Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

Under § 2151.414(E), clear and convincing evidence of any one factor in (E)(1) through (E)(16) requires a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time; a parent's failure to provide a safe environment despite agency services supported findings under (E)(1), (E)(4), and (E)(14).

In Re Mark B., Unpublished Decision (3-14-2005) · filed 2005-03-14(E)(1), (E)(4), (E)(14)

The record establishes that LCCS provided support and services to appellant to help her regain custody of her children. Despite this assistance, appellant was unable to provide a safe environment for the children. We find that the record supports, by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court's findings under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1). {¶ 97} This same evidence, and for the same reasons, supports the trial court's findings under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) and (14) — that appellant is unwilling to provide "an adequate permanent home" for the children and is unwilling to protect the child from physical abuse or neglect. ... {¶ 105} According to R.C. 2151.414 (E), even a single finding under subsections (E)(1) to (E)(16) requires the court to "enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent[.]" We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the children cannot or should not be placed with their parent within a reasonable time.

Before awarding permanent custody to a children-services agency, a court must find both that a circumstance in division (B)(1) applies and that permanent custody serves the child's best interests; one proven factor under division (E) is sufficient to support the required placement finding.

In Matter of P.N.M., Unpublished Decision (9-17-2007) · filed 2007-09-17(B)(1), (E)

"[B]efore a trial court may award a children services agency permanent custody, it must find: (1) that one of the circumstances described in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) applies; and (2) that awarding the children services agency permanent custody would further the child's best interests." In re McCain , Vinton App. No. 06CA654, 2007-Ohio-1429 , ¶ 13 . Thus, once the court determines that just one of the specific instances in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exist, and that "permanent custody is in the best interest of the child[,]" permanent custody can be awarded.

Under subsection (E), the existence of any one listed factor is sufficient to require a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re P.H., 08 Ca 29 (3-17-2009) · filed 2009-03-17(E)

The trial court must consider all relevant evidence before determining the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents. R.C. 2151.414 (E). The statute also indicates that if the court makes a finding under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1)-(15), the court shall determine the children cannot or should not be placed with the parent. A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent upon the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414 (E) factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (b) permit permanent custody when the evidence establishes that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or that the child was abandoned.

In re Z.D. · filed 2012-08-14(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(b)

{¶24} Upon review, we hold the trial court did not err in determining that Z.D. could not be placed with appellant or Brown within a reasonable time or should not be placed with appellant or Brown. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). Furthermore, the trial court could have properly relied on the factor of abandonment under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), based on the evidence presented. See R.C. 2151.011(C) (setting forth a ninety-day rule for the definition of abandonment in this context).

Any one subsection (E) factor is sufficient to support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re K.S. · filed 2017-07-10(E)

A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent upon the existence of any one of the R.C. §2151.414(E) factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

If clear and convincing evidence establishes any one subsection (E) factor, the court must find that the child cannot or should not be placed with the parents within a reasonable time.

In re N.R.S. · filed 2018-01-16(E)

The juvenile court need only find the existence of one of the enumerated factors. In re D.C., 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2015-03-006, 2015-Ohio-3178, ¶31. “If the trial court finds one of the factors present by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must make a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent(s).”

Section 2151.414(E) requires a court to find that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent when clear and convincing evidence establishes any one of its listed factors.

In re B. P. · filed 2011-04-18(E)

Furthermore, R.C. 2151.414(E) contains several factors, the presence of any one of which requires the court, upon a finding of clear and convincing evidence ... that the factor exists, to enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a juvenile court determining a child's best interest to consider possible placement with a suitable relative when that placement is relevant.

In Re Schaefer, Unpublished Decision (3-21-2005) · filed 2005-03-21(D)

We agree with the Ninth District's conclusion that, when necessary, the juvenile court is required to consider the possibility of placement with a suitable relative. This proposition of law is supported by the language of R.C. 2151.414 (D). Specifically, R.C. 2151.414 (D) states, "[i]n determining the best interest of a child * * * the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following[.]" The language of R.C. 2151.414 (D) clearly sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors and requires the juvenile court to consider any factor relevant to the best interest of the child. In the case at bar, the possible placement of Damian with a suitable relative was a relevant factor.

In determining a child's best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D), the court must consider the statutory factors, and a relative's willingness to care for the child neither changes those factors nor requires the court to favor relative placement over permanent custody with the agency.

In Re Turner Children, Unpublished Decision (9-18-2006) · filed 2006-09-18(D)

In determining the best interest of a child, the trial court is required to consider the factors contained in R.C. § 2151.414 (D). ... The willingness of a relative to care for a child does not alter the statutory factors to be considered in granting permanent custody. ... Accordingly, a court is not required to favor a relative if, after considering all the factors; it is in the child's best interest for the agency to be granted permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(a) does not require consideration of placing a child with a relative, although the possibility should be considered as part of the child's interactions and relationships with relatives and others who may significantly affect the child.

In re L.C. · filed 2011-04-29(D)(1)(a)

Consideration of placement of a child with a relative is not a statutory requirement. In re F.C., Montgomery App. No. 23803, 2010-Ohio-3113, ¶24. “That possibility is a matter that ought to be considered in connection with the child’s interaction and relationship with the child’s parents, relatives, foster caregivers, out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child.” Id., citing R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) and In re C.W., Montgomery App. No. 20140, 2004-Ohio-2040.

In determining a child’s best interest under § 2151.414(D)(1), family unity, blood relationship, and the availability of a suitable relative placement are relevant but not controlling; the court must consider all relevant factors and select the best option for the child.

In re J.B. · filed 2013-04-26(D)(1)

Although family unity and “blood relationship” are important factors to consider, neither is controlling. ... Rather, all relevant factors must be considered when determining the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). ... Even if S.C. were a suitable relative, “[t]he statute does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parenting rights an all-controlling factor [and] does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.” ... Rather, the statute “requires the court to find the best option for the child[.]”

The availability of a suitable relative placement is not controlling or entitled to greater weight; the court must weigh all relevant factors to identify the child’s best option.

In re Tr.T. · filed 2018-05-31(D)

Rather, R.C. 2151.414 requires the court to find the best option for the child upon a weighing of all the relevant factors. In re Schaefer at ¶ 63. “The statute does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.”

The availability of a family member as a possible custodian is not itself a statutory best-interest factor the court must weigh, especially when no one moved for custody before the hearing.

In re S.B. · filed 2018-06-04(D)(1)

However, the record is clear that no one had moved for custody of the child at the time of the hearing. Moreover, consideration of a family member as a viable custody option is not a statutory factor the trial court must weigh.

The twelve-of-twenty-two-month period under Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is calculated from the child's entry into agency custody through the filing of the permanent-custody motion.

In re L.W. · filed 2019-04-11(B)(1)(d)

The time period for R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is calculated from when the child enters agency custody and the filing of the motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) requires a child to have been in agency custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period when the agency files its permanent-custody motion, so time between filing and the hearing does not count toward that period.

In Re B.S., Ca2007-06-140 (11-26-2007) · filed 2007-11-26(B)(1)(d)

{¶ 28} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court correctly found that the children had been in the temporary custody of BCDJFS since May 17, 2005. However, the record indicates that BCDJFS filed its motion seeking permanent custody of the children on May 11, 2006. While the children had been in the temporary custody of BCDJFS for 12 or more months as of the date of the permanent custody hearing, the children had not been in the temporary custody of BCDJFS as of the date BCDJFS filed its permanent custody motion. As the Ohio Supreme Court held in In re C.W. , 104 Ohio St.3d 163 , ¶ 26, "* * * before a public children-services agency * * * can move for permanent custody of a child on R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) grounds, the child must have been in the temporary custody of an agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. In other words, the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward the 12-month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)." {¶ 29} However, the Court went on to state that, "[this] holding does not preclude an agency from moving for permanent custody before a child has been in the agency's temporary custody for at least 12 months. If a ground other than R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) exists to support a grant of permanent custody, the agency may move for permanent custody on that other ground." Id. at ¶ 27.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) requires only a best-interest finding, not a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent, when the child has been in agency temporary custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period.

In Re D. J., 21906 (12-14-2007) · filed 2007-12-14(B)(1)(d)

The trial court's initial finding was incorrect, because the proper consideration is not whether the child has been in the agency's custody for 12 of the last 22 months following the filing of a permanent custody motion — the proper inquiry is whether the child has been in the agency's temporary custody "for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period." C.W. , 2004-Ohio-6411 , syllabus. ... As we have noted, the trial court did not need to consider whether D.J. could be placed with Sandra within a reasonable time or should be placed with her. The court only had to consider whether permanent custody was in D.J.'s best interest.

Once a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the agency need only prove by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.

In re K.L.S. · filed 2010-11-08(B)(1)(d)

Since the children had been in appellee’s custody for the previous 19 months, appellee only had to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was in their best interest to grant their permanent custody to it. Based on the evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the children’s best interest would be served by granting permanent custody to appellee.

Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), temporary custody begins on the earlier of adjudication or sixty days after removal, and the twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition is satisfied when the resulting statutory period reaches at least twelve consecutive months.

In re S.L. · filed 2010-12-27(B)(1)(d)

For the purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), “a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty (60) days after the removal of the child from the home.” R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). As of August 9, 2008, the children had been out of the home for sixty days. The motions for permanent custody were filed on December 10, 2009. Thus, pursuant to the statute, the children had been in the temporary custody of the Agency for sixteen consecutive months, and the trial court’s determination in this regard was clearly supported by the evidence.

When a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not determine whether the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and need only additionally determine the child's best interests.

In re D.P. · filed 2012-07-24(B)(1)(d)

Pursuant to the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in a children services agency's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. ... Consequently, when considering a R.C. 2151 .414(B)(1)(d) permanent custody motion, the only other consideration becomes the child's best interests. A trial court need not conduct an R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) analysis of whether the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits an award of permanent custody when a child has been in an agency's custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re K.L. · filed 2012-12-10(B)(1)

Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), this fact alone, along with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the trial court's decision.

The twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground does not require twenty-two months of agency involvement before a permanent-custody motion is filed.

In re R.B. · filed 2025-05-02(B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not require 22 months of agency involvement before an agency seeks permanent custody of a child, it only requires that the child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period.

The twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground does not require twenty-two months of agency involvement before an agency seeks permanent custody.

In re A.M. · filed 2025-05-15(B)(1)(d)

Although R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) requires 12 or more months of temporary custody within a 22-month period, “[n]othing in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) requires 22 months of agency involvement before the agency seeks permanent custody.” ... Therefore, the juvenile court’s finding that A.M. had been in agency custody for 12 or more months of a 22-month period was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

An agency may allege a permanent-custody ground only if it exists when the motion is filed, and a later motion cannot add the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground while the original motion remains pending.

In re W.R. · filed 2025-08-01(B)(1)(d)

An agency may file a motion for permanent custody at any time alleging grounds enunciated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) or (2), as long as such grounds exist at the time the agency files its motion. ... Unless the motion is withdrawn in good faith or otherwise disposed in a manner which does not terminate the case, * * * the agency is bound by the allegations in its original motion for permanent custody and may not further allege ‘12 of 22’ grounds only because the passage of time due to continuances and other delays would otherwise support such grounds.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody basis for permanent custody only if the child has been in temporary agency custody for twelve months when the motion is filed.

In Re S.C., Unpublished Decision (9-1-2004) · filed 2004-09-01(B)(1)(d)

Because S.C. had not been in the temporary custody of LCCS for 12 months at the time the motion for permanent custody was filed, the first prong of the permanent custody test may not be satisfied on this basis.

The 12-of-22-month condition must be satisfied when the agency files its permanent custody motion.

In re L.D. · filed 2025-08-15(B)(1)(d)

Therefore, when the Agency filed its motion for permanent custody the children had not been in the Agency's temporary custody for 12 of the previous 22 months and the juvenile court erred in finding that the "12 of 22" condition of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) was met.

When permanent custody rests on inability to place a child with either parent, § 2151.414 requires clear and convincing proof of that condition and of the child’s best interest, evaluated under the listed factors.

In Re McHugh, Unpublished Decision (5-5-2005) · filed 2005-05-05(B), (D), and (E)

R.C. § 2151.414 (B) enables the court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. R.C. § 2151.414 (D) sets out the factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child. ... We find clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. ... As for best interests, the trial court found that the children were in need of a legally secure permanent placement and that such could not be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the Agency.

A trial court need not deny permanent custody solely because the agency failed to implement a particular aspect of the child's case plan.

In Re Townsend, Unpublished Decision (5-9-2005) · filed 2005-05-09(C)

R.C. 2151.414 (C) specifically states that a trial court is not required to deny permanent custody "solely because the agency failed to implement any particular aspect of the child's case plan." ACCS did fail to implement telephone contact between Appellant and her children as required by the case plan, but this one failure does not negate the numerous and substantial efforts ACCS made to reunify Appellant with her children through the duration of this case.

Under § 2151.414(E)(1), clear and convincing evidence that a parent failed to complete or make substantial progress on the case plan supports a finding that the child cannot be placed with that parent within a reasonable time.

In re D.F. · filed 2012-07-02(E)(1)

Given the testimony in this case, the trial court could reasonably determine by clear and convincing evidence that the Agency had proven that Francis had not completed or even made substantial progress on the case plan. R.C. 2151.414(E)(1).

The permanent-custody inquiry focuses on the child's best interest rather than the children-services agency's actions or inactions.

In re D.W. · filed 2015-08-25(C)

Additionally, the focus when a court considers a permanent custody motion under R.C. 2151.414 is not upon the children services agency’s actions or inactions.

Section 2151.414 limits the disposition at a permanent-custody hearing to granting or denying the permanent-custody motion, and the dispositional options in Section 2151.353 do not apply to that proceeding.

In Re Fell, Unpublished Decision (5-16-2005) · filed 2005-05-16

The only disposition option available at a permanent custody hearing held pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 is the determination to deny or grant the permanent custody motion. Greene, supra; In re Schmidt (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 331 . In their motion, appellants seek legal custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.353 (A) (3); legal custody and permanent custody are alternative disposition choices. R.C. 2151.353 (A). Accordingly, R.C. 2151.353 (A) (3) does not authorize appellants to intervene in the adjudicatory permanent custody proceeding and move for legal custody of the children. In re Thompson, supra. The dispositional options set forth in R.C. 2151.353 have no bearing on a permanent custody proceeding pursuant R.C. 2151.414 .

Section 2151.414 asks whether permanently terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody to the moving agency is in the child's best interests, so a nonparent grandmother lacks standing to challenge the award under that provision.

In Re th.W., Unpublished Decision (6-9-2005) · filed 2005-06-09

R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-part test for determining whether permanent custody should be granted to an agency. Under this statute, the issue is whether or not "it is in the best interests of the child to permanently terminate parental rights and to grant permanent custody to the agency that filed the motion." (Emphasis added.) M.C., as maternal grandmother to all three children, however, lacks standing to bring such a claim.

An abandonment finding under § 2151.414(B)(1)(b) is supported when a parent has failed to communicate or visit with the children for at least ninety days and, despite being able to contact the agency, made no effort to determine their status.

In Re Bailey Children, Unpublished Decision (6-13-2005) · filed 2005-06-13(B)(1)(b)

Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, we have reviewed the record and hereby conclude the court's R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(b), "abandonment" was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as the transcript supports a finding that appellant failed to communicate or visit with his children for a period of ninety days or more. See R.C. 2151.011 (c). Although appellant was aware that the children had been removed form their mother's care and had been possibly placed in foster care, he admitted to making no attempt to contact SCDJFS or the mother to determine their status. Tr. II at 18-20. Appellant tried to rationalize that he was out of town, "working down south," but acknowledged that he had the ability to contact SCDJFS but did not do so. Tr. II at 20. He further admitted to providing no financial support for the children. Tr. II at 19.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and the child is abandoned, even if the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is not met.

In Matter of Westfall, Unpublished Decision (12-18-2006) · filed 2006-12-18(B)(1)(b)

We agree, however, other grounds under R.C. 2151.414 (B) support the trial court's decision to terminate appellant's parental rights and grant the motion for permanent custody. ... According to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), before a court can grant permanent custody to the moving agency, it must "determin[e] * * *, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: ... "(b) The child is abandoned. ... This finding, in conjunction with the best interest findings, is sufficient to support a termination of appellant's parental rights.

Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), a finding that a parent abandoned the child makes evidence about whether the child could be placed with that parent within a reasonable time immaterial to the permanent-custody decision.

In Re Z. D., 24295 (12-10-2008) · filed 2008-12-10(B)(1)(b)

The motion was based on the fact that the mother had gained a spot on a waiting list for housing after the trial court terminated her parental rights. The question, therefore, is whether the mother's newly acquired position on a waiting list for housing could alter the decision to terminate the mother's parental rights. This fact would be relevant, if at all, to the question of whether the child could be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should be placed with a parent. While the trial court did enter a finding on this factor when it terminated the mother's parental rights, the court also found that the mother had abandoned her child, making the issue of whether the child could be placed with a parent within a reasonable time inconsequential. See R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(b). Accordingly, regardless of the label attached to the motion, the substance of it is immaterial and this issue is without merit.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that the child was abandoned and termination is in the child’s best interests.

In re S.B. · filed 2009-07-23(B)(1)(b)

In order to terminate appellant’s rights, FCCS was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that (1) one of the four factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies and (2) termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. ... Alternatively, the agency must prove that under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), the child is abandoned. ... Given the substantial amount of time during which appellant lacked all contact with or support of the child, the trial court did not err in concluding that appellant failed to rebut the presumption set forth in R.C. 2151.011(C).

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes that a parent abandoned the child and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re A.S. · filed 2011-02-14(B)(1)(b), (D)(1), (E)(10)

We find the trial court did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child is dependent and appellant abandoned the child. ... Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the best interests of the child would best be served by granting appellee permanent custody of the child.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) treats the filing of the permanent-custody motion and the dispositional hearing as alternative dates from which to measure whether a parent will remain incarcerated for eighteen months.

In Re J.Z., Unpublished Decision (6-28-2005) · filed 2005-06-28(E)(12)

While appellant's contentions are grounded in at least some of the language of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12), they ignore the alternative posture of the statute. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12) sets forth two points in time for calculating the 18-month provision, the date the motion for permanent custody was filed and the dispositional hearing. The facts of this case reveal that appellant will not be available to J.Z. for more than 18 months after the motion for permanent custody was filed, and thus the child cannot be returned to her.

Permanent custody was supported where an incarcerated parent could not care for the child within a reasonable time, had no bond with the child, and an extension would pass the case's sunset date.

In re O.S. · filed 2025-10-30(B)(1)(a) and (D)

Testimony established Father will not be able to care for O.S within a reasonable time, if ever, and further, that Father has no bond with O.S. ... While Father advocated for an extension of time, waiting for Father to be released from prison, to begin and complete a case plan, learn how to care for O.S., and reunify with O.S. would take this matter past its sunset date. ... We therefore find the trial court did not err in finding O.S. could not be placed with Father within a reasonable time. ... Upon review, we find sufficient, competent and credible evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence, and find the trial court did not err in determining the best interests of O.S. were best served by terminating the parental rights of Father and granting permanent custody to SCJFS.

Section 2151.414(A)(2) requires the trial court to continue expediting a permanent-custody matter after remand for a new hearing.

In Re Walker · filed 2005-07-22(A)(2)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(A)(2), the trial court shall continue to expedite this matter.

When permanent custody is requested in an original complaint, Section 2151.414's twelve-of-twenty-two-month provision is irrelevant to the reasonable-placement prong and matters only as part of the best-interest analysis.

In re R.B. · filed 2019-08-28(B)(1)(d), (D), (E)

In a request for permanent custody as part of an original complaint, the “12 of 22” provision is only relevant under the second prong when considering the best interests of the children.

The subsection (B) analysis is not required when permanent custody is sought in an original complaint under section 2151.353(A), rather than by motion under sections 2151.413 and 2151.414(A).

In re H.H. · filed 2019-12-03(B)

Contrary to mother's contention, the juvenile court was not required to engage in this analysis because the juvenile court analyzed FCCS's request for permanent custody in the original complaint pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A), not 2151.413 and 2151.414(A).

Section 2151.414 requires a court granting permanent custody as its initial dispositional order to find both that permanent custody is in the child's best interest under division (D) and that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent under division (E).

In Re Green, Unpublished Decision (6-23-2005) · filed 2005-06-23(B), (D), and (E)

{¶ 18} R.C. 2151.414 (B) governs granting of permanent custody. In order to grant permanent custody as the initial dispositional order, the court must determine that the permanent commitment is in the best interest of the child under R.C. 2151.414 (D) and that the child cannot be placed with one of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent under R.C. 2151.414 (E).

Section 2151.414(E)(1) cannot support permanent custody when a new, independent complaint seeks permanent custody as the initial disposition.

In Re Destiny C., L-08-1147 (10-10-2008) · filed 2008-10-10(E)(1)

In our view then, when there is a new and independent complaint that requests an initial disposition of permanent custody, reliance on the R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) factor is error. Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court found an (E)(1) factor, this determination is erroneous.

When an agency requests permanent custody as the initial disposition in its original complaint, the court must find under section 2151.414(E) that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent; the twelve-of-twenty-two-month provision does not apply.

In re A.M. · filed 2023-05-08(E)

Because the Agency's June 4, 2021 dependency complaint requested the juvenile court grant it permanent custody of Marc as part of its initial disposition, R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) applied to the Agency's request for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) does not allow a juvenile court to grant an agency permanent custody as the initial disposition, unless the court finds under R.C. 2151.414(E) that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. The so-called "12 of 22" provision is neither a predicate circumstance in R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) nor one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E).

Section 2151.414(E)(4) requires a finding that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when the parent demonstrates a lack of commitment by failing to communicate with or visit the child for approximately nine months.

In the Matter of Mercedes, Unpublished Decision (7-25-2005) · filed 2005-07-25(E)(4)

R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) states a court shall find that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time if "[t]he parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment towards the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so[.]" As stated previously, the evidence affirmatively establishes that appellant had demonstrated a lack of commitment to her children as she had failed to communicate or visit with the children for approximately nine months. Accordingly, the trial court accurately found that the children could not be placed with appellant in a reasonable amount of time.

Section 2151.414(E)(4) applies to an incarcerated parent who makes no attempt to communicate with or inquire about the child and is unwilling or unable to provide a stable home.

In Re Jamilah P., Unpublished Decision (3-31-2006) · filed 2006-03-31(E)(4)

We disagree. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) is clearly applicable in this case. The father made no attempt to communicate with his newborn child, nor did he inquire as to her well-being. He did not make any attempt to contact appellee regarding the child. He also did not attend the adjudication and disposition hearing. Furthermore, the father is unwilling or unable to provide a stable home for Jamilah P. Even though the father was incarcerated, he had an obligation to provide for his child.

Section 2151.414(E) requires at least one enumerated predicate finding before a court may conclude that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In Re Craig, 2007 Ap 03 0017 (7-19-2007) · filed 2007-07-19(E)

With respect to the first requirement, R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets forth a list of 16 possible predicate findings. One of those findings must be established prior to a judicial conclusion that a child cannot or should not be placed with the child's parent. ... Finally, we find that the trial court's findings, that the child could not be placed with any of the child's parents within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with any parent and that the best interests of the child would be served by granting permanent custody to the Tuscarawas County Department of Job and Family Services, were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 2151.414(E)(4) supports a lack-of-commitment finding when an incarcerated parent fails to contact or attempt to contact the child, including by letter or telephone, and offers no legal basis for making the agency responsible for initiating prison visitation.

In re D.M.C. · filed 2013-03-06(E)(4)

Under these circumstances the findings reflected by the court and the record below support the conclusion, at a minimum, that “the parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so” and that the child could not be placed with his parent within a reasonable time. Appellant does not dispute that he has failed to contact or even attempt to contact his children in any way during the entire duration of his incarceration; this failure extends to letters and telephone calls, in addition to visitation. Appellant argues that Appellee should be charged with the responsibility of initiating and arranging visitation and should be required to locate his other relatives, but offers no legal basis for this assertion and no explanation of the absence of written or telephone contact.

A parent’s rape conviction involving another child who lived in the parent’s household requires a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with that parent within a reasonable time.

In re C.C. · filed 2021-03-29(E)(7)(d)

R.C. 2151.414(E) requires a juvenile court to find that a child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent if any one of sixteen factors are met. ... We also conclude there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s finding that father was convicted of raping his minor stepdaughter.

Section 2151.414(E) does not require a juvenile court to align every supporting fact in its judgment entry with the specific statutory condition to which it relates.

In Re Donnel F., Unpublished Decision (8-12-2005) · filed 2005-08-12(E)

The court also set forth the necessary facts in its judgment entry to support these findings. In the case before us, the fact that these facts were not all aligned with the specific R.C. 2151.414 (E) condition to which each related is not reversible error.

A permanent-custody award satisfies § 2151.414 when the required statutory findings are supported by competent and credible evidence.

In re T.W. · filed 2013-06-28

Applying the same reasoning here, we have reviewed the entire record and find no error in the decision awarding permanent custody to MCCS. The magistrate and trial court made all the required findings under R.C. 2151.414, and there is competent and credible evidence, as outlined above, to support the findings.

A trial court need not discuss or make findings under Section 2151.414(D)(1)(e) when no evidence shows that any Section 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) factor applies.

In re K.H. · filed 2016-03-30(D)(1)(e)

Because no evidence was presented to the trial court that any of the factors set forth in Sections 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) applied in this case, however, the trial court was not required to discuss or make findings under Revised Code Section 2151.414(D)(1)(e).

A trial court need not expressly cite § 2151.414(E)(1) when its factual findings address the provision's elements and establish that the parent failed to remedy the condition causing removal despite agency services.

In re C.C. · filed 2016-10-24(E)(1)

However, while the court did not specifically refer to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the trial court made findings of fact regarding the elements of this factor and thus essentially found R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) applied to her. The court found that mother is unable to protect the children because she “does not anticipate dangers to them” and “is not protective of her children from those who will prey on them.” The undisputed evidence established that this inability to protect the children was the condition, as to mother, that caused the children to be removed from the home. The court found this condition still exists and thus has not been remedied.

A judgment does not violate subsection (B)(1) merely by omitting the statute's precise language if its findings support the required conclusion.

In re J.W. · filed 2019-07-03(B)(1)

The magistrate’s failure here to specifically mention the statutory language is not “a per se violation of the statutory criteria as long as the judgment entry granting permanent custody supports such conclusion.”

The statute requires substantive first- and second-prong findings but does not require a juvenile court to cite the corresponding subsections when its judgment clearly makes those findings.

In re T.B. · filed 2020-08-12(D), (E)

This Court has never held that a juvenile court’s first- and second-prong permanent custody findings must be accompanied by citation to the relevant subsections. Nor does the statute require as much.

Absent a proper request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, a trial court need not separately set out its findings on the division (E) factors.

In re Ar.C. · filed 2021-02-26(E)

Thus, in the absence of a proper request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, a trial court need not specifically set forth its findings regarding the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors.

Section 2151.414(D)(1) requires consideration of each best-interest factor but does not require the juvenile court to expressly discuss each one.

In re A.F.H. · filed 2023-05-04(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). Consideration is all the statute requires.

A permanent-custody judgment must state the applicable statutory provisions and make the required evidentiary findings, though correcting deficient findings on remand does not require a new hearing.

In re S.I. · filed 2025-10-29(B)(1)

Thus, on remand, the trial court should clearly state the applicable statutory provisions, as well as its specific findings based on the evidence presented. ... Importantly, the trial court does not need to hold a new evidentiary hearing and may make proper findings based on the previous record. ... Because we conclude that the trial court failed to make the required findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), Appellant’s first assignment of error is sustained.

A court making the cannot-or-should-not placement finding need not cite the specific subsection (E) factor supporting that finding.

In re A.K. · filed 2026-03-18(B)(1)(a), (E)

This Court has repeatedly held that, in making a finding that the child cannot or should not be returned to the custody of the parents under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the trial court is not required to cite to a specific subsection of R.C. 2151.414(E).

Section 2151.414(E)(2) requires competent, credible evidence linking a parent's severe mental or emotional illness to an inability to provide an adequate permanent home at present or within one year; a diagnosis and failure to pursue treatment are insufficient without evidence of how the condition affects the parent's ability to care for the children.

In Re Amber L., Unpublished Decision (8-12-2005) · filed 2005-08-12(E)(2)

The evidence falls short, however, with respect to the question of whether appellant's disorders were so severe as to render her incapable of providing an adequate, stable home for her children. Although Dr. Peters did opine that, left untreated, one suffering from borderline personality disorder is likely to repeat the same patterns of behavior without a lot of insight into or understanding about the causes of that behavior, there was no specific discussion of what those behavior patterns might be or how they might impact appellant's ability to care for her children. As a result of these deficiencies in the evidence, we find that the trial court erred in its finding with respect to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(2), in that such finding is not supported by competent credible evidence.

Section 2151.414(E)(2) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when chronic mental or emotional illness is so severe that the parent cannot provide an adequate permanent home now or within one year.

In Re Summerfield, Unpublished Decision (10-17-2005) · filed 2005-10-17(E)(2)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets forth sixteen factors a trial court may consider as grounds for finding a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time period. The court specifically found R.C. 2151.414 (E)(2) applicable. This factor mandates a trial court to enter a finding the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent if the following exists: "Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, mental retardation, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code." ... Accordingly, we find the trial court's determination Bre'Ana could not and should not be placed with mother is not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.

Section 2151.414(E)(2) permits a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when the parent's chronic mental or emotional illness is so severe that it affects the parent's ability to provide an adequate permanent home at the time of the hearing or within one year afterward.

In Re Kayla H. · filed 2007-11-16(E)(2)

In order to find that section applicable, the parent’s mental illness must be “so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home” at the time of or within one year after the dispositional hearing. The evidence must show that the mental illness affects the parent’s ability to care for his or her children. ... Therefore, due to Todd’s multiple diagnoses of pedophilia, and the expert testimony regarding his therapy, we conclude that Todd’s pedophilia qualifies as a “chronic mental or emotional illness” so severe that his children cannot and should not be placed in his care.

Under § 2151.414(E)(2), ongoing hallucinations and paranoid delusions despite medication, coupled with an inability to interact with or control the children, may clearly and convincingly establish that the children cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In re E.S. · filed 2011-05-19(E)(2)

The court found that the children could not be placed with the mother within a reasonable period of time because, despite reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency, the mother had failed to remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed and she suffered from a chronic mental or emotional illness. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (2). ... Upon review of the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, we find the court had clear and convincing evidence showing that the mother’s mental illness proved that the children could not be placed with her within a reasonable amount of time. The 2010 psychological evaluation showed that, even though she was compliant with her medication, the mother continued to experience auditory hallucinations and paranoid delusions.

Section 2151.414(E)(6) requires evidence of a listed conviction or guilty plea, that the child or a sibling was the victim, and that the parent poses an ongoing danger to the child or a sibling.

In Re Bowers, Unpublished Decision (8-18-2005) · filed 2005-08-18(E)(6)

R.C. § 2151.414 (E)(6) requires: (1) evidence that the parent pleaded guilty or was convicted of one of the offenses listed, which includes child endangerment; (2) that the victim be the child or a sibling of the child; and (3) that the parent poses an ongoing danger to the child or a sibling of the child. All three elements are satisfied by the record: Appellant committed the crime of child endangerment, the victims of the crime were siblings of the two boys that were the subject of the custody hearing, and Appellant posed a danger to the boys by dropping one of them.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground may support permanent custody even when the motion does not specifically identify that ground, where the motion invokes Section 2151.414 broadly, the parent is allowed to cross-examine on the issue, and the custody period is clearly established.

In Re Vann Children, Unpublished Decision (9-6-2005) · filed 2005-09-06(B)(1)(d)

Appellant claims the trial court erred in basing the issue of permanent custody on R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), "The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999," because the motion for permanent custody did not state the basis of the motion was said section. We disagree. ... Upon review, we do not find any prejudice or error given the broad language of the permanent custody motion, the trial court's assurance to permit cross-examination on the issue and the clear fact that the children were in appellee's temporary custody for twelve months out of a consecutive twenty-two month period.

Section 2151.414(A)(1) requires notice of both the permanent-custody motion and the hearing, and notice is adequate when a parent is personally served with a complaint listing the hearing date and later attends a pretrial whose entry reiterates that date.

In Re zurfley/chatman/black Children, Unpublished Decision (2-13-2006) · filed 2006-02-13(A)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 (A)(1) mandates the juvenile court must schedule a hearing, and provide notice of the filing of the motion and of the hearing, in accordance with section 2151.29 of the Revised Code, to all parties to the action and to the child's guardian ad litem. ... A review of the record reveals, and father concedes, he was personally served at the initial shelter care hearing with a summons and a copy of the permanent custody complaint. The Complaint sets forth the dates of the pretrial, trial and subsequent review dates. Additionally, father was present at the June 1, 2005 pretrial hearing. The trial court's entry notes father's presence and reiterates the date of the permanent custody hearing on the entry. We find father was provided with appropriate notice of the permanent custody hearing.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) permits permanent custody when the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent and permanent custody is in the child's best interest; the twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding in subsection (B)(1)(d) is not required when subsection (B)(1)(a) applies.

In Matter of Angler, Ct 2006-0079 (6-15-2007) · filed 2007-06-15(B)(1)(a)

After a child has been adjudicated abused, neglected or dependent and a public children's services agency files a motion for permanent custody as a change of a prior disposition or requests permanent custody as the initial disposition, the court may grant permanent custody of the child to the movant if the court determines in accordance with R.C. 2151.414 (E) that the child cannot be placed with one of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent and determines in accordance with division R.C. 2151.414 (D) that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

Section 2151.414(A)(1) requires notice of the permanent-custody hearing to be given to all parties and the child's guardian ad litem in accordance with section 2151.29.

In re D.G. · filed 2012-04-25(A)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) requires that notice of the permanent custody hearing be given to “all parties to the action and to the child’s guardian ad litem” in accordance with R.C. 2151.29.

Subsection (A)(1) requires notice of a permanent-custody hearing through section 2151.29, including waiting at least one week after publication before the hearing.

In re G.C.J. · filed 2019-01-22(A)(1)

Although R.C. 2151.29 appears to address only “summons” in relation to service by publication, R.C. 2151.414(A)(1), by its specific mandate, contemplates the same process be utilized for service of notice of a hearing on termination. ... It is therefore clear that a court must wait at least one week from publication to proceed to hearing in a termination case to have “full jurisdiction” over a party properly served via publication.

A permanent-custody hearing notice is deficient under subsection (A)(1) if it omits the legal effect of permanent custody, the parent's right to appointed counsel, and the designated employee who assists indigent parents.

In re J.T. · filed 2019-02-05(A)(1)

The notice is printed on the court’s letterhead, which contains a phone number, but the notice does not advise Appellant of the legal effect of granting permanent custody, of her right to counsel, or the name of an employee designated to assist indigent parents. ... It therefore was deficient.

Section 2151.414(A)(1)'s notice requirement concerns personal jurisdiction over each parent, so one parent cannot challenge lack of service on another parent without showing prejudice to her own case.

In re E.M. · filed 2023-02-24(A)(1)

The notice requirement found in R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) “merely ensures that the juvenile court has personal jurisdiction over the parents” and thus “involves the juvenile court’s personal jurisdiction over the parents, not its subject matter jurisdiction to decide a motion for permanent custody.” ... Here, mother fails to demonstrate that she suffered any prejudice relating to the juvenile court’s provision of notice of the permanent custody hearing to R.M. This fact alone warrants rejection of mother’s argument.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits permanent custody when the child's best interest and any one of the listed grounds are established by clear and convincing evidence.

In the Matter of Merryman, Unpublished Decision (6-14-2004) · filed 2004-06-14(B)(1)

Each one of these findings, if supported by the evidence, is sufficient in and of itself to base a grant of permanent custody pursuant to R.C. § 2151.414 (B)(1).

Section 2151.414(A) requires notice of the permanent custody motion and initial hearing; it does not require renewed notice for a continued hearing.

In re A.M. · filed 2012-03-14(A)

Mother has not supported her position with any legal authority. Ohio courts have held that “R.C. 2151.414 requires only notice of the original hearing following the filing of a motion for permanent custody. * * * After notice is served concerning the permanent custody motion and initial hearing, nothing further is required for the juvenile court to acquire jurisdiction* * *.” In re K.P., 6th Dist. No. L-03-1266, 2004-Ohio-1976, ¶ 7. See also In re Xavier D.-S., 6th Dist. No. L-99-1342, 2000 WL 1161912, *2 (Aug. 14, 2000). Furthermore, the record appears to indicate that notice of the continued date was mailed to Travonne M. at the above address, and that the date was journalized and entered into the appearance docket. Mother’s argument in regard to service upon Travonne M. is overruled.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) provides alternative grounds for the first prong of the permanent custody test; a 12-of-22-month temporary-custody finding does not also require a finding under subsection (E).

In re D.B. · filed 2016-07-18(B)(1)

Although Mother asserts that the trial court was also required to find that D.B. could not be returned to his parents’ custody under one of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E), she has misinterpreted the language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) that “any” of several alternate grounds will satisfy the first prong of the permanent custody test.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that custody is in the child’s best interest and that the child was abandoned or cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In re A.J. · filed 2018-03-23(B)(1)

In Ohio, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) authorizes a juvenile court to terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a state agency upon a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that permanent custody is in a child's best interest and that the child has been abandoned (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b)) or the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with either parent (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)).

Under the twelve-of-twenty-two-month rule, time a child spends in a planned permanent living arrangement may count toward the required twelve months, including together with consecutive time in an agency's temporary custody.

In Re J.I., Unpublished Decision (9-19-2005) · filed 2005-09-19(B)(1)(d)

We therefore hold that if a child is in a PPLA when an agency files for permanent custody of the child, a juvenile court can apply the "12 of 22" rule of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) in determining whether to grant the agency's motion. We further hold that if a child has not been in the agency's temporary custody for at least 12 months at the time the agency moves for permanent custody, but the child was subsequently placed in a PPLA, as in the case at bar, the juvenile court can count the period of time the child was in a PPLA and the period of time the child was in the agency's temporary custody together to satisfy the 12-month period of temporary custody set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), as long as those two periods were consecutive to one another. Finally, we hold that if a child has been in a PPLA for at least 12 months at the time the agency moves for permanent custody, this satisfies the 12-month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d).

When a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not determine under division (B)(1)(a) whether the child can or should be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Rishforth, Unpublished Decision (9-23-2005) · filed 2005-09-23(B)(1)(d)

Under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), when a child has been in the temporary custody of a children services agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, it is not necessary to engage in the R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) analysis of whether the child can or should be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. See id.

A finding that children were in agency custody for 12 or more of the last 22 months is sufficient to satisfy the permanent-custody requirements of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

In Re McKinney, Unpublished Decision (11-10-2005) · filed 2005-11-10(B)(1)(d)

Appellant does not appeal the trial court's finding that the children were in the custody of the agency for 12 or more of the last 22 months. Such a finding is enough to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits permanent custody when a child has been in agency temporary custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period by the time the agency files its motion.

In the Matter of Oj, Unpublished Decision (1-26-2006) · filed 2006-01-26(B)(1)(d)

{¶ 12} To establish one of the four factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), FCCS relied upon R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), which provides that a court may grant permanent custody if the "child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999." {¶ 13} FCCS removed JD from appellant's care on April 1, 2001, and JD remained in FCCS custody; FCCS filed a motion for permanent custody of JD on April 11, 2003. OJ was removed from appellant's care on November 19, 2003, and remained in FCCS custody; FCCS filed a motion for permanent custody of OJ on January 11, 2005. Thus, at the time FCCS filed the respective motions for permanent custody, both children had been in the custody of FCCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period; appellant does not dispute that conclusion. Although the trial court specifically so found regarding JD, it did not regarding OJ; the record nonetheless supports such a finding. Accordingly, R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is met as to both children.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes that permanent custody is in the children's best interests and one enumerated circumstance applies; a conclusive twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding plus the required best-interest showing is sufficient.

In Re pendziwiatr/hannah Children, 2007 Ap 03 0016 (7-20-2007) · filed 2007-07-20(B)(1)(d)

{¶ 18} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child. {¶ 19} In the case sub judice , the trial court found that two of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) were found by clear and convincing evidence. First, the trial court found the Pendziwiatr/Hannah children have been in Appellee's custody for 12 or more months in a consecutive 22-month period under division (d) of the statute. Appellant did not appeal this finding. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), this conclusive finding, coupled with a showing by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the best interest of the children, provides a sufficient basis for this Court to affirm the trial court.

When a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need only additionally find by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In Matter of D.d, Ca2007-04-024 (9-4-2007) · filed 2007-09-04(B)(1)(d)

The trial court determined that D.D. had been in the temporary custody of CCCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. We note that father acknowledged and did not contest that D.D. was in the temporary custody of CCCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. We find the record supports the trial court's finding. {¶ 13} After the trial court made the finding that D.D. was in temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, the trial court was only required to find by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

When a child has been in agency temporary custody for at least twelve of the preceding twenty-two months, permanent custody may be granted upon a clear-and-convincing best-interest finding without a finding that the agency's case plan and reunification efforts were reasonable.

In Matter of J.E., 07-Ca-68 (3-21-2008) · filed 2008-03-21(B)(1)(d)

Whether the agency formulated a reasonable case plan for the parent(s) and made diligent efforts to assist the parent(s) to substantially remedy the problems that led to the temporary custody order is relevant to a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1). However, that finding is necessary to a permanent custody order only when the child had not been in the agency's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a). When the child has been in the agency's temporary custody for at least twelve months of the 22 months preceding the conclusion of the hearing required by R.C. 2151.414 (A), per R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) the court is directed to grant permanent custody to the agency if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest, applying the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1)-(5).

When a child has been in agency custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not also find that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time, but must still determine the child's best interest.

In Re W.C., 90748 (5-1-2008) · filed 2008-05-01(B)(1)(d)

Since the trial court correctly concluded that R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) applied to this case, the additional finding that R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) and (2) apply is relevant but not required. ... Once the trial court found that the first prong of the analysis was satisfied, it could have proceeded directly to a best-interest-of-the-child analysis.

When a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for at least twelve months before the permanent-custody motion, the court need only determine whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest and need not find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Z.R., 22338 (5-30-2008) · filed 2008-05-30(B)(1)(d)

As a preliminary matter, we note that the children had been in MCCS's temporary custody for at least twelve months before the agency filed for permanent custody. Therefore, it was not necessary for the trial court to find, as it did, that the children could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. In re C.W. , 104 Ohio St. 3d 163 , 166-167 , 2004-Ohio-6411 , ¶ 21 . The court needed only to determine whether it is in the child's best interest to be placed with the agency. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d).

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) supplies an independent predicate for permanent custody when the child has been in agency temporary custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, making a finding under (B)(1)(a) irrelevant, although permanent custody must still be in the child's best interests.

In Re J.Z., 08 Co 31 (4-24-2009) · filed 2009-04-24(B)(1)(d)

An agency seeking permanent custody must prove that permanent custody is in the best interests of the child and one of the following: (a) the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable amount of time or should not be placed with either parent, (b) the child is orphaned, (c) the child is abandoned, (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a)-(d). ... Here, the court made findings regarding both options (a) and (d). The mother does not dispute that the child was in temporary custody of the agency for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. If (d) exists, then (a) is irrelevant.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits permanent custody when a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for at least twelve consecutive months and clear and convincing evidence shows that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re C.I.P. · filed 2011-07-14(B)(1)(d)

Both Cl.P. and Cr.P. were in the custody of CCDCFS for over 12 consecutive months. Therefore, permanent custody may be granted under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children.

When a child has been in a children services agency's custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period when the permanent-custody motion is filed, the court need decide only whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest and need not decide whether the child can or should be placed with a parent.

In re M.R. · filed 2011-07-29(B)(1)(d)

If the child has been in the custody of the children services agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period at the time the motion for permanent custody is filed, the court need only determine whether permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). The court need not consider whether the child can be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents, as would be required under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) makes a twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody finding, together with a best-interest finding, independently sufficient to grant permanent custody.

In re L.D. · filed 2012-04-23(B)(1)(d)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody. ... This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes that permanent custody is in the child's best interests, and a finding that the child spent twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period in the agency's temporary custody is sufficient under subsection (B)(1)(d).

In re M.W. · filed 2011-09-12(B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) enables a trial court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of the child. ... In addition, as to both parents, the trial court found the child had been in appellee's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. ... This finding is sufficient to grant permanent custody to appellee. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); In re Parks, Muskingum App. No. CT2006-0024, 2006-Ohio-5891.

When sixty days after removal is the operative custody-entry date, that date starts the twelve-of-twenty-two-month period.

In re M.H. · filed 2012-04-02(B)(1)(d)

Pursuant to the above statutory guidance, sixty days after April 1, 2010, i.e., May 31, 2010, would be considered the starting date for purposes of the “12 of 22” rule. The permanent custody motion was filed on September 1, 2011, fifteen months after the statutory commencement of agency custody.

When a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not also find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re C.B. · filed 2012-09-04(B)(1)(d)

Pursuant to the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits an award of permanent custody when a child has been in agency custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re H.M. · filed 2013-01-11(B)(1)(d)

In this case, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children had been in the temporary custody of a public children services agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). Appellant does not challenge the trial court's finding. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best-interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition is met, the court need only additionally determine that permanent custody is in the child’s best interests, without finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent, is abandoned, or is orphaned.

In re J.P.B. · filed 2013-03-01(B)(1)(d)

If the court finds that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies, then it need not also find that (1) the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, (2) the child is abandoned, or (3) the child is orphaned. Consequently, when considering a R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permanent custody motion, the only other consideration becomes the child’s best interests.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits an award of permanent custody when the child has been in agency temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re J.C. · filed 2013-07-15(B)(1)(d)

In the case sub judice, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the child had been in the temporary custody of a public children services agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). Appellants do not challenge the trial court's finding. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best-interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody.

When a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, a court may grant permanent custody upon clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest without also finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent.

In re H.M.K. · filed 2013-09-30(B)(1)(d)

A trial court may grant the motion if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child, and “[t]he child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *.” R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). ... Although this latter finding was supported by the record, it was not necessary in this case since H.M.K. had been in WCDJFS’ temporary custody for twelve consecutive months out of a twenty-two month period. Compare R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d).

Courts deciding legal custody may use division (D)(1)'s permanent-custody factors or section 3109.04(F)'s private-custody factors for guidance.

In re M.E. · filed 2021-02-19(D)(1)

We have also explained that, for guidance, courts are permitted to use R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) (the permanent custody factors discussed above) or R.C. 3109.04(F) (factors used for private custody disputes).

After an abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication, a juvenile court may use either section 3109.04(F)(1)'s or subsection (D)'s best-interest factors in making a custody determination.

In re E.S.K. · filed 2020-12-07(D)

As this court has previously recognized, a juvenile court may consider the best interest factors set forth in either R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) or R.C. 2151.414(D) when making a custody determination after a child has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent.

Subsection (D)'s factors are instructive but not mandatory in a legal-custody best-interest determination.

In re V.P. · filed 2020-12-10(D)

Thus, the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) are not mandatory but instructive when making a best-interest-of-the-child determination in legal custody matters.

Division (B)(1) governs permanent custody, not legal custody.

In re L.C. · filed 2020-09-28(B)(1)

As an initial matter, we note that the statute cited by Father, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), is inapplicable as that statute governs the award of permanent custody, not legal custody.

Subsection (D)'s factors are instructive when a juvenile court determines a child's best interest in a legal-custody proceeding.

In re M.R. · filed 2020-07-08(D)

this court has held that the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) are instructive.”

Subsection (D)'s best-interest factors may guide a legal-custody determination even though the legal-custody statute does not independently prescribe them.

In re S.G. · filed 2020-08-13(D)

Nevertheless, this court has held that the R.C. 2151.414(D) best interest factors may be “instructive” in making that determination.

In a legal-custody case, division (D)(1)'s factors guide the best-interest inquiry without limiting the court to those factors or requiring mechanical application.

In re E.B. · filed 2019-09-27(D)(1)

And despite GAL’s assertion, the court is not limited to only the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e), nor must it apply those factors in a mechanical fashion.

The subsection (D)(1) best-interest factors guide a court deciding an award of legal custody.

In re S.R. · filed 2017-11-03(D)(1)

In determining the best interest of the child, we look to the best-interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414. ... These factors include the child's interactions and relationships with his or her parents, relatives, and foster caregivers or any other out-of-home providers; the wishes of the child, expressed directly through the child or through the child's guardian ad litem; the custodial history of the child; and the child's need for a legally secure placement.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody may look to subsection (D)'s permanent-custody factors for guidance in determining the child's best interest.

In re B.D. · filed 2017-11-22(D)

In determining the best interest of the child in a legal custody case, the juvenile court should consider all relevant factors, and may look to the factors listed under R.C. 2151.414(D), which pertains to permanent custody cases, for guidance.

The permanent-custody best-interest factors in subsection (D) guide a juvenile court's decision whether to award legal custody to a parent or relative.

In re K.C. · filed 2017-12-04(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enunciated in Revised Code Section 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody factors may inform a legal-custody determination through the catch-all requirement to consider all relevant factors.

In re J.T. · filed 2017-04-07(D)(1)

In any event, to the extent that … those permanent-custody factors may be relevant to a legal-custody determination (based on R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)’s catch-all “all relevant factors” language), Mother’s analysis of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors is repetitive of her analysis under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Based on our own review, we see nothing in the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors that would change our opinion or the outcome herein.

R.C. 2151.414 applies to permanent-custody proceedings, not proceedings that award legal custody while leaving the parent with residual rights.

In Re Sean T. · filed 2005-10-28

Because the lower court did not grant permanent custody of Sean and Dakota to a public children services agency or private child-placing agency, the statutes applying to permanent custody proceedings, namely R.C. 2151.414, and the clear and convincing evidence standard, to which appellant refers in her brief, do not apply to these cases.

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s diligent-efforts requirement applies only when a public children services agency seeks permanent custody, not when it seeks an award of legal custody to a nonparent.

In Re Christopher, Unpublished Decision (3-9-2007) · filed 2007-03-09(E)(1)

{¶ 15} With regard to appellant's second argument, the R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) is applicable only in those cases in which a public children services agency seeks permanent custody of a child. See R.C. 2151.414 (A)(1). In other words, LCCS is required to demonstrate that it made "diligent efforts" to help a parent to remedy a condition that caused the child to be removed from the home only when that particular condition is relied upon by the agency a basis for the termination of a parent's constitutional right to raise his or her child. LCCS did not seek permanent custody of appellant's children in this cause. Therefore, the strictures of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) are not pertinent to the case at hand.

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s diligent-efforts standard applies only when a public children services agency seeks permanent custody and does not govern a legal-custody proceeding.

In Re Donovan M., L-06-1176 (8-3-2007) · filed 2007-08-03(E)(1)

The diligent efforts standard to which appellant refers, however, and which is found in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1), only applies to cases in which a public children services agency seeks permanent custody of a child. See R.C. 2151.414 (A). Because LCCS did not seek permanent custody of Donovan, R.C. 2151.414 is not relevant to these proceedings.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) applies to permanent-custody awards to an agency, not legal-custody awards to a relative.

In Re Antwan J., L-07-1128 (2-8-2008) · filed 2008-02-08(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) provides that "the court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines * * *, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody" and if any one of 16 enumerated factors apply. Because the trial court did not grant permanent custody of the children to LCCS or a private agency, R.C. 2151.414 does not apply in this case.

R.C. 2151.414(D)'s best-interest factors apply to possible grants of permanent custody or planned permanent living arrangements with a children services agency, but are not mandatory in a legal-custody proceeding.

In Re Yates, 2008-G-2836 (12-19-2008) · filed 2008-12-19(D)

A plain reading of R.C. 2151.414 (D) demonstrates that it does not apply to the present situation. The factors contained in R.C. 2151.414 (D) become operative when the "best interest" of the child is considered within the context of a possible grant of "permanent custody" to a children services agency or a "planned permanent living arrangement" with such an agency. R.C. 2151.353 (A)(4) and (5). Consistent with this reading of the statute, the Ninth District in R.R. merely characterized the factors contained in R.C. 2151.414 (D) as factors that "may provide guidance." 2007-Ohio-4808 , at ¶ 12 . Nothing in the R.R. decision suggests that consideration of these factors is mandatory.

Section 2151.414(E) applies when a court decides whether to grant permanent custody to a public or private child agency and does not apply to an award of temporary custody that leaves parental rights intact.

In Re S.S., 22980 (1-23-2009) · filed 2009-01-23(E)

R.C. 2151.414 (E), upon which Theresa relies, does not apply in the case before us. R.C. 2151.414 (E) applies in situations where the trial court must decide whether to grant permanent custody of children to a public or private child agency, and thereby divest the natural parents of their parental rights. That is not what occurred. The trial court has not divested the parents of permanent custody.

The best-interest factors in § 2151.414(D) are mandatory before terminating parental rights but are not mandatory when deciding legal custody under § 2151.353, although a court may consult them to guide its discretion.

In re W.A.J. · filed 2014-02-20(D)

R.C. 2151.353 does not provide factors that the court should consider to determine the child’s best interest in a request for legal custody. In re E.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99065, 2013-Ohio-1193, ¶ 13. Some courts have employed the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) that must be considered before a court can terminate parental rights; other courts have considered the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F) that must be considered before allocating parental rights in domestic relations child custody cases. In In re G.M., we found that principles of statutory construction meant that the absence of best interest factors in R.C. 2151.353 compelled the presumption that “the legislature did not intend to require the consideration of certain factors as a predicate for granting legal custody.” In re G.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95410, 2011-Ohio-4090, at ¶ 16. We found that the courts were free to consider the best interest factors set forth in other statutes to guide their discretion in determining legal custody issues, but were not compelled to consider those statutes. Id.

Subsection (D) does not govern an award of legal custody; its factors become operative for permanent custody or a planned permanent living arrangement, though they may provide nonmandatory guidance in a legal-custody case.

In re K.Q. · filed 2018-03-12(D)

A plain reading of R.C. 2151.414(D) demonstrates that it does not apply to the present situation[, i.e. an award of legal custody]. The factors contained in R.C. 2151.414(D) become operative when the “best interest” of the child is considered within the context of a possible grant of “permanent custody” to a children services agency or a “planned permanent living arrangement” with such an agency.

When deciding legal custody after an abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication, a juvenile court may use section 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors as guidance.

In re S.M. · filed 2023-03-01(D)(1)

The statutory scheme regarding an award of legal custody does not include a specific test or set of criteria, but Ohio courts agree that the juvenile court must base its decision to award legal custody on the best interest of the child. ... In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enunciated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Unlike permanent custody under section 2151.414(D), legal custody does not require consideration of specified statutory best-interest factors; the permanent-custody factors are merely instructive in a legal-custody proceeding.

In re P.V.A. · filed 2023-05-15(D)

Unlike R.C. 2151.414(D), which sets forth specific factors that the court must consider before terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody, R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) does not independently set forth factors that the court should consider for determining the child's best interests in a request for legal custody. ... The differences in the best interest factors are of no great consequence, however, because the different statutes are merely instructive on the question of a child's best interests.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody factors are not mandatory in a legal-custody case but may guide the court's best-interest determination.

In re J.C. · filed 2023-09-14(D)(1)

Although the child’s best interest is the controlling principle in determining whether to award a parent or other person legal custody, R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) does not list any certain factors that guide the best interest determination. Moreover, Ohio appellate courts have not settled on any particular best interest test that a trial court must apply when considering an R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) legal custody award. Instead, courts have looked to the best interest factors listed in R.C. 3109.04 or R.C. 2151.414, a combination of the two, or a general best interest test.

A juvenile court modifying legal custody may consider the relevant best-interest factors in section 2151.414(D), although the legal-custody statute enumerates no specific factors.

In re M.V.P. · filed 2023-12-28(D)

While R.C. 2151.42(B) requires the court determine whether a change in custody is in the best interest of the child when determining whether to modify an order of legal custody, there are no specific factors enumerated for the court to consider. A juvenile court considering the best interests of the child in a legal custody matter must consider all relevant factors and may consider the relevant best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F) or R.C. 2151.414(D).

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody factors may be considered with section 3109.04(F)(1)'s factors in deciding best interests in a legal-custody modification.

In re J.G. · filed 2024-03-21(D)

Although the statute does not provide specific best interest factors, courts may consider the best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) (applicable to permanent custody) in conjunction with R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) (applicable to allocation of parental ... rights).

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody factors guide a juvenile court's best-interest decision in a legal-custody proceeding.

In re T.M. · filed 2024-06-28(D)(1)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in Revised Code Section 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody. ... Those factors include the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the child’s wishes, the custodial history of the child, and the child’s need for permanence.

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody factors may guide the best-interest determination in a legal-custody disposition when the governing statute supplies no specific factors.

In re L.N. · filed 2024-07-03(D)

R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) does not list any certain factors that guide the best interest determination. Therefore, this court and others “have looked to the best interest factors of R.C. 2151.414(D) [Regarding Permanent Custody], R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) [Regarding Shared Parenting], a combination of the two, or general notions of what should be considered regarding the best interests of the [child].”

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody factors guide the best-interest determination in a legal-custody proceeding.

In re T.R. · filed 2024-08-14(D)(1)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enunciated in Revised Code Section 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody. ... Those factors include the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the child’s wishes, the custodial history of the child, the child’s need for permanence, and whether any of the factors in Section 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) are applicable.

The subsection (D)(1) factors may guide a legal-custody best-interest decision, but the legal-custody statutes do not require their consideration.

In re A.O. · filed 2025-10-28(D)(1)

Accordingly, although the factors in R.C. 3019.04(F)(1) and 2151.414(D)(1) may be instructive on the issue of a child’s best interests, the trial court is not required to consider those factors when determining legal custody.

Section 2151.414(E)(16) permits a court to consider an involuntary parental-rights termination from another state as a relevant factor when deciding whether a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Samantha D., Unpublished Decision (8-26-2005) · filed 2005-08-26(E)(16)

Thus, such terminations may be considered as a "relevant factor" under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16).

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence both that a child satisfies one of the statutory placement conditions and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest; the court must consider every enumerated best-interest factor.

In Re T.E., Unpublished Decision (1-25-2006) · filed 2006-01-25(B)(1), (D), and (E)(1)

Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of the prior 22 months, or that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (E); and (2) the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... Each prong of the permanent custody test requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. ... Although the trial court is not precluded from considering other relevant factors, the statute explicitly requires the court to consider all of the enumerated factors.

Section 2151.414(B) requires a juvenile court granting permanent custody to a children’s services agency to find both that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest under the relevant Section 2151.414(D) factors and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Re J.S., Unpublished Decision (3-13-2006) · filed 2006-03-13(B), (D)

R.C. 2151.414 (B) requires the juvenile court to apply a two-part test when terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody to a children's services agency. Specifically, the trial court must find that: (1) the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the children, utilizing, in part, the factors of R.C. 2151.414 (D); and, (2) as applicable to the present case, the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

Section 2151.414 requires consideration of the statutory best-interest factors and supports permanent custody where the child's custodial history and need for secure placement, the parent's prior involuntary termination of rights to siblings, and other relevant evidence favor that disposition.

In Re Craig, Unpublished Decision (6-9-2006) · filed 2006-06-09(D)(1)-(5), (E)(11)

{¶ 22} In its judgment entry of February 21, 2006, the trial court found the best interest of the child would be served by an award of permanent custody to appellee based on R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1)-(5), and (E)(11) which state as follows, respectively: ... {¶ 31} We concur with the trial court's decision because of appellant's lack of cooperation with the prior case plan and the lack of an available placement with relatives given the maternal grandparents' refusal to acknowledge the seriousness of the problems in the family. T. at 60-61. As for the custodial history of the child, the child has never been with nor bonded to the parents and is in a home placement with his siblings and available for adoption. T. at 44-45.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that an enumerated circumstance applies, while division (D) requires consideration of all relevant best-interest factors.

In Re N.C., Unpublished Decision (7-31-2006) · filed 2006-07-31(B)(1), (D)

Under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to a state agency only if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that permanent custody is in the child's best interest, and that one of the following circumstances applies: ... Accordingly, in order to grant permanent custody to DJFS, the juvenile court was required to find (1) that permanent custody was in the children's best interest, and (2) that the children could not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time or should not be placed with appellant. ... In making its best interest determination, the juvenile court was required to consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (D): ... Based on our review of the record in light of the best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414 (D), we overrule appellant's sole assignment of error. We find no error by the juvenile court in its consideration and application of the best interest factors. Those factors clearly tilted in favor of permanent custody to DJFS.

Section 2151.414 requires the juvenile court to make the required permanent-custody findings and analyze the child's best-interest factors, supported by sufficient, credible evidence.

In Matter of A.W., Unpublished Decision (2-22-2007) · filed 2007-02-22(B), (D)

{¶ 29} After reviewing the entire record, we find sufficient, credible evidence supporting the juvenile court's decision granting permanent custody to CCCSB. The juvenile court made the required findings in R.C. 2151.414 (B), and thoroughly analyzed the best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414 (D). Sufficient, credible evidence in the record supports the juvenile court's conclusion that permanent custody with CCCSB was in the best interest of the child. Testimony by CCCSB employees at the hearing clearly demonstrated appellant's lack of willingness and ability to care for her child. The testimony of multiple CCCSB witnesses regarding the grandmother's violation of the no-contact order supported the court's concern that the grandmother would not protect the child from appellant's negative influence. Testimony by CCCSB employees regarding the grandparents' dishonesty and prior criminal offenses, and the substantiated child endangerment charge against the grandmother, raised substantial doubt about the grandparents' ability to provide legally secure placement.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one subsection (E) condition as to each parent and consideration of the child's best interest under subsection (D) before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody to a children-services agency.

In Re Joseph C., Unpublished Decision (3-30-2007) · filed 2007-03-30(B)(1), (D), and (E)

In granting a motion for permanent custody, the trial court must find that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exist as to each of the child's parents. If, after considering all relevant evidence, the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the conditions exists, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). Further, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D), a juvenile court must consider the best interest of the child by examining factors relevant to the case including, but not limited to, those set forth in paragraphs (1)-(5) of subsection (D). Only if these findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence can a juvenile court terminate the rights of a natural parent and award permanent custody of a child to a children services agency. In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 . Clear and convincing evidence is that which is sufficient to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469 , paragraph three of the syllabus.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a trial court to specifically address each required best-interest consideration in its judgment entry or otherwise affirmatively indicate in the record that it considered each listed factor.

In Matter of D.H., 9-06-57 (4-16-2007) · filed 2007-04-16(D)

Accordingly, we hold that in rendering its judgment, the trial court must either specifically address each of the required considerations set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (D) in its judgment entry, or otherwise provide some affirmative indication in the record that the court has considered the specific factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (D).

Section 2151.414(D) requires a trial court to consider every applicable best-interest factor, but unless a party requests findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court need not expressly recite its factual findings for each factor.

In Matter of M.M., 07ca3203 (4-23-2008) · filed 2008-04-23(D)

We have previously held that though trial courts are required to consider all the factors of R.C. 2151.414 (D) in determining a child's best interest, courts are not required to expressly recite the factual findings as to each of these factors. ... Trial courts are only required to do so if a party has requested findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence of both a condition listed in division (B)(1)(a)-(d) and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest after consideration of the relevant division (D) factors.

In Re A.M., 91173 (9-4-2008) · filed 2008-09-04(B)(1)(d), (D)

In order to terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a county agency, the record must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a)-(d) and that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child, by considering the five factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... As relates to this appeal, R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) focuses on whether the child has "been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999." It is undisputed that this requirement was met. Indeed, the child had been in CCDCFS custody from the day after her birth through the time the trial concluded. ... Next, the trial court was required to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child by considering all the relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the five factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (D). Those factors include the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with others; (2) the wishes of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child's need for a legally secure placement and whether such a placement can be achieved without permanent custody; and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) apply. R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... The record demonstrates that the trial court considered all the applicable factors and that its award of permanent custody to CCDCFS was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 2151.414 requires a two-pronged permanent-custody analysis: clear and convincing evidence must establish a listed statutory circumstance and that permanent custody serves the child's best interest; a court finding that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time must consider all relevant evidence and becomes mandatory when an enumerated subsection (E) factor is proven.

In Re Garbrandt, 2008ap050038 (10-6-2008) · filed 2008-10-06(B)(1), (D), (E)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child. ... Under R.C. 2151.414 (E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence before making this determination. The trial court is required to enter such a finding if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exist, which includes: ... Based upon our review of the record, we find there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that the children could not be placed with appellant in a reasonable amount of time. Appellant actively participated in the case plan, but she then abandoned all efforts to safely provide for her children. ... In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing, R.C. 2151.414 (D) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; and (4) the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody. ... Upon review of the record, we find the trial court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that the children should be placed in the permanent custody of TCJFS.

Section 2151.414(D)(1) requires a court to consider the best-interest factors but does not require the court's judgment entry to list or specifically discuss each factor.

In re B.M. · filed 2011-10-06(D)(1)

In her fourth assignment of error, C.M. argues that the trial court erred because the journal entry granting permanent custody did not fully and specifically discuss all five of the best interest factors enumerated within R.C. 2151.414(D). This assignment of error lacks merit. ... This Court has previously held that “the statute does not require the court to list those factors or conditions it found applicable before making its determination that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.” In re T.S.; In re I.M., Cuyahoga App. Nos. 82669 and 82695, 2003-Ohio-7069. As such, C.M.’s argument fails.

A juvenile court need not specifically examine each section 2151.414(D)(1) factor in writing, but the record must indicate that it considered all of them.

In re L.M. · filed 2023-11-30(D)(1)

While a juvenile court is not obligated to specifically examine each R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factor, it must make some indication on the record that all the factors were considered in its analysis.

Section 2151.414(D)(1) does not require express discussion of each best-interest factor, but the decision and judgment must allow a reviewing court to discern that all enumerated factors were considered.

In re H.H. · filed 2024-02-22(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court “to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors.” ... “Consideration is all the statute requires, [but] a reviewing court must be able to discern from the magistrate’s or juvenile court’s decision and the court’s judgment entry that the court satisfied the statutory requirement that it consider the enumerated factors[.]”

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not violate parents' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

In the Matter of J.S., Unpublished Decision (2-16-2006) · filed 2006-02-16(B)(1)(d)

Given this precedent, we find that R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is not unconstitutional.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) requires a court deciding permanent custody to consider whether a child's need for a legally secure permanent placement can be met without granting permanent custody to the agency, including potential placement with an available suitable relative.

In Re H.M., Unpublished Decision (2-22-2006) · filed 2006-02-22(D)(4)

{¶ 14} Appellants argue the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider whether other suitable relatives were available for placement pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D) before granting permanent custody to CCCS. Appellants are correct in their assertion that when an agency seeks permanent custody of a child, the court shall consider all pertinent factors including whether the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement could be accomplished without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. See R.C. 2151.414 (D)(4). Further, when a suitable relative is available as a potential placement option, the trial court must consider the possibility of placement with that relative. In re A.A., Summit App. No. 22196, 2004-Ohio-5955 , ¶ 17; In re Shaefer, Geauga App. No. 2004-G-2594, 2005-Ohio-1258 , ¶ 37.

Section 2151.414(D) does not require a court deciding a child's best interests to favor relative placement over permanent custody with an agency after considering all relevant factors.

In Re Riemenschnieder, 2006-Ca-00390 (9-24-2007) · filed 2007-09-24(D)

Accordingly, a court is not required to favor a relative if, after considering all the factors, it is in the child's best interest for the agency to be granted permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a court weighing a child's best interests to consider all relevant factors, but it does not require proof that no suitable relative placement exists or give such a placement controlling weight.

In Re Warren, 2007ca00054 (10-22-2007) · filed 2007-10-22(D)

{¶ 30} In In re Schaefer , 111 Ohio St.3d 498 , 2006-Ohio-5513 , the Ohio Supreme Court clearly found a trial court's statutory duty in determining whether it is in the best interest of a child to grant permanent custody to an agency does not include finding, by clear and convincing evidence, no suitable relative is available for placement. The statute requires the trial court to weigh all relevant factors. R.C. 2151.414 requires the court to find the best option for the child once a determination has been made pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d). The statute does not make the availability of a placement which would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor nor require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors. Schaeffer at ¶ 64.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the court to weigh all relevant best-interest factors but does not require proof that no suitable relative placement exists or give controlling weight to a placement that would avoid terminating parental rights.

In re L.D. · filed 2011-11-03(D)

In In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 857 N.E.2d 532, 2006-Ohio-5513, the Ohio Supreme Court clearly found a trial court's statutory duty in determining whether it is in the best interest of a child to grant permanent custody to an agency does not include finding, by clear and convincing evidence, no suitable relative is available for placement. The statute requires the trial court to weigh all relevant factors. R.C. 2151.414 requires the court to find the best option for the child once a determination has been made pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d). The statute does not make the availability of a placement which would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor nor does it require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors. Schaeffer at ¶ 64.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires a court considering termination of parental rights to consider the child's wishes as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child's maturity; a mother's testimony about those wishes does not satisfy the requirement.

In Re Walling, Unpublished Decision (2-24-2006) · filed 2006-02-24(D)(2)

Among other requirements, before a court may terminate parental rights, it must consider the wishes of the child as expressed directly by the child or through the child's GAL, with due regard for the maturity of the child. R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2). ... Testimony by a child's mother does not fulfill the requirements of R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2) that a child's wishes be expressed directly by the child or the child's GAL.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires the juvenile court to consider the child's wishes in the permanent-custody best-interest analysis, but permits those wishes to be conveyed through the guardian ad litem rather than through direct questioning of the child.

In Re A. C., Unpublished Decision (10-17-2007) · filed 2007-10-17(D)(2)

She correctly asserts that, as part of the best interest prong of the permanent custody test, the trial court was required to consider "[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child[.]" See R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2). ... The trial court is not required to speak directly to the child, however; it has the discretion to allow the guardian ad litem to speak on the child's behalf.

R.C. 2151.414's procedural protections apply to biological and adoptive parents, but not to an unrelated prior legal custodian.

In Re Kenny B., Unpublished Decision (3-3-2006) · filed 2006-03-03

While there has been some modern trend to liberally define family and to bestow certain rights to extended family, see, e.g., Harold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44 , 2005-Ohio-5334 (grandparent visitation), we have found no authority, including those cited by appellant, which grants to an unrelated individual the unique status occupied by biological parents or their legal equivalent, adoptive parents. It is only these upon whom constitutional protection is invested and, in Ohio, the strictures of R.C. 2151.414 adhere. Consequently, we reject appellant's assertion that he is entitled to the same legal status as Kenny B., Jr.'s natural parents.

Section 2151.414's permanent-custody procedures do not extend to grandparents or other relatives.

In re N.B.G. · filed 2025-09-29

The statute does not extend to grandparents or other relatives.

Section 2151.414's heightened protections attach to biological or adoptive parents, not unrelated nonparent legal custodians.

In re K.S. · filed 2025-10-17

That same interest is not present for non-biological legal guardians. As the Sixth District has said, “[W]e have found no authority . . . which grants to an unrelated individual the unique status occupied by biological parents or their legal equivalent, adoptive parents. It is only these upon whom constitutional protection is invested and, in Ohio, the strictures of R.C. 2151.414 adhere.”