N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1

Rule 702(b)(2)a requires active clinical practice in the same or a similar specialty that performs the procedure at issue; familiarity with the standard of care alone is insufficient.

Smith v. Serro · filed 2007-08-21(b)(2)a

Even if Dr. Marsigli is “familiar with the standard of care,” as he claims to be, familiarity is not the same as “the active clinical practice of the same specialty or a similar specialty which includes within its specialty the performance of the procedure that is the subject of the complaint . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(b)(2)a (2005) (emphasis added).

Rule 702(b) requires an expert testifying about a specialist’s standard of care to have the same or a qualifying similar specialty.

Knox v. University Health Systems of Eastern Carolina, Inc. · filed 2007-11-20(b)

Plaintiffs witness, Dr. Reynolds, is not certified as either an emergency room physician or a trauma surgeon, nor does Dr. Reynolds practice in either of these areas. Therefore, Dr. Reynolds could not reasonably be expected to qualify as an expert witness as required by Rule 9(j), and does not qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702 subsections (b) or (c).

Rule 702 does not require a witness to be formally tendered as an expert before testifying as one.

State v. Pettis · filed 2007-09-18Rule 702

Although the State did not formally tender Agent Freeman as an expert witness, he can still testify as an expert.

Rules 403 and 702(a) permit exclusion of expert testimony about the likely duration of commitment after an insanity acquittal when it would not help the jury resolve an issue and could confuse it.

State v. Hall · filed 2007-12-04Rules 403 and 702(a)

The trial court properly excluded Dr. Bellard’s testimony under Rules 403 and 702(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.

Rule 702(a) permits a qualified expert to give an opinion when the expert’s knowledge places them in a better position than the trier of fact to address the subject.

Hamilton v. Thomasville Medical Associates, Inc. · filed 2007-12-18Rule 702(a)

Plaintiffs expert witnesses are in a better position than the trier of fact to have an opinion on the subject of whether Mr. Hamilton would have suffered a stroke but for Dr. Blackwell’s failure to read the 29 November 1999 MRI.

Rule 702 permits an expert qualified by training and experience in evaluating child sexual abuse victims to explain their usual symptoms and characteristics.

State v. Quiroz · filed 2008-01-15Rule 702

Moreover, the evidence establishes that Ms. Madden was qualified by training and experience in evaluating child sexual abuse victims, not just in interviewing them. Therefore, she was qualified to explain the usual symptoms and characteristics of such children. The trial court properly allowed her testimony and did not err in overruling Defendant's objection thereto.

Rule 702(b)(1)(b) permits a specialist in a similar field to testify about the standard of care when that field includes the procedure at issue and the expert has experience treating similar patients.

Roush v. Kennon · filed 2008-02-05Rule 702(b)(1)(b)

Upon review of the record, we conclude that Dr. Tuzman does practice in a similar specialty to Dr. Kennon for the purposes of Rule 702(b)(1)(b).

Rule 702(a) permits expert testimony when a witness’s experience and training can help the jury understand the evidence.

State v. GUILLEN-MARTINEZ · filed 2008-12-02Rule 702(a)

Given his extensive experience and training, the trial court could properly determine in its discretion that Officer Ashworth could assist the jury in understanding the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Officer Ashworth to testify as an expert witness.

Rule 702(b) requires a medical malpractice expert testifying about the standard of care to have devoted a majority of professional time during the preceding year to qualifying clinical practice, instruction, or both.

Cornett v. Watauga Surgical Group, P.A. · filed 2008-12-16(b)

We conclude the trial court’s determination that Dr. Litwin did not qualify as an expert witness under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(b) was supported by its findings of fact and those findings are supported by competent evidence.

Rule 702 permits a trial court to reject a proposed expert whose general computer experience does not establish expertise in hard drives or file erasure.

State v. Anderson · filed 2008-12-16Rule 702

Although Mr. David testified that he had worked in several jobs involving the use of computers, and that he had built several computers, the record does not indicate that Mr. David possessed any particular expertise with regard to hard drives or the erasure of files. Therefore, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion.

When the paper record leaves a proposed medical expert's familiarity with the applicable standard of care unclear, the trial court may use voir dire to determine whether the testimony is admissible.

Crocker v. Roethling · filed 2009-05-01Rule 702

When the proffered expert's familiarity with the relevant standard of care is unclear from the paper record, our trial courts should consider requiring the production of the expert for purposes of voir dire examination. ... For the foregoing reasons, this case is reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court with instructions to conduct a voir dire examination of plaintiffs' proffered expert and, based on this evidentiary foundation, to determine the admissibility of the proposed expert testimony.

Rule 702(b) requires a medical malpractice expert in a similar specialty to the defendant’s to practice a specialty that includes the procedure at issue.

Barringer v. FORSYTH COUNTY WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY BAPTIST MEDICAL CTR · filed 2009-06-02Rule 702(b)

Under Rule 702, however, a plaintiff’s expert is not qualified to offer testimony merely because the expert specializes in a similar specialty as the defendant. The expert’s specialty must also “include [] within its specialty the performance of the procedure that is the subject of the complaint[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(b) (2005).

A physician’s clinical and teaching work can give a plaintiff reasonable grounds to expect that the physician meets Rule 702(b)(2)’s qualifications for a medical malpractice expert.

Morris v. Southeastern Orthopedics Sports Medicine · filed 2009-09-01(b)(2)

These facts would cause a reasonable person to believe that Dr. Basamania also met the requirements of Rule 702(b)(2).

Rule 702(b) does not make supervision or lack of board certification a bar to a medical malpractice expert’s initial qualification; those facts affect the weight of the testimony.

GRANTHAM EX REL. TRUST CO., OF STERNE v. Crawford · filed 2010-05-18(b)

Therefore, she satisfies the three basic elements of Rule 702(b). We agree with plaintiff that defendants' arguments concerning Dr. Gurewitsch's being supervised during the year in question and her lack of board certification at the time go to the weight of her testimony, rather than to her initial qualification.

Rule 702(a) permits an expert to testify when the expert’s knowledge puts the witness in a better position than the jury to form an opinion on the subject.

State v. Norton · filed 2011-06-21(a)

As a trained expert in forensic toxicology with degrees in biology and chemistry, the witness in this case was plainly in a better position to have an opinion on the physiological effects of cocaine than the jury.

Rule 702(a) requires supporting physical evidence before an expert may give a definitive diagnosis that a child was sexually abused.

State v. Treadway · filed 2010-12-07(a)

Rule 702 governs the admissibility of an expert opinion in sexual offense prosecutions. ... Accordingly, we must hold that Ms. Mumford’s diagnosis of sexual abuse absent physical evidence was erroneously admitted in this case.

Rule 702(a) permits a witness with extensive practical experience to testify as an expert without a formal degree or certification in the field.

State v. Norman · filed 2011-07-05Rule 702(a)

Despite Mr. Glover’s lack of a formal degree or certification in the fields of physiology and pharmacology, his extensive practical experience in these fields qualifies him to testify as an expert.

Rule 702(a) permits an experienced witness to give expert opinion testimony that assists the jury; admitting the testimony can imply a finding that the witness is qualified.

State v. Powell · filed 2012-10-02Rule 702(a)

In sum, the record reveals that: (1) as in Brockett, Defendant “never requested a specific finding by the trial court as to [Wilson’s] qualifications as an expert[,]” and (2) accordingly, “a finding that [Wilson was] qualified as an expert is implicit in the trial court’s ruling admitting [Wilson’s] opinion testimony[.]”

Rule 702(b) requires findings about a proposed medical malpractice expert’s professional work time to assess the expert’s qualifications.

Moore v. Proper · filed 2011-09-06(b)

On remand, the trial court must make sufficient findings of fact regarding the elements of Rule 702(b) qualifications on which it bases its decision as to whether his testimony would be available at trial if he is tendered.

Rule 702(b)(2)(a) determines whether a medical malpractice expert’s clinical practice was active by considering clinical hours, the work performed, and how regularly the expert practiced.

Moore v. Proper · filed 2012-06-14(b)(2)(a)

Whether a professional's clinical practice is considered active during the relevant time period will necessarily be decided on a case-by-case basis considering, among other things, the total number of hours engaged in clinical practice, the type of work the professional is performing, and the regularity or intermittent nature of that practice. No one factor is likely to be determinative. Instead, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances when making this determination.

Rule 703 permits an expert to base an opinion on data reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, even if the data are not themselves admissible.

State v. Harris · filed 2012-07-17Rule 703

Initially, we note that Agent Dehaan was available for cross-examination; that she gave her opinion that the DNA profile found on the pad from Zora’s rape kit matched defendant’s DNA profile; and that the statistical information upon which she relied in developing her opinion regarding the significance of the match was of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of DNA analysis, such being admissible under North Carolina Rules of Evidence, Rule 703, “Bases of opinion testimony by experts.”

Rule 702(a) permits a qualified scientific expert to testify without a professional license in the field when the expert’s knowledge and experience support the opinion.

Stark v. N.C. Department of Environment & Natural Resources · filed 2012-12-18(a)

We conclude likewise and hold that the fact that Straw was neither a licensed engineer nor a licensed geologist did not render his expert testimony either “illegal” or inadmissible, and, in light of Straw’s demonstrated expertise in the study of ground vibration and its effect on structures, Straw’s expert testimony was properly admitted.

Rule 702(a) permits an expert to testify within the expert’s field without specializing in the precise issue; narrower expertise may affect credibility and weight.

Wise v. Alcoa, Inc. · filed 2013-12-03(a)

We hold that there was evidence in the record to support the Commission’s determination that defendant’s witnesses were sufficiently qualified in their respective fields to testify as experts, and that the Commission was within its discretion to determine the credibility of their testimony and the weight to be given to that testimony.

Rule 702(d) permits a qualified physician familiar with the standard of care for physician assistants to testify about that standard in a medical malpractice action.

Katy v. Capriola · filed 2013-04-16Rule 702(d)

Capriola worked directly with Riser and testified on voir dire that he was familiar with the standard of care for physician assistants. Therefore, he met the requirements to testify regarding Riser’s standard of care under Rule 702(d). Since Capriola was equally qualified to give an expert opinion regarding both his own standard of care and Riser’s standard of care under Rule 702, the trial court abused its discretion by requiring Capriola to limit his testimony to his own standard of care.

Rule 702(a) permits an oral surgeon to testify about medical causation when the surgeon’s own knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education qualify him on that subject.

Webb v. Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center · filed 2014-02-18Rule 702(a)

Focusing on the qualifications of Dr. Behrman in particular, as opposed to the qualifications of licensed dentists in general, Dr. Behrman’s knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education qualify him to opine as to the causation of bronchopneumonia.

Rule 702(a) allows a trial court to qualify a witness as an expert implicitly by admitting the witness’s opinion testimony.

State v. King · filed 2014-07-15Rule 702(a)

We hold that the trial court’s qualification of Dr. Monahan-Estes as an expert in pediatric medicine as well as the evaluation and treatment of child sexual abuse is implicit in the trial court’s admission of her testimony regarding common behaviors in children who have suffered from sexual abuse.

Rule 702 permits a qualified officer to give expert HGN testimony about impairment when the officer’s training and experience make the testimony helpful to the jury.

State v. Jackson · filed 2014-11-04(a1)(1)

Given Officer Noble’s knowledge, experience, training, and education, he was better qualified than the jury regarding the administration and interpretation of the HGN test and his testimony on the issue of defendant’s impairment was helpful to the jury. Therefore, we reject defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Officer Noble’s testimony as expert testimony.

Rule 702(b)(1) requires a medical malpractice expert to be a licensed health care provider and, when testifying against a specialist, to practice in the same or a similar specialty.

Alston v. Hueske · filed 2016-01-05(b)(1)

An expert in a medical malpractice action must be a licensed health care provider, and if the party is a specialist, the expert must specialize in the same or a similar specialty as the party against whom the testimony is given.

Rule 702 permits a psychologist to qualify as an expert based on education and experience.

Pickett v. Advance Auto Parts · filed 2016-02-02(a)

Moreover, it is clear to this Court that the Commission did not err in determining Dr. Morris to be an expert in psychology. The Commission’s designation is supported by Dr. Morris’ education and experience as set forth in finding of fact eighteen.

Rule 702(a1) requires a witness giving HGN testimony about impairment to be qualified as an expert under Rule 702(a), and prohibits HGN testimony about a specific alcohol concentration level.

State v. Torrence · filed 2016-04-19(a1)

Phillips’s testimony violated Rule 702(a1) because he testified on the issue of impairment relating to the results of the HGN test without first being qualified under subsection (a), and because he testified on the issue of specific alcohol concentration level relating to the results of the HGN test.

Rule 702(a1) requires a witness to be qualified as an expert before testifying about impairment based on HGN test results.

State v. Godwin · filed 2016-04-19Rule 702(a1)

The question for decision is whether Rule 702(a1) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence requires a witness to be qualified as an expert before he may testify to the issue of impairment related to HGN test results. We hold that it does.

Rule 702(a) permits an actuary with reinsurance credentials and rate-case experience to testify about reinsurance even if the actuary is not qualified to develop a reinsurance model.

In re: NC Rate Bureau · filed 2016-08-02Rule 702(a)

Based on Schwartz’s reinsurance designation and experience as an actuary having participated in numerous rate cases, we hold Schwartz was competent to testify on the subject of reinsurance and the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in considering or giving weight to Schwartz’s testimony.

Rule 702(a) permits an actuary with relevant reinsurance training and rate-case experience to testify about reinsurance costs.

State ex rel. Com'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau · filed 2016-08-02Rule 702(a)

Based on Schwartz's reinsurance designation and experience as an actuary having participated in numerous rate cases, we hold Schwartz was competent to testify on the subject of reinsurance and the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in considering or giving weight to Schwartz's testimony.

Rule 702(a) permits an expert with extensive training and experience processing methamphetamine labs to testify about methamphetamine manufacturing.

State v. Mayes · filed 2017-12-19Rule 702(a)

He was in a better position than the jury to have an opinion on the subject of manufacturing methamphetamine and was qualified to testify as an expert witness in the field of clandestine laboratories and the manufacture of methamphetamines.

Rule 702(a)(3) requires an expert to apply reliable principles and methods to the facts of the case.

State v. Wardrett · filed 2019-02-19Rule 702(a)(3)

Given the nature of the expert testimony, we conclude that this detail sufficiently demonstrated how Mr. Bishop "applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case, as required by Rule 702(a)(3)." McPhaul , --- N.C. App. at ----, 808 S.E.2d at 305 (quotation marks omitted).

Rule 702(a) allows a trial court to admit forensic pathologists' opinions based on training and experience when it assesses their reliability and limits the opinions accordingly.

State v. Parks · filed 2019-05-21(a)(1)-(3)

Here, it is evident that the trial court understood the reliability requirements and limited its decision to allow the testimony based on the type of testimony being offered and nature of the pathologists' work. We hold it was within the trial court's discretion to do so.

Rule 702(a) permits expert firearms testimony when the opinion rests on reliable principles and methods that the expert reliably applies to the case facts.

State v. Griffin · filed 2019-10-15(a)

As Fields’ testimony shows that her opinion was the product of reliable principles and methods, and that she reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, much less plainly err, in admitting Fields’ expert opinion testimony on forensic firearms examination.

Rule 702(b) does not require a medical expert to have the defendant’s exact professional qualifications when the expert has experience performing the procedure at issue and treating similar patients.

Preston v. Movahed · filed 2020-04-03(b)

The rule only requires that an expert witness have experience performing the procedure that is the subject of the complaint and treats similar patients, not that both the defendant and the testifying witness have the exact same professional qualifications.

Rule 702(a) makes an expert’s qualifications relevant to admissibility and gives the trial court discretion to decide whether the witness is qualified in the proposed field.

Stowe v. Stowe · filed 2020-07-07(a)

Contrary to Defendant’s arguments before the trial court and this Court, Franks’ qualifications are pertinent to admissibility, not just weight or credibility of the testimony.

Rule 702(a) requires expert testimony to rest on sufficient facts or data and reliable principles and methods.

State v. Phillips · filed 2019-12-03Rule 702(a)(1)-(2)

The challenged testimony, describing the alleles of the minor contributor, was neither “based upon sufficient facts or data” nor “the product of reliable principles and methods.” N.C. R. Evid. 702(a)(1)-(2). The trial court erred in allowing and admitting this testimony over Defendant’s objection.

Rule 702(a) bars expert bloodstain testimony when untested stains leave the opinion without sufficient facts or a reliable application of the expert’s methods.

State v. Corbett/Martens · filed 2020-02-04(a)

For the foregoing reasons, James’s testimony regarding the untested stains on Tom’s boxer shorts and Molly’s pajama pants was based upon insufficient facts and data, and accordingly, could not have been the product of reliable principles and methods applied reliably to the facts of this case.

Rule 702(a1)(1) permits a trained officer to give expert HGN testimony about impairment, but not about a specific alcohol concentration.

State v. Wiles · filed 2020-03-17Rule 702(a1)(1)

Accordingly, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a1)(1), the trial court did not err in qualifying Trooper Stewart as an expert based on his training and professional experience administering the test, or in admitting his testimony regarding HGN testing.

Rule 702(a)(3) requires an expert to show how the expert reliably applied accepted methods to the facts of the case.

State v. Koiyan · filed 2020-04-07Rule 702(a)(3)

As Roberts failed to demonstrate that he “applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case,” as required by Rule 702(a)(3), we determine that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony.

Rule 702(a) requires expert testimony to rest on sufficient facts or data, use reliable principles and methods, and apply those methods reliably to the facts of the case.

In re: M.M. · filed 2020-06-16Rule 702(a)(1)-(3)

Because the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the three prongs of the reliability test, we reject Father’s argument that the trial court did not consider or establish the requirements of this test in determining that Dr. Sheaffer’s testimony was reliable.

Rule 702(a)(3) requires a foundation showing how an expert applied a method to the facts of the case before the expert’s opinion is admitted.

State v. Sasek · filed 2020-05-19Rule 702(a)(3)

We therefore hold that the trial court erred by admitting Chancey’s expert opinion testimony without first requiring that she explain how she applied GCMS testing in this case.

Rule 703 permits an expert to base an opinion on records and deposition testimony.

Keller v. Deerfield Episcopal Ret. Cmty. · filed 2020-06-02Rule 703

Rule 703 explicitly permits an expert witness to base his opinion on records and deposition testimony.

Rule 702(d) permits a physician qualified under Rule 702(a) who knows the applicable standard of care for nurses or other medical support staff through active clinical practice to testify about that standard in a medical malpractice action.

HUNTLEY v. CRISCO · filed 2020-08-21Rule 702(d)

Among other things and as is relevant here, Rule 702(d) states that a physician who qualifies as a medical expert witness under Rule 702(a), and “who by reason of active clinical practice . . . has knowledge of the applicable standard of care for nurses . . . or other medical support staff may give expert testimony in a medical malpractice action with respect to the standard of care of which he is knowledgeable” as it applies to nurses or other medical support staff. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(d). ... Dr. Mathis has over 20 years of experience in correctional medicine, including supervising nurses and physician’s assistants, and he is qualified to testify concerning NCCHC standards. He has reviewed materials specific to Stanly County, and he is qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care.

Rule 702(a)(3) requires an expert to apply reliable methods to the facts of the case.

State v. Coffey · filed 2020-12-15Rule 702(a)(3)

Thus, her testimony was sufficient to satisfy Rule 702(a)(3).

Rule 702(a) does not require an expert to have firsthand knowledge before offering an opinion within the expert’s field.

Hailey v. Tropic Leisure Corp. · filed 2020-12-31(a)

Rule 702 does not require an expert have firsthand knowledge before providing his or her opinion; moreover, former-Justice Orr’s testimony concerning the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees is within the purview of his expertise as an appellate practitioner.

Rule 702 requires a witness offering expert testimony about a medical prognosis or health risk to have relevant expert qualifications.

State v. Daw · filed 2021-05-04Rule 702

We do, however, conclude that the averments in the affidavits by Petitioner and his wife and the other materials submitted in support of the petition fail to demonstrate that any testimony Petitioner or his wife might offer about his prognosis and increased risk of serious illness or complications from COVID-19 because of his health conditions would be admissible expert testimony under Rule 702.

Rule 702(a)(1) permits expert testimony supported by sufficient data; gaps in the records an expert reviewed may affect the opinion’s weight rather than its admissibility.

Miller v. Carolina Coast Emer. Physicians · filed 2021-05-18(a)(1)

Therefore, the trial court misapplied Rule 702(a) by concluding Dr. Harris’s opinions were not based on sufficient data when his opinions were supported by evidence in the Record.

Rule 703 permits an expert to base an opinion on otherwise inadmissible materials if experts in the field reasonably rely on that type of material.

Reynolds Am. Inc. v. Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd. · filed 2021-12-17Rule 703

However, an expert is permitted to offer an opinion based upon materials that would otherwise be inadmissible as evidence, provided that the materials are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.”

Rule 702(a) permits expert testimony based on sufficient facts or data when the expert uses reliable principles and methods and applies them reliably to the case.

State v. Gallion · filed 2022-03-15Rule 702(a)

The trial court did not plainly err in admitting testimony of the State’s expert witness on firearm identification and examination because her testimony met the requirements under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a).

Rule 702(a) excludes expert opinion when jurors can assess the evidence without specialized knowledge.

State v. Mason · filed 2022-10-18Rule 702(a)

Furthermore, Investigator Henline’s proffered expert testimony did not satisfy Rule 702(a)’s relevance requirement because no specialized knowledge was required to determine the reasonableness of Defendant’s actions.

Rule 702 permits a trial court to limit expert testimony when the proposed opinion lacks a reliable scientific basis.

State v. Hawkins · filed 2022-11-15Rule 702

Here, Defendant has failed to show the trial court did not act and rule within the allowable scope of its discretion. The trial court first applied the factors outlined in Daubert when determining whether Jones was qualified as an expert, focusing on the absence of reliable principles and methods.

Rule 703 allows an expert to base an opinion on otherwise inadmissible information of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.

In re: A.J.D. · filed 2022-04-19Rule 703

Thus, the rule against hearsay did not bar Dr. Zarzar from testifying about Respondent’s medical history and prior incidents of psychosis as he properly relied on this information in forming his expert opinion.

Rule 702(b)(1)b. requires an expert in a similar specialty to have prior experience treating patients with similar medical conditions and treatment needs.

Gray v. E. Carolina Med. Servs. · filed 2022-08-02(b)(1)b.

Rule 702(b)(1)b. requires an expert witness who is not in the “same specialty” to have “prior experience treating similar patients” as the party against whom the testimony is offered. A “similar patient” in this context is a patient with similar medical conditions and treatment needs.

Rule 702(a) requires expert testimony to rest on sufficient facts or data, but does not require the expert to review every potentially relevant record.

Miller v. Carolina Coast Emergency Physicians, LLC · filed 2022-08-19Rule 702(a)

As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, Rule 702(a) requires that expert testimony be based upon “sufficient facts or data,” not upon all the facts or data in existence at the time a putative expert testifies.

Rule 703 permits a toxicology report to be admitted to show the basis of a testifying expert’s independent opinion.

State v. Watson · filed 2022-10-18Rule 703

Under Rule 703, Barra’s toxicology report was admissible at trial to show the basis of Simms’ opinion.

Rule 702(a)(3) requires an expert to show how the expert reliably applied a method to the facts; testimony that omits the fingerprint comparison method and characteristics considered is insufficient.

State v. Graham · filed 2023-01-17(a)(3)

Therefore, we conclude again Roberts’ testimony is insufficient to meet the reliability requirements of Rule 702, and the trial court erred in admitting it.

Rule 702(a)(3) allows a crash reconstruction opinion when the expert reliably applies his methods to the facts, even if established tests cannot calculate a specific speed.

State v. Taylor · filed 2023-07-05Rule 702(a)(3)

Trooper Murphy’s testimony established the principles and methods he had employed were “applied . . . reliably to the facts of the case[,]” per Rule 702(a)(3).

Rule 702(a) requires an expert identifying a controlled substance to explain the methodology of the chemical analysis; failure to do so is error, though it may not amount to plain error.

State v. Figueroa · filed 2023-12-19Rule 702(a)

Although Meyers identified the analysis that she performed, she did not explain the methodology of that analysis. Thus, the trial court erred by failing to exercise its gatekeeping function. See id. at 339-40, 822 S.E.2d at 888. However, the error does not amount to plain error because Meyers identified the tests she performed and the result of those tests.

Rule 702(a) permits a qualified expert to explain general principles without applying them to the specific facts when the testimony assists the jury, is reliable, and fits the case.

State v. Cox · filed 2024-02-20(a)

Therefore, consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Dagenhart’s general testimony was admissible under N.C. Rule of Evidence 702(a).

Rule 702(a) limits expert testimony to matters within the witness’s expertise; a physical therapist was not qualified to give an opinion on the medical cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Cason v. Galloway · filed 2025-07-16(a)

Under our Rules of Evidence, expert witnesses are qualified to testify within their fields of expertise. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2023). ... The physical therapist was not qualified to testify regarding causation of Plaintiff’s injuries, as this opinion testimony was outside his area of expertise.

Rule 702(e) requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances before an otherwise qualified expert who does not meet the usual requirements may testify about the standard of health care.

Dobson v. Sears · filed 2024-11-19(e)

The record on appeal is devoid of any extraordinary circumstances to support the certification or admission of Nurse Mohammed under Rule 702(e), nor do Plaintiffs argue such circumstances exist.

Rule 702(a) permits expert testimony identifying plant material as marijuana when the analyst’s testing procedures are sufficiently reliable.

State v. Ruffin · filed 2025-03-05Rule 702(a)

Thus, the expert testimony identifying the plant material as marijuana was sufficiently reliable under Rule of Evidence 702(a).

Rule 702(a) does not require an expert to address every Daubert factor when explaining the reliability of the methods used and their application to the case.

State v. Stidham · filed 2025-07-02(a)

His failure to testify as to all of the Daubert factors does not render his testimony unreliable or inadmissible.

Rule 702 requires a trial court to let a proposed expert attempt to lay the foundation for expert testimony; denying that opportunity is error, but relief requires prejudice.

Fields v. Rana · filed 2025-09-17Rule 702(a)

We hold the trial court committed error by not allowing Plaintiff to attempt to lay the requisite Rule 702 foundation, but such error was not prejudicial.

Rule 702(a)(3) requires a certified drug recognition expert to apply the expert’s principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

State v. Moore · filed 2025-07-16Rule 702(a)(3)

The statute clearly requires the witness to be certified as a Drug Recognition Expert to testify; therefore, it follows that witness testimony must apply the certification principles and methods reliably to the facts of each case. In addition, in the same statute, the HGN test must be “administered in accordance” with the HGN training. Consequently, we hold N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a)(3) must apply.

Rule 702(a) permits expert testimony that will assist the jury when it rests on sufficient facts, reliable methods, and reliable application of those methods.

State v. Allen · filed 2025-12-03Rule 702(a)

Agent Putman’s testimony satisfied the requirements of Rule 702. His opinions were grounded in sufficient facts and data, derived from methods consistently accepted by courts, and applied reliably to the facts of the case. The trial court acted within its broad discretion in determining Agent Putman’s testimony would assist the jury and met the reliability thresholds mandated by Daubert, Kumho Tire, Joiner, and Rule 702(a).

Rule 702(a)(1)-(3) requires expert testimony to rest on sufficient facts or data, use reliable methods, and apply those methods reliably to the case.

State v. Purser · filed 2026-05-06(a)(1)-(3)

However, based on our review of the record, we conclude Ms. Ayres’s had sufficient data to base her testimony on, as she reviewed all of the child’s forensic interviews, she based her testimony off of her experiences and methods she has routinely used during her career, and those methods were applied reliably to the case at hand.

Rule 703 permits an expert to base an opinion on the opinions and evaluations of other doctors.

State v. McClary · filed 2003-04-01Rule 703

The opinions and evaluations of other doctors have been held to be a proper basis for an expert opinion under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 703 (2001). ... Although Dr. Rollins evaluated defendant by court order for the purpose of determining his capacity to proceed, his personal observations taken together with the other materials considered provided an adequate basis for his opinion that defendant was capable of forming the requisite intent to kill at the time of the shooting.

Rule 104(a) leaves preliminary questions about expert testimony to the trial court; reliable blood alcohol extrapolation testimony may be admitted even when it uses an average elimination rate.

State v. Taylor · filed 2004-08-17Rule 104(a)

Thus, as in Catoe, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting Glover's extrapolation testimony even though an average elimination rate was used for the calculation.

Rule 702(a) governs the admissibility of expert testimony based on specialized knowledge and the witness’s qualifications.

State v. Cooper · filed 2013-09-03Rule 702(a)

The admissibility of expert testimony is controlled by Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence: ... “If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2004).

Rule 104(a) assigns preliminary questions about witness qualifications to the trial court, which need not apply the rules of evidence when deciding them.

State v. Oakes · filed 2011-01-04Rule 104(a)

Trial courts are not bound by the rules of evidence when making these determinations.

Rule 702(b)(1) treats general dentistry, periodontics, and oral surgery as distinct specialties when assessing whether an expert can testify about a general dentist’s standard of care.

Kennedy v. DeAngelo · filed 2019-02-19Rule 702(b)(1)

Under Roush, Dr. Prettyman, a general dentist, Dr. Thomas, a periodontist, and Dr. Jelic, an oral surgeon, all practice in separate, distinct specialties.

Rule 609 does not permit a witness to be impeached with a criminal charge rather than a conviction.

State v. Jones · filed 1991-06-12Rule 609

We held such testimony could not be used to impeach a witness. See also N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609 (1983). It was error to allow the State to elicit this testimony that the defendant had been charged with assaulting his wife.

Rule 609(a) permits impeachment with prior convictions, but questioning must stay within the time and place of the convictions and the punishment imposed.

State v. Gallagher · filed 1990-12-18Rule 609(a)

As we have determined that the questions objected to were inquiries which went beyond the time and place of defendant’s convictions and the punishment imposed, we also find that in this case, which turned on credibility, the defendant was prejudiced by the trial judge’s overruling defendant’s objections to those questions.

Rule 609(a) permits a conviction based on a no contest plea to be used to impeach a witness on cross-examination.

State v. Outlaw · filed 1989-07-05Rule 609(a)

For the reasons set forth herein and because our G.S. 8C-1, Rule 609(a), like its federal counterpart, does not by its language create a difference between convictions based on their underlying plea we hold that the court did not err in allowing defendant’s prior convictions to be used to attack his credibility during cross-examination.

Rule 609(a) permits cross-examination about a witness’s prior convictions to impeach credibility.

State v. Von Cunningham · filed 1990-03-20Rule 609(a)

A witness, including a defendant, may be cross-examined with respect to prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching his credibility. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 609(a) (1986). ... It was entirely proper to cross-examine defendant concerning the existence of his prior conviction.

Rule 609(a) permits impeachment with a conviction entered after a no contest plea.

State v. Outlaw · filed 1990-04-05(a)

This adjudication would be a conviction within the meaning of Rule 609(a). As a conviction it may then be used in another case to attack the credibility of a witness.

Rule 609(b) requires specific findings showing that an older conviction’s probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect; conclusory findings do not satisfy that requirement.

State v. Moul · filed 1989-09-19Rule 609(b)

These conclusory findings do not satisfy the “specific facts and circumstances” requirement of Rule 609(b).

Rule 609(b) permits impeachment with a conviction more than ten years old only when specific facts and circumstances show that its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

State v. Artis · filed 1989-10-05Rule 609(b)

The trial court’s determination that defendant’s convictions for assault on a female and assault on a female with intent to commit rape were admissible was erroneous. Specific facts and circumstances supporting the probative value of this evidence are neither apparent from the record nor recounted by the trial court.

Rule 609(a) permits a prior conviction to be proved by public record even when the witness denies it on cross-examination.

State v. Dalton · filed 1989-10-17Rule 609(a)

The official commentary to the rules makes it clear that Rule 609(a) was intended to change the former practice and allow the record of the prior conviction to be introduced, regardless of the witness’s denial. Therefore, defendant’s objection on this ground to the admission of this evidence during the State’s rebuttal was properly overruled by the court.

Rule 609(b) requires specific facts and circumstances showing that an old conviction’s value for impeachment substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; the conviction’s violent nature and a conclusory claim of impeachment do not suffice.

State v. Carter · filed 1990-02-07(b)

With this in mind, it is apparent that the “specific facts and circumstances” articulated by the trial court as underlying its determination in this case that introduction of the thirteen-year-old convictions were more probative than prejudicial violated this principle. The court singled out and permitted evidence that defendant had committed prior assaults because they involved the use of violence. The trial court’s conclusory remark that the only purpose for admission through cross-examination would be to impeach the credibility or truthfulness of the defendant was not a “fact” or “circumstance” vouching for an appropriate balance of probative over prejudicial weight.

Rule 609(d) leaves admission of a witness’s juvenile adjudications for impeachment to the trial judge’s discretion.

State v. Whiteside · filed 1989-10-05Rule 609(d)

While Rule 609(a) is a rule of general admissibility, Rule 609(d), which applies specifically to juvenile adjudications, leaves admissibility in the trial court's discretion. We find no abuse of that discretion in this case.

Rule 609(b) permits convictions more than ten years old to be used for impeachment only if the court finds their probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect and the State gives sufficient advance written notice.

State v. Porter · filed 1990-05-10(b)

Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence permits the introduction of convictions more than ten years old for the limited purpose of impeachment if two requirements are first met. First, the court must determine that the probative value of the convictions, supported by specific facts and circumstances, outweighs the prejudicial effect of introduction. Second, the State must give “sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609(b) (1986). The State concedes that “the record does not indicate that the prosecutor gave the notice required.” Nor is there any indication that the judge indulged in the weighing process despite timely objection from the defendant. ... We hold that admission of these convictions under these circumstances was error. ... Because we conclude that this error was prejudicial, we remand for a new sentencing hearing.

A defendant who testifies that his listed convictions are his entire record opens the door to cross-examination about an older conviction.

State v. Chandler · filed 1990-12-04Rule 609(b)

We find that defendant’s testimony creates favorable inferences as to his entire criminal record. Therefore, on cross-examination, the State “may inquire into defendant’s record and rebut his statement that [he] had not been convicted of anything other than the crimes mentioned in [his] testimony.”

Rule 609(b) permits impeachment with a conviction more than ten years old only when specific facts show that its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

State v. Norris · filed 1990-12-18Rule 609(b)

The circumstances surrounding his 1975 incest conviction and the present allegations are so similar that admitting the old conviction would have so prejudiced the defendant with such little corresponding probative value that it should have been excluded.

Rule 609(b) permits impeachment with a conviction more than ten years old only when specific facts show that its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

State v. Ross · filed 1991-06-12Rule 609(b)

This finding describes no "specific facts and circumstances" indicating that the probative value of the conviction "substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609(b).

Rule 609(a) limits impeachment based on prior convictions to the crime’s name and the time, place, and punishment imposed; it does not permit inquiry into other details of the crimes.

State v. Lynch · filed 1993-07-30Rule 609(a)

For the “[s]trong policy reasons” stated in Finch, we again reaffirm the rule stated therein prohibiting the State from eliciting details of prior convictions other than the name of the crime and the time, place, and punishment for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a) in the guilt-innocence phase of a criminal trial.

Rule 609(b) requires the court to weigh an older conviction’s value for impeachment against its prejudicial effect before admitting it.

State v. Lynch · filed 1994-07-29Rule 609(b)

In determining whether the evidence was admissible, the court focused, as directed by Rule 609(b), on the importance of the evidence in attacking the credibility of the defendant and balanced this importance against the danger of prejudice to the defendant in admitting this evidence. We hold that on the facts of this case, the court did not commit error.

Rule 609(a) permits impeachment with qualifying convictions, but does not permit inquiry into the date of a particular act underlying a conviction.

State v. Skipper · filed 1994-07-29Rule 609(a)

Rule of Evidence 609(a) allows a party to attack the credibility of a witness with "evidence that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than 60 days confinement." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609(a) (1992). ... We conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining the prosecutor's objection to the question of when a particular act for which the witness was later convicted was committed.

Rule 609(a) permits impeachment with a prior guilty plea to a qualifying crime even when prayer for judgment has been continued.

State v. Sidberry · filed 1994-10-06Rule 609(a)

Defendant argues that a prayer for judgment continued is not a final judgment and should not be treated as a conviction for purposes of Rule 609. We disagree. ... Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in ruling that the State could cross-examine defendant regarding these prior guilty pleas if defendant chose to testify.

Rule 609(d) governs the use of juvenile adjudications to impeach a witness’s credibility; it does not apply when the evidence is offered to rebut a defendant’s claimed nonviolent character.

State v. Williams · filed 1994-12-30Rule 609(d)

Evidence Rule 609, relied on by defendant, is inapplicable. Rule 609 governs the use of juvenile adjudications for purposes of impeaching the credibility of a witness. ... Here, the testimony of Waters was not offered to impeach the credibility of a witness; it was offered to rebut defendant’s evidence that he was not a violent person.

Rule 609(b) permits a conviction more than ten years old to be used for impeachment when the trial court's findings show that it meaningfully weighed probative value against prejudice.

State v. Holston · filed 1999-08-17Rule 609(b)

Although the findings are minimal, we believe they are legally sufficient in this case, as they indicate the trial court exercised meaningful discretion in weighing the probative value of the 1981 conviction against its prejudicial effect.

Rule 609(d) gives the trial court discretion to admit a witness's juvenile adjudications when they are necessary for a fair determination of guilt or innocence.

State v. McAllister · filed 1999-02-16Rule 609(d)

Despite the language used by the trial court in making the ruling, it is clear from an examination of the record that the trial court understood the standard to be applied under Rule 609 and that the trial court believed the evidence was not necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. Furthermore, defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of the juvenile adjudications.

Rule 609(d) leaves the admission of a witness’s juvenile adjudication for impeachment to the trial court’s discretion when the evidence is necessary for a fair determination of guilt or innocence.

State v. Deese · filed 2000-01-18Rule 609(d)

The decision whether the “evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence” is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Whiteside, 325 N.C. 389, 383 S.E.2d 911 (1989). After hearing the motion in limine in this case, the trial court concluded that defendant had not satisfied the court that the admission of evidence concerning Ms. Jackson’s juvenile adjudication of involuntary manslaughter was necessary to a fair determination of defendant’s guilt or innocence, essentially a determination that the evidence was not relevant. Defendant has shown no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling to exclude irrelevant evidence, and we find none.

Rule 609 permits inquiry into a witness’s prior convictions but does not permit extraneous prejudicial details.

State v. Stanfield · filed 1999-09-07Rule 609

Moreover, the substance of the questions was appropriate. The prosecutor limited his inquiry to the facts supporting the conviction and did not elicit extraneous prejudicial details.

Rule 609(b)'s notice requirement for impeaching a witness with a conviction more than ten years old may guide a court at sentencing, although the Rules of Evidence do not apply there.

State v. Greene · filed 2000-05-05Rule 609(b)

Ordinarily, notice of intent to impeach a witness with a conviction more than ten years old is necessary to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609(b) (1999). The Rules of Evidence do not apply in sentencing proceedings; however, they may be helpful as a guide to reliability and relevance. See State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 31, 478 S.E.2d 163, 179, (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124, 117 S.Ct. 2521, 138 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1997). The trial judge properly used Rule 609(b) as a guide in this case.

Rule 609(b) generally excludes convictions more than ten years old unless their probative value substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.

State v. Harris · filed 2002-03-19Rule 609(b)

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence of defendant’s conviction in 1984 should not have been admitted because the substantial likelihood of prejudice outweighed the minimal impeachment value of the evidence.

Rule 609(a) permits a prior DWI conviction to be used for impeachment because it is a Class 1 misdemeanor.

State v. Gregory · filed 2002-12-17(a)

A careful reading of these statutes leads us to conclude that a DWT conviction is a Class 1 misdemeanor and, thus, is admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a).

Rule 609(b) requires specific findings that a conviction more than ten years old has probative value substantially outweighing its prejudicial effect before it is admitted for impeachment.

State v. Smith · filed 2002-12-31Rule 609(b)

There are no findings of specific facts and circumstances in the record to support the trial court’s determination that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. The trial court’s admission of defendant’s prior convictions beyond ten years was error and we now examine whether defendant was prejudiced.

Rule 609(d) bars impeachment of a criminal defendant with a juvenile adjudication, but admitting one does not automatically constitute plain error.

State v. Perkins · filed 2002-11-19Rule 609(d)

Under Rule 609(d), a defendant cannot be impeached by a juvenile adjudication in a criminal case. ... While admission of defendant’s juvenile conviction for stealing and questions concerning an assault conviction were inappropriate, the General Assembly’s decision to exclude such testimony does not mean its admission is plain error.

Rule 609(a) permits qualifying prior convictions to be used to assess a witness’s credibility, but not as evidence of guilt.

State v. Wilson · filed 2003-06-03Rule 609(a)

Second, the instruction given by the trial court correctly sets forth the law in North Carolina. “For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a felony, or of a Class Al, Class 1, or Class 2 misdemeanor, shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-examination or thereafter.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 609(a) (2001).

Rule 609(e) allows a conviction to be used for impeachment while an appeal is pending, including an appeal from district court to superior court.

State v. Weaver · filed 2003-08-19Rule 609(e)

Rule 609(e) specifically states that “[t]he pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.” Defendant cites no authority suggesting that Rule 609(e)’s reference to “an appeal” excludes appeals from district court to superior court and we have found none. This assignment of error is overruled.

Rule 609(a) requires admission of qualifying prior convictions to impeach a witness without balancing their probative value against prejudice under Rule 403.

State v. Brown · filed 2003-08-22Rule 609(a)

Defendant nonetheless urges this Court to apply the balancing test of N.C. R. Evid. 403 to his conviction. Defendant’s argument fails to take into account the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. The language of Rule 609(a) (“shall be admitted”) is mandatory, leaving no room for the trial court’s discretion. Moreover, while N.C. R. Evid. 609(b) requires a balancing test of the probative value and prejudicial effect of a conviction more than ten years old, this provision is explicitly absent from 609(a).

Rule 403 permits exclusion of a later, unrelated DWI conviction offered to impeach a witness when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, even though such convictions are generally admissible under Rule 609.

Headley v. Williams · filed 2004-01-20Rule 403

Although evidence of a DWI conviction is generally admissible under Rule 609, see State v. Gregory, 154 N.C. App. 718, 722, 572 S.E.2d 838, 840-41 (2002), a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, is reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion, see State v. Ferguson, 105 N.C. App. 692, 695, 414 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1992). In this case, the trial court found that the probative value as to the credibility of defendant from the evidence that defendant was convicted of DWI in an unrelated matter subsequent to the accident was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Rule 609(a) does not permit impeachment with a reversed conviction because reversal invalidates the conviction.

State v. Jordan · filed 2004-01-20Rule 609(a)

As Rule 609 does not envision the usage of convictions that either have not come to fruition or have become nullities, the trial court did not err in denying defense counsel’s attempt to elicit testimony from Jordan regarding his reversed sentence.

Rule 609(a) permits impeachment with a felony conviction and allows questions about its details when a defendant gives a misleading account of the criminal record.

State v. Singletary · filed 2004-04-06Rule 609(a)

Thus, where a defendant “opens the door” by misstating his criminal record or the facts of crimes or actions, or where a defendant uses his criminal record to create inferences in his favor, the State is allowed to cross-examine the defendant about the details of those prior crimes or actions.

Rule 609(d) generally bars juvenile adjudications as impeachment evidence in criminal cases, but does not prevent their use against a juvenile who testifies in a delinquency proceeding under § 7B-3201(b).

In re S.S.T. · filed 2004-07-20(d)

Thus, the clear intent of our legislature in adopting Rule 609 and Section 7B-3201(b) was to provide that although evidence of a prior juvenile adjudication is not admissible in a criminal case, evidence of a prior juvenile adjudication is admissible in a juvenile proceeding where the juvenile takes the stand in his own defense.

Rule 609(b) permits impeachment with convictions more than ten years old despite a lack of written notice when the defendant had actual advance notice and a fair opportunity to contest their use.

State v. Shelly · filed 2006-03-21Rule 609(b)

In a case where, as here, the defense obviously deciphered the State’s intent to use the old conviction evidence by preparing a motion objecting to the evidence well in advance of trial, it cannot be reasonably or fairly determined that the failure of the State to follow the Rule to the letter prohibits use of the evidence solely on that basis. While advance written notice is preferred, we decline to reverse Defendant’s convictions for what would clearly be a mere technicality.

Rule 609(a) permits questions about prior convictions that correct misleading testimony by the defendant about his record.

State v. Mewborn · filed 2006-07-05Rule 609(a)

Considering defendant’s testimony about his prior record and the police search, we conclude the State did not exceed the scope of proper cross-examination under Rule 609(a) when, in response to defendant’s testimony, the State suggested the reason police officers searched defendant’s home was because they knew defendant had been convicted of selling drugs.

Rule 609(a) permits impeachment with qualifying convictions; a defendant who minimizes his criminal history on direct examination may open the door to further questioning about it.

State v. Blair · filed 2007-01-02Rule 609(a)

Here, the State’s questioning was not in error, let alone plain error. During direct examination, defendant minimized the seriousness of his criminal involvement when he claimed that he was not a violent person and had never robbed anyone. This testimony opened the door to the State’s questioning as to defendant’s past criminal history. ... When the questioning seemed to move beyond the purposes allowable under Rule 609(a), defendant’s objection was sustained without further ado.

Rule 609(b) permits impeachment with a conviction more than ten years old only when its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect and the proponent gives sufficient advance written notice.

State v. Pollard · filed 2007-02-20Rule 609(b)

"Second, the State must give sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence." ... Here, the record on appeal does not indicate whether the district attorney gave the required notice. Nonetheless, defendant failed to meet his burden of proving plain error.

Rule 609(b) does not automatically exclude an old conviction because it involved a different crime or did not involve dishonesty; admission depends on specific findings that its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

State v. Muhammad · filed 2007-10-16Rule 609(b)

The fact that the conviction was for a crime that did not involve dishonesty and was a different crime from the one charged in this case alone is not dispositive of its admissibility.

Rule 609(a) permits questions about the details of a prior conviction when a defendant's misleading testimony opens the door to them.

State v. Galanis · filed 2007-11-20Rule 609(a)

This testimony was misleading, created an inference favorable to defendant, and "opened the door" to the prosecutor's follow-up questions. Thus, the trial court did not err in permitting the State to ask defendant about the details of his conviction in order to correct inaccuracies and rebut defendant's version of the charges.

Rule 609(a) requires admission of qualifying convictions to impeach a witness; Rule 403 does not permit their exclusion based on prejudice.

Outlaw v. Johnson · filed 2008-05-06Rule 609(a)

Therefore, because Plaintiff Outlaw’s convictions were admissible under Rule 609(a), and because the trial court had no discretion to exclude such evidence under Rule 403, we hold that the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff Outlaw’s motion in limine.

Rule 609(a) permits qualifying prior convictions to be used to challenge a witness’s credibility; proper cross-examination about those convictions can render an earlier improper admission harmless.

State v. Slade · filed 2008-11-18Rule 609(a)

However, this Court has held the admission of evidence of prior convictions which would be inadmissible under Rule 404(b) "was rendered harmless when defendant testified and was properly cross-examined about the convictions pursuant to Rule 609(a)" of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. ... Here, defendant took the stand in his own defense and, on cross-examination, the State inquired about his previous convictions. Defendant stated he "got put on probation" for a conviction in Rockingham County for possession of cocaine. Thus, any possible error the trial court may have committed in permitting Detective Steinberg to testify regarding defendant's probation status was harmless.

Rule 609(b) measures the ten-year limit from the later of conviction or release from confinement; when release occurred within ten years of trial, advance written notice and probative value balancing are unnecessary.

State v. Gervin · filed 2010-01-05Rule 609(b)

Defendant's trial in the present case occurred in 2005, only six years after his 1999 release. ... Because the evidence of the 1988 conviction is not more than ten years old "as calculated herein," the notice requirement does not apply to Defendant's case. ... Therefore, the trial court was not required to apply a balancing test to Defendant's 1988 conviction under Rule 609(b).

Rule 609 permits cross-examination about qualifying prior convictions to attack a witness’s credibility.

State v. Riley · filed 2010-02-02Rule 609

Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence permits a witness to be cross-examined concerning prior felony and misdemeanor convictions, with the exception of Class 3 misdemeanors, committed within the time limits set forth in subsection (b), for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the witness.

Rule 609(a) requires admission of certified public records of a witness’s qualifying prior convictions to impeach the witness’s credibility.

State v. Lynch · filed 2011-12-20Rule 609(a)

As defense counsel was requesting the introduction of the certified “public record[s]” showing Mr. Tinnin’s prior convictions “for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,” see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 609(a), and the language of Rule 609(a) “is mandatory,” see Brown, 357 N.C. at 390, 584 S.E.2d at 283, the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s request to allow defendant’s exhibit 1 into evidence.

Rule 609(a) permits questions about a defendant’s prior convictions to challenge credibility when the questions have a good faith basis and stay within the permissible scope of cross-examination.

State v. Ruffin · filed 2014-03-04Rule 609(a)

The prosecutor did not attempt to elicit details about the facts of the offenses, or pursue the matter further when defendant denied remembering his alleged prior convictions. On appeal, defendant does not dispute that the document relied upon by the prosecutor provided a good faith basis for his questions, and does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing this cross-examination or that the prosecutor exceeded the permissible scope of cross-examination. We conclude that there was no error in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant about prior convictions.

Rule 609(a) does not permit impeachment with a witness’s Class 3 misdemeanor conviction.

Powell v. Christopherson · filed 2015-01-06Rule 609(a)

As previously discussed, the trial court properly ruled that Defendant could not cross- examine Plaintiff about her Class 3 misdemeanor conviction for possession.

Rule 609(b) does not require detailed findings before admitting an older conviction when the facts supporting its probative value are apparent from the record.

State v. Joyner · filed 2015-10-20Rule 609(b)

Even assuming defendant’s objection was sufficient to preserve the Rule 609(b) issue on appeal, the trial court did not err by making conclusory findings on the challenged evidence as its probative value was apparent from the record.

Rule 609 permits impeachment of a defendant who testifies with prior convictions even if he has stipulated to felon status for a firearm charge.

State v. Gayles · filed 2014-04-01Rule 609

Here, where defendant did testify, he was subject to impeachment on the basis of his prior convictions, even though he had already stipulated to being a convicted felon for purposes of the firearm possession charge.

Rule 609(b) permits a conviction more than ten years old to be used for impeachment only when its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effects in the interests of justice.

State v. Powell · filed 2025-09-03Rule 609(b)

Here, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of Defendant’s prior convictions under Rule 609 during the State’s cross-examination of Defendant.

Rule 609(b) requires specific findings that an older conviction’s value for assessing credibility substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect before it may be used for impeachment.

State v. Toomer · filed 2026-02-04Rule 609(b)

Rule 609(b) requires the court to “make findings of fact” demonstrating that the conviction’s probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect—and to explain how the conviction bears on the witness’s credibility.

Federal cases may guide interpretation of North Carolina’s Rules of Evidence, but they do not bind state courts.

State v. Quesinberry · filed 1989-07-26Rule 102

Federal cases, while not binding on the courts of this state in construing our rules of evidence, “should be looked to by the courts for enlightenment and guidance in ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 102, Commentary.

Rule 402 requires a foundation establishing the relevance of blood test results before hearsay exceptions can support their admission.

Lombroia v. Peek · filed 1992-10-20Rule 402

Hearsay rules, however, do not become an issue until the relevancy of the evidence has been established. See G.S. 8C-1, Rule 402. ... Plaintiff therefore failed to establish the relevancy of this test result. The trial court erred in allowing Dr. Osborne’s testimony concerning the report and in admitting that document into evidence.

Rules 401 and 402 permit relevant evidence to be admitted when it tends to make a consequential fact more or less probable; a conclusive link to stolen merchandise is unnecessary for price tags to be relevant.

State v. Quick · filed 1992-07-07Rules 401, 402

All relevant evidence is admissible. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 402 (1988). Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (1988). ... The merchandise tags introduced in this case were relevant to prove the charges of breaking and entering, larceny, and the possession of stolen goods. And, the tags were identified by the store’s co-owner as being ones which had previously been attached to store merchandise. Since the evidence is relevant, and because defendant has failed to prove any prejudice pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (1988), we find no error with respect to its admission.

Rules 401 and 402 permit evidence tending to prove motive or premeditation when no other rule excludes it.

State v. Hightower · filed 1992-06-25Rules 401 and 402

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 402 (1988) provides "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible[]" except if it is excluded by some other exclusionary rule. ... In the instant case, the evidence of Donnell's pregnancy is relevant because it tended to support the State's theory of the defendant's motive for the murder. ... This evidence will be admissible at the new trial.

Rules 401 and 402 permit questions about a defendant’s affairs with other women when his testimony that he loved his wife makes that subject relevant.

State v. Norman · filed 1992-06-25Rules 401 and 402

The defendant, by his testimony, made this subject relevant under Rule 401 and admissible under Rule 402.

Rules 401 and 402 permit exclusion of evidence that has no tendency to prove a fact at issue.

State v. Hart · filed 1992-03-03

Both conversations detailed events following Winebarger’s murder. Evidence having no tendency to prove a fact at issue in the case is not relevant and is properly excluded. G.S. 8C-1, Rules 401 and 402 (1983). We find no error in the exclusion of either Minton’s or Heskett’s testimony.

Rule 401 makes evidence relevant when it tends to prove a consequential fact, including a defendant’s motive.

State v. Wynne · filed 1991-08-14R. 401

Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, R. 401 (1988). ... No evidence other than race, as to why Aaron Parker was singled out for abuse, appears from the record. This evidence is clearly relevant.

Rule 401 treats evidence as relevant only if it tends to make a consequential fact more or less probable; testimony about prior alcohol sales at the premises was irrelevant to the cocaine charges.

State v. Major Givens · filed 1989-08-15Rule 401

Rule 401 provides that relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” G.S. 8C-1, Rule 401. The testimony regarding prior sales of.alcohol at the premises searched was irrelevant in Givens’ trial for manufacturing cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. The testimony was erroneously admitted.

Rule 401 treats prior animal sightings near an airport runway as relevant when they tend to show that a dangerous condition was foreseeable.

Screaming Eagle Air, Ltd. v. Airport Commission of Forsyth County · filed 1990-01-16Rule 401

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401, defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” In proving that defendant was negligent, plaintiff had to prove that it was foreseeable that an insecure fence around the airport would expose to danger a person landing an aircraft at the airport. The number of dogs or other animals seen on or near the runway in the year preceding the incident in question would have a tendency to prove that a dangerous situation existed.

Evidence of a defendant’s explanation during an earlier alleged blackout is relevant when it tends to rebut his claim that he was unaware of his actions.

State v. Leroux · filed 1990-04-05Rule 401

Relevant evidence “means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (1983). ... Certainly, defendant’s explanation to the victim regarding his reasons for attempting to break into her mobile home would tend to challenge his theory that he did not know what he was doing at the time.

Rule 401 requires evidence offered to show that someone else committed the crime to point directly to the guilt of a specific third party.

State v. Brewer · filed 1989-12-07Rule 401

Although the Cotton case established that the general standard of relevancy under Rule 401 would be applied to cases such as this, it did not change the established policy that such evidence must point directly to the guilt of a specific third party.

Rules 401 and 402 permit relevant testimony about a witness’s background when it introduces the witness and explains that background.

State v. Summerlin · filed 1990-04-17

After reviewing the transcript, we find that the challenged testimony was relevant. We further find that the evidence was offered as a means of introducing the victim to the court and jury and to assist in explaining the victim’s background.

Rule 401 treats evidence as relevant when it tends to make a consequential fact more or less probable, even if the connection is tenuous.

State v. Smith · filed 1991-02-07Rule 401

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (1988). ... Though the relationship is tenuous, the facts to which Ms. Davenport testified are relevant ... to the theory the prosecution sought to prove.

Rule 401 treats an expert’s fingerprint recovery rate in unrelated cases as irrelevant to whether fingerprints should have been found at the crime scene.

State v. Robinson · filed 1991-10-03Rule 401

While it may be helpful to the jury to understand general, scientific explanations regarding why a fingerprint may or may not be found at a crime scene, it is simply not relevant to . the issues in this case that Sergeant Lance has found identifiable fingerprints in only three percent of the cases he has personally investigated.

Rule 401 treats physical evidence as irrelevant when it has no connection to the charged crime and no logical tendency to prove a fact in issue.

State v. Wallace · filed 1991-11-19Rule 401

Items such as this toboggan which have not been connected to the crime charged and which have no logical tendency to prove any fact in issue, are irrelevant and inadmissible.

Rule 401 permits evidence of a person’s physical condition shortly before and after an event when it is sufficiently probative of their condition at the time of the event.

State v. Dodd · filed 1992-01-27Rule 401

Moreover, Forest’s knowledge of Cunningham’s physical condition shortly before and after the crime was sufficiently probative of Cunningham’s condition on the day of the crime to satisfy the standards of relevance.

Rule 401 makes evidence relevant when it bears on a fact consequential to the charge; the defendants’ views on abortion were irrelevant to the trespass charge.

State v. Taylor · filed 1992-07-07Rule 401

The court tried repeatedly to explain to defendants what evidence could constitute evidence relevant to the charge against them and why certain testimony they wished to elicit from State’s witnesses or present in their case in chief was irrelevant. ... The admonition to defendant Taylor, while couched in terms of truthfulness, addressed the question of relevancy of his proposed testimony.

Rule 401 treats medical opinion evidence of penetration as relevant to an indecent liberties charge even when the child did not mention penetration.

State v. Baker · filed 1993-02-12Rule 401

We hold that medical opinion evidence that the vagina of the victim in this case had been penetrated was relevant to the charge of taking indecent liberties with a child, even though the child’s testimony did not mention penetration.

Rule 401 makes evidence relevant when it tends to prove a consequential fact, including a child’s home environment in a neglect proceeding.

In Re Beck · filed 1993-04-06Rule 401

Relevant evidence is such evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (1992). ... Petitioner argues, and we agree, that the materials were relevant to show the home environment of the children.

Rule 401 permits evidence that a defendant intimidated a witness to show the defendant’s awareness of guilt.

State v. Hicks · filed 1993-04-08Rule 401

An attempt by a defendant to intimidate a witness in an effort to prevent the witness from testifying or to induce the witness to testify falsely in his favor is relevant to show the defendant’s awareness of his guilt.

Rule 401 treats questions about a victim’s general familiarity with people of another race as irrelevant when they have no tendency to prove a fact in issue.

State v. Roddey · filed 1993-07-06Rule 401

It is always proper to inquire into a victim’s ability to identify his attacker, but it is another matter entirely to inquire into a victim’s familiarity with members of another, race and his ability to identify members of another race. Such an inquiry has no tendency to prove a fact in issue and does nothing more than inject racial issues into the trial process.

Rule 401 treats evidence as relevant when it tends to prove a consequential fact, including the extent of wrongful death damages.

Hales v. Thompson · filed 1993-08-03Rule 401

Accordingly, the evidence pertaining to Donald’s disease and the effect it had on his relationship with his parents had a tendency to prove the extent of damages, which are in controversy in this case. The evidence was therefore relevant and should not have been excluded on that ground.