N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3212

A court may entertain a summary judgment motion filed after the deadline set in its order only on a showing of good cause; unspecified clerical inadvertence and reassignment of counsel do not suffice.

Baldessari v. Caines · filed 2009-04-28(a)

The defendants concede that their summary judgment motion was made beyond the time period set forth in the court’s certification order (see CPLR 3212 [a]). While such a motion may nevertheless be entertained with leave of court on good cause shown (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]), the defendants’ “perfunctory claims of unspecified clerical inadvertence and reassignment of counsel were insufficient to constitute good cause for the delay” (Breiding v Giladi, 15 AD3d 435 [2005]; see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Sanango v Generoso, 13 AD3d 349 [2004]; Gibbs v McRide Cab Co., 10 AD3d 671 [2004]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when discovery has not yet been conducted.

Lambert v. Sklar · filed 2009-04-28(f)

In any event, the motion was properly denied as premature since discovery has not yet been conducted (see CPLR 3212 [f|; ...).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a party to move for summary judgment once issue is joined; a court cannot require a note of issue first.

Vasquez v. Soto · filed 2009-04-28(a)

The court has no authority to require the filing of a note of issue as a prerequisite to a motion for summary judgment, since CPLR 3212 (a) clearly states that a motion for summary judgment may be made once issue has been joined (see Richard’s Home Ctr. & Lbr. v Kownacki, 247 AD2d 371 [1998]).

A court may consider a delayed summary judgment motion when good cause exists for the delay.

Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2009-05-21(a)

Preliminarily, the court properly considered Ford’s cross motion since good cause existed for Ford’s delay in making it (CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]), namely, the eve-of-trial order precluding plaintiff’s then sole transient-signal theory of liability, as well as her expert, and the subsequent unsuccessful appeal.

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a late summary judgment motion.

Hernandez v. Central Parking System of New York, Inc. · filed 2009-06-02(a)

Defendants failed to demonstrate good cause for the late filing of their motion for summary judgment (CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to entertain a late summary judgment motion when the movant demonstrates good cause for the delay.

Huerta v. Longo · filed 2009-06-02(a)

The defendants demonstrated good cause for their delay in making a motion for summary judgment, and the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in entertaining the late motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725, 726-727 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Kunz v Gleeson, 9 AD3d 480, 481 [2004]).

A party that has already sought summary judgment generally cannot make a successive motion without newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause.

Tolpygina v. Teper · filed 2009-06-02

As the appellants had previously cross-moved seeking relief pursuant to CPLR 3212, contrary to their contention, that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the stated causes of action insofar as asserted against them “violated the general proscription against ... successive summary judgment motions absent ‘a showing of newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause’ ” ... No sufficient showing of newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause was made here.

Section 3212(a) does not permit a summary judgment application made more than 120 days after the note of issue without a showing of good cause.

Williams v. Naylor · filed 2009-07-07(a)

The Supreme Court improperly granted the oral application of the defendant Emeka Okeke, which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. The oral application was not supported by any motion papers, no formal motion was made on notice to the plaintiff, and the application was made after jury selection had been completed and more than 120 days after the note of issue had been filed, without any showing of good cause (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Giannattasio v Han Suk Kang, 30 AD3d 375 [2006]; Long v Children’s Vil., Inc., 24 AD3d 518 [2005]; Minucci v City of New York, 303 AD2d 473 [2003]; Hilton v City of New Rochelle, 298 AD2d 360 [2002]; Diaz v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 289 AD2d 365, 366 [2001]; Martin Iron & Constr. Co. v Grace Indus., 285 AD2d 494, 495 [2001]).

When a note of issue is struck, a stipulated deadline for summary judgment motions becomes inoperative.

Deans v. Jamaica Hospital Medical Center · filed 2009-07-28(a)

We agree that the motions were not untimely. The court’s order dated September 12, 2006, striking the note of issue, rendered the stipulation with respect to summary judgment motions inoperative (see CPLR 3212 [a]; cf. Williams v Peralta, 37 AD3d 712, 713 [2007]; Johnson v Ladin, 18 AD3d 439 [2005]).

Section 3212(a) does not permit summary judgment on amended claims before defendants answer the amended complaint.

Charles v. Suvannavejh · filed 2009-11-17(a)

Upon granting the relief plaintiff seeks, however, the court lacks the further authority to grant summary judgment before defendants answer the new complaint. Once the court has granted plaintiffs motion to serve and file her proposed amended complaint, summary judgment is impermissible, at least on the amended claims, when defendants have not yet answered the amended complaint.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion when the opposing party has not had a fair opportunity to obtain evidence through discovery.

Lopez v. Garcia · filed 2009-11-19(f)

We note that plaintiff made her motion for summary judgment two months after joinder of issue, before a preliminary conference ... had been conducted and before defendants had a fair opportunity to depose plaintiff or the witness mentioned in the police report (CPLR 3212 [f]; see Bradley v Ibex Constr. LLC, 22 AD3d 380 [2005]).

Section 3212(f) addresses a claim that summary judgment is premature because facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Passucci v. Home Depot, Inc. · filed 2009-11-20(f)

Plaintiffs contention that the motion with respect to the malicious prosecution cause of action was premature inasmuch as facts essential to justify opposition to that part of the motion may exist but cannot be stated is without merit (see Newman v Regent Contr. Corp., 31 AD3d 1133, 1134-1135 [2006]; see generally CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not require a court to defer a summary judgment motion that is not premature.

Staton v. Ilic · filed 2010-01-05(f)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the motions were not premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736 [2007]).

Section 3212 permits a court to consider a late summary judgment motion on nearly identical grounds to a timely motion because that similarity supplies good cause.

Lennard v. Khan · filed 2010-01-19(b)

In effect, the “nearly identical” nature of the grounds supporting both motions serves as good cause sufficient to permit review on the merits of the untimely motion (Grande v Peteroy, 39 AD3d at 592). “Notably, the court, in the course of deciding the timely motion, is, in any event, empowered to search the record and award summary judgment to a nonmoving party” (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Grande v Peteroy, 39 AD3d at 592).

Section 3212(f) allows a party to argue that a summary judgment motion is premature; the court may reject that argument as meritless.

Rivera v. Corbett · filed 2010-01-26(f)

The plaintiffs’ contention that the motion was premature was without merit (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Neryaev v Solon, 6 AD3d 510 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to consider an untimely summary judgment cross motion when a timely motion raises nearly identical grounds.

Wysk v. New York City School Construction Authority · filed 2010-02-05(a)

In such circumstances, the issues raised by the untimely motion or cross motion are already properly before the court and, thus, the nearly identical nature of the grounds may provide the requisite good cause (see CPLR 3212 [a]) to review the untimely motion or cross motion on the merits.

CPLR 3212(a) permits an untimely summary judgment motion when the movant shows good cause through a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

Scerri v. Walsh · filed 2010-02-16(a)

Contrary to the defendants’ argument, the plaintiffs showed “good cause” in the form of a “satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness” of their summary judgment motion (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; see CPLR 3212 [a]).

CPLR 3212(a) allows a late summary judgment motion on good cause when a timely motion to dismiss reasonably appeared to resolve the same issues.

Fofana v. 41 West 34th Street, LLC · filed 2010-03-09(a)

Thus, defendants’ averment that they had good cause not to file a motion for summary judgment contemporaneously with the motion to dismiss is valid.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when discovery may yield evidence relevant to the motion.

Astudillo v. City of New York · filed 2010-03-09(f)

Upon reargument, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, denied Comstock’s summary judgment motion, made one day after it filed its answer, as premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

A party claiming that a summary judgment motion is premature must offer an evidentiary basis that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within another party’s knowledge and control.

Hill v. Ackall · filed 2010-03-16(f)

Contrary to the contention of MTA Bus, the motion was not premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Staton v Ilic, 69 AD3d 606 [2010]; Garner v Chevalier Transp. Corp., 58 AD3d at 802). MTA Bus failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff (see Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d at 737; Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a late summary judgment motion; changing counsel does not establish good cause when prior counsel could have sought relief on time.

Hurley v. Best Buy Stores, L.P. · filed 2010-03-23(a)

Defendants failed to demonstrate “good cause” for their belated summary judgment motion (CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

A renewed summary judgment motion must address a triable issue of fact that defeated the earlier motion; the movant cannot prevail without new evidence resolving that issue.

Fried v. Tucker · filed 2010-03-23

In order for plaintiff to succeed on his instant motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must present with new evidence beyond what he presented to the court on his last motion to defeat the issue of fact raised by the ninth affirmative defense. Plaintiff has come forth with no new evidence. Thus, the triable issue of fact raised by the ninth affirmative defense remains and plaintiffs latest motion for summary judgment must be denied.

Section 3212(a)’s 120-day deadline runs from filing a note of issue and does not apply to District Court motions filed after a notice of trial.

Custis v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance · filed 2010-04-07(a)

In enacting the 120-day requirement for summary judgment motions in supreme and county courts, the legislature chose not to enact an amendment to the Uniform District Court Act or to otherwise expressly provide that the reference in CPLR 3212 (a) to the note of issue should be treated as a reference to the notice of trial.

CPLR 3212(f) allows a court to assess whether a summary judgment motion is premature.

Usowski v. All Tom R.V. Inc. · filed 2010-05-04(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the motion was not premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736, 737 [2007]; Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause to file a summary judgment motion more than 120 days after the note of issue.

Demacopoulos v. City of New York · filed 2010-05-11(a)

Generally, unless a trial court specifies otherwise, a party has 120 days after the filing of a note of issue to move for summary judgment, after which it may do so only with “leave of court on good cause shown” (CPLR 3212 [a]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a summary judgment motion more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed when the movant shows good cause for the delay, including significant discovery still outstanding when the note was filed.

Kung v. Zheng · filed 2010-05-11(a)

Under the circumstances of this case, Jeng demonstrated “good cause” for the delay in making his motion, since, inter alia, the note of issue was filed while there was significant discovery outstanding (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; see Gonzalez v 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124, 129 [2000]; McArdle v 123 Jackpot, Inc., 51 AD3d 743, 745 [2008]; Sclafani v Washington Mut., 36 AD3d 682, 682 [2007]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires a late summary judgment motion to be denied without reaching its merits when the movant offers no excuse for the delay.

Brewi-Bijoux v. City of New York · filed 2010-05-25(a)

Moreover, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering this late motion since the defendants failed to offer any excuse for their failure to timely move for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Nobile v Town of Hempstead, 17 AD3d 647 [2005]; Clermont v Hillsdale Indus., 6 AD3d 376, 377 [2004]). Such failure warrants denial of the motion without consideration of the merits thereof (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Rivera v City of New York, 306 AD2d 456 [2003]).

Section 3212(a) allows a court to consider a late summary judgment motion when the movant shows good cause for the delay.

Adika v. Dramitinos · filed 2010-06-08(a)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in refusing to entertain the appellants’ motion on the merits, on the ground that the motion was made five days after the expiration of 120 days after the filing of a note of issue (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]). Upon renewal, the appellants established that there was good cause for the delay.

Section 3212(a) permits a timely summary judgment motion to be considered even when it is made on the eve of trial.

Rozz v. Village Auto Body Works Inc. · filed 2010-06-11(a)

The plaintiffs objection was, and is, overruled as a motion for summary judgment should not be denied merely because it is made on the eve of trial, particularly when it is meritorious (676 R.S.D. v Scandia Realty, 195 AD2d 387 [1993]). Moreover, the motions for summary judgment are timely (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Arbay v Sunoco Inc., 24 Misc 3d 1243[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51865[U] [Nassau Dist Ct 2009]).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a court to consider a summary judgment cross motion filed after a court-ordered deadline.

Fiorino v. North Shore University Hospital at Glen Cove · filed 2010-11-30(a)

It is undisputed that all of those cross motions were untimely, as they were submitted beyond the court-ordered time limit of May 16, 2009, and none of the parties offered any good cause for their delay in making their respective cross motions (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; DiBenedetto v Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 43 AD3d 853 [2007]; cf. Ianello v O’Connor, 58 AD3d 684 [2009]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to deny an untimely summary judgment motion when the movant fails to show good cause for the delay.

Tapia v. Prudential Richard Albert Realtors · filed 2010-12-07(a)

The appellants failed to demonstrate good cause for their delay in making the motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Chechile v Magee, 66 AD3d 625 [2009]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated because disclosure is incomplete.

Bartee v. D & S Fire Protection Corp. · filed 2010-12-09(f)

Contrary to appellant’s contention that plaintiff’s request for additional disclosure is based on mere hope or conjecture that such will reveal favorable evidence, plaintiff’s photos of the hole and appellant’s daily reports show that facts essential to defeat the summary judgment motion may exist but cannot yet be stated (CPLR 3212 [f]).

A party who fails to timely object that a summary judgment motion was made before issue was joined cannot raise that objection for the first time on appeal.

Finsel v. Wachala · filed 2010-12-16(a)

While defendant made this motion for summary judgment before issue was joined, plaintiff failed to make a timely objection on the ground that it was premature (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Erie Ins. Group v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 63 AD3d 1412, 1414 n 2 [2009]; see also Roche v Claverack Coop. Ins. Co., 59 AD3d 914, 916 [2009]) and he cannot make this argument for the first time on appeal (seeAvraham v Allied Realty Corp., 8 AD3d 1079 [2004]).

Under CPLR 3212(b), an unanswered summary judgment motion may be granted if the movant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Town of Kirkwood v. Ritter · filed 2011-01-13(b)

Because defendants did not respond to plaintiffs motion, plaintiff could prevail by merely presenting a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Successive summary judgment motions are discouraged unless the movant shows newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause.

Velen Medical Supply, Inc. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 2011-01-26

Successive motions for summary judgment are discouraged in the absence of a showing of newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause (Ralston Purina Co. v McKee & Co., 174 AD2d 1060 [4th Dept 1991]). Plaintiff has not moved to reargue Judge Chaikin’s decision but merely offers a second motion for the relief previously denied. Moreover, the plaintiff has not set forth sufficient cause or presented any newly discovered evidence which would warrant entertaining the motion as one for renewal.

Section 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion for good cause, including when significant discovery remained outstanding when the note of issue was filed.

Grochowski v. Ben Rubins, LLC · filed 2011-02-01(a)

A to Z Steel demonstrated good cause for the delay in filing its motion for summary judgment, since the note of issue was filed while there was significant discovery outstanding (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Richardson v JAL Diversified Mgt., 73 AD3d 1012, 1012-1013 [2010]; Kung v Zheng, 73 AD3d 862, 863 [2010]; McArdle v 123 Jackpot, Inc., 51 AD3d 743, 745 [2008]; Sclafani v Washington Mut., 36 AD3d 682, 682 [2007]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for discovery based only on speculation that useful evidence might be found.

Hanover Insurance v. Prakin · filed 2011-02-15(f)

The mere hope and speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat the motion might be uncovered during discovery is an insufficient basis upon which to deny the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Essex Ins. Co. v Michael Cunningham Carpentry, 74 AD3d 733 [2010]; Peerless Ins. Co. v Micro Fibertek, Inc., 67 AD3d 978, 979 [2009]; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736, 737 [2007]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to consider a cross motion despite its untimeliness.

Snolis v. Clare · filed 2011-02-22(a)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying, as untimely, that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment with leave to renew when the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

Gardner v. Cason, Inc. · filed 2011-03-15(f)

It was premature to award summary judgment at this stage of the case.

CPLR 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature when the opposing party fails to show it could not obtain the needed evidence before the motion.

KUHN, JAMES C. v. CAMELOT ASSOCIATION, INC. · filed 2011-03-25(f)

We reject at the outset the contention of defendant that plaintiff’s motion was premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). ... Moreover, defendant failed to establish that it could not have deposed the nonparty witnesses during the approximately two-year period between the commencement of the action and plaintiff’s motion (see Guarino v Mohawk Containers Co., 59 NY2d 753; Avraham v Allied Realty Corp., 8 AD3d 1079; Witte v Incorporated Vil. of Port Washington N., 114 AD2d 359).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a late summary judgment motion.

Greenpoint Properties, Inc. v. Carter · filed 2011-03-29(a)

The Supreme Court erred by, in effect, granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for leave to serve and file a late motion for summary judgment, since the defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for not timely serving the motion as required by CPLR 3212 (a) (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when the opposing party has not had an opportunity to obtain evidence through a relevant deposition.

Gonzalez v. ARC Interior Construction · filed 2011-04-05(f)

It is noted again that the motion was made before defendants had an opportunity to depose plaintiff concerning the circumstances surrounding the accident and test her credibility (see Lopez, 67 AD3d at 558-559; CPLR 3212 [f]; see also Donato v ELRAC, Inc., 18 AD3d 696, 698 [2005]). Thus, dismissal of the defense would have been premature.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when further discovery may yield relevant evidence or facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Davis v. Rochdale Village, Inc. · filed 2011-04-26(f)

The plaintiff also failed to establish that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was premature, because he did not demonstrate that additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the defendant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Nash v Baumblit Constr. Corp., 72 AD3d 1037, 1040 [2010]; Chin Sue v City of New York, 83 AD3d 643 [2011]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause to consider a summary judgment motion made returnable after a court-set deadline.

Van Dyke v. Skanska USA Civil Northeast, Inc. · filed 2011-04-26(a)

The Supreme Court erred in entertaining the motion of the defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, which was made returnable over 30 days beyond the deadline fixed by the Supreme Court in a so-ordered stipulation, where the defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Anderson v Kantares, 51 AD3d 954 [2008]; Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Razy Assoc., 37 AD3d 702, 703-704 [2007]; Espejo v Hiro Real Estate Co., 19 AD3d 360, 361 [2005]; see also Jackson v Jamaica First Parking, LLC, 49 AD3d 501 [2008]; Smith v Nameth, 25 AD3d 599, 600 [2006]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to consider an untimely summary judgment cross motion for good cause when a timely motion raises nearly identical grounds.

Homeland Insurance v. National Grange Mutual Insurance · filed 2011-05-03(a)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying, as untimely, National Grange’s cross motion for summary judgment. While the cross motion was made more than 120 days after the note of issue was filed and, therefore, was untimely (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]), “an untimely motion or cross motion for summary judgment may be considered by the court where, as here, a timely motion for summary judgment was made on nearly identical grounds” (Grande v Peteroy, 39 AD3d 590, 591-592 [2007]; see Whitehead v City of New York, 79 AD3d 858, 860 [2010]; Lennard v Khan, 69 AD3d 812, 814 [2010]; Bressingham v Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 17 AD3d 496, 497 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a late summary judgment cross motion.

Teitelbaum v. Crown Heights Ass'n · filed 2011-05-10(a)

The Supreme Court, however, should have denied, as untimely, that branch of the City’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The City failed to demonstrate good cause for its delay in making the cross motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Bickelman v Herrill Bowling Corp., 49 AD3d 578, 580 [2008]).

A summary judgment cross motion filed after the applicable deadline requires good cause for the delay.

Polanco v. Creston Avenue Properties, Inc. · filed 2011-05-31(a)

Finally, with respect to Creston/Norwax’s cross motion, it was untimely under the rules of the Supreme Court, Civil Term, Kings County, as it was made more than 60 days after the filing of the note of issue (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Uniform Civ Term Rules of Sup Ct, Kings County, part C, rule 6; Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]). Moreover, Creston/Norwax failed to establish good cause for its delay in cross-moving for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [a]; cf. Grande v Peteroy, 39 AD3d 590, 591-592 [2007]).

CPLR 3212(a) allows a summary judgment motion more than 120 days after the note of issue upon a showing of good cause.

Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Tequila Cuervo La Rojena · filed 2011-06-16(a)

The court properly determined the motion for summary judgment, although it was made more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue.

Section 3212(a) allows a court to set a summary judgment deadline of at least 30 days after the note of issue is filed; a late movant must show good cause for the delay, and lack of prejudice alone is insufficient.

Gutheil v. Consolidated Edison of New York Co. · filed 2011-06-20(a)

Since 1996, CPLR 3212 (a) has provided that a motion for summary judgment must be made within 120 days after the note of issue has been filed, although the court may order a shorter period of at least 30 days. ... The court finds that plaintiffs motion is untimely pursuant to CPLR 3212. ... Plaintiff did not offer any explanation for the delay in bringing his motion and has only made a general statement that the motion was not prejudicial to defendants.

Under section 3212(a), removal of an action from the trial calendar nullifies its earlier note of issue, so the timeliness of a summary judgment motion is measured from the operative note of issue.

Lance International, Inc. v. First National City Bank · filed 2011-07-21(a)

Defendant’s underlying motion for summary judgment was timely (see CPLR 3212 [a]). ... Plaintiffs original note of issue, which was filed on October 19, 2007, “was, in effect, nullified” (Negron v Helmsley Spear, Inc., 280 AD2d 305, 305 [2001]) when the action was removed from the trial calendar. Therefore, the operative note of issue is the one filed on April 25, 2008 (see Williams v Peralta, 37 AD3d 712, 713 [2007]), and the motion was timely.

Section 3212(a) allows a court to deny an untimely summary judgment motion when the movant offers no excuse for the delay.

Ofman v. Ginsberg · filed 2011-11-15(a)

Moreover, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering this motion since the defendant failed to offer any excuse for the untimely submission of the motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when relevant discovery, including depositions, remains incomplete.

Shenkerman v. Goycoechea · filed 2011-11-18(f)

In light of the plaintiff’s own showing on this motion, and that discovery has not been completed, including the depositions of defendants Project O.H.R., Inc. and Dora Mikhlin, the motion is premature.

A summary judgment motion filed after a court-set deadline requires a showing of good cause for the delay.

Powers v. Sculco · filed 2011-11-29(a)

The defendants filed their cross motion for summary judgment more than four months after the deadline set by the Supreme Court. Contrary to their contention, the defendants failed to show “good cause” for filing a late motion (CPLR 3212 [a]; ...). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, as untimely, the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion filed more than 120 days after the note of issue.

Bivona v. Bob's Discount Furniture of NY, LLC · filed 2011-12-20(a)

Here, the defendant failed to establish “good cause” for the delay in serving and filing its motion (CPLR 3212 [a]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a late summary judgment motion; lack of prejudice to other parties does not establish good cause.

Reeps v. BMW of North America, LLC · filed 2012-04-05(a)

Martin’s motion for leave to serve a late cross motion for summary judgment was unsupported by a showing of “good cause” for the delay in making the motion and emphasized only the lack of prejudice to the other parties (CPLR 3212 [a]; see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated without further discovery.

Aburto v. City of New York · filed 2012-04-24(f)

We also find that plaintiffs motion is not premature. Defendants have not shown, or even argued, that other facts essential to justify opposition to the motion might exist but could not be stated without additional discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Matter of East 51st St. Crane Collapse Litig., 89 AD3d 426, 428 [2011]; Trainer v City of New York, 41 AD3d 202 [2007]).

Section 3212(a)'s good-cause requirement for a late summary judgment motion can be satisfied when a timely filed motion fails to reach the court because of a court filing error.

Kase v. H.E.E. Co. · filed 2012-05-10(a)

Defendants demonstrated “good cause” by submitting the affidavit of a paralegal describing how the motion papers had been prepared, served and personally filed with the clerk, but had not been delivered by the clerk to the motion court (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause to make a late motion for summary judgment.

Isolabella v. Sapir · filed 2012-06-05(a)

Defendants failed to demonstrate the requisite good cause for making a late motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) requires a late summary judgment motion to be denied when the movant fails to show good cause for the delay.

LAPP, PEGGY D. v. MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING CO · filed 2012-06-15(a)

Supreme Court properly denied the motion on the grounds that it was untimely (see CPLR 3212 [a]), and that defendant did not meet its burden of demonstrating good cause for its delay in bringing the motion (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652; Jones v Town of Le Ray, 28 AD3d 1177, 1178).

A pretrial application to dismiss that is substantively a summary judgment motion is subject to CPLR 3212(a)’s timing rule.

Samuels v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 2012-06-28(a)

The motion was in substance a motion for summary judgment and as such was untimely (CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to find a summary judgment motion premature when discovery is in its early stages and depositions have not been taken.

Blech v. West Park Presbyterian Church · filed 2012-07-10(f)

Defendants’ initial motions for summary judgment were premature, since the matter was in the early stages of discovery, and depositions had not yet been taken (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Tucker v New York City Tr. Auth., 42 AD3d 316 [2007]; Gonzalez v Vincent James Mgt. Co., 306 AD2d 226 [2003]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a court to set a deadline for summary judgment motions.

Vanderlyn v. Daly · filed 2012-07-26(a)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a), Supreme Court was free to establish its own deadline for the submission of a motion for summary judgment ... and, granting due deference to Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own scheduling order, we cannot say that the court erred in concluding that the challenged motion and cross motion were timely.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when relevant discovery remains outstanding.

Dwyer v. Central Park Studios, Inc. · filed 2012-09-18(f)

AHAC’s motion was premature, given that plaintiff was still scheduled to undergo three additional surgeries, an additional deposition of the plaintiff was still pending following the three surgeries, and plaintiff has not yet been examined by any physicians at the request of the defendants (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(b) permits a court to consider an untimely summary judgment cross motion based on nearly identical grounds as a timely motion.

Das v. Sun Wah Restaurant · filed 2012-10-10(b)

Moreover, the Supreme Court should have considered that branch of Livanos’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him even though it was filed almost a month after the deadline set by the parties’ stipulation, which was so-ordered by the Supreme Court.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when discovery may reveal facts needed to oppose the motion.

American Security Insurance v. Church of God of St. Albans · filed 2012-10-25(f)

The cross motion is denied as premature, with leave to renew, because discovery relevant to the instant cross motion has not been completed. Depositions concerning Leptourgos’ performance, if any, of any work relevant to the damage suffered by plaintiffs’ building have not been had (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) governs whether a summary judgment motion is premature.

HSBC Mortgage Corp. v. Pascoe · filed 2012-11-14(f)

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the moving defendants’ motion was not premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Buchinger v Jazz Leasing Corp., 95 AD3d 1053 [2012]; Savage v Quinn, 91 AD3d 748, 750 [2012]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery may reveal relevant evidence or that essential facts are within another party’s exclusive knowledge and control.

Martens v. County of Suffolk · filed 2012-11-21(f)

Furthermore, the County’s motion was not premature, as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how discovery may reveal or lead to relevant evidence, or that “facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within” another party’s “knowledge and control” (Espada v City of New York, 74 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2010]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Norero v 99-105 Third Ave. Realty, LLC, 96 AD3d 727, 728 [2012]; Haque v Daddazio, 84 AD3d 940 [2011]).

Section 3212(a) bars consideration of an untimely summary judgment cross motion that does not respond to a timely pending summary judgment motion.

Bicounty Brokerage Corp. v. Burlington Insurance · filed 2012-12-12(a)

Buckingham’s cross motion, while denominated as one to “clarify” the March 5 order, was, in effect, an untimely cross motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [a]). ... Here, however, Buckingham’s cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment was not responsive to a timely, pending motion for summary judgment and, therefore, the Supreme Court was without authority to consider it on its merits (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 650-651 [2004]).

A motion made before service of an answer is not treated as a summary judgment motion for purposes of the rule against successive summary judgment motions.

Shirzadnia v. Lecci · filed 2012-12-26

However, since the defendant’s 2005 motion was made prior to the service of an answer, and the 2011 motion was made following the completion of discovery, the record supports the Supreme Court’s determination that the 2005 motion was not properly characterized as one for summary judgment, and that, accordingly, the 2011 motion did not violate the rule against successive motions for summary judgment (see Sutter v Wakefern Food Corp., 69 AD3d 844, 845 [2010]; see also Kimber Mfg., Inc. v Hanzus, 56 AD3d 615, 616 [2008]; Williams v City of White Plains, 6 AD3d 609 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a late summary judgment motion.

Avezbakiyev v. City of New York · filed 2013-03-27(a)

The Supreme Court properly denied, as untimely, the motion of the defendants Horizon at Forest Hills, LLC, and Britt Realty Development Corp. (hereinafter together the appellants) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them, since they failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay in making their motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

CPLR 3212 requires a party that misses the 120-day deadline for a summary judgment motion to show good cause for the delay.

St. John's University v. Butler Rogers Baskett Architects, P.C. · filed 2013-04-03(a)

The Supreme Court properly denied, as untimely, the first motion of the defendant Langan Engineering and Environmental Services, Inc., EC. (hereinafter Langan) for summary judgment dismissing stated portions of the complaint since Langan failed to demonstrate good cause for not filing the motion before the expiration of the 120-day deadline set forth in CPLR 3212 (b) (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

A late cross motion for summary judgment requires good cause for the delay when it raises issues that are not nearly identical to those in a timely motion.

Vasquez v. C2 Development Corp. · filed 2013-04-03(a)

The Supreme Court properly, upon reargument, adhered to its original determination denying, as untimely, C2 Development’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, since C2 Development failed to demonstrate good cause for its delay in making the cross motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]). Contrary to C2 Development’s contention, the issues raised in its cross motion were not nearly identical to the issues raised in the plaintiffs timely motion (see Tapia v Prudential Richard Albert Realtors, 79 AD3d 735 [2010]; Podlaski v Long Is. Paneling Ctr. of Centereach, Inc., 58 AD3d 825, 827 [2009]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party claiming that a summary judgment motion is premature must establish that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

THE BANK OF CASTILE v. B. BEARDSLEY MANAGEMENT AND ENTERPR, ISES, INC. · filed 2013-05-03(f)

Contrary to defendants’ further contention, the motion was not premature. Defendants “failed to establish ‘that facts essential to justify opposition [to the motion] may exist but cannot then be stated’ ” (Newman v Regent Contr. Corp., 31 AD3d 1133, 1135, quoting CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to consider a late summary judgment motion when the movant shows good cause for the delay.

DeFilippo v. Miller · filed 2013-05-08(a)

The plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court erred in entertaining the defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment, even though they were made outside of the statutorily prescribed period for making such motions (see CPLR 3212 [a]). However, the Supreme Court properly entertained the motions, as the defendants demonstrated good cause for the delay (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725, 726-727 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

Section 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature when the opposing party fails to show that discovery may reveal relevant evidence or essential facts exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Sealy v. Clifton, LLC · filed 2013-05-22(f)

Further, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the subject motion was not premature, as “they failed to demonstrate how discovery may reveal or lead to relevant evidence or that ‘facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within’ [the plaintiff’s] ‘knowledge and control’ ” (Norero v 99-105 Third Ave. Realty, LLC, 96 AD3d 727, 728 [2012], quoting Espada v City of New York, 74 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2010]; see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when essential facts are in the movant’s possession and may emerge through discovery.

Brooks v. Somerset Surgical Associates · filed 2013-05-28(f)

Although Dr. Sohn submitted an affidavit stating he was not present at the moment of plaintiff’s fall, his motion for summary judgment was properly denied as premature, because essential facts concerning the cause of ... plaintiffs accident and the relationship between Dr. Sohn and defendant Somerset are exclusively within the possession of defendants and might well be disclosed by examination before trial or through cross-examination (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Baldasano v Bank of N.Y., 199 AD2d 184, 185 [1st Dept 1993]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a delayed summary judgment cross motion.

Medina v. R.M. Resources · filed 2013-06-19(a)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly denied, as untimely, that branch of the Costco defendants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The Costco defendants failed to demonstrate good cause for their delay in filing the cross motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

Section 3212(f) does not require denial of summary judgment as premature when the facts sought are not exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and would not support liability.

OWENS, KIMBERLY v. MIESCH, BARR · filed 2014-06-13(f)

We reject plaintiff’s contention that defendant’s motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) on the ground that it was premature. We conclude that the facts she sought to obtain were not ... in defendant’s exclusive knowledge and control and, in any event, would not have provided a basis to impose liability on defendant (see Cueva v 373 Wythe Realty, Inc., 111 AD3d 876, 877).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to show that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated; speculation is insufficient.

RESETARITS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. ELIZABETH PIERCE OLMSTED, M.D. CENT · filed 2014-06-20(f)

We further conclude that the court properly rejected defendants’ contention that plaintiff’s motion was premature because further discovery was necessary and thus properly denied the cross motion seeking that further discovery. In opposing a summary judgment motion as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), “ ‘the opposing party must make an evidentiary showing supporting [the conclusion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, and] mere speculation or conjecture [is] insufficient’ ” (Preferred Capital v PBK, Inc., 309 AD2d 1168, 1169; see Newman v Regent Contr. Corp., 31 AD3d 1133, 1134-1135).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity for disclosure.

Dhanlaxmi, Inc. v. Schiller · filed 2014-07-16(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the defendant was not given a reasonable opportunity for disclosure prior to the making of the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint. The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Family-Friendly Media, Inc. v Recorder Tel. Network, 74 AD3d 738, 739 [2010]; Gruenfeld v City of New Rochelle, 72 AD3d 1025 [2010]; Rodriguez v DeStefano, 72 AD3d 926 [2010]; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792 [1988]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not require denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when the opponent fails to show that discovery might yield relevant evidence or essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s control.

Singh v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc. · filed 2014-07-16(f)

Here, the defendants did not satisfy their burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was premature.

A summary judgment motion made after issue is joined and before the note of issue is filed is timely.

AgilityFunding,LLCvWholey · filed 2014-07-17(a)

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment after issue was joined and prior to the filing of the note of issue; hence, its motion was timely (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Oakes v Muka, 56 AD3d 1057, 1058 [2008]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion as premature.

Government Employees Insurance v. Sherpa · filed 2014-07-23(f)

The Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the issue of liability (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v LaMattina & Assoc., Inc., 59 AD3d 578 [2009]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636, 637 [2006]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for an untimely summary judgment motion; without it, the court will not consider the motion.

Carrasco v. Weissman · filed 2014-08-13(a)

Those defendants failed to establish good cause for not timely serving the motion as required by CPLR 3212 (a) (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Demacopoulos v City of New York, 73 AD3d 842 [2010]). Accordingly, those defendants were not entitled to consideration of their request for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, although we note that, by virtue of our determination in the related appeal, they have already been awarded summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action insofar as asserted against them.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a premature summary judgment motion without prejudice to renewal after outstanding discovery is completed.

Board of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist. v. County of Nassau · filed 2014-09-10(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, including the fact that substantial discovery is outstanding, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Lettieri v Cushing, 80 AD3d 574, 576 [2011]; Hall Enters., Inc. v Liberty Mgt. & Constr., Ltd., 37 AD3d 658, 659 [2007]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party opposing summary judgment as premature must provide evidence that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated; speculation is insufficient.

CSMC 2007-C1 OSWEGO ROAD, LLC v. KIMBROOK ROUTE 31, LLC · filed 2014-09-26(f)

“Although a motion for summary judgment may be opposed on the ground ‘that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated’ (CPLR 3212 [f]), ‘the opposing party must make an evidentiary showing supporting this conclusion, mere speculation or conjecture being insufficient’ ” ... and defendants failed to make that showing.

CPLR 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the note of issue to be denied unless the movant shows good cause for the delay.

Pantojas v. Niang · filed 2014-11-20(a)

The motion for summary judgment should have been denied, as defendant made the motion more than 120 days after the note of issue was filed, and he failed to show good cause for doing so (CPLR 3212 [a]; Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) requires a party moving for summary judgment after the 120-day deadline to show good cause for the delay in its moving papers.

BISSELL, JOHN v. STATE OF NEW YORK · filed 2014-11-21(a)

Defendant made its motion more than 10 months after the expiration of the statutory deadline of 120 days and failed to show good cause for its delay in its moving papers (see CPLR 3212 [a]; McNeill v Menter, 19 AD3d 1161, 1161).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment cross motion filed after a court-set deadline; the court also considered whether the late cross motion raised issues nearly identical to a timely motion.

Farrell v. Herzog · filed 2014-12-03(a)

The Supreme Court properly denied the cross motion of the defendant Michael A. Schirripa for summary judgment since he failed to establish “good cause” for his failure to cross-move within the 60-day time limit set by the Supreme Court for the making of motions or cross motions for summary judgment (CPLR 3212 [a]; ...), and this was not a situation where the issues raised by Schirripa’s untimely cross motion were nearly identical to the codefendants’ timely motion for summary judgment ...).

Section 3212(f) requires a party claiming that summary judgment is premature to show that further discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s control.

Burlington Insurance v. Casur Corp. · filed 2014-12-24(f)

A party contending that a motion for summary judgment is premature is required to demonstrate that ... additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to oppose the motion are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant ... Here, the defendant failed to indicate what evidence discovery may uncover, in addition to what has already been produced.

CPLR 3212(a) permits a summary judgment motion after the 120-day deadline when the movant shows good cause for the delay.

Braun v. Star Community Publishing Group, LLC · filed 2015-02-25(a)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in entertaining the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Although the motion was made nine days after the expiration of the statutory 120-day period following the filing of the note of issue (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]), the defendant established that there was good cause for the delay (see Nisimova v Starbucks Corp., 108 AD3d 513, 514 [2013]; Adika v Dramitinos, 74 AD3d 848, 849 [2010]).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause to excuse a summary judgment motion filed after a court-set deadline; an attorney’s inadvertence does not suffice.

Kritzer v. Ventura Insurance Brokerage, Inc. · filed 2015-03-04(a)

When the court sets the time within which a party may move for summary judgment under CPLR 3212 (a), the court may not excuse lateness without a showing of good cause. ... While the mistaken belief of defendant’s attorney that no deadline shorter than the 120 days provided by CPLR 3212 (a) had been imposed may explain defendant’s failure to seek an extension, an attorney’s inadvertence does not amount to the good cause required to excuse the lateness.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when facts needed to oppose the motion may emerge from a deposition of the moving party.

Figueroa v. City of New York · filed 2015-03-05(f)

We affirm the motion court’s denial of BID’s motion for summary judgment with leave to renew after the EBT of a BID representative. CPLR 3212 (f) provides that “[sjhould it appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot'then be stated, the court may deny the motion.”

CPLR 3212(a) permits a court to consider an untimely summary judgment motion when good cause exists.

Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hong Kong Supermarket, Inc. · filed 2015-03-24(a)

Under the specific circumstances of this case, the court should have found that good cause existed to review Hong Kong’s motion for summary judgment on the merits (see CPLR 3212 [a]).

Section 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion for good cause, including lack of clarity in a court order about when the motion must be filed.

Keibel v. Riina · filed 2015-03-26(a)

Even if the renewed motions may nevertheless be considered untimely despite the lack of clarity in Supreme Court’s January 27, 2012 order, such lack of clarity constituted the requisite “good cause” for the late filing (see Vila v Cablevision of NYC, 28 AD3d 248, 249 [1st Dept 2006]; CPLR 3212 [a]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to show that discovery could yield material evidence sufficient to defeat the motion.

Seton Health at Schuyler Ridge Residential Health Care v. Dziuba · filed 2015-04-02(f)

Nor has defendant made the requisite showing that discovery would yield material and relevant evidence sufficient to defeat the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Hobler v Hussain, 111 AD3d 1006, 1009 [2013]; 2 N. St. Corp. v Getty Saugerties Corp., 68 AD3d 1392, 1396 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 706 [2010]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion as premature when needed deposition testimony has not yet been given.

VanNostrand v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2015-04-08(f)

Finally, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, denied, as premature, that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted by VanNostrand, with leave to renew within 45 days, on the ground that the plaintiffs’ attorney had not yet given deposition testimony (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Worley v Safemove Rental, 120 AD3d 667, 667-668 [2014]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show why the motion should be denied on that ground.

Sears Ready Mix, Ltd. v. Lighthouse Marina, Inc. · filed 2015-04-08(f)

Moreover, the plaintiff failed to show that the motion should have been denied as premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; 1375 Equities Corp. v Buildgreen Solutions, LLC, 120 AD3d 783, 784 [2014]).

Section 3212(a)’s filing deadline applies to a second summary judgment motion; a court may consider a timely motion that raises an issue not previously decided.

Green Harbour Homeowners Ass'n v. Ermiger · filed 2015-05-07(a)

First addressing plaintiffs procedural contentions, we are unpersuaded that Supreme Court erred by entertaining a second summary judgment motion by defendant. ... Here, defendant’s second summary judgment motion against plaintiff was made after the completion of discovery and within the time limits of CPLR 3212 (a), and it turned upon a legal issue not previously decided.

A party may waive CPLR 3212(a)’s 120-day deadline for a summary judgment motion by expressly consenting to the motion’s timing.

BENNETT, AINSWORTH M. v. ST. JOHN'S HOME · filed 2015-05-08(a)

While we agree with our dissenting colleague that the court was not required to accept the express stipulation of the parties to extend the 120-day deadline in CPLR 3212, we note that the court in fact did so in advance of the motion (cf. Coty v County of Clinton, 42 AD3d 612, 614). Moreover, unlike our dissenting colleague, we do not view the timing requirements applicable to motions for summary judgment as a matter of public policy that may not be affirmatively waived by a party (see Mitchell v New York Hosp., 61 NY2d 208, 214).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment while discovery is pending when information needed to oppose the motion may be within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

Fisher v. City of New York · filed 2015-05-13(f)

Nevertheless, inasmuch as discovery in the case is in its beginning stages and information may be within the City’s exclusive knowledge as to whether it created the dangerous condition (see Adler v City of New York, 52 AD3d 549 [2008]), summary judgment dismissing the Castronovos’ cross claims against the City is inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Colon v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 35 AD3d 515, 517 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when further discovery may yield relevant evidence or facts essential to opposing the motion are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Lido Beach Towers v. Denis A. Miller Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 2015-05-27(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ and Kaled’s arguments, Miller’s motion was not premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium, 96 AD3d 703 [2012]; Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The plaintiffs and Kaled failed to demonstrate that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to their opposition of the motion were exclusively within Miller’s knowledge and control (see Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614, 615 [1999]; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792, 793 [1988]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after the note of issue is filed unless the court grants leave for good cause.

Caban v. Mastrosimone · filed 2015-06-10(a)

The defendant was required to make his motion for summary judgment no more than 120 days after the note of issue was filed, unless he obtained leave of the court on good cause shown (see CPLR 3212 [a]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when necessary facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and discovery is needed.

Hoffman v. Wyckoff Heights Medical Center · filed 2015-06-16(f)

Plaintiffs motion was also premature (CPLR 3212 [f]). Defendant demonstrated that discovery was necessary because proof of whether plaintiff engaged in misconduct constituting cause for termination resided exclusively within his knowledge, including, for example, why he withheld information about being the target of an investigation by the Kings County District Attorney’s Office.

A party seeking to delay summary judgment under section 3212(f) must show that discovery might yield relevant evidence or that facts essential to its opposition are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

MVB Collision, Inc. v. Progressive Insurance · filed 2015-06-24(f)

The plaintiffs contention that summary judgment should have been denied as premature under CPLR 3212 (f) is unpersuasive. A party contending that a summary judgment motion is premature must demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant (see Singh v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 119 AD3d 768, 770 [2014]; Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium, 96 AD3d 703, 704 [2012]; Corwin v Heart Share Human Servs. of N.Y., 66 AD3d 814, 815 [2009]).

A summary judgment motion served before the note of issue remains timely under CPLR 3212(a) when it is renewed after a deceased party’s representative is substituted.

Pietrafesa v. Canestro · filed 2015-07-01(a)

Therefore, the defendant’s motion was timely made pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a). The fact that the defendant, in effect, renewed his pending motion for summary judgment in August 2014, after a personal representative was substituted for the decedent, did not render his motion untimely.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when further discovery is needed.

Knapp v. Town of Hempstead · filed 2015-07-01(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, we find that it was premature to award summary judgment to the defendant at this stage of the action on the ground that there was no prior written notice, or the absence of any recognized exceptions thereto (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Gruenfeld v City of New Rochelle, 72 AD3d 1025, 1026 [2010]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for an untimely summary judgment motion; without it, the motion must be denied without considering its merits.

Jones v. City of New York · filed 2015-07-08(a)

The court erred in considering this late application, since the defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for its failure to timely move for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Giannattasio v Han Suk Kang, 30 AD3d 375 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) permits an opponent to resist summary judgment as premature by showing that facts essential to opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Matter of Gilmore · filed 2015-09-16(f)

The Surrogate’s Court properly determined that the motion was not premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), since the object-ant Andrea Hofler failed to show that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]; see Anzel v Pistorino, 105 AD3d 784, 786 [2013]).

A party seeking to delay summary judgment for discovery must show that further discovery may produce relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Jannetti v. Whelan · filed 2015-09-30(f)

“A party contending that a motion for summary judgment is premature is required to demonstrate that additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to oppose the motion are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant[s]” ... Here, the plaintiff failed to indicate what evidence further discovery might uncover, or to explain how information concerning his financial ability to close on December 24, 2010, was not already in his possession.

Section 3212(a)'s 120-day deadline for summary judgment motions is not triggered when no note of issue has been filed and no scheduling order is in place.

Eisenberg v. Cope Bestway Express, Inc. · filed 2015-09-30(a)

There is no indication in the record before us that there was a scheduling order in place, or that a note of issue was filed which would have triggered the CPLR 3212 (a) 120-day statutory deadline for the filing of summary judgment motions, and no defendant took issue with the timeliness of the cross motion.

Section 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion for good cause, which a detailed affidavit explaining counsel’s calendaring error can establish.

Obiotta v. Dukes System Corp. · filed 2015-10-06(a)

Defendants acknowledged that their motion for summary judgment was filed 21 days after the expiration of the time period provided in CPLR 3212 (a) as a result of an error by their attorney in calendaring the deadline. The motion court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in finding good cause for the delay based on the detailed affidavit by counsel concerning the error (see Gonzalez v 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124, 128-129 [2000]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when facts essential to oppose it may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Bonilla v. Bangert's Flowers · filed 2015-10-07(f)

Amotion for summary judgment may be denied as premature where it appears that the facts essential to oppose the motion exist but cannot then be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Sepulveda v Cammeby’s Mgt. Co., LLC, 119 AD3d 927, 927 [2014]).

A party opposing summary judgment as premature must show that discovery might yield relevant evidence or that facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Richards v. Burch · filed 2015-10-14(f)

A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts necessary to oppose the motion are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant ... Here, the defendants established neither.

Section 3212(a) requires good cause or leave to file a summary judgment cross motion more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed.

CRACCHIOLA, STEVEN J. v. SAUSNER, BRIAN · filed 2015-11-20(a)

We further note that we agree with defendants that plaintiffs’ cross motion was untimely, inasmuch as it was made more than 120 days after the note of issue was filed, and plaintiffs did not seek leave to file a late motion or show good cause for their delay pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a court to entertain a late summary judgment motion when the movant establishes good cause for the delay.

Chan v. Auto Traders of 5 Towns, Inc. · filed 2016-01-27(a)

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in entertaining the defendants’ late summary judgment motion, as the defendants established good cause for the delay (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Grochowski v Ben Rubins, LLC, 81 AD3d 589, 591 [2011]).

CPLR 3212(b) permits a dismissal motion to be treated as a motion for summary judgment.

Kinberg v. Schwartzapfel, Novick, Truhowsky, Marcus, PC · filed 2016-02-04(b)

Defendant’s motion, properly treated as a motion for summary judgment (CPLR 3212 [b]), is not precluded by the “single motion” rule (CPLR 3211 [e]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion as premature when discovery remains incomplete.

Torres-Ruiz v. Luxor Transport Corp. · filed 2016-02-10(f)

The Supreme Court properly denied, with leave to renew following the completion of discovery, Fleet’s motion and Luxor’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against each of them. Under the circumstances of this case, the motion and the cross motion were premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Knapp v Town of Hempstead, 130 AD3d 579, 580 [2015]; Buto v Town of Smithtown, 121 AD3d 829, 830 [2014]; Johnson v Richardson, 120 AD3d 767, 768 [2014]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion made after the deadline.

Sanchez v. Metro Builders Corp. · filed 2016-02-10(a)

Because Metro moved for summary judgment relief against JMZ and Cocos Brothers after the deadline to make a motion for summary judgment had passed, and failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay, ... were correctly deemed untimely and rejected as such by the court (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Gaines v Shell-Mar Foods, Inc., 21 AD3d at 986; Milano v George, 17 AD3d 644 [2005]).

Section 3212(a) governs whether a cross motion for summary judgment is timely.

Graham v. City of New York · filed 2016-02-10(a)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention (see Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539 [1983]), that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment was timely (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Vazquez v Flesor, 128 AD3d 808 [2015]).

An untimely summary judgment cross motion requires good cause for the delay unless it raises issues nearly identical to those in a timely motion.

Vitale v. Astoria Energy II, LLC · filed 2016-04-20(a)

The Supreme Court also properly denied the remainder of the defendants’ cross motion as untimely, since the defendants failed to demonstrate good cause for their delay in making the ... cross motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]). The issues raised in the remainder of the cross motion were not nearly identical to the issues raised in the plaintiffs’ timely motion (see Paredes v 1668 Realty Assoc., LLC, 110 AD3d 700, 702 [2013]; Vasquez v C2 Dev. Corp., 105 AD3d 729, 731 [2013]).

Section 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion for good cause, including ambiguity in a stipulation setting the deadline.

Diaz v. 313-315 West 125th Street LLC · filed 2016-04-26(a)

Accordingly, even if appellants’ motion is considered untimely, the ambiguity in the stipulation constituted good cause for the late filing (id. at 248-249; see CPLR 3212 [a]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice when necessary disclosure remains incomplete.

Gitman v. Martinez · filed 2016-05-05(f)

Under the circumstances, plaintiff's motion should have been denied as premature without prejudice to seeking such relief following completion of disclosure (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Takhalov v Rottenberg, 128 AD3d 678, 678 [2015]; Sorbello v Birchez Assoc., LLC, 61 AD3d 1225, 1226-1227 [2009]; Catena v Amsterdam Mem. Hosp., 6 AD3d at 1038-1039).

CPLR 3212(a) does not permit a court to entertain a summary judgment motion that duplicates an earlier motion denied as untimely.

Shanoff v. Golyan · filed 2016-05-18(a)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court should not have entertained Winiarsky’s motion for summary judgment, as it was duplicative of his motion denominated as being in limine, which was actually a summary judgment motion and which had already been denied as untimely in the order dated April 12, 2012 (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Bressingham v Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 17 AD3d 496, 496 [2005]).

When the court sets no earlier deadline, section 3212(a) allows a party 120 days after filing the note of issue to move for summary judgment.

Boereau v. Scott · filed 2016-06-01(a)

CPLR 3212 (a) provides that “[i]f no such date is set by the court, such motion shall be made no later than one hundred twenty days after the filing of the note of issue, except with leave of court on good cause shown” (CPLR 3212 [a]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when necessary discovery remains outstanding and the record suggests unresolved factual issues.

Baghban v. City of New York · filed 2016-06-23(f)

The court also properly held that 153 Chambers’s motion was premature (CPLR 3212 [f]). Plaintiff and codefendants demonstrated that additional discovery was necessary because 153 Chambers’s president had yet to be deposed, and the record suggested that there were issues of fact as to whether 153 Chambers had constructive notice of the sidewalk condition before the accident (see Figueroa v City of New York, 126 AD3d 438, 439 [1st Dept 2015]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when further discovery may produce relevant evidence or facts essential to opposing the motion are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Pabarroo v. TS 405 Lexington Owner, LLC · filed 2016-07-20(f)

Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention and the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the motion for summary judgment was not premature, since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that further discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to justify opposition to Guardian’s motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of Guardian (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Williams v Spencer-Hall, 113 AD3d 759, 760 [2014]; Brabham v City of New York, 105 AD3d 881, 883 [2013]).

Under CPLR 3212(a), a summary judgment motion filed after the court’s deadline must be denied when the movant offers no good cause for the delay.

Cullity v. Posner · filed 2016-10-13(a)

The motion should have been denied as untimely.

A party claiming a summary judgment motion is premature under section 3212(f) must show that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Oppedisano v. Arnold · filed 2016-10-19(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was not premature, as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the defendant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Joon Mgt. One Corp. v Town of Ramapo, 142 AD3d 587 [2016]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion filed after the deadline, and the moving papers must show that cause.

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Weisblum · filed 2016-10-19(a)

Here, the plaintiff’s motion was made 128 days after filing of the note of issue, or 8 days after the 120-day deadline imposed by the Supreme Court in a notice to resume prosecution dated December 17, 2013. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate, in its moving papers, good cause for not filing the motion in a timely manner, as directed by the court ... The court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint and in considering the good cause arguments raised for the first time in the plaintiff’s reply papers ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint.

CPLR 3212(a) permits a court to consider an untimely summary judgment motion when a timely motion raises nearly identical issues; otherwise, the late movant must show good cause for the delay.

Sheng Hai Tong v. K and K 7619, Inc. · filed 2016-11-16(a)

Thus, since K and K failed to demonstrate good cause for its delay in making the cross motion, those branches of the cross motion were properly denied as untimely (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Vitale v Astoria Energy II, LLC, 138 AD3d 981, 983 [2016]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show that discovery might yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Morales v. Amar · filed 2016-12-28(f)

The appellants’ contention that the motions should have been denied as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Suero-Sosa v Cardona, 112 AD3d 706, 708 [2013]; Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850, 852 [2013]; Woodard v Thomas, 77 AD3d 738, 740 [2010]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment for outstanding discovery when the opposing party identifies information in the movant’s exclusive control that could raise a material issue of fact.

Erkan v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 2017-01-10(f)

However, they failed to identify what information is in the exclusive control of plaintiff that would raise a material issue of fact such that CPLR 3212 (f) would warrant denial of the motion.

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show an evidentiary basis for believing discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are controlled by the movant.

Reale v. Tsoukas · filed 2017-01-11(f)

There is no merit to the plaintiff’s contention that the motion for summary judgment was premature. “A party who seeks a finding that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to put forth some evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant” ... Here, the plaintiff failed to meet this burden.

Section 3212(f) requires denial of summary judgment when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but are within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge or control.

Curry v. Hundreds of Hats, Inc. · filed 2017-01-19(f)

We agree with plaintiff that the motion should have been denied as premature. Plaintiff is entitled to complete discovery in her effort to establish the precise relationships among the various entities and their relationships to Nolfi. Significantly, this information is solely within the control of defendants. Yet, not only have defendants not been produced for court-ordered depositions, but they have also failed to produce many of the relevant written agreements. “Where essential facts to justify opposition to a motion for summary judgment might exist, but cannot be stated because they are in the moving party’s exclusive knowledge or control, summary judgment must be denied (CPLR 3212 [f])” (Ciaffaglione v Rabiner, 202 AD2d 373, 373 [1st Dept 1994]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party claiming that summary judgment is premature must show how discovery might yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant's knowledge and control.

Toscano v. Weiss · filed 2017-01-20(f)

Defendant's contention that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment dismissing the counterclaims was premature is without merit, as defendant failed to demonstrate how discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within plaintiff's knowledge and control (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Joon Mgt. One Corp. v Town of Ramapo, 142 AD3d 587 [2016]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when needed discovery may clarify outstanding factual issues.

Burke v. Yankee Stadium, LLC · filed 2017-01-31(f)

Furthermore, Cassone’s motion was premature to the extent it was premised on CPLR 3212.

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show how discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge or control.

Diaz v. Yang · filed 2017-03-01(f)

The plaintiff’s contention that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was premature also is without merit, since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the defendants’ knowledge or control {see CPLR 3212 [f]; Reyes v Carroll, 137 AD3d 886, 890 [2016]).

Section 3212(f) does not require denial of summary judgment as premature when the requested discovery would not raise a triable issue of fact.

Park Place at Malta, LLC v. Berkshire Bank · filed 2017-03-16(f)

Finally, Supreme Court properly refused to deny defendants’ motion as premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]). The documentary proof submitted on the motion conclusively established that each of plaintiff’s seven causes of action failed as a matter of law and that the discovery sought by plaintiff would not result in a triable issue of fact (see Route 217, LLC v Greer, 119 AD3d at 1021; Weintraub v Levine, 22 AD3d 664, 664 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(a)'s time limit for summary judgment motions does not apply to a cross motion seeking relief under CPLR 3211(b).

ZARNOCH, JERAD M. v. LUCKINA, ROBERT W. · filed 2017-03-24(a)

To the extent that the cross motion sought relief pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b), it was not subject to the time limit for summary judgment motions under CPLR 3212 (a) (see Siegel, NY Prac § 272 at 470 [5th ed 2011]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when further discovery may produce evidence relevant to the claims.

Solano v. Skanska USA Civil Northeast Inc. · filed 2017-03-28(f)

Because discovery has not been completed, and depositions have yet to be taken, Durr’s motion, to the extent it sought dismissal of the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims, was properly denied as premature (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion are in the movant’s control and the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

Blake v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-29(f)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), “where facts essential to justify opposition to a motion for summary judgment are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant, summary judgment may be denied. This is especially so where the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity for disclosure prior to the making of the motion” ... Here, the plaintiffs showed that they have not yet had an adequate opportunity to complete discovery relevant to their remaining causes of action alleging malicious prosecution and false arrest. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ remaining malicious prosecution and false arrest causes of action as premature.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when the opposing party needs discovery of relevant facts exclusively within the movant's control.

Stern v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2017-04-13(f)

Accordingly, the motion court properly found that the motion for summary judgment was premature, since plaintiff is entitled to discovery of matter exclusively within Starwood's control [*2]concerning issues relating to its possible agency relationship with the hotel, including its reservations system and advertising (CPLR 3212[f]; see Ross v Stuart Intl. , 275 AD2d 650, 651 [1st Dept 2000]).

Subdivision (f) permits a summary judgment motion to be deferred for discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are within the movant’s control.

Unified Window Systems, Inc. v. Endurance American Specialty Insurance Co. · filed 2017-04-19(f)

Moreover, Endurance failed to establish that summary judgment was premature in light of outstanding discovery. “ ‘A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or [that] the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant’ ” (Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2014], quoting Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850, 852 [2013]; see CPLR 3212 [f]). Here, Endurance did not establish what information it hoped to discover that would demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact.

An opponent of summary judgment must show that the motion is premature to obtain relief under CPLR 3212 (f).

Medina v. Richard A. Kraslow, P.C. · filed 2017-04-19(f)

Further, the defendant’s opposition failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s motion was premature (see CPLR 3212 [fl).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for an untimely summary judgment motion.

Brody v. Propark America · filed 2017-04-20(a)

Propark’s motion for summary judgment was untimely, and Propark failed to offer “good cause,” or any explanation at all, for the delay in making it (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion for good cause, including when counsel was not notified of the note of issue and discovery continued after it was filed.

Coon v. Hotel Gansevoort Group, LLC · filed 2017-05-16(a)

The motion court providently exercised its discretion in granting SSI, upon “good cause shown,” leave to file its belated summary judgment motion (CPLR 3212 [a]), where SSI’s counsel was not notified that plaintiff had e-filed the note of issue, the parties continued to engage in discovery after the filing of the note of issue, and plaintiff filed the note of issue more than one month before the deadline stipulated to by the parties (see Pena v Women’s Outreach Network, Inc., 35 AD3d 104, 108-109 [1st Dept 2006]).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause to waive the time limits for a summary judgment motion.

Burbridge v. Soho Plaza Corp. · filed 2017-05-16(a)

In addition, Supreme Court properly refused to vacate the note of issue (22 NYCRR 202.21 [e]) and/or waive the time limits for summary judgment (CPLR 3212 [a]), as plaintiffs failed to make a showing of “good cause” for either relief.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when the opposing party shows that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Sapp v. S.J.C. 308 Lenox Avenue Family Ltd. Partnership · filed 2017-05-18(f)

Plaintiff ignores that CPLR 3212 (f), on which she relies, permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature if the nonmovant can establish that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.” Plaintiff has not offered any reason why she could not have submitted an affidavit from BLA at the time her opposition to defendant’s motion was due.

Section 3212 provides for a postanswer summary judgment motion to raise preserved arguments that are premature on a preanswer dismissal motion.

539 W 156, L.L.C. v. Hernandez · filed 2017-05-24

Respondents' remaining appellate arguments in support of their preanswer dismissal motion, to the extent preserved, are properly made in a postanswer motion for summary [*2] judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212.