N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-02

Section 32-03.2-02 requires the trier of fact to compare an intentional tortfeasor’s conduct with any alleged product-liability fault when assigning liability for an injury.

Symington v. Daisy Manufacturing Co. · filed 2005-02-23

North Dakota’s modified comparative fault laws differ from those of other states. North Dakota requires the trier of fact to compare an intentional tortfeasor’s conduct with a product liability tortfeasor’s conduct when assigning liability for an injury. Therefore, the fault of the shooter in this case must be compared with any alleged fault of the manufacturer.

Section 32-03.2-02 requires comparison of a negligent tortfeasor’s fault with an intentional tortfeasor’s fault.

Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead Young Men's Christian Ass'n · filed 2001-07-23

While good arguments can be made for not comparing the fault of a negligent tortfeasor with that of an intentional tortfeasor, such arguments would be more appropriately addressed to the legislature than to the judiciary. In N.D.C.C. §§ 32-03.2-01 and 32-03.2-02, the legislature chose to compare the fault of each.

Section 32-03.2-02 makes a party responsible for its percentage of fault in causing an injury, and fault under the statute requires ordinary negligence, including a duty to the injured person.

Baumiller v. United States · filed 2025-09-09

North Dakota’s comparative fault laws state that when multiple parties cause an injury, each is only responsible for their share of the damages based on their percentage of “fault.” N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-02. Here, “fault” is based on regular negligence principles. Id. ... But under North Dakota law, “fault” requires a duty on behalf of the allegedly negligent party to protect the plaintiff from injury. ... As a matter of law, GSA cannot share in the fault for Baumiller’s injuries because it owed no duty to her.

Section 32-03.2-02 requires the comparative-fault analysis to include intentional conduct, and when the decedent’s fault is found to be primary, that fault may be attributed to wrongful-death plaintiffs so as to bar recovery.

Champagne v. United States · filed 1992-08-04

However, after having considered the percentage of fault attributable to IHS, and the percentage of fault attributable to the father/son relationship, the court finds that this fault combined still does not approach 50% of the total fault that contributed to Ricky’s death. Therefore, because the statutory framework at chapter 32-03.2 of the North Dakota Century Code contemplates that all fault including intentional acts must be considered, the court finds that Ricky bears the ultimate and, primary responsibility for his own death.

Section 32-03.2-02 permits an instruction explaining how comparative fault findings affect damages when properly requested and when the instruction will not confuse or mislead the jury.

Sollin v. Wangler · filed 2001-05-22

When N.D.C.C. § 9-10-07 was effectively repealed in 1987, ... and replaced with the new modified comparative fault law codified at N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, the provision allowing, upon request, the court to inform the jury and the attorneys to comment to the jury about the law was omitted from the new legislation. ... Because this line of authority is consistent with N.D.R.Civ.P. 49(a) on special verdicts, we conclude a trial court should give an ultimate-outcome instruction in a comparative fault case if it is properly requested and the court determines the instruction will not confuse or mislead the jury.

Section 32-03.2-02 includes a suicide victim’s fault in the comparison, but greatly reduces that fault when a medical provider assumes responsibility for a patient too incapacitated to care for himself.

Champagne v. United States · filed 1994-03-08

A suicide victim’s fault is considered under NDCC 32-03.2-02. But, if the medical provider, knowing the patient is suicidal and too mentally incapacitated to assume responsibility for his own well-being, undertakes a duty of care to the patient that takes in the patient’s duty of self care, then the patient’s fault in the act of suicide is greatly reduced.

Section 32-03.2-02 requires the factfinder to assign percentages of fault; an unresolved comparative fault defense can prevent prior findings from establishing liability through collateral estoppel.

Norberg v. Norberg · filed 2017-02-16

Under the doctrine of comparative fault, the factfinder finds with percentages each party’s fault. See N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02. ... Here the divorce court’s order did not find the exact fault of either party. ... Knorr’s affirmative defense of comparative fault prevents collateral estoppel from establishing her liability for Norberg’s claims.

A party waives the right to have the jury apportion comparative fault by failing to request the instruction when given the opportunity.

Kluver v. SGJ Holdings · filed 2023-03-31

Thus, the jury instructions became the law of the case, and the defendants waived any right to have the jury apportion fault among the parties.

Section 32-03.2-02 requires the jury to allocate fault among those who contributed to an injury and limits each party’s liability to its own share.

Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of America v. Williams Co. Construction, Inc. · filed 2014-07-31

We conclude the jury instructions, taken together as a whole, fairly advised the jury of the law on the essential issues in the case, including comparative fault. Williams stipulated to try the case on the issue of comparative fault, which required the jury to determine the percentage of fault attributable to each person who contributed to the damages caused by the broken water pipe. The instructions fairly covered the claims made by the parties, and did not suggest that Williams should be responsible for anything beyond its own failure to exercise reasonable care.

Section 32-03.2-02’s several liability rule and its joint liability exception for tortfeasors who act in concert or aid or encourage a tortious act do not violate equal protection.

Kavadas v. Lorenzen · filed 1989-11-20

We conclude that the legislative classification in Section 32-03.2-02, N.D.C.C., is rationally related to a legitimate legislative goal of “fixing responsibility for and paying of damages” and therefore does not violate equal protection.

Section 32-03.2-02 directs comparison of fault, including negligence and reckless or willful conduct, only for claims accruing after July 8, 1987.

McLean v. Kirby Co. · filed 1992-07-28

Legislation enacted in 1987 directs comparison of “fault,” rather than comparison of “negligence,” and it includes within “fault” both “negligence” and “reckless or willful conduct.” NDCC 32-03.2-02. That statute, however, “applies only to claims accruing after July 8, 1987.” Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 516 (N.D.1989). Because NDCC 32-03.2-02 is inapplicable, Molachek’s criminal act may not be compared with the negligence of Urie and Kirby to reduce McLean’s recovery.

Section 32-03.2-02 permits the factfinder in a dram shop claim to compare the fault of all persons involved in the incident.

Born v. Mayers · filed 1994-04-05

The statute also expressly places the claim for relief “under section 32-03.2-02,” ... 2 ... thereby permitting the factfinder to compare the conduct or “fault” of all persons involved in the particular incident from which the claim arises.

Section 32-03.2-02 bars a person from recovering damages when that person’s fault is as great as the combined fault of all others who contributed to the injury.

Anderson v. Jacobson · filed 2001-02-21

Under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 a person is barred from recovering any damages if that person’s “fault was as great as the combined faull of all other persons who contribute to the injury.’’

Section 32-03.2-02 allows a jury to consider a prisoner's consent when allocating fault for a jailer's sexual conduct, but consent does not completely bar civil recovery.

Grager v. Schudar · filed 2009-07-21

Construing our comparative fault statutes in conjunction with our criminal statutes and N.D.C.C. § 31-11-05(6), we conclude an adult prisoner’s apparent consent to or participation in sexual conduct with a jailer imposes neither absolute liability on the jailer nor a complete bar to the prisoner’s recovery in a civil action premised upon the sexual conduct. When the statutory provisions for comparative fault are considered together with N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-20-06, 12.1-20-07, 25-03.3-01(9)(a)(6) and 31-11-05(6), and the Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 892C, we believe those provisions preclude consent as a complete defense to a civil action for damages, but do not prevent a trier-of-fact from considering consent in allocating fault or determining the existence and extent of damages.

Section 32-03.2-02 allows the jury to consider each party’s fault and reduces damages in proportion to the injured person’s contributing fault.

Reiss v. Komatsu America Corp. · filed 2010-08-17

In accordance with N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, the jury will be allowed to consider the “fault” of each party and assess whether the manner in which Henry Reiss operated the P-3000 on September 26, 2006 contributed to his injuries and damages will be diminished in proportion to the amount of contributing fault.

Section 32-03.2-02 makes concurrent tort-feasors severally liable for their percentage shares of damages unless they acted in concert; without concerted action, one cannot seek contribution from another.

Target Stores v. Automated Maintenance Services, Inc. · filed 1992-11-24

The reforms relevant here directed that responsibility for tort damages be separately allocated among concurrent tort-feasors on a percentage basis, rather than jointly and severally, absent concerted action. NDCC 32-03.2-02 and 32-03.2-03. ... Under current North Dakota law, the absence of a claim for concerted action among concurrent tort-feasors precludes a third-party claim for contribution between them.

Section 32-03.2-02 limits a person’s liability to the percentage of damages equal to that person’s percentage of fault.

Endresen v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc. · filed 1997-03-05

Under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, a person who contributes to an injury is only responsible for the percentage of damages equal to that person’s percentage of fault. Beretta would be entitled to have Endresen’s total damages reduced by that portion of fault attributable to the settling defendants.

Section 32-03.2-02 limits a tortfeasor’s liability to its own share of fault absent concerted action, leaving no basis for contribution.

Pierce v. Shannon · filed 2000-03-21

Because a tortfeasor can now be held liable only for its own pro rata share of fault under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, there is no basis for contribution under N.D.C.C. § 32-38-01(2).

Section 32-03.2-02 makes each party liable only for damages attributable to that party and generally forecloses contribution between tortfeasors.

Campbell v. BNSF Railway Co. · filed 2010-12-21

Under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, the liability of each party is several only, not joint, and therefore each party is liable only for the amount of damages attributable to that party. The Court finds that none of the recognized exceptions to this principle apply in this case as between BNSF and KC Transport/Pederson, nor has either party asserted that any exceptions apply. Therefore, BNSF is foreclosed from making a claim for contribution against KC Transport and Pederson.

Section 32-03.2-02 allows fault to be compared among multiple parties and limits each party’s liability to damages attributable to that party’s percentage of fault.

Saltsman v. Sharp · filed 2011-09-07

Under North Dakota’s modified comparative fault law, negligence is included in the concept of “fault,” and the fault of two or more parties may be compared so that each party is liable only for the amount of damages attributable to the percentage of fault by that party. N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02.

Section 32-03.2-02 makes tortfeasors severally liable absent concerted action, so a plaintiff cannot recover an unsued tortfeasor’s share of fault from a named defendant.

Chapman v. Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC · filed 2014-09-10

Under North Dakota law, when two or more tortfeasors contribute to a plaintiffs injury, their liability is several only, unless they acted in concert. Since liability is several, a plaintiff may not recover more than the percentage of fault attributed to a single tortfeasor. Thus, if a jury attributes fault to a party the plaintiff has not sued, then the plaintiff cannot recover that portion of the judgment from the named defendants. N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02.

Section 32-03.2-02 does not reduce the Bureau’s subrogation rights when a claimant cannot recover full damages from all tortfeasors.

Kavadas v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau · filed 1991-03-13

Neither Section 32-03.2-02, N.D. C.C., nor Section 65-01-09, N.D.C.C., permits a reduction of the subrogation rights because the claimant is unable to recover his full damages from all tortfeasors.

Section 32-03.2-02’s several-liability rule does not preclude potential indemnity liability under a subcontract.

Praus Ex Rel. Praus v. MacK · filed 2001-05-01

The trial court’s ruling that state law several liability was not preempted by federal law did not preclude the possibility of indemnity liability under the subcontract agreements.

Section 32-03.2-02 makes each party that contributed to an injury liable only for its own percentage of fault, without joint liability.

Buckles v. Continental Resources · filed 2020-11-24

North Dakota’s statute does not provide this protection, providing instead that “[w]hen two or more parties are found to have contributed to the injury, the liability of each party is several only, and is not joint, and each party is liable only for the amount of damages attributable to the percentage of fault of that party . . . .” Section 32-03.2-02, NDCC.

Section 32-03.2-02 makes each at-fault party liable only for the fault allocated to that party.

Cichos v. Dakota Eye Institute, P.C. · filed 2024-04-19

If more than one party is found at fault, the liability of each party is several. N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02. Thus, a tortfeasor would be liable only for fault allocated to them.

Section 32-03.2-02 makes tortfeasors liable only for their own shares of fault unless they acted in concert; absent concerted action, there is no claim for contribution between them.

New Hope Wesleyan Church v. Ecclesia Construction Company · filed 2026-04-21

Under North Dakota law, Ecclesia can only be held liable for its pro rata share of fault because its liability is several rather than joint, absent a showing of concerted action. There is no claim of concerted action in this case.

Section 32-03.2-02 includes willful conduct and dram shop liability in the allocation of fault among people who contributed to an injury.

Stewart v. Ryan · filed 1994-07-18

The dram shop amendments specifically incorporate the requirement of N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, for allocation of fault among all persons “who contributed to the injury.” Sections 32-03.2-01 and 32-03.2-02, N.D.C.C., expressly define “fault” in terms of “negligence,” “reckless or willful conduct,” and “dram shop liability.” That definition indicates that negligence remains a separate theory from dram shop liability, and contemplates that negligence, willful conduct, and dram shop liability are all integrated for the allocation of fault among those “who contributed to the injury.”

Section 32-03.2-02 requires separate special verdicts on damages and each contributing person's percentage of fault, but does not prescribe the order of the jury's decisions.

Barnes v. Mitzel Builders, Inc. · filed 1995-01-19

Neither our rules of civil procedure, nor our statute on comparative fault direct any particular order of decision for special verdicts. See NDRCivP 49(a) on special verdicts. The statute only requires the court to “direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each person, whether or not a party, who contributed to the injury.” NDCC 32-03.2-02 (part). The jury was so instructed, and did so here.

Section 32-03.2-02 bars a plaintiff’s recovery only when the plaintiff’s negligence is at least as great as the combined negligence of everyone else who contributed to the injury.

Kiemele v. Soo Line Railroad · filed 1996-08-20

In North Dakota a plaintiff’s contributory negligence will bar recovery only if his or her negligence was as great as the combined negligence of all of the other individuals who contributed to the injury.

Section 32-03.2-02 bars recovery when the plaintiff’s fault is at least as great as the combined fault of everyone else who contributed to the injury.

Rodney Kiemele Lillian Kiemele v. Soo Line Railroad Company · filed 1996-10-01

In North Dakota a plaintiffs contributory negligence will bar recovery only if his or her negligence was as great as the combined negligence of all of the other individuals who contributed to the injury.

A plaintiff’s own negligence does not by itself absolve a defendant of possible liability, but the plaintiff must still prove that the defendant proximately caused the injury.

Beckler v. Bismarck Public School District · filed 2006-03-29

Although under North Dakota’s comparative fault law provided for in N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, Beckler’s own negligence would not absolve Bismarck Public Schools of possible liability, she must present evidence that Bismarck Public Schools proximately caused her injuries.

Section 32-03.2-02 bars a parent's claim for a minor child's medical expenses when the child's comparative fault exceeds the tortfeasor's fault.

Moore v. Fargo Public School District No. 1 · filed 2012-04-10

We conclude a parent is not entitled to recover medical expenses paid on behalf of an injured minor child whose comparative fault exceeds the fault of the tortfeasor.

Section 32-03.2-02 bars a parent's derivative claim for a minor child's medical expenses when the child's comparative fault exceeds the tortfeasor's fault.

Rudolph v. N.D. Department of Transportation · filed 2012-04-10

We conclude a parent is not entitled to recover medical expenses paid on behalf of an injured minor child whose comparative fault exceeds the fault of the tortfeasor.

Section 32-03.2-02 treats assumption of risk as part of comparative fault; it does not bar recovery unless the plaintiff is more than fifty percent at fault.

Lee v. N.D. Department of Transportation · filed 2004-01-14

Consequently, assumption of risk is no longer an affirmative defense in North Dakota, but, rather, is one part of the analysis in determining comparative fault. ... Without such a definitive holding by the court, we conclude the court misapplied the law by treating assumption of risk as an all or nothing affirmative defense.

Section 32-03.2-02 makes assumption of risk part of comparative fault; it bars recovery only when the plaintiff's fault exceeds fifty percent.

Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic · filed 2004-01-14

However, the court did not expressly hold that, as a matter of law, a reasonable person must conclude Green’s assumption of risk would make him more than fifty percent at fault and thereby preclude him from obtaining damages for the Clinic’s allegedly negligent conduct. See N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02. Without such a definitive holding by the court, we conclude the court misapplied the law by treating assumption of risk as an all or nothing affirmative defense.

Section 32-03.2-02 allocates damages among persons already at fault; it does not create an independent basis of liability.

Schumacher v. Schumacher · filed 1999-01-27

N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 does not create an independent basis of liability, rather it deals with the allocation of damages among those already at fault.

Section 32-03.2-02 allocates damages among persons already at fault; it does not create an independent basis of liability.

Hurt v. Freeland · filed 1999-01-27

N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 does not create an independent basis of liability, rather it deals with the allocation of damages among those already at fault.

Section 32-03.2-02 allocates damages among those already at fault and does not create an independent basis of tort liability.

Schneider v. Schaaf · filed 1999-12-22

First, N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 does not create an independent basis of tort liability, but deals only with the allocation of damages among those already at fault.

Section 32-03.2-02 allocates damages among those already at fault; it does not independently establish liability.

Ward v. Bullis · filed 2008-04-25

This Court has said “N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 does not create an independent basis of liability, rather it deals with the allocation of damages among those already at fault.”

Section 32-03.2-02 requires damages to be apportioned according to the fault of the original tortfeasor and medical care providers who negligently treat the original injury.

Haff v. Hettich · filed 1999-05-19

We conclude N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, when read as a whole, requires apportionment of damages based on the percentages of fault attributable to the original tortfeasor and medical care providers who negligently treat the original injury.

Section 32-03.2-02 requires comparative fault to be allocated before no-fault benefits are deducted from past economic damages in an underinsured motorist claim.

Hiltner v. Owners Insurance Co. · filed 2016-02-24

Based on the forgoing, we construe the phrase “legally entitled to collect” in NiD.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.3(1) as defining the compensatory damages payable under underinsured coverage and contemplating an initial allocation for comparative fault under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02. ... Under the specific question presented to this Court, construing N.D.C.C. §§ 26.1-40-15.3(1) and 26.1-40-15.4(l)(b) together and in conjunction with comparative fault law, we conclude the court should first reduce the past economic damages for the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff, ie., the underinsured insured, and other persons or parties, other than the operator or owner of the underinsured motor vehicle, and then deduct the no-fault benefits paid.

Section 32-03.2-02 limits joint liability to persons who act in concert; concurrent negligence alone is insufficient.

Reed v. University of North Dakota · filed 1999-02-23

Athough NDAD and UND may have been concurrently negligent in relying upon each other to perform certain acts at the race site, N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 was clearly intended to limit the application of joint liability to persons who act in concert.

Section 32-03.2-02 makes whether a party aided another’s tortious act a question for the fact finder when the evidence supports more than one conclusion; without such a finding, liability is several.

Case Credit Corp. v. Oppegard's, Inc. · filed 2005-07-25

A fact finder could reach more than one conclusion based on the evidence presented, and the district court properly concluded the question of whether Oppegard’s aided the conversion and became jointly liable for Case Credit’s damages was one for the jury. The jury specifically found Oppegard’s did not aid Case Credit, so Oppegard’s is only severally liable for Case Credit’s damages.

Section 32-03.2-02 permits fault to be allocated to a nonparty who contributed to an injury, but a nonparty found to owe no duty cannot be assigned fault on that basis.

Hansen v. Scott · filed 2002-06-10

The Texas defendants therefore cannot be said to have “contributed to the injury” within the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 based upon the trial court’s ruling on the issue of duty. Although Lawrence may be entitled to raise an “empty chair” defense against Brian Erickstad, in this posture Lawrence cannot raise an empty chair defense against the Texas defendants.

Section 32-03.2-02 permits evidence of fault by parties and nonparties and requires the jury to be instructed to allocate fault among them.

Langness v. Fencil Urethane Systems, Inc. · filed 2003-08-20

A party has the right to present evidence to a jury about the fault of other parties and nonparties, and a trial court must instruct the jury to allocate fault between the parties and nonparties.

Section 32-03.2-02 does not apply modified comparative fault to claims arising solely from a contract when the damages sought are limited to the loss of the expected bargain.

Leno v. K & L Homes, Inc. · filed 2011-09-02

Fault and modified comparative fault do not apply where the cause of action arises solely out of the contract between the parties, and the damages sought are for the loss of the expected bargain only.