N.D. Cent. Code § 32-12.1-03

Section 32-12.1-03(3) does not shield a political subdivision from liability for required family notification and observations, even when the resulting release decision is discretionary.

McCroskey v. Cass County · filed 1981-03-16(3)

Although the decision made as a result of the observations involves the Center staff’s discretion, the notification to the family and the observations upon which the decision must be made are not discretionary.

Section 32-12.1-03 protects an officer’s discretionary determination that a person is apparently intoxicated, but the officer must first make observations supporting that determination and a finding of danger.

McCroskey v. Fettes · filed 1981-10-15

While an officer has discretion in determining whether or not a subject is apparently intoxicated, it is non-discretionary that he make observations that the subject is apparently intoxicated and constitutes a danger to himself or others prior to taking the subject to jail for detoxification.

Section 32-12.1-03(3)(c) does not immunize a county from liability for an auditor’s failure to search tax payment receipts for a secondary address and mail notice there after the first notice is returned undelivered.

MILES HOMES DIVISION OF INSILCO CORP. v. City of Westhope · filed 1990-07-03(3)(c)

We hold that an auditor’s duty to search the file of tax payment receipts for a secondary address of the taxpayer and to mail the notice to that address upon return of an undelivered notice mailed in accordance with § 57-28-04 is not a discretionary act within the meaning of § 32-12.1-03(3)(c).

Section 32-12.1-03(3) shields a political subdivision from tort claims challenging discretionary decisions grounded in public policy.

Olson v. City of Garrison · filed 1995-10-31(3)

This discretionary function exception, now found in section 32-12.1-03(3) of the North Dakota Century Code, frames the analysis in the instant case. ... We conclude the City of Garrison's conduct falls within the discretionary function exception.

Section 32-12.1-03(3) does not shield a political subdivision from liability for a personal injury directly arising from a discretionary function, whether caused by a negligent act or omission.

Peterson v. Traill County · filed 1999-10-20(3)

We conclude the phrase “personal injury arising out of the execution of any ... discretionary function” means a personal injury arising directly out of the execution of the discretionary function or decision itself, regardless of whether it is caused by an allegedly negligent affirmative act or omission to act.

Section 32-12.1-03(3) shields a political subdivision from claims based on an employee’s due-care exercise or nonexercise of a discretionary function.

Boudreau v. Estate of Miller · filed 2000-02-22(3)

Under the circumstances presented, we conclude the district court did not err in concluding installation of yield signs was discretionary. ... Section 32-12.1-03(3), N.D.C.C., provides a political subdivision is not liable for any claim based on the act of an employee exercising due care in the exercise or performance of, or failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function.

Section 32-12.1-03(3) does not shield a political subdivision from liability for routine, individualized decisions that do not implicate social, economic, or political policy.

Kautzman v. McDonald · filed 2001-02-02(3)

A political subdivision is exempt under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(3) from liability for an act or omission of its employees who are performing discretionary functions or duties. ... The decision whether the Kautzmans’ dogs posed a danger to the deputies or to others, thereby justifying the dogs’ destruction, implicates no social, economic or political policy, and was merely an ordinary individualized judgment made by the deputies as part of their routine work duties. Discretionary function immunity does not shield individualized decisions such as these.

Section 32-12.1-03(3)(d) shields a political subdivision from negligence liability for discretionary water-main maintenance decisions that balance economic and social costs.

Knutson v. City of Fargo · filed 2006-05-11(3)(d)

As in Olson, this operation and maintenance is the kind of function that discretionary immunity is designed to shield from second-guessing. Discretionary immunity bars the Knutsons' negligence claim, so summary judgment is appropriate.

Section 32-12.1-03(3)(d) treats visitation arrangements as discretionary when no specific mandatory directive controls them.

Geraci v. Women's Alliance, Inc. · filed 2006-06-29(3)(d)

Outside of the general statutory provisions outlined above, there is simply no mandate regarding visitation. Thus, the first element of the discretionary function exception is satisfied.

Section 32-12.1-03(3) does not shield a township from liability for failing to warn travelers of an unusually dangerous section line condition it actually knows about.

Kappenman v. Klipfel · filed 2009-05-26(3)

A political subdivision is exempt under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(3) from liability for an act or omission of its employees who are performing discretionary functions or duties. ... We conclude that discretionary function immunity does not shield Albion Township from liability if it had actual knowledge of an unusually dangerous or unusually hazardous condition of the section line.

Section 32-12.1-03(3)(d) shields a political subdivision from claims based on discretionary functions; a claimant must establish any asserted waiver of that immunity.

Lovro v. City of Finley · filed 2022-07-21(3)(d)

The source of discretionary immunity is N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(3)(d), which provides that a political subdivision may not be held liable for claims based on “[t]he decision to perform or the refusal to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not such discretion is abused and whether or not the statute, charter, ordinance, order, resolution, regulation, or resolve under which the discretionary function or duty is performed is valid or invalid.” ... Lovro’s claims are barred by governmental immunity and he has failed to establish that the City can or did waive its immunity.

Section 32-12.1-03(3) shields a township from damages for discretionary zoning approval decisions even if officials abuse their discretion or the ordinance is invalid.

McLain v. Midway Township · filed 1982-11-15(3)

The township is immune from liability for those actions under Subsection 32-12.1-03(3), N.D.C.C., irrespective of whether or not the township representatives abused their discretion or whether or not the zoning ordinance, or parts of it, are invalid.

Section 32-12.1-03 does not bar a damages action alleging that a township reconstructed a road in violation of mandatory stream crossing standards.

Skogen v. Hemen Township Board of Township Supervisors · filed 2010-05-14(3)(c)

That language indicates a specific intent to impose liability if a road is not reconstructed in accordance with stream crossing standards, and we decline to construe the more general language of N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03 to negate that liability for roads that do not comply with a township’s mandatory duty for stream crossing standards.

Section 32-12.1-03(4) preserves the state’s sovereign immunity in the absence of insurance coverage.

Senger v. Hulstrand Construction, Inc. · filed 1982-06-10(4)

Section 32-12.1-03(4), N.D. C.C., reflects a definite legislative intent to retain sovereign immunity in the absence of insurance coverage.

Subsection (4) preserves the state's sovereign immunity from tort claims; the chapter does not waive or abrogate it.

Leadbetter v. Rose · filed 1991-03-19(4)

However, Section 32-12.1-03(4), N.D.C.C., deals with sovereign immunity for torts and provides: ... "4. The sovereign immunity of the state is not waived in any manner by this chapter, and this chapter shall not be construed to abrogate the immunity of the state."

Section 32-12.1-03 makes a political subdivision liable, up to its statutory limit, for injuries caused by employees acting within the scope of employment, including when the employee may also be personally liable.

Binstock v. Fort Yates Public School District No. 4 · filed 1990-11-29(1), (2)

The political subdivision remains liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for all acts of its employees performed within the scope of employment to the maximum amount specified in section 32-12.1-03(2), NDCC. Because chapter 32-12.1 does not immunize employees from their reckless, grossly negligent, willful, or wanton misconduct, a political subdivision and its employee may be jointly liable if an employee caused injury while acting within the scope of his employment in a reckless or grossly negligent manner or a willful or wanton manner.

Section 32-12.1-03(1) makes a political subdivision vicariously liable for an employee’s torts within the scope of employment; all elements of Restatement § 228 apply when assessing an intentional act.

Nelson v. Gillette · filed 1997-11-06(1)

Thus, while political subdivisions' employees can be liable for torts in the scope of their employment, NDCC 32-12.1-03(1) confirms that the political subdivisions are vicariously liable for them, too. ... Like the Alaska Supreme Court, we conclude that all the elements of Restatement § 228 must be considered to assess whether an employee was acting within the scope of employment when committing an intentional act.

Section 32-12.1-03(1) permits liability for a political subdivision whose employee negligently causes injury when the employee would be personally liable; it contains no general exception for duties owed to the public.

Ficek v. Morken · filed 2004-08-04(1)

We are persuaded by the reasoning of the minority view and refuse to adopt the public duty doctrine as a part of North Dakota law. Section 32-12.1-03(1), N.D.C.C., specifically provides that political subdivisions are liable for damages caused by an employee’s negligence “under circumstances where the employee would be personally liable to a claimant in accordance with the laws of this state.”

Section 32-12.1-03(3) shields political subdivisions and their employees from claims arising from a public duty unless a special relationship is established; gross negligence alone does not remove that immunity.

Tangedal v. Mertens · filed 2016-08-25(3)(f) and (g)

When the provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 32-12.1 are considered together to harmonize and give meaning to each provision, we conclude a political subdivision and an employee may not be held liable for a claim for an injury caused by the performance or nonperformance of a public duty unless a special relationship is established.

The special relationship exception to public duty immunity requires all four statutory elements; if any element is missing, the political subdivision remains immune.

Hoff v. City of Burlington · filed 2025-03-28(3)(g)

We need not address all four elements of a special relationship because the City is entitled to immunity under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(3) if any element of a special relationship under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(3)(g) is not met.

Section 32-12.1-03(2) bars punitive damages against a political subdivision.

Copper v. City of Fargo · filed 1994-12-30(2)

Although a political subdivision may not be held liable for punitive damages, employees of a political subdivision may be held liable for punitive or exemplary damages.

Section 32-12.1-03(2) bars punitive damages against political subdivisions.

Veneklase v. City of Fargo · filed 1995-02-17(2)

Although a political subdivision may not be held liable for punitive damages, employees of a political subdivision may be held liable for punitive or exemplary damages.

Section 32-12.1-03(2)’s cap on damages against political subdivisions satisfies intermediate scrutiny and does not violate state equal protection, either facially or as applied.

Larimore Public School District No. 44 v. Aamodt · filed 2018-03-19(2)

We conclude there is a close correspondence between the damage cap at issue in this case and legitimate legislative goals to satisfy the intermediate level of scrutiny for the parents' equal protection claims under N.D. Const. art. I, § 21. We therefore conclude the applicable damage cap in N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(2) does not on its face, or as applied, violate the equal protection provisions of N.D. Const. art. I, § 21.

Section 32-12.1-03(3) provides public employees immunity from liability for negligent acts or omissions.

Habiger v. City of Fargo · filed 1995-01-23(3)

Section 32-12.1-03(3) provides public employees immunity from liability for their negligent acts or omissions.

Section 32-12.1-03(3)(a) immunizes a political subdivision employee from claims based on acts or omissions performed with due care while executing a statute or regulation.

Thompson-Widmer v. Larson · filed 2021-02-18(3)(a)

Under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(3)(a), a political subdivision employee is immune from liability for “[a] claim based upon an act or omission of a political subdivision employee exercising due care in the execution of a valid or invalid statute or regulation.” ... We conclude Larson’s communications were privileged and she was immune from liability.

Section 32-12.1-03(3)(f)(3) immunizes a political subdivision and its employees from claims arising from law enforcement services provided in the ordinary course of operations, even when the circumstances are extraordinary.

Wilansky v. Morton County, North Dakota · filed 2024-04-03(3)(f)(3)

This case falls under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(3)(f)(3), which provides immunity for actions relating to law enforcement services in the ordinary course of Morton County’s law enforcement operations.

Section 32-12.1-03(3)(c) shields political subdivision employees from liability for decisions to undertake or refuse judicial or quasi-judicial acts, including a state’s attorney’s decision whether to initiate criminal proceedings.

Sanderson v. Cole · filed 2026-01-29(3)(c)

A political subdivision employee may not be held liable for “[t]he decision to undertake or the refusal to undertake any judicial or quasi-judicial act, including the decision to grant, to grant with conditions, to refuse to grant, or to revoke any license, permit, order, or other administrative approval or denial.” N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(3)(c). ... Sanderson alleges in his complaint Cole failed to investigate or initiate criminal proceedings. Although Sanderson now argues Cole committed administrative misconduct regarding open records violations, his complaint does not address that topic. Absolute immunity applies to the allegations in Sanderson’s complaint.

Section 32-12.1-03(1) allows claims against political subdivisions for injuries caused by public property; applying the recreational use statute to bar those claims would defeat the legislature's intent.

Hovland v. City of Grand Forks · filed 1997-05-13(1)

Applying the recreational use statute to the political subdivision liability statute completely circumvents the legislature's intent under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03 and leads to an unintended and absurd result.

Section 32-12.1-03(1) allows students injured on school grounds during the school day to sue a school district despite recreational use immunity.

M.M. v. Fargo Public School District No. 1 · filed 2010-06-10(1)

When harmonizing N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03 and N.D.C.C. ch. 53-08, we agree with those courts that refuse to apply recreational use immunity statutes to bar suits by students injured on school grounds during the school day.