N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3212

Section 3212(a) permits a court to allow a late summary judgment motion for good cause, with lack of prejudice supporting that decision.

McKay v. Ciani · filed 2001-02-08(a)

Addressing plaintiffs procedural challenge, CPLR 3212 (a) provides that a court may permit a late proffer of a motion for summary judgment if “good cause [is] shown.”

Section 3212(a) permits a court to deny an untimely motion for summary judgment.

Nationwide Postal Management v. BMW Financial Services, N. A. · filed 2001-02-20(a)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as untimely (see, CPLR 3212 [a]; Clifford v Harrow Stores, 274 AD2d 370; Gonzalez v 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124; Welch Foods v Wilson, 277 AD2d 882).

CPLR 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after the note of issue is filed unless the court grants leave for good cause shown.

Seifried v. Seifried · filed 2001-03-05(a)

Insofar as the motion and cross motion seek summary judgment, the parties are time barred from pursuing such relief. The latest date for making such a motion is 120 days from the date the note of issue is filed “except with leave of court on good cause shown.” (CPLR 3212 [a].) Here, neither party seeks such leave and neither presents good cause to be exempted from this time frame; indeed, neither party seems to notice that this rule exists. The note of issue was filed September 13, 2000, plaintiffs motion was made January 31, 2000, and the cross motion was made February 5, 2001. As such, those portions of the motion and cross motion which seek summary judgment are denied as untimely.

Section 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion when good cause is shown.

La Hendro v. Nadeau · filed 2001-03-08(a)

CPLR 3212 (a) permits a late proffer of a motion for summary judgment if “good cause [is] shown.”

A party seeking to defeat summary judgment for lack of discovery must show that its ignorance of critical facts is unavoidable and that it made reasonable efforts to discover facts that could raise a triable issue.

Lumbsy v. Theater · filed 2001-04-16(f)

To defeat a motion for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [f]) a party claiming ignorance of critical facts must first demonstrate that his or her ignorance is unavoidable, and that reasonable attempts were made to discover facts which would give rise to a triable issue (see, Cruz v Otis El. Co., 238 AD2d 540; Rothbort v S.L.S. Mgt. Corp., 185 AD2d 806).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when further discovery may reveal evidence relevant to a material factual dispute.

Schachat v. Bell Atlantic Corp. · filed 2001-04-19(f)

Relying solely on plaintiffs testimony, defendant failed to meet its burden of eliminating any material issues of fact from the case (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562), and its motion for summary judgment should have been denied as premature. Plaintiffs cross motion to compel defendant to produce such employees for deposition and to respond to her earlier notice of discovery and inspection, which sought the names and addresses of the employees as well as document disclosure, should have been granted (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when evidence essential to opposing the motion is in the moving party’s exclusive control.

Petrell v. Victory Markets, Inc. · filed 2001-05-02(f)

In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant met its initial burden, we nevertheless conclude that the motion should have been denied as premature. Plaintiff established that defendant had exclusive possession and control over an accident report that was “essential to justify opposition” to the motion (CPLR 3212 [f]) and that defendant failed to provide the report to plaintiff as requested (cf., Sumell v Wegmans Food Mkts., supra, at 703).

Section 3212(a) requires summary judgment motions within 120 days after the note of issue unless the court grants leave for good cause.

Williams v. Nicolaou · filed 2001-06-18(a)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in entertaining the motion for summary judgment which was filed 123 days after the plaintiff filed a note of issue. CPLR 3212 (a) provides that motions for summary judgment shall be made no later than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, except with leave of the court on “good cause” shown.

Section 3212(a) permits a court to consider a summary judgment motion filed more than 120 days after the note of issue when the movant shows good cause for the delay.

Slate v. State · filed 2001-06-21(a)

Therefore, we find that claimant has established good cause for consideration of his belated motion for summary judgment.

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed.

Martin Iron & Construction Co. v. Grace Industries, Inc. · filed 2001-07-09(a)

Contrary to the appellants’ contentions, the Supreme Court properly denied their motion for summary judgment as against Martin. The motion was made after the jury was selected and more than 120 days after filing of the note of issue in Action No. 1 (see, CPLR 3212 [a]), and good cause was not shown for the failure to timely move (cf., Samuel v A.T.P. Dev. Corp., 276 AD2d 685; Rossi v Arnot Ogden Med. Ctr., 252 AD2d 778, 779).

CPLR 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after the note of issue is filed unless the court grants leave for good cause.

Torres v. Westchester Dental Services, P. C. · filed 2001-10-29(a)

The defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, filed more than eight months after the filing of the note of issue, was untimely.

A nunc pro tunc amendment and refiling of a note of issue does not extend the deadline for a summary judgment motion under CPLR 3212(a).

Weitzner v. Elazarov · filed 2001-11-05(a)

As such, it cannot be said that the refiling of the note of issue herein extended the time in which a summary judgment motion must be filed. ... It would be a total abuse of this court’s discretion to exercise it in such a way as to ignore the gross violations of CPLR 3212 (a) and the local court rule and reach the merits of this extremely late motion for summary judgment. ... There being no compelling reason for considering this motion at this late juncture, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

CPLR 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after the note of issue is filed unless the court grants leave for good cause.

Tavkar v. Cab · filed 2001-12-03(a)

The appellant’s summary judgment motion, filed more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, was untimely.

Section 3212(a) permits a court to deny an untimely summary judgment motion in its discretion.

Morreira v. City of New York · filed 2001-12-10(a)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion for summary judgment as untimely (see, CPLR 3212 [a]; Morhart v City of New York, 267 AD2d 438; Caiola v Allcity Ins. Co., 277 AD2d 273; cf., Gonzalez v 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124).

Section 3212(a) allows a court to hear a summary judgment motion after the 120-day deadline on good cause shown; the reason for the delay matters more than the motion’s merits.

Luciano v. Apple Maintenance & Services, Inc. · filed 2001-12-13(a)

CPLR 3212 (a), as amended (eff Jan. 1, 1997), requires a motion for summary judgment to be made within 120 days of the filing of note of issue, “except with leave of court on good cause shown.” ... The motion here was accompanied by an adequate explanation from defendant’s attorney for the de minimis delay of six days.

A belated motion for summary judgment may be denied under CPLR 3212(a).

Hernandez v. City of New York · filed 2002-01-14(a)

In addition, the Supreme Court properly denied the belated motion of the appellant City of New York for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [a]; Neves v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 265 AD2d 393, 394).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.

Waggoner v. Lancet Arch, Inc. · filed 2002-02-01(f)

Defendants failed to establish that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to consider a late summary judgment motion for good cause when the delay is minimal and causes no prejudice.

Lambadarios v. Kobren · filed 2002-02-05(a)

The court may exercise its discretion in considering the six day late cross motion of defendants Winthrop University Hospital and Salvatore LoPresti, D.O. The delay was minimal and in the absence of prejudice, good cause warrants the consideration of the cross motion (Miranda v Devlin, 260 AD2d 451 [2d Dept 1999]). The motion for summary judgment by Winthrop University Hospital and Dr. LoPresti, therefore, is not time barred.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when the opposing party has not had an adequate opportunity to discover relevant information exclusively within the movant’s knowledge.

Mazzola v. Kelly · filed 2002-02-25(f)

The plaintiff has not yet had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery into several relevant issues that are exclusively within the knowledge of the appellant (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Firesearch Corp. v Micro Computer Controls Corp., 240 AD2d 365, 366; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly denied, as premature, the appellant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

CPLR 3212 permits a court to exercise discretion in entertaining a belated motion for summary judgment.

Popovetsky v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. · filed 2002-03-11

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in entertaining the defendants’ belated motion for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212; Gonzalez v 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124; Williams v Nicolaou, 284 AD2d 451).

CPLR 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after a note of issue is filed unless the court grants leave for good cause shown.

Dono v. Bar Biz Restaurant & Equipment Corp. · filed 2002-03-18(a)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in allowing the defendant to move for summary judgment more than 120 days after the filing of the plaintiff’s note of issue. CPLR 3212 (a) requires a motion for summary judgment to be made within 120 days after the filing of a note of issue, except with leave of court on good cause shown.

Section 3212(a) limits when a summary judgment motion may be entertained; an untimely motion requires an excuse for the delay.

Braunsdorf v. Haywood · filed 2002-06-13(a)

Moreover, to the extent the motion was, in essence, one for summary judgment, it was untimely and Supreme Court abused its discretion in entertaining it in the absence of any excuse for plaintiffs’ delay (see, CPLR 3212 [a]; see also, Kaminski v Modern Italian Bakery of W. Babylon, 282 AD2d 652).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when the opposing party has had no opportunity for discovery and essential facts are within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

Morris v. Hochman · filed 2002-07-15(f)

The plaintiff’s motion was made before the defendants had any opportunity to conduct discovery, and there are essential issues of fact which are within her exclusive knowledge (see Plaza Invs. v Kim, 208 AD2d 704). Thus, her motion was premature and should have been denied (see CPLR 3212 [f|).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed.

Carvajal v. M. Madison LLC · filed 2002-09-19(a)

In any event, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was untimely inasmuch as it was made more than 120 days after the -filing of the note of issue and defendants have failed to demonstrate the requisite “good cause” for the delay (see CPLR 3212 [a]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature, with leave to renew, when facts essential to opposing the motion remain in the movant’s control.

Borland v. Sampson Steel Fabricators, Inc. · filed 2002-10-01(f)

The court properly denied as premature, without prejudice and with leave to renew, that part of Sampson’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 claim and common-law negligence cause of action against Sampson. ... In opposition to Sampson’s cross motion, plaintiffs’ attorney averred that dismissal of that claim and cause of action would be premature because Sampson possessed pertinent facts essential to justify plaintiffs’ opposition to such dismissal, i.e., whether Sampson had any control over plaintiffs’ work, and plaintiffs had not yet deposed a representative of Sampson (see 562 Eglinton v Merlo, 277 AD2d 1027; see also Kozdranski v O’Brien-Kreitzberg & Assoc., 265 AD2d 916; see generally CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to allow a late summary judgment motion when the opposing party agreed to an extension and is not prejudiced by the delay.

Miah v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2002-10-04(a)

Preliminarily, the court grants the City’s application for leave to move for summary judgment. Plaintiffs earlier had agreed to give the City an extension of time, and they are not now prejudiced by the City’s delay.

Section 3212(a) permits a court to consider a summary judgment motion filed after the 120-day deadline when good cause is shown.

Centeno v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority Long Island Bus · filed 2002-10-22(a)

Where a motion for summary judgment is filed beyond the 120-day period, the court may allow such a motion if good cause is shown. ... Here the motion does not appear to have been made on the eve of trial, an adequate excuse has been offered for the delay and plaintiff has not suggested any prejudice. Hence the court will entertain this motion on the merits.

Section 3212(a) permits a party to move for summary judgment after issue has been joined.

Charter One Bank, FSB v. Houston · filed 2002-12-16(a)

Issue was joined by service of the appellants’ answers, and therefore summary judgment was not prematurely granted.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when disclosure is lacking.

Rajan v. Insler · filed 2002-12-16(f)

The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment. Due to the lack of disclosure, it would be premature to grant summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Almonte v Latortue, 293 AD2d 431; AIT Intl. v Federal Express Corp., 278 AD2d 439).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion filed after a court-ordered deadline when the movant shows no good cause for the delay.

Ripepe v. Crown Equipment Corp. · filed 2002-12-30(a)

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the cross motion of the defendant Maybury Corporation for summary judgment as untimely (see CPLR 3212 [a]). The cross motion was filed 17 days after the court-ordered deadline for the filing of motions (see CPLR 3212 [a]), and there was no showing of good cause for this delay (see Kaminski v Modern Italian Bakery of W. Babylon, 282 AD2d 652, 653; Anzalone v Varis, 254 AD2d 381).

A court may reach a summary judgment motion despite a timeliness objection when the opponent did not raise it and the motion was not used for delay.

M.D. v. Pasadena Realty Co. · filed 2002-12-31(a)

As to the timeliness of defendants’ motion, it should be noted initially that plaintiff did not raise the issue in her opposition papers (see Fainberg v Dalton Kent Sec. Group, 268 AD2d 247, 248). Moreover, judicial economy is not promoted by requiring the parties to try a case that is appropriate for summary disposition on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.

CPLR 3212(f) requires an evidentiary showing that facts essential to oppose summary judgment exist but cannot yet be stated before the motion can be denied as premature.

Odorizzi v. Otsego Northern Catskills Board of Cooperative Education Services · filed 2003-07-10(f)

Furthermore, in the absence of an evidentiary showing “that facts essential to justify opposition [existed] but [could] not then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]), we find no merit in plaintiffs’ argument that the motion for summary judgment should have been denied as premature (see Firth v State of New York, 287 AD2d 771, 773 [2001], affd 98 NY2d 365 [2002]).

CPLR 3212 (a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after the note of issue is filed unless the court grants leave for good cause shown.

Parker v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2003-07-14(a)

The plaintiff correctly contends that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting leave to the defendant New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the Transit Authority) to file a late motion for summary judgment, since the motion was made nine months after the note of issue had been filed and no good cause was offered for the delay (see Morhart v City of New York, supra; Scocozza v Tolia, supra; Olzaski v Locust Val. Cent. School Dist., supra; Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539 [1983]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court, in its discretion, to entertain an untimely summary judgment motion under the circumstances.

Bobi v. Soulanzos · filed 2003-07-24(a)

Although the court properly exercised its discretion, under the circumstances, in entertaining defendant’s untimely motion for summary judgment (CPLR 3212 [a]; see Cruz v City of New York, 292 AD2d 209 [2002]; Luciano v Apple Maintenance & Servs., 289 AD2d 90 [2001]), it erred in dismissing the complaint.

Section 3212(a) generally permits a summary judgment motion after joinder of issue, including one based on the statute of limitations.

Horan v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 2003-10-23(a)

With certain exceptions not applicable here, a motion for summary judgment predicated on the running of the statute of limitations (CPLR 3211 [a] [5]) can be brought at any time after joinder of issue (CPLR 3212 [a]; Weiner v Miller, 56 AD2d 819 [1977], lv denied 42 NY2d 809 [1977]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion without prejudice when it is made before depositions under the circumstances of the case.

Ashkenazi v. Hertz Rent-A-Car · filed 2004-02-02(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, made prior to conducting depositions, was properly denied without prejudice (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Elson v Defren, 283 AD2d 109, 117 [2001]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to consider a late summary judgment motion upon a showing of good cause.

Chance v. Gap, Inc. · filed 2004-03-31(a)

Pursuant to CPLR §3212(a) a court has the discretion to entertain a late motion for summary judgment upon a showing of good cause. ... Therefore, this court finds that defendant has shown good cause and the summary judgment motion will be considered.

Section 3212(a) governs the deadline for summary judgment motions; a court should not consider a late motion without good cause for the delay when the opposing party is prejudiced.

Clermont v. Hillsdale Industries, Inc. · filed 2004-04-05(a)

It is undisputed that this motion, which the Supreme Court treated as a motion for summary judgment, was made after the deadline set by the court and more than 120 days after the filing of the plaintiffs’ note of issue (see CPLR 3212 [a]). ... Moreover, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering this late motion that it treated as a motion for summary judgment where no good cause for the delay was offered and the plaintiffs suffered prejudice (see Parker v New York City Tr. Auth., 307 AD2d 285, 286 [2003]; Rivera v City of New York, supra; Dono v Bar Biz Rest. & Equip. Corp., 292 AD2d 494 [2002]; Marshall v 130 N. Bedford Rd. Mount Kisco Corp., supra; Welch v City of Glen Cove, 273 AD2d 302 [2000]; Morhart v City of New York, 267 AD2d 438 [1999]; Johnson v Town of Fishkill, 262 AD2d 532, 533 [1999]; Deinhardt v Vought, 258 AD2d 432, 433 [1999]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a summary judgment motion more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed when good cause for the delay is established.

Rampersad v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2004-04-26(a)

It was an improvident exercise of the Supreme Court’s discretion to deny the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that it was made more than 120 days after the note of issue had been filed, since good cause for the delay was established (see CPLR 3212 [a]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when discovery remains outstanding.

Rengifo v. City of New York · filed 2004-05-24(f)

In any event, granting Shareen’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint would have been premature since discovery was outstanding at the time the motion was made (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Lantigua v Mallick, 263 AD2d 467 [1999]; Brown v County of Nassau, 226 AD2d 492 [1996]; Yu v Forero, 184 AD2d 506 [1992]).

Section 3212(a) allows a court to exercise discretion to accept a summary judgment cross motion filed after the time limit.

Justice v. City of New York · filed 2004-06-01(a)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the defendant City of New York ... to file its cross motion for summary judgment beyond the time limit provided by CPLR 3212 (a) (see Boehme v A.P.P.L.E., A Program Planned for Life Enrichment, 298 AD2d 540 [2002]; Goodman v Gudi, 264 AD2d 758 [1999]).

CPLR 3212 (a) requires a satisfactory explanation for the delay before a court may consider an untimely summary judgment motion; merit and lack of prejudice alone do not establish good cause.

Brill v. City of New York · filed 2004-06-10(a)

We conclude that “good cause” in CPLR 3212 (a) requires a showing of good cause for the delay in making the motion—a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness—rather than simply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy.

Section 3212 permits a court to treat dismissal motions as seeking summary judgment when the parties deliberately chart a summary judgment course.

Ubaydah v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2004-06-14

Although only one of the Tim Horton’s defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3212 while the other two moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), all of the parties submitted “facts and arguments clearly indicating that they were deliberately charting a summary judgment course” (Carcone v D’Angelo Ins. Agency, 302 AD2d 963, 963 [2003] [internal quotation marks omitted]). We thus conclude that the court properly treated all of the motions and cross motions as in effect seeking summary judgment (see Clark v State of New York [appeal No. 2], 302 AD2d 942, 944 [2003]).

Section 3212(a) requires a satisfactory explanation for a late summary judgment motion; judicial economy alone is not good cause.

Eighteen Assocs., LLC. v. Nanjim Leasing Corp. · filed 2004-06-29(a)

While it is understandable that the parties herein do not want to relitigate this matter, and as alleged, the granting of summary judgment may "streamline" the issues and reduce the litigation, that fact alone does not form the basis for "good cause shown" under CPLR §3212(a) and does not make the motions any more meritorious.

Summary judgment may be premature under CPLR 3212(f) when substantial discovery remains outstanding on an issue material to the motion.

Rupp v. City of Port Jervis · filed 2004-08-09(f)

Under the particular facts of this case, summary judgment on this issue would have been premature since substantial discovery remained outstanding (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Rengifo v City of New York, 7 AD3d 773 [2004]; Yadgarov v Dekel, 2 AD3d 631 [2003]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion to be served within 120 days after the note of issue is filed; without a showing of good cause for delay, the court cannot consider an untimely motion.

Thompson v. New York City Board of Education · filed 2004-09-13(a)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering the defendant’s untimely motion for summary judgment in view of the defendant’s failure to offer a satisfactory explanation for not serving the motion within 120 days of the filing of the note of issue as required by CPLR 3212 (a) (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]). In the absence of such a “good cause” showing, the court has no discretion to entertain even a meritorious, nonprejudicial motion for summary judgment (id.).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion made after the filing deadline; lack of prejudice does not establish good cause.

Gibbs v. McRide Cab Co. · filed 2004-09-20(a)

The motion of the defendant McRide Cab Co. for summary judgment, made almost six months after the note of issue was filed, failed to comply with the requirements of CPLR 3212 (a). The absence of prejudice to the plaintiff did not constitute good cause for the delay (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a court to consider an untimely summary judgment motion upon a showing of good cause.

Dugas v. Bernstein · filed 2004-09-28(a)

The feature distinguishing those cases from the case at bar is that courts retain discretion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a) to consider untimely summary judgment motions upon a showing of “good cause,” whereas no such discretion is statutorily conferred upon the courts with respect to belated motions for leave to reargue (see CPLR 2221 [d] [3]).

Section 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion filed more than 120 days after the note of issue to be supported by good cause; the motion’s merits alone do not suffice.

Miceli v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2004-10-21(a)

Plaintiff does not dispute that her motion for summary judgment was made more than 120 days after note of issue was filed, and offers no excuse for her failure to comply with CPLR 3212 (a), arguing only that her motion is meritorious. This was precisely defendant’s position before us in Brill. To countenance plaintiff’s position here would require us to overturn our own recent precedent. This we refuse to do, and we therefore reverse the order of the Appellate Division awarding summary judgment to plaintiff, without considering the merit of the motion.

Section 3212(a) requires a satisfactory explanation for a late summary judgment motion; the motion’s merits and lack of prejudice do not alone establish good cause.

Gonzalez v. Zam Apartment Corp. · filed 2004-10-25(a)

The Court of Appeals has recently noted that “ ‘good cause’ in CPLR 3212 (a) requires a showing of good cause for the. delay in making the motion—a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness—rather than simply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy ... No excuse at all, or a perfunctory excuse, cannot be ‘good cause.’ ” ... As no excuse whatsoever was proffered by Waxman for the late filing, his cross motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

CPLR 3212 (a) imposes a 120-day limit on summary judgment motions and requires good cause for a late filing.

Sanango v. Generoso · filed 2004-12-06(a)

The appellant’s motion for summary judgment was made well after the 120-day limit imposed by CPLR 3212 (a) and he failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay in making the motion.

A post-answer motion mislabeled as a dismissal motion may be treated as a CPLR 3212 summary judgment motion when its papers clearly notify the opposing party of the relief sought.

Guzov v. Manor Lodge Holding Corp. · filed 2004-12-20

The post-answer cross motion, in effect, for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 by the defendant Manor Lodge Holding Corp. (hereinafter Manor) was mislabeled as one for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211. Nevertheless, the papers in support of the cross motion clearly placed the plaintiff on notice that Manor was moving for summary judgment to dismiss the ... complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that documentary evidence established that there were no triable issues of fact (cf. Ressis v Mactye, 98 AD2d 836 [1983]; De Pan v First Natl. Bank of Glens Falls, 98 AD2d 885 [1983]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion when the movant gives a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

Cooper v. Hodge · filed 2004-12-30(a)

Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that defendant provided a “satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness” of the proposed summary judgment motion and therefore established good cause for the delay in making the motion (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; see CPLR 3212 [a]; Gonzalez v 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124, 128-129 [2000]; cf. Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]).

CPLR 3212 (b) requires an affidavit from someone with actual knowledge of the facts to support a summary judgment motion; a verified pleading may serve as the affidavit.

Innovative Audio Video v. Friedman · filed 2005-01-31(b)

Defendant’s motion is not supported by an affidavit from someone with actual knowledge of the facts, as required by CPLR 3212 (b) (Stainless, Inc. v Employers Fire Ins. Co., 69 AD2d 27 [1st Dept 1979], affd 49 NY2d 924 [1980]). However, defendant included a verified answer, and a “ ‘verified pleading’ may be utilized as an affidavit whenever the latter is required” (CPLR 105 [u]; Salch v Paratore, 60 NY2d 851 [1983]).

A late summary judgment motion requires good cause for the delay; the motion’s merits cannot excuse an unexplained delay.

Perini Corp. v. City of New York · filed 2005-02-03(a)

Furthermore, in the wake of Miceli and Brill, parties may no longer rely on the merits of their cases to extricate themselves from failing to show good cause for a delay in moving for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a).

Section 3212 (a) permits a court to consider a summary judgment motion filed after its own deadline but within the 120-day statutory limit when there is a genuine need, without requiring good cause under the statute.

Hernandez v. 620 West 189th Ltd. Partnership · filed 2005-02-03(a)

Thus, courts have the discretion to disregard a self-imposed deadline for filing a summary judgment motion to “accommodate a genuine need.” The “genuine need,” however, does not mean “good cause” as contemplated by CPLR 3212 (a), and it may include entertaining the merits of a belated motion filed within the 120-day ceiling and, consistent with a court’s traditional exercise of discretion, the absence of prejudice to the party opposing the belated motion.

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed; unspecified clerical inadvertence and reassignment of counsel do not suffice.

Breiding v. Giladi · filed 2005-02-14(a)

The motion was made more than two months after the statutory deadline (i.e., 120 days from the date the note of issue was filed) (see CPLR 3212 [a]), and the defendants’ perfunctory claims of unspecified clerical inadvertence and reassignment of counsel were insufficient to constitute good cause for the delay (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, supra; Sanango v Generoso, 13 AD3d 349 [2004]; Gibbs v McRide Cab Co., 10 AD3d 671 [2004]; Thompson v New York City Bd. of Educ., 10 AD3d 650 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion to be served within 120 days after the note of issue is filed unless the movant gives a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

Kone v. Ritter Sysco Food Service, Inc. · filed 2005-02-28(a)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering the untimely motion of the defendant ... for summary judgment in view of its failure to offer a satisfactory explanation for not serving the motion within 120 days of the filing of the note of issue as required by CPLR 3212 (a) (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed; outstanding discovery does not establish good cause when it is not essential to the motion.

LoGrasso v. Myer · filed 2005-03-18(a)

We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant failed to show good cause for failing to make her motion within 120 days of the filing of the note of issue (see CPLR 3212 [a]; ...).

A summary judgment motion made after the statutory deadline must be denied if the movant gives no satisfactory explanation for the delay.

Hayes v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2005-03-21(a)

The respondents’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was made after the statutory deadline (see CPLR 3212 [a]), and the respondents failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for this delay (see Brill v City of New York, supra; Thompson v New York City Bd. of Educ., 10 AD3d 650, 651 [2004]).

A party seeking to deny a summary judgment motion as premature under CPLR 3212 (f) must show that it is premature.

Chowdhury v. Soroka · filed 2005-03-28(f)

She also failed to show that the motion should be denied as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).

CPLR 3212 (f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion as premature.

St. Louis v. Town of North Elba · filed 2005-04-14(f)

As a final matter, we agree with Supreme Court that defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims under Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6) was premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Reohr v Golub Corp., 242 AD2d 850, 851 [1997]).

A summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the note of issue requires good cause for the delay; a pending motion for similar relief can justify considering it if the motions are nearly identical.

Bressingham v. Jamaica Hospital Medical Center · filed 2005-04-18(a)

The branch of the cross motion of defendant Jamaica Hospital Medical Center which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, made more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, was untimely (see CPLR 3212 [a]) and should not have been entertained without a showing of good cause for the delay (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]). There was no such showing here. While the pending motion of the codefendant, Pyrosignal & Suppression, Inc., for similar relief would have been a sufficient basis to consider the untimely motion had the motion and cross motion been nearly identical (see Boehme v A.P.P.L.E., A Program Planned for Life Enrichment, 298 AD2d 540, 541-542 [2002]; Miranda v Devlin, 260 AD2d 451 [1999]), they were not.

A summary judgment motion filed one day after a court-set deadline may be denied when the movant offers no good cause for the delay.

Milano v. George · filed 2005-04-25

Because the record does not establish “good cause” for the delay, we affirm the order appealed from on the basis of the untimeliness of the motion alone ... and we do not address the merits.

Section 3212(a) bars a summary judgment motion before issue is joined.

Ward v. Guardian Industries Corp. · filed 2005-04-29(a)

That part of plaintiffs cross motion that sought summary judgment before defendant answered the complaint was thus premature and should have been denied (see Gold Medal Packing, 6 AD3d at 1085; Pitts v City of Buffalo, 298 AD2d 1003, 1004 [2002]; Delpopolo v Zanghi, 140 AD2d 930, 932 [1988]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires a satisfactory explanation for a late summary judgment motion; lack of prejudice does not excuse the delay.

Dettmann v. Page · filed 2005-05-02(a)

Under the standard announced in Brill, leave to file a late motion for summary judgment under CPLR 3212 (a) requires a showing of a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the motion.

CPLR 3212 (a) permits a summary judgment motion filed more than 120 days after the note of issue when good cause explains the delay, including a court-ordered stay of motions pending discovery.

Certified Electrical Contracting Corp. v. City of New York · filed 2005-05-16(a)

The Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiffs motion and the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment as untimely under CPLR 3212 (a) (see generally Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]). While the parties did not move for summary judgment until more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, the record demonstrates good cause for the delay. An order of the court stayed the parties from moving for summary judgment pending the completion of disclosure proceedings, and the note of issue itself was conditioned upon the completion of discovery and thus did not indicate a state of trial readiness. Therefore, under the particular circumstances herein, the court should have entertained the motions.

Section 3212(a) permits a court to entertain a late summary judgment motion when the moving party establishes good cause.

Brannigan v. Board of Education of Levittown Union Free School District · filed 2005-05-31(a)

Initially, we note that under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in entertaining the defendant’s late motion for summary judgment since the defendant established good cause (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Nesbit v Turner, 15 AD3d 552 [2005]; Quizhpi v Lochinvar Corp., 12 AD3d 252 [2004]; Kunz v Gleeson, 9 AD3d 480, 481 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a late summary judgment motion.

Asaro v. City of New York · filed 2005-06-09(a)

Since defendants did not demonstrate “good cause” for their failure to comply with the time constraints of CPLR 3212 (a), their motion for summary judgment was properly rejected as untimely (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; see also Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to consider a late summary judgment motion when the moving party establishes good cause.

Wanamaker v. VHA, Inc. · filed 2005-06-10(a)

The court did not abuse its discretion in considering the late motion of the Hospital, counsel for the Hospital having established good cause (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Luciano v Apple Maintenance & Servs., 289 AD2d 90, 91 [2001]).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a late summary judgment motion; waiting for another party’s appeal period to expire does not suffice.

McNeill v. Menter · filed 2005-06-10(a)

That excuse cannot constitute good cause because the record establishes that the motion of those other two defendants was argued approximately one month after the expiration of the statutory time limit pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion as premature when relevant discovery remains outstanding.

Whelan v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 2005-06-13(f)

The Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) because certain relevant discovery remained outstanding.

When the court sets no deadline, CPLR 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after the note of issue is filed unless the movant shows good cause for the delay.

Polhamus v. Foulke · filed 2005-07-01(a)

The note of issue herein was filed on August 18, 2003, and thus any summary judgment motion had to be made no later than December 16, 2003. It is undisputed that the motion at issue was not made by that date, and thus defendant had to show good cause for its untimeliness.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Salm v. Feldstein · filed 2005-07-11(f)

Although the defendant denies the plaintiff’s allegation that he failed to keep the plaintiff informed of all communications with the nonparty purchaser, the alacrity with which the dealership was sold after the plaintiff conveyed his interest in the company to the defendant was sufficient to establish “that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]).

A CPLR 3212 motion mislabeled as a CPLR 3211 motion ordinarily requires notice and an opportunity to respond, but the error may be disregarded if it causes no prejudice.

Schultz v. Estate of Sloan · filed 2005-07-18

Ordinarily, if a party mislabels a CPLR 3212 motion as a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211, the opponent of the motion must be notified that the motion will be treated as one for summary judgment and given the opportunity to respond to the motion as such (see Rich v Lefkovits, 56 NY2d 276, 282 [1982]). However, the error of mislabeling a CPLR 3212 motion as a CPLR 3211 motion should be disregarded where, as in this case, it did not prejudice the opponent of the motion (see Hertz Corp. v Luken, 126 AD2d 446, 449 [1987]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion filed after the applicable deadline.

Bevilacqua v. City of New York · filed 2005-08-01(a)

The appellants’ summary judgment motion was made more than 60 days after the plaintiff filed a note of issue on February 4, 2004, in violation of rule 13 of the Uniform Civil Trial Rules of the Supreme Court, Kings County. The appellants failed to establish good cause for the delay (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; First Union Auto Fin., Inc. v Donat, 16 AD3d 372 [2005]; Breiding v Giladi, 15 AD3d 435 [2005]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to set a summary judgment deadline between 30 and 120 days after the note of issue and requires good cause for a late motion.

Buckner v. City of New York · filed 2005-08-03(a)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a), any party may move for summary judgment once issue is joined, however, the court may set a date after which such motions may not be made, with the date not to be earlier than 30 days after the filing of the note of issue, and not later than 120 days after the filing of the note issue, except with leave of court on good cause shown. ... Accordingly, the motion and cross motions for summary judgment are denied as untimely.

CPLR 3212 (a) permits a court to consider a late summary judgment motion when the movant shows good cause.

Khaimova v. Osnat Corp. · filed 2005-08-08(a)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in ... entertaining the defendant’s belated motion for summary judgment since good cause was shown by the defendant pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a) (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

A late summary judgment motion must be denied absent good cause for the delay; lack of prejudice and the motion’s merit do not justify late filing.

Gaines v. Shell-Mar Foods, Inc. · filed 2005-09-19(a)

Shell-Mar moved for summary judgment 142 days after the note of issue was filed and the plaintiff opposed on the grounds, inter alia, that it was untimely under CPLR 3212 (a). The plaintiff is correct. ... As no “good cause” was proffered by Shell-Mar for the late filing, its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it should have been denied as untimely (see Gonzalez v Zam Apt. Corp., 11 AD3d 657 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) generally requires issue to be joined before a summary judgment motion, but a court may entertain an earlier motion when the opposing party had notice, submitted opposition papers, and deliberately took a summary judgment course.

Feitner v. Town of Smithtown · filed 2005-11-14(a)

Although the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was technically premature since issue had not yet been joined (see CPLR 3212 [a]), under the particular facts of this case, where the plaintiff was clearly on notice that the motion was made pursuant to CPLR 3212, submitted opposition papers thereto, and “ ‘deliberately charter[ed] a summary judgment course,’ ” the Supreme Court properly entertained the motion (Hickey v Travelers Ins. Co., 158 AD2d 112, 114 [1990], quoting Four Seasons Hotels v Vinnik, 127 AD2d 310, 320 [1987]; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3212:12, at 21).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a summary judgment motion filed more than 120 days after the note of issue when good cause explains the delay.

Certified Electrical Contracting Corp. v. City of New York (Department of Transportation) · filed 2005-11-28(a)

While the parties did not move for summary judgment until more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, the record demonstrates good cause for the delay. An order of the court stayed the parties from moving for summary judgment pending the completion of disclosure proceedings, and the note of issue itself was conditioned upon the completion of discovery and thus did not indicate a state of trial readiness. Therefore, under the particular circumstances herein, the court should have entertained the motions.

CPLR 3212(a) requires a satisfactory explanation for a late summary judgment application, even if the application appears meritorious.

Long v. Children's Village, Inc. · filed 2005-12-12(a)

It was made some 17 months after the note of issue was filed, and the defendant made no explanation for the delay in making its application (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]). In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, the application should not have been considered, even if it appeared to be meritorious (see Brill v City of New York, supra; Rivera v Toruno, 19 AD3d 473 [2005]; Hesse v Rockland County Legislature, 18 AD3d 614 [2005]).

Section 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion when the movant shows good cause for the delay.

Brooks v. Ross · filed 2005-12-19(a)

Since the defendant established good cause for the delay, the Supreme Court properly granted him leave to file the motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Certified Elec. Contr. Corp. v City of New York [Dept. of Transp.], 23 AD3d 596 [2005]; Gonzalez v United Parcel Serv., 249 AD2d 210 [1998]).

A motion for summary judgment made more than 120 days after the note of issue requires a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

Czernicki v. Lawniczak · filed 2006-01-17(a)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was for leave to serve and file a summary judgment motion more than 120 days after the note of issue was filed. The plaintiff failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for the more than two-year delay in making the motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to allow a late summary judgment motion for good cause shown.

Bullard v. St. Barnabas Hospital · filed 2006-03-02(a)

The court properly exercised its discretion in granting the institutional defendants leave to file a late motion for summary judgment, for good cause shown (CPLR 3212 [a]; cf. Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a court to entertain an untimely summary judgment motion upon a showing of good cause for the delay.

Orenstein v. Brum · filed 2006-03-23(a)

Defendants’ motions, while untimely, were properly entertained upon a showing of good cause for the delay (CPLR 3212 [a]; see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

Section 3212 permits a court to entertain a successive summary judgment motion when earlier motions were not decided on their merits and the new motion raises an undecided issue.

Pozament Corp. v. AES Westover, LLC · filed 2006-03-23

Initially, we reject plaintiff’s procedural argument that Supreme Court erred by entertaining a third motion for summary judgment. Since the prior motions were not considered on their merits and the third turns upon an issue not previously decided, Supreme Court acted well within its broad discretion (see Matter of Mega Personal Lines, Inc. v Halton, 9 AD3d 553, 554-555 [2004]; W. Joseph McPhillips, Inc. v Ellis, 8 AD3d 782, 783 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) measures the time to move for summary judgment from the filing of the note of issue, but failure to serve the note of issue can provide good cause for a late motion.

McFadden v. 530 Fifth Avenue RPS III Associates, LP · filed 2006-04-04(a)

While CPLR 3212 (a) and the applicable local rule specify the date of filing of the note of issue as the triggering date for the time within which to bring a summary judgment motion, and do not mention service of the note of issue, an opponent’s failure to serve a note of issue constitutes good cause for a late summary judgment motion (see Cibener v City of New York, 268 AD2d 334 [2000]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion made after its 120-day deadline.

Witkowski v. Escobar · filed 2006-04-11(a)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court correctly denied summary judgment to the Town of Babylon, because it failed to demonstrate “good cause” for making its motion after the 120-day deadline imposed by CPLR 3212 (a) (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Thompson v New York City Bd. of Educ., 10 AD3d 650, 651 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion to be made within 120 days after the note of issue is filed when the court sets no deadline, unless the court grants leave for good cause shown.

Jones v. Town of Le Ray · filed 2006-04-28(a)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a), the court may set a date by which summary judgment motions must be made, provided that the date is no earlier than 30 days after the filing of the note of issue. ... Defendant failed to move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint by that date and thus was required to show good cause for the failure to do so.

Section 3212(a) requires a satisfactory explanation for delay before a party may file a late summary judgment motion.

Montgomery Group, LLC v. Town of Montgomery · filed 2006-05-02(a)

The Supreme Court properly denied the appellants leave to serve and file a late motion for summary judgment, as the appellants failed to give a satisfactory explanation for their delay (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion when the movant satisfactorily explains the delay.

Bycinthe v. Kombos · filed 2006-05-23(a)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the appellants offered a satisfactory explanation for the delay in making their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion filed after the applicable deadline following a note of issue.

Giordano v. CSC Holdings, Inc. · filed 2006-05-30(a)

motion was made more than 60 days after the plaintiff filed a note of issue on January 30, 2003, in violation of rule 13 of the Uniform Civil Trial Rules of the Supreme Court, Kings County, and the defendants failed to establish good cause for the delay (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Bevilacqua v City of New York, 21 AD3d 340 [2005]; First Union Auto Fin., Inc. v Donat, 16 AD3d 372 [2005]; cf. Brooks v Ross, 24AD3d 589 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a court to accept a late summary judgment motion for good cause, including reasonable delays in obtaining deposition transcripts and an expert opinion.

Perkins v. AAA Cleaning · filed 2006-06-15(a)

Under the circumstances here, however, we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion in accepting as good cause defendant’s reasonable explanation that its delay was due to difficulties in obtaining deposition transcripts and a written opinion from its expert (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; La Duke v Albany Motel Enters., 282 AD2d 974, 974 [2001]).

When the court sets no deadline, section 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after the note of issue is filed unless the court grants leave for good cause shown.

Johnson v. Peconic Diner · filed 2006-07-05(a)

Where, as here, no deadline is set by the court for the making of summary judgment motions, no such motion may be made more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue “except with leave of court on good cause shown” (CPLR 3212 [a]; see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]). ... Since the appellants failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay, that branch of the motion which was for leave to make a late motion for summary judgment was properly denied (see Brill v City of New York, supra).

A court may consider a second summary judgment motion filed within the time limits of CPLR 3212 (a) when it raises a legal issue not previously decided.

Kletter v. Fleming · filed 2006-08-03(a)

Even if we were to view it as a second request for summary judgment, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in considering it because it was made within the time limits of CPLR 3212 (a) and it turned upon a legal issue not previously decided (see Matter of Mega Personal Lines, Inc. v Halton, 9 AD3d 553, 554-555 [2004]; W. Joseph McPhillips, Inc. v Ellis, 8 AD3d 782, 783 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) requires denial of an untimely summary judgment motion absent a showing of good cause.

Fuller v. Westchester County Health Care Corp. · filed 2006-09-19(a)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the appellant’s motion was untimely, and that denial of the motion was required in the absence of any showing of “good cause” (CPLR 3212 [a]; see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Gaines v Shell-Mar Foods, Inc., 21 AD3d 986 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a court to consider a late summary judgment motion when the movant shows good cause for the delay.

Zajac v. Wilson · filed 2006-09-22(a)

Finally, contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, defendants showed “good cause” for their delay in filing the motion, and thus the court properly exercised its discretion in entertaining the motion on the merits (CPLR 3212 [a]; see Kunz v Gleeson, 9 AD3d 480, 481 [2004]).

A summary judgment motion filed after a court-set deadline requires a showing of good cause for the delay.

Kaplan v. Defoe Corp. · filed 2006-09-28(a)

Appellants’ summary judgment motion was made almost one year after the deadline for making summary judgment motions set by the court, and appellants failed to show good cause for their delay (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Perini Corp. v City of New York [Department of Envtl. Protection], 16 AD3d 37 [2005]; Colon v City of New York, 15 AD3d 173 [2005]).

Section 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after the note of issue is filed unless the court grants leave for good cause.

Fahrenholz v. Security Mutual Insurance · filed 2006-09-29(a)

Pursuant to that section, a party seeking summary judgment must do so within 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, “except with leave of court on good cause shown” (CPLR 3212 [a]).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a late summary judgment motion; ongoing discovery and a newly ordered deposition can establish good cause.

Pena v. Women's Outreach Network, Inc. · filed 2006-10-26(a)

... a party moving for summary judgment outside the statutory (CPLR 3212 [a]) or court-imposed time limit must show good cause for the delay. ... Here, Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in finding good cause.

Section 3212(a) permits denial of a late summary judgment motion when the movant does not seek leave or show good cause for the delay.

Hayes v. Dargone, Inc. · filed 2006-10-31(a)

It is undisputed that defendant Dargone, Inc. moved for summary judgment approximately 18 months after the note of issue was filed without seeking leave of the court or offering an explanation showing good cause for the delay. The motion was thus properly denied by the court as untimely (see CPLR 3212 [a]), and without reaching the merits of defendant’s arguments for summary relief (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; and see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause before a court may consider an untimely summary judgment motion.

White v. Frize · filed 2006-12-14(a)

Initially, we agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred by considering plaintiffs untimely motion for summary judgment. The record is devoid of any showing by plaintiff or finding by the court as to good cause for her failure to comply with statutory deadlines (see CPLR 3212 [a]).

Section 3212 provides the postanswer procedure for presenting factual submissions and arguments that are improper on a preanswer motion to dismiss.

Tucker v. M & T Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 2006-12-22

The factual submissions and arguments in support of those parts of defendant’s motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) are properly made in a postanswer motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 and not on a preanswer motion to dismiss.

An untimely summary judgment motion must be denied when the movant neither seeks leave nor shows good cause for the delay.

Cabibel v. XYZ Associates, L.P. · filed 2007-01-18(a)

The ...motion should thus have been denied as untimely (CPLR 3212 [a]), and the court should have declined to reach the merits (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; see also Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to entertain a late summary judgment motion when the movant shows good cause for the delay.

Chou v. A to Z Vending Service Corp. · filed 2007-01-23(a)

The defendant demonstrated a good cause for its delay in making a motion for summary judgment, and the motion court providently exercised its discretion in entertaining the late motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Olivier v Rodney, 27 AD3d 631 [2006]; Certified Elec. Contr. Corp. v City of New York [Dept. of Transp.], 23 AD3d 596 [2005]; Herrera v Felice Realty Corp., 22 AD3d 723 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause to consider a summary judgment motion filed after a court-imposed deadline, even if it is filed within the statutory 120-day period.

Glasser v. Abramovitz · filed 2007-02-06(a)

We reject plaintiffs argument that motion courts have discretion to entertain nonprejudicial, meritorious post-note of issue motions made after a court-imposed deadline but within the statutory maximum 120-day period in CPLR 3212 (a) regardless of whether good cause is shown for the failure to meet the deadline (cf. Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725, 726 [2004] [statutory deadlines “to be taken seriously by the parties” no less than court-ordered deadlines]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652-653 [2004] [same]; see Giordano v CSC Holdings, Inc., 29 AD3d 948 [2006]).

Section 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion when the movant establishes good cause for the delay.

Guevara v. Baginski · filed 2007-02-06(a)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion, the defendants established good cause for their delay in making their motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the note of issue when the court has set no deadline.

Tower Insurance v. Razy Associates · filed 2007-02-20(a)

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause for moving for summary judgment approximately nine months after the filing of the note of issue.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a party to oppose summary judgment on the ground that the motion is premature.

Argueta v. Pomona Panorama Estates, Ltd. · filed 2007-04-24(f)

Moreover, S & B’s contention that Pomona’s cross motion for summary judgment was premature is without merit (cf. CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed to be supported by good cause for the delay.

Jimenez v. Haros · filed 2007-04-26(a)

Defendants’ summary judgment motion was properly denied as untimely, having been made more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, and the record does not indicate good cause for the delay (see CPLR 3212 [a]).

Section 3212(a) permits a deadline for serving a summary judgment motion and requires good cause to excuse a late motion.

Davidson v. Brisman · filed 2007-05-01(a)

It is undisputed that rule 13 of the Uniform Civil Trial Rules of the Supreme Court, Kings County, required that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment be served within 60 days of the filing of the note of issue (see CPLR 3212 [a]). ... Therefore, the defendant failed to meet the rule 13 deadline, and he failed to establish good cause for the delay (see Bevilacqua v City of New York, 21 AD3d 340 [2005]; First Union Auto Fin., Inc. v Donat, 16 AD3d 372, 373 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires leave based on a showing of good cause before a court may entertain an untimely summary judgment motion.

Crespo v. Elrac, Inc. · filed 2007-05-22(a)

Since the defendants never sought leave on a showing of good cause from the Supreme Court to submit an untimely motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court should not have entertained the motion in the first instance (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, supra).

CPLR 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed to be denied unless the movant shows good cause for the delay.

Jones v. Ricciardelli · filed 2007-05-22(a)

Inasmuch as Pilaster’s motion for summary judgment was made more than 120 days after the note of issue was filed, it was untimely (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]). Since no good cause was provided by Pflaster for his late filing, his motion for summary judgment should have been denied as untimely (see Brill v City of New York, supra).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause to permit a summary judgment motion filed after the applicable deadline.

Pierre v. Feldman · filed 2007-06-05(a)

Pursuant to rule 13 of the Uniform Civil Term Rules of the Supreme Court, Kings County, the appellant was required to make his motion for summary judgment no more than 60 days after the note of issue was filed, unless he obtained leave of the court on good cause shown. His motion was made more than 60 days after the plaintiffs filed a note of issue on May 27, 2005 and the excuse proffered by the appellant’s attorney was insufficient to constitute good cause for the delay ... Accordingly, the appellant’s motion was properly denied as untimely.

Section 3212(a) permits a court to consider an untimely summary judgment motion or cross motion when a timely motion on nearly identical grounds supplies good cause.

Ellman v. Village of Rhinebeck · filed 2007-06-19(a)

“[A]n untimely motion or cross motion for summary judgment may be considered by the court where, as here, a timely motion for summary judgment was made on nearly identical grounds [because] the nearly identical nature of the grounds may provide the requisite good cause (see CPLR 3212 [a]) to review the untimely motion or cross motion on the merits”

A court may decline to treat an order to show cause as a summary judgment motion under Section 3212 when the movants have not pleaded the claim on which they seek judgment.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Mamadou · filed 2007-09-24

It is noted that the defendant movants did not plead a counterclaim alleging breach of the agreement or demanding specific performance of the agreement. In the absence of a cause of action for breach of contract seeking specific performance, defendant movants may lose the opportunity to ever obtain the remedy they seek. The court does not and will not deem the instant order to show cause to be a summary judgment motion pursuant to CPLR 3212.

Section 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion made more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed to be supported by good cause for the delay.

Lofstad v. S & R Fisheries, Inc. · filed 2007-11-20(a)

Inasmuch as Havel’s motion for summary judgment was made more than 120 days after the note of issue was filed, it was untimely (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Jones v Ricciardelli, 40 AD3d 936 [2007]). Since Havel failed to provide good cause for his late filing, his motion for summary judgment should have been denied as untimely (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion when the movant shows good cause for the delay.

Butt v. Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc. · filed 2007-12-06(a)

Defendants satisfied their obligation to show good cause for the delay in moving for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [a]), and the merits of the motion should have been reached.

A court may deny a summary judgment motion filed after a court-ordered deadline when the movant offers no good cause for the delay.

Kwang Ho Kim v. D & W Shin Realty Corp. · filed 2008-01-08(a)

The Supreme Court properly denied as untimely those branches of D & W’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action based on Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and § 241 (6) insofar as asserted against it. The motion was submitted beyond the court-ordered time limit of July 1, 2005 (see CPLR 3212 [a]), and D & W failed to offer any good cause for its delay in making the motion (see CPLR 2004; DiBenedetto v Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 43 AD3d 853 [2007]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to set a deadline for summary judgment motions, and a motion filed after that deadline may be denied absent good cause for the delay.

Town of Kinderhook v. Slovak · filed 2008-01-17(a)

The court also properly denied defendants’ belated motion for summary judgment as untimely, as it was made after the August 28, 2006 deadline for such motions as set forth in the court’s (Egan, Jr., J.) April 13, 2006 scheduling order (see CPLR 3212 [a] [“the court may set a date after which no such motion may be made”]). Defendants never established lack of awareness of the deadline or any reason for their failure to seek an extension of time to file the motion; the court made no finding of good cause for the delay and we discern none (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Rahman v Domber, 45 AD3d 497 [2007]; cf. Burnell v Huneau, 1 AD3d 758, 760 [2003]). Thus, it was within the wide latitude of discretion afforded to Supreme Court to deny the motion as untimely.

Section 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after the note of issue is filed, unless the court permits a later motion for good cause.

Armentano v. Broadway Mall Properties, Inc. · filed 2008-02-13(a)

While CPLR 3212 (a) requires that a motion for summary judgment be made no later than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, there is an exception for motions made with leave of court on good cause shown (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]). Here, such good cause was shown.

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment motion made after its 120-day deadline.

Jackson v. Jamaica First Parking, LLC · filed 2008-03-04(a)

The Supreme Court correctly denied the appellant’s motion as untimely, as the appellant failed to demonstrate “good cause” for making its motion after the 120-day deadline imposed by CPLR 3212 (a) had passed (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]; Coty v County of Clinton, 42 AD3d 612 [2007]).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a late summary judgment motion; a separate motion raising different issues cannot be considered without it.

Bickelman v. Herrill Bowling Corp. · filed 2008-03-11(a)

However, the Supreme Court should not have entertained Herrill’s separate motion for summary judgment, which was untimely. Herrill failed to demonstrate good cause for its delay in making the motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; DiBenedetto v Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 43 AD3d 853 [2007]). Contrary to Herrill’s contention, the issues raised on its motion were not nearly identical to the issues raised on Polito’s motion (see Grande v Peteroy, 39 AD3d 590, 591-592 [2007]; Bressingham v Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 17 AD3d 496, 496-497 [2005]).

Section 3212(f) does not make a prediscovery summary judgment motion premature unless the opponent shows that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Griffin v. Pennoyer · filed 2008-03-13(f)

Plaintiffs prediscovery motion for partial summary judgment was not, under the circumstances, premature since defendant failed to demonstrate that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion may exist but could not be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause to excuse a summary judgment motion filed after the 120-day deadline.

Azcona v. Salem · filed 2008-03-13(a)

In granting defendants’ belated summary judgment motion (see CPLR 3212 [a]), Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether defendants demonstrated good cause (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [ 2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]). In any event, as a matter of law, defendants failed to demonstrate good cause.

Section 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion filed more than 120 days after the note of issue to be supported by good cause for the delay.

Oparaji v. Scheiner · filed 2008-04-08(a)

The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability as untimely and academic. The motion was made more than 120 days after a note of issue was filed (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Lofstad v S & R Fisheries, Inc., 45 AD3d 739, 743 [2007]; Jones v Ricciardelli, 40 AD3d 936 [2007]). Moreover, the plaintiff failed to establish good cause for the late filing of the motion (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

Section 3212(a)'s good-cause requirement permits a late summary judgment motion when significant discovery remained outstanding after the note of issue was filed.

McArdle v. 123 Jackpot, Inc. · filed 2008-05-13(a)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, under the circumstances of this case, the respondents demonstrated “good cause” for their delay in filing their motion for summary judgment, since the note of issue was filed while there was significant discovery outstanding (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Gonzalez v 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124, 129 [2000]; Sclafani v Washington Mut, 36 AD3d 682 [2007]).

CPLR 3212 permits a later summary judgment motion when the movant shows sufficient cause, as when an earlier order expressly reserved substantive issues.

Kinberg v. Opinsky · filed 2008-05-22

Accordingly, defendant showed sufficient cause for this motion under CPLR 3212 (see Varsity Tr. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 300 AD2d 38, 39 [2002]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires good cause to entertain a summary judgment motion made returnable after a court-ordered deadline.

Anderson v. Kantares · filed 2008-05-27(a)

The Supreme Court erred in entertaining the motion of the defendant Helen Minadis (hereinafter the defendant) for summary judgment, which was made returnable 29 days beyond the deadline fixed by the Supreme Court in the so-ordered stipulation, where she failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; DiBenedetto v Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 43 AD3d 853 [2007]).

When the court sets no deadline, section 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion within 120 days after the note of issue unless the movant shows good cause for filing late.

Matys v. Zuccala · filed 2008-06-06(a)

Where, as here, a court does not set a date by which summary judgment motions must be made pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a), such a motion must be made no later than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue “except with leave of court on good cause shown” (id.).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery.

Elliot v. County of Nassau · filed 2008-07-15(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, where it is undisputed that no discovery has yet taken place, that branch of the Town’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it should have been denied as premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Fazio v Brandywine Realty Trust, 29 AD3d 939 [2006]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636 [2006]; Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v North Fork Bank, 16 AD3d 467 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when additional discovery remains outstanding.

Angelo Capobianco, Inc. v. Brentwood Union Free School District · filed 2008-07-29(f)

Moreover, an award of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff would have been premature since additional discovery remained outstanding (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Rengifo v City of New York, 7 AD3d 773; Lantigua v Mallick, 263 AD2d 467 [1999]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to set a deadline for summary judgment motions and requires a satisfactory explanation for an untimely motion.

Ford v. City of New York · filed 2008-08-12(a)

CPLR 3212 (a) provides that a court may set the time within which a party may move for summary judgment. ... This attempt to fall within the “good cause” provision of CPLR 3212 (a) is unavailing. The “good cause” exception requires the moving party to show “a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness—rather than simply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy” (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]).

Section 3212(a) requires good cause for a summary judgment cross motion filed after a court-imposed deadline.

Gross v. 420 East 72nd Street Tenants Corp. · filed 2008-09-15(a)

Defendant argues that the cross motion is untimely; this court agrees, as the motion for summary judgment was not filed within 60 days of the filing of the note of issue as provided by this Part’s rules and as indicated in the parties’ preliminary conference order dated November 17, 2006. ... Here, plaintiffs failed to proffer any excuse for their failure to timely move for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court is constrained to deny the motion as the requisite “good cause” showing has not been established.

Section 3212(a) requires a summary judgment motion to be made within 120 days after the note of issue is filed unless the movant shows good cause for the delay.

John P. Krupski & Bros. v. Town Board of Southold · filed 2008-09-23(a)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering the Town Board’s untimely motion for summary judgment in view of its failure to demonstrate good cause for not serving the motion within 120 days of the filing of the note of issue as required by CPLR 3212 (a) (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]). In the absence of such a good cause showing, the court has no discretion to entertain even a meritorious, nonprejudicial motion for summary judgment (id. at 652).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to grant leave to move for summary judgment more than 120 days after the note of issue is filed.

Santos v. Taveras · filed 2008-10-21(a)

The motion court properly granted defendant’s motion for leave to move for summary judgment more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue (CPLR 3212 [a]; see Pippo v City of New York, 43 AD3d 303, 303-304 [2007]).

Section 3212(a) permits a court to set a deadline for summary judgment motions, and a motion filed after that deadline may be denied without reaching the merits if the movant fails to show good cause for the delay.

Finger v. Saal · filed 2008-11-18(a)

The Supreme Court set a deadline for the making of motions for summary judgment in this action, and fixed the deadline at 30 days following the date of the filing of a note of issue (see CPLR 3212 [a]). The defendants’separate cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was made more than 30 days after the filing of the note of issue. Since the defendants did not establish “good cause” for the delay, the Supreme Court ... properly denied the separate cross motion, on the basis of untimeliness alone, without addressing the merits (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 654 [2004]; Kennedy v Bae, 51 AD3d 980, 981 [2008]; Milano v George, 17 AD3d 644, 645 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits a late summary judgment motion for good cause when a party receives notice of a court-imposed deadline only after it has expired.

Simpson v. Trace Equipment Corp. · filed 2009-02-11(a)

We conclude that Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying that part of the motion seeking leave to make a late motion for summary judgment inasmuch as Trace established that it would have been impossible for it to comply with the court’s truncated deadline. We therefore modify the order accordingly. In our view, Trace “provided a ‘satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness’ of the proposed summary judgment motion and therefore established good cause for the delay in making the motion” (Cooper v Hodge, 13 AD3d 1111, 1112 [2004], quoting Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; see CPLR 3212 [a]).

CPLR 3212(a) permits an untimely summary judgment motion with leave of court upon a showing of good cause, including a reasonable resubmission of a timely motion denied without prejudice.

Tray-Wrap, Inc. v. Pacific Growers, Ltd. · filed 2009-04-21(a)

By decision dated February 6, 2007, Supreme Court denied the same, without prejudice to resubmission upon papers which were to include copies of the pleadings. Such motions were made within a reasonable time thereafter. Accordingly, the instant motions, although untimely, were made with leave of the court upon a showing of good cause pursuant to the statute.

Section 3212(f) does not require delaying summary judgment when the relevant agreement is clear and unambiguous.

Congel v. Malfitano · filed 2009-04-21(f)

The terms of the subject partnership agreement are clear and unambiguous. Thus, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly declined to treat, as premature, that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the first and second causes of action (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated because further discovery is necessary.

Sorbello v. Birchez Associates, LLC · filed 2009-04-23(f)

This is especially the case where, as here, the facts necessary to successfully oppose the cross motion may exist but cannot be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636, 637 [2006]). Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on his cross motion.