Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

Subsection (E)(12) requires a reasonable-time finding when the incarcerated parent will remain unavailable to care for the child at least eighteen months after the permanent-custody motion was filed.

In re A.J. · filed 2019-02-19(E)(12)

Therefore, based on the plain language found in R.C. 2151.414(E)(12), the juvenile court was required to find A.J. could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time if Mother would still be incarcerated 18 months after CCDJFS filed its motion for permanent custody.

Subsection (E)(12) requires a reasonable-time finding when the parent will remain incarcerated for 18 months after the permanent-custody motion or dispositional hearing; it does not give an incarcerated parent a right to delay proceedings until release.

In re A.A. · filed 2017-11-27(E)(12)

Father misinterprets R.C. 2151.414(E)(12). That provision requires a trial court to find that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time where the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for 18 months following the filing of a motion for permanent custody or a dispositional hearing. ... It does not create a mechanism for an incarcerated parent to delay proceedings while he completes his sentence.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when clear and convincing evidence shows that the parent was incarcerated when permanent custody was sought and would remain unavailable for at least 18 months after the motion was filed.

In Re Whitney W., Unpublished Decision (3-17-2006) · filed 2006-03-17(E)(12)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12), the trial court "* * * shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent * * *" (emphasis added) if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is incarcerated when the motion for permanent custody is filed, as appellant herein was, and will not be available for the child for at least 18 months after the filing of the motion. The trial court's finding that R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12) applies in this case is supported by the record and is sufficient to support granting permanent custody to LCCS.

A parent who is incarcerated when permanent custody is sought and will remain unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months satisfies the placement-with-parent prong for granting permanent custody.

In Re Lenix, Unpublished Decision (3-17-2006) · filed 2006-03-17(E)(12)

As is stated above, appellant testified at the permanent custody hearing held November 29, 2004 that he has been incarcerated in a state penal institution since his conviction for murder with a gun specification. (T. at 53). Appellant received a sentence of fifteen years to life upon his conviction. (Id.). Appellant will be eligible for parole in May, 2007. (Id. at 70). However, parole is not guaranteed. (Id. at 53-54; 70; 119-120). In any event, the May, 2007 parole date is more than 18 months after the filing of the motion for permanent custody, and more than 18 months after the hearing. R.C. 2151.414 (E) (12). This finding is sufficient to meet the first prong of a permanent custody determination pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B) (1).

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires reasonable case planning and diligent agency efforts to help a parent remedy the problem causing removal, and several years of counseling, treatment, and drug-court programs can satisfy those duties.

In Re Jasmine H., Unpublished Decision (5-5-2006) · filed 2006-05-05(E)(1)

Although R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) charges LCCS with providing "reasonable case planning" and exerting "diligent efforts" to help a parent remedy a problem causing removal, In re Alexis K. et al. (2005), 160 Ohio App.3d 32 , 41 , the several years of counseling, treatment, and Drug Court programs appellant received were certainly reasonable. ... Thus, the R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) finding is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

An agency makes reasonable and diligent reunification efforts under § 2151.414(E)(1) when its case planning and services are tailored to the family’s problems, even if additional measures might have been possible.

In re C.E · filed 2010-09-20(E)(1)

Given all of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding that MCCS made diligent efforts to assist the parents in remedying the problems that caused the children to be removed. To the contrary, MCCS’ case planning, particularly the referral to counseling for Sarah’s mental health issues and the April 2009 amended case plan that was done in an effort to more specifically detail the concerns and requirements of the plan in order to better assist the parents in complying with it so that the children could be returned to them, and Middleton’s efforts to achieve the goals of the case plan were more than reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of this case.

Section 2151.414(E)(4) supports a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when the parent's failure to secure appropriate housing despite instruction and offered assistance demonstrates an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home.

In Re Bradley, Unpublished Decision (5-15-2006) · filed 2006-05-15(E)(4)

This statute further states that "the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent * * *," if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of sixteen enumerated factors exists. R.C. 2151.414 (E). ... In his second assignment of error, Father disputes the juvenile court's finding that he demonstrated a lack of commitment toward each of the children by his unwillingness to provide an adequate, permanent home for his children. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4). This finding was supported by clear and convincing evidence. ... Additionally, Ms. Rompella testified that the family aid gave and offered to help Father fill out applications for low income housing so he could move into appropriate housing, but Father never completed these forms. ... Accordingly, the juvenile court's finding that the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) were present was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, we overrule Father's second assignment of error.

Sporadic visitation supported lack of commitment, while unsuitable housing and inability to provide basic needs supported unwillingness to provide necessities.

In re G.J. · filed 2025-10-23(E)(4) and (14)

The testimony given at the hearing shows that Father has failed to visit his children for multiple months at a time despite being required to attend weekly visits. ... This evidence also supports a finding of lack of commitment under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4). ... Also, the court’s determination that Father failed to obtain suitable housing is supported by competent, credible evidence from the record and provides clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(14).

Permanent custody requires clear and convincing evidence of both a qualifying first-prong ground and the child's best interest under division (D).

In re T.C. · filed 2020-10-13(B)(1), (D), (E)

Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: ... and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D).

Division (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for deciding permanent custody.

In re D.T. · filed 2020-10-19(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Division (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for deciding permanent custody.

In re C.T. · filed 2020-10-19(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Division (B) requires a two-pronged analysis when ruling on permanent custody.

In re C.P. · filed 2020-10-21(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) provides a two-pronged analysis the trial court is required to apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Division (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for ruling on permanent custody.

In re J.L.S. · filed 2020-11-02(B)

“R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis that the juvenile court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.”

Permanent custody requires clear and convincing evidence of both a qualifying division (B)(1) ground and the child's best interest under division (D).

In re M.B. · filed 2020-06-01(B)(1), (D), (E)

Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another child in a parent’s custody has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent on three separate occasions; or the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D).

Section 2151.414 establishes a two-part analysis for adjudicating a permanent-custody motion.

In re A.W. · filed 2020-06-18(B)(1), (D)

Ohio’s permanent custody statute, R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-part analysis to be applied by a juvenile court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody.

After one division (B)(1) circumstance is established, the court must determine whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re M.L. · filed 2019-09-19(B)(1), (D)

Once the trial court finds one of the circumstances in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) applies, the trial court then must determine whether a grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.

The permanent-custody test requires clear and convincing evidence that granting permanent custody is in the child's best interest under division (D)(1).

In re H.S. · filed 2019-10-23(D)(1)

and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

Division (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for deciding a motion for permanent custody.

In re J.W. · filed 2019-10-25(B)

Therefore, R.C. §2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414 requires a juvenile court first to find that one of the circumstances in subsection (B)(1)(a) through (d) applies and then to determine by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In the Matter of V.H., Unpublished Decision (2-9-2006) · filed 2006-02-09(B)(1)

{¶ 9} "R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the procedures a juvenile court must follow and the findings it must make before granting a motion filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413." In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2004-Ohio-6411 , at ¶ 9 . To award permanent custody requires a two-step approach by the trial court. In the Matter of: G.B., Franklin App. No. 04AP-1024, 2005-Ohio-3141 , at ¶ 13 (Sadler, J., dissenting). First, a trial court must determine whether any of the circumstances in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) apply. Id. After a trial court finds that one of the circumstances in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) applies, then the trial court must determine by clear and convincing evidence whether a grant of permanent custody is in the child's best interest. Id. at ¶ 14; R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). See, also, In the Matter of: S.S., Franklin App. No. 05AP-204, 2005-Ohio-4282 , at ¶ 18.

Section 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

In Re Hinkley, Unpublished Decision (7-21-2006) · filed 2006-07-21(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B) requires a two-pronged permanent-custody analysis: the court must find both that one of the statutory circumstances exists and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest; when the child is not abandoned or orphaned, subsection (E) requires a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with the parents if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one enumerated factor as to each parent.

In Matter of Mastache, Unpublished Decision (12-28-2006) · filed 2006-12-28(B) and (E)

{¶ 22} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child. {¶ 23} If the child is not abandoned or orphaned, then the focus turns to whether the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents. Under R.C. 2151.414 (E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence before making this determination. The trial court is required to enter such a finding if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the factors enumerated in R .C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with respect to each of the child's parents.

Section 2151.414(B) requires a two-pronged analysis: the court generally first determines whether one of the circumstances in subsection (B)(1)(a) through (d) exists and then determines the child's best interest.

In Re Womack, Unpublished Decision (11-20-2006) · filed 2006-11-20(B)(1)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.

Section 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

In Re sammons/scott Children, 2007ca00029 (5-14-2007) · filed 2007-05-14(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires a court considering permanent custody to find both that one of the four listed circumstances exists and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In Re Franklin, 2007 Ap 02 0009 (7-12-2007) · filed 2007-07-12(B)(1)

Therefore, R.C. § 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.

Section 2151.414(B) requires a two-pronged analysis: permanent custody must be in the child's best interest, and one of the four statutory circumstances must apply.

In Re Davis, 2007ca00002 (8-6-2007) · filed 2007-08-06(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires a two-pronged permanent-custody analysis: the court must find one of the four enumerated circumstances and determine that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In Re Hackmann, 07-Ca-26 (10-31-2007) · filed 2007-10-31(B)(1)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.

Section 2151.414(B) requires clear and convincing evidence both that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that one of the statutory circumstances exists.

In Matter of Richardson, Ct2007-0028 (11-27-2007) · filed 2007-11-27(B)

Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414 (B) authorizes the juvenile court to grant permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody; or (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placement agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999. ... Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. ... Based upon the foregoing as well as the entire record in this matter, we find the trial court's findings it was in the best interest of the children to grant permanent custody to the Department, and the children could not or should not be placed with parents are supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires a two-pronged permanent-custody analysis: permanent custody must be in the child's best interest, and at least one of the statutory circumstances must exist; any one circumstance, including 12 months of agency custody in a consecutive 22-month period, independently satisfies the second prong.

In Matter of Hess, 2007ca00262 (4-21-2008) · filed 2008-04-21(B)(1)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child. ... In the case sub judice, the trial court found Xavier had been in the temporary custody of the Department for 12 or more of the past consecutive 22 months, and the child could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time. Those findings are alternate findings under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) and (a), respectively. Either of those findings, if supported by the evidence, would have been sufficient, in and of itself, to base a grant of permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). ... Again, such a finding is enough to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).

Section 2151.414 requires a court considering permanent custody to determine by clear and convincing evidence both that custody serves the child's best interest and that a statutory circumstance exists, after considering the relevant best-interest and parental-placement factors.

In Re Shawn II, 2008 Ap 04 0025 (7-24-2008) · filed 2008-07-24(B), (D), and (E)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child. ... Based upon the foregoing and the entire record in this matter, we find the trial court's finding the children could not or should not be placed with Father within a reasonable time as well as its finding it was in the best interest of the children to grant permanent custody to the Department is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 2151.414(B) requires a two-pronged permanent-custody analysis: clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that one of the circumstances in (B)(1)(a) through (d) applies.

In Re nicholas/wenning Children, 2008ca00149 (12-30-2008) · filed 2008-12-30(B)

Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414 (B) authorizes the juvenile court to grant permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody; or (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placement agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999. ... Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

R.C. 2151.414 requires a two-pronged permanent-custody analysis: the court must find an enumerated statutory circumstance and determine that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re S.R.C. · filed 2011-07-25(B)(1)(a), (D), (E)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. ... Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence before making this determination. The trial court is required to enter such a finding if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the factors enumerated in R .C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with respect to each of the child's parents. ... Based on Appellant’s previous failures and current status, Appellant cannot be reunited with her children within a reasonable time. ... The record further shows it is in the children’s best interest to be placed with SCJFS.

Section 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis that a trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

In re C.A.B. · filed 2012-01-04(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414 requires a two-part permanent-custody analysis: clear and convincing evidence must establish a criterion under division (B)(1), and the child's best interest must then be established under division (D) by the same standard.

In re C.B. · filed 2012-07-30(B)(1), (D)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414, the trial court must make a two-part analysis before granting permanent custody. First it must determine by clear and convincing evidence whether any of the criteria in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) apply. If the court determines the criteria does apply, then the court must take the second step of determining the best interest of the children by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D).

Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires a court considering permanent custody to find both that one of the listed statutory circumstances exists and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re J.M. · filed 2012-10-08(B)(1)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.

R.C. 2151.414(B) requires a permanent-custody court to find that one of the circumstances in (B)(1)(a) through (d) exists and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re H.P. · filed 2013-06-10(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.

Section 2151.414(B) requires a two-pronged permanent-custody analysis: the court determines whether one of the circumstances in subsection (B)(1)(a) through (d) exists and whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re J.M. · filed 2013-09-03(B)

R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, a trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.

Section 2151.414(B) does not require a court-appointed special advocate to be present at a permanent-custody hearing.

In Re Hickman, Unpublished Decision (6-7-2006) · filed 2006-06-07(B)

Third, there is no statutory requirement that CASA must be present at the permanent custody hearing. See R.C. 2151.414 (B).

Section 2151.414 requires a court deciding permanent custody to consider all relevant best-interest factors, including whether a parent previously had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling.

In Re Craig, Unpublished Decision (6-9-2006) · filed 2006-06-09(D), (E)(11)

R.C. 2151.414 governs procedures upon the filing of a motion for permanent custody. Subsection (D) governs best interests and states the following: ... "(D) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) or (5) of section 2151.353 or division (C) of section 2151.415 of the Revised Code, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: ... "(5) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child." ... "(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to this section or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code with respect to a sibling of the child." ... Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in granting permanent custody of the child to appellee.

A parent whose rights to another child were involuntarily terminated may avoid the subsection (E)(11) finding only by clear and convincing proof that the parent can provide legally secure placement and adequate care for the child's health, welfare, and safety.

In re J.D. · filed 2015-10-02(E)(11)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), the parent who has had parental rights involuntarily terminated may prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child, notwithstanding the prior termination.

After a parent loses permanent custody of a child's siblings, subsection (E)(11) places on the parent the burden to prove an ability to provide the child secure permanent placement and adequate care.

In re C.M. · filed 2015-09-30(E)(11)

Therefore, under former R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), it was the mother’s burden to show that she could provide a legally secure permanent placement for C.M. and provide adequate care for the child’s health, welfare, and safety.

A permanent-custody judgment based on prior terminations as to the child's siblings cannot stand after those sibling-termination judgments are reversed.

In re J.P. · filed 2016-02-01(E)(11)

This Court must agree that, given our reversal of the judgments terminating Mother’s parental rights to J.P.’s siblings, there is no evidence to support the trial court’s permanent custody judgment in this case.

A prior involuntary termination as to a sibling supports a cannot-be-placed finding when the parent presents no evidence of an ability to provide the child secure permanent placement and adequate care.

In re A.E. · filed 2016-02-05(E)(11)

Notably, the record contains no evidence that appellant can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of A.E. Thus, we hold that the trial court’s finding that R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) applies is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Subsection (E)(11) supports a cannot-be-placed finding when both parents previously lost rights to a sibling and neither can provide legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re A.A. · filed 2016-05-16(E)(11)

The record also plainly reveals that neither Mother, who admittedly does not have permanent housing, nor Father, who is incarcerated, can provide a legally secure placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of their daughter.

A parent whose rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated may counter section 2151.414(E)(11) only with clear and convincing evidence that the parent can now provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the child's health, welfare, and safety.

In re A.L. · filed 2016-12-30(E)(11)

Father is nevertheless statutorily entitled to counter this fact by providing “clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). In other words, Father may challenge the determination that the child cannot or should not be placed in his custody within a reasonable time, by clearly and convincingly establishing that he can now “provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” See R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) and R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

After a parent's rights to a sibling have been involuntarily terminated, subsection (E)(11) places on the parent the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care.

In re Y.W. · filed 2017-06-12(E)(11)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), “the burden is on the parent to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that he or she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.”

After an involuntary termination of rights to other children, subsection (E)(11) places on the parent the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the condition underlying the prior termination has been remedied.

In re D.C. · filed 2017-11-28(E)(11)

Appellant had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that she remedied the condition which caused the termination of her parental rights to her two children in the previous case.

Once the prior-sibling-termination factor is established, the parent bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care.

In re M.L. · filed 2018-03-01(E)(11)

Further, where this factor is established, the burden is then on the parent to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that he or she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.

When a parent's rights to siblings were involuntarily terminated, subsection (E)(11) requires the parent to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can nevertheless provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care.

In re S.W. · filed 2018-03-21(E)(11)

As noted by the trial court, appellant had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that notwithstanding the prior termination, she could provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of S.W.

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) does not require a trial court to expressly find that parents failed to remedy the conditions causing a child's removal for six months or more; that requirement appeared in an earlier version of the statute but was removed effective October 5, 2000.

In Re Gallion, Unpublished Decision (6-12-2006) · filed 2006-06-12(E)(1)

The father's assertion that the trial court was required to find that the parents failed to remedy the conditions causing the child's removal for a period of six months or more is meritless. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) does not require the trial court to expressly find that the parents have failed to remedy the conditions for a period of six months or more. The father relies upon an outdated version of the statute in making this argument. The statute formerly required the evidence to show that the parents repeatedly and continuously failed, over at least a six month period of time, to remedy the conditions. See, e.g., In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , 98 , 661 N.E.2d 738 . The current version of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) became effective on October 5, 2000, and no longer contains the six-month requirement. See In re Ross, Geauga App. No. 2003-G-2550, 2004-Ohio-3680.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits termination of parental rights upon findings that termination is in the child's best interest and that the twelve-out-of-twenty-two rule applies, without a separate finding of parental unfitness.

In the Matter of Sw, Unpublished Decision (6-13-2006) · filed 2006-06-13(B)(1)(d)

Contrary to appellant's assertion, R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), applied in appellant's case, does not require the trial court to find a parent unfit before it may terminate parental rights. In re B.L., at ¶ 22, citing In re Stillman, 155 Ohio App.3d 333 , 2003-Ohio-6228 , at ¶ 50 . Rather, to terminate parental rights, the trial court was required to find that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, and that the "twelve out of twenty-two" rule applies. Parental unfitness is not a required finding to terminate parental rights under that section.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) does not require a specific finding that parents failed to work on their case plan, and their work on the plan does not prevent a finding that they failed to remedy the conditions that initially caused removal.

In Re Bentley, Unpublished Decision (6-20-2006) · filed 2006-06-20(E)(1)

Parents argue the trial court was required to make a specific finding they did not work on their case plan prior to the court's having authority to grant permanent custody of the children to the department. We find no such statutory requirement under R.C. 2151.414 (E) (1). Assuming, arguendo, the trial court did in fact find parents had worked on their case plan, this did not preclude the trial court from determining parents had failed to remedy the conditions which caused the children to be removed from the home initially.

Substantial compliance with a case plan does not by itself satisfy § 2151.414(E)(1); the parent must substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child's out-of-home placement.

In re P.S.V. · filed 2013-05-31(E)(1)

The evidence shows Mother substantially complied with the case plan requirements, but the statute provides that she substantially remedy the conditions that caused her child to be placed outside of the home.

A parent’s participation in and completion of most or all case-plan requirements does not preclude a finding that the parent failed to substantially remedy the problems leading to agency involvement, particularly when repeated agency efforts have not corrected chronic parenting issues affecting the child.

In re Z.H. · filed 2013-06-17(B)(1)(a)

We have recognized that even where a parent has participated in his or her case plan and completed most or all of the plan requirements, a trial court may still properly determine that such parent has not substantially remedied the problems leading to agency involvement. See, e.g., In re Pendziwiatr/Hannah Children, Tuscarawas App.No. 2007 AP 03 0025, 2007–Ohio–3802, ¶ 27. This principle is particularly relevant where, as here, there have been repeated agency attempts over the years to correct chronic parenting issues that are now negatively impacting an adolescent child as he moves closer to the responsibilities of adulthood. Upon review, we hold the trial court did not err in determining that Z.H. could not be placed with appellant or Richard within a reasonable time or should not be placed with appellant or Richard. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

Technical completion of case-plan objectives does not preclude a finding under Section 2151.414(E)(1) when the parent has not meaningfully improved the ability to care for the child or remedied the conditions causing removal.

In re J.S. · filed 2013-12-27(E)(1)

These factors include, among all other relevant factors, the parent’s failure continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child to be placed outside the home, chronic mental illness, “mental retardation,” or chemical dependency of the parent that makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home at the present time or, as anticipated, within one year of the hearing. R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(2). ... Although Father complied, technically, with the case plan objectives, his compliance had not meaningfully advanced his ability to care for the children’s needs. ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the award of permanent custody to FCSCC was in the children’s best interest, and that they could not or should not be returned to the parents’ care within a reasonable time.

Completing one case-plan component does not preclude a finding that a parent failed to substantially remedy the conditions causing removal when the parent does not seriously address the core problems during the case plan.

In re ZA.C. · filed 2014-03-17(E)(1)

There was substantial evidence presented in the testimony that both Kris and Stacy had not resolved their drug issues during the two and a half years that the case plan was in place. There was also substantial evidence that both had participated in illegal activities, that neither of them had procured adequate housing, and that Stacy had no legal source of income. At the time of the hearing, Kris was incarcerated and Stacy was facing incarceration. Both had used illegal substances within the past year. The only aspect of the case plan that either of them completed was the parenting classes. Although both parents maintained contact with the children and visited them faithfully, at least when they were not incarcerated or in a rehabilitation facility, the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that neither of them took steps during the pendency of the case plan to seriously address the issues which resulted in the removal of the children from the home. Since there is competent and credible evidence that clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s findings, the trial court did not err in finding that the children could not be placed with either Stacy or Kris within a reasonable period of time as set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E).

Completing every case-plan requirement does not preclude a finding that a parent failed to remedy the conditions causing removal when the parent cannot use what was learned to parent properly.

In re A.W. · filed 2013-12-18(E)(1)

As set forth in our statement of the facts and case, supra, we find there was both sufficient and substantial competent evidence Mother failed to remedy the problems which initially caused the removal of the child from the home. Although she completed all of her case plan requirements, Mother was unable to utilize the information she obtained to properly parent the children. Mother continued to have a live-in boyfriend despite Dr. Dean’s recommendation to the contrary.

Time between filing the permanent-custody motion and the hearing does not count toward Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s twelve-month custody period.

In re S.D. · filed 2015-02-02(B)(1)(d)

At the time of the Motion, he had not been in the custody of ACCSB for 12 months, since emergency custody had been granted to ACCSB on April 22, 2013. As the Ohio Supreme Court has held, “the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward the 12-month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).” In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 26.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) requires twelve actual months in agency temporary custody; a partial month cannot be counted as a whole month, and 352 days is insufficient.

In Re A.C., Unpublished Decision (6-30-2006) · filed 2006-06-30(B)(1)(d)

Contrary to the methodology proposed by CSB, R.C. 1.45 does not provide that a portion of a month may be counted as an entire month. Therefore, J.M. and Z.C. were in temporary custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) for a total of ten months and 47 days or, stated otherwise, for 352 days. This does not equate to the 12 months required by R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). The trial court, therefore, lacked authority to grant permanent custody of J.M and Z.C. to CSB on the grounds of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d).

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s "12 of 22" provision applies only when permanent custody is in the child's best interests and the child has spent at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period in agency temporary custody, measured from the earlier of adjudication or 60 days after removal.

In Matter of Miajanigue W., Unpublished Decision (12-1-2006) · filed 2006-12-01(B)(1)(d)

With respect to the disposition, the trial court entered a finding, in part, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). Also known as the "12 of 22" provision, it allows a court to grant permanent custody to an agency if it determines that a grant of permanent custody is in the child's best interests, and if it determines that the child has been in the temporary custody of a children services agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22 month period. For the purposes of this determination, a child is considered to have entered the temporary custody of the agency at the earlier of 1) the date the child is adjudicated neglected, dependent, or abused, or 2) the date that is 60 days after the removal of the child from home. R.C. 2151.414 (B). We find this provision to be inapplicable to Milyon. ... Milyon was in the temporary custody of LCCSB for eight months and 16 days. Thus, the "12 of 22" provision cannot be applied to Milyon, although it may have been applied only to Milyon's siblings, who entered the temporary custody of LCCSB under the prior complaint on February 19, 2003, and who were therefore in LCCSB's temporary custody for more than 12 months.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is available only if the child has already spent twelve qualifying months in agency custody when the agency files its permanent-custody motion.

In Re Dylan B., 2007-Ca-00362 (5-12-2008) · filed 2008-05-12(B)(1)(d)

"Before a public children-services agency or private child-placing agency can move for permanent custody of a child on R.C. 2151.414 (B) (1) (d) grounds, the child must have been in the temporary custody of an agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period." ... "the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward the 12-month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d)." ... The record establishes that when SCDJFS filed its motion for permanent custody, the children had not been in its custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody without a finding that the child spent 12 of the prior 22 months in temporary custody when another authorized first-prong finding is established and permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In Re A. S., 08ca009386 (9-29-2008) · filed 2008-09-29(B)(1)

Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, or that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... Indeed, the record reveals that the children were not in temporary custody for 12 of the prior 22 months. However, the agency did not make such a claim, the trial court did not make such a finding, and there was no error in the trial court's failure to make such a finding. Upon the facts of this case and in light of other findings made by the court, the trial court was not required to make such a finding in order to sustain its award of permanent custody to LCCS.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) allows an agency to seek permanent custody even though it has not held the child for twelve of the preceding twenty-two months when the child is not abandoned or orphaned and cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Re S.M., 2008-G-2858 (1-9-2009) · filed 2009-01-09(B)(1)(a)

GCJFS filed the Motion for Permanent Custody under R.C. 2151.413 and R.C. 2151.414 . The motion specifically states that "the child is not abandoned or orphaned and cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent". This echoes the language found in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), which contains an exception if the termination of parental rights if the child has not been in custody of a public children's service twelve out of twenty-two months. GCJFS was able to file for permanent custody even though S.M. was not in its custody for twelve months out of the last twenty-two months. Therefore, the first portion of S.M.'s argument is without merit.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) counts only temporary-custody time accrued before the agency files its permanent-custody motion toward the twelve-of-twenty-two-month requirement.

In re C.E. · filed 2009-11-16(B)(1)(d)

However, only the time between the start date and the date of the filing by the Agency of the motion for permanent custody is to be considered by the trial court.

Under subsection (B)(1)(d), the 12 months of agency temporary custody may accrue in separate portions within the 22-month lookback period; a brief reunification does not restart the count.

In re M.Z. · filed 2012-07-16(B)(1)(d)

Second, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) anticipates that the applicable period of 12 months of temporary custody may accrue in portions. The statute calls for the accumulation of 12 months of temporary custody over the span of the 22 months directly prior to the filing of the motion for permanent custody. See In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, at syllabus; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). There is nothing that prohibits a court from looking back to the period of time that passed prior to the date the children were temporarily returned to a parent’s care.

The twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground in Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is measured when the agency files its permanent-custody motion, not when the motion is heard.

In re T.K. · filed 2013-12-23(B)(1)(d)

Although the juvenile court found that they had been in temporary custody for sixteen of twenty-two months on the date the permanent custody motion was heard, the relevant date triggering this provision is the date the motion was filed by the agency. See In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 N.E.2d 1176 at ¶22-26 (the court cannot use the "12 of 22" provision if the agency files the motion for permanent custody prior to the child actually being in the temporary custody for 12 months). Here, HCJFS's motion was filed prior to the expiration of twelve months. Thus, the 12 of 22 provision is inapplicable and cannot serve as a basis for terminating Knight's parental rights.

Section 2151.414(E)(14) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unwilling, rather than merely unable, to provide basic necessities such as adequate housing.

In Re Cassandra, Unpublished Decision (6-2-2006) · filed 2006-06-02(E)(14)

Based on the record before us, we cannot say the court's finding that appellant is unwilling to find suitable housing is based on clear and convincing evidence. Her attempts were unsuccessful, yet, it is evident from her testimony that she was willing to provide adequate housing. The fact that she was unable to obtain housing that met the standards of WCDJFS does not mean she was unwilling to provide adequate housing for her children. It appears that appellant is caught between the proverbial "rock and a hard place" in that anything she could afford was unacceptable and anything acceptable to WCDJFS was out of appellant's price range. Appellant's efforts in maintaining employment, following her case plan, keeping in touch with her children and seeking out housing in spite of the obstacles she faced shows, in fact, a determined willingness to reunify her family. Accordingly, the court's finding that appellant is unsuitable pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(14) is unfounded. Finding that none of the other statutory predicate findings apply, In re William S., supra, In re Alyssa Nicole C., 153 Ohio App.3d 10 , 14 , 2003-Ohio-2673 at ¶ 8, appellant's sole assignment of error is found well-taken.

An incarcerated parent's complete failure to work with the agency or take steps toward custody supports finding unwillingness to provide basic necessities.

In re J.H. · filed 2022-12-08(E)(14)

He completely neglected them. Therefore, the trial court’s finding that Father was unwilling to provide basic necessities for J.H. pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(14) is supported by the evidence.

A court need not identify by number the applicable division (E) factors when its findings demonstrate that the parent continuously failed to remedy the conditions causing removal and showed a lack of commitment to the child.

In Re Oaks, Unpublished Decision (9-13-2006) · filed 2006-09-13(E)(1), (4)

And while it did not specify by number which of the R.C. 2151.414 (E) factors it found to exist, the court's findings demonstrate that it found R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) and (4) exist.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when, despite reasonable case planning and diligent agency efforts, the parent continuously and repeatedly fails to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child’s removal.

In Re Davidson-Rush, Unpublished Decision (9-18-2006) · filed 2006-09-18(E)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets forth factors a trial court is to consider in determining whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents. ... "(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home. In determining whether the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties." ... In short, the evidence showed that appellant failed to comply with his case plan. ... Thus, there was competent and credible evidence that appellant had failed to remedy the problems that initially caused the children to be removed from the home.

A parent’s continuous and repeated failure to remedy the conditions causing removal supports a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re A.R. · filed 2017-07-03(E)(1)

Based on the foregoing, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court's finding that appellant had continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions causing the children to be placed outside the home and that the children could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

Ongoing drug abuse and unstable housing, coupled with a parent’s admission that he cannot currently care for the children, can support a finding that the conditions causing removal were not substantially remedied.

In re D.M. · filed 2017-08-07(E)(1)

Here, the trial court determined that Richard’s abuse of drugs, lack of stable housing and inappropriate home conditions led to the children’s removal from his custody and “he has been unable to remedy the conditions”. (Doc. 150, ¶8). Furthermore, Richard’s admission to being unable to take care of the children, the testimony of caseworker Winter and the recommendation of the GAL (for permanent custody) all support the trial court’s determination that D.M. and R.M. could not be placed with their father within a reasonable time.

A child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when, despite reasonable case planning and diligent agency efforts, the parent has not substantially remedied the conditions that caused removal.

In re Kail.K. · filed 2018-04-20(B)(1)(a), (E)(1)

Based on our review of the record as summarized above, we find, as to the first prong of the permanent custody analysis, there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the court’s determination that pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the children cannot be placed with mother within a reasonable time, because, despite ... reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency, mother has failed to substantially remedy the conditions which caused the children’s removal.

Drug relapse, failure to use offered services or maintain housing and employment, and repeated incarceration may support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In re K.O. · filed 2018-05-04(E)(1), (E)(13)

The findings Appellant had failed to remedy the conditions which led to the removal of the children and his repeated incarceration prevents him from providing care for the children are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the ... evidence. The court therefore did not err in finding the children could not be placed with Appellant within a reasonable period of time.

Participation in services does not defeat a failure-to-remedy finding when the parent remains unable to independently care for the child, anticipate developmental needs, and keep the child safe.

In re J.J. · filed 2018-09-19(E)(1)

A review of the record reveals that despite participating in case plan services, counseling and parenting programs, appellant failed to demonstrate her ability to independently care for J.J., anticipate and address his developmental needs, and keep him safe. The issues which caused J.J. to be removed from appellant’s home included her problems with decision-making, her challenges caring for the child and her relationship with father, and all of these issues persist.

Participation in services does not defeat a failure-to-remedy finding when the parent still cannot implement the skills needed to care for the children, address their developmental needs, and keep them safe.

In re J.J. · filed 2018-09-27(E)(1)

A review of the record reveals that despite participating in case plan services, counseling and parenting programs, appellant failed to adequately and appropriately demonstrate her ability to implement the skills necessary to care for J.J. and B.J., anticipate and address their developmental needs, and keep them safe. The issues which caused the children to be removed from appellant’s home included her problems with decision-making, her challenges caring for the children and her relationship with father, and all of these issues persist.

A parent’s signed permanent-custody agreement stipulating the agency’s allegations may support a finding that the parent failed to complete treatment, case-management, and visitation services and did not substantially remedy the causes of removal.

In re A.H. · filed 2018-10-29(E)(1)

Limiting our review of the circumstances involving Father, we find the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Father “has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy” the conditions that caused D.W. to be placed outside the home. ... When he executed the “Permanent Custody Agreement and Waiver of Rights to Hearing” form, Father stipulated that the facts alleged in LCCS’s motion for permanent custody were true. In so doing, he stipulated ... that he failed to successfully complete services that included dual assessments, substance abuse treatment and mental health treatment, case management services and visitation.

Reasonable planning and diligent agency efforts may support failure to remedy when a parent does not complete case-plan objectives or significantly change conduct and delays requesting specialized mental-health treatment until the hearing.

In re J.S. · filed 2019-03-22(E)(1)

The record reflects that MCCS provided reasonable case planning (after attempting to maintain J.S. at home with supportive in- ... home services) and diligent efforts to assist Father, but that Father was unsuccessful in completing his case plan objectives and in significantly changing his conduct to allow him to resume and maintain parental duties pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). ... Father did not ask for assistance in obtaining the specialized treatment until the first day of the dispositional hearing.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody where clear and convincing evidence shows that permanent custody serves the children's best interests and that the children cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Jordan R., Unpublished Decision (10-18-2006) · filed 2006-10-18(B)(1)(a), (D), (E)

LCCS demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the children is served by permanent custody to LCCS. ... LCCS demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the children cannot and should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence both that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody serves the child's best interest; a prior involuntary termination under division (E)(11) establishes the former but not the latter.

In Re Banks, Unpublished Decision (12-21-2006) · filed 2006-12-21(B)(1)(a), (D), (E)(11)

{¶ 45} Courts have stated that the permanent termination of parental rights is the, "family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case." In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46 , 48 , 679 N.E.2d 680 , quoting In re Smith (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 1 , 16 , 601 N.E.2d 45 . For that reason, parents "must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows." Id. Given the evidence presented, we cannot conclude that it supports the court's determination that permanent custody to appellee is in Matthew's best interest. The court clearly met the first statutory element in order to grant permanent custody — that Matthew could not or should not be placed with appellant within a reasonable amount of time due to the fact that appellant has previously had his parental rights involuntarily terminated. However, the court was also required to find by clear and convincing evidence that it was in Matthew's best interest to grant his permanent custody to appellee. Based on the evidence, the court did not meet this element.

First-prong grounds are determined when the permanent-custody motion is filed, but the child's fluid best interest may account for later developments before the hearing.

In re L.P. · filed 2021-09-15(B)(1), (D)(1)

Although first prong grounds for permanent custody should be established as of the time that the permanent custody motion was filed, “the child’s best interest is a fluid concept, as it involves the child’s continually-changing need for appropriate care.”

Section 2151.414 no longer requires an agency to hold temporary custody for a minimum period before seeking permanent custody; subsection (E)(1) requires reasonable case planning and diligent assistance to the parents.

In re C.R. · filed 2020-05-13(E)(1)

Under the current statutory provisions, there is no longer a requirement that an agency must have had temporary custody for a minimum amount of time before it could move for permanent custody. ... The only requirement is that the agency provide the parents with “reasonable case planning and diligent efforts.”

The grounds alleged for permanent custody must exist when the agency moves for permanent custody, so parental mental health and treatment compliance are evaluated at that time.

In re A.T. · filed 2017-05-31(E)(1), (E)(2)

Therefore, the relevant time for the trial court to evaluate Mother’s mental health and her compliance with treatment was the time that the agency moved for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) permits an agency to move for permanent custody before the child has spent twelve months in temporary custody; the twelve-month waiting condition applies only when the agency relies on subsection (B)(1)(d).

In Re Baby Morgan, 91312 (10-9-2008) · filed 2008-10-09(B)(1)(a)

We find that the holding in C.W. is inapplicable here because, in the case at bar, the motion for permanent custody was based on R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), not R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). In fact, the Court in C.W. went on to hold that "our holding does not preclude an agency from moving for permanent custody before a child has been in the agency's temporary custody for at least 12 months. If a ground other than R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) exists to support a grant of permanent custody, the agency may move for permanent custody on that other ground." Id. at ¶ 27. Accordingly, we find that the agency was not required to wait 12 months before filing its motion for permanent custody.

An agency seeking permanent custody under § 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and (E), rather than the twelve-of-twenty-two ground in (B)(1)(d), need not wait twelve months before filing its motion.

In re B.A. · filed 2013-02-01(B)(1)(b), (B)(1)(d), (E)

And here, Children Services moved for permanent custody on grounds other than R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) -- namely, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and 2151.414(E). Therefore, Children Services did not have to wait 12 months to file the motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires a court to grant permanent custody to the state when all four conditions listed in that subsection are met.

In re R.M. · filed 2013-11-07(D)(2)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) also requires that a court grant permanent custody to the state if four factors are met: ... Therefore, according to R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), the trial court was required to award permanent custody to CCDCFS.

An agency proceeding under subsection (B)(1)(a) need not wait until the child has spent the twelve months in temporary custody required for subsection (B)(1)(d).

In re B.H. · filed 2018-08-08(B)(1)(a)

In its complaint, appellee alleged that B.H. could not be placed with her parents within a reasonable time pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). Thus, the agency was not required to wait until the child had been in temporary custody for the 12 months required when a petition is filed under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes that the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody is in the child's best interests, as evaluated under the statutory factors.

In Matter of Weatherspoon, Unpublished Decision (12-4-2006) · filed 2006-12-04(B), (D), and (E)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets out the factors relevant to determining permanent custody. ... R.C. 2151.414 (B) enables the court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414 (D) sets out the factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child. ... Upon review, we agree with the trial court's assessment, and find the trial court did not err in finding the child could not be placed with a biological parent within a reasonable time and did not err in determining permanent custody to appellee was in the best interests of the child.

Section 2151.414(E) requires consideration of all relevant evidence and a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent when clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one listed factor as to each parent, while division (D) requires consideration of the listed best-interest factors.

In Matter of Crigger, Unpublished Decision (2-7-2007) · filed 2007-02-07(D), (E)

Revised Code 2151.414 (E) sets forth the factors a trial court must consider in determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. ... In determining the best interest of a child, the trial court is required to consider the factors contained in R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... Accordingly, we find the evidence to be substantial and credible that the child can not and should not be placed with either parent and that it is in the child's best interest to be provided with a safe and stable environment, which can only be available through a grant of permanent custody to Fairfield County Children's Services.

R.C. 2151.414 permits a court to grant permanent custody upon clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest, directs consideration of the best-interest factors in division (D), and requires a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent when a division (E) factor is proved as to each parent.

In Matter of Cain, 07ca13 (4-30-2007) · filed 2007-04-30(B), (D), (E)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets out the factors relevant to determining permanent custody. ... R.C. 2151.414 (B) enables the court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414 (D) sets out the factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child. ... Upon review, we find sufficient, competent and credible evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings by clear and convincing evidence, and find the trial court did not err in determining the best interests of the child was best served by terminating the parental rights and granting permanent custody to appellee.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes the child's best interest and a statutory condition, including that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Matter of Starkey, 2008 Ap 09 0056 (12-15-2008) · filed 2008-12-15(B)(1)(a), (D)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) addresses under what circumstances a trial court may grant permanent custody.... In the case sub judice, we note appellant and Thomas' father failed to participate in the permanent custody evidentiary, and neither parent challenged the testimony of the TCJFS witnesses or the trial court's application of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414 (D), supra, to the facts presented. Upon review of the record and the findings of fact and conclusions of law therein, we conclude the trial court's grant of permanent custody of Thomas to TCDJFS was made in the consideration of the child's best interests and did not constitute error or an abuse of discretion.

Section 2151.414(E)(4) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when clear and convincing evidence shows the parent's lack of commitment through failure to support, visit, or communicate when able, or through other conduct showing unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home.

In Re M.M.-d., 2008 Ca 29 (1-16-2009) · filed 2009-01-16(E)(4)

A trial court may base its decision in this regard upon the existence of any one of the factors contained in R.C. § 2151.414 (E). The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. ... As stated previously, we agree with the ruling of the trial court that pursuant to R.C. § 2151.414 (E)(4), the State established by clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be placed with Amanda within a reasonable time, or should not be placed with her.

Section 2151.414 permits an award of permanent custody upon clear and convincing evidence that the award is in the child’s best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, with the best-interest analysis accounting for the statutory factors, including a parent’s prior involuntary loss of parental rights to the child’s sibling.

In re K.B. · filed 2010-12-10(B)(1)(a), (D)(1), (E)(11)

The trial court may grant permanent custody of a child to the agency if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interest to grant permanent custody to the agency and that the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). ... The applicable statutory best interest factors support the court’s determination. ... First, K.B. has bonded with his foster parents who want to adopt him. And his foster parents bring him to visit with his biological sister, who is not in appellant’s custody. Appellant testified that she too has bonded with K.B. However, it is uncertain how much she could have bonded with him considering she only attended 37 out of 99 visits, amounting to less than once a week for a year. ... Second, at the time of the hearing, K.B. had been in appellee’s temporary custody for just two days shy of 12 consecutive months, since his birth. ... Third, both appellant’s caseworker and K.B.’s guardian ad litem testified that K.B. is in need of a legally secure placement. Additionally, both opined that returning K.B. to appellant would not be a legally secure placement. ... Finally, appellant has already had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to K.B.’s sister. ... Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated that K.B. cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his parents. ... Based on all of these factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting permanent custody of K.B. to appellee.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) supports a finding that a child cannot be placed with an incarcerated parent within a reasonable time when the parent’s release date leaves the parent unable to provide a home for the child within the next eighteen months.

In re M.M. · filed 2011-11-28(E)(12)

Finally, the trial court determined that since Elizabeth’s release date from prison was not until 2015, she would be unable to provide a home for M.M. within the next eighteen months. R.C. 2151.414(E)(12). All of these findings are supported by evidence in the record. Since there were factors present under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court did not err in finding that M.M. could not be placed with Elizabeth within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a finding that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, or should not be placed with either parent, when clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one of the enumerated conditions as to each parent.

In re B.E.S. · filed 2011-12-27(E)

R.C. 2151.414(E) sets out the factors relevant to determining permanent custody. Said section states in pertinent part as follows: ... If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child's parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent: ... Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in finding that the children could not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time.

Under § 2151.414(E), a parent's cessation of visits, failure to complete required parenting and substance-abuse treatment, and lack of housing or employment supported a finding that the children could not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In re O.C. · filed 2012-02-21(E)

R.C. 2151.414(E) sets out the factors relevant to determining permanent custody. ... Appellant stopped visiting the children in February and failed to return telephone calls to the agency. ... Through her case plan, appellant was required to receive a parenting assessment which she never completed. ... She walked out on her inpatient treatment for drugs and alcohol and did not complete the program. Id. She has not obtained housing or a job. T. at 15. ... Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in finding that the children could not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time.

Subsection (E)(4) does not address a child’s schooling or counseling, and a parent’s future desire to satisfy those objectives does not bear on that factor’s reasonable-time reunification inquiry.

In re A.D. · filed 2022-01-27(E)(4)

{¶ 27} In addition to the housing issue, appellant argues that she would have re-enrolled the children in school and daycare had they not been removed the day after the final review hearing, believing she had a “window” to do so. Therefore, appellant argues, her failure to re-enroll the children could not be interpreted as a lack of commitment as stated at R.C. 2151.414(E)(4). However, R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) makes no mention of schooling or counseling for the child, but instead addresses factors pertaining to the parents that would lead a court to believe reunification is possible “within a reasonable time.” To the extent appellant argues a future desire to comply with schooling and counseling objectives, therefore, such argument has no bearing on the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4).

Subsection (B)(1)(a) applies when a child who is not abandoned or orphaned and has spent fewer than twelve of twenty-two months in agency custody cannot or should not be placed with the parents within a reasonable time.

In re S.W. · filed 2023-01-17(B)(1)(a)

As noted above, that statute allows for an award of permanent custody where a child, who has not been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, and who has neither been abandoned nor orphaned, cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents.

Section 2151.414(D) and (E) governs whether clear and convincing evidence supports permanent custody based on the children's best interests and whether they can be placed with either parent.

In the Matter of Hutzel, Unpublished Decision (8-12-2004) · filed 2004-08-12(D), (E)

Here, the Juvenile Court found by clear and convincing evidence the grant of permanent custody was in the best interest of the children, and the children cannot be placed with either parent, R.C. 2151.414 (D)(E). Our review of the record indicates there was sufficient, competent and credible evidence for the court to conclude by clear and convincing evidence it was in the best interest of both Jesse and Joseph to grant permanent custody to appellee.

In a legal-custody matter, courts may use the subsection (D)(1) permanent-custody factors as a guide to the child’s best interest.

In re RY.T. · filed 2023-01-05(D)(1)

This court has routinely looked to the best interest factors delineated for permanent custody cases as a guide to determining the issue in legal custody matters. Id., citing In re D.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100970 and 100971, 2014-Ohio-4818 ¶ 20, citing In re E.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99065, 2013-Ohio-1193, ¶ 13.

In legal-custody cases no particular statutory factor set is mandatory, but courts may use subsection (D)(1)’s permanent-custody factors or R.C. 3109.04’s private-custody factors as instructive guidance.

In re L.W. · filed 2022-10-17(D)(1)

However, although, no specific factors must be followed in a case involving the dispositional alternative of legal custody, we have previously concluded that juvenile courts may be guided by the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) (the permanent-custody factors) or R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) (factors employed in private-custody disputes) since they are both purely instructive. See In re L.P., 3d Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-12-60 and 13-12-61, 2013-Ohio-2607, ¶ 22.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody is guided by § 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors.

In re S.P. · filed 2022-05-18(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s remedied-conditions factor bears on whether a child cannot or should not be returned to a parent, not on the child's best interest, though Section 2151.414's factors may guide a legal-custody best-interest determination.

In Re S.J., Unpublished Decision (12-6-2006) · filed 2006-12-06(D), (E)(1)

Most importantly, Heatherly is a permanent custody case, and does not offer direct guidance on issues related to legal custody. In addition, Heatherly indicates that the matter of "whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child's removal" is related, not to the best interest of the child, but rather to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1). Heatherly , 2002-Ohio-3028, at ¶ 21. In the context of permanent custody issues, proof of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1), in turn, is relevant to the "first prong" question of whether a child cannot or should not be returned to a parent, but is not relevant to the "second prong" question of the best interest of the child. See R.C. 2151.414 (D) and (E). See, also, Heatherly , 2002-Ohio-3028, at ¶ 13 — ¶ 16. Therefore, this argument is inapposite. ... This Court has previously observed that the statutory scheme regarding an award of legal custody does not include a specific test or set of criteria, and that the trial court must base its decision on the best interest of the child. In re N.P ., 9th Dist. No. 21707, 2004-Ohio-110 , at ¶ 23 . In addition, this Court has indicated that the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 may provide some guidance in determining whether a grant of legal custody is in the best interest of the children. In re T.A ., 9th Dist. No. 22954, 2006-Ohio-4468 , at ¶ 17 .

Section 2151.414(D) supplies the factors considered in determining a child's best interest in a legal-custody disposition.

In Re Bouska, 2007 Ap 09 0063 (6-27-2008) · filed 2008-06-27(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) provides factors to be considered in making a best interest of the child determination. ... Based on the evidence presented, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the best interest of Jason Bouska, Jr. that legal custody should be granted to Shelly and Dennis LeMonte.

R.C. 2151.414 governs permanent-custody proceedings and termination of parental rights, not an award of legal custody following an initial temporary-custody order.

In Re Katelynn M., L-07-1354 (10-10-2008) · filed 2008-10-10

Contrary to appellant's assertion, it is R.C. 2151.415 (A)(3) which provides the authority to grant legal custody following an initial order of temporary custody. R.C. 2151.414 governs permanent custody procedures. ... In his second assignment of error, appellant again incorrectly cites R.C. 2151.414 , which governs permanent custody and termination of parental rights. An award of legal custody is not equivalent to the termination of parental rights.

The best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) guide a juvenile court deciding whether to award legal custody to a relative even though the legal-custody statutes contain no specific test or criteria.

In re B.C. · filed 2014-06-25(D)(1)

In regard to the trial court’s decision to grant legal custody to Aunt, “[a]lthough there is no specific test or set of criteria set forth in the statutory scheme” for a trial court’s disposition of legal custody to a relative, “courts agree that the trial court must base its decision on the best interest of the child.” In re N.P., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21707, 2004-Ohio-110, ¶ 23, citing In re Fulton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-09-236, 2003-Ohio-5984, ¶ 11. “[T]he factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 provide guidance in determining whether a grant of legal custody is in the best interest of the child[].”

The R.C. 2151.414(D) permanent-custody factors are instructive in legal-custody cases, but they are not mandatory predicates because R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) contains no specified best-interest factors.

In re A.S. · filed 2014-07-10(D)

Unlike permanent custody cases in which the trial court is guided by the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D) before terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody, R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) does not provide factors the court should consider in determining the child’s best interest in a motion for legal custody. In re G.M. at ¶ 15. We must presume that, in the absence of best interest factors in a legal custody case, “the legislature did not intend to require the consideration of certain factors as a predicate for granting legal custody.” Id. at ¶ 16. Such factors, however, are instructive when making a determination as to the child’s best interest.

The R.C. 2151.414(D) best-interest factors are instructive but not mandatory predicates when a court decides legal custody under R.C. 2151.353(A)(3).

In re D.T. · filed 2014-10-30(D)

We must presume that, in the absence of best interest factors in a legal custody case, “the legislature did not intend to require the consideration of certain factors as a predicate for granting legal custody.” Id. at ¶ 16. Such factors, however, are instructive when making a determination as to the child’s best interest.

Although the legal-custody statute contains no specific best-interest test, Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody factors may guide a court deciding whether legal custody serves the child's best interest.

In re D.M. · filed 2015-01-20(D)

The statutory scheme regarding an award of legal custody does not include a specific test or set of criteria, but Ohio courts have concluded that the trial court must base such a decision on the best interest of the child. See, e.g., In re N.P., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21707, 2004-Ohio-110, ¶ 23. We have previously indicated that the best interest factors of R.C. 2151.414(D) may provide some guidance in determining whether legal custody is in the best interest of the child.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s interaction, wishes, custodial-history, and legally-secure-placement factors are instructive when deciding the best interest of a child in a legal-custody proceeding.

In re A.C. · filed 2015-01-21(D)(1)

In determining the best interest of the child, the best-interest factors delineated in R.C. 2151.414 are instructive. See In re Needom, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-080107 and C-080121, 2008-Ohio-2196, at ¶ 15. These factors include the child’s interactions and relationships with his or her parents, siblings, relatives, and foster caregivers or any other out-of-home providers; the wishes of the child, expressed directly through the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem; the custodial history of the child; and the child’s need for a legally secure placement. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

Although R.C. 2151.414(D)'s factors are not mandatory predicates for an award of legal custody, they are instructive in determining a child's best interest.

In re Howland Children · filed 2015-09-21(D)

Such factors, however, are instructive when making a determination as to the child's best interest.

The permanent-custody best-interest test in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) may guide, but does not govern, a juvenile court's legal-custody decision.

In re A.S. · filed 2016-01-11(D)(1)

Despite the differences between a disposition of permanent custody and a disposition of legal custody, some Ohio courts have recognized that “the statutory best interest test designed for the permanent custody situation may provide some ‘guidance’ for trial courts making legal custody decisions.”

Courts deciding legal custody may look to the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D), other custody factors, a combination, or general best-interest considerations.

In re I.R. · filed 2016-05-11(D)

In making this determination, “courts have looked to the best interest factors of R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), a combination of the two, or general notions of what should be considered regarding the best interests of the children.”

Legal custody is in a child's best interest when it provides a legally secure permanent placement and the parent seeking reunification remains unable to provide a stable home.

In re I.T. · filed 2016-06-29(D)(1)(d)

Mother had completed some of the reunification requirements of the case plan but was not ready to provide the children with a stable home.

The R.C. 2151.414(D) best-interest factors are instructive, but not required predicates, in legal-custody decisions.

In re K.H. · filed 2016-06-30(D)

Such factors, however, are instructive when making a determination as to the child's best interest.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s interaction, wishes, custodial-history, and permanence factors may guide a legal-custody best-interest determination.

In re T.A. · filed 2016-08-29(D)(1)

We have previously indicated that the factors listed in Revised Code Section 2151.414(D) may provide some guidance in determining whether legal custody is in the best interest of a child.

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors may guide a court making a legal-custody determination.

In re M.P. · filed 2017-01-06(D)

Despite the differences between a disposition of permanent custody and legal custody, some Ohio courts have recognized “the statutory best interest test designed for the permanent custody situation may provide some ‘guidance’ for trial courts making legal custody decisions.”

The permanent-custody best-interest factors in subsection (D) guide a juvenile court's best-interest determination when awarding legal custody.

In re K.D. · filed 2017-06-07(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enunciated in R.C. ... 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Although subsection (D)'s best-interest test governs permanent custody, it also provides guidance in legal-custody determinations.

In re D.D. · filed 2017-06-12(D)

“[T]his Court has held that the best interest test set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D), although it relates to permanent custody, ‘provide[s] guidance’ in legal custody determinations.”

Although subsection (D)'s best-interest test relates to permanent custody, it provides guidance in legal-custody determinations.

In re E.W. · filed 2017-06-30(D)

“[T]his Court has held that the best interest test set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D), although it relates to permanent custody, ‘provide[s] guidance’ in legal custody determinations.”

The permanent-custody best-interest factors in subsection (D) guide a juvenile court's legal-custody determination.

In re T.H. · filed 2018-03-28(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody. ... Those factors include the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the child’s wishes, the custodial history of the child, and the child’s need for permanence.

A court determining the best interest of a child for legal custody may look to subsection (D)'s factors, the custody factors in section 3109.04(F)(1), a combination, or general best-interest considerations.

In re B.H. · filed 2018-03-30(D)

In making such a determination, ‘courts have looked to the best interest factors of R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), a combination of the two, or general notions of what should be considered regarding the best interests of the [child].”

Subsection (D)’s factors apply only to agency motions for permanent custody or permanent living arrangements and are not mandatory in a nonparent legal-custody disposition.

In re A.B. · filed 2018-10-17(D)

In dispositional hearings involving motions for legal custody by nonparents, appellate courts have often held that the juvenile court must consider the best interest factors of either R.C. 2151.414(D) (applicable only to motions of an agency for permanent custody or a permanent living arrangement) or R.C. 3109.04(F) ... under a preponderance of the evidence standard. ... However, the General Assembly did not specify the factors to be considered for legal custody as it did for other dispositional orders. ... Therefore, we must presume the juvenile court is free to consider any best interest factors it deems appropriate.

Although section 2151.353(A)(3) supplies no mandatory best-interest factors for legal custody, subsection (D)'s factors are instructive in that determination.

In re J.M. · filed 2019-02-11(D)

Unlike permanent custody cases in which the trial court is guided by the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D) before terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody, R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) does not provide factors the court should consider in determining the child's best interest in a motion for legal custody. ... Such factors, however, are instructive when making a determination as to the child's best interest.

A court deciding a legal-custody request may use subsection (D)'s relevant best-interest factors.

In re: K.S. · filed 2019-06-17(D)

A court may therefore consider the relevant best interest factors set forth in either R.C. 3109.04(F) or R.C. 2151.414(D) in determining the best interest of the child.

Although permanent custody and legal custody are distinct dispositions, subsection (D)'s best-interest test may guide legal-custody decisions.

In re S.K. · filed 2019-06-24(D)

Despite the differences between a disposition of permanent custody and legal custody, some Ohio courts have recognized “the statutory best interest test designed for the permanent custody situation may provide some ‘guidance’ for trial courts making legal custody decisions.”

Subsection (D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court's legal-custody decision.

In re J.G. · filed 2019-06-26(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enunciated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Subsection (D)'s best-interest factors are instructive in legal-custody proceedings, for which the statutory scheme supplies no specific factor list.

In re F.B.D. · filed 2019-06-26(D)

In several cases, this court has held that the best-interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) are instructive.

A court deciding legal custody may use subsection (D)'s relevant best-interest factors as guidance.

In re J.T. · filed 2019-11-04(D)

A court may therefore consider the relevant best interest factors set forth in either R.C. 3109.04(F) or R.C. 2151.414(D) as guidance in determining the best interest of the child.

Subsection (D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court deciding between legal custody and an extension of temporary custody.

In re M.P. · filed 2019-11-06(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody may look to subsection (D)'s permanent-custody factors for guidance while considering all relevant best-interest factors.

In re A.C. · filed 2019-11-21(D)

In determining the best interest of the child in a legal custody case, the juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, and may look to the factors listed under R.C. 2151.414(D) for guidance even though these factors apply to permanent custody decisions.

Subsection (D)'s factors are instructive when determining a child's best interest in a legal-custody proceeding.

In re T.K.M. · filed 2019-12-11(D)

But this court has held that the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) and 3109.04(F) are instructive.

Subsection (D)'s factors may guide the best-interest determination in a legal-custody case even though legal-custody statutes supply no specific factor test.

In re A.C. · filed 2020-03-16(D)

Although there is no specific test or set of criteria that must be followed in determining what is in a child’s best interest in a legal custody case, other appellate courts have held that the R.C. 2151.414(D) factors may be “instructive.”

Subsection (D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court's legal-custody decision.

In re H.K. · filed 2020-11-25(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Subsection (D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors guide the juvenile court when awarding legal custody after an abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication.

In re M.T. · filed 2020-12-02(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enunciated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Subsection (D)'s factors are instructive in a legal-custody best-interest determination.

In re H/B Children · filed 2021-04-02(D)

But this court has held that the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) and 3109.04(F) are instructive.

Subsection (D)'s permanent-custody factors are instructive when deciding a child's best interest in a legal-custody proceeding.

In re J.C. · filed 2021-04-05(D)

However, the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) for determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child have been held to be “instructive.”

Although the legal-custody statute specifies no best-interest factors, § 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody factors are instructive when deciding legal custody.

In re J.C. · filed 2021-04-26(D)

The statute does not set forth specific factors to be considered in making the determination of best interest of the child. In re B.P., supra. However, the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) for determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child have been held to be “instructive” as to an award of legal custody. Id.

When permanent custody is in the children's best interest, awarding legal custody to another person necessarily is not.

In re D.T. · filed 2021-05-12(D)

If permanent custody is in the children’s best interest, legal custody to [any other person] necessarily is not.

A court may use § 2151.414(D)'s best-interest factors as guidance when deciding legal custody.

In re K.B. · filed 2021-09-20(D)

A court may therefore consider the relevant best interest factors set forth in either R.C. 3109.04(F) or R.C. 2151.414(D) as guidance in determining the best interest of the child.

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors are instructive when deciding legal custody because the legal-custody statute lists no specific factors.

In re M.H. · filed 2021-10-12(D)

However, the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) for determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest have been held to be “instructive” regarding an award of legal custody.

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody factors are instructive in determining a child's best interest for legal custody, though no particular factors are mandatory predicates.

In re A.B. · filed 2021-12-30(D)

However, the best interest factors under R.C. 2151.414(D) are instructive in determining what is in the best interest of the child.

Section 2151.414(D)'s factors are instructive in legal-custody decisions, including the child's relationships, custodial history, need for a secure placement, and whether removal conditions were remedied.

In re I.V. · filed 2022-01-14(D)

The best interest factors include, for example, the interaction of the child with the child's parents, relatives, and caregivers; the custodial history of the child; the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement; and whether a parent has continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home. R.C. 2151.414(D).

A juvenile court deciding legal custody is guided by § 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors.

In re L.C. · filed 2022-01-26(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody is guided by § 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors.

In re E.C. · filed 2022-04-13(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody is guided by § 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors.

In re L.S. · filed 2022-09-19(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody is guided by § 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors.

In re A.J.K. · filed 2022-12-02(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enunciated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody factors are instructive when deciding a child's best interest for legal custody.

In re D.F. · filed 2022-12-13(D)

Such factors, however, are instructive when making a determination as to the child's best interest.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody is guided by § 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors.

In re L.L. · filed 2022-12-14(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

A court modifying legal custody properly uses § 2151.414(D)'s mandatory best-interest factors and may supplement them with R.C. 3109.04(F)'s factors.

In re J.B. · filed 2022-12-14(D)

As the juvenile court recognized Foster Parents’ motion for legal custody as a request to modify Uncle’s and Aunt’s existing award of legal custody, applied the standard set forth in R.C. 2151.42(B) relevant to such modifications, and utilized the mandatory best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D), as well as the permissible supplemental best interest factors in R.C. 3109.04(F), this Court concludes that the trial court properly applied the law in this case.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s best-interest factors govern an initial permanent-custody disposition and also guide the court when considering competing legal custody, though the standards of proof and appellate review differ.

In re K.H. · filed 2024-11-06(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) allows a juvenile court to award permanent custody of child to a children’s services agency as an initial disposition if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child cannot be placed with the parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents under R.C. 2151.414(E), and (2) permanent custody is in the child’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). ... In determining whether to grant legal custody to a petitioner, the court again is guided by the best-interest factors under R.C. 2151.414(D).