N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-06.2

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) does not require corroboration to prove domestic violence in a custody determination.

Kasprowicz v. Kasprowicz · filed 1998-03-30(1)(j)

But corroboration is not required as a matter of law to prove domestic violence under section 14-09-06.2(l)(j), N.D.C.C.

A single incident of domestic violence causing serious bodily injury or a pattern of domestic violence creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator; acts committed in self-defense are mitigated.

Peters-Riemers v. Riemers · filed 2002-06-04(j)

Under this statutory provision a single incident of domestic violence which results in serious bodily injury or a pattern of domestic violence creates a presumption that the perpetrator may not be awarded custody. ... Acts of domestic violence are mitigated when committed in self-defense. The trial court did not find Jenese’s conduct toward Roland rose to a level of violence triggering the presumption against her receiving child custody. We conclude the trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j)’s custody presumption does not apply without a qualifying incident of domestic violence or a pattern of domestic violence.

State v. Jackson · filed 2005-07-13(1)(j)

While the trial court’s finding on this issue is not extensive, we are able to glean from it that the trial court did not believe the evidence of abusive behavior in this case demonstrates a pattern of domestic violence by either party or an incident of violence which resulted in serious bodily injury so as to trigger the presumption under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.1(j) against awarding one of the parties custody. We, therefore, hold the trial court did not err in refusing to apply the presumption under the statute in this case.

The domestic violence factor may favor neither parent when the evidence supports a finding that alleged violence does not trigger the custody presumption.

Vandal v. Leno · filed 2014-03-11(1)(j)

Here, the district court determined the alleged domestic violence did not rise to the level of the presumption. ... We conclude the district court was not clearly erroneous in deciding that factor (j) favored neither party.

Factor (j) treats a party’s assault on or physical harm to the party’s parent as domestic violence.

Law v. Whittet · filed 2014-04-07(1)(j)

Thus, under the unambiguous statutory definition, a party who assaults or causes physical harm to her parent has engaged in domestic violence under factor (j).

Domestic violence must be considered when awarding primary residential responsibility even if it does not trigger the rebuttable presumption, and the court must make findings about it.

Mowan v. Berg · filed 2015-04-28(1)(j)

If the presumption does not apply, the district court must make findings considering domestic violence when awarding primary residential responsibility.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires courts deciding primary residential responsibility to consider domestic violence, which may create a rebuttable presumption against awarding responsibility to the perpetrator.

Haag v. Haag · filed 2016-02-18(1)(j)

In deciding primary residential responsibility, evidence of domestic violence is one .factor that must, be, considered and may create a rebuttable presumption against .awarding primary residential. responsibility to the perpetrator.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires courts to consider credible evidence and make a domestic violence finding before deciding whether the rebuttable presumption applies; a guilty plea does not automatically establish domestic violence.

Interest of R.W.B.C. · filed 2017-06-07(1)(j)

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) asks district courts to (1) consider credible evidence .of domestic violence; (2) issue findings on whether domestic violence has occurred; and then, if there is a finding of domestic violence, (3) determine whether the domestic violence triggers the presumption. The statutory language plainly asks the court to make a finding, not to presume domestic violence solely because of a prior conviction that stemmed from a guilty plea rather than a factfinder.

Domestic violence may be considered as a best-interest factor even when it does not trigger the presumption against awarding residential responsibility.

Dick v. Erman · filed 2019-02-21(1)(j)

Evidence of domestic violence may still be considered by the court as one of the best interest factors, even if it does not trigger the presumption.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires findings on whether domestic violence triggers the presumption and, if it does not, why the evidence does not change the residential responsibility award.

Carlson v. Carlson · filed 2020-02-12(1)(j)

We remand for further findings on whether a presumption of domestic violence applies. If the presumption does not apply, the district court must explain why evidence of domestic violence does not change its award of primary residential responsibility.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires the court to assess evidence of domestic violence, apply a rebuttable presumption when specified circumstances are present, and weigh the evidence even when the presumption does not arise.

Kolstad v. Claussen · filed 2025-12-18(1)(j)

The court must first determine whether credible evidence of domestic violence exists. If so, the court must determine whether the violence resulted in serious bodily injury, involved the use of a dangerous weapon, or constituted part of a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding. If credible evidence of domestic violence exists and one of these three circumstances is present, the court must apply the rebuttable presumption and determine whether the presumption was rebutted. If the presumption is not raised, the court must still determine whether the evidence of domestic violence weighs the factor in favor of one party.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires courts to consider domestic violence, but a single incident in which a third party assaults a parent does not alone determine the child’s best interests.

Johnshoy v. Johnshoy · filed 2021-06-24(1)(j)

When it is present, “the court shall consider evidence of domestic violence.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j). Evidence of a single incident of one parent being victimized by a third party may implicate “the dominant best interests factor,” O’Hara v. Schneider, 2017 ND 53, ¶ 21, 890 N.W.2d 831, but it is not by itself determinative of the best interests of the children.

A court deciding the domestic violence factor may consider a finding from a protection order proceeding but is not bound by it.

Kershaw v. Finnson · filed 2022-09-01(1)(j)

The district court “may consider, but is not bound by, a finding of domestic violence in another proceeding under chapter 14-07.1.” Id. ... We conclude the court’s findings under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) are not clearly erroneous.

Factor (j) requires a court to consider credible evidence of domestic violence even when it does not trigger the presumption against awarding residential responsibility.

Vormestrand v. Craig, et al. · filed 2026-03-26(1)(j)

Evidence of domestic violence insufficient to trigger the rebuttable presumption is nonetheless relevant, “must still be considered as one of the factors in deciding primary residential responsibility, and when credible evidence of domestic violence exists[,] it dominates the hierarchy of factors to be considered when determining the best interests of the child.” ... Despite the district court’s erroneous interpretation of section 14-09-06.2(1)(j), N.D.C.C., the error is harmless because the court did not find credible evidence of domestic violence from the evidence presented at the December 2024 hearing.

Section 14-09-06.2’s best-interest factors apply in custody modification proceedings, with weight given to the stability of the child’s relationship with the custodial parent.

Blotske v. Leidholm · filed 1992-07-28

We have said that in determining the best interests of a child in a change of custody proceeding, the trial court is to apply the factors in NDCC § 14-09-06.2. E.g., Reede v. Steen, 461 N.W.2d 438 (N.D.1990). However, that application must be done within the constraints of a modification proceeding, as contrasted to an original custody proceeding.

Section 14-09-06.2 supplies the best-interests factors for custody decisions. When parents stipulate that changed circumstances require a custody change, the court may weigh those factors as it would in an original custody case.

Dalin v. Dalin · filed 1994-02-23

Here, however, the parents stipulated to a "significant change of circumstances necessitating a change of custody," thus dispensing with the need for the usual two-step analysis and its presumption in favor of maintaining the custodial status quo. Instead, the judge properly treated this case as an original disputed custody case and applied the factors of section 14-09-06.2 within the wide range of discretion it has to weigh each factor.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires a court deciding custody after an earlier stipulated award to consider relevant evidence about the children’s best interests, including conduct predating the award.

Wetch v. Wetch · filed 1995-10-31

A trial court also has substantial discretion in custody matters, providing the court evaluates all factors affecting the children’s best interests and welfare as enumerated under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. ... Because the prior custody decisions in this case were based on stipulation of the parties, not upon evidence introduced in a contested proceeding and not by considered fact finding of the court, we conclude the trial court should have considered custody-related evidence of factors predating the April 5, 1994 Amended Judgment and Decree.

Section 14-09-06.2’s best-interest factors must be weighed against the stability of the child’s existing custodial relationship when deciding a custody modification.

Lovin v. Lovin · filed 1997-04-01

Because of the importance accorded custodial stability and continuity, courts in a modification proceeding must weigh the statutory best-interest factors against the backdrop of the stability of the child’s relationship with the custodial parent.

In a custody modification, the stability of the custodial home weighs in the child’s best interests, and a change requires reasons that substantially outweigh that stability.

Myers v. Myers · filed 1999-10-20(d)

A change should only be made when the reasons for transferring custody substantially outweigh the child’s stability with the custodial parent. ... In view of the reasoning expressed by the trial court, we conclude it is not clearly erroneous to find it is in the best interests of the children to continue the present custodial arrangement.

In a custody modification, the court must use the best-interest factors and weigh custodial stability against risks to the children.

Schumacher v. Schumacher · filed 2000-12-07(1)

In deciding whether changing custody is necessary to serve the child’s best interests, the trial court must use the factors set forth in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). ... The trial court gauged the best interests of the children against the backdrop of the stability of the relationship with Banjac, and we are unable to fault the trial court for deeming the danger of damage from parentification weightier than the custodial stability factor.

A trial court must use the section's best-interest factors when deciding whether to modify custody.

Mayo v. Mayo · filed 2000-12-07(1)

In deciding whether changing custody is necessary to serve the child's best interests, the trial court must use the factors set forth in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

In a residential responsibility modification, the best interest factors must be weighed against the stability of the child’s relationship with the parent who has primary residential responsibility, including their psychological and emotional relationship.

Rudnick v. Rode · filed 2012-08-16(1)

To determine whether a modification is in the child’s best interests the court must apply the best interest factors from N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). ... Weighing the best interest factors against the stability of the relationship between the child and parent with primary residential responsibility requires more than making findings about the stability of both parents’ home environments, which the best interest factors already consider; rather, the court must consider the psychological and emotional relationship the child has with the parent with primary residential responsibility.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts deciding whether a change of primary residential responsibility serves a child’s best interests to consider its listed factors.

Kartes v. Kartes · filed 2013-06-19(1)

To determine whether modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child, the court must consider the factors set out in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

When a material change in circumstances is found, the court must apply Section 14-09-06.2(1)’s best interest factors before denying a motion to modify primary residential responsibility.

Seay v. Seay · filed 2015-02-12(1)

The court should have first analyzed the best interest factors outlined in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 before denying Darren Seay’s motion to modify residential responsibility.

A court deciding whether to modify primary residential responsibility must consider the best interest factors in subsection (1).

Sweeney v. Kirby · filed 2015-06-11(1)

To determine whether modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child, the court must consider the best interest factors set out in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts deciding whether a residential responsibility modification serves a child’s best interests to consider factors including each parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs and provide a stable home.

Forster v. Flaagan · filed 2016-01-14(1)

“To determine whether modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child, the court must consider the factors set out in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).” ... Under our de novo standard of review, Flaagan’s allegations and corroborating information are sufficient to establish- a prima facie showing modification of primary residential responsibility would be in J.F.F.’s best interests.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to consider all relevant best-interest factors when awarding primary residential responsibility.

Lizakowski v. Lizakowski · filed 2019-07-02(1)

A court must award primary residential responsibility in light of the child’s best interests, considering all the relevant best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to consider all relevant best interest factors when awarding primary residential responsibility.

Zuo v. Wang · filed 2019-08-06(1)

A court must award primary residential responsibility in light of the child’s best interests, considering all the relevant best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to consider all relevant best interest factors when awarding primary residential responsibility.

Saastad v. Saastad · filed 2019-11-25(1)

A court must award primary residential responsibility in light of the child’s best interests, considering all the relevant best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

The best-interest factors must be considered at the time of a proposed change in residential responsibility; a judgment cannot automatically change responsibility upon a parent's future relocation.

Woelfel v. Gifford · filed 2020-09-15(1)

However, the judgment also provides for a future “automatic” modification of its equal residential responsibility determination with an award of primary residential responsibility to Woelfel, without analysis under the best-interest factors at the time of Gifford’s possible relocation. ... We therefore reverse and remand for the district court to consider awarding either equal residential responsibility to both parents or primary residential responsibility to one parent without the automatic change of residential responsibility provisions.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) treats threats as domestic violence for custody and visitation only if they inflict fear of imminent physical harm.

Lawrence v. Delkamp · filed 2000-12-12(1)(j)

Under our domestic violence statutes, threats can only constitute domestic violence for purposes of creating a rebuttable presumption against custody and for restriction of visitation, if they constitute “the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm.”

Domestic violence remains a best-interest factor even when the evidence does not trigger the rebuttable presumption under § 14-09-06.2(1)(j).

Interest of J.S. · filed 2001-01-30(1)(j)

The evidence of domestic violence presented to the trial court did not trigger the rebuttable presumption under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j). Evidence of domestic violence which does not trigger the presumption, nonetheless, remains one of the best interest factors to be considered by the trial court.

Domestic violence remains a best interest factor even when the evidence does not trigger the rebuttable presumption.

Hurt v. Hurt · filed 2001-01-30(1)(j)

Evidence of domestic violence which does not trigger the presumption, nonetheless, remains one of the best interest factors to be considered by the trial court.

The domestic violence custody presumption does not apply when evidence of a pattern of abuse is insufficient, and the court need not make specific findings about the presumption in that circumstance.

BeauLac v. BeauLac · filed 2002-08-15(1)

Although the trial court should make specific factual findings and conclusions regarding the presumption against custody for perpetrating domestic violence, specific findings are not required when there is insufficient evidence of domestic violence to trigger the presumption.

The domestic violence presumption can require a change in interim custody while the accused parent has an opportunity to rebut it.

Coons v. Coons · filed 2003-07-16(1)(j)

After the district court found the presumption of abuse existed, it did not err in finding a change in interim custody was required until the presumption could be, if possible, rebutted by Troy Coons. The district court found Troy Coons did not rebut the presumption; thus, custody was granted to Susan Coons.

A dangerous weapon triggers the custody presumption only when it is involved in an incident of domestic violence.

Morton County Social Service Board v. Schumacher · filed 2004-02-02(1)(j)

Use of a dangerous weapon without domestic violence is not enough to create a rebuttable presumption. The statute is clear that there must be a finding of domestic violence and an incident of domestic violence involving the use of a dangerous weapon.

Use of a dangerous weapon alone does not trigger the presumption against custody unless the incident also constitutes domestic violence.

MORTON COUNTY SOCIAL SERV. BD. v. Schumacher · filed 2004-02-02(1)(j)

Use of a dangerous weapon without domestic violence is not enough to create a rebuttable presumption. The statute is clear that there must be a finding of domestic violence and an incident of domestic violence involving the use of a dangerous weapon.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent when credible evidence establishes a qualifying incident or pattern of domestic violence.

Gonzalez v. Gonzalez · filed 2005-07-13(1)(j)

Under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j), a presumption arises against awarding custody to the perpetrator of domestic violence, if the court finds there is an instance of violence resulting in serious bodily injury or there is a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the custody proceeding: ... We, therefore, hold the trial court did not err in refusing to apply the presumption under the statute in this case.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent whose domestic violence caused serious bodily injury; whether injuries meet that threshold is a fact question reviewed for clear error.

Thompson v. Olson · filed 2006-03-29(1)(j)

Those cases merely stand for the proposition that whether injuries rise to the level of serious bodily injuries for purposes of applying the domestic violence presumption is a finding of fact which will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Here, the trial court viewed the March 27, 1999, incident as having caused Olson serious bodily injury, and we cannot say that the court incorrectly evaluated the evidence in the record or that the trial court's findings in this regard are clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2 permits a court to consider serious threats when deciding visitation, even if the threats do not constitute domestic violence.

Lawrence v. Delkamp · filed 2003-04-01

Although we held in Lawrence, 2000 ND 214, ¶ 12, 620 N.W.2d 151, that Lawrence’s threats “did not denote immediacy so as to place Delkamp in fear of harm occurring without delay” and, therefore, did not constitute domestic violence under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)©, we expressly stated his threats were both serious and reprehensible and the trial court could consider that behavior in deciding custody and visitation issues. ... Consequently, it was appropriate for the trial court to consider all of Lawrence’s actions, including his serious threats, in requiring Lawrence to receive counseling to address his behaviors as a condition of visitation.

Threatening a parent with a dangerous weapon and causing fear of imminent harm triggers the rebuttable presumption against awarding the perpetrator custody.

DeMers v. DeMers · filed 2006-06-29(1)(j)

Using a dangerous weapon, such as an ax, to threaten someone and cause fear of imminent harm is “use” of a weapon under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)0'). In this case, the presumption was triggered by the court’s finding on the incident with the ax.

When both parents are accused of domestic violence, subsection (1)(j) requires findings sufficient to determine whether the custody presumption applies.

Gietzen v. Gabel · filed 2006-07-18(1)(j)

Although the court said the domestic violence factor favored neither parent, the court did not make a specific finding on the amount and extent of domestic violence and the court did not address the possible application of the presumption. ... From the district court's findings, we are unable to say the court correctly applied the law for domestic violence, and we therefore reverse the custody award and remand for appropriate findings and application of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j).

When evidence of domestic violence does not trigger the custody presumption, factor (j) receives equal consideration with the other applicable best interest factors.

Burns v. Burns · filed 2007-08-22(1)(j)

Because the evidence was insufficient to trigger the domestic violence presumption, the court properly gave factor (j) equal consideration with the other applicable factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) when determining the best interests of the children.

The domestic violence presumption in subsection (j) is considered with the best interest factors only after the court finds a significant change in circumstances.

Niemann v. Niemann · filed 2008-03-20(j)

A court does not reach the consideration of the best interest factors, which include the domestic violence presumption, unless the court first finds a significant change in circumstances. ... If domestic violence exists under the definition in N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01 but does not rise to the level necessary to invoke the presumption contained in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(j), there may nevertheless be a change of circumstances which may justify a change in custody under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6. ... Insofar as the district court believed there must be serious bodily injury or a pattern of domestic violence to justify a change in custody, we conclude the district court made a mistake of law by applying the standard necessary to invoke the domestic violence presumption to determine whether a change in circumstances justifying a change in custody occurred.

When domestic violence triggers the presumption against awarding custody to a parent, custody may be changed to that parent only if clear and convincing evidence rebuts the presumption.

Laib v. Laib · filed 2008-06-26(1)(j)

The district court also failed to address its findings in the divorce proceeding that Virgil Laib had committed domestic violence sufficient to trigger the rebuttable presumption against an award of custody under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(j) and that he had failed to rebut the presumption. If the pre-divorce domestic violence triggers the presumption against an award of custody, custody may not be changed to the perpetrator unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the presumption has been rebutted.

Subsection (1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent when domestic violence caused serious bodily injury, involved a dangerous weapon, or formed a pattern close in time to the custody proceeding.

Dronen v. Dronen · filed 2009-04-30(1)(j)

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j), N.D.C.C., creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody of a child to a perpetrator of domestic violence. ... The court considered the allegations of domestic violence, but found the incidents did not constitute domestic violence. This finding was not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires detailed findings on whether domestic violence triggers the rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to its perpetrator.

Boeckel v. Boeckel · filed 2010-07-13(1)(j)

Therefore, we reverse and remand the case to the district court with instructions to provide more detailed findings regarding factor (j) and the applicability of the presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator of domestic violence.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires specific findings on alleged domestic violence before a custody court decides whether its rebuttable presumption applies.

Wessman v. Wessman · filed 2008-03-31(1)(j)

While the district court in the divorce action may not be bound by these prior findings, because the court took judicial notice of the prior domestic violence proceedings and there is testimony relating to the alleged sexual assaults, the court must at least make specific findings addressing whether these two alleged incidents constituted domestic violence for purposes of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(j).

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) permits a court to consider evidence of incidents under the domestic violence factor even when the incidents do not trigger the presumption against custody.

Sailer v. Sailer · filed 2009-04-30(1)(j)

The trial court's determination that none of the incidents rose to the level of domestic violence sufficient to activate the presumption against custody for the perpetrator is not clearly erroneous. Further, we hold the trial court's decision to consider the evidence of the incidents as one of the best interests factors and its decision to favor Curtis Sailer on this factor, is not clearly erroneous.

Evidence of domestic violence may be considered in awarding custody even when it does not trigger the rebuttable presumption against custody.

Wolt v. Wolt · filed 2010-02-17(1)(j)

Under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(j), evidence of domestic violence that does not trigger the presumption may be considered in awarding custody. ... We conclude the district court did not misapply the law in finding the factor favored Kathy Wolt and that the domestic violence presumption was not triggered in this case.

Conduct that does not qualify as domestic violence cannot favor a parent under factor (j), but may be considered under factor (m) if it is relevant to the child’s best interests.

Heinle v. Heinle · filed 2010-05-25(1)(j)

The district court was clearly erroneous to conclude this factor favored Angie Heinle because Travis Heinle’s conduct does not qualify as domestic violence. Nevertheless, the district court could consider this conduct under factor (m), because it was rationally related to the best interests of A.N.H.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires sufficiently detailed findings on domestic violence and whether the presumption against awarding residential responsibility to its perpetrator applies.

Smith v. Martinez · filed 2011-07-13(1)(j)

The district court’s findings on domestic violence, the credibility it assigns to each party’s assertions against the other, and whether the domestic violence presumption applies, are insufficient. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to provide more detailed findings for factor (j) and the applicability of presumption against awarding primary residential responsibility to the perpetrator of domestic violence.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) creates a domestic violence presumption when determining primary residential responsibility, but the presumption does not govern parenting time.

Schurmann v. Schurmann · filed 2016-03-15(1)(j)

Under the plain language of the statute, however, the presumption is created only in the context of determining primary residential responsibility.

Violence against the other parent must be considered under the domestic violence factor; the absence of violence toward the child does not rebut the presumption.

O'Hara v. Schneider · filed 2017-03-07(1)(j)

This rationale disregards the many cases in which this Court has stressed that “the lack of violence toward the children does not rebut the presumption” under either § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) or § 14-09-29(2).

A parent who has committed domestic violence may receive primary residential responsibility only by clearly and convincingly showing that the child’s best interests require it; the presumption outweighs other best interest factors.

Gagnon v. Gagnon · filed 2017-03-30(1)(j)

The rebuttable presumption outweighs other best interest factors and prevents the abusive parent from obtaining primary residential responsibility unless the violent parent clearly and convincingly proves the child’s best interests require that the perpetrator receive residential responsibility.

The domestic violence presumption does not apply without sufficient evidence of a qualifying incident, and more specific findings are not required when the evidence does not trigger it.

Zuraff v. Reiger · filed 2018-06-05(1)(j)

Because the district court concluded the evidence of domestic violence did not rise to the level triggering the presumption, it was not required to make more specific findings. Although there was evidence of domestic violence perpetrated by Zuraff, the district court did not clearly err by concluding there was not sufficient evidence of domestic violence involving serious bodily injury.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) allows a court to consider a domestic violence finding from another proceeding but does not require it to apply the domestic violence presumption on that basis alone.

Dickson v. Dickson · filed 2018-06-05(1)(j)

On remand, the district court should consider whether the domestic violence presumption provided in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j), applies. In doing so, the court may consider the prior finding of domestic violence, but is not bound by the finding.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires findings on whether a pattern of domestic violence triggers the presumption against awarding residential responsibility and, if so, whether the presumption has been rebutted.

Thomas v. Thomas · filed 2019-12-12(1)(j)

We remand with instructions for the court to address whether the facts presented triggered the presumption based on a pattern of domestic violence under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j), and if so, whether the presumption has been rebutted.

Two incidents of domestic violence do not trigger the residential responsibility presumption when they do not establish a pattern.

Thomas v. Thomas · filed 2020-01-23(1)(j)

There is sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings and the findings support the court’s conclusion there was domestic violence, but the domestic violence was not a pattern. The court did not err.

A child abuse conviction can establish domestic violence under subsection (1)(j) without necessarily establishing the serious bodily injury needed to trigger its residential responsibility presumption.

Vetter v. Vetter · filed 2020-02-12(1)(j)

Although the child abuse conviction satisfies the definition of “domestic violence” under § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) because that definition requires only “bodily injury,” the district court was correct insofar as it found that such a conviction does not necessarily satisfy the threshold to trigger the presumption, which requires credible evidence of “serious bodily injury.”

Under factor j, the domestic violence presumption applies only when the evidence triggers it.

Carlson v. Carlson · filed 2020-03-19(1)(j)

After reviewing the district court’s findings on the best-interest factors, and its additional findings on factor j, we conclude the district court’s finding that the evidence did not trigger the presumption of domestic violence is not clearly erroneous, and we summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

Subsection (1)(j) requires findings on whether domestic violence triggers the presumption against awarding a parent residential responsibility and, if it does, whether the presumption is rebutted.

Queen v. Martel · filed 2022-10-04(1)(j)

We conclude the district court did not make sufficient findings of fact under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) to permit appellate review. We retain jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3)(B) and remand to the district court with instructions that within thirty days from the filing of this opinion, the court make specific findings of fact on whether the domestic violence rebuttable presumption is triggered against either party and, if so, whether the presumption, in either or both cases, is rebutted.

Subsection (1)(j) provides a rebuttable presumption against awarding residential responsibility to a parent who perpetrated domestic violence resulting in serious bodily injury.

Queen v. Martel · filed 2023-02-23(1)(j)

We conclude the district court’s findings on the best interests factors, including N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j); primary residential responsibility; and child support calculations are not clearly erroneous.

A parent who perpetrated qualifying domestic violence can overcome the presumption against residential responsibility only by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s best interests require it.

Van Beek v. Van Beek · filed 2025-05-22(1)(j)

To overcome the domestic violence presumption, Darrell Van Beek must clearly and convincingly demonstrate the children’s best interests require that he have primary residential responsibility.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires a pattern of domestic violence to be proximate to the proceeding, but imposes no proximity requirement on an incident involving serious bodily injury or a dangerous weapon.

Clemenson v. Clemenson, et al. · filed 2025-11-20(1)(j)

For the presumption to trigger, the statute does not require a court find a serious bodily injury or the use of a dangerous weapon proximate to the proceeding.

The domestic violence presumption applies when determining parental rights and responsibilities and does not extend to domestic violence protection order proceedings.

B.S., et al. v. Lopez-Rangel · filed 2026-03-26(1)(j)

The statutory presumption applies when determining parental rights and responsibilities, and does not extend to domestic violence protection order proceedings where the petitioner “must prove actual or imminent domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Tracy, 2024 ND 195, ¶ 4.

Subsection (1)(j) provides a presumption against residential responsibility that courts consider with the other best interest factors.

Muscha v. Krolik · filed 2022-01-06(1)(j)

The court’s findings under the best interest factors, its application of the N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) presumption, and its ultimate finding applying those factors to award primary residential responsibility to Krolik were not clearly erroneous. Upon our review of the entire record, we summarily affirm the remainder of the judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent when credible evidence establishes a qualifying incident or pattern of domestic violence.

N.C.C. v. C.S.C. · filed 2000-06-29(1)(j)

We accordingly hold the district court did not clearly err in finding there was not sufficient credible evidence of domestic violence to engage the presumption of factor (j), N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

The best interests standard requires a specific finding that parents can communicate and cooperate sufficiently before a court awards rotating physical custody.

Peek v. Berning · filed 2001-02-15

[¶ 27] Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the opinions of Peek’s expert witness, but we reverse and remand because we conclude the trial court clearly erred in awarding rotating physical custody without a specific finding the parents could communicate and cooperate sufficiently to ensure the child’s best interests would not be jeopardized.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(e) makes the permanence of the existing or proposed custodial home a custody factor and permits the court to weigh a caregiver’s continued availability.

Corbett v. Corbett · filed 2001-06-08(1)(e)

The permanence of the existing or proposed custodial home is a relevant factor in deciding child custody, see N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(e), and the trial court was entitled to give appreciable weight to Fran Corbett's testimony about the conditions under which she would continue to provide day care for the children.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(d) considers the child's past stability and the desirability of continuity, while factor (e) considers future prospects for permanence as a family unit.

Stoppler v. Stoppler · filed 2001-08-29(1)(d) and (e)

Essentially, factor d addresses past stability of environment, including a consideration of place or physical setting, as well as a consideration of the prior family unit and its lifestyle as part of that setting. It also addresses the quality of that past environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. ... Factor e, on the other hand, deals with future prospects for permanence as a family unit.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(d) permits courts to consider a child’s existing custodial relationship, school, and home when weighing stability and continuity.

Shaw v. Shaw · filed 2002-07-11(1)(d)

The trial court’s concerns about maintaining the custodial relationship that existed prior to the divorce and allowing the child to attend the same school and live in the same house are all valid considerations under factor d.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(d) allows courts to consider continuity of the child’s custodial relationship, school, and home when deciding custody.

Mayer v. Mayer · filed 2002-07-11(1)(d)

The trial court’s concerns about maintaining the custodial relationship that existed prior to the divorce and allowing the child to attend the same school and live in the same house are all valid considerations under factor d.

Factor (d) requires courts to assess the quality and stability of a child's past environment without requiring proof that an unstable home harmed the child.

Klein v. Larson · filed 2006-11-28(1)(d)

The statutory factor does not require a showing of harm to the child before a parent's unstable lifestyle may be considered in awarding custody. ... Proper consideration of factor (d) requires that the court assess the quality and stability of the child's past environment.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(d) requires courts to consider both past and future home stability when assessing a child’s best interests.

Deyle v. Deyle · filed 2012-11-30(1)(d)

After the legislature incorporated pre-2009 factors (d) and (e) into the current factor (d), district courts now must look both forward and backward, just as the district court did in this case.

The home, school, and community records factor may be inapplicable to a child too young to attend school or have community involvement when the effect of a change in home life is considered under another factor.

Niffenegger v. LaFromboise · filed 2013-02-26(1)(h)

[¶ 9] Evidence supports the district court’s finding that based upon S.R.L.’s age, factor (h) was inapplicable. Potential change to S.R.L.’s home life was adequately discussed under the district court’s factor (d) analysis. The district court’s finding factor (h) inapplicable was based upon sufficient evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

Factor (d) permits a court to consider how a parent's past and possible future military deployments affect the children and the stability of their home.

Frey v. Frey · filed 2014-12-18(1)(d)

We conclude the district court did not solely base its factor (d) determination on Frey’s past and future deployments, but rather on the impact of Frey’s past and possible future deployments on the children, as well as other considerations. Accordingly, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find factor (d) favors Wonser.

In assessing a child’s developmental needs and home stability, a court may consider the child’s upcoming school schedule and the continuity of the child’s home and community.

Schweitzer v. Mattingley · filed 2016-12-05(1)(c), (d)

[¶23] Here, .the ■ district- court addressed each of the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1), finding factors (c) and (d) favored Schweitzer, factors (b) and (e) favored Mattingley, and the remaining factors favored each party equally or had no application. ... On this record, there is evidence to support the district court’s findings and we cannot conclude the court clearly erred in awarding Schweitzer primary residential responsibility.

Subdivision (1)(m) allows consideration of other relevant custody factors but does not create a presumption against custody.

Selzler v. Selzler · filed 2001-07-20(1)(m)

Subdivision m does not refer to a presumption against custody, as does N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j).

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(m) allows a court to consider deliberate mental anguish inflicted on a parent and children when deciding custody.

State v. Vincent · filed 2002-04-16(1)(m)

The deliberate infliction of mental anguish upon one parent and the children by the other parent is relevant to the custody determination and may be considered under the last factor, the catch-all factor, of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(m) permits a court to consider the deliberate infliction of mental anguish when deciding custody.

DesLauriers v. DesLauriers · filed 2002-04-16(1)(m)

The last factor of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1), factor (m), however, allows a trial court to consider any relevant information not covered by a specific factor of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). The deliberate infliction of mental anguish upon one parent and the children by the other parent is relevant to the custody determination and may be considered under the last factor, the catch-all factor, of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

The catch-all best-interests factor permits courts to consider a child’s relationships with extended family and other people who may significantly affect the child.

Schmidt v. Schmidt · filed 2003-04-15(1)(m)

We conclude a trial court determining the best interest and welfare of a child in making a custody decision may appropriately consider such things as the child’s interaction and interrelationships with a party’s extended family and other people, such as childcare providers and others who may significantly affect the child’s best interests.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(k) permits a court to consider potential harm from people in a parent’s household even if they have not yet injured the child.

Krank v. Krank · filed 2003-09-23(1)(k)

The trial court expressed concern about how Tammie’s male friend and her two older boys have conducted themselves in the past. The court found that although they have not yet injured this child, they present the potential for doing so. It is appropriate for the trial court to factor in these concerns in deciding which parental household provides the safest environment for the child and provides the likelihood of interrelationships with others that are in the child’s best interests.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(m) permits consideration of other custody factors only when they are rationally related to the child’s best interests; a parent’s recent financial contributions to the marriage do not qualify without evidence bearing on that parent’s disposition to provide for the child.

Duff v. Kearns-Duff · filed 2010-12-21(1)(m)

In assessing the best interests of the child, neither parent should be penalized or rewarded for the timing or extent of their financial contributions to the marriage. We conclude the district court misapplied the law in relying on the parents’ most recent financial contributions to the marriage to analyze the best interests of the children and to decide custody.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(m) does not permit a court to weigh the amount of a parent's guideline-based, court-ordered child support obligation against that parent when deciding custody.

Frueh v. Frueh · filed 2009-08-27(1)(m)

In considering other factors relevant to the custody dispute under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(m), the court found: ... We conclude the district court misapplied the law and impermissibly considered the amount of Frueh's child support obligation, which was set by a court order under the child support guidelines.

A court may give appreciable weight to the extended family’s role in caring for children when assessing other relevant custody factors.

Eifert v. Eifert · filed 2006-11-28(1)(m)

A district court is “entitled to give appreciable weight” to the role of the extended family in the care of the parties’ children.

Factor (k) requires the court to consider a child’s relationship with people currently in a parent’s household, rather than a parent’s past relationships with people no longer present.

Doll v. Doll · filed 2011-02-08(1)(k)

The plain language of factor (k) requires a trial court to consider the interaction and interrelationship of the children with a person who currently resides in or is present in the household, not to review a parent’s past relationships with individuals not currently present in that parent’s life.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) does not require a court to consider a child’s cultural background when deciding custody.

Marsden v. Koop · filed 2010-10-19(1)

Our statute does not require the district court to consider cultural background in its decision. See N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

The catchall best interest factor permits a court to consider the parents’ prior agreement about where their child should live.

Hageman v. Hageman · filed 2013-02-26(1)(m)

On this record, we conclude the court did not clearly err in finding factor (m) favored Hageman based, in part, upon the parties’ prior stipulation.

Factor (1)(e) considers each parent’s willingness and ability to encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent.

Morris v. Moller · filed 2012-04-10(1)(e)

As to factor e, the court noted the parties are unable to communicate effectively with one another. The court found “[Morris] has told the children that he does not like [Moller] and he called the police in the presence of the children and sought to have [Moller] arrested.” ... Evidence in the record supports this finding, and we conclude the district court did not clearly err in determining factor e favors Moller.

A parent’s mental and physical health is one of several best-interest factors considered when determining parenting time.

Conzemius v. Conzemius · filed 2014-01-14(g)

Although the court concluded this factor favors the mother, the mental and physical health of the parents is only one of the best interest factors.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(e) allows a court to consider parental alienation when weighing each parent's willingness and ability to encourage the child's relationship with the other parent.

Rustad v. Rustad · filed 2014-07-17(1)(e)

Although alienation is not specifically listed as one of the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1), it is a significant factor in determining primary residential responsibility and can be considered under factor (e), the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child.

Factor (k) permits a court to consider a household member’s past behavior when assessing whether that person may significantly affect a child’s best interests in the future.

Rebenitsch v. Rebenitsch · filed 2018-02-22(1)(k)

The district court did not clearly err in considering Jessica Rebenitsch’s past behavior under factor (k).

Under factor (a), spending more time caring for a child does not automatically favor one parent.

Klundt v. Benjamin · filed 2019-06-27(1)(a)

However, our holding in Datz does not support a generalized rule that an individual who spends more time caring for a child should be favored with respect to factor (a).

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(m) permits a court to consider relevant relocation factors when deciding residential responsibility.

Asiama v. Asumeng · filed 2023-06-21(1)(m)

Because factor (m) allows a court to consider other relevant factors in a parental rights and responsibilities dispute, the court did not err by addressing the Stout-Hawkinson factors as part of its consideration of factor (m).

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(m) allows a court to weigh other factors it considers relevant to a parental rights and responsibilities dispute.

Kinden v. Kinden, et al. · filed 2025-04-10(1)(m)

Factor m, “the catch-all factor,” allows the district court to consider “[a]ny other factors” the court deems “relevant to a particular parental rights and responsibilities dispute.” ... The district court properly exercised its discretion under factor m to weigh the other factors it deemed relevant in this case.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(k) requires courts assessing a child’s best interests to consider the child’s interactions with household members and those members’ history or tendency to inflict harm.

Jensen v. Jensen · filed 2023-02-16(1)(k)

Whatever allegations support Penor’s case, Jensen’s counter-affidavits and the allegations in Penor’s affidavit show that modifying residential responsibility would expose the children to Erick Penor, and thus the offered evidence could only weigh against Penor in determining the children’s best interests. This shows the allegations are insufficient on their face to establish a prima facie case that a change in residential responsibility is necessary to further the children’s best interests under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

A parent’s conduct that undermines the children’s relationship with the other parent may weigh against that parent under the factor concerning willingness to encourage that relationship.

Jones v. Jones · filed 2025-03-28(1)(e)

Melanie Jones’s gossip undermines her argument that she is willing to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the children and their father. We conclude the district court did not clearly err in finding factor (e) favored Benjamin Jones.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts making an initial custody decision to consider all listed best interests factors.

State v. Morrison · filed 2002-03-12(1)

“In making an initial custody determination, a trial court must base custody on the best interest and welfare of the child, considering all of the factors listed in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).” ... Reviewing the record, we are able to understand from the findings the factual basis for the determination it is in the best interests of the children for Joe to be the custodial parent.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires a court making an initial custody award to consider the applicable factors affecting the child’s best interests and welfare.

Neidviecky v. Neidviecky · filed 2003-03-05(1)

A review of the trial court’s findings on the custody issue reveals the court conscientiously considered the factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to consider the relevant best-interests factors when awarding child custody.

Hogan v. Hogan · filed 2003-06-17(1)

Upon considering the relevant factors for awarding custody under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2, the trial court concluded it would be in the children’s best interests to award “Gail primary physical custody of the children with Wayne to have extended visitation from the first Sunday after school adjourns for the summer until the first Saturday after the completion of the first nine-week term of school in the fall.” ... The trial court stated the award was based on a consideration of the best interests of the children, and we conclude there is no evidence to the contrary.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) provides the best interests factors for an initial custody decision; a custody award based on supported findings under those factors is upheld unless clearly erroneous.

McDowell v. McDowell · filed 2003-11-13(1)

In making an initial custody determination, the trial court found that factors (c), (d), (f), and (m) of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) favored Sharon McDowell and that the parties were equal on the remaining factors. ... The district court's decision to award custody to Sharon McDowell was based on many factors, and we are not convinced that its findings of fact are clearly erroneous or that its decision was improper.

The court weighs applicable best interest factors, including the parents’ ability to provide necessities, moral fitness, health, and household relationships, when deciding whether a custody change serves the child’s best interests.

Woods v. Ryan · filed 2005-05-17(1)

In light of the evidence of Ryan's continued unemployment and secret marriage, the trial court's assessment of her demeanor, and the evidence of Ryan's early morning arrests for criminal mischief and possession of drug paraphernalia and her numerous convictions and arrests for driving under suspension, driving without insurance, and exhibition driving, there is evidence supporting the trial court's findings that consideration of factors c, f, and g under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) favors Woods, which, when balanced against the court's finding that factor k favors Ryan, supports the court's finding that "a change in custody is necessary for the best interests of" the parties' child.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires equal consideration of relevant best interests factors, but their importance may vary with the circumstances; custody is not decided by counting factors.

P.A. v. A.H.O. · filed 2008-10-27

However, we have not interpreted “equal consideration” or “equal weight” to mean a mathematical formula by which the factors are added up and the person with the most factors in their favor is awarded custody. While each factor relevant to a child should be given equal consideration, some factors may prove to be more important in one situation than in another with different circumstances.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts deciding a child’s best interests to consider the listed factors, including the child’s reasonable preference and relationships with household members.

Machart v. Machart · filed 2009-12-15(1)

If the district court determines a material change in circumstances has occurred, it must consider whether a change in primary residential responsibility is necessary to serve the children’s best interests, applying the factors listed in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). ... Evidence was presented to support the referee’s findings, and the findings were not induced by an erroneous view of the law. The referee’s awarding of primary residential responsibility to Machart is not clearly erroneous.

After a significant change in circumstances, a court deciding primary residential responsibility applies the best interests factors in subsection (1).

Fleck v. Fleck · filed 2010-02-17(1)

Consequently, the district court properly analyzed this case under the best interests factors contained in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

The version of § 14-09-06.2’s best interests factors in effect when a custody action began applies if the factors are substantively amended before trial.

Sorenson v. Slater · filed 2010-08-17

The district court should have applied the prior version of the best interests factors.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) supplies the best interests factors for an initial custody decision when an earlier judgment designated a primary caregiver only for child support.

Jelsing v. Peterson · filed 2007-03-22(1)

Contrary to Jelsing’s claim, the plain language of the stipulated judgment reflects there was no initial custody determination in this case. The district court thus properly analyzed this case under the best interests factors in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) for an initial custody determination.

In an initial custody determination, the district court must apply the best interests factors in subsection (1).

Koble v. Koble · filed 2008-11-25(1)

In making an initial custody determination, the district court must apply the factors listed in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) and award custody of the child to the person who will better promote the best interests and welfare of the child.

When deciding whether to modify primary residential responsibility, a court must consider the applicable best interests factors in § 14-09-06.2(1).

Vining v. Renton · filed 2012-05-03(1)

To determine whether modifying primary residential responsibility is necessary to serve the best interests of the child, the district court must consider the applicable N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) factors.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to consider all enumerated best interests factors when awarding primary residential responsibility.

Seay v. Seay · filed 2012-08-30(1)

The district court expressly considered all of the best interests factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) and made detailed findings of fact on each factor. ... We have thoroughly reviewed the district court’s findings of fact on the best interests factors and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. We therefore conclude the district court’s finding of fact awarding primary residential responsibility to Svetlana Seay is not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires an initial award of primary residential responsibility to the person who will best promote the child’s best interests and welfare.

Miller v. Mees · filed 2011-08-18(1)

In an initial custody decision, a district court must award primary residential responsibility of a child to the person who will best promote the best interests and welfare of the child under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. ... We therefore conclude the court did not clearly err in awarding Miller primary residential responsibility of the child.

Courts must consider the best interest factors in subsection (1) when deciding whether to modify primary residential responsibility.

Krueger v. Tran · filed 2012-10-23(1)

The court must consider the best interest factors set out in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1) supplies the best interests factors considered when deciding whether to modify primary residential responsibility.

Ritter v. Ritter · filed 2016-01-14(1)

Joshua Ritter’s affidavit provides sufficient evidence to support finding modification is in the best interests of the children under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(e) requires courts to consider each parent’s willingness and ability to encourage a close relationship between the child and the other parent.

Schrodt v. Schrodt · filed 2022-03-17(1)(e)

When analyzing this factor, the court must examine “[t]he willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(e). Under this factor, the court noted that Katie Schrodt testified that Joseph Schrodt frequently made negative comments about her in front of the minor child and that he had threatened to take the minor child out of state where she would be unable to find the child. The court emphasized that Joseph Schrodt had in fact removed the child from the state without notice or permission. Therefore, the court’s award of parenting time to Joseph Schrodt with restrictions is supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)’s best interest factors apply when a court decides whether to remove a minor’s guardian.

Barros v. Smestad · filed 2005-07-13(1)

Because a guardian acts in place of a parent, the best interest factors that are used in custody determinations are also used in guardianship proceedings.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)'s best interest factors apply in guardianship proceedings because a guardian acts in place of a parent.

In Re Guardianship of Barros · filed 2005-07-13(1)

Because a guardian acts in place of a parent, the best interest factors that are used in custody determinations are also used in guardianship proceedings.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)'s current best interests factors apply when deciding whether to continue a guardianship.

Guardianship of P.T. · filed 2014-12-18(1)

However, applying the facts here to the current version of the best interests factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) would not yield a different result.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)’s best-interest factors apply when a court decides whether to appoint a guardian under section 27-20.1-11.

Interest of G.V. · filed 2023-02-16(1)

Courts apply the best interest factors of N.D.C.C. § 14- 09-06.2(1) to guardianship proceedings under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.1-11.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)’s best interest factors apply in guardianship proceedings, but the court need not identify and discuss each factor separately when its findings show how the factors apply.

Interest of A.D. · filed 2021-11-17(1)

We are able to discern how the court’s findings apply to the statutory best interest factors. The court was not required to specifically identify and discuss each best interest factor.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to assess the best interest factors through findings about the individual parents rather than sex-based generalizations.

Edison v. Edison · filed 2023-08-02(1)

The law requires specific findings about the individual parents, not application of generalizations about what may be generally true of men and women. To illustrate, the court’s findings would have been similarly erroneous if it had reasoned that because, as a group, men generally have superior physical strength compared to women, the father would better provide a safe environment under factor (b), N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires the district court to make findings of fact on the best interest factors when deciding residential responsibility.

Dimmler v. Dimmler · filed 2024-02-08(1)

The district court must make findings of fact on the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1)’s best interest factors apply when a nonparent seeks to remove or modify a nonparent guardian; the petitioner must prove the change serves the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence.

Interest of A.E.E. · filed 2024-12-19(1)

Such petitions require an analysis of the best interest factors set out in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). As such, like any best interest factor analysis, we hold the burden is on the petitioners to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that removal or modification of the guardianship is in the bests interests of the child or children.

A parent’s experience of mental illness does not itself make the parent immoral under the moral fitness factor.

Hanisch v. Osvold · filed 2008-11-24(1)(f)

We decline to hold that any person who experiences or has experienced a mental illness is an immoral person under this factor.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(f) permits courts to consider a parent's conduct during the marriage or pending divorce when evaluating moral fitness, and findings under another best-interest factor may address the conduct's impact on the child.

Grasser v. Grasser · filed 2018-03-29(1)(f)

Gene has cited no authority that the court cannot consider conduct during a pending divorce or during the marriage in determining factor (f). While the court did not discuss the impact of Gene's moral fitness on the child under factor (f), the conduct weighing against his moral fitness was discussed under factor (c).

Section 14-09-06.2 permits a court to consider a parent’s conviction involving another minor when assessing moral fitness and its effect on the child.

Iakel-Garcia v. Anderson · filed 2021-11-26(1)(f)

In deciding primary residential responsibility, the court must consider the relevant best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. ... The court stated the crimes involved sexual acts with a minor child which was relevant to Anderson’s moral fitness under factor (f). The court reasoned his conviction and incarceration has impacted the parties’ minor child because Anderson has not been available or involved in the child’s life since May 2019. The court’s decision to award Iakel-Garcia primary residential responsibility and sole decision-making was not clearly erroneous.

Factor (l) permits a court to consider allegations of harm to a child only if the allegations are false.

Bernhardt v. Harrington · filed 2009-11-17(1)(l)

Although Harrington's allegations contained the type of harm defined in section 50-25.1-02, the district court was not required to consider them under factor ( l ) because the court did not consider the allegations to be false.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)’s best interest factors are not required when deciding a minor child’s name change petition.

Matter of L.Z.N. · filed 2017-06-07(1)

We conclude the district court did not err in failing to take the best interest factors under § 14-09-06.2 into consideration of L.Z.N.’s name change.

Section 14-09-06.2’s best interest factors need not be considered when deciding a minor’s name change under § 32-28-02.

Jackson v. Narvais · filed 2017-06-07(1)

However, § 32-28-02 does not require the district court to go through the best interest factors of § 14-09-06.2; rather, all it requires is that there is a “proper and reasonable cause” for the name change which “must include consideration of the best interest of the child.”

Section 14-09-06.2(1) sets best interest factors for parental rights and responsibilities, few of which are relevant to a child’s name change.

E.R.J. v. T.L.B. · filed 2023-05-09(1)

We agree that few of these statutory best interest factors in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 have relevance to a name change, and note that these factors by their own terms relate only to parental rights.