N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-06.2

Section 14-09-06.2 requires consideration of the applicable child custody factors but does not require an express written finding on each one.

Lapp v. Lapp · filed 1980-05-15

We do not believe, nor does the statute require, that the trial court must make an express written finding as to each of the factors enumerated. If a careful perusal of the record discloses that evidence was presented relative to each of the applicable factors, that is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 14-09-06.2.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires consideration of the custody factors, but adequate findings need not address each factor in detail.

Voth v. Voth · filed 1981-05-12

Although we think that more artfully drafted findings of fact would more clearly provide the explicit basis for the trial court’s determination, ... we believe that we understand what the trial court intended with respect to each of the 10 factors listed in § 14-09-06.2. The findings of fact are not “grossly inadequate.”

Section 14-09-06.2 does not require an express written finding on each custody factor.

Miller v. Miller · filed 1981-05-12

There is no requirement that the trial court must make an express written finding as to each of the factors listed in Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires the court to consider the applicable custody factors, but does not require a separate finding on each factor when the court has considered them all.

Roen v. Roen · filed 1989-03-27

Although the trial court did not make separate findings on each relevant statutory factor, it did consider all of them: “In reviewing the factors set forth in § 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., one must conclude that the evidence here does not overwhelmingly favor either parent.”

Section 14-09-06.2 requires a court deciding custody to consider and evaluate all listed factors affecting the children’s best interests, but does not require separate findings on each factor.

Wolf v. Wolf · filed 1991-08-16

The trial court is vested with substantial discretion in matters of custody and in the determination of what is in the best interests of the child, but it must consider and evaluate all factors that affect those best interests and welfare as enumerated in Section 14-09-06.2, NDCC. ... Therefore, the trial court did not impermissibly rely on the “primary caretaker” factor to the exclusion of all others.

A custody court need not make an express finding on every best interests factor, but should do so for each factor that is factually significant.

Dschaak v. Dschaak · filed 1992-01-09(1)

A trial court need not make an express finding as to each statutory factor that may affect the best interests of a child but it should do so as to each one that is factually significant in a particular case.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires a trial court deciding initial custody to consider and evaluate its best-interest factors, but does not require a separate finding on each factor.

Severson v. Hansen · filed 1995-02-28

In determining the best interests of the child, the trial court has substantial discretion, but it must consider and evaluate the factors listed in NDCC 14-09-06.2. Id. Although the trial court is not required to make a separate finding on each statutory factor, the court's findings should be stated with sufficient specificity so that we can understand the factual basis for its decision.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires courts to consider the best-interest factors, but does not require a separate finding on each factor; the findings must be sufficiently specific and consistent with the facts.

Ackerman v. Ackerman · filed 1999-07-13

Although the district court is not required to make a separate finding on each statutory factor, the court’s findings should be stated with sufficient specificity and should be consistent with the facts of the case.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires custody findings that explain the factual basis for the decision, though a separate finding on every best-interest factor is unnecessary.

McDowell v. McDowell · filed 2001-11-02(1)

We do not require a separate finding for each statutory factor under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1), provided we can understand the factual basis for the court’s decision. ... The trial court’s analysis of the custody issue is cryptic and confusing, leaving us unable to discern the factual basis for its award of custody to Sharon. We therefore conclude the court erred in failing to explain its grant of custody to Sharon, and we remand for reconsideration and for the preparation of findings that sufficiently explain its custody decision.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires the court to consider the child’s best interests, but separate findings on every factor are unnecessary if the factual basis for custody is clear.

Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. Custom Processors, Inc. · filed 2001-11-02(1)

We do not require a separate finding for each statutory factor under N.D.C.C. § 14- 09-06.2(1), provided we can understand the factual basis for the court’s decision. ... We therefore conclude the court erred in failing to explain its grant of custody to Sharon, and we remand for reconsideration and for the preparation of findings that sufficiently explain its custody decision.

Section 14-09-06.2 does not require a separate finding on each best-interest factor, but custody findings must be specific enough for appellate review.

Huntress v. Griffey · filed 2002-10-15

Although a separate finding is not required for each factor under § 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., the court’s findings should be stated with sufficient specificity to enable a reviewing court to understand the factual basis for the trial court’s decision.

Section 14-09-06.2 does not require a separate finding on each best interests factor, but the findings must show the factual basis for the custody decision.

Roberson v. Roberson · filed 2004-11-02

While this Court does not require a separate finding for each factor, a trial court should state its findings with sufficient enough specificity to enable a reviewing court to understand the factual basis behind the decision.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to apply the best interest factors when deciding initial custody, but does not require a separate finding on each factor if the findings explain the decision.

Molitor v. Molitor · filed 2006-07-18(1)

These findings indicate the application of, at a minimum, factors (b), (c), (f), and (g) by the trial court against awarding custody to Molitor. We believe these findings are sufficient to provide us with an understanding of the trial court's decision on custody.

When applying § 14-09-06.2’s best interests factors to a change in primary residential responsibility, the court must make findings that show how the factors support its decision.

State v. Neustel · filed 2010-11-09

A review of the court’s findings on the best interests factors does not enable us to understand the basis for the decision. Those findings basically consist of a recitation of the evidence presented by the parties, without any clear indication of which factor the court believed favored either Albrecht or Neustel.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires specific findings under the applicable best interests factors when deciding primary residential responsibility.

Haroldson v. Haroldson · filed 2012-02-27(1)

The district court’s decision cited the best interest factors and recited and summarized some of the parties’ testimony relative to those factors without making any specific findings about how those factors applied to this case. ... We therefore conclude a remand is necessary for specific findings under the appropriate factors for deciding the best interests of the children.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) does not require a separate finding on every best-interest factor, but the findings must show the factual basis for the primary residential responsibility decision.

Dieterle v. Dieterle · filed 2013-05-14(1)

Although a separate finding is not required for each statutory factor, the court’s findings must contain sufficient specificity to' show the factual basis for the decision on primary residential responsibility.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to consider the relevant best interests factors and explain their findings sufficiently for appellate review.

Frey v. Frey · filed 2013-06-19(1)

“Although a trial court has broad discretion in awarding primary residential responsibility, the court must consider all of the relevant factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(a)-(m).” ... Given the lack of explanation for its conclusion that factors (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) favored neither party, we are left to speculate whether the factors were properly considered.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires courts to consider all relevant best-interest factors; the findings need not address each factor separately if they sufficiently explain the custody decision.

Interest of N.C.M., D.C.M., and J.J.M. · filed 2013-07-18(1)

“Although a separate finding is not required for each statutory factor, the court’s findings must contain sufficient specificity to show the factual basis for the custody decision.” ... In analyzing the best interest factors, the trial court considered the witnesses’ testimony, including testimony of Grand Forks County social workers, and made specific findings of fact on the best interest factors.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts deciding primary residential responsibility to consider all best interest factors and make findings that explain how those factors apply.

Datz v. Dosch · filed 2013-08-29(1)

District courts have substantial discretion in making determinations of primary residential responsibility; however, they must consider all factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). ... We reverse the judgment and remand for findings on the best interest factors as required by law.

A court considering the statutory best interest factors need not make a separate finding on each factor, but its findings must show the factual basis for its custody decision.

State, County of Cass, Ex Rel. Seibold v. Leverington · filed 2013-09-25(1)

“Although a separate finding is not required for each statutory factor, the court’s findings must contain sufficient specificity to show the factual basis for the custody decision.”

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires a court deciding primary residential responsibility to consider all relevant best interest factors and make findings that explain how they apply.

Rustad v. Rustad · filed 2013-10-22(1)

A court has broad discretion in making a determination of primary residential responsibility, but it must consider all of the relevant best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). ... The court is required to make specific findings explaining how the statutory factors apply.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to consider the applicable best-interest factors, but sufficiently detailed findings can support a residential responsibility decision without separately identifying each factor.

Topolski v. Topolski · filed 2014-04-03(1)

The district court did not, as it should have, clearly specify how its findings relate to the best interest factors which must be considered under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). ... We hold the district court did not err in its application of the best interest factors.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires the court to consider every best interest factor and make findings specific enough to explain its residential responsibility decision, though it need not make a separate finding on each factor.

Harvey v. Harvey · filed 2014-11-12(1)

“The court is not required to make specific findings on each best interest factor, but the court must consider all of the factors and make findings with sufficient specificity to enable our Court to understand the factual basis for its decision.”

A court need not discuss each best-interest factor separately if its findings sufficiently explain the parenting plan decision for appellate review.

Hoff v. Gututala-Hoff · filed 2018-05-08

[¶ 8] Here, the district court made minimally sufficient findings orally at the hearing and in its written order, explaining its decision on the various parenting plan issues raised at trial. While additional discussion of the best-interest factors would have been helpful, the court's findings are sufficient for us to understand its decision.

A court need not make separate findings for each best interests factor, but its findings must show the factual basis for its decision.

Rath v. Rath · filed 2018-06-05

A court need not make separate findings for each best interests factor under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2, but its findings must contain sufficient specificity to show the factual basis for the decision.

When evaluating the best interest factors, a court need not expressly mention every item of evidence in its findings.

Purdy v. Purdy · filed 2019-03-13(1)(a)-(m)

The court did not err as a matter of law by not explicitly mentioning the prescription pill in its findings on the best interest factors. ... We are not left with a definite and firm conviction the court made a mistake in evaluating the best interest factors.

A district court’s analysis of the best interests factors in subsections (1)(b) and (c) is reviewed for clear error.

Voigt v. Nelson · filed 2020-06-02(1)(b), (1)(c)

We have considered Voigt’s other arguments and conclude the district court did not clearly err in its analysis of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(b) and (c).

Courts must consider all thirteen best interest factors when deciding primary residential responsibility, but need not make a separate finding on each factor.

State v. P.K. · filed 2020-11-19(1)

The district court must consider all thirteen of the best interest factors when determining primary residential responsibility. ... However, the court need not make separate findings on each factor.

Under the court’s 1981 application of § 14-09-06.2, a parent’s planned same-sex cohabitation could outweigh continuity of care in deciding a child’s best interests.

Jacobson v. Jacobson · filed 1981-12-30

Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., provides that the best interests and welfare of the child should be considered by the trial court in determining which parent in a divorce proceeding should have custody of the children. ... Rather, we believe that because of the mores of today’s society, because Sandra is engaged in a homosexual relationship in the home in which she resides with the children, and because of the lack of legal recognition of the status of a homosexual relationship, the best interests of the children will be better served by placing custody of the children with Duane.

Section 14-09-06.2 lists factors for determining a child's best interests in a custody dispute.

Fraase v. Fraase · filed 1982-01-21

In finding of fact 23, the trial court extensively discussed the factors listed at Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C.... We have reviewed the transcript and have determined that there is a substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding. In any case, the finding as to custody does not appear to be clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires the court to weigh the child's best-interest factors when deciding custody, even if several factors favor neither parent.

Naumann v. Naumann · filed 1985-11-21

In summary, when many of the considerations as to the best interests of the child are equal and neither parent is deemed to be unfit, the trial court, after viewing all of the evidence must reach a conclusion. The trial court, in the instant case, based on the evidence as it applied to § 14-09-06.2, N.D. C.C., found that the best interests of the child, Derrick, will be served by granting custody to Stanley. After a review of the record, we conclude that this finding of fact is not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2 permits a court deciding custody between fit parents to consider continuity of care and the support available from a parent’s extended family.

Bashus v. Bashus · filed 1986-09-30(4), (5)

We cannot say that the trial court placed undue emphasis on Jeff’s extended family in determining the best interests of the children where, as in this case, the choice was between two fit and able parents.

Section 14-09-06.2(3) makes a parent’s disposition to provide care and material needs a relevant best-interests factor, including economic advantages from the parent’s current household.

Hedstrom v. Berg · filed 1988-03-29(3)

Certainly, Darcy’s disposition to provide the boys with care and material needs, while living with her current husband, is an important factor. See NDCC 14-09-06.2(3). We conclude that the trial court’s finding, that economic advantages make this move in the interests of these children, is relevant and is supported by the record.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires the factfinder to consider all applicable best-interests factors, but does not require express findings on each factor.

Mertz v. Mertz · filed 1989-04-19

Moreover, we have stated on countless prior occasions that Section 14-09-06.2 does not require a trial court to make express findings as to each factor enunciated in that section; rather, it requires that the factfinder consider all applicable factors. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, supra. We are satisfied that has been done in this case.

Section 14-09-06.2 permits courts to consider established care and residential continuity when deciding a child's best interests, but gives the primary caretaker no presumptive priority.

Heggen v. Heggen · filed 1990-03-01

In finding that several of the statutory "best interest" factors supported an award of custody to Patricia, the trial court recognized the importance of stability and continuity in the lives of the children and the benefits to the children from continuing the children's relationship with the parent who had cared for them on a daily basis. See Roen v. Roen, 438 N.W.2d 170, 174 & n. 2 (N.D.1989). While the "primary caretaker" enjoys no paramount or presumptive status under the majority view of this Court, it does deserve recognition. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D.1986). Established patterns of care and nurture are relevant factors for the trial court to have considered. Cf. Von Bank v. Von Bank, 443 N.W.2d 618, 621 (N.D.1989) [role of each parent in caretaking is relevant factor in deciding whether custody should be changed]. We conclude the findings in support of the custody award are not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires a trial court deciding custody to consider and evaluate all factors affecting the child’s best interests and welfare.

Haus v. Haus · filed 1992-01-09

The trial court is vested with substantial discretion in matters of custody and in the determination of what is in the best interests of the child, so long as it considers and evaluates all factors that affect those best interests and welfare as enumerated in Section 14-09-06.2, NDCC.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires the trial court to consider and evaluate the factors affecting a child's best interests, but does not require separate findings on each relevant factor.

Berg v. Berg · filed 1992-10-13

In determining custody, the trial court must consider and evaluate the factors affecting the best interests and welfare of the children, as enumerated under Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., but the trial court is not required to make separate findings on each relevant statutory factor.

Section 14-09-06.2 makes primary caretaker status relevant to a child’s best interests, but courts may not rely on it to the exclusion of other factors.

Foreng v. Foreng · filed 1993-12-02(1)

While a trial court may not rely upon the primary caretaker status to the exclusion of all other factors, it certainly should consider which parent served as the primary caretaker.

Section 14-09-06.2(6) makes the moral fitness of the parents a factor in custody decisions.

Larson v. Larson · filed 1980-06-20(6)

However, the moral fitness of the parents is one of the factors for the trial court to properly consider in custody determinations, and the Legislature has so provided. See Section 14-09-06.2(6), N.D.C.C.

Section 14-09-06.2 permits a court to consider a custodian’s physical health without proof of present harm, but speculative future disability does not justify removing a child from a stable home.

Daley v. Gunville · filed 1984-04-24

Turning now to Emma’s physical health, we note that, like many of the factors listed in § 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., Emma’s health and its effect on Katie’s development is largely a matter for conjecture. We do not mean to suggest that actual adverse effect must be demonstrated before physical health can be considered in making a custody award. ... These events are simply too far removed from the present to justify the removal of a six-year-old child from an environment where she feels secure and loved and is progressing satisfactorily.

Section 14-09-06.2(10) allows courts to consider other factors relevant to a custody dispute; a parent’s work outside the home does not disqualify that parent from custody.

Landsberger v. Landsberger · filed 1985-03-26(10)

A “career mother” is not disqualified for custody of her children any more than a working father, but where each parent works outside of the home and where each has the ability and desire to care for their children, the trial court must necessarily weigh the circumstances on a fine and delicate scale. The trial court may consider “any other factors ... relevant to a particular child custody dispute;” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(10).

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(l) allows a court to consider other factors relevant to a child’s best interests, including interference with communication between the child and a parent.

Reede v. Steen · filed 1990-10-02(1)(l)

Shirley also contests the trial court’s findings of fact concerning factor (l) of section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., which allows the court to consider any other relevant factors. In weighing factor (l) in Darian’s favor, the court considered Shirley’s possible past denial of telephone contact between Darian and Katherine, the denial of written communication between Darian and Katherine, verbally abusive conversations between Darian and Shirley’s present husband, and the reluctance of Shirley to inform Darian of Katherine’s status. As the trial court made findings that these things did, in essence, occur and that they have a bearing on Katherine’s best interests, and the evidence in the record supports these findings, we are not convinced a mistake has been made relative to factor (Z) and thus we conclude that those findings are not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires courts to consider the child's stability, continuity, and the permanence of the custodial home; alternating custody may satisfy those considerations.

Kaloupek v. Burfening · filed 1989-05-17(4), (5)

We disagree with Chris' contention that the trial court did not adequately address the foregoing custody considerations. The trial court found that both parents have played an important role in Robert's life and that it is important to maintain the continuity of Robert's home in the Grand Forks area where he has both parents as well as extended family. The trial court determined that it could best maintain stability and continuity in Robert's life by allowing each parent to open his and her home to Robert, alternately sharing in the responsibility of providing the day to day care, love, and nurture that physical custody entails.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(b) makes a parent's bigotry relevant to the parent's capacity to guide a child, but it does not automatically outweigh the other best-interest factors.

Johnson v. Schlotman · filed 1993-07-01(1)(b)

We readily agree that bigotry, in whatever form, on the part of a parent is a matter affecting the best interests of the children, for it affects the capacity and disposition of that parent to give guidance to the children. NDCC § 14-09-06.2(1)(b). However, unless we were to hold, which we do not, that bigotry as a matter of law transcends all other factors applicable to the best interest of the children, we cannot, under our standard of review, reverse this custody order.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(f) allows courts to consider whether a parent’s religious beliefs and conduct are likely to harm a child physically or emotionally when deciding custody.

Leppert v. Leppert · filed 1994-07-08(1)(f)

The only reason for any consideration of religious beliefs when determining the best interests of the child is to take into account any harmful impact the belief system may have on the child. The best interests factors enumerated in § 14-09-06.2 are secular in nature, and the courts’ functions do not include determining the road to salvation.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires a court awarding custody to consider and evaluate all factors affecting the child's best interests and welfare.

Fahlsing v. Teters · filed 1996-07-24

When awarding custody, a trial court must consider and evaluate "all factors affecting the best interests and welfare of the child" enumerated in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. ... The record before us does not show the trial court considered the best interests of Shawn when issuing the December 30, 1994, order.

Section 14-09-06.2 permits a custody award based on the relevant best-interest factors, including the children’s preference and a parent’s role as primary caretaker.

Schmaltz v. Schmaltz · filed 1998-12-22

[¶ 7] Upon considering the relevant factors for awarding custody under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2, the trial court concluded it would be in the children’s best interests to award Thomas custody with very liberal visitation for Sheila, including three weekend visitations per month and two months of visitation in the summer. ... [¶ 12] Based upon our review of the record evidence, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction the trial court made a mistake in awarding custody. The trial judge analyzed the relevant factors and cogently expressed her reasons for awarding-custody to Thomas. We conclude the custody award is not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(k) requires a court to consider a child's relationship with a grandparent when that relationship is relevant to custody.

Schneider v. Livingston · filed 1996-01-30(1)(k)

Subsection (k) requires the trial court to consider and evaluate the interaction and interrelationship of the child with a non-parent, such as a grandparent. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(k).

A court may consider a parent’s contact with and support for another child when deciding custody under the best interests factors.

Houge v. Hogue · filed 1998-02-12(1)(m)

Robert’s relationship and child support obligation to Blake is relevant to his disposition to provide for Robbi. Even if it does not fit squarely within subsection c, it certainly is a factor which may be considered by the trial court under subdivision m.

A court deciding custody must consider and evaluate all relevant best-interest factors, including the section’s listed factors when applicable.

Harty v. Harty · filed 1998-05-04

In determining what custody placement is in the best interests of a child, the court must consider and evaluate all relevant factors including, when applicable, those factors listed under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires a court making an initial custody decision to weigh the best interests of the child factors.

Clark v. Clark · filed 2005-10-18

A court must weigh the “best interests of the child” factors set forth under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 when making such a decision. ... The district court’s memorandum opinion disparages both parents, more or less equally, but fails to evaluate the “best interests” factors or provide justification for the custody decision.

Section 14-09-06.2 does not require separate findings for every best interests factor, but the findings must show the factual basis for the decision.

Horsted v. Horsted · filed 2012-02-17

The best interests factors are delineated in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. A district court need not make separate findings for each best interests factor but, as with custody, the court’s findings must contain sufficient specificity to show the factual basis for the decision. ... We conclude the district court did not provide sufficient findings to allow proper appellate review of its decision, and we reverse and remand with instructions to make findings regarding R.M.H.’s best interests.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires parenting decisions to reflect the child’s best interests; findings supporting unequal parenting time satisfy that standard.

Eubanks v. Fisketjon · filed 2021-07-08

The requirement that parenting decisions are determined in light of the child’s best interest is codified. See N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 (setting out the best interests factors). The district court’s findings support a determination that unequal parenting time is in the child’s best interests.

The best-interest factors include children’s developmental needs, each parent’s willingness to facilitate a relationship with the other parent, and the children’s school records.

Kerzmann v. Kerzmann · filed 2021-10-14(1)(c), (e), and (h)

The statements, assumed true, implicate the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) (c), (e), and (h), because the statements relate to the children’s developmental needs, the willingness of each parent to facilitate a relationship with the other, and the school records of the children.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires the court to consider the best interest factors, but its findings are sufficient if they explain the basis for the residential responsibility decision and permit appellate review.

Boldt v. Boldt · filed 2021-11-26(1)

The court considered the best interest factors and determined each parent was capable of caring for the children, but it found awarding Heidi Boldt primary residential responsibility would be in the children’s best interest because it would provide stability and facilitate their participation in school and extra-curricular activities. Because we are able to understand the court’s rationale and its application of the best interest factors, we reject Cliff Boldt’s request for us to remand the case for additional findings.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires findings specific enough to show the factual basis for a best interests decision, but does not require a separate finding for every factor.

Cote v. Cote · filed 2024-04-04(1)

A court need not make separate findings for each best interest factor but, as with a custody determination, the court’s findings must contain sufficient specificity to show the factual basis for the decision.

Section 14-09-06.2’s best-interest factors guide parenting-time modifications, and the district court’s evaluation of them is reviewed for clear error.

Field v. Field, et al. · filed 2024-05-02

The district court addressed the applicable best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2, and found the statutory best interest factors were equal as applied to both parties. ... Reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude the court’s decision to modify the parties’ parenting time was not induced by an erroneous view of the law, evidence exists in the record to support the court’s findings, and the court did not clearly err in evaluating the best interest factors.

A court must explain a residential responsibility award when its reliance on factor (d) conflicts with its finding that the factor favors neither parent.

Shively v. Shively · filed 2025-04-10(d)

The district court’s only explanation of its award to Sarah Shively is not supported by its own findings. The district court did not explain its award of primary residential responsibility to Sarah Shively in light of finding all of the best interest factors as either neutral or favoring neither party.

Section 14-09-06.2 includes primary caretaker status among the factors relevant to a child's best interests, but gives it no presumptive weight.

Gravning v. Gravning · filed 1986-06-19

The guiding standard is "the best interests and welfare of the child," § 14-09-06.1, N.D.C.C., which must "be determined by the court's consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the best interests and welfare of the child" as enumerated in § 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C. ... Some courts have made the "primary caretaker" factor into a presumptive rule, see Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn.1985), but in North Dakota the concept inheres in the statutory factors and has not yet been accorded elevated status.

Section 14-09-06.2 includes the primary caretaker’s role among the child’s best-interest factors but gives it no presumptive weight in a custody modification.

Von Bank v. Von Bank · filed 1989-07-17

While the primary caretaker role inheres in the statutory factors to be considered in every case, we decline to give presumptive weight to that single factor in this case.

A parent's role as primary caretaker is relevant to custody, but it does not create a presumption or require custody when the stability and permanence factors favor the other parent.

Dinius v. Dinius · filed 1989-11-20(4), (5)

While this Court, in the past, has declined to adopt a presumption that it is in the child's best interest to award custody to a primary caretaker, being a child's primary caretaker is a relevant factor for determining custody. ... We are not convinced under the circumstances of this case that Carmen's status as the children's primary caretaker requires a custody placement contrary to that made by the trial court.

Section 14-09-06.2 makes primary caretaker status relevant to the child’s best interests, but gives it no presumptive weight.

Nefzger v. Nefzger · filed 1999-06-23

Although the primary caretaker rule has not been given presumptive status in this state, it remains a relevant factor to be considered by the trial court in its review of the statutory best interests factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2.

Section 14-09-06.2 allows courts to consider primary caretaker status in custody decisions but gives it no presumptive weight.

Kjelland v. Kjelland · filed 2000-04-25

The primary caretaker rule has not been given presumptive status in this state; however, it is a relevant factor to be considered by the trial court in its review under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2.

Best interest factors (a) and (d) permit consideration of a parent’s role as primary caretaker, but give that role no paramount or presumptive status.

Hillestad v. Small · filed 2023-10-11(1)(a), (d)

Although the court considered Hillestad’s role as primary caretaker, the record does not demonstrate the court used Hillestad’s role as primary caretaker as a paramount or presumptive status. The court’s consideration of Hillestad’s role as primary caretaker was not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2(9) makes a child's custody preference a factor when the court deems the child sufficiently able to express one.

Patzer v. Glaser · filed 1986-12-02(9)

Under Section 14-09-06.2(9), N.D.C.C., a child's custody preference is a factor for the court to consider in rendering a custody decision "if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference." ... Under the circumstances of this case and in view of Dr. Peterson's testimony, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Steven's custody preference.

A child’s reasonable preference is a factor in deciding custody, and the court may consider a preference reported by a guardian ad litem.

Gronneberg v. Gronneberg · filed 1987-08-12

We find no merit in Bruce’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to consider the reasonable preferences of the children in making its custody decision. ... Additionally, the trial court was aware of the children’s alleged preference for Bruce from the report submitted by the guardian ad litem, and fully considered their preference as a factor in determining custody.

Section 14-09-06.2(9) allows a child's preference to be considered in deciding the child's best interests, but that preference is only one factor and may be outweighed by family stability.

Thomas v. Thomas · filed 1989-09-26(9)

The preference of a child who is capable of intelligently choosing between parents for custody can be a factor in a trial court's determination of that child's best interests. NDCC 14-09-06.2(9); Mertz v. Mertz, 439 N.W.2d 94 (N.D.1989). ... Consequently, a child's preference is "only one factor." ... Those preferences were outweighed by the continuity and stability of the integrated family unit in which Jason, Tammy and Tanya had been residing with their mother.

A child's custody preference is one best-interest factor, but a twelve-year-old's wish to remain near familiar friends, school, and activities does not determine a custody modification.

Barstad v. Barstad · filed 1993-04-27(1)(i)

But, a child's preference, in a custody modification proceeding, to remain where his friends are and where his familiar school and community are, while "understandable," should not dictate custody when that child is twelve years old.

A mature child's reasonable preference may be particularly significant when deciding whether a change of custody serves the child's best interests.

Gietzen v. Gietzen · filed 1998-03-30(i)

The trial court then weighed the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2, and found the best interests of the child required a change in custody. ... The preference of a mature child may be particularly significant to the trial court, both in determining whether there has been a significant change of circumstances and in determining the best interests of the child.

A child's custody preference may receive substantial weight when the child is mature enough to give persuasive reasons for it.

Kelly v. Kelly · filed 2002-02-21(1)(i)

The district court stated it looked to the "age, intelligence, maturity, and the reasons given" when considering the weight to be given to a child's preference. Here, both girls expressed a desire to live with their father, and the district court appropriately considered their preferences in finding factor (i) weighed heavily in favor of Delmer Kelly.

The court must assess whether a child has sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a custody preference before refusing the child's testimony about that preference.

Reineke v. Reineke · filed 2003-11-13(1)(i)

Although N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) only requires a court to consider a child's reasonable custodial preference, without guaranteeing a right to testify, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the fourteen and seventeen-year-old children in this case to testify, without first assessing whether the children were of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference.

A child’s intelligent custody preference is one factor in the best-interest analysis and is not usually determinative.

Hanson v. Hanson · filed 2005-04-26

Hanson argues the district court did not properly weigh the preference of the children to live with him. ... but it is only one of the factors to consider in a custody decision, and it is not usually determinative.

The reasonable-preference factor requires courts to consider a sufficiently mature child’s custody preference; speculative harm from testifying does not justify refusing to interview the child.

Clark v. Clark · filed 2006-08-21(1)(i)

The referee should have interviewed the children. Although the court indicated it was applying the N.D.R.Ev. 403 balancing test in excluding the testimony, the referee’s finding of potential detriment to the children is based on conjecture. Without interviewing the children, the referee could not know how testifying about their custody preferences would affect the children. Merely assuming that a child’s testimony in a custody dispute will be potentially detrimental to the child renders the reasonable-preference-of-the-child factor inoperative and undermines the legislative policy that children of sufficient age and maturity are entitled to express their preference.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(i) allows a court to consider a child's custody preference if the child can express a reasonable preference; it does not contemplate testimony about that preference from parties or other witnesses.

Lindberg v. Lindberg · filed 2009-07-21(1)(i)

Factor (i) does not contemplate having the parties or other witnesses testify about the children's preference. Factor (i) only allows the court to consider the children's preference if the court determines the children are able to express a preference.

A mature child’s preference should be considered only if there are persuasive reasons for it.

Glass v. Glass · filed 2011-07-15(1)(i)

A mature child’s preference should be considered by a court, but only if there are persuasive reasons for that preference.

A mature child’s preference may receive substantial weight in a best interests decision, but it is not usually determinative.

Hammeren v. Hammeren · filed 2012-10-23(1)(i)

Further, based on the trial court’s findings, we believe that even if the child’s preference had been considered, it would not have been determinative in the court’s denial of Allen Hammeren’s request for equally-shared parenting time alternating weekly. Accordingly, we reject Allen Hammeren’s argument that the trial court erred under best-interest factor (i). We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.

A mature child’s preference may be a significant best-interest factor, but it is not necessarily decisive.

Schlieve v. Schlieve · filed 2014-05-28(1)(i)

Although we have held that a child’s preference is not necessarily determinative, it is still a significant factor, and we cannot say the court clearly erred under the facts of this otherwise very close case.

A court may give substantial weight to a child’s preference when clear and convincing evidence shows the child is mature enough to make a sound judgment.

Thompson v. Thompson · filed 2018-01-22(1)(i)

Factor (i) takes into consideration a child’s preference “[i]f the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a child is of sufficient maturity to make a sound judgment.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(i). “[T]he court may give substantial weight to the preference of the mature child.” ... Because there was evidence supporting the district court’s finding, its determination on this factor was not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(i) does not require an in-chambers interview of every child to assess the child's ability to express a custody preference.

Solwey v. Solwey · filed 2018-03-22(1)(i)

Solwey argues the district court erred in denying K.D.S. the opportunity to testify regarding her preference under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(i). Solwey argues the district court erred in failing to at least interview K.D.S. to assess her degree of maturity, intelligence, understanding, and experience as to preference. Solwey contends this Court should extend a bright-line rule that all children, regardless of age, should be given an in-chambers interview to assess their ability to testify to custodial preference. We decline to do so.

A mature child may express a preference about residential responsibility, but the court must decide the arrangement based on the evidence and the child’s best interests.

State v. Faber · filed 2022-08-04(1)(i)

In effect, the court allowed K.F. to choose her own parenting schedule. A mature child may testify on his or her preferences, but the court must decide residential responsibility based on the evidence presented and the best interests of the child. The court erred as a matter of law by awarding Faber equal residential responsibility of K.F.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(i) gives the court discretion to decide how much weight to give a mature child’s preference, including whether to give it substantial weight.

Goetz v. Goetz · filed 2026-02-26(1)(i)

Factor (i) therefore gives the court discretion in weighing the mature child’s preference, including giving it “substantial weight.”

Section 14-09-06.2’s best-interest factors can inform a decision about a child’s relocation because custody and visitation are interrelated.

McRae v. Carbno · filed 1987-04-16

Justice Meschke, in his dissent, points out that this is not a custody case and that the factors set forth in Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., cannot be used to determine the best interests of the child. It is axiomatic that the issue of child custody and visitation are interrelated. In Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82 (N.D.1981), a case involving visitation and not a change of custody, Chief Justice Erickstad, writing for a unanimous court, said: "In determining the best interests of a child, the trial court must consider the factors listed in Section 14-09-06.2, N.D. C.C. We believe that the factors impliedly recognize a child's need for a meaningful relationship with both his mother and his father. That need is met not only by daily contact with the custodial parent, but also by meaningful visitations with the noncustodial parent." 314 N.W.2d at 87.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires trial courts to consider and evaluate all listed factors affecting a child's best interests and welfare when deciding custody.

Weber v. Weber · filed 1994-03-11

Trial courts are vested with substantial discretion in matters of custody and determinations of the best interests of children, so long as they consider and evaluate all factors that affect children's best interests and welfare as enumerated in § 14-09-06.2.

Section 14-09-06.2 supplies the factors for a change of custody, but a motion to relocate alone does not reopen custody.

Stout v. Stout · filed 1997-04-01

We emphasize that motions to relocate are not motions for change of custody. The factors to be considered in motions to change custody are enumerated in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. In contrast, in a motion to relocate, the primary physical custody decision has already been made, and custody is not the issue.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) provides a best interest analysis that does not replace the Stout factors when a custodial parent seeks to move out of state.

Aus v. Carter · filed 1999-12-23(1)

The Stout factors are tailored to the unique context of a custodial parent’s request to move out of state. A best interest analysis under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) is not a substitute for application of the Stout factors.

Initial custody decisions must consider all statutory best-interest factors, and a parent’s prior role as primary caretaker carries no presumptive priority.

Dufner v. Dufner · filed 2002-03-12(1)

“In making an initial custody determination, a trial court must base custody on the best interest and welfare of the child, considering all of the factors listed in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).” ... While Kerry’s one-time role as primary caretaker deserves recognition, a primary caretaker does not enjoy paramount or presumptive status. ... We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the finding the award of custody to Joe was in the best interests of the children.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to apply its best-interest factors when deciding whether to modify custody.

In the Interest of v. Johnson · filed 2003-04-15(1)

The factors in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) must be applied.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to apply its best-interest factors when deciding whether to modify custody.

In Re Thompson · filed 2003-04-15(1)

The factors in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) must be applied.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to apply its best-interest factors when deciding whether to modify child custody.

City of Bismarck v. Stockert · filed 2003-04-15(1)

The factors in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) must be applied.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) lists the factors courts consider when deciding child custody.

Paulson v. Paulson · filed 2005-04-06(1)

In determining custody, Section 14-09-06.2(1), N.D.C.C., lists the relevant factors to be considered by the court: ... We conclude the court’s findings are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous. We further conclude the evidence supports the court’s award of custody to Paulson and that decision is not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to apply the child’s best-interest factors when awarding custody.

L.C.V. v. D.E.G. · filed 2005-10-26(1)

The best interests and welfare of the child are determined by application of the factors set forth in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). ... We conclude the district court’s decision to award primary physical custody to Doug with liberal visitation privileges for Lisa is supported by the record evidence and is not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2’s best-interest factors govern the primary custody decision when a parent with joint custody seeks to relocate with the child.

Maynard v. McNett · filed 2006-02-08

The best-interests-of-the-child factors in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 must be applied rather than the Stout-Hawkinson factors.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) supplies the factors a court must apply when deciding whether a custody change serves a child’s best interests.

Siewert v. Siewert · filed 2008-12-16(1)

To determine whether a change is in the child’s best interest, the court must apply the factors set out in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1) supplies the factors for determining a child’s best interests and welfare when deciding custody after a guardianship.

Hartleib v. Simes · filed 2009-12-15(1)

The best interest factors enumerated in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) apply to determine the best interest and welfare of the child.

Section 14-09-06.2's best interest factors determine which parent should have primary custody when a parent with joint custody seeks to relocate with the child.

Dunn v. Dunn · filed 2009-11-17

Maynard further states "the statutory factors provided in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 must be used to decide which primary custody arrangement will serve the best interests of the child." Maynard, at ¶ 21. ... The district court's findings are consistent with the requirements of N.D.C.C. §§ 14-09-06.6(6), and 14-09-06.2 and are supported by the evidence, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake was made.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) permits a court to consider a parent’s intended relocation under the relevant best-interest factors when making an initial custody award.

Pember v. Shapiro · filed 2011-02-08(1)

As part of this analysis, the district court considered Shapiro’s intended move in its consideration of factors e and k, as it is permitted to do under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires a court awarding primary residential responsibility to consider all relevant best-interest factors.

Martiré v. Martiré · filed 2012-09-25(1)

A district court must consider the best interests of the child in awarding primary residential responsibility, and in doing so must consider all the relevant best-interest factors contained in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to apply the best interest factors in effect when the divorce and custody action commenced.

Fonder v. Fonder · filed 2012-10-23(1)

He correctly argues the pre-amended version of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 applies to this case.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to consider applicable factors when assessing a child’s best interests, including domestic violence and each parent’s willingness to support the child’s relationship with the other parent.

Wald v. Holmes · filed 2013-11-21(1)

Several affidavits alluded to Wald’s abusive behavior toward Holmes and the child, which, under factor (j) would create a re-buttable presumption against Wald. ... Therefore, we conclude that the evidence presented by Holmes has established a prima facie showing that modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.

A court deciding primary residential responsibility must consider the relevant best-interest factors and make findings that explain how they apply to the evidence.

Lucas v. Lucas · filed 2014-01-14(1)

The district court must at least consider the relevant best-interest factors, addressing the evidence that was presented at the hearing.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires the court to consider the relevant best interest factors when awarding primary residential responsibility.

Norberg v. Norberg · filed 2014-04-29(1)

The district court considered and made specific findings on each of the relevant best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

The best interest factors in subsection (1) must be adequately addressed when seeking to change primary residential responsibility.

Schroeder v. Schroeder · filed 2014-05-28(1)

Karjalainen’s affidavits fail to adequately address the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts awarding primary residential responsibility to consider all best-interest factors.

Mairs v. Mairs · filed 2014-06-24(1)

In awarding primary residential responsibility, the district court must consider factors (a) through (m) provided in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) to evaluate the best interests and welfare of the child. ... We have thoroughly reviewed the district court’s findings of fact on the best-interest factors, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. We therefore conclude the court’s finding of fact awarding primary residential responsibility to Aker is not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires consideration of the child’s best-interest factors when significantly changing parenting time.

Capes v. Capes · filed 2015-10-14

Moreover, completely lacking in the district court’s analysis is any consideration of the best-interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 to justify significantly realigning and expanding Novak’s parenting time.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) supplies the best-interest factors a court must consider when awarding primary residential responsibility.

Brouillet v. Brouillet · filed 2016-02-18(1)

On the basis of our review, we conclude the district court did not misapply, the law or improperly consider the best-interest factors in making its residential responsibility determination. We therefore affirm the award of primary residential responsibility of the younger two children to their father.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) does not require a court deciding a change of primary residential responsibility to consider a contingent relocation motion in its best interests analysis under these circumstances.

Larson v. Larson · filed 2016-04-12(1)

In those cases, we never held a district court must consider the proposed relocation in its analysis of the best interests factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). ... Under these. circumstances, we cannot conclude the court’s decision to not consider Conceicao’s relocation motion in its analysis of the- best interest factors in deciding Larson’s motion was an abuse of discretion nor does it render that analysis clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to consider all relevant best-interest factors when deciding parental residential responsibility.

State v. Andres · filed 2016-05-26(1)

The district court is required to consider the best interests and welfare of children in determining the rights and responsibilities of the parents. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. In deciding the children’s best interests the “court must consider all [relevant] factors specified in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).”

Section 14-09-06.2’s best-interest factors include a child’s development and the stability of the child’s home environment.

Solwey v. Solwey · filed 2016-12-20(1)

These allegations, assumed true, implicate the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(a), (b), (c) and (d), because the allegations suggest disruptions in the child’s development and possibly the stability of-his home environment.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) provides the best-interest factors used to determine primary residential responsibility.

Rustad v. Baumgartner · filed 2018-12-06(1)

The best interest factors are found under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). ... Our review of the record reveals no clear error in the court's findings on the individual best interest factors.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires courts to consider all relevant best interest factors when awarding primary residential responsibility.

Friesner v. Friesner · filed 2019-01-22(1)

A court must award primary residential responsibility in light of the child's best interests, considering all the relevant best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) : ... Here, the district court considered each of the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) and found three factors heavily favored Angelina Friesner and one factor favored Daniel Friesner. ... We conclude the court's findings relating to primary residential responsibility have support in the record, and its decision to award Angelina Friesner primary residential responsibility of H.F. was not clearly erroneous.

Section 14-09-06.2’s best interest factors may guide decisions about a child’s school enrollment, parenting time, and primary residential responsibility.

Krump-Wooton v. Krump · filed 2019-11-20

Having considered the Stout-Hawkinson factors, the district court then considered the best interest factors as provided by N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 to determine what would be in the best interests of the children. ... Upon reviewing the record and the district court’s order, we conclude the findings were not induced by an erroneous view of the law and evidence exists in the record to support the court’s findings, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction the court made a mistake in evaluating the best interest factors.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires courts deciding primary residential responsibility to consider relevant best interest factors and make findings specific enough to show the factual basis for the decision, without separate findings on every factor.

Lessard v. Johnson · filed 2019-12-17

The court must consider the relevant best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 in deciding primary residential responsibility. ... The court is not required to make separate findings for each best interest factor, but the court’s findings must contain sufficient specificity to show the factual basis for the primary residential responsibility decision.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires a court awarding primary residential responsibility to consider the relevant best-interest factors.

Stevenson v. Biffert · filed 2020-02-12(1)

However, when read within the context of the entire decision, we conclude the court’s statement about shifting primary residential responsibility did not place an additional burden on Stevenson or cloud the court’s findings. The court made findings on each best-interest factor and awarded Biffert primary residential responsibility on the basis of those findings.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) requires a court awarding primary residential responsibility to consider all relevant best-interest factors.

Martodam v. Martodam · filed 2020-03-19(1)

A court must award primary residential responsibility in light of the child’s best interests, considering all the relevant best-interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). ... We conclude the district court made sufficient findings supported by testimony in the record, and the record contains sufficient competent evidence supporting the court’s decision on primary residential responsibility and parenting time.

Section 14-09-06.2(1) permits a court making an initial residential responsibility decision to consider a parent’s prior move, the reasons for it, and its effect on the children when weighing their best interests.

Sayler v. Sayler · filed 2023-08-17(1)

When considering the best interest factors, the district court considered events that occurred before and after the interim order, including that Mari Sayler moved the children from North Dakota to Minnesota, the move “changed the location and environment of the children” and “upset” the children’s continuity, and the reasons she moved. These, and other factors considered by the court, were relevant to the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). We conclude the court did not err by improperly relying on the interim period when analyzing the best interest factors.

Section 14-09-06.2’s best-interest factors guide decisions about a child’s residential responsibility.

Hofland v. Hofland · filed 2017-03-01

Mandi Hofland argues the district court erred in finding N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 factors (a) and (c) favored neither party and factor (g) favored Seth Hofland. Because the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, we affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

The former version of § 14-09-06.2 applies to custody actions commenced before the 1989 amendments took effect on April 7, 1989.

Freed v. Freed · filed 1990-04-12

In 1989, the North Dakota Legislature modified § 14-09-06.2 to include additional factors. The effective date of the amendments to § 14-09-06.2 was April 7, 1989. Because the action in the instant case commenced before the effective date of the legislative amendments, we apply the former version of the statute.

When both parents are fit, the presumption against awarding custody to a parent who perpetrated domestic violence can be rebutted only by compelling circumstances showing that the children's best interests require that parent to have custody.

Heck v. Reed · filed 1995-02-28(1)(j)

Under section 14-09-06.2(1)(j), the statutory presumption against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence may be rebutted, in the case of two fit parents, only by compelling circumstances demonstrating that the best interests of the children require that custody be placed in the perpetrator.

When credible evidence of domestic violence triggers the custody presumption, a violent parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that additional circumstances require placing the child with that parent.

Bruner v. Hager · filed 1995-07-27(1)(j)

To rebut the presumption, a violent parent, like Kevin, must clearly and convincingly prove that some additional circumstances "require" placement of the child with him rather than the non-violent parent.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j)'s presumption against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence can apply despite the passage of time when the parent has taken no steps to address the abuse.

Krank v. Krank · filed 1996-01-11(1)(j)

Given the evidence of a pattern of abusive behavior on Krank's part throughout his relationship with Jones, and given the fact that Krank has not sought treatment for his abusive tendencies, the trial court did not err in finding that the statutory presumption against awarding custody operates against Krank despite the passage of time since the last incident of abuse between the parties.

When both parents commit domestic violence, the custody presumption applies only to the parent whose violence is significantly greater; if their violence is roughly proportional and both are otherwise fit, it applies to neither.

Krank v. Krank · filed 1995-03-16(1)(j)

Thus, we believe a proper construction of the statute requires that if domestic violence has been committed by both parents, the trial court measure the amount and extent of domestic violence inflicted by both parents. If the amount and extent of domestic violence inflicted by one parent is significantly greater than that inflicted by the other, the statutory presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator will apply only to the parent who has inflicted the greater domestic violence, and will not apply to the parent who has inflicted the lesser. However, if the trial court finds that the amount and extent of the violence inflicted by one parent is roughly proportional to the violence inflicted by the other parent, and both parents are otherwise found to be fit parents, the presumption against awarding custody to either perpetrating parent ceases to exist.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires the trial court itself to weigh evidence of domestic violence and make specific findings showing that the custody arrangement protects the child and the victim.

Owan v. Owan · filed 1996-01-11(1)(j)

Here, the statute directs the trial court itself to weigh the testimony about domestic violence, to make specific findings about it, and to "show" that the custodial arrangement "protects the child and the parent ... who is the victim of domestic violence." NDCC 14-09-06.2(1)(j). Those duties cannot be delegated by the trial court.

The 1993 domestic violence presumption applied to custody hearings held after the amendment took effect.

Bruner v. Hager · filed 1996-05-14(l)(j)

Bruner’s custody hearing took place August 31, 1994. The rules of the game, as established in 1993 by the legislature through its amendment of section 14-09-06.2(l)(j), were, therefore, in place at the time of the hearing.

When domestic violence triggers the custody presumption, the trial court must make specific findings, and the violent parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that compelling circumstances require awarding that parent custody.

Engh v. Jensen · filed 1996-05-14(1)(j)

On remand, the trial court must make specific findings of domestic violence. If the presumption is triggered, the violent parent must show by clear and convincing evidence that compelling circumstances "require" the violent parent receive custody of the children. The trial court's reasoning, that violence was not inflicted toward the children, that the parties are separated, and that James provides stability which is more beneficial for the children, are insufficient to rebut the presumption.

The domestic violence presumption can apply when a parent's violence is directed at a dating partner rather than a parent or child.

Anderson v. Hensrud · filed 1996-05-29(1)(j)

Thus, the presumption is not confined, as the trial court found in this case, to circumstances in which a parent or child is the direct victim of the violence.

A party seeking the domestic violence presumption based on unclear evidence must raise the issue in the trial court, rather than first on appeal.

Ternes v. Ternes · filed 1996-11-13(1)(j)

However, when the evidence does not demonstrate a clear showing of domestic violence, as statutorily defined, but rather, demonstrates a showing of actions which may or may not be within the domestic violence definition, the party attempting to raise the presumption must do so at the trial court level, and not wait to raise the issue when the case is on appeal.

Nonviolent provocation does not excuse domestic violence when applying the custody presumption, which a perpetrator must overcome by clear and convincing evidence.

Huesers v. Huesers · filed 1997-02-27(1)(j)

Domestic violence must be weighed against the perpetrator and custody cannot be granted to the perpetrator unless he or she can rebut the allegations by clear and convincing evidence, as the statute requires. A trial court cannot dismiss violent behavior merely because the behavior was instigated by nonviolent behavior.

When both parents commit domestic violence, the presumption against custody applies to the parent whose violence is significantly greater.

Kluck v. Kluck · filed 1997-03-20(1)(j)

We conclude the trial court’s finding that Marcia committed significantly greater domestic violence is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the trial court correctly applied the presumption against placing custody with Marcia.

The domestic violence custody presumption does not apply to two remote acts that caused no serious bodily injury and did not establish a pattern of domestic violence.

Dinius v. Dinius · filed 1997-06-03(1)(j)

In light of the amendment, we do not believe John’s actions constitute domestic violence required to invoke the presumption against custody.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) raises a rebuttable presumption against custody when a parent commits a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time before the proceeding.

Huesers v. Huesers · filed 1998-03-05(1)(j)

We conclude, as a matter of law, Stuart’s repeated acts of greater domestic violence, including some that occurred within months before this divorce began, constituted a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time before the divorce action. That pattern raised the statutory presumption against custody by Stuart.

The domestic violence custody presumption may be rebutted without expressly finding that the child’s best interests “require” custody with the violent parent when the findings establish that the other parent is unfit and would place the child in serious danger.

Carver v. Miller · filed 1998-10-20(1)(j)

Although the trial court’s findings did not specifically recite the statutory language that Michaela’s best interests “require” Miller’s participation as a custodial parent, the court’s findings clearly state Carver’s exposure of Michaela to a drug-related atmosphere rendered Carver “unfit-pure and simple” and Carver’s history of heavy drug usage placed Michaela in “serious danger.” ... We conclude the court’s findings were not induced by an erroneous view of the law about the domestic violence presumption.

Subsection (j)’s domestic violence presumption requires the specified degree of violence; failure to consider the 1997 definition is harmless when the court does not apply the presumption.

Gregg v. Gregg · filed 1998-11-19(j)

Although the trial court found there was some evidence of domestic violence, it did not find the requisite degree of violence to raise the statutory presumption against David receiving custody of the children. Assuming the trial court erred in not considering the more restrictive domestic violence definition under the 1997 amendments, David was not harmed by the error because the court did not apply the domestic violence presumption against him.

The domestic violence presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s best interests require custody with the parent who committed domestic violence.

Holtz v. Holtz · filed 1999-06-18(1)(j)

We believe April’s mental inability to parent Jessica, coupled with James’s legitimate attempts to receive professional help to control his anger, constitute clear and convincing evidence under N.D.C.C. § 14 — 09—06.2(l)(j) that the best interests of the child require James to have custody of Jessica. We conclude the evidence in this record supports the trial court’s findings and conclusions that James has rebutted any presumption against custody of Jessica arising from his past incidents of domestic violence.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires specific findings about domestic violence when the evidence triggers the custody presumption, but not when it falls below that threshold.

Schumacher v. Schumacher · filed 1999-07-29(1)(j)

However, specific factual findings are not required when the evidence of domestic violence does not rise to the level triggering the presumption.

The presumption against awarding custody to a parent who committed domestic violence requires credible evidence of an incident causing serious bodily injury, an incident involving a dangerous weapon, or a pattern of domestic violence near the proceeding.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1999-10-20(1)(j)

The presumption is now triggered when the district court finds “credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred, and there exists one incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding.”

The domestic violence presumption applies only when there is sufficient credible evidence of qualifying domestic violence.

In Re NCC · filed 2000-06-29(1)(j)

We accordingly hold the district court did not clearly err in finding there was not sufficient credible evidence of domestic violence to engage the presumption of factor (j), N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).

The custody presumption based on a pattern of domestic violence may not apply when the incidents occurred several years before the proceeding and were not severe.

Tulintseff v. Jacobsen · filed 2000-07-20(1)(j)

Because there is evidence the incidents occurred several years before Jacob-sen moved for sole custody and there is evidence the incidents were not severe, we conclude the trial court did not clearly err in finding there is not a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding. We further conclude the trial court did not clearly err in finding there is not sufficient evidence to trigger the presumption under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(j).

The domestic violence presumption requires credible evidence of serious bodily injury, use of a dangerous weapon, or a pattern of domestic violence; lesser evidence may still be considered as a best-interests factor.

Cox v. Cox · filed 2000-07-20(1)(j)

Specific factual findings are not required when the evidence of domestic violence does not rise to the level of triggering the domestic violence presumption, but that evidence can still be considered by the court as one of the best-interests factors. ... The trial court’s finding Christi Cox had not proven credible evidence of domestic violence involving serious bodily injury, use of a dangerous weapon, or a pattern of domestic violence is not clearly erroneous.

Subsection (1)(j) does not require additional findings about alleged domestic violence when the evidence does not credibly show that it occurred.

Hendrickson v. Hendrickson · filed 1996-09-10(1)(j)

While more detailed findings on this one incident might have facilitated our review, we see insufficient evidence tending to credibly show "infliction of fear of imminent physical harm" or domestic violence by Diane to reverse and remand for specific findings.

Section 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires specific findings addressing evidence of domestic violence when deciding custody.

Owan v. Owan · filed 1997-04-01(1)(j)

The district court did not address the allegations against Rayann in its findings of fact. In order for the district court to properly apply N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j), the court must explicitly address the evidence of domestic violence in its findings.

When evidence of domestic violence is present, Section 14-09-06.2 requires specific findings addressing it to support a custody award.

Zimmerman v. Zimmerman · filed 1997-09-30(1)(j)

The trial court must adequately address the domestic violence issues in its findings to support its custody award when evidence of domestic violence is present. Because of the severe consequences under our statutes of a finding of domestic violence, the trial court must carefully delineate relevant and specific facts in support of its determination. The trial court’s failure to do that in this case requires us to reverse and remand for a redetermination of custody.

Domestic violence that does not trigger the custody presumption remains a best interests factor, but a separate finding on that factor is unnecessary when the court’s reasoning is clear.

Reeves v. Chepulis · filed 1999-04-06(1)(j)

Karen’s testimony regarding the single incident of domestic violence by Robert, though clearly not sufficient to raise the presumption, undoubtably should have been considered along with the other relevant factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. While the trial court failed to specifically address the allegation in its factual findings, we do not require a separate finding for each statutory factor under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 provided we can understand the factual basis for the court’s decision.

Section 14-09-06.2 requires specific factual findings showing why a custody or visitation arrangement protects the child and the victim of domestic violence when the domestic violence presumption is rebutted.

Berg v. Berg · filed 2000-02-25(1)(j)

Section 14-09-06.2(1)©, N.D.C.C., directs that in determining whether the domestic violence presumption has been rebutted, the trial court “shall cite specific findings of fact to show that the custody or visitation arrangement best protects the child and the parent or other family or household member who is the victim of domestic violence.” Specific, detailed findings of fact, outlining the clear and convincing evidence and delineating the factors considered by the court are required.