N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3126

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with a discovery order when the default is deliberate and contumacious.

Scharlack v. Richmond Memorial Hospital · filed 1987-02-02

To strike a pleading for noncompliance with an order pursuant to CPLR 3126, it must be shown that the plaintiff’s default was "deliberate and contumacious” (Battaglia v Hofmeister, 100 AD2d 833). The nine-month unexcused failure to comply with this court’s order demonstrates a cavalier attitude by the plaintiff’s counsel with respect to compliance with this court’s order, and the defendants met their initial burden of showing willfulness.

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 for failure to obey a discovery order requires a showing that the failure was willful and contumacious, and the noncomplying party must offer a reasonable excuse.

Rosner v. Blue Channel Corp. · filed 1987-06-15

The defendant’s motion must be characterized as one pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the October 3, 1984 order of discovery. In order to prevail on such a motion, the defendant must show that the plaintiffs failure to comply was willful and contumacious and the plaintiff was required to offer a reasonable excuse for her noncompliance (see, Battaglia v Hofmeister, 100 AD2d 833).

Section 3126 does not warrant dismissal for failure to comply with a disclosure order when that failure was neither willful nor contumacious.

Prisco v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 1987-07-20

The appellant’s failure to comply with the order dated July 2, 1985 was clearly not willful or contumacious (see, CPLR 3126). Therefore, it was error to impose the harsh sanction of dismissal of the complaint based upon such failure (see, e.g., Miller v County of Orange, 120 AD2d 713).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for willful or contumacious failure to comply with discovery orders.

Sawh v. Bridges · filed 1986-10-27

In conclusion, while we recognize that dismissal of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a harsh sanction, it is called for under the circumstances of this case.

Section 3126 permits dismissal after a plaintiff defaults on a conditional discovery order and fails to demonstrate a meritorious claim.

Quigley v. Jabbur · filed 1986-10-30

Some eight months later, Jabbur brought on the instant CPLR 3126 motion for a final order of dismissal. ... Therefore, since plaintiffs failed to submit competent medical evidence, either from a treating physician or by an expert whose opinion was based on the available medical records, regarding the merits of the medical malpractice action, Special Term abused its discretion in denying the application for a final order of dismissal.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to deny dismissal for delayed interrogatory answers when the moving party has shown no prejudice from the delay.

Corinno Civetta Construction Corp. v. City of New York · filed 1986-05-06

In addition, the court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to answer interrogatories insofar as no showing of prejudice to the city from the delay has been made.

Dismissal of a complaint under CPLR 3126 may be denied.

Andrew Catapano Co. v. City of New York · filed 1985-01-24

Denial of dismissal of the complaint under CPLR 3126 is affirmed for the reasons stated by Special Term.

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint if a plaintiff fails to provide a meaningful opportunity to inspect evidence requested in discovery.

Jonassen v. A.M.F., Inc. · filed 1984-08-27

Accordingly, plaintiff’s second amended complaint will be dismissed unless appellants are afforded an opportunity to conduct a meaningful inspection of the motorcycle within 30 days after service upon her of a copy of the order to be made hereon, with notice of entry (CPLR 3126).

Section 3126(3) permits a default judgment against a party who fails to appear for a court-ordered blood test in a paternity proceeding.

Reid v. White · filed 1982-01-20(3)

CPLR 3126 sets forth alternative penalties for refusal to comply with an order to disclose. In reviewing these alternatives the court can find but one that will effectively accomplish the public policy goal of obtaining support for the child born out of wedlock, namely, to render a judgment by default against the disobedient party, respondent herein. (CPLR 3126, subd 3.)

Section 3126(3) permits a default judgment when a party repeatedly fails to provide ordered disclosure without a viable excuse.

Arnot-Ogden Memorial Hospital v. Axelrod · filed 1983-06-16(3)

The record confirms that the judgment was entered pursuant to CPLR 3126 (subd 3) as a penalty for failure to disclose the information underlying the reimbursement rates determination. ... This record demonstrates a contumacious disregard of the court’s authority by evading disclosure. That respondent provided the certified records two days after entry of default judgment does not negate this behavior, but lends further support to the fact that respondent could have accumulated such data on time.

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery orders.

Citrin Furniture Corp. v. Royal Globe Insurance · filed 1982-03-15

Order modified, on the law, by (1) deleting the provision which denied the plaintiff’s motion to vacate its default (said motion having previously been granted by order dated Oct. 27,1980) and (2) adding a provision granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. ... Upon plaintiff’s failure to comply, defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint.

Section 3126 permits unconditional discovery sanctions when a party defaults without showing merit and a reasonable excuse.

Jonard Industries Corp. v. Jerico Precision Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1982-04-05

In the absence of a showing of merit and a reasonable excuse for the default and delay, it was error for Special Term to impose conditions upon the grant of defendants’ motion (see CPLR 3126; Barasch v Micucci, 49 NY2d 594; Cinelli v Radcliffe, 35 AD2d 829).

CPLR 3126 permits sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order, including dismissal if the party misses a court-imposed deadline.

Pascale v. Hoppenfeld · filed 1982-12-23

This is not a case of law office failure involving vacatur of a default; it is simply the sort of situation envisioned by CPLR 3126.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with discovery orders when the circumstances warrant that harsh remedy.

Baumann v. Dee · filed 1984-03-05

While the dismissal of a complaint under CPLR 3126 is a harsh remedy for failure to comply with a court order for discovery, it is nonetheless called for under the circumstances of this case.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to answer interrogatories despite a court order.

Consumers Credit Corp. v. Green · filed 1976-02-03

Plaintiff is precluded from any further proceedings herein and defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is granted. (CPLR 3126).

CPLR 3126 dismissal may be too severe when a claim remains viable and the plaintiff can correct a deficient pretrial response.

Denker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. · filed 1974-06-04

Again, the sanction imposed under CPLR 3126 is over severe.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a pleading as a discovery sanction, but that extreme penalty is improper when the party has no witness under its control who can provide more information than its examined witness.

McIntosh v. Flight Safety, Inc. · filed 1976-09-20

It was therefore an improvident exercise of discretion for Special Term to invoke the "extreme and drastic penalty” under CPLR 3126 of dismissal of the pleading (see Cinelli v Radcliffe, 35 AD2d 829; Thornlow v Long Is. R. R. Co., 33 AD2d 1027; 3A Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3126.04; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3126:2, pp 641-642; CPLR 3126:7, pp 646-649).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff willfully fails to obey prior orders compelling disclosure.

Laverne v. INC. VILL. OF LAUREL HOLLOW · filed 1966-07-07

... the court properly dismissed the complaint ... because of plaintiff's willful failure to purge himself of his disobedience of prior court orders compelling disclosure on matters relevant to his causes of action and defenses thereto (CPLR 3126).

A counterclaim should not be dismissed under CPLR 3126 for willful failure to obey a disclosure order when the defendants supplied detailed information to the best of their knowledge.

McClosky v. Long Island Hockey Club, Inc. · filed 1971-06-28

In our opinion, the record indicates that defendants Hamid have supplied, to the best of their knowledge under the circumstances, detailed information concerning the components of the counterclaim and, consequently, neither the counterclaim nor any part thereof should have been dismissed under CPLR 3126 for a willful failure to obey an order for disclosure.

Section 3126 permits conditions instead of dismissal when a party's failure to submit to a court-ordered examination is not willful.

Spiegel v. Goodman · filed 1983-12-30

Under the circumstances of this case the imposition of conditions rather than dismissal is appropriate (see CPLR 3126; ...). The conduct of the defaulting parties does not amount to a willful disregard of a prior order.

Section 3126 does not support dismissal for failure to provide disclosure to defendants who obtained no disclosure order and had no ruling that the requested material ought to have been disclosed.

Zletz v. Wetanson · filed 1986-02-11

Dismissal of the complaint as against the remaining three defendants, however, was an abuse of discretion. Although similarly affected by plaintiff’s actions, these defendants never sought an order compelling disclosure and Special Term made no ruling that material sought by these defendants “ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for a discovery violation only when the failure to disclose is sufficiently willful or contumacious; a monetary sanction may be imposed instead.

Farrell v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. · filed 1986-05-01

Based upon the alleged inability of plaintiff’s attorney to contact his client, who was working out of State, we cannot agree with Special Term’s determination that his conduct was so willful as to warrant an outright dismissal of the complaint against Poreda.

Section 3126 permits evidence preclusion for refusal to obey a disclosure order or willful failure to disclose information required by notice.

Gershon v. South Nassau Communities Hospital · filed 1986-08-25

The record indicates that the defendants did not refuse to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fail to disclose information which the court found ought to have been disclosed, pursuant to notice (see, CPLR 3126; Mancusi v Middlesex Ins. Co., 102 AD2d 846).

CPLR 3126 permits monetary sanctions for disobeying disclosure orders, including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred because of the failure to comply.

In re the Estate of Glazer · filed 1987-11-10

Based on the entire record before it, including the time sheets of the attorneys, the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing monetary sanctions, pursuant to CPLR 3126, against Malcolm Glazer for disobeying the orders directing disclosure. The amount of the attorneys’ fees assessed was reasonable and was limited to those fees incurred as a result of the failure to comply with the disclosure orders.

Section 3126 does not warrant dismissal for delay in serving a supplemental bill of particulars when the delay is not willful or contumacious and the plaintiff needs further discovery to prepare it.

Bernabe v. Long Island College Hospital · filed 1988-06-13

The plaintiff’s delay in serving a supplemental bill of particulars did not entail the willful or contumacious violation of a court order. The plaintiff was in need of additional pretrial discovery in order to be able to frame an adequate bill of particulars.

Section 3126 permits striking a pleading for a disclosure failure only when the failure is willful, deliberate and contumacious; a plaintiff should not be penalized without warning for counsel’s misconduct.

Mink v. Conifer Park, Inc. · filed 1988-07-28

The striking of a pleading is a drastic remedy which should only be used when the failure to comply with disclosure has been shown to be willful, deliberate and contumacious (Henderson v Stilwell, 116 AD2d 861, 863, lv denied 68 NY2d 606; Arantes v Gotham Taxi Corp., 116 AD2d 539, 540-541). It was plaintiff’s attorney, not plaintiff, that acted improperly during the course of the deposition. A plaintiff should not be penalized, without warning, for unprofessional conduct by his counsel.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for discovery noncompliance, but the court may decline that harsh sanction in its discretion.

Wells Fargo Alarm Services v. Consumers Distributing Ltd. · filed 1989-05-01

Under the circumstances, we find that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to impose the harsh sanction of dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 permits a court to strike a party’s pleading for disobeying a disclosure order when the default is clearly deliberate or contumacious.

Henry Rosenfeld, Inc. v. Bower & Gardner · filed 1990-05-15

Under CPLR 3126, if a party refuses to obey an order for disclosure, the court may order that party’s pleading stricken (Rodriguez v Sklar, 56 AD2d 537, 538). The striking of an answer is an extreme and drastic penalty, and should not be invoked where the moving affidavit fails to show conclusively that the default was clearly deliberate or contumacious (Cinelli v Radcliffe, 35 AD2d 829).

Section 3126 does not warrant dismissal for failure to provide disclosure when willfulness has not been demonstrated.

Burdett Radiology Consultants, P. C. v. Samaritan Hospital · filed 1990-06-28

Finally, we find that Supreme Court properly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for plaintiffs’ willful failure to provide agreed-upon disclosure (see, CPLR 3126). Defendants failed to demonstrate willfulness on plaintiffs’ part such as to warrant dismissal (see, Brandi v Chan, 151 AD2d 853, 854, appeal dismissed 75 NY2d 789).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery orders.

Gurwicz v. Greenberg · filed 1990-10-18

Under these circumstances, dismissal of the complaint was proper due to plaintiffs willful and contumacious conduct.

CPLR 3126 (3) permits a court to refuse dismissal for failure to comply with disclosure orders when the failure was not willful or contumacious.

Bufogle v. Pesiri · filed 1991-03-25(3)

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, we find that the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) due to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s disclosure orders.

CPLR 3126 gives courts broad discretion over discovery sanctions, and dismissal is a harsh remedy that may be justified by willful or contumacious failure to comply with a discovery order.

Strauss v. Vladeck · filed 1991-05-16

With regard to Supreme Court’s denial of defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3126, it is well settled that the court has broad discretion to determine motions under that section and that the dismissal sanction is considered a harsh remedy (Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711). While there is no doubt that dismissal of a complaint is a justifiable sanction where failure to comply with a discovery order is willful or contumacious (Baumann v Dee, 100 AD2d 504), Supreme Court made no such finding here. Indeed, it appears from the opposing affidavit that the failure to comply was due, in part, to plaintiffs hospitalization. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that Supreme Court abused its discretion.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for a clearly deliberate or contumacious failure to disclose, with the choice of penalty left to the court’s discretion.

Berman v. Szpilzinger · filed 1992-02-27

Although the striking of a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 is an extreme and drastic penalty to be invoked only where the refusal to obey an order for disclosure or failure to disclose pursuant to notice was clearly contumacious or deliberate (Henry Rosenfeld, Inc. v Bower & Gardner, 161 AD2d 374), it is equally well settled that the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed for such a refusal or failure is a matter lying within the sound discretion of the court (Brandi v Chan, 151 AD2d 853, 854, appeal dismissed 75 NY2d 789).

Section 3126 permits striking a party’s answer and counterclaims for a deliberate disclosure default that violates a court-ordered stipulation.

Pan World Construction Corp. v. 791 Park Avenue Corp. · filed 1992-07-02

In light of its failure to abide by the so-ordered stipulation dated July 3, 1990, the defendant’s default in disclosure was clearly deliberate, warranting the agreed upon sanction of striking its answer and counterclaims (CPLR 3126; Will v County of Nassau, 90 AD2d 795).

Section 3126’s dismissal sanction was unwarranted where the record did not show a willful or contumacious attempt to hinder pretrial disclosure.

Bratt v. Machlin · filed 1992-07-20

We agree with the plaintiff that under the circumstances outlined above, and under all of the other circumstances of this case, the drastic remedy of dismissal (see, CPLR 3126) was unwarranted (see generally, Prisco v Port Auth., 132 AD2d 655; Miller v County of Orange, 120 AD2d 713). ... Considering these circumstances, and that the plaintiff produced a total of 16 authorizations before the conference on December 19, 1989, we cannot conclude that the plaintiff is guilty of a willful or contumacious attempt to hinder pretrial disclosure (see generally, 3A Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 3126.4).

Section 3126 (3) permits dismissal when a party deliberately disobeys discovery orders and leaves the opposing party hopelessly prejudiced.

Hughes v. Atlantic Oldsmobile, Ltd. · filed 1994-03-07(3)

Under these circumstances, where the plaintiffs have deliberately removed and replaced evidence in defiance of two court orders, thereby hopelessly prejudicing the defense, we find that the court was faced with no viable sanction alternative, and therefore properly dismissed the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) (see, Hyosung [Am.] v Woodcrest Fabrics, 106 AD2d 298; Ferraro v Koncal Assocs., 97 AD2d 429).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when prolonged failure to provide court-ordered discovery supports an inference of willfulness and the party offers no reasonable excuse.

Spinello v. Abortion Services of O.B.G.Y.N. Associates Medical Pavilion · filed 1993-05-24(3)

We reverse and dismiss the complaint insofar as it is asserted against the appellant Levi. The decade-long delay in responding to court-ordered discovery permits the inference that the plaintiffs willfully failed to provide that discovery (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Wolfson v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 141 AD2d 815), and they have failed to offer a reasonable excuse for their default (see, e.g., Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 AD2d 580, 581).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders even when the plaintiff’s whereabouts are unknown.

Smith v. North Shore University Hospital · filed 1993-11-01

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in dismissing the complaint due to the infant plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery (see, CPLR 3126). Specifically, the infant plaintiff failed to comply with two orders, dated July 10, 1989, and October 25, 1989, directing him to appear for an examination before trial and for a physical examination. We reject the contention of counsel that since the whereabouts of the infant plaintiff were unknown, his failure to comply with the orders precluded the dismissal of the action (see, Gonzalez v Paniccioli, 174 AD2d 709).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with a disclosure order.

Aalbue v. Flaherty · filed 1994-03-07(b)(3)

Dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Bob Flaherty and Bob Flaherty, Inc., for failure to comply with a disclosure order was also appropriate (see, CPLR 3126 [b] [3]).

CPLR 3126 gives courts discretion to select and impose penalties for failure to comply with disclosure orders.

Bordes v. 170 East 106th Street Realty Corp. · filed 1994-04-04

The court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in the selection or imposition of penalties against the parties for failure to comply with disclosure orders (see, CPLR 3126; Stathoudakes v Kelmar Contr. Corp., 147 AD2d 690).

Section 3126 (3) permits dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery orders and offers unsatisfactory excuses.

D.A.D. Restaurant Ltd. v. North River Insurance · filed 1994-05-16(3)

We find these excuses to be unsatisfactory, and conclude that dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) was entirely proper and not an improvident exercise of discretion (see, Adams v Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 188 AD2d 630; Kirkland v Community Hosp., 187 AD2d 566; Bender & Bodnar v Nankin, 186 AD2d 524; Kogan v Royal Indem. Co., 179 AD2d 399).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when parties willfully fail to comply with a discovery order.

Johnson v. Greater New York Conference of Seventh Day Adventist Church · filed 1994-05-31

Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal for the parties’ failure to comply with its discovery order (see, CPLR 3126; Spinello v Abortion Servs. of O.B.G.Y.N. Assocs. Med. Pavilion, 193 AD2d 797; Adams v Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 188 AD2d 630; Gonzalez v Paniccioli, 174 AD2d 709), or in declining to vacate its order of dismissal solely to prevent the infant plaintiff from recommencing her action in Bronx County where she had relocated.

Section 3126 permits dismissal for willful failure to disclose information that should have been disclosed, even without a prior court order.

Brown v. Michelin Tire Corp. · filed 1994-05-02

A court may dismiss an action where a plaintiff "wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126), even where, as here, the plaintiff violated no prior court order (see, Wolfson v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 141 AD2d 815). We find dismissal to be necessary here due to the plaintiff’s counsel’s willful conduct, and the irreparable injury done to the appellants’ ability to defend.

Section 3126(2) permits a preclusion order that effectively strikes a pleading when failure to comply with a disclosure order is willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Vatel v. City of New York · filed 1994-10-03(2)

In order to invoke the drastic remedy of a preclusion order which effectively results in the striking of a pleading; the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, CPLR 3126 [2]; Beard v Peconic Foam Insulation Corp., 149 AD2d 555). The willful and contumacious character of the defendants’ failure to disclose can be inferred from their almost two-year-long noncompliance with two court orders, coupled with the inadequate excuses for those defaults (see, Wolfson v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 141 AD2d 815; Glasburgh v Port Auth., 193 AD2d 441).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with a disclosure order when the violation warrants that drastic remedy.

Ritter Foundation, Inc. v. Tebele · filed 1995-12-28

While the striking of a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with an order of disclosure is an extreme and drastic remedy, here it is warranted by defendant’s defiance of the demand for interrogatories for more than seven months, especially since a court order compelling disclosure was issued more than one month prior to defendant’s incomplete and unresponsive answers (CPLR 3126; Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711; Corsini v U-Haul Intl., 212 AD2d 288; Henry Rosenfeld, Inc. v Bower & Gardner, 161 AD2d 374).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits dismissal of a complaint for willful failure to comply with discovery orders.

Kaplan v. Elkind · filed 1994-10-17(3)

Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly concluded that plaintiffs’ conduct was willful and permissibly exercised its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) (see, Glasburgh v Port Auth., 193 AD2d 441; Wolfson v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 141 AD2d 815; Bigman v Dime Sav. Bank, 181 AD2d 648).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for willful and contumacious failure to comply with repeated disclosure and deposition demands.

Polito v. DeTomaso · filed 1994-10-31

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal of a pleading when a party’s conduct during discovery is so abusive that dismissal is warranted.

Corsini v. U-Haul International, Inc. · filed 1995-07-20(3)

Upon review of this record, however, we find that plaintiff’s behavior, preceding and during a pretrial deposition, was so lacking in professionalism and civility that dismissal is the only appropriate remedy (CPLR 3126 [3]; Zletz v Wetanson, supra).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff willfully destroys recordings that a court ordered him to produce.

Doino v. Meltzer · filed 1994-10-24

Under these and all the additional circumstances revealed in the record on appeal, the Supreme Court should have unconditionally dismissed the complaint (CPLR 3126; Wolfson v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 141 AD2d 815; Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 AD2d 580).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when parties fail to comply with discovery and a further conditional order would serve no useful purpose.

Giannakoulopoulos v. Koukoumelis · filed 1995-03-03

Under the circumstances, no useful purpose will be served by a further conditional order when it plainly appears, by reason of their unexplained disappearance, that plaintiffs cannot and will not comply with outstanding discovery requests. ... Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the complaint for plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute, pursuant to CPLR 3126, is granted and the complaint is dismissed.

Section 3126 allows discovery sanctions in addition to the appointment of a receiver when the receiver alone is an insufficient remedy.

Wolf v. Rand · filed 1995-06-15

In this case, approximately nine months transpired between the service of the motion for contempt and CPLR 3126 sanctions and the time the order appealed from was entered. ... The IAS Court’s determination to appoint a Receiver at that time was not a sufficient remedy. Accordingly, we remand for the imposition of sanction other than contempt in addition to the appointment of a Receiver.

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike an answer when a party willfully and in bad faith fails to comply with a discovery order.

Burgess v. Rains-ford · filed 1995-11-13

The record shows that the failure of the appellant Mercy Hospital to comply with the court’s order to meet the plaintiffs’ discovery demands was willful, contumacious, and in bad faith. Under the circumstances, the court properly granted the plaintiffs’ motion to strike its answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 (see, e.g., Rodriguez v All Am. Auto Rental, 179 AD2d 632; Ahroni v City of New York, 175 AD2d 789; Dauria v City of New York, 127 AD2d 459, 460; Sawh v Bridges, 120 AD2d 74, 78).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party refuses without just cause to obey a court order to submit to physical and psychological examinations.

Canosa v. Abadir · filed 1995-11-27

Moreover it was proper for the court to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3126, which provides for imposition of penalties for refusal to comply with court orders. The plaintiff had refused, without just cause, to obey the court’s previous order that she submit to the defendants’ outstanding demands for physical and psychological examinations (see, CPLR 3121).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to impose sanctions when a party fails to comply with a prior court order, subject to the court’s discretion.

Dillon v. Dillon · filed 1995-12-29

Under the circumstances of this case, the provision of the order providing for sanctions if the defendant failed to comply with a prior court order did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion (see, CPLR 3126; Hubbard v Hubbard, 113 Misc 2d 763; see also, Serdaroglu v Serdaroglu, 209 AD2d 606; Arnoff v Lorio, 208 AD2d 581; Kivo v Kivo, 193 AD2d 585; Adinolfi v Adinolfi, 168 AD2d 401).

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer for a disclosure default only when the default is conclusively shown to be deliberate or contumacious.

Quinn v. Broder · filed 1996-03-08

We also reject plaintiff’s contention that Supreme Court erred in refusing to strike the answer based upon defendant’s failure to submit to an examination before trial. Such drastic relief should be granted only where it is conclusively shown that the default was deliberate or contumacious (see, CPLR 3126; Henry Rosenfeld, Inc. v Bower & Gardner, 161 AD2d 374).

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 may be too harsh when a party has not deliberately or wilfully withheld particulars and needs discovery to provide them.

Aldana v. Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, Inc. · filed 1996-04-09

Loath as we are to interfere with the IAS Court’s management of its calendar and although plaintiffs failure to provide responses to the disputed particulars violated the court’s July 25, 1994 and February 15, 1995 orders, there is no showing that he did so deliberately, wilfully or contumaciously. In partial compliance, plaintiff did not indicate an unwillingness to respond, which would have necessitated a motion for a protective order, but verified that in the absence of discovery, he has no knowledge with which to provide the particulars demanded. Under such circumstances, dismissal of his claim was unnecessarily harsh and he should be afforded one last opportunity adequately to comply with defendants’ demands.

CPLR 3126 does not warrant striking an answer for missed disclosure deadlines absent a clear showing of willful or contumacious conduct.

Frye v. City of New York · filed 1996-06-06

The IAS Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining to strike defendants’ answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 for noncompliance with prior disclosure orders inasmuch as plaintiff failed to establish that defendants’ failure to appear at court-ordered examinations before trial was willful or contumacious, and since defendants offered a reasonable excuse for their good-faith, albeit belated, efforts to comply (Rossi v Lin, 189 AD2d 868; Bassett v Bando Sangsa Co., 103 AD2d 728).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party willfully disobeys a disclosure order.

Arcuri & Sons, Inc. v. Alfonsi · filed 1997-08-18

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the record demonstrates that it deliberately engaged in conduct which frustrated disclosure by repeatedly providing the defendants with illegible and incomplete copies of construction plans. This willful misconduct violated, inter alia, the court’s preliminary conference order (to which the plaintiff consented), and a conditional order of dismissal. Under these circumstances, we discern no improvident exercise of discretion in the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the action.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal for failure to attend a deposition when willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from repeated failures to obey deposition orders and inadequate excuses.

Porreco v. Selway · filed 1996-03-25(3)

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion by dismissing the complaint because the plaintiff failed to appear at a deposition. That the plaintiffs conduct was willful and contumacious can be inferred from his repeated failure to comply with court orders directing depositions and his inadequate excuses for his defaults (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Mills v Ducille, 170 AD2d 657).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal for failure to comply with a preliminary conference order only when the failure was willful, contumacious, deliberate, or in bad faith.

Little v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center · filed 1996-09-09(3)

However, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) should not be granted unless the lack of compliance with a preliminary conference order was "willfull, contumacious, deliberate or in bad faith” (Magrabi v City of New York, 211 AD2d 422, 423; see, Van Inwegen v Lucia, 192 AD2d 834; Hocevar v Honig Indus. Diamond Wheel, 172 AD2d 588; Bermudez v Laminates Unlimited, 134 AD2d 314, 315).

CPLR 3126 permits an answer to be stricken when a party fails to comply with a conditional order requiring an examination before trial.

Green v. Kolur · filed 1996-12-02

The appellants’ answer was stricken by operation of law, because of their failure to comply with a prior conditional order of preclusion of the same court, dated January 8, 1996, which granted the cross motion of the plaintiffs to strike the appellants’ answer unless they submitted to an examination before trial (see, CPLR 3126; see also, Amico v Pepe, 172 AD2d 575).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a claim and limits on damages when a party repeatedly disobeys discovery orders and frustrates disclosure; striking a pleading requires a deliberate and contumacious default.

Collins v. Guerra · filed 1996-12-16

Although the drastic sanction of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 should not be invoked unless the resisting party’s default is shown to be deliberate and contumacious (see, Lestingi v City of New York, 209 AD2d 384; Eagle Star Ins. Co. v Behar, 207 AD2d 326), where a party disobeys a court order and thereby frustrates the disclosure scheme provided by the CPLR, dismissal of the complaint is within the court’s broad discretion (see, Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711; Eagle Star Ins. Co. v Behar, supra).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when repeated refusal to comply with disclosure demands and court orders is willful and contumacious.

Re v. Ernst & Whinney · filed 1997-02-10

By their repeated refusal to comply with the defendants’ repeated demands for disclosure and the numerous court orders directing disclosure, the plaintiffs exhibited willful and contumacious conduct which warranted dismissal of their complaint (see, Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711, 713; Rivers v Embassy Club, 207 AD2d 876, 877; CPLR 3126).

Section 3126 permits reasonable attorney’s fees for failure to comply with a discovery order when striking the answer is unwarranted.

Dehaney v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1997-03-27

Although the court is not satisfied that defendant and its counsel’s actions in failing to comply with the preliminary conference order dated February 2, 1995 were so willful and contumacious as to warrant the extreme penalty of striking defendant’s answer, they do warrant the imposition of reasonable attorneys’ fees to compensate plaintiffs for the additional time and expense incurred in seeking the previously ordered relief.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party willfully fails to comply with an order requiring a deposition.

Macias v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1997-06-05(3)

The IAS Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in sua sponte dismissing this ten-year-old personal injury action where plaintiff willfully failed to comply with the preliminary conference order requiring her appearance for deposition (see, CPLR 3126 [3]), and plaintiff’s attorney did not move to vacate the order relieving him, which he had sought on grounds of plaintiff’s lack of cooperation, for eight months after entry thereof, at which time he was allegedly again retained by plaintiff.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal of a pleading when a party fails to comply with disclosure orders without a reasonable excuse.

Frias v. Fortini · filed 1997-06-09(3)

Here, the plaintiffs failed to provide a reasonable excuse for the failure to provide medical authorizations in full compliance with the defendants’ July 1993 discovery demand, despite the issuance of two prior court orders directing compliance with the outstanding demand. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in dismissing the complaint (see, Brady v County of Nassau, supra).

CPLR 3126(3) gives courts discretion to deny a motion to dismiss a complaint as a disclosure sanction.

Smith v. Yonkers Contracting Co. · filed 1997-04-21(3)

Finally, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Soto v City of Long Beach, 197 AD2d 615; Spira v Antoine, 191 AD2d 219).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for willful and contumacious failure to comply with disclosure demands and court orders without a reasonable excuse.

Cutolo v. Khalife · filed 1997-09-29

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

CPLR 3126(2) permits preclusion when a party’s failure to cooperate with disclosure is willful, deliberate, and contumacious.

Maillard v. Maillard · filed 1997-10-06(2)

In order to invoke the drastic remedy of preclusion, the court must determine that the offending party’s lack of cooperation with disclosure was willful, deliberate, and contumacious (see, CPLR 3126 [2]; Vatel v City of New York, 208 AD2d 524).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for violating a discovery order only upon a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad-faith noncompliance.

Corner Realty 30/7, Inc. v. Bernstein Management Corp. · filed 1998-04-28

CPLR 3126 provides various sanctions for violations of discovery orders, the most serious of which are striking a party’s pleadings or outright dismissal of the action (see, Corsini v U-Haul Intl., 212 AD2d 288, 291, lv dismissed in part and denied in part 87 NY2d 964; see also, Dauria v City of New York, 127 AD2d 459, 460). However, in furtherance of the policy of favoring the resolution of actions on the merits, the extreme sanction of dismissal is warranted only where a clear showing has been made that the noncompliance with a discovery order was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith (Corsini v U-Haul Intl., supra; Washington v Alco Auto Sales, 199 AD2d 165; Rubin v Pan Am. World Airways, 128 AD2d 765; see also, 1250 Broadway Parking Corp. v 38-32 Assocs., 238 AD2d 188).

CPLR 3126 cannot be invoked to strike an expert response without a showing that the party refused to obey a disclosure order or acted willfully.

Brooks v. City of New York · filed 1998-08-24

Finally, Defendant has not demonstrated that-in relation to the reply, Plaintiff refused to obey an order for disclosure or acted willfully, and thus Defendant cannot invoke CPLR 3126.

Dismissal for failure to comply with discovery under CPLR 3126 requires a showing of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct.

DeAngelis v. Korea First Bank · filed 1998-10-05

The appellant failed to establish that the plaintiff engaged in willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct (see, Parish Constr. Corp. v Franlo Tile, 215 AD2d 545; Ahroni v City of New York, 175 AD2d 789).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a plaintiff fails to attend noticed physical examinations without a reasonable excuse.

Chen v. Goldstein · filed 1998-01-15

Nevertheless, we sustain the dismissal of complaint since plaintiff fails to offer a reasonable excuse for his noncompliance with defendants’ notices of physical examination.

Section 3126(3) does not warrant dismissing a complaint for failure to bring a principal to a discovery conference when an attorney appears with the information the court requested.

Board of Managers of the Landmark Condominium v. 117 Tulip Avenue Associates · filed 1998-02-23(3)

Since this was the information that the plaintiff was supposed to provide, the plaintiffs failure to comply literally with the Supreme Court’s prior direction by appearing with one of its principals should not have resulted in the dismissal of its complaint (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; Kokalari v Kokalari, 166 AD2d 418; Obrenski v Tushinsky, 63 AD2d 695; cf., Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467; Herrera v City of New York, 238 AD2d 475).

CPLR 3126 dismissal for failure to comply with a disclosure order requires a showing of willful or contumacious conduct.

Pickens v. St. John's Hospital · filed 1998-03-30

Furthermore, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the cross motion of North Shore University Hospital, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to comply with stated portions of the preliminary conference order since there was no showing of willful or contumacious conduct (cf, Cutolo v Khalife, 242 AD2d 661).

Section 3126 permits a court to allow additional time to produce a witness for a court-ordered deposition instead of imposing a liability sanction.

Fellin v. Sahgal · filed 1998-04-13

Under the circumstances of this case, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion for the Supreme Court, in effect, to modify the order entered October 24, 1996, and allow the defendants additional time to comply with an order directing production of a witness for the court-ordered deposition (see generally, CPLR 3126; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party willfully and contumaciously fails to comply with a discovery order.

Lawrence H. Morse, Inc. v. Anson · filed 1998-06-04(3)

Based upon the record before us, as disclosed in the chronology of events previously stated, we conclude that plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the outstanding discovery order was willful and contumacious (see, CPLR 3126 [3]; ...).

A party seeking preclusion for a disclosure failure bears the burden of showing that the failure was willful, deliberate, or contumacious.

Goodman, Rackower & Agiato v. Lieberman · filed 1999-04-26(2)

The burden of establishing that a failure or refusal to disclose was the result of willful, deliberate, or contumacious conduct rests with the party seeking an order of preclusion (see, Florio v Newmark & Lewis, 248 AD2d 504). ... The plaintiff failed to meet its burden in this case since the defendant complied with the order directing her to serve a bill of particulars by November 24, 1997.

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 for failure to appear for depositions is improper when the failure was not willful and contumacious.

Personalized Home Care, Ltd. v. Tvert · filed 1999-06-07

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 inasmuch as the plaintiffs did not exhibit willful and contumacious conduct in failing to appear for depositions (see, Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711, 713).

Section 3126 permits a court to dismiss claims when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery orders and provide sufficiently specific discovery.

Gonzalez v. Guirguis · filed 1999-09-27

The plaintiffs, over a two-year period, failed to comply with numerous court orders and directives concerning discovery, and failed to provide discovery with the requested specificity on certain issues. Thus, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in granting the respondents’ separate motions to ...dismiss the action insofar as asserted against them (see, Abreu v St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 247 AD2d 238).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a counterclaim when a party repeatedly fails to respond adequately to discovery demands and offers no explanation.

Oliveri v. Carter · filed 1998-12-14

In light of this history, and because Carter did not offer an explanation for his failure to provide the information currently at issue, which related to Carter’s second counterclaim for defamation, dismissal of the second counterclaim is warranted (see, CPLR 3126; Herrera v City of New York, 238 AD2d 475).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to deny dismissal for a discovery failure when the failure has not been shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Tillman v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority · filed 1999-10-25

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss since there was no showing that the plaintiffs failure to comply with discovery was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, Mohammed v 919 Park Place Owners Corp., 245 AD2d 351; Parish Constr. Corp. v Franlo Tile, 215 AD2d 545).

Section 3126 does not warrant dismissal for failure to attend a deposition when the deposition was ordered for a mutually convenient time but was noticed without consulting the plaintiff.

Greene v. New England Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1999-01-26

Inasmuch as it had been ordered that plaintiffs deposition was to take place at a time mutually convenient to the parties and defendant nonetheless noticed the deposition without consulting -plaintiff, the motion court properly determined that plaintiffs failure to appear did not warrant dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 gives courts discretion to dismiss a complaint for failure to obey discovery orders; dismissal was unwarranted where the plaintiffs had not willfully or contumaciously refused to comply.

Hills v. La Group-Landscape Architecture & Engineering, P. C. · filed 2000-01-13

Upon our review of the record, we are unable to conclude that plaintiffs willfully or contumaciously refused to obey any court order such that the complaint should be dismissed. ... Finding no abuse of its considerable discretion in determining whether the harsh sanction of dismissal of the complaint was a warranted penalty for the alleged failure to comply with its discovery orders (see, Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711; see also, CPLR 3126), we affirm.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party's conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Cronin v. Perry · filed 2000-02-07

It is well settled that the drastic remedy of striking a pleading or dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith. ... We agree with the Supreme Court that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiffs conduct in responding to court-ordered disclosure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith. Thus, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying dismissal of the action.

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 requires a showing that the party willfully frustrated discovery.

Guerrero v. Lenox Hill Hospital · filed 2000-03-28

Accordingly, since defendants have failed to establish that discovery had been willfully frustrated by plaintiff, the motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 was properly denied.

CPLR 3126 permits preclusion that effectively strikes a pleading only when the failure to comply with a disclosure order was willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Vancott v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. · filed 2000-04-03

In order to invoke the drastic remedy of preclusion which effectively results in the striking of a pleading, the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, CPLR 3126; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664; Vatel v City of New York, 208 AD2d 524).

CPLR 3126 requires willful, deliberate, and contumacious failure to comply with a disclosure order before a court imposes preclusion that effectively strikes a pleading.

Cianciolo v. Trism Specialized Carriers · filed 2000-07-03

To invoke the drastic remedy of preclusion, which effectively results in the striking of a pleading, the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, CPLR 3126; Vancott v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 271 AD2d 438). The record does not support a finding that the appellants willfully and deliberately failed to produce the appellant Charles Edward Alexander for a deposition.

Section 3126 does not support dismissal for a default without evidence that the default was willful or contumacious.

Ramos v. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Health Center, Inc. · filed 2001-04-03

Initially, the dismissal was unwarranted, since there was no evidence that plaintiffs default had been willful or contumacious (see, CPLR 3126; Corner Realty 30/7 v Bernstein Mgt. Corp., 249 AD2d 191, 193).

CPLR 3126 treats dismissal as the most drastic discovery sanction; ordinarily, the party seeking disclosure must clearly show willful, contumacious, or bad-faith noncompliance.

Tsai v. Hernandez · filed 2001-06-05

Dismissal is the most drastic sanction contemplated by CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with discovery. Ordinarily, we look to whether the party seeking disclosure clearly demonstrates that the failure to disclose was willful, contumacious or manifested bad faith ... factors not present here. ... Dismissal under these circumstances was improvident.

Section 3126 gives courts discretion to deny a motion to dismiss for a discovery violation.

Jones v. Board of Education · filed 2002-03-18

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in ...denying the motion of the New York City School Construction Authority (hereinafter NYCSCA) to dismiss the third-party complaint (see, Villatoro v Talt, 269 AD2d 390; Annanquartey v Passeser, 260 AD2d 517; Guilford v Netter, 179 AD2d 801; Pescatore v American Export Lines, 131 AD2d 739).

CPLR 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party refuses to obey a disclosure order or willfully fails to disclose information the court finds should be disclosed.

Cippitelli v. County of Schenectady · filed 2001-06-28(3)

With CPLR 3126 permitting a court to “make such orders * * * as are just,” including the dismissal of the action (CPLR 3126 [3]) upon the refusal of a party to obey an order for disclosure or upon the willful failure to disclose information which a court finds ought to be disclosed, no error can be discerned.

Section 3126 allows a conditional discovery dismissal to become absolute when a party fails to comply; relief requires a reasonable excuse and a meritorious cause of action.

Macancela v. Pekurar · filed 2001-08-06

In addition, as a consequence of the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with a conditional order of dismissal, that order became absolute. To be relieved from the adverse impact of the order of dismissal, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their failure to comply with the discovery demands, and the existence of a meritorious cause of action (see, Liotti v Ruk, 282 AD2d 717; Kepple v Hill Assocs., 275 AD2d 299).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff willfully and contumaciously fails to comply with discovery demands and orders.

Cavaliere v. Episcopal Health Services, Inc. · filed 2001-10-15

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against the respondents since the record establishes that the plaintiff willfully and contumaciously failed to comply with the respondents’ discovery demands and the Supreme Court’s discovery orders (see, CPLR 3126; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118; Birch Hill Farm v Reed, 272 AD2d 282).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to dismiss a complaint when a party fails to produce requested documents and comply with orders directing discovery.

Michael v. General Tire, Inc. · filed 2002-01-28

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing his complaint on the ground that he failed to produce requested documents and failed to comply with orders directing compliance with discovery demands (see, CPLR 3126 [33; Cavaliere v Episcopal Health Servs., 287 AD2d 532; Birch Hill Farm v Reed, 272 AD2d 282).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party’s failure to comply with discovery demands and a court order is willful, contumacious and in bad faith.

Engeleit v. Atlantic · filed 2002-02-05

It is, accordingly, clear that plaintiff’s noncompliance with discovery demands and a court order was willful, contumacious and in bad faith and thus that the sanction imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 was appropriate (see, Sage Realty Corp. v Proskauer Rose, 275 AD2d 11, 17-18).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to dismiss an action as a discretionary sanction for willful discovery defaults.

Yona v. Beth Israel Medical Center · filed 2001-07-02(b)(3)

Pursuant to CPLR 3126 (b) (3), the Supreme Court possesses the discretion, inter alia, to dismiss an action as a sanction for willful discovery defaults.

CPLR 3126 (3) permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery when the conduct is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Wilson v. West Hempstead Generals Football Club, Inc. · filed 2001-08-20(3)

The drastic remedy of dismissing a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) for a plaintiffs failure to comply with court-ordered discovery should be granted only where the conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

CPLR 3126(3) permits dismissal for a discovery failure only when the party seeking disclosure conclusively shows that the failure was wilful, contumacious, or in bad faith; lateness alone is insufficient.

Hassan v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority · filed 2001-08-30(3)

CPLR 3126 provides various sanctions for failing to comply with outstanding discovery requests or court-ordered discovery obligations, the most drastic of which is dismissal of a party’s pleadings (CPLR 3126 [3]). ... Therefore, absent any showing that plaintiffs’ tardiness was wilful, contumacious or in bad faith, lateness alone was insufficient to warrant the harsh remedy of dismissal and, absent any discernible prejudice to defendants, their motion should have been denied.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the party’s conduct is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Lampel v. Sergel · filed 2001-10-15

An action should be resolved on the merits, if at all possible, and the drastic remedy of striking a pleading or dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the offending party is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, Cronin v Perry, 269 AD2d 351; Cruzatti v St. Mary’s Hosp., 193 AD2d 579).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint only when the plaintiff’s conduct is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Halali v. Evanston Insurance · filed 2001-11-13

Nor is there any basis for the Supreme Court to have dismissed the complaint under CPLR 3126. To sustain the dismissal of a complaint under CPLR 3126, a plaintiffs behavior must be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see, Ranfort v Peak Tours, 250 AD2d 747). The record does not establish that the plaintiffs’ behavior was such that dismissal is warranted.

CPLR 3126 permits unconditional dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to comply with court-ordered discovery.

Nowak v. Veira · filed 2001-12-17

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion by failing to dismiss the complaint unconditionally under these circumstances (see, Zletz v Wetanson, supra; Rivers v Embassy Club, 207 AD2d 876).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant dismissal when a further bill of particulars adequately states the claimed negligent acts or omissions.

Ramos v. County of Nassau · filed 2002-02-19

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126. The plaintiff’s further bill of particulars adequately provides a general statement “of the acts or omissions constituting the negligence claimed” (CPLR 3043 [a] [3]; see, Laukaitis v Ski Stop, 223 AD2d 627).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party’s conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Gruber v. Central Truck Equipment, Inc. · filed 2002-10-07

It is well established that the striking of a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith. The plaintiffs’ repeated failure to comply with orders of the Supreme Court directing disclosure, and failure to appear at multiple court conferences, support an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Blake v. Chawla · filed 2002-11-18

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, the Supreme Court has the discretion to dismiss an action where the plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery is willful, contumacious, or due to bad faith (see Yona v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 285 AD2d 460; Birch Hill Farm v Reed, 272 AD2d 282; Amato v County of Westchester, 243 AD2d 593).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits dismissal of a complaint when a party fails to comply with discovery orders; willful noncompliance may be inferred from a failure to comply fully or offer a reasonable excuse.

Leone v. Esposito · filed 2002-11-15(3)

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the motion of defendant pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) to dismiss the complaints against him for plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the court’s discovery orders (see Cavaliere v Episcopal Health Servs., 287 AD2d 532, 533; Wilson v West Hempstead Gens. Football Club, 286 AD2d 438; Kingsley v Kantor, 265 AD2d 529, 530).

Section 3126 permits preclusion for failure to comply with a disclosure order when the conduct is willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Reyes v. Vanderbilt · filed 2003-03-03

However, to invoke the drastic remedy of preclusion, the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see CPLR 3126; Ciandolo v Trism Spedalized Carriers, 274 AD2d 369 [2000]).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with a disclosure order when the conduct is willful, deliberate, and contumacious or its equivalent.

Conch Associates, Inc. v. PMCC Mortgage Corp. · filed 2003-03-17

However, to invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading, the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent ... In the instant case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the motion to strike the complaint.

CPLR 3126 preclusion requires a willful, deliberate, and contumacious failure to cooperate with disclosure.

Assael v. Metropolitan Transit Authority · filed 2004-02-17

Under these circumstances, and considering the lack of evidence that the defendants’ conduct was willful or contumacious, the Supreme Court’s preclusion of the defendants’ use of the transcript on cross examination was unwarranted.

CPLR 3126 does not warrant dismissal for disobeying a court order without a showing of intentional disobedience.

Klein v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2003-03-03

Dismissal is also unwarranted pursuant to CPLR 3126, as there has been no showing that the plaintiff intentionally disobeyed the order dated February 27, 2001.

Section 3126 permits dismissal when a party repeatedly disobeys discovery orders without a reasonable excuse.

Sinn v. City of New York · filed 2003-04-29

Absent a reasonable excuse for the disobedience, dismissal of the action was a proper exercise of discretion (see Oberlander v Levi, 207 AD2d 437 [1994]; Pimental v City of New York, 246 AD2d 467, 468 [1998]).

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion when a party unreasonably delays providing information required by repeated disclosure orders, frustrating the opposing party’s preparation and the disclosure process.

Mines v. American Honda Motors Co. · filed 2003-05-20(2)

Plaintiffs offer no excuse for this unreasonable delay in demanding specifically identified materials supposedly necessary to the particularization of their claim directed in numerous court orders, a delay that has frustrated defendants’ preparation of a defense and the disclosure process itself. Accordingly, preclusion was properly granted (CPLR 3126 [2]; ...).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal of a complaint if a plaintiff fails to appear for an examination before trial within the time ordered by the court.

Albatros Medical, P.C. v. Government Employees Ins. · filed 2003-07-21(3)

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is granted unless the plaintiff appears for an examination before trial within 90 days of service of this order with notice of entry. (CPLR 3126 [3].)

CPLR 3126(3) permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure after repeated opportunities to comply.

Silva v. 7 Highland Management Corp. · filed 2003-09-22(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion to vacate her default in complying with court-ordered disclosure after affording the plaintiff numerous opportunities to comply (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Clarke v United Parcel Serv., 300 AD2d 614, 615 [2002]; UBS AG v Geecee Exportaciones LTDA., 277 AD2d 17 [2000]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when repeated failure to obey orders to appear for an examination before trial and inadequate excuses support an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Wiltos v. 1230 Park Owners, Inc. · filed 2003-11-03

The plaintiffs willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from his repeated failure to comply with orders directing him to appear for an examination before trial and the inadequate excuses offered for his failure to comply (see Porreco v Selway, 225 AD2d 752 [1996]). Accordingly, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 should have been granted.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party willfully and deliberately fails to provide ordered discovery.

International Consulting Services, Ltd. v. Kiss · filed 2004-03-29

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly found that the plaintiffs failure to provide the discovery sought by the respondents was willful, contumacious, and deliberate, warranting dismissal under CPLR 3126 (see Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 123 [1999]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a party willfully and persistently obstructs disclosure.

Joseph v. Iannace · filed 2004-04-12

Since the plaintiff engaged in a pattern of “willful disobedience of a specific notice for discovery” (Ordonez v Guerra, supra at 329 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see American Reliance Ins. Co. v National Gen. Ins. Co., 174 AD2d 591 [1991]), dismissal under CPLR 3126 was warranted.

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 requires proof of the terms of the disclosure orders allegedly violated and that the violations were willful and contumacious.

Carter v. County of Erie · filed 2004-04-30

The court erred, however, in granting those parts of the respective motion and cross motion of defendants seeking dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 does not justify dismissal based substantially on a nonparty’s refusal to provide financial disclosure.

Fox v. Fox · filed 2004-07-01

The Support Magistrate’s placement of significant weight in the decision to dismiss under CPLR 3126 on the position taken by petitioner’s current husband was improper since he is not a party to the proceeding (see CPLR 3126).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a party’s failure to comply with discovery is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Rowell v. Joyce · filed 2004-09-07(3)

Although dismissing a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy, it is warranted where a party’s conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see Beneficial Mtge. Corp. v Lawrence, 5 AD3d 339 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 602 [2004]; Frias v Fortini, 240 AD2d 467 [1997]).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant dismissal for incomplete disclosure when the noncompliance is not willful and contumacious.

Torres v. Lowinger · filed 2004-11-01

While the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiffs had not yet provided some of the mandated disclosure in this action, under the circumstances of this case, their noncompliance did not rise to the level of willful and contumacious conduct warranting dismissal (see CPLR 3126; see generally Felipe v 2820 W. 36th St. Realty Corp., 7 AD3d 483 [2004]; 181 S. Franklin Assoc. v Y & R Assoc., 6 AD3d 594 [2004]; Hinds v Price Club, 2 AD3d 585 [2003]; Avenue C Constr. v Gassner, 306 AD2d 506 [2003]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for repeated failures to provide timely, good faith responses to court-ordered disclosure.

Maneti v. Ariana Realty Co. · filed 2005-06-13

Given the plaintiffs repeated failures to provide timely and good faith responses to court-ordered disclosure, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint (see CPLR 3126; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]).

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 is unwarranted when a party’s failure to comply with discovery does not appear willful and contumacious.

Cestaro v. Mun Yuen Roger Chin · filed 2005-07-18

In any event, the extreme sanction of dismissing the complaint as against those defendants is not warranted because it does not appear that the plaintiff willfully and contumaciously failed to appear for an examination before trial and provide complete responses to the discovery demands of Product Development Corp.

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 for delayed disclosure is improper when the record does not support a finding that the failure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Piche v. Greenpoint Savings Bank · filed 2005-09-06

The record does not support the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ failure to timely respond to some of the defendants’ demands for disclosure was willful, contumacious, or in bad faith. Thus, the” Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 based on such failure (see Felipe v 2820 W. 36th St. Realty Corp., 7 AD3d 483 [2004]).

Section 3126 permits a conditional dismissal when a party misses medical examinations but outright dismissal is unwarranted.

Gokey v. DeCicco · filed 2005-12-01(3)

Rather, we find that a conditional order of dismissal is justified upon these facts.

CPLR 3126 leaves the choice of disclosure penalty to the court’s discretion, but dismissal should be imposed only for a willful, contumacious, or bad faith failure to disclose.

Sisca v. City of Yonkers · filed 2005-12-12

Generally, the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court (see CPLR 3126; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118 [1999]). However, the penalty of dismissing a complaint for failure to disclose is extreme and should only be imposed where the failure has been willful, contumacious, or in bad faith (see DeCintio v Ahmed, 276 AD2d 463, 464 [2000]; Espinal v City of New York, 264 AD2d 806 [1999]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when plaintiffs repeatedly disregard discovery demands and court orders without excuse.

Martel v. Chupka · filed 2006-02-28

In opposition to the present motion, the plaintiffs failed to present any excuse for their noncompliance. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint (see Royal Caterers, LLC v Marine Midland, 8 AD3d 549 [2004]; Alto v Gilman Mgt. Corp., 7 AD3d 650 [2004]).

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 (a) (3) for late discovery is unwarranted when the failure to comply was not willful and contumacious.

Amato v. Commack Union Free School District · filed 2006-09-12(a)(3)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the appellant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it pursuant to CPLR 3126 (a) (3) for failure to comply with a preliminary conference order. The plaintiffs’ failure to timely provide discovery pursuant to that order was not willful and contumacious (see Piche v Greenpoint Sav. Bank, 21 AD3d 886 [2005]; Felipe v 2820 W. 36th St. Realty Corp., 7 AD3d 483, 484 [2004]).

CPLR 3126 permits striking a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party’s conduct is willful and contumacious.

Bomzer v. Parke-Davis · filed 2007-06-12

However, the drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful and contumacious (see Goldstein v Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 39 AD3d 816 [2007]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the party's conduct is willful and contumacious.

Resnick v. Schwarzkopf · filed 2007-06-12

“[T]he drastic remedy of striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the party is shown to be willful and contumacious”

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with a disclosure order when the party’s conduct is willful and contumacious.

Watson v. Hall · filed 2007-08-14

Although dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with a disclosure order pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy, it is warranted where a party’s conduct is shown to be willful and contumacious (see Devito v J & J Towing, Inc., 17 AD3d 624, 625 [2005]; Schwartz v Suebsanguan, 15 AD3d 565, 566 [2005]; cf. Prappas v Papadatos, 38 AD3d 871, 872-873 [2007]; Russo v Tolchin, 35 AD3d 431, 434-435 [2006]).

Section 3126 leaves the choice of disclosure penalty to the trial court’s discretion; striking an answer requires a showing of willful, deliberate, and contumacious noncompliance or its equivalent.

Sladowski-Casolaro v. World Championship Wrestling, Inc. · filed 2008-01-22

The nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter within the discretion of the trial court ... Here, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was to strike the defendants’ answers as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any purported failure on the part of the defendants to comply with a disclosure order was willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent ... The record demonstrates that the defendants had complied with all, or nearly all, of the plaintiffs demands.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party repeatedly disobeys disclosure orders and frustrates discovery.

Rossi v. Budget Rent A Car · filed 2008-03-27(3)

Since the record is clear that plaintiff repeatedly disobeyed court orders, evaded her disclosure obligations and frustrated the disclosure process, Supreme Court acted within its discretion in dismissing her claim (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 123 [1999]; Du Valle v Swan Lake Resort Hotel, LLC, 26 AD3d 616, 618 [2006]; Appler v Riverview Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 9 AD3d at 578).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for failure to provide disclosure, but a court may deny dismissal and impose an alternative sanction when the failure was not willful or contumacious.

Shapiro v. Kurtzman · filed 2008-04-08

Furthermore, in light of the new information presented, the plaintiff’s failure to provide disclosure was not willful or contumacious. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its broad discretion in granting leave to renew and thereupon denying Kurtzman’s motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her, and in granting her alternative relief.

CPLR 3126 does not permit a court to strike a complaint for failure to comply with disclosure absent a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

ACME ANC Corp. v. Read · filed 2008-10-28

The Supreme Court, however, upon reargument, improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the respondents’ motion which was to strike the complaint absent a clear showing that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with disclosure was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Manko v Lenox Hill Hosp., 44 AD3d 1014 [2007]; Russo v Tolchin, 35 AD3d 431, 434 [2006]; Kuzmin v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 22 AD3d 643 [2005]).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party’s conduct is willful and contumacious.

Rizzuti v. Laucella · filed 2008-12-16(3)

The drastic remedy of dismissing a complaint or striking a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful and contumacious (see Novick v DeRosa, 51 AD3d 885 [2008]; Martin v City of New York, 46 AD3d 635 [2007]; Bomzer v Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner Lambert Co., 41 AD3d 522 [2007]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for refusal to obey a disclosure order or willful failure to disclose, but dismissal is too harsh when willful noncompliance is not shown.

Shure v. New York Cruise Lines, Inc. · filed 2009-02-24

An action may be dismissed where a party refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information the court finds ought to have been disclosed (CPLR 3126). ... Defendants did not demonstrate that plaintiff had willfully failed to comply with the scheduling orders of the court. Dismissal of the complaint was too harsh a penalty under these circumstances.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal for failure to comply with a disclosure order, but generally requires a showing of willful and contumacious noncompliance.

Mazzuca v. Warren P. Wielt Trust · filed 2009-02-26(3)

While a trial court has discretion to dismiss a complaint as a sanction against a plaintiff who fails to comply with a court order and frustrates the disclosure process (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 122-123 [1999]), this drastic sanction is generally only justified when the party seeking dismissal demonstrates that the failure to comply with the request and order for disclosure was willful and contumacious (see Doherty v Schuyler Hills, Inc., 55 AD3d 1174, 1176 [2008]).

Section 3126 permits a court to impose a monetary sanction, including costs and counsel fees, for disobeying a disclosure order or willfully failing to comply with legitimate disclosure demands.

In re John H. · filed 2009-03-12

The determination to impose sanctions is sustainable pursuant to CPLR 3126. That statute provides penalties for refusing to obey an order for disclosure or willfully failing to comply with legitimate disclosure demands. ... Although not specifically listed, a monetary sanction, including costs and counsel fees, may be imposed under the statutory language permitting any order that the court finds “just” (see Connors, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3126:ll, at 474-476).

CPLR 3126(3) requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery demands before a complaint may be dismissed.

EDP Hospital Computer System, Inc. v. Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Center · filed 2009-06-02(3)

The defendant failed to make a clear showing that the plaintiff willfully and contumaciously failed to comply with discovery demands (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Pulsone v North Shore Towers Apts. Inc., 29 AD3d 883 [2006]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for discovery delays when they are willful and contumacious; providing the requested disclosure while a dismissal motion is pending can support denying that remedy.

Lopes v. Metropolitan Transit Authority · filed 2009-10-13

Accordingly, while we do not condone the plaintiffs’ delays in adhering to court-ordered discovery schedules (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 123 [1999]), given the public policy favoring resolution on the merits (see Lampel v Sergel, 287 AD2d 548 [2001]), under the circumstances, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion for the Supreme Court to deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss (see Savin v Brooklyn Mar. Park Dev. Corp., 61 AD3d 954 [2009]; Duncan v Hebb, 47 AD3d 871 [2008]; Zouev v City of New York, 32 AD3d 850, 851 [2006]; Pascarelli v City of New York, 16 AD3d 472, 473 [2005]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for delayed compliance with court-ordered discovery when the delay is willful and contumacious.

Santiago v. Nyack Hospital · filed 2009-12-08

The appellants failed to establish that any of the plaintiffs delays in complying with court-ordered discovery were willful and contumacious such that the drastic remedy of dismissing the complaint would be justified (see Negro v Saint Charles Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr., 44 AD3d at 728; Sisca v City of Yonkers, N.Y., 24 AD3d 531, 532 [2005]; A.F.C. Enters., Inc. v New York City School Constr. Auth., 33 AD3d 737 [2006]; Lampel v Sergei, 287 AD2d 548, 549 [2001]).

Section 3126 (3) permits dismissal for a party’s disclosure violation, but not for a nonparty’s.

Mia Acupuncture, P.C. v. Mercury Insurance · filed 2009-12-09(3)

By its terms, the CPLR 3126 (3) dismissal sanction is applicable only to the disclosure violations of parties, not nonparties (see Siegel, NY Prac § 367 [4th ed]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only upon a clear showing of willful and contumacious conduct.

Hutchinson v. Langer · filed 2010-03-09

The drastic remedy of dismissing a complaint based on a plaintiff s failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where there is a clear showing that the plaintiff’s conduct was willful and contumacious (see ACME ANC Corp. v Read, 55 AD3d 854, 855 [2008]; Brown v Astoria Fed. Sav., 51 AD3d 961, 962 [2008]; Suazo-Alvarez v Nordlaw, LLC, 48 AD3d 670 [2008]; Robinson v Pediatric Assoc. of Irwin Ave., 307 AD2d 1029, 1030 [2003]). Here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the appellants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126, among other things, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery when the failure is willful and contumacious.

Umar v. Ohrnberger · filed 2010-04-27

The drastic remedy of dismissing a complaint for a plaintiffs failure to comply with court-ordered discovery is warranted where the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful and contumacious (see Rowell v Joyce, 10 AD3d 601 [2004]; My Carpet, Inc. v Bruce Supply Corp., 8 AD3d 248 [2004]).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure when willful and contumacious conduct is clearly shown.

Kim v. Goldmine Realty, Inc. · filed 2010-05-04(3)

The drastic remedy of dismissing a complaint based on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where there is a clear showing that the plaintiffs’ conduct was willful and contumacious (see Hutchinson v Langer, 71 AD3d 735 [2010]; Brown v Astoria Fed. Sav., 51 AD3d 961, 962 [2008]; Robinson v Pediatric Assoc. of Irwin Ave., 307 AD2d 1029, 1030 [2003]). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) to dismiss the complaint.

Section 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the resisting party's conduct is willful and contumacious.

Moray v. City of Yonkers · filed 2010-08-17

The record does not support the dismissal of the complaint to the extent of “precluding the plaintiff from seeking recovery for emotional damages” pursuant to CPLR 3126, as there was no evidence of willful or contumacious conduct in connection with the plaintiffs failure to authorize the release of the records at issue (see Simpson v City of New York, 10 AD3d 601, 602-603 [2004]; Lerner v Knot, 201 AD2d 466 [1994]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery orders without a reasonable excuse, supporting an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Workman v. Town of Southampton · filed 2010-01-05(3)

In this case, the willful and contumacious character of the plaintiffs conduct can be inferred from his repeated failure to comply with court orders directing him to provide properly-executed authorizations without a reasonable excuse.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when repeated failures to provide discovery and obey discovery orders support an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Batshever v. Jafar · filed 2010-05-25

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ cross motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 because the plaintiffs’ willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from their repeated failures to provide outstanding authorizations both in response ...to the defendants’ demands and in compliance with the Supreme Court’s orders, and to comply with the Supreme Court’s directive to provide a further bill of particulars (see Pirro Group, LLC v One Point St., Inc., 71 AD3d 654 [2010]; Workman v Town of Southampton, 69 AD3d 619 [2010]; Nicolia Ready Mix, Inc. v Fernandes, 37 AD3d 568 [2007]; Royal Caterers, LLC v Marine Midland, 8 AD3d 549 [2004]).