N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16

Subsection (1) imposes a six-year statute of limitations on contract or other obligations claims.

Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky · filed 1998-06-10(1)

Morris and Edward argue that T.R.'s claim for his share of the partnership assets, filed in July of 1995, was barred by North Dakota's six-year statute of limitations on contract or other obligations claims. See N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16(1) (1991). ... T.R.'s claim was filed within six years of March 12, 1992, and thus was not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 28-01-16(1) requires an action on a contract, including a contractual uninsured-motorist claim, to be commenced within six years after the claim for relief accrues.

Carpenter v. Grinnell Specialty Agency, Inc. · filed 2019-12-31(1)

The general statute of limitations for actions based upon a contract is found in N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16(1). That statute states that an action upon a contract “must be commenced within six years after the claim for relief has accrued,” with exceptions not relevant here. N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16(1). ... The claim is therefore governed by the general six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions found in N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16(1). It is undisputed that Carpenter brought the uninsured motorist claim within six years, so it is not time-barred.

For a mutual account, Section 28-01-16 does not bar individual items older than six years if the latest item is less than six years old.

Everson v. Partners Life Insurance Co. · filed 1978-07-26

We hold that the account we are concerned with is a mutual account and that the statute of limitations does not bar items in the account between the parties more than six years prior to the commencement of the action, so long as the latest item is less than six years old.

Section 28-01-16’s six-year limitations period does not apply to a mutual, open, and current account governed by § 28-01-37.

Sheyenne Valley Lumber Co. v. Nokleberg · filed 1982-04-29

Furthermore, because we conclude that this is a mutual, open, and current account, neither § 28-01— 16, N.D.C.C., which is the 6-year statute of limitations, nor § 41-02 — 104, N.D.C.C., which is the 4-year statute of limitations, is applicable in the instant case because § 28-01 — 37, N.D.C.C., governs in this case.

Section 28-01-16 requires an action to collect each charge on a simple open account to begin within six years of that charge.

State Ex Rel. State Hospital v. Hintz · filed 1979-07-11(1)

Under the rule enunciated by our court in Hansen v. Fettig, supra, 179 N.W.2d at 744, the statute of limitations on a simple open account runs from the date of each item, rather than from the date of the last transaction. The collection of any remaining balance alleged to be outstanding must be initiated within six years after the date the expense for a particular service was incurred.

Section 28-01-16 provides a general six-year limit for contract actions and a six-year limit for independent tort claims; the special three-year limit governs actions on sickness or accident insurance policies.

Bender v. Time Insurance Co. · filed 1979-12-12(1), (5)

Section 28-01-16, subsection 1, imposes a general six-year limitation on contract actions. Section 26-03.1-03, subsection 1-k, imposes a special three-year limitation on sickness or accident insurance contract actions. Because all insurance policies also include contractual relationships, Section 26-03.1-03, subsection 1-k, would be meaningless if Section 28-01-16, subsection 1, were to control under the circumstances. We therefore find the two provisions irreconcilable, in which case Section 26-03.1-03, subsection 1 — k, as a special provision, will prevail and will be considered an exception to the general provision found at Section 28-01-16, subsection 1. ... We therefore remand this case to the district court for consideration of the second cause of action in Bender’s first amended complaint, which we hold to be timely under Section 28-01-16, subsection 5, imposing a six-year statute of limitation for tort actions.

Section 28-01-16(1) gives six years to bring an action for breach of an alleged indemnity contract.

Johnson v. Haugland · filed 1981-03-23(1)

An action for breach of that alleged contract is governed by subdivision 1 of the six-year statute of limitation, Section 28-01-16, N.D.C.C.

Section 28-01-16(1)'s six-year limit for contract actions yields to the four-year limit for breach-of-warranty claims involving sales of goods.

Spieker v. Westgo, Inc. · filed 1992-01-09(1)

That section specifically exempts the four-year statute of limitations in Section 41-02-104, N.D.C.C., from the six-year statute of limitations generally applicable to “action[s] upon a contract.”

Section 28-01-16(1) requires an action on a demand note within six years of the note’s date.

Helling v. American State Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1994-01-05(1)

A creditor must commence an action upon a demand note within six years from the date of the note.

For a note with optional acceleration, repossession and sale of collateral alone do not accelerate the debt and start the six-year limitations period before maturity.

AMERICAN STATE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF WILLISTON v. Sorenson · filed 1995-10-31(1)

The record only shows that the Bank took possession of the car and Rollohome, sold the car and applied the proceeds before the note’s maturity date, and applied the proceeds from the sale of the Rollohome ten days after the maturity date. This conduct, alone, does not evidence affirmative action to accelerate the note.

Section 28-01-16(1)’s six-year limit for contract actions is subject to the more specific ten-year limit for contracts in instruments affecting title to real property.

Diocese of Bismarck Trust v. Ramada, Inc. · filed 1996-09-10(1)

However, the six-year limitation in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1), is explicitly “subject to the provisions of section ] 28-01-15.”

Section 28-01-16’s six-year limitation period does not govern an action to reform a deed affecting title to real property.

City of Fargo v. D.T.L. Properties, Inc. · filed 1997-06-03

D.T.L. contends Fargo’s action for reformation accrued when the MIDA bond financing documents were drafted in 1986 and is barred by the six-year statute of limitations in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16. ... We hold Fargo’s 1994 lawsuit against D.T.L. is governed by the ten-year statute of limitations in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15(2) and is timely, regardless of whether the limitation period began to run in 1986 when the MIDA bond documents were prepared or in 1993 when the quit claim deed was executed.

Section 28-01-16(1) gives a claimant six years to bring a breach of contract action after the claim accrues under the discovery rule.

Snortland v. State · filed 2000-08-23(1)

We conclude as a matter of law Snortland knew, or reasonably should have known, he had a potential claim against the Fund when he received his first retirement check in February 1981. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled Snortland’s claim is barred by the six-year statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1).

Section 28-01-16(1) sets a six-year limitation period for actions arising from a contract.

Pratt v. Altendorf · filed 2005-02-16(1)

Pratt’s claim is based on breach of contract, and actions arising in contract are governed by a six-year statute of limitations. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1). The alleged breach of contract occurred in the spring of 2000. Therefore, Pratt would not be barred by the statute of limitations from bringing a subsequent action.

Section 28-01-16(1) gives a six-year limitations period for actions arising in contract.

Guardianship of Topp · filed 2005-02-16(1)

Pratt’s claim is based on breach of contract, and actions arising in contract are governed by a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 28-01-16(1) gives breach-of-contract and rescission claims a six-year limitations period.

Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Development, LLC · filed 2005-09-13(1)

The statute of limitations for a breach of contract or rescission action is six years in North Dakota. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16. Thus, it is clear and undisputed that the counterclaim was filed beyond the six-year statute of limitations period and is clearly time-barred.

Section 28-01-16(1) provides a general six-year period for contract actions, but contract actions against the State are subject to the specific three-year period in section 28-01-22.1.

Dimond v. State Ex Rel. State Board of Higher Education · filed 2001-12-24(1)

When N.D.C.C. § 28-01-22.1 and N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1) are construed together to give meaning to each, we construe the specific language of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-22.1 for actions against the State, rather than the general language of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1) for actions upon a contract, to apply to contract actions against the State and to require those actions to be commenced within three years after the claim for relief accrued.

Section 28-01-16(1) provides a general six-year limit for contract actions, but contract actions against the state are governed by the three-year limit in § 28-01-22.1.

Murphy v. Rossow · filed 2010-08-23(1)

Contract actions against the state are governed by the three-year statute of limitations in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-22.1, rather than the general six-year statute of limitations for an action upon a contract in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1).

Section 28-01-16’s six-year limit for contract actions does not govern actions for basic no-fault benefits; the specific four-year limit in § 26.1-41-19 governs them.

Johnson v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2005-06-22

We conclude the specific language in N.D.C.C. § 26.1-41-19 governs “all actions for basic ... no-fault benefits,” rather than the more general statute of *50 limitations for actions upon a contract, and Johnson’s action is governed by the four-year statute ■ of limitations in that provision.

Section 28-01-16(1) requires an action on a promissory note to begin within six years after the claim accrues.

In Re Estate of Sorenson · filed 2006-06-29(1)

An action upon a promissory note must be commenced within six years after the claim for relief has accrued.

Section 28-01-16(1)'s six-year contract limitation does not apply to a claim for breach of a sales contract, which is governed by the four-year limitation for sales of goods.

Superior, Inc. v. Behlen Mfg. Co. · filed 2007-08-24(1)

Therefore, we apply the four-year statute of limitations governing contracts for the sale of goods, not the more general six-year contract statute of limitations.

The six-year limit for contract actions does not apply to a declaratory action seeking to construe a contract before breach.

Jensen v. Deaver · filed 2013-04-04(1)

The plaintiffs brought this action under N.D.C.C. ch. 32-23, seeking to have their contract construed as an easement. Section 32-23-03, N.D.C.C., allows a contract to be construed before or after breach. ... This is not an action subject to the six-year limitation in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1).

Section 28-01-16(1) provides a general six-year limit for contract actions, subject to the ten-year limit in § 28-01-15(2) for contracts in instruments affecting title to real property.

Kittleson v. Grynberg Petroleum Company · filed 2016-02-22(1)

Both N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1) and N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15(2) apply to contract actions. As discussed earlier, however, N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1) is subject to the provisions of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15. ... We hold the ten-year limitation period iñ N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15(2) applies to' Kittleson’s breach of contract action for the underpayment of royalties under the oil and gas lease.

Section 28-01-16(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on contract or other obligations claims, and the partnership-asset claim was timely because it was filed within six years after dissolution.

Tarnavsky v. Morris Tarnavsky Edward Tarnavsky · filed 1998-06-10(1)

T.R.’s claim was filed within six years of March 12, 1992, and thus was not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 28-01-16 provides a six-year limitations period for general personal-injury claims, which the court applied to Rehabilitation Act claims.

Dick v. Dickinson State University · filed 2016-06-23

Applying the longest possible limitations period of six years under North Dakota's general personal injury statute, N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16, many of Dick's claims would still be time-barred.

Section 28-01-16 gives a person six years to bring an action to rescind a personal-injury release under § 9-09-04.

Wock v. Kuhn · filed 1974-06-28

Section 28-01-16, N.D.C.C., provides a six-year statute of limitations in cases of this kind, and Wock has brought his action well within that time period.

Section 28-01-16(1) requires a collection action on an account to be commenced within six years after the claim accrues.

Wayne-Juntunen Fertilizer Co. v. Lassonde · filed 1990-06-01(1)

Under North Dakota law, this type of action must be commenced within six years of the accrual of the claim for relief.

Section 28-01-16(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions upon liabilities created by statute; it does not apply when the plaintiff has no statutory remedy.

L.E. Bostow v. Lundell Manufacturing Co. · filed 1985-10-28(2)

The statute of limitations for an action upon a liability created by statute is six years. NDCC § 28-01-16(2). For a contract for the sale of goods not covered by § 51-07-01, the statute of limitations is four years. NDCC § 28-01-16(1); § 41-02-104. Because Bostow’s action was commenced over five years after it accrued, and because he had no statutory remedy pursuant to § 51-07-01, the district court was correct in determining that Bostow’s action for breach of warranty was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.

Section 28-01-16(2) gives the state six years to assess gross production taxes when the tax statutes provide no other limitation period.

Amerada Hess Corp. v. Conrad · filed 1987-06-30(2)

We therefore conclude that the general six-year statute of limitations in § 28-01-16(2), N.D.C.C., applies to the assessment in this case.

Section 28-01-16’s six-year limitation does not apply to administrative tax intercept proceedings to collect child support arrearages.

Guthmiller v. North Dakota Department of Human Services · filed 1988-03-29

Therefore, the statute of limitations imposed by Section 28-01-16, N.D.C.C., does not apply to the tax intercept procedure.

Section 28-01-16(5) provides a six-year period for personal injury claims only when another statute does not expressly provide a limitations period.

Olson v. University of North Dakota · filed 1992-06-25(5)

The general six-year statute of limitations in NDCC § 28-01-16(5) applies to any injury to the person or rights of another not arising upon contract, “when not otherwise expressly provided.” NDCC § 32-12.1-10 expressly provides that “[a]n action brought under this chapter must be commenced within three years after the claim for relief has accrued.”

Section 28-01-16(5) provides a six-year limitations period for tort actions; Rule 6(a) supplies the method for computing that period.

Thompson v. Thompson · filed 2012-01-12(5)

Because N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16 does not specify a method of computing time for commencing an action within the six-year statute of limitations, the language of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure indicates the rules supplement N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16.

Section 28-01-16(1) gives six years to bring an inverse condemnation claim, whether the claim concerns a taking or damage to property.

Hager v. City of Devils Lake · filed 2009-10-13(1)

Therefore, the action is one “upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied,” and the six-year statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1) governs.

Section 28-01-16(5) and (6) provide a six-year limitations period for fraud, deceit, and injury-to-person claims.

Solberg v. McKennett · filed 2021-03-24(5), (6)

The statute of limitations for fraud, deceit, and injury to person is six years.

Section 28-01-16(2) gives six years to bring an action for statutory liability other than a penalty or forfeiture, including a claim for remedial interest on late royalty payments.

Rice v. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company LP · filed 2022-01-21(2)

And to the extent a question remains about the appropriate statute of limitations, the longer six-year statute of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(2) applies.

Section 28-01-16(2) sets a six-year limit for an unleased mineral interest owner’s claim for statutory interest on late oil and gas royalties.

Dorchester Minerals v. Hess Bakken Investments II · filed 2024-07-05(2)

It is undisputed Dorchester is an “unleased mineral interest owner” claiming the statutory 18 percent interest under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 on a royalty arising under North Dakota’s pooling statute, N.D.C.C. § 38-08-08(1). We therefore conclude the six-year limitation period provided in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(2) applies to Dorchester’s claims in this case.

Section 28-01-16 provides a six-year limitations period for general negligence claims; claims based on professional malpractice are subject to the two-year period instead.

New Hope Wesleyan Church v. Ecclesia Construction Company · filed 2026-04-21

In North Dakota, general negligence claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations period under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16. ... The Court concludes the two-year professional malpractice statute of limitations applies to Ecclesia’s claim against Schultz and Hite.

Section 28-01-16(4) gives a party six years from the date of conversion to bring a conversion claim.

Roth, et al. v. Meyer, et al. · filed 2024-06-06(4)

A claim of conversion has a statute of limitations of six years from the date of the conversion.

Section 28-01-16 gives a construction contract claim a six-year limitations period after discovery of the injury, which must also satisfy the applicable statute of repose.

New Hope Wesleyan Church v. Ecclesia Construction Company · filed 2025-11-04

The plain language of the statutes, together with the North Dakota Supreme Court’s treatment of statutes of repose and limitations, makes clear New Hope must satisfy both statutory requirements. It must file its breach of contract claim within the six-year period after discovery of the injury and before the ten-year statute of repose expires. Accordingly, the six-year statute of limitations in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16 is the applicable limitations period for New Hope’s breach of contract claim.

Section 28-01-16(4) gives a conversion claim six years from the date of conversion, rather than from the property's earlier acquisition or creation.

Roth v. Meyer · filed 2024-06-06(4)

A claim of conversion has a statute of limitations of six years from the date of the conversion. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16. ... The court erred by focusing on the birth date instead of finding when specific cattle were converted by Gary Meyer.

Section 28-01-16(4) requires a conversion claim to be brought within six years of the conversion, not the property’s creation or acquisition.

Roth, et al. v. Meyer, et al. · filed 2024-07-03(4)

A claim of conversion has a statute of limitations of six years from the date of the conversion. ... The court erred by focusing on the birth date instead of finding when specific cattle were converted by Gary Meyer.

Section 28-01-16(4) gives a party six years from the date of conversion to bring a conversion claim.

Roth v. Meyer · filed 2024-07-03(4)

A claim of conversion has a statute of limitations of six years from the date of the conversion. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16.

Section 28-01-16(1) provides a six-year limitations defense against claims arising more than six years before filing.

Thomas Ex Rel. Schmidt v. Thomas · filed 1995-06-05(1)

It is undisputed all of Phil’s claim arising more than six years before the claim was filed would have been barred. See Section 28-01-16(1), N.D.C.C. As to those parts of Phil’s claim, the estate had a valid defense.

Section 28-01-16(6)’s six-year limitation applies to claims for attorney deceit or collusion because the nature of the action determines the applicable limitation period.

Bjorgen v. Kinsey · filed 1991-02-21(6)

Although the six-year statute of limitations in § 28-01-16(6), N.D.C.C., refers only to "fraud” rather than “deceit,” the determination of which statute of limitation is applicable in a given case rests on the actual nature of the action. ... Because § 27-13-08(1), N.D.C.C., merely provides treble damages for actions based on an attorney's acts of essentially common law deceit or collusion, we conclude that the six-year statute is applicable.

Section 28-01-16(1) imposed a six-year limit on an action to collect a contractual debt; under the accrual rule then applicable to demand notes, the period ran from the note’s date.

Pear v. Grand Forks Motel Associates · filed 1996-10-01(1)

Pear’s demand note was dated October 5, 1984. Therefore, Pear’s debt claim became barred on October 5,1990, unless the limiting time is otherwise extended or avoided.

Section 28-01-16(1) sets a six-year limitation, but it does not bar an RTC assignee’s claim when the assignee can rely on the federal limitations period.

Global Financial Services, Inc. v. Duttenhefner · filed 1998-03-05(1)

Although NDCC 28-01-16(1), like the federal statute of limitations, sets a six-year limitation for bringing an action, the difference between the statutes lies in when the claim accrues. ... Because the federal statute of limitations applies under state law, Global’s action is not barred.

Section 28-01-16(5) gives a claim for tortious interference with business a six-year limitations period.

Atkinson v. McLaughlin · filed 2006-11-28(5)

Under North Dakota law, the statute of limitations for a claim based on tortious interference with business is six (6) years. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(5).

Section 28-01-16 gives breach of fiduciary duty claims under the North Dakota Limited Liability Company Act a six-year limitations period.

Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Development · filed 2008-05-13(2), (5)

First, an action for breach of fiduciary duty falls within the plain language of § 28-01-16. ... Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly applied the six-year statute of limitations to Roemmich’s claims.

Subsection (5) provides a six-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which applies to a § 1983 excessive-force claim through the borrowed state limitations period.

Twardowski v. Bismarck Police Department · filed 2019-02-27(5)

There is no dispute that he filed it more than ten years after the allegedly wrongful act occurred—long after the six-year statute of limitations for his excessive-force claim had expired. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989) (explaining that section 1983 actions “borrow” the “general or residual” statute of limitations “for personal injury actions”); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16(5) (providing a six-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions).

Section 28-01-16(5) provides a six-year catchall limitations period for personal injuries not expressly covered by § 28-01-18.

Kessel v. Schaff · filed 1987-08-12(5)

The other statute of limitations for personal injuries in North Dakota is a catchall provision which provides for a six year statutory period for those personal injuries not expressly provided for in § 28-01-18. See N.D.Cent. Code § 28-01-16(5) (1985). ... Therefore it is the conclusion of this court that while both North Dakota limitations statutes theoretically encompass intentional tort actions, the intentional statute of limitation, which applies to actions involving assault, batteries and the like, is the best alternative and more specifically encompasses the sorts of actions which concerned Congress in enacting section 1983. Consequently the two year statute of limitation founded at North Dakota Century Code section 28-01-18 applies to Kessel’s 1983 action.

Section 28-01-16(5) provides a six-year limitations period for ordinary-negligence claims, but it does not apply when the alleged conduct constitutes professional negligence.

Ron Krein and Jeanne Krein v. Dba Corporation · filed 2003-04-28(5)

North Dakota provides a six-year statute of limitations for ordinary negligence. N.D. Cent.Code § 28-01-16(5). However, when a plaintiff brings an action for professional negligence, the statute of limitations is shortened to a period of two-years. N.D. CentCode § 28-01-18(3). ... In sum, having reviewed the record as a whole and considered all facts and inferences in the light most- favorable to the Kreins, we conclude that the district court properly determined that these allegations did not support a cause.of action for ordinary negligence. -We believe that the acts complained of involved special skills not possessed by lay«persons.

Section 28-01-16(5) imposes a six-year limitations period on personal-injury or rights-based tort actions not otherwise expressly covered, running from accrual; the court treated injury manifestation as the relevant accrual point here.

Matthews v. Celotex Corp. · filed 1983-09-08(5)

The longest statute of limitations arguably applicable to Alex Matthews’ original personal injury action is found in North Dakota Century Code section 28-01-16(5). This section provides in pertinent part as follows: ... 5. An action for criminal conversation or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not arising upon contract, when not otherwise expressly provided .... ... Applying the foregoing legal analysis to the facts in this case, it is the opinion of this court that plaintiff’s survival claim is time barred. ... Therefore, under Keller, because Matthews’ injury became manifest long before he commenced his lawsuit on January 9, 1981, the action is time barred. Even if the court assumes that no injury occurred prior to Matthews being told by Dr. Mendoza that he had asbestosis, the statute of limitations would have run in August 1975.

Section 28-01-16(5) supplies North Dakota's six-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury actions when North Dakota law applies.

Carpenter v. WILLIAMS COUNTY, ND · filed 1985-09-30(5)

North Dakota law provides a six year statute of limitations for “[a]n action for criminal conversation or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not arising upon contract, when not otherwise expressly provided.” N.D.Cent.Code § 28-01-16(5) (Supp.1983). This is the statute for personal injury action which is to be applied in section 1983 actions to which North Dakota law applies. This action was commenced within the six year period.

Section 28-01-16(5) provides a six-year limitation period for a survival action based on tort claims.

Hulne v. International Harvester Co. · filed 1982-08-02(5)

The survival action in the instant case is based upon two theories in tort and is, therefore, subject to the six-year statute of limitations under Subsection 28-01-16(5), N.D.C.C.

Section 28-01-16(1) requires an action on a contract to begin within six years after the claim accrues.

Kadrmas, Lee & Jackson, P.C. v. Bolken · filed 1993-11-10(1)

An action upon a contract must begin within six years after the claim for relief has accrued.

Section 28-01-16 sets a six-year limit for personal injury claims, with the period suspended for three months after the defendant’s death under section 30.1-19-02.

Matter of Estate of Stirling · filed 1995-09-26(5)

Here, the statute of limitations, NDCC 28-01-16, was extended three months by NDCC 30.1-19-02, but then ran on August 21, 1993. Ness’s petition filed on September 19, 1994, was time barred.

Section 28-01-16(5) provides six years to file a negligence action; the medical expenses needed to meet the Auto Accident Reparations Act’s threshold need not all be incurred within that period.

Calavera v. Vix · filed 1984-10-30(5)

The district court correctly determined that the six-year statute of limitations under Subsection 28-01-16(5), N.D. C.C., is applicable to Calavera's negligence action against Vix. ... Accordingly, we hold that a tort action filed within the six-year statute of limitations is not barred by the $1,000 medical expense threshold under Chapter 26-41, N.D.C.C., if the plaintiff can, in good faith, allege and establish at trial that his total medical expenses will exceed $1,000, including those medical expenses incurred within the limitations period and those which, with reasonable medical certainty, will be incurred in the future.

Section 28-01-16 provides a six-year limitations period for nonprofessional negligence claims against tradespersons.

Jilek v. Berger Electric, Inc. · filed 1989-06-06

The six-year statute of limitations for nonprofessional negligence, NDCC § 28-01-16, applies to all tradespersons alike.

Section 28-01-16(5) sets a six-year limitation period for an action based on negligent conduct.

Lang v. Barrios · filed 1991-06-25(5)

The general period of limitation for an action for negligent conduct is six years. NDCC § 28-01-16(5). Lang brought this action within one year of the execution sale, well within any of the limitation periods. Accordingly, summary judgment of Lang's damage action against Barrios, the County and the Bank because of untimeliness was improper.

Section 28-01-16(5) gives product liability tort actions a six-year limitations period, whether they are based on negligence or strict liability.

BASF Corp. v. Symington · filed 1994-02-23(5)

Product liability tort actions, whether based upon negligence or strict liability, are subject to the six year statute of limitations under Section 28-01-16(5), N.D.C.C.

Section 28-01-16 gives a plaintiff six years from an accident causing a perceptible injury to commence a negligence action.

Kimball v. Landeis · filed 2002-10-15

Kimball concedes the statute of limitations for his claim against Landeis is six years. See N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16; Lang v. Barrios, 472 N.W.2d 464, 466 (N.D.1991). The accident happened on February 17, 1995, and Kimball had six years from then to commence an action against Landeis.

Section 28-01-16(5) gives a plaintiff six years to commence a negligence action for personal injury.

Langowski v. Altendorf · filed 2012-02-17(5)

Section 28-01-16, N.D.C.C., provides a general six-year statute of limitations for Langowski’s tort claims: ... That date is the last day when Langowski could have timely sued Altendorf under the six-year statute of limitations governing her claims.

Section 28-01-16(5) gives six years after accrual to commence an action for injury to a person or another’s rights when no other period applies.

Interest of T.H. · filed 2012-02-17(5)

Section 28-01-16, N.D.C.C., provides a general six-year statute of limitations for Langowski’s tort claims: ... That date is the last day when Langowski could have timely sued Altendorf under the six-year statute of limitations governing her claims.

Section 28-01-16(1)’s six-year limit for contract actions does not apply to a prebreach declaratory action to construe an agreement as an easement.

Niles v. Eldridge · filed 2013-04-04(1)

This is not an action subject to the six-year limitation in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1).

Section 28-01-16 provides a six-year limitations period for actions upon a liability created by statute.

Mosser v. Denbury Resources, Inc. · filed 2015-06-24(2)

The last sentence was added in 2013, apparently to make explicit what already was the law in that, even without the last sentence, the six-year limitations period in § 28-01-16 would have applied since it covers, among other things, statutory actions.

Section 28-01-16(5) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within six years after the claim accrues.

Lupo v. McNeeley · filed 2019-04-11(5)

Under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(5), an action for personal injury must be commenced within six years after the claim for relief accrues.

Section 28-01-16(5) requires a negligence action resulting in personal injury to be commenced within six years.

Hughes v. Olheiser Masonry · filed 2019-11-20(5)

Under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(5), a negligence action that resulted in personal injury must be commenced within six years.

Section 28-01-16’s six-year limitations period does not apply to maritime personal injury tort claims, which are governed by the federal three-year period.

Voge v. Schnaidt · filed 2001-11-02

We conclude the trial court properly applied the three-year limitation in 46 U.S.CApp. § 763a, rather than the six-year limitation in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16.

Section 28-01-16’s six-year limitation does not apply to personal injury claims arising from maritime torts; the federal three-year limitation governs.

Bell v. State · filed 2001-11-02

We conclude the trial court properly applied the three-year limitation in 46 U.S.C. App. § 763a, rather than the six-year limitation in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16.

Section 28-01-16’s six-year period for general negligence does not apply to claims involving medical malpractice.

Krebsbach v. Trinity Hospitals, Inc. · filed 2020-01-27

Krebsbach relies on Jilek to support his argument that the six-year statute of limitations for general negligence under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16 should apply. ... Krebsbach’s negligence claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations for malpractice under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-18(3).

Section 28-01-16(5) sets a six-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Herrera v. MDU Resources Group · filed 2024-01-22(5)

In personal injury actions, North Dakota provides for a six-year statute of limitations. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(5).

Section 28-01-16(2) gives nuisance claims a six-year limitations period.

Kessler v. Minnesota Power · filed 2025-09-03(2)

Under North Dakota law, a nuisance claim is also subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(2).

If Section 28-01-16's six-year limit applies to an action to reform an instrument for mutual mistake, the action accrues when the mistake was or reasonably should have been discovered.

Ell v. Ell · filed 1980-07-17

Regardless of which limitation period applies to actions for the reformation of a written instrument on the ground of mutual mistake, we follow the weight of authority and hold that a reformation action accrues, or comes into existence as a legally enforceable right, not at the time the instrument in question is executed, but at the time the facts which constitute the mistake and form the basis for reformation have been, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been, discovered by the party applying for relief. ... Therefore, regardless of which limitation period applies, the action for reformation filed in July of 1978 was timely.

The six-year limitations period begins when a cause of action accrues, which requires both the defendant’s wrongful act and resulting injury.

Keller v. Clark Equipment Co. · filed 1979-08-16

It is the law in North Dakota that the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. A cause of action accrues when the right to commence it comes into existence; when it can be brought in a court of law without being subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. N.D.Cent.Code § 28-01-16; ... The Kellers’ cause of action in this case accrued no earlier than 1972, when Clark stopped paying them royalties based on the 117 patent. Before then, the Kellers had suffered no injury and therefore had no cause of action, even though the wrongful act occurred in 1962.

Section 28-01-16's six-year limitations period begins when the tort cause of action accrues, which requires both wrongful conduct and actual injury; for this claim, accrual occurred when royalty payments stopped in 1972, not when the patent application was filed late in 1962.

KELLER v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY · filed 1983-08-11

Clark contends that the Kellers' negligence action is barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations established in N.D.Cent.Code § 28-01-16. ... We affirm. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the negligence action filed by the Kellers in 1973 did not accrue until 1972, and that it thus was not barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations.

Section 28-01-16 establishes a six-year limitations period, and the negligence claim accrued when the plaintiffs suffered actionable injury in 1972, so the action was not time-barred.

Keller v. Clark Equipment Co. · filed 1983-08-11

Clark contends that the Kellers’ negligence action is barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations established in N.D.Cent.Code § 28-01-16. Clark argues that the Kellers’ cause of action accrued on September 30, 1962, which was the last day on which the 117 patent application could have been timely filed, and thus the limitations period ran out on September 30, 1968 —four years before the plaintiffs filed suit in 1972. The district court rejected Clark’s position, holding that the Kellers initiated their claim within the limitations period because their cause of action did not accrue until 1972 when Clark ceased paying the royalties due under the parties’ 1971 agreement. We affirm.

For a claim under subsection (1), accrual does not occur until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or claim for relief.

Hebron Public School District No. 13 of Morton County v. United States Gypsum Co. · filed 1991-09-17(1)

We conclude that for purposes of § 28-01-16(1), N.D.C.C., (Cum.Supp.1989), a cause of action, or claim for relief does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers the facts which constitute the basis for its cause of action or claim for relief, and we answer the first certified question in the affirmative.

Section 28-01-16(1) uses a discovery rule: a claim for relief accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the basis of the claim, so the six-year limitations period begins then.

Hebron Public School District No. 13 of Morton County, State of North Dakota v. U.S. Gypsum · filed 1992-01-08(1)

In view of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s answers to the certified questions of law, we must reject USG’s arguments and hold that the district court did not err in denying USG’s motion for summary judgment on these issues. Because Hebron discovered the existence of asbestos in the acoustical ceiling plaster in 1983, its cause of action, or claim for relief, accrued at that time and the complaint was timely filed in 1986, well within the 6-year statutory period.

Section 28-01-16 imposes a six-year limitations period for asbestos-contamination claims, which begins when the plaintiff could reasonably have discovered contamination causing compensable harm, not merely the presence of asbestos.

MDU Resources Group v. W.R. Grace & Co. · filed 1994-01-27

Under North Dakota law, the statute of limitations for a cause of action based on asbestos contamination is six years. N.D.Cent.Code § 28-01-16 (1991). ... Therefore, the District Court erred when it instructed that the issue for purposes of the statute of limitations was when MDU learned of the presence of asbestos in its building; instead, the proper question was when MDU could have learned, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, that its building had been contaminated by asbestos. ... It is at this point that North Dakota’s six-year statute of limitations began to run. We hold that the jury was incorrectly instructed on this point, and so reverse its finding that the statute of limitations had expired.

Section 28-01-16's limitation period is tolled during a child's minority in an action to determine inheritance rights.

C. L. W. ex rel. Waagen v. M. J. · filed 1977-06-02

As to the action to determine the right to inheritance, the two-year statute of limitations does not apply, and the other *451statutes of limitations, such as Section 28-01-16, N.D.C.C., are tolled by the infancy of the child.

Section 28-01-16's limitations period is tolled during a child's minority in an action to determine inheritance rights.

Clw v. Mj · filed 1977-07-26

As to the action to determine the right to inheritance, the two-year statute of limitations does not apply, and the other *451 statutes of limitations, such as Section 28-01-16, N.D.C.C., are tolled by the infancy of the child.

Section 28-01-16 allows six years to bring an action on an express or implied obligation; for a purchase-money resulting trust, the limitations period begins when the trustee clearly repudiates the trust.

Zundel v. Zundel · filed 1979-04-12

Section 28-01-16, NDCC, provides an action upon an obligation, express or implied, must be commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued. ... Thus, the statute does not begin to run as long as there is a recognition of the trust, or a repudiation followed by a subsequent recognition by the trustee.

Partial payments and renewals of a borrower’s note do not toll the six-year limitations period for a separate claim that the lender promised to lend additional money.

Pioneer Credit Co. v. Latendresse · filed 1979-08-02

These cases do not, as Latendresse contends, stand for the proposition that Latendresse’s renewals or payments tolled the statute of limitations on any promise by the plaintiff to lend Latendresse money.

Section 28-01-16(6) gives a party six years after discovering the facts constituting fraud to bring an action for relief on that ground.

Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck · filed 1985-04-17(6)

Unlike the other actions listed in § 28-01-16, N.D.C.C., a cause of action on the ground of fraud does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud. There is no limitation upon the time for discovery of the cause of action. A fraud action is not barred by the passage of time until six years after discovery of the facts constituting the fraud.

For latent product defects, § 28-01-16’s six-year period begins when the plaintiff learns, or with reasonable diligence should learn, of the facts giving rise to the claim.

Drayton Public School District No. 19 v. W.R. Grace & Co. · filed 1989-12-19(1)

The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the time a plaintiff actually learned, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned, of his or her cause of action against the defendant.

The six-year limitations period for a product-liability injury is not tolled until the plaintiff learns the full extent of an injury the plaintiff already knew about.

Erickson v. Scotsman, Inc. · filed 1990-06-01(5)

We conclude that when a plaintiff is aware of his or her injury, but not the full extent of those injuries, a “discovery rule” should not be applied to toll the statute of limitations. Because Erickson did not commence her product liability action within the six-year statute of limitation of NDCC § 28-01-16, the summary judgment granted by the trial court is affirmed.

The discovery rule does not delay the limitation period when the claimant knew or, with reasonable diligence, should have known the facts supporting its claim.

American Insurance Co. v. Midwest Motor Express, Inc. · filed 1996-10-01(1)

Midwest asserts the trial court erred in holding that the “discovery rule” did not prevent the running of the statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1). ... We conclude the trial court did not err in holding the discovery rule did not prevent the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 28-01-16(1) gives six years to bring a rescission action based on failure of consideration, measured from when the claimant discovered or reasonably should have discovered the facts constituting that failure.

Schmidt v. Grand Forks Country Club · filed 1990-08-09(1)

We believe that under § 28-01-16 an action for rescission based on failure of consideration accrues when the facts which constitute the failure of consideration have been, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been, discovered by the party applying for relief.

Section 28-01-16(6) gives a party six years to bring a fraud claim, beginning when the party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Westerso v. Rustad · filed 1994-06-15(6)

Actions based on fraud must begin within six years after the claim for relief accrued. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(6). A claim of fraud accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(6). Phoenix Assur. Co. of Canada v. Runck, 366 N.W.2d 788, 791 (N.D. 1985). Westerso filed his complaint on March 16, 1993. Therefore, if Westerso knew of the allegedly altered agreement, or the divorce judgment incorporating the agreement, before March 16, 1987, his cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 28-01-16(1) applies the discovery rule to breach of contract claims, so a claim accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts forming its basis.

Wells v. First American Bank West · filed 1999-08-25(1)

We think their arguments are misplaced and hold the discovery rule applies to a breach of contract claim. In Hebron Public School v. United States Gypsum Co., 475 N.W.2d 120 (N.D.1991), this Court applied the discovery rule to N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1) and held a cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers the facts that constitute the basis for its cause of action or claim for relief.

Section 28-01-16(6) gives fraud and deceit claims a six-year limitation period, measured from when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the fraud.

Kuntz v. Muehler · filed 1999-12-01(6)

A six-year limitation period is applicable to actions for fraud and deceit. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(6). ... Even with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Kuntzes, a reasonable person under these circumstances would have or should have discovered the alleged fraud before July 1991.

Section 28-01-16’s limitations period begins when a plaintiff knows of an injury and has facts that would prompt an ordinary person to inquire, even if the plaintiff does not yet know the injury’s full extent.

Podrygula v. Bray · filed 2014-12-18

We conclude there was no genuine issue of material fact, and alerting law enforcement of suspected theft constitutes actual knowledge and would put an ordinary person on inquiry.

Section 28-01-16’s six-year period begins when reasonable diligence would reveal facts giving notice of a potential claim.

Larson v. Midland Hospital Supply, Inc. · filed 2016-11-18

The parties agree a six-year statute of limitations applies to Stephen Larson’s claims under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16. ... Receipt of the 1999 financial statement and K-l would have put a reasonable person on inquiry and exercising reasonable diligence would have led to the discovery of a potential claim. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Stephen Larson’s actions cannot be characterized as reasonable diligence. The evidence supports the district court’s finding that Stephen Larson’s cause of action accrued in spring 2000.

Section 28-01-16 gives a claimant six years to sue after the claim accrues; accrual occurs when the claimant discovers facts forming the basis of the claim.

Curtiss A. Hogen Trust B v. Hogen · filed 2018-05-08

Claims governed by N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16 must be brought within six years after the claim for relief accrued, and claims under N.D.C.C. § 59-18-05(3) must be brought within five years of the termination of the beneficiaries' interest in a trust, or the termination of the trust. Under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16, a cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers facts constituting the basis for the claim.

A fraud claim accrues when the claimant discovers the facts constituting fraud and must be brought within six years.

Jones v. Barnett · filed 2000-12-07(6)

Under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16, the statute of limitations for bringing a claim of fraud accrues on discovery of the facts constituting fraud and expires in six years. Because Barnett only produced unsupported, conclusory allegations in her pleadings that she discovered the fraud later than 1991 and because her own pleadings indicate knowledge of material facts in 1991, Barnett’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and the district court properly granted summary judgment.

A premium increase alone does not necessarily give notice of a potential fraud claim and start the six-year limitations period.

Rose v. United Equitable Insurance Co. · filed 2001-08-29(6)

We agree with the insurers that any claim the insurers’ representation the initial annual premium rate was the “total premium” and could never be increased for any reason is barred by the statute of limitations. We are unwilling, however, to hold, as a matter of law, that a premium increase, without more, is notice of a potential claim for constructive fraud, actual fraud, consumer fraud, false advertising, or negligent misrepresentation, barring any possibility of recovery if suit is brought more than six years after a premium increase.

Section 28-01-16(6) requires a fraud claim to be brought within six years after discovery of the facts constituting the fraud.

Holverson v. Lundberg · filed 2016-05-31(6)

Under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(6), we have said a claim for fraud must be commenced within six years after the claim has accrued, and the claim does not accrue until discovery of the facts constituting the fraud. ... We conclude the statute of limitations for the Trust’s counterclaims for rescission and damages for breach of contract involving alleged fraudulent misrepresentations began to run no later than November 1997, and the Trust did not pursue those counterclaims until 2013.

A fraud claim must be filed within six years of accrual, which is postponed until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Klein v. Sletto · filed 2017-02-16(6)

An action for relief on the ground of fraud must be commenced within six years after the claim for relief has accrued. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(6). A claim for fraud is not deemed to have accrued “until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Id. ... These facts would place a reasonable person on notice a potential claim existed in 2002. The statute of limitations began to run in 2002 and expired before the Kleins commenced this action.

Section 28-01-16 sets a six-year limitations period for tort claims; Rule 6(a) supplies the method for computing it because the section specifies none.

American Family Insurance v. Waupaca Elevator Co. · filed 2012-01-12

Because N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16 does not specify a method of computing time for commencing an action within the six-year statute of limitations, the language of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure indicates the rules supplement N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16.

Section 28-01-16(4) gives a claimant six years to sue for recovery of personal property, beginning when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known it would not be returned.

Pettinger v. Carroll · filed 2018-06-05(4)

A reasonable person under the same circumstances should have known a cause of action existed after repeatedly requesting a return of his or her funds for years without success. Pettinger knew or should have known his brother was not going to return the money no later than 2007 and his cause of action should have been brought no less than six years later. The district court did not err in concluding the six-year statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(4) barred Pettinger's lawsuit.

Section 28-01-16(6) gives a plaintiff six years to bring a fraud or deceit claim after it accrues; notice of facts that would lead a reasonable person to discover the claim starts the period.

Bullinger Enterprises v. Dahl · filed 2020-03-19(6)

We conclude the court did not err in concluding that Bullinger Enterprises had been placed on notice of its claims no later than March 14, 2012, and Bullinger Enterprises’ assertion of the claims in July 2018 was outside the six year statute of limitations.

Section 28-01-16 gives claims on express or implied contracts six years from accrual; a factual dispute about when the wrongful conduct was discovered can prevent dismissal on limitations grounds.

Great American Insurance Company v. Mosher · filed 2024-06-25(1)

For the purposes of this motion, the Court applies the North Dakota statute of limitations and its provisions governing implied contracts. ... The Court finds that the case at bar fits the description in Rose that resolution of the statute of limitations issue is fact-bound. Therefore, the issue will not be resolved by the motion to dismiss, thus enabling the Parties to develop the facts surrounding the discovery of the allegedly wrongful conduct giving rise to the cause of action. The Court denies the motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 28-01-16(1) gives inverse condemnation claims under the North Dakota Constitution a six-year limitation period; a claim alleging a physical taking accrues when the government acts under the challenged law, not when the law is enacted.

Northwest Landowners Association, et al. v. State, et al. · filed 2025-08-28(1)

In the context of an inverse condemnation case, the N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1) six-year limitation period for actions asserting liability applies to claims brought under N.D. Const. art. I, § 16. ... Their claims instead accrued when the NDIC acted under the authority of the law.