N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3126

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of an entire complaint when a party wilfully defies discovery orders by deleting materials she was directed to produce.

Chen v. Fischer · filed 2010-05-25(3)

It is clear from this record that the plaintiff wilfully and contumaciously defied discovery orders of the Supreme Court by deleting from her computer’s hard drive materials that she had been directed to produce. ... Under the particular circumstances of this case, we find that the appropriate sanction for the plaintiff’s conduct was the dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for extensive delay in scheduling witness examinations.

In re the Estate of Forgione · filed 2010-10-26

The Surrogate’s Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the respondent’s motion to dismiss the proceeding pursuant to CPLR 3126 because of the petitioner’s extensive delay in scheduling the examinations of out-of-state attesting witnesses pursuant to SCPA 1404 (see Rizzuti v Laucella, 57 AD3d 755 [2008]).

Section 3126(3) does not warrant dismissal for failure to provide court-ordered disclosure absent a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

LOP Development, LLC v. ZHL Group, Inc. · filed 2010-11-23(3)

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in ... granting that branch of the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them absent a clear showing that the plaintiffs failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Myung Sum Suh v Jung Ja Kim, 51 AD3d 883 [2008]; Manko v Lenox Hill Hosp., 44 AD3d 1014 [2007]; Mawson v Historic Props., LLC, 30 AD3d 480, 481 [2006] ; Garan v Don & Walt Sutton Bldrs., Inc., 27 AD3d 521, 523-524 [2006]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for disclosure violations, but dismissal requires a clear showing of willful and contumacious noncompliance.

Mitchell v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. · filed 2010-12-28

A court may dismiss an action as a sanction if a plaintiff “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126). ... Here, the record does not demonstrate that the plaintiffs failure to disclose certain information was willful and contumacious.

CPLR 3126 dismissal for failure to provide requested discovery requires evidence of willful and contumacious conduct.

Castillo v. Star Leasing Co. · filed 2011-04-19

That branch of Cargo Connection’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the plaintiff failed to provide requested discovery was providently denied, as there was no evidence that the plaintiffs failure to authorize release of employment and medical authorizations constituted willful and contumacious conduct (see Moray v City of Yonkers, 76 AD3d 618 [2010]; Cestaro v Chin, 20 AD3d 500 [2005]; Diel v Rosenfeld, 12 AD3d 558 [2004]).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant dismissal of a complaint without a clear showing that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery demands or orders was willful and contumacious.

McDermott v. Bahnatka · filed 2011-04-26

The drastic remedy of dismissal of a complaint is not warranted where there is no clear showing that the plaintiffs failure to comply with discovery demands or orders was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; Mitchell v Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 79 AD3d 1108, 1109 [2010]; LOP Dev., LLC v ZHL Group, Inc., 78 AD3d 1020, 1020-1021 [2010]; Torres v Lowinger, 12 AD3d 363, 364 [2004]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits dismissal for failure to comply with disclosure demands or orders, but reserves that remedy for willful, contumacious, or bad faith noncompliance.

Mary Imogene Bassett Hospital v. Cannon Design, Inc. · filed 2011-05-12(3)

While a court may order dismissal of an action or a claim therein as a penalty for noncompliance with disclosure demands or orders (see CPLR 3126 [3]), this type of drastic remedy is reserved for situations where a party’s failure to comply is “willful, contumacious, or in bad faith” (Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663, 664 [1995]; see Pangea Farm, Inc. v Sack, 51 AD3d 1352, 1354 [2008]; Altu v Clark, 20 AD3d 749, 750 [2005]). ... These efforts, while perhaps not providing defendant with all of the information to which it is entitled, cannot be considered a willful or bad faith failure to comply with disclosure obligations.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint as a sanction for willful and contumacious failure to comply adequately with a discovery order.

Velazquez v. Jamaica Hospital Nursing Home Co. · filed 2011-05-17

Under the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the motion of the defendant Jamaica Hospital Nursing Home Company, Inc., individually and doing business as Trump Pavilion, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it pursuant to CPLR 3126 as a sanction for the plaintiffs willful and contumacious failure to adequately comply with an order dated July 21, 2009, which directed discovery (see Morgenstern v Jeffsam Corp., 78 AD3d 913, 914 [2010]; Watson v Hall, 43 AD3d 435, 435-436 [2007]; Reed v Jaspan, Ginsberg, Schlesinger, Silverman & Hoffman, 283 AD2d 630 [2001]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to attend an independent medical examination ordered by the court.

Reyes-Peralta v. Ngernak · filed 2010-10-22

The motion by the defendants pursuant to CPLR 3126 or, in the alternative, Insurance Law article 51, for an order dismissing the complaint (motion sequence No. 004) is granted pursuant to CPLR 3126 for the plaintiffs failure to appear for an independent medical examination, in violation of this court’s prior order dated April 9, 2010.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party repeatedly and willfully disobeys discovery orders without an adequate excuse.

Bort v. Perper · filed 2011-03-01(3)

In any event, based on the plaintiffs repeated refusal to fully comply with court orders directing discovery, and the inadequate excuses for his failure to do so, which were willful and contumacious, the Supreme Court correctly also dismissed the action pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) insofar as asserted against the defendants (see Kyung Soo Kim v Goldmine Realty, Inc., 73 AD3d 709 [2010]; Nunez v City of New York, 37 AD3d 434, 434-435 [2007]; Kuzmin v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 22 AD3d 643, 643-644 [2005]; Mendez v City of New York, 7 AD3d 766, 767 [2004]; Yona v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 285 AD2d 460, 461 [2001]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a pleading when repeated failure to comply with discovery orders without a reasonable excuse shows willful and contumacious conduct.

Commisso v. Orshan · filed 2011-06-14

Here, the plaintiffs willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from her repeated failure, over an extended period of time, to appear for a deposition, provide outstanding authorizations, and serve supplemental bills of particulars in compliance with the Supreme Court’s orders and a so-ordered stipulation without a reasonable excuse. Therefore, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ separate motions to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

CPLR 3126 (3) permits dismissal for failure to comply with discovery demands when there is a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Delarosa v. Besser Co. · filed 2011-07-19(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the appellants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3), since there was no clear showing that the plaintiffs failure to comply with the appellants’ discovery demand was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; ACME ANC Corp. v Read, 55 AD3d 854, 855 [2008]; Myung Sum, Suh v Jung Ja Kim, 51 AD3d 883 [2008]; Manko v Lenox Hill Hosp., 44 AD3d 1014 [2007]; Resnick v Schwarzkopf, 41 AD3d 573 [2007]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party’s willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery demands and orders warrants that sanction.

MacDonald v. Leif · filed 2011-11-22

Here, the plaintiffs willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from his failure, over an extended period of time, to comply with the defendant’s demands for discovery and the court’s orders directing disclosure ... Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint.

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when repeated discovery failures without a reasonable excuse show willful and contumacious conduct.

Quinones v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center · filed 2011-12-06

Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to comply with a discovery order.

Mars v. Sharp · filed 2011-12-20(3)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) to dismiss the complaint based On the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the order dated May 12, 2010, and in denying the plaintiffs’ motion, ...inter alia, to vacate the portion of the order dated May 12, 2010, that directed the dismissal of the complaint in the event the plaintiff failed to comply with certain discovery deadlines.

Section 3126 permits dismissal when a party’s prolonged failure to comply with discovery demands and court orders, without an adequate excuse, shows willful and contumacious conduct.

Dokaj v. Ruxton Tower Ltd. Partnership · filed 2012-01-24

Here, the willful and contumacious nature of the plaintiffs’ conduct can be inferred from their failure, over an extended period of time, to comply with Ruxton’s discovery demands and the court’s orders directing disclosure, and the absence of an adequate excuse for the failure to comply ... . Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting Ruxton’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Section 3126 (3) permits dismissal when prolonged failure to comply with discovery orders supports an inference of willful noncompliance and delays prejudice the defense.

Perez v. City of New York · filed 2012-05-22(3)

Alternatively, the court properly granted the cross motions to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3), since the extended failure to comply with discovery orders warrants an inference of willful noncompliance (see Bryant v New York City Hous. Auth., 69 AD3d 488 [2010]; Henry Rosenfeld, Inc. v Bower & Gardner, 161 AD2d 374, 375 [1990]), and the extensive delays in prosecuting the 11-year-old case have prejudiced the ability of defendants and third-party defendants to defend the action (see Almanzar v Rye Ridge Realty Co., 249 AD2d 128 [1998]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits dismissal for a party’s repeated disobedience of court orders and failure to provide discovery.

Pagano v. Malpeso · filed 2012-06-19(3)

The court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action based on pro se plaintiff’s pattern of disobeying court orders and failing to provide discovery (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Arts4All, Ltd. v Hancock, 54 AD3d 286, 287 [2008], affd 12 NY3d 846 [2009], cert denied 559 US —, 130 S Ct 1301 [2010]).

Section 3126(3) requires a finding of willful and contumacious conduct to justify dismissal as a discovery sanction.

Armstrong v. B.R. Fries & Associates, Inc. · filed 2012-05-24(3)

Nor was dismissal proper as a discovery sanction pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3), since there was no finding of “willful and contumacious” conduct on plaintiffs part justifying dismissal of the complaint (see Jones v Green, 34 AD3d 260, 261 [2006]).

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion for a disclosure violation, but preclusion is unwarranted when there is no failure to obey a disclosure order or willful failure to disclose.

Fougner v. Royal Oak · filed 2012-08-28(2)

CPLR 3126 (2) provides for preclusion in instances of willful disclosure violations. ... As there is no allegation that the plaintiff failed to comply with a court order or willfully failed to disclose information, preclusion is not warranted.

Section 3126 (3) permits dismissal when a party fails to comply with a conditional preclusion order and consequently cannot establish a prima facie case.

BURTON, IRIC v. MATTELIANO, DR. ANDREW C. · filed 2012-09-28(3)

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, Supreme Court properly granted the motion of Andrew Matteliano, M.D., incorrectly sued as Dr. Andrew Matteliano (defendant), seeking dismissal of the action against him pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3).

CPLR 3126(3) permits a court to strike a complaint and dismiss an action when a plaintiff repeatedly disobeys discovery orders in bad faith.

Williams v. Shiva Ambulette Service Inc. · filed 2013-01-29(3)

The court did not abuse its discretion in striking the complaint and dismissing the action (see CPLR 3126 [3]; see also Arts4All, Ltd. v Hancock, 54 AD3d 286, 286-287 [1st Dept 2008], affd 12 NY3d 846 [2009], cert denied 559 US —, 130 S Ct 1301 [2010]). Plaintiffs unexplained pattern of disobeying four successive court orders and failing to timely provide discovery regarding her medical treatment, prior accidents and preexisting medical conditions involving the same body parts involved in this action demonstrated that her noncompliance was willful, contumacious and in bad faith (see Henderson-Jones v City of New York, 87 AD3d 498, 504 [1st Dept 2011], quoting McGilvery v New York City Tr. Auth., 213 AD2d 322, 324 [1st Dept 1995]).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal of a complaint for a party’s willful failure to respond to discovery requests.

Cherubin Antiques, Inc. v. Matiash · filed 2013-05-15(3)

Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting that branch of Matiash’s cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him by Calabretta based on her willful failure to respond to Matiash’s discovery requests (see CPLR 3126 [3]; Montemurro v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 94 AD3d 1066, 1066-1067 [2012]; Batshever v Jafar, 73 AD3d 1108, 1108-1109 [2010]).

CPLR 3126 (3) permits dismissal when repeated failures to comply with discovery demands and disclosure orders support an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Thomas v. Avalon Gardens Rehabilitation & Health Care Center · filed 2013-06-05(3)

Regarding the defendant’s cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3), the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of a potentially meritorious opposition to the cross motion (cf. Santos v Penske Truck Leasing Co., 105 AD3d 1029 [2d Dept 2013]). Indeed, the willful and contumacious nature of their conduct can be inferred from their failure, over a period of three years, to comply with the defendant’s discovery demands, their failure to attend scheduled court appearances, and their failure to comply with court orders directing disclosure (see Dokaj v Ruxton Tower Ltd. Partnership, 91 AD3d 812, 814 [2012]).

CPLR 3126 permits striking an answer when a party refuses to obey a disclosure order or willfully fails to disclose information the court finds should have been disclosed.

Spadaro v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. · filed 2014-01-29

The record demonstrates that those defendants did not refuse to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fail to disclose information which the court found ought to have been disclosed (see CPLR 3126).

Section 3126 permits preclusion for disclosure violations only after the court determines that the party’s failure to cooperate was willful, deliberate, and contumacious.

Tung Wa Ma v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2014-01-29

Before a court may impose the drastic remedy of preclusion for disclosure violations, it must determine that the offending party’s lack of cooperation with disclosure was willful, deliberate, and contumacious (see Aha Sales, Inc. v Creative Bath Prods., Inc., 110 AD3d 1020 [2013]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of an entire complaint when a party willfully and contumaciously refuses to comply with discovery demands and court orders without a reasonable excuse.

Silberstein v. Maimonides Medical Center · filed 2013-09-11

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint, as there was a clear showing that the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the defendants’ demand for the mohel’s identity and subsequent court orders directing the disclosure of this information, without a reasonable excuse, was willful and contumacious (see Cherubin Antiques, Inc. v Matiash, 106 AD3d 861, 862 [2013]; Montemurro v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 94 AD3d at 1066; Vanalst v City of New York, 302 AD2d 515, 516 [2003]; see also Flynn v City of New York, 101 AD 3d at 805).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when repeated failures to obey discovery orders, without a reasonable excuse, show willful and contumacious conduct.

Harris v. City of New York · filed 2014-05-14(3)

Accordingly, the appellants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint should have been granted.

Section 3126 permits dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to appear for a deposition without a reasonable excuse, supporting an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Apladenaki v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. · filed 2014-05-28

Here, the plaintiffs repeated failure to appear for a deposition, coupled with her failure to proffer a reasonable excuse for that failure, supports an inference that her conduct was willful and contumacious (see Orgel v Stewart Tit. Ins. Co., 91 AD3d at 924; Bort v Perper, 82 AD3d 692, 695 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) (hereinafter together the respondents), which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Section 3126 did not warrant preclusion or dismissal where the plaintiff’s explained deposition adjournments did not show a pattern of willful failure to comply with discovery.

De Leo v. State-Whitehall Co. · filed 2015-03-11

The defendants did not move for relief pursuant to CPLR 3126 until the plaintiff filed a note of issue — which she was required to do pursuant to the compliance conference order dated July 10, 2012. No pattern of willful failure to respond to discovery demands or comply with disclosure orders was demonstrated (see Holand v Cascino, 122 AD3d 575 [2014]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Javeed v. 3619 Realty Corp. · filed 2015-06-24

The record further demonstrates that the plaintiffs’ subsequent failure to comply with the court-ordered discovery schedule set forth in the order dated July 5, 2012, was not clearly willful and contumacious.

A court may deny dismissal under CPLR 3126 when the movant fails to show a pattern of discovery-order violations, willful or contumacious conduct, or bad faith.

New GPC Inc. v. Kaieteur Newspaper Inc. · filed 2015-06-25

Defendant failed to demonstrate that plaintiff engaged in a pattern of violating court orders on discovery, that plaintiff’s conduct has been willful or contumacious, or that plaintiff acted in bad faith (Christian v City of New York, 269 AD2d 135, 136-137 [1st Dept 2000]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal when a party willfully fails to attend ordered medical examinations without sufficient excuse and materially frustrates disclosure.

Aziz v. City of New York · filed 2015-07-07

Such conduct provided a basis upon which the motion court, in its broad exercise of discretion (see Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711, 713 [1986]), could conclude that plaintiff willfully declined to participate in an IME, and warranted dismissal of the complaint for conduct that materially frustrated the defendant’s diligent attempts at seeking disclosure, without sufficient excuse (see Henry Rosenfeld, Inc. v Bower & Gardner, 161 AD2d 374 [1st Dept 1990]; Xina v City of New York, 13 AD3d 440 [2d Dept 2004]). Despite the apparent scrivener’s error in mis-citing the applicable CPLR provision in the cross motion (i.e. CPLR 3216, versus CPLR 3126), it is clear from the body of the cross motion and arguments raised therein, that defendant was seeking dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 as a discovery sanction.

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 requires a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious.

Krause v. Lobacz · filed 2015-09-23

This was insufficient to show a pattern of a willful and contumacious failure to respond to discovery demands or comply with disclosure, so as to justify the Supreme Court striking the complaint in action No. 2 ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the Krause defendants’ motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint in action No. 2.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff willfully fails to comply with court-ordered discovery.

Wolf v. Flowers · filed 2014-11-12(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with court-ordered discovery.

Section 3126 permits a court to preclude a party from offering evidence at trial for willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery orders.

Yong Soon Oh v. Jin · filed 2015-01-14

In light of the defendant’s willful and contumacious conduct, it was appropriate to preclude the defendant from offering any evidence at trial, and the court should not have modified its prior order so as to permit the defendant to present certain evidence at trial (cf. Stone v Zinoukhova, 119 AD3d at 930; Carabello v Luna, 49 AD3d at 680; Maignan v Nahar, 37 AD3d at 557).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to dismiss an action when a party refuses to obey a disclosure order.

HALL, MITCHELL T. v. INTEGRITY REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES, I · filed 2015-01-02(3)

The CPLR provides that, “[i]f any party . . . refuses to obey an order for disclosure . . . , the court may make such orders with regard to the . . . refusal as are just, among them: . . . an order . . . dismissing the action” (CPLR 3126 [3]).

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery requires a motion requesting that relief and an opportunity to be heard.

Paradiso v. St. John's Episcopal Hospital · filed 2015-12-23

Contrary to the defendant’s contention raised for the first time on appeal, this action could not have properly been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3126 based upon the plaintiff’s failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, since there was no motion requesting this relief and the plaintiff was not afforded an opportunity to be heard on this issue (see Goodman v Lempa, 124 AD3d 581 [2015]; Arroyo v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 110 AD3d 17, 19 [2013]; Mitskevitch v City of New York, 78 AD3d 1137, 1138 [2010]).

Dismissal under CPLR 3126 as a discovery sanction requires a record supporting willful and contumacious conduct.

Yunga v. Yonkers Contr. Co., Inc. · filed 2015-12-23

Further, the record does not support any finding that the plaintiff engaged in the type of willful and contumacious conduct that would justify the drastic remedy of dismissing the complaint as a discovery sanction (see Sowerby v Camarda, 20 AD3d 411 [2005]). Thus, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the Forest defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal of a complaint as a discovery penalty, but dismissal is discretionary.

PAGE, PATRICIA v. NIAGARA FALLS MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENT · filed 2016-07-01(3)

Under the circumstances of this case, we substitute our own discretion for that of the court, and we conclude that dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) is not warranted.

CPLR 3126 (3) permits dismissal when a party fails to comply in good faith with a conditional discovery order and the conduct is egregious.

Muboyayi v. Quintero · filed 2016-02-11(3)

On this record, the motion court correctly determined that plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct was egregious and that plaintiff failed to comply in good faith with the conditional order. Accordingly, the motion court “applied the correct legal standards, properly considered all the facts and circumstances of the case, and did not abuse [its] discretion in dismissing plaintiff[’s] . . . action pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3)” (Arts4All, Ltd. v Hancock, 12 NY3d 846, 847 [2009], cert denied 559 US 905 [2010]).

Section 3126 leaves the nature and degree of a penalty for violating a disclosure order to the motion court’s discretion.

Dynasty Med., P.C. v. Mercury Cas. Ins. Co. · filed 2016-03-23

The determination of the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 for failing to comply with an order compelling disclosure lies within the discretion of the motion court ( see Kihl v Pfeffer , 94 NY2d 118, 122-123 [1999]; Morano v Westchester Paving & Sealing Corp. , 7 AD3d 495 [2004]). ... Upon a review of the record, we find that the District Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining to grant the branch of defendant's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Section 3126 does not support dismissal where the plaintiff neither disobeyed a disclosure order nor willfully withheld information the court required.

Monzon v. Chiaramonte · filed 2016-06-29

The plaintiff did not refuse to obey an order for disclosure, or willfully fail to disclose information which the court found ought to have been disclosed (see CPLR 3126), or to provide particulars which the court found ought to have been provided (see CPLR 3042 [d]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for a discovery failure, but dismissal may be denied when the failure was not shown to be willful.

PNC Bank, National Ass'n v. Campbell · filed 2016-09-28(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126. ... Here, the appellant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s failure to fully comply with the discovery demand was willful (see CPLR 3126; Delarosa v Besser Co., 86 AD3d 588 [2011]; LOP Dev., LLC v ZHL Group, Inc., 78 AD3d 1020 [2010]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, but the court may deny that sanction when the movant delays seeking it and omits a required good-faith affidavit.

Long Island Pine Barrens Society, Inc. v. Suffolk County Legislature · filed 2016-09-28

Remedies for the failure to comply with court ordered discovery deadlines are provided in CPLR 3124 and 3126. These rules provide, respectively, for the issuance of orders directing the recalcitrant parties to comply with any and all requests, notices or demands and/or for the imposition of sanctions such as orders of preclusion or dismissal of the pleadings served by the party in default. ... Those portions of the plaintiffs’ motion wherein they seek dismissal of the defendants’ answer pursuant to CPLR 3126 are thus denied.

Courts have broad discretion under CPLR 3126(3) to deny a request to strike a complaint and dismiss an action because dismissal is a harsh sanction.

Place v. Chaffee-Sardinia Volunteer Fire Co. · filed 2016-10-07(3)

In appeal No. 1, we conclude that Supreme Court did not err in refusing to strike the complaint and dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3). “[I]t is well settled that the court has broad discretion to determine motions under [CPLR 3126] and that the dismissal sanction is considered a harsh remedy” (Strauss v Vladeck, 173 AD2d 1063, 1064 [1991]).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to dismiss an action when a litigant ignores a court order.

Blasoff v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2017-02-10(3)

Where, as here, a litigant ignores a court order, the court may dismiss the action (CPLR 3126 [3]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 123 [1999]).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party disobeys a disclosure order or willfully fails to disclose information.

Corex-SPA v. Janel Group of New York, Inc. · filed 2017-12-06(3)

If a party refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information, the court may dismiss the action (see CPLR 3126 [3]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Tanriverdi v. United Skates of Am., Inc. · filed 2018-08-22

Contrary to the defendant's contention, CPLR 3126 did not otherwise justify the Supreme Court's determination to dismiss the complaint. "Actions should be resolved on their merits whenever possible, and the drastic remedy of striking a pleading should not be employed without a clear showing that the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery was willful and contumacious" ( Nunez v Laidlaw , 150 AD3d 1124, 1125; see Zakhidov v Boulevard Tenants Corp ., 96 AD3d 737, 739).

Section 3126(3) permits conditional dismissal when a party's unexplained failure to comply with discovery orders supports an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Pastore v. Utilimaster Corp. · filed 2018-10-03(3)

Here, on the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint, the Supreme Court properly inferred the plaintiff's willful and contumacious conduct from the plaintiff's failure to comply with court-ordered discovery and the defendants' demands for discovery, for which the plaintiff did not offer an adequate explanation ( see Montemurro v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr ., 94 AD3d 1066, 1066; Orgel v Stewart Tit. Ins. Co. , 91 AD3d 922, 923). Thus, the court providently exercised its discretion in conditionally granting the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 and directing dismissal of the complaint unless the plaintiff served the defendants with certain outstanding discovery documents by February 18, 2016.

Section 3126 permits dismissal for discovery failures when the failure to comply is shown to be willful and contumacious.

Rosenblatt v. Franklin Hosp. Med. Ctr. · filed 2018-10-10(3)

Since public policy strongly favors the resolution of actions on the merits, the remedy of dismissal is "only warranted where there has been a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious" ( Arpino v F.J.F. & Sons Elec. Co., Inc. , 102 AD3d 201, 210; see Corex-SPA v Janel Group of N.Y., Inc. , 156 AD3d at 601).

Section 3126 supports dismissal when plaintiffs repeatedly fail to appear for court-ordered depositions and provide no justifiable excuse.

Bustamante v. Green Door Realty Corp. · filed 2018-02-06

Moreover, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for noncompliance with the motion court's CPLR 3126 notice ( see id. ; Pryce v Montefiore Med. Ctr. , 114 AD3d 594, 595 [1st Dept 2014]). Plaintiffs failed to produce four plaintiffs for depositions, in defiance of five court orders and a stipulation. Plaintiffs' excuse — that it was difficult to locate some of the plaintiffs — was conclusory and unreasonable, as they failed to identify what efforts were made, when they were undertaken, or when counsel lost touch with these plaintiffs ( see Touray v Munoz , 96 AD3d 623 [1st Dept 2012]; Reidel v Ryder TRS, Inc. , 13 AD3d 170 [1st Dept 2004]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a party refuses to comply with a court order to undergo an independent medical examination.

Clark v. Allen & Overy, LLP · filed 2018-03-08

Under the circumstances, the court properly dismissed the complaint for noncompliance pursuant to CPLR 3126 ( see generally Muboyayi v Quintero , 136 AD3d 497 [1st Dept 2016], lv dismissed in part, denied in part 27 NY3d 1046 [2016]).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party's unexplained failure to produce relevant documents supports an inference of willfulness.

International Brain Research Found., Inc. v. Cavalier · filed 2018-02-08(3)

Defendants demonstrated that, despite their repeated requests, plaintiff failed to produce responsive, relevant documents, many of which were favorable to defendants, as was discovered when they were provided to defendants by a third party. This failure to disclose is sufficient to support an inference of willfulness ( see Henderson-Jones v City of New York , 87 AD3d 498, 504 [1st Dept 2011]; DiDomenico v C & S Aeromatik Supplies , 252 AD2d 41, 52 [2d Dept 1998]; CPLR 3126[3]).

CPLR 3126 gives courts discretion to deny dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery.

Matter of Anthony S. v. Monique T.B. · filed 2018-12-04

The court providently exercised its discretion in upholding the Support Magistrate's denial of respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as a sanction for petitioner's failure to comply with discovery under CPLR 3126.

CPLR 3126(3) permits dismissal for discovery violations, but dismissal requires a clear showing of willful, contumacious, or bad-faith conduct.

Michaluk v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. · filed 2019-02-14(3)

Since defendant never sought to compel disclosure or to have preclusionary language added to any of the parties' compliance orders, its motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) was premature given the lack of evidence that plaintiffs' delay in conducting the deposition was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith ( see W & W Glass, LLC v 1113 York Ave. Realty Co. LLC , 83 AD3d 438 [1st Dept 2011]).

Section 3126 does not support dismissal for a discovery violation without a showing of willful and contumacious failure to comply with court orders.

Ramirez v. Reyes · filed 2019-04-17

The Supreme Court should not have granted dismissal under CPLR 3126, inasmuch as there was no showing that the plaintiff had willfully and contumaciously failed to comply with court orders regarding discovery ( see CPLR 3126; Rosenblatt v Franklin Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 165 AD3d 862 ; Chowdhury v Hudson Val. Limousine Serv., LLC , 162 AD3d 845 , 846-847).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal for failure to comply with discovery demands only upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Strong v. Delemos · filed 2019-05-08(3)

Therefore, "the remedy of dismissal is only warranted where there has been a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious" ( Rosenblatt v Franklin Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 165 AD3d 862, 862 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3126[3]; Krause v Lobacz , 131 AD3d 1128, 1129). Here, on the record before this Court, it cannot be determined whether the plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure only when the plaintiff's conduct is willful and contumacious.

Empire Enters. I.J.J.A., Inc. v. Daimler Buses of N. Am., Inc. · filed 2019-05-08(3)

The drastic remedy of dismissing a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure should be granted only where the conduct of the plaintiff is shown to be willful and contumacious ( see Moray v City of Yonkers , 76 AD3d 618; Kyung Soo Kim v Goldmine Realty, Inc. , 73 AD3d 709; Novick v DeRosa , 51 AD3d 885).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal of a complaint when willful access to privileged communications and spoliation of evidence irreparably taint the litigation.

Shawe v. Elting · filed 2019-02-26(3)

Plaintiff's improper and willful access of defendant's privileged communications and spoliation of evidence supports dismissal of his claims in this action (CPLR 3103[c]; CPLR 3126[3]; Lipin v Bender , 84 NY2d 562 [1994] [dismissing the plaintiff's complaint because her improper taking of the defendant's attorney/client documents and work product caused prejudice to the defendant and irreparably tainted the litigation process]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal when repeated failures to comply with discovery orders show willful and contumacious conduct.

Vega v. Beacon 109 207-209 LLC · filed 2020-01-23

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Arthur F. Engoron, J.), entered August 13, 2018, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126, unanimously affirmed, without costs. The court providently exercised its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss the complaint based on a clear showing that plaintiff had repeatedly failed to comply with multiple discovery orders, which was "dilatory, evasive, obstructive and ultimately contumacious" ( CDR Créances S.A.S v Cohen , 23 NY3d 307, 318 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits dismissal only upon a clear showing of willful and contumacious failure to comply with discovery demands.

Rezk v. New York Presbyt. Hospital/N.Y. Weill Cornell Ctr. · filed 2019-08-28(3)

Further, dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) was unwarranted as a sanction for the plaintiff's failure to limit his disclosure demands. The remedy of dismissal is "only warranted where there has been a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful and contumacious" ( Rosenblatt v Franklin Hosp. Med. Ctr ., 165 AD3d 862, [*2]862 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Williams v Suttle , 168 AD3d 792, 793).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for discovery misconduct, but dismissal was unwarranted without evidence that a party willfully withheld discovery.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v. Van Dyke · filed 2020-02-11

The court providently exercised its discretion in denying Van Dyke's cross motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126, as there is no evidence that plaintiff has willfully withheld discovery from defendant ( see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Oscar , 161 AD3d 1055, 1057 [2d Dept 2018]).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party disobeys a disclosure order or willfully fails to disclose information.

Marino v. Armogan · filed 2020-01-08(3)

A court may dismiss an action if a party refuses to obey an order directing disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information ( see CPLR 3126[3]). ... Thus, the court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 and directing dismissal of the complaint.

CPLR 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party willfully fails to provide discovery or disobeys a disclosure order.

Cobo v. Pennwalt Corp. Stokes Div. · filed 2020-07-08(3)

"A court may dismiss an action if a party refuses to obey an order directing disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information" ( Marino v Armogan , 179 AD3d at 666; see CPLR 3126[3]; Kihl v Pfeffer , 94 NY2d at 122). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the amended complaint.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to dismiss a pleading when a party's failure to comply with discovery demands is willful or contumacious.

Ewa v. City of New York · filed 2020-09-02(3)

The striking of a pleading may be appropriate where there is a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful or contumacious ( see CPLR 3126[3]; Ahmed v Ahmed , 175 AD3d 1363; Montemurro v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr. , 94 AD3d at 1066).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for repeated discovery noncompliance from which willfulness may be inferred.

Ruiz v. Selzer · filed 2020-10-15

The motion court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 based on plaintiff's failure to comply with her discovery obligations. Plaintiff asserts that she has complied with all of her discovery obligations, but fails to respond to defendants' specific allegations of deficiencies. The record reflects that, although plaintiff did provide at least some discovery, some of it was provided belatedly or in improper form, there are still missing items, and depositions have never been completed. Moreover, plaintiff's failure to comply with her discovery obligations has been the subject of multiple prior motions to dismiss, good faith letters, and discovery stipulations and orders. As such, willfulness may be inferred ( see Henderson-Jones v City of New York , 87 AD3d 498, 504 [1st Dept 2011]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for discovery noncompliance when the conduct is clearly shown to be deliberate and contumacious.

Brigham v. Jaffe · filed 2020-12-08

The motion court improvidently exercised its discretion by dismissing the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 ( see e.g. Catarine v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 290 AD2d 213, 215-216 [1st Dept 2002]; Palmenta v Columbia Univ., 266 AD2d 90, 91 [1st Dept 1999]; Hanson v City of New York, 227 AD2d 217 [1st Dept 1996]). Defendants did not "clearly establish[]" that plaintiff's noncompliance was "both deliberate and contumacious" ( Catarine, 290 AD2d at 215).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint for discovery misconduct when the party's conduct is willful, contumacious or in bad faith.

Kalonarou v. G&V Taxi, Inc. · filed 2021-02-19(3)

Although dismissing a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy, it is warranted where a party's conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious or in bad faith ( see Rock City Sound, Inc. v Bashian & Farber, LLP , 83 AD3d 685 [2011]).

Section 3126 permits preclusion of trial evidence when a party fails to comply with a self-executing conditional discovery order.

Papadopoulos v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth. · filed 2021-03-04

The July 19, 2018 so-ordered stipulation was a self-executing, conditional order of preclusion, which defendants ignored. Thus, defendants are precluded from adducing evidence at trial ( see generally Gibbs v St. Barnabas Hosp. , 16 NY3d 74, 80 [2010]; CPLR 3126).

Precluding a damages theory for lack of notice does not amount to a dismissal sanction under CPLR 3126(3).

Advanced Aerofoil Tech. AG v. MissionPoint Capital Partners LLC · filed 2021-03-30(3)

Contrary to plaintiff's contention, Supreme Court did not convert that motion into one for discovery sanctions or impose the sanction of dismissal by precluding this damages theory based on lack of notice ( see CPLR 3126[3]; compare Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v Global Stat Inc. , 22 NY3d 877, 880 [2013]).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to comply with court-ordered discovery without an adequate explanation.

Von Maack v. Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr. · filed 2021-06-09(3)

Here, the willful and contumacious character of the plaintiff's conduct can be inferred from her repeated failures to comply with court-ordered discovery, for which the plaintiff did not offer adequate explanation ( see Bouri v Jackson , 177 AD3d at 949; Pastore v Utilimaster Corp. , 165 AD3d at 687; Unity Mfg. Corp. v St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. , 97 AD2d 462). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in conditionally directing dismissal of the complaint ( see Williams v Suttle , 168 AD3d at 792).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party willfully and repeatedly fails to comply with court-ordered discovery without an adequate explanation.

Patrick v. Lend Lease (US) Constr. LMB, Inc. · filed 2022-03-09(3)

Based upon the foregoing, the court providently exercised its discretion in directing dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) and in [*2]denying the plaintiff's motion to vacate the dismissal order and to restore the action to the calendar.

Section 3126 permits dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery orders without a reasonable excuse.

122-24 Lexington Ave. Corp. v. Wesco Ins. Co. · filed 2021-10-28

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Nancy M. Bannon, J.), entered on or about May 21, 2021, which denied plaintiff's motion to vacate an order that dismissed the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 and 22 NYCRR 202.27, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Plaintiff failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for its continuing and repeated failure to comply with discovery orders ( see Biton v Turco , 88 AD3d 519 [1st Dept 2011], lv dismissed 30 NY3d 1081 [2018]), despite multiple court orders and requests from defendant's counsel to provide discovery ( see Goldstein v CIBC World Mkts. Corp., 30 AD3d 217 [1st Dept 2006]).

Section 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with discovery demands upon a clear showing that the failure was willful and contumacious.

Angotti v. Petro Home Servs. · filed 2022-09-28(3)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint based upon the plaintiff's failure to comply with their discovery demands to inspect the oil tank. ... Here, the defendants failed to make a clear showing that the plaintiff's failure to comply with their discovery demands to inspect the oil tank was the result of willful and contumacious conduct ( see Amos v Southampton Hospital , 198 AD3d at 948).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal for a discovery violation only upon a clear showing that the failure to comply was willful and contumacious.

Lopez v. Maggies Paratransit Corp. · filed 2022-11-30(3)

Since public policy strongly favors the resolution of actions on the merits, the drastic remedy of dismissal of a complaint is not warranted unless there is a clear showing that the plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery demands or orders was willful and contumacious ( see CPLR 3126; Williams v Suttle , 168 AD3d 792, 793; Rosenblatt v Franklin Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 165 AD3d 862, 862; Arpino v F.J.F. & Sons Elec. Co., Inc. , 102 AD3d 201, 210). ... Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants' motion to the extent of directing dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126(3).

Section 3126 permits dismissal when a party's prolonged failure to comply with discovery demands, without a valid excuse, supports an inference of willful, contumacious, or bad faith conduct.

Follors v. TI Ozone Park Stor., LLC · filed 2022-10-19

The defendant demonstrated that, for a period of more than 17 months, the plaintiff did not comply with the defendant's discovery demands, object to them, or seek to be relieved from the obligation to comply with them. A party's failure to comply with discovery demands over an extended period of time, in the absence of a valid excuse, "supports an inference that such failure was willful, contumacious, and in bad faith" ( Blake v Chawla , 299 AD2d 437, 440; see Penafiel v Puretz , 12 AD3d 431; Birch Hill Farm v Reed , 272 AD2d at 282-283). While the plaintiff asserts in a conclusory manner that her failure to comply with the defendant's discovery demands was not willful and contumacious, she has not offered any explanation as to why she did not comply with or respond to the defendant's discovery demands. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she has a potentially meritorious opposition to that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal for discovery failures when the failures are shown to be willful or contumacious.

Marvin E. Goldberg, P.C. v. Law Offs. of Raymond Schwartzberg & Assoc., PLLC · filed 2023-05-23(3)

The court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendants' motion to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) and 3042(b). ... Even if plaintiffs' bill of particulars was inadequate and other discovery responses untimely, defendants had not conclusively shown that these failures were willful or contumacious (see Christian v City of New York , 269 AD2d 135, 137 [1st Dept 2000]).

Section 3126 allows a court to impose a lesser discovery sanction when dismissal of the complaint would be too drastic.

Jurlina v. Town of Brookhaven · filed 2023-04-26(3)

However, under the circumstances, we find that the dismissal of the complaint was too drastic a remedy. Accordingly, the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 should have been granted only to the extent of directing the plaintiff to appear for the IME and directing the plaintiff's counsel to personally pay the sum of $2,500 as a sanction to the defendant ( see id. ; Bermudez v Laminates Unlimited , 134 AD2d 314).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party refuses to obey a disclosure order or willfully fails to disclose information.

Matter of Dellorusso v. Dellorusso · filed 2023-10-04(3)

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, if a party "refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information," the court may dismiss the action ( see id . § 3126[3]).

CPLR 3126(3) permits dismissal of a complaint when a party’s failure to comply with court-ordered discovery is willful or contumacious.

Halyard v. Magellan Aerospace N.Y., Inc. · filed 2023-11-01(3)

A trial court may dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3126 where there is a clear showing that the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery is willful or contumacious ( see Ewa v City of New York , 186 AD3d at 1196; Ahmed v Ahmed , 175 AD3d 1363, 1365; see also CDR Créances S.A.S. v Cohen , 23 NY3d at 318). ... Accordingly, the court properly, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to its prior determination conditionally granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126(3) to dismiss the complaint.

Section 3126 does not support preclusion for a disclosure failure without a clear showing that the party's conduct was willful or contumacious.

Decius v. 1362 Ocean, LLC · filed 2023-12-06

The Supreme Court, in effect, correctly determined that the plaintiff failed to make a clear showing that the defendants' conduct was willful or contumacious ( see Perez v Tedesco , 214 AD3d 1010, 1012; Prappas v Papadatos , 38 AD3d 871, 873). ... Under the circumstances, the court should have denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to impose sanctions against the defendants.

Section 3126 did not support dismissal for violating a disclosure order where the record showed no outstanding order that could have been violated.

Bank of N.Y. v. Wells · filed 2023-12-21

Considering that a default judgment had already been entered against defendants, the record also does not indicate [*3]any outstanding disclosure order that could have been violated and warranted dismissal of the action ( see CPLR 3126).

Dismissal under Section 3126 requires evidence that a party’s delay in complying with discovery demands was willful or contumacious.

Board of Mgrs. of the Dorchester Towers Condominium v. Hwang · filed 2024-01-04(3)

While Hwang asserts that the Board failed to comply with the deadline to file a note of issue and has yet to complete discovery, Hwang does not submit any evidence that the Board engaged in willful or contumacious conduct regarding the delay in the Board's compliance with Hwang's discovery demands that would merit the dismissal of the Board's complaint. ... As such, Hwang has failed to demonstrate entitlement to a sanction pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 permits dismissal for discovery noncompliance when the failure is willful and contumacious.

Johnson v. Willis · filed 2024-01-29

Moreover, the defendants failed to establish that the plaintiffs' alleged failure to proceed with discovery was willful and contumacious.

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff willfully fails to provide discovery.

Tejada-Nunez v. AMX Mech. Corp. · filed 2024-02-15

Accordingly, defendants' motion to pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint is granted.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party willfully and contumaciously disobeys disclosure orders.

O'Rourke v. Hammerstein Ballroom · filed 2024-08-22(3)

Here, the appropriate sanction is dismissing plaintiffs complaint.

Section 3126(3) allows dismissal for a disclosure failure, but a party seeking dismissal must identify a refused disclosure order or information that should have been disclosed.

Reyes v. 1650 Corp. · filed 2025-03-28(3)

Given that defendants fail to allege plaintiff refused to comply with any order for disclosure, or set forth what, if any, information this court should find ought to be disclosed for purposes of a dismissal, their application mandates a plain denial.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal of a complaint when a party willfully and repeatedly disobeys discovery orders, including after a conditional warning of dismissal.

Chiropractic Testing Servs. of N.Y., P.C. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. · filed 2025-03-10(3)

Thus, after six years of violations, which is much more egregious of a period than two or three years, the sole escalating punitive penalty left to This Court is dismissal of the complaint. ... For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3126 is Granted. This case is dismissed.

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff's failure to provide discovery is willful and contumacious.

Prigarina v. Shain · filed 2025-04-10

On this record, defendant has established that the plaintiff's failure to provide discovery is willful and contumacious and warrants an order dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for willful, contumacious, or bad-faith failure to comply with discovery demands or orders when the noncompliant party offers no reasonable excuse.

Almontaser v. Roswell Park Cancer Inst. Corp. · filed 2025-06-27

"The nature and degree of a sanction to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is within the discretion of the court, and the striking of a pleading is appropriate only upon a clear showing that a party's failure to comply with a discovery demand or order is willful, contumacious or in bad faith" ( Mosey v County of Erie , 117 AD3d 1381, 1384 [4th Dept 2014]). ... We therefore conclude that the Court of Claims did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion and dismissing the claim.

Dismissal of a complaint under CPLR 3126 (3) is discretionary and may be unwarranted under the circumstances.

Gena v. Mu · filed 2025-07-25(3)

Under the circumstances of this case, we substitute our own discretion for that of the motion court and conclude that dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (3) is not warranted ( see generally Windnagle v Tarnacki , 184 AD3d 1178, 1179-1180 [4th Dept 2020]).

A request under CPLR 3126 to strike a complaint for fraud on the court requires clear and convincing evidence of the alleged misconduct.

Meisels v. Bernstein · filed 2025-12-10

However, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint and pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 to impose sanctions against the plaintiffs on the ground that the plaintiffs perpetrated a fraud on the court. ... Here, while Meisels's representations regarding the nature of his relationship with Rightmatch were contradictory, the defendants failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Meisels engaged in conduct that would constitute a fraud on the court ( see Sterling Trust Ltd. v Stern , 177 AD3d 928, 929).

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a pleading and dismiss an action when repeated failures to attend court-ordered depositions show willful and contumacious noncompliance.

ARK76 Doe v. Diocese of Brooklyn · filed 2026-02-18(3)

Notwithstanding the fact that it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the appropriate penalty under CPLR §3126 to be imposed, a sanction under CPLR §3126(3) requires a conclusive showing that the noncomplying party's conduct was willful, contumacious or due to bad faith.

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal and monetary sanctions for willful and dishonest failure to provide discovery.

Peterson v. Credit Agricole Am. Servs., Inc. · filed 2026-02-25

Under these circumstances, granting the defendants' motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them and for monetary sanctions due to the plaintiff's misconduct and dishonesty was justified ( see Morgenstern v Jeffsam Corp. , 78 AD3d at 914).

Section 3126(2) permits preclusion for a disclosure failure when the failure was willful, deliberate and contumacious; preclusion is not automatic.

350 E. Houston St., LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. · filed 2026-04-02(2)

Finally, Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to preclude Peterson from offering an affidavit or report from its expert in opposition to its summary judgment motion and at trial (see CPLR 3126[2]; MSCI Inc. v Jacob, 120 AD3d 1072, 1075 [1st Dept 2014]). ... The law is well settled that in order to impose the drastic remedy of preclusion, a court must determine that the offending party's failure to comply with disclosure "was willful, deliberate and contumacious" (Siegman v Rosen, 270 AD2d 14, 15 [1st Dept 2000]). Plaintiffs have not sustained this burden, nor have they shown prejudice, as they were able to address the expert's opinions in reply and received Peterson's theories of the case well in advance of trial (see Rivera v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 123 AD3d 424, 425-426 [1st Dept 2014], affd 28 NY3d 999 [2016]).

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery orders and offers no reasonable excuse, supporting an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Bryant v. Boston Props., Inc. · filed 2026-04-15(3)

His counsel's assertion that she struggled to schedule the plaintiff's deposition following the May 2021 order due to the plaintiff's incarceration and the COVID-19 protocols at the facility where he was being held does not constitute a reasonable excuse. The record reflects that the plaintiff had been incarcerated since January 2019. The plaintiff's counsel also failed to detail her purported efforts to schedule the plaintiff's deposition.

Section 3126(3) permits dismissal when a party repeatedly fails to comply with court-ordered discovery without a reasonable excuse.

Romanova v. Glatzer · filed 2026-05-13(3)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in directing dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 (see Taglianetti v Bay Ridge Med. Imaging, P.C., 229 AD3d 477, 478-479; Hongyan Sun v Lee, 212 AD3d 717, 719; Patrick v Lend Lease [US] Constr. LMB, Inc., 203 AD3d 836, 838).

Section 3126 permits dismissal when repeated failures to comply with discovery orders and demands, without an adequate excuse, support an inference of willful and contumacious conduct.

Tulino v. Raza · filed 2026-06-24

The Supreme Court, in effect, upon reargument, properly adhered to its original determination granting the moving defendants' separate prior motions pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. The plaintiff's willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from her repeated failures over an extended period of time to comply with court-ordered discovery and discovery demands and to respond to the moving defendants' separate demands for discovery without an adequate excuse ( see Muhammad v Ramadan , 228 AD3d at 676; Morales v Valeo , 218 AD3d 676, 678).

Section 3126 gives courts discretion to impose remedies for disclosure noncompliance, with willfulness relevant to that decision.

Desnoyers v. Desnoyers · filed 1988-07-21

The court had adequate civil (see, CPLR 3126; Reed v Reed, 93 AD2d 105) and criminal remedies (see, People v Russo, 124 Misc 2d 438) within its discretion to apply to a noncomplying party and there was no evidence of willful noncompliance on defendant’s part (cf., Reed v Reed, supra, at 108).

CPLR 3126 permits exclusion of evidence as a disclosure sanction when a party refuses to obey a disclosure order or fails to disclose required information.

Nuesi v. Gago · filed 2009-12-22

There was no claim that the father’s financial records should be excluded on the grounds that he refused to obey a disclosure order, or failed to disclose information that ought to have been disclosed (see CPLR 3126; Matter of Greenidge v Greenidge, 56 AD3d 473 [2008]; Matter of Pena v Diaz, 275 AD2d 415 [2000]).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint as a disclosure sanction when warranted.

Gould v. Decolator, Cohen & DiPrisco, LLP · filed 2021-09-22

The defendant's alternative contention that the Supreme Court should have directed dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is without merit.

Section 3126(3) does not authorize dismissal as a discovery sanction when there has been no discovery default.

Bauernfeind v. Albany Medical Center Hospital · filed 1989-10-12(3)

The record discloses no default in pleading (see, CPLR 3012 [b]), discovery (see, CPLR 3126 [3]) or in proceeding to trial (see, CPLR 3215 [a]), and Supreme Court lacks the power to dismiss a complaint for "general delay” (see, Ciminelli Constr. Co. v City of Buffalo, 110 AD2d 1075, 1076, appeals dismissed 65 NY2d 1053).

CPLR 3126 permits dismissal for failure to comply with discovery; absent a motion seeking that remedy, the failure did not prevent restoration of the action to the calendar.

Goodman v. Lempa · filed 2015-01-14

Furthermore, there was no 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216, nor was there any motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the action based upon the plaintiffs failure to comply with discovery ... Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion to restore the action to the calendar should have been granted.

Relief under CPLR 3126 can make summary judgment premature at the current stage of a case.

Rice v. Dylan · filed 1972-05-25

The motion for relief pursuant to CPLR 3126 and the partial grant of such motion renders summary judgment a premature remedy at the present posture of the proceedings.

A CPLR 3126 penalty against one claimant does not foreclose another claimant’s rights when the underlying assignment’s validity remains undetermined and the claimants have not been shown to be united in interest.

In re the Estate of Klein · filed 1975-12-29

Since there has been no finding as to the validity of that assignment, and absent a showing that appellants and William Klein are united in interest, appellants’ rights are not foreclosed merely because William Klein was penalized pursuant to CPLR 3126.

CPLR 3126 penalties must account for whether sanctioning a party who disobeyed a disclosure order would unfairly impair an innocent party’s claim or defense.

Quintanilla v. Harchack · filed 1999-03-22

It is incumbent upon the trial court to protect the rights of any innocent party whose cause of action or defense would be unfairly impaired by the imposition of a CPLR 3126 penalty on another, contumacious party.

A CPLR 3126 penalty must not unfairly impair an innocent party’s ability to prove a claim or defense.

Denn v. Hardwick · filed 2012-07-11(2)

“It is incumbent upon the trial court to protect the rights of any innocent party whose cause of action or defense would be unfairly impaired by the imposition of a CPLR 3126 penalty on another, contumacious party” (Quintanilla v Harchack, 259 AD2d 681, 682 [1999]). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in precluding the plaintiff from calling Nappo as a witness at trial (see Ingoglia v Leshaj, 1 AD3d at 485; Quintanilla v Harchack, 259 AD2d at 682; Williams v New Style Limousine, 1 Misc 3d 502, 509 [2003]).

A dismissal under CPLR 3126 following an insured’s default does not estop an injured intervenor from asserting coverage under the insured’s policy.

NYAT Operating Corp. v. GAN National Insurance · filed 2007-12-06

The dismissal of NYAT’s complaint as a result of its default in opposing GAN’s CPLR 3126 motion does not estop Cabrera from asserting ¡NYAT’s coverage under the subject commercial general liability policy for the sexual assault committed against her by ¡NYAT’s employee (Zimmerman v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y., 13 AD3d 137 [2004]; see Stumpf AG v Dynegy Inc., 32 AD3d 232, 233 [2006]).

Section 3126 permits a court to stay proceedings until a party who refused to answer proper examination questions attends another examination.

Cronk v. Cayuga County Patrons' Fire Relief Ass'n · filed 1977-06-28

Judged by these standards, plaintiff’s refusal to testify was inexcusable. Accordingly, further proceedings in this action shall be stayed until plaintiff attends another examination before trial to be held at the offices of Bouck, Holloway & Kiernan on a mutually agreed date.

Section 3126 permits dismissal of a complaint when a party repeatedly refuses to produce witnesses for depositions and precluding their testimony would be an insufficient sanction.

Trataros Construction, Inc. v. New York City School Construction Authority · filed 2007-12-26(3)

Under the circumstances of this case, where the witnesses’ testimony may be crucial to the ability of the SCA, inter alia, to establish the plaintiff’s responsibility for premature deterioration of the facade of the subject real property, and in view of the plaintiffs flat-out refusal twice to produce either witness, mere preclusion of the witnesses’ testimony was not a sufficient sanction under CPLR 3126 (cf. Poulas v U-Haul Intl., 288 AD2d 202 [2001]; Postel v New York Univ. Hosp., 262 AD2d 40, 42 [1999]; Mills v Ducille, 170 AD2d 657, 658 [1991]).

Section 3126 supports denial of relief from a default when a party repeatedly fails to attend court-ordered depositions and offers inadequate excuses.

Moody v. Burgos · filed 1989-06-12

The Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion by denying the plaintiffs motion to vacate her default in appearing at the preliminary conference. It appears from a review of the papers submitted in connection with that motion that the plaintiff not only failed to appear at the conference held on June 24, 1987, but that she also failed to appear at two prior court-ordered depositions. The excuses offered in support of these several defaults were vague and contradictory, and no adequate affidavit of merit was produced. Under these circumstances, her motion was properly denied (see, CPLR 3126; see, Walk & Smile v 2491 Atl. Ave. Corp., 150 AD2d 366).

CPLR 3126 sanctions against a party for a nonparty’s failure to obey a subpoena require a showing that the nonparty was the party’s agent or otherwise under the party’s control.

Rogers v. Rogers · filed 1989-04-10

We find that there was an insufficient showing that the plaintiff wife’s mother was an agent of or otherwise under the control of the plaintiff. Absent such a showing, the imposition of sanctions against the plaintiff for the failure of her mother to obey a subpoena duces tecum is not warranted (see, CPLR 3126).

CPLR 3126 sanctions for failing to produce a witness require evidence that the witness is within the party’s control.

Two Clinton Square Corp. v. Computerized Recovery Systems, Inc. · filed 1978-05-26

However, absent any evidence that Cohen is within the control of defendant corporation, Special Term properly denied the application for sanctions at this time.

CPLR 3126(3) does not permit sanctions against a party for failing to produce a nonparty assignor who is outside its control for an examination before trial.

Bath Medical Supply, Inc. v. Allstate Indemnity Co. · filed 2010-02-19(3)

As plaintiffs assignor is neither a party to this action nor under plaintiff’s control (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]; Cardtronics, LE v St. Nicholas Beverage Discount Ctr., Inc., 8 AD3d 419, 420 [2004]; 6A NY Jur 2d, Assignments §§ 59, 85), the sanctions provided by CPLR 3126 (3) for nondisclosure cannot be imposed on plaintiff for failing to produce its assignor for an examination before trial (Mia Acupuncture, F.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 39 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

CPLR 3126 does not warrant sanctions for failing to produce former employees whom a party is not compelled to produce for deposition.

Ward v. City of New York · filed 2024-12-24

These individuals were no longer employed by NYCHH at the time plaintiff sought to depose them, and, thus, NYCHH was not compelled to produce them ( see Doomes v Best Tr. Corp. at 323).

Section 3126 permits an award of expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred in seeking to compel a party to provide updated medical authorizations and attend a physical examination.

Danser v. Carrols Corp. · filed 2004-10-01

Supreme Court did not abuse or improvidently exercise its discretion in granting that part of the motion of Carrols Corporation and Carrols Corporation, doing business as Burger King (defendants), seeking an award of expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred as a result of their having to seek to compel plaintiff Helen Danser to provide updated medical authorizations and to attend a physical examination (see Matter of Glazer, 134 AD2d 875 [1987], lv dismissed in part and denied ... in part 72 NY2d 828 [1988]; see generally CPLR 3126; Kimmel v State of New York, 267 AD2d 1079, 1080-1081 [1999]).

CPLR 3126 authorizes requiring counsel to personally bear extraordinary costs caused by unjustifiably stopping a deposition.

Erhard v. Panzer · filed 1990-12-03

The order appealed from imposed sanctions against counsel for the plaintiff pursuant to CPLR 3126 as a result of his unjustified conduct at the deposition. We find that the sanctions imposed against counsel were proper under the circumstances, and authorized by CPLR 3126.

CPLR 3126 permits attorney’s fees as a sanction when a party disobeys court orders to answer interrogatories.

Keingarsky v. Keingarsky · filed 1988-12-29

Under the circumstances, the imposition of sanctions upon the plaintiff, in the form of attorney’s fees, was proper (see, CPLR 3126; Minnick v Minnick, 109 AD2d 871; Gabrelian v Gabrelian, 108 AD2d 445, 448, appeal dismissed 66 NY2d 741; 3A Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac jljj 3126.06, 3126.14; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3126:ll, at 653-654).

CPLR 3126 permits a court, when the circumstances warrant, to impose a monetary sanction in lieu of its specified penalties.

Renford v. Lizardo · filed 1984-09-21

It is well established, however, that where, as here, the circumstances warrant such relief, the court has discretion to impose monetary sanctions in lieu of those specified in CPLR 3126 (Aliksanyan v Sundman, 98 AD2d 607; Boes v Harris, 96 AD2d 849; Bolser v Newport Trucking, 90 AD2d 784; Plainview Assoc. v Miconics Inds., 90 AD2d 825).

Section 3126 permits monetary sanctions for refusing to comply with a discovery order or refusing to disclose.

Gabrelian v. Gabrelian · filed 1985-05-20

In addition, it is now well settled that monetary sanctions may be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 as a penalty for refusal to comply with an order of discovery or a refusal to disclose (see, e.g., Renford v Lizardo, 104 AD2d 717; Thadford Realty Co. v L. V. Income Props. Corp., 102 AD2d 823; Everin v Greyhound Elevator Corp., 97 AD2d 832; Jordan v Huntington Hosp. Assn., 40 AD2d 870).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to award attorney’s fees as a just penalty when a party refuses to disclose material it should have disclosed.

In re the Arbitration between Gretka & General Accident Group · filed 1979-07-06

In addition, the court is empowered to fashion appropriate penalties "as are just”, where a party refuses to disclose what ought to have been disclosed (CPLR 3126). While not specifically enumerated in the statute, an award of counsel fees has been found to be such a just penalty (Di Bartolo v American & Foreign Ins. Co., 48 Misc 2d 843, affd 26 AD2d 992; Nomako v Ashton, 22 AD2d 683; Warner v Bumgarner, 49 Misc 2d 488).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to condition denial of a motion to strike testimony on payment of attorney’s fees caused by failure to comply with a disclosure order, but the fee amount requires a showing of the work and time expended.

Fontanella v. Fontanella · filed 1990-11-13

The court was within its discretion in conditioning the denial of plaintiffs motion to strike defendant’s testimony upon defendant’s payment of plaintiffs attorney’s fees. (CPLR 3126.) Those fees were necessitated solely by defendant’s failure to comply with the court’s earlier order which required that she serve and file an affidavit of net worth by March 17, 1989. However, the court abused its discretion by arbitrarily fixing the amount of the fees, and we accordingly remand so that fees may be fixed upon a proper showing of the value of the work necessitated and amount of time actually expended.

Section 3126 permits counsel fees as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery orders without requiring the court to consider affidavits or time and work sheets before making the award.

Kivo v. Kivo · filed 1993-05-03

Contrary to his contentions, there was no need for the court to consider affidavits or time and work sheets before awarding the plaintiff $500 in counsel fees, since that award was in the nature of a sanction for failure to comply with discovery orders (see, Jacobs v Levy, 154 AD2d 654, 655).

Section 3126 did not support an award of attorney’s fees and costs where the record showed no willful refusal to comply and the court had not first issued a conditional order.

Davoli v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. · filed 1998-03-13

Supreme Court erred in awarding plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs on her motion to compel discovery (see, CPLR 3126). ... At a minimum, the court should have issued a conditional order before imposing the sanction of attorney’s fees in this case.

CPLR 3126 permits a monetary penalty for failure to comply with discovery obligations without a finding that the conduct was frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.

New v. Scores Entertainment, Inc. · filed 1998-11-05

We note that this penalty, which was imposed pursuant to the provisions of CPLR 3126 setting forth penalties for failure to comply with discovery obligations, was not governed by the provisions of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 and it was therefore not necessary that the court find that defendant’s behavior had been “frivolous” within the meaning of that rule (see, Taub v Wulwick, 168 AD2d 492).

Section 3126 permits monetary sanctions against counsel for misconduct in discovery.

O'Brien v. Occidental Chemical Corp. · filed 1999-11-12

The court properly imposed monetary sanctions on plaintiffs’ counsel stemming from the discovery dispute (see, CPLR 3126; see also, Taub v Wulwick, 168 AD2d 492).

CPLR 3126 permits an attorney’s fee award when a party fails to comply with a discovery order.

Brown v. City of New York · filed 2000-04-17

We conclude that the award of an attorney’s fee is warranted and the order dated October 22, 1999, is modified accordingly (see, CPLR 3126; O’Brien v Occidental Chem. Corp., 266 AD2d 915; Rosner v Blue Channel Corp., 131 AD2d 654).

CPLR 3126 permits costs for missed medical examinations, but requiring the party personally to pay them as a condition of another examination may be an abuse of discretion.

Adams v. Deloreto · filed 2000-05-10

Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in assessing costs of $1,000 upon plaintiff (see, CPLR 3126; Flynn v Debonis, 246 AD2d 852, 853; Wolford v Cerrone, 184 AD2d 833, 834; Renford v Lizardo, 104 AD2d 717, 718). Under the circumstances of this case, however, it was an abuse of discretion to require plaintiff “personally” to pay such costs as a condition of her being permitted to attend a further independent medical examination.

Section 3126 permits a court to impose a monetary sanction in its discretion.

In re the Estate of Gaye · filed 2001-07-02

The Surrogate’s Court providently exercised its discretion in imposing a monetary sanction upon the appellant (see, CPLR 3126; Kaufman v Red Ground Corp., 170 AD2d 484).

CPLR 3126 permits an attorney’s fee award when a party fails to appear for scheduled depositions.

In re the Estate of Reichberg · filed 2001-05-29

The award to the co-executors of an attorney’s fee was appropriate due to the failure of the appellant Gregory Reichberg to appear for two scheduled depositions (see, Smith v New York Tel. Co., 235 AD2d 529; Barbiere v Motamed, 209 AD2d 368).

CPLR 3126 permits a monetary sanction against a party’s trial attorney for willful and contumacious discovery conduct instead of striking the party’s answer.

Makris v. Westchester County · filed 2005-09-12

Nevertheless, under the particular circumstances of this case, and as a matter of discretion, we find that a monetary sanction in the sum of $10,000, payable to the plaintiff by the appellants’ trial attorney, constitutes an appropriate sanction (see Curdo v Hogan Coring & Sawing Corp., 303 AD2d 357, 359 [2003]; DeFoe v Bankers Trust Co., 179 AD2d 737, 738 [1992]).

Section 3126 cannot sustain an attorney’s fee award imposed for frivolous conduct rather than disclosure violations.

Kane v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority · filed 2007-05-29

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention on appeal, the award of an attorney’s fee cannot be sustained as a sanction for disclosure violations (see CPLR 3126; Riley v ISS Intl. Serv. Sys., 304 AD2d 637 [2003]). Rather, based on the court’s statements at trial, it is clear that the award was intended to be the imposition of costs for frivolous conduct within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (see Yan v Klein, 35 AD3d 729 [2006]).

Section 3126 permits a monetary sanction in lieu of striking an answer for a party’s delay in making witnesses available for deposition.

Messer v. Keyspan Energy Delivery, Inc. · filed 2008-11-25

Although NYCTA previously had been dilatory in making these witnesses available, it was within the Supreme Court’s discretion to impose a monetary sanction against NYCTA in lieu of striking its answer (see CPLR 3126; O’Neill v Ho, 28 AD3d 626 [2006]; Garan v Don & Walt Sutton Bldrs., Inc., 27 AD3d 521, 523 [2006]).

Section 3126 permits a court to award costs and attorney’s fees for failure to comply with discovery obligations.

IMANVERDI, ATASH v. POPOVICI, DPM, BRYAN G. · filed 2013-09-27

Furthermore, the court properly exercised its discretion in awarding costs and attorney’s fees to defendant (see CPLR 3126; Riley v ISS Intl. Serv. Sys., 304 AD2d 637, 637-638; see also Danser v Carrols Corp., 11 AD3d 940, 940-941), and in denying plaintiffs’ cross motion for a protective order (see Rawlins v St. Joseph’s Hosp. Health Ctr., 108 AD3d 1191, 1191-1192).

CPLR 3126 permits a court to award counsel fees when a party’s failure to comply with discovery makes a motion necessary.

Rosenbaum v. Festinger · filed 2017-06-14

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding counsel fees to the plaintiff for the necessity of bringing the motion (see CPLR 3126).

CPLR 3126 permits monetary sanctions for discovery abuses.

Maxim, Inc. v. Feifer · filed 2018-05-17

Plaintiffs' discovery abuses warrant the imposition of a $10,000 monetary sanction pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 permits monetary sanctions for willful failure to disclose, but the amount awarded must be reasonable.

Riverside Ctr. Site 5 Owner LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co. · filed 2024-03-28

Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in imposing monetary sanctions on plaintiffs, as defendants sufficiently established the willful nature of plaintiffs' failure to comply with disclosure requirements ( see D2D Holdings LLC v Bridgemarket Assoc., L.P. , 222 AD3d 430, 430 [1st Dept 2023]; see also Siegman v Rosen , 270 AD2d 14, 15 [1st Dept 2000]), but the extent of damages awarded was excessive ( see Maxim v Feifer , 161 AD3d 551 [1st Dept 2018]).

Section 3126 permits a court to impose monetary sanctions for discovery abuses.

Etkin v. Sherwood Residential Mgt. LLC · filed 2024-12-19

The court providently exercised its discretion by imposing monetary sanctions against defendants ( see CPLR 3126; Arts4All, Ltd. v Hancock , 54 AD3d 286, 288 [1st Dept 2008], aff'd 12 NY3d 846 [2008] cert. den. 559 US 905 [2010]).

Section 3126 permits a party to seek sanctions in either of two actions covered by a shared deposition stipulation when promises made during the deposition go unfulfilled.

Nitec Paper Corp. v. Carborundum Co. · filed 1980-01-22

Nonetheless, since Khan’s deposition was admissible in both actions, we find that it was within the intent and spirit of the stipulation that sanctions could be sought in both actions for the unfulfilled promises made during Khan’s deposition. Therefore, Nitec properly sought sanctions in this proceeding under CPLR 3126 for Carborundum’s failure to turn over the promised documents.

Section 3126 permits disclosure sanctions when a plaintiff invokes the Fifth Amendment to refuse relevant questions, but does not permit them when a defendant invokes the privilege as a shield.

Rosenberg v. Trachtman · filed 1980-03-21

The sanctions of CPLR 3126 may not be invoked where the defendant uses his constitutional privilege against self incrimination as a shield. On the other hand, where the plaintiff uses it as a sword by refusing to disclose information which may be relevant, the civil sanctions of CPLR 3126 may be invoked.

Section 3126 permits disclosure of material facts about a spouse’s relationship with another person, but does not penalize refusal to answer irrelevant questions about adultery on self-incrimination grounds.

Bloom v. Bloom · filed 1976-05-14

To that extent the information is material and necessary to the defense of the action (CPLR 3126). ... Since the wife’s defense is based upon the premise that the husband’s relationship with this woman caused him to leave home and adultery is not an affirmative defense, proof of actual sexual intercourse is irrelevant. ... Upon the trial he may be asked questions concerning his love and affection for this woman and his relationship with her, insofar as it reflects upon his cause for leaving defendant, but plaintiff may invoke his right against self incrimination without penalty with respect to questions concerning the act of adultery.

A CPLR 3126 request to compel a witness’s deposition is academic when the relevant causes of action have been withdrawn.

Husak v. 45th Avenue Housing Co. · filed 2008-06-24

Further, in light of the withdrawal of the plaintiffs causes of action to recover damages for negligence and violation of Labor Law § 200, that branch of the plaintiffs cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to compel the defendant 45th Avenue Housing Company to produce a certain witness for deposition was rendered academic.

A request for sanctions under CPLR 3126 is moot when the interrogatories at issue have been served.

Guepet v. International TAO Systems, Inc. · filed 1981-09-24

Defendants’ cross motion for an order sanctioning plaintiff, pursuant to CPLR 3126, is denied as moot, since the interrogatories at issue have been served.

A request for preclusion under section 3126 may be denied as moot when the requested disclosure is provided in response to the motion.

Eileen G. v. Frank G. · filed 2011-11-30

The branch of the cross motion that seeks the sanction of preclusion or a direction to compel disclosure is denied as moot, as the papers indicate that in response to the cross motion disclosure was provided.

Section 3126 permits discovery sanctions when a spouse fails to obey an order to fund an appraiser needed to evaluate marital assets.

Hubbard v. Hubbard · filed 1982-04-21

Here, defendant is not merely in default of an order directing payment of a sum of money; rather, by not paying plaintiff the sum of money ordered to enable her to secure the services of a pension actuary, he is actually impeding the process of discovery, and, accordingly, the court holds that where a court directs the payment of a sum of money to be paid to a needy spouse to enable said spouse to secure the services of an appraiser in a matrimonial action for purposes of evaluating marital assets, noncompliance with same shall subject the offending party to sanctions or penalties for nondisclosure pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126 sanctions of dismissal or evidence preclusion are inappropriate if mental illness leaves a party unable to comply with a disclosure order.

Flaherty v. Olins Leasing Inc. · filed 1983-01-03

However, if it is established that plaintiff is, in fact, unable to appear for the examinations by reason of his mental condition, in that he lacks the capacity to “refuse * * * to obey an order for disclosure”, or to “wilfully fail * * * to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126), then the sanctions of dismissing the complaint or precluding plaintiff from introducing at the trial on the issue of damages evidence of his alleged mental disability, would be inappropriate.

Section 3126(3) permits a court to strike a party’s pleading for failing to comply with a disclosure order; willful, contumacious and evasive conduct can warrant dismissal.

Anteri v. NRS Construction Corp. · filed 1986-02-18(3)

Where a party fails to comply with a disclosure order, CPLR 3126 authorizes the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon that party. The authorized sanctions include the striking of the noncomplying party’s pleadings, in whole or in part (see, CPLR 3126 [3]). ... Moreover, M & C’s failure to offer a reasonable excuse for the absence of said documents at some time prior to the motion to dismiss its fourth-party complaint, indicates that M & C engaged in willful, contumacious and evasive conduct with respect to the fourth-party defendants’ discovery rights. Accordingly, dismissal of the fourth-party complaint was warranted and Special Term did not abuse its discretion in so ordering.

CPLR 3126 permits sanctions when a party’s prolonged failure to comply with disclosure orders leaves relevant documents unavailable.

Schneider v. Barash · filed 1991-02-21

Defendant’s dilatory tactics over a four year period and his noncompliance with three court orders compelling disclosure of certain documents, resulting in the unavailability of those documents, justified the imposition of sanctions pursuant to CPLR 3126.

Section 3126(3) permits unconditional dismissal for failure to comply with an order compelling disclosure, particularly when counsel willfully refuses disclosure and persistently obstructs it.

Barretta v. Webb Corp. · filed 1992-03-13(3)

Unconditional dismissal is a sanction that may be imposed for a party’s failure to comply with an order compelling disclosure (see, CPLR 3126 [3]), and such relief was particularly appropriate in this case in light of plaintiffs counsel’s willful refusal to comply with disclosure demands and persistent pattern of dilatory and obstructive conduct (see, Gaylord Bros. v RND Co., 134 AD2d 848).