman is not entitled to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund, because his injury was not sustained in the course of and arising out of his employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; an employee’s ordinary commute to a fixed workplace does not meet the course-of-employment requirement.

Holter v. Western Reserve Telephone Co., Unpublished Decision (6-21-2002) · filed 2002-06-21(C)

R.C. 4123.01 (C) defines what constitutes an "injury" in the workers' compensation context: "`Injury' includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." ... Thus, because appellant cannot demonstrate that he suffered his injuries while in the course of employment, appellant may not recover workers' compensation benefits.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an employee to show that an injury occurred in the course of and arose out of employment to receive workers' compensation benefits.

Brown v. Administrator, Bur., Wkr. Comp., Unpublished Decision (11-19-2002) · filed 2002-11-19(C)

Therefore, an employee must show both that the injury was sustained in the course of his/her employment and that it arose out of his/her employment in order to participate in the workers' compensation fund.

An injury arises out of employment when its circumstances show a causal connection to the employee’s work.

Wyatt v. Autozone, Inc., Unpublished Decision (12-15-2003) · filed 2003-12-15(C)

There is no dispute that the injury occurred while Wyatt was acting within the course of his employment; a causal connection exists because the injury resulted from Wyatt returning from an awkward bent-over position; and Wyatt was in the bent-over position while assisting an AutoZone customer. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that Wyatt's injury arose out of his employment at AutoZone.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of and occur in the course of employment; after-hours travel to a restaurant does not qualify when it benefits no employer and creates no special hazard or greater travel risk.

Richardson v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (3-18-2004) · filed 2004-03-18(C)

Thus, we conclude that, while in Columbus, appellant was a fixed-situs employee whose travel to and from a restaurant after work hours in the evening was not to the benefit of his employer and did not expose him to a special hazard or to a risk quantitatively greater than that encountered by other drivers on Columbus roads.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of employment; the aide’s highway accident while traveling between work sites did not satisfy that requirement.

Crockett v. Hcr Manorcare, Inc., Unpublished Decision (6-24-2004) · filed 2004-06-24(C)

R.C. 4123.01 (C) defines what constitutes an "injury" in the workers' compensation context: "`Injury' includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." ... Consequently, because appellee cannot show that her injuries arose out of her employment, she is not entitled to participate in the workers' compensation system and the trial court erroneously entered summary judgment in her favor.

An injury sustained while walking to work can qualify for workers’ compensation when the employer’s parking and entrance instructions place it within the zone of employment.

Jesse v. May Department Store Co., Unpublished Decision (9-30-2004) · filed 2004-09-30(C)

Jesse's injury occurred in the "zone of employment" of May.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; an assault arising solely from a private marital dispute is not compensable.

Foster v. Cleveland Clinic Found, Unpublished Decision (12-16-2004) · filed 2004-12-16(C)

Pursuant to R.C. 4123.01 (C), an employee is entitled to worker's compensation benefits for an injury received in the course of, and arising out of, his or her employment. ... Monica's injury was "independent of and disconnected with" employment and, therefore, is noncompensable.

An injury may arise out of employment when an employee waits on the employer's premises to give a coworker a ride, depending on the employer's benefit and control.

Saldana v. Erickson Landscaping Constr., Unpublished Decision (1-14-2005) · filed 2005-01-14(C)

Saldana presented sufficient evidence that Erickson benefited from the ride-sharing agreements to survive a motion for summary judgment. In addition, the evidence suggests that Erickson exercised control over the ride-sharing agreements, including allowing employees to wait for rides. Reasonable minds could differ on these factors. There remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether Saldana's activity arose out of his employment in order for his injury to qualify for workers' compensation benefits.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an employee or qualifying dependents to show that an injury occurred both in the course of and arising out of employment.

Burkey v. Elyria Maint., Unpublished Decision (3-9-2005) · filed 2005-03-09(C)

In order to be entitled to benefits, an employee, or her qualifying dependents, must demonstrate both the "in the course of" prong and the "arising out of" prong of R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Thus, a trial court could not properly conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Wendy's death was work related.

An injury during medical treatment may arise out of employment if the employee understood the employer’s directive to encompass that treatment; the directive’s scope may be a jury question.

Chilton v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (7-29-2005) · filed 2005-07-29(C)

However, it does not necessarily resolve whether in this instance the accidental injury Chilton suffered was received in the course of and arose out of his employment, R.C. 4123.01 (C), particularly when per Civ.R. 56(C) the evidence must be construed most strongly in Chilton's favor for purposes of summary judgment. ... In that circumstance, the angioplasty was an activity of Chilton's employment environment, permitting a causal connection to the injury to be found. Fisher v. Mayfield. Or, Chilton might have understood the distinction between diagnosis and treatment, and that the order he got was limited to the former, yet chose to undergo the angioplasty anyway. Those are genuine issues of material fact that bar summary judgment and, on this record, should be determined by a jury.

An injury during a ride home does not arise out of employment when an employer's errand is merely incidental to the employee's journey.

Cartwright v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (8-12-2005) · filed 2005-08-12(C)

Even absent such an offer, the errand Stanch undertook to perform remains merely incidental to Cartwright's journey home, not a major factor in it. Therefore, the injury Cartwright suffered in the accident was not one and "arising out of (the injured employee's) employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C).

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of employment and arise out of employment; each requirement must be established separately.

Haney v. Zimmer Orthopaedic Surgical Prod., Unpublished Decision (8-16-2005) · filed 2005-08-16(C)

Specifically, R.C. 4123.01 (C) provides that in order for an employee's injury to be compensable by the state workers' compensation fund, it must be "received in the course of and arising out of the injured employee's employment." ... Based upon the above case law from the Ohio Supreme Court, we find the trial court erred when it combined the "in the course of" and "arising out of" prongs into one jury instruction. The jury instruction misled the jury, in a manner materially affecting Zimmer's substantial rights, as it did not convey, to the jury, that separate prongs had to be established before appellee would be entitled to participate in the workers' compensation fund.

An injury sustained while performing work directly connected to an employee’s duties may qualify for workers’ compensation even when it occurs at the employee’s home.

Tressler v. Specialty Transp., Unpublished Decision (9-16-2005) · filed 2005-09-16(C)

The state of Ohio statutorily mandates that an employee is qualified and entitled to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund upon sustaining an injury, "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... Given these facts, taken in conjunction with the mandated liberal statutory construction, we find that appellee sustained her injuries while engaged in activity wholly and directly connected to her position and to appellant's business. As such, appellee was injured during the course and scope of her employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a connection between an injury and employment; a blister caused solely by an employee's defective boot is not compensable even when the employer requires boots.

Anderson v. Sherwood Food Distrib., Unpublished Decision (1-12-2006) · filed 2006-01-12(C)

Nevertheless, the statute requires a nexus between the injury and employment as a predicate to compensation; hence the requirement that an injury arise in the course of and scope of employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur both in the course of and arising out of employment to qualify for compensation.

Maynard v. H.A.M. Landscaping, Inc. · filed 2006-04-06(C)

The requirements for compensation are conjunctive; all elements of “in the course of and arising out of’ the employment must be met before compensation will be allowed.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained within the zone of employment while an employee returns from an authorized paid break.

Fitch v. Ameritech Corp., 05ap-1277 (6-5-2007) · filed 2007-06-05(C)

Pursuant to R.C. 4123.01 (C), a workplace "injury" is defined as any injury "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." ... In light of our determination that appellee's injury occurred within the zone of employment, and, therefore, arose out of and in the course of his employment, we conclude that the trial court properly determined appellee was entitled to participate in the workers' compensation fund.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; an injury on a personal meal errand during a rest break does not meet that definition.

Cline v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 07ap-498 (12-18-2007) · filed 2007-12-18(C)

For purposes of Ohio workers' compensation statutes, "injury" includes "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01 (C). ... In our view, appellant's accident occurred in the course of his own errand, not his employment, and is not sufficiently causally connected to his employment to permit appellant's participation in the workers' compensation system therefor.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to arise out of and occur in the course of employment; general fitness requirements do not make an off-duty basketball injury compensable without a sufficient connection to employment.

Young v. State Hwy. Patrol, Unpublished Decision (12-28-2007) · filed 2007-12-28(C)

Injuries to workers are compensable under Ohio's workers' compensation system only to the extent that they arise out of and are received in the course of employment. R.C. 4123.01 (C); Fisher v. Mayfield (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 275 , 276 . These requirements are stated conjunctively and, therefore, both are necessary for an injury to be compensable. Id. at 277. ... OSP did not require Trooper Young to participate in the basketball game by virtue of his employment, and OSP's general fitness requirements do not establish a causal connection between employment and every injury that may occur to a trooper in the course of physical activity.

Section 4123.01(C) makes an injury compensable when it is sustained in the course of and arising out of employment.

Emmert v. Mabe, C-070315 (4-18-2008) · filed 2008-04-18(C)

An injury is compensable under R.C. 4123.01 (C) only if it is sustained "in the course of, and arising out of" the claimant's employment. ... But bearing in mind that the workers' compensation statutes are to be liberally construed, we hold, on the specific facts presented in this case, that Emmert was entitled to participate in the fund.

Section 4123.01(C) requires an injury to occur both in the course of employment and arising out of employment; an assault at lodging required for work can satisfy both requirements.

Masden v. Cci Supply, 22304 (8-29-2008) · filed 2008-08-29(C)

To be compensable for an injury under Ohio Worker's Compensation Act, both prongs of the test in R.C. 4123.01 (c) must be satisfied: the injury must have occurred both "in the course of" and "arising out of" the employment.

Section 4123.01(C) requires a compensable injury to occur in the course of and arise out of employment; a brief business discussion during a personal outing does not establish that connection.

Callahan v. Proctor Gamble Co., 1-08-19 (9-29-2008) · filed 2008-09-29(C)

However, "[a]n injury sustained by an employee is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act only if it was `received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment.'" Fisher v. Mayfield (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 275 , 276 , 551 N.E.2d 1271 quoting R.C. 4123.01 (C); R.C. 4123.54 . ... In sum, under the totality of the circumstances, the fact that business may have been briefly discussed at Club Utopia does not give rise to any genuine issue as to whether the PG employees, who were receiving drinks from the Moldex representative, were within the scope of their employment for the benefit of PG.

Section 4123.01(C) covers an injury sustained during recreation at employer-approved training when the activity is in the course of employment and the circumstances show a causal connection to the employment.

Griffith v. Miamisburg, 08ap-557 (12-16-2008) · filed 2008-12-16(C)

Thus, to be compensable under the workers' compensation fund, an employee's injury must be received in the course of, and arising out of, his or her employment. ... Thus, applying the "in the course of" prong for workers' compensation coverage liberally in favor of Griffith, and looking at the time, place, and circumstances of Griffith's injury, we find that reasonable minds could only conclude that Griffith was injured in the course of his employment. ... Under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the unique facts of this case, and construing the statutory requirements liberally in favor of Griffith, we find that the evidence demonstrates the requisite causal connection between Griffith's injury and his employment.