N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of personal and business tax returns when they are material and relevant to the action.

Mirabel v. State Farm Insurance · filed 1999-10-04(a)

The information demanded in items 2 and 3 of the defendant’s notice for discovery and inspection, i.e., the plaintiff’s personal income tax returns and certain business tax returns, are material and relevant (see, CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) allows a court to deny access to old school records when their connection to the claimed injury has not been shown.

Dolback v. Reeves · filed 1999-10-14(a)

Likewise, we find no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court’s denial of access to plaintiff’s school records. Initially, we note that Supreme Court granted defendants’ request for discovery of plaintiff’s pre-1995 medical records pertaining to her psychological or sexual dysfunction problems. Although plaintiff testified that her mother had abused her as a child, there was no evidence that the abuse was of a sexual nature. Moreover, at the time of the incident, nearly 20 years had passed since plaintiff was in school. Under these particular circumstances, we cannot say that Supreme Court abused its discretion.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of evidence material and necessary to the defense of a claim.

Kern v. City of Rochester · filed 1999-12-30(a)

The disclosure permitted by the court was properly limited to evidence “material and necessary in the * * * defense of’ that cause of action (CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of witness evidence that may be material and necessary to the defense of an action.

Cavaretta v. George · filed 2000-03-29(a)

Defendants established that those witnesses may have evidence “material and necessary” in the defense of the action (CPLR 3101 [a]; see, Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 407-408; Wiseman v American Motors Sales Corp., 103 AD2d 230, 239).

CPLR 3101 (a) favors broad disclosure, but a party cannot be compelled to produce information that does not exist or is outside its possession or control, or to create new documents.

Hawley v. Hasgo Power Equipment Sales, Inc. · filed 2000-02-16(a)

Although CPLR 3101 (a) is to be interpreted liberally in favor of disclosure (see, Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assocs., 257 AD2d 37, 40), a party may not be compelled to produce information that does not exist or that he or she does not control or possess, nor may a party be compelled to create new documents (see, Durham Med. Search v Physicians Intl. Search, 122 AD2d 529, 529-530).

Section 3101(a) leaves courts discretion to deny discovery when its speculative usefulness is outweighed by the burden and delay it would cause.

Andon v. 302-304 Mott Street Associates · filed 2000-05-11(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) entitles parties to “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof.” ... Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law in denying defendants’ discovery motion.

Section 3101(a) permits a court to compel disclosure of records material and relevant to the prosecution of an action.

Rodriguez v. Serge Elevators Co. · filed 2000-05-15(a)

The Supreme Court properly directed the defendant to respond to the plaintiffs notices for discovery and inspection of certain records, as they were material and relevant to the prosecution of the action (see, CPLR 3101 [a]; Northway Eng’g v *464Felix Indus., 77 NY2d 332; Mirabel v State Farm Ins. Co., 265 AD2d 310; Coan v Long Is. R. R., 246 AD2d 569).

Section 3101(a) does not require a further deposition about business transactions unrelated to the litigation when the requesting party fails to show that the information is material or necessary.

MS Partnership v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2000-06-16(a)

The court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant failed to establish that the information sought at the further deposition of Mark Perlbinder concerning business transactions unrelated to the litigation is material or necessary (see, Kern v City of Rochester [appeal No. 1], 267 AD2d 1026).

CPLR 3101(a) requires disclosure of prior injury records when they are material and necessary to a defense against claimed damages for loss of enjoyment of life.

Vanalst v. City of New York · filed 2000-10-30(a)

Here, the nature and severity of the plaintiffs previous back injuries may have an impact upon the amount of damages, if any, recoverable for a claimed loss of enjoyment of life because of his current knee injury. Therefore, the requested records and reports are material and necessary to the defense, and the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the appellant’s cross motion which was for disclosure (see, CPLR 3101 [a]; Dillenbeck v Hess, supra; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., supra).

Section 3101 does not make documents discoverable merely because they may help with settlement negotiations; they must be material and necessary to the litigation.

Hussain v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2000-10-31

Accordingly, the documents sought, bearing as they do solely upon the issue of attorneys’ fees, are neither material nor necessary at this early stage of the litigation. That documents may prove helpful or even necessary in settlement considerations or negotiations does not render those documents material and necessary within the meaning of CPLR 3101.

Section 3101(a) permits a deposition of a Town official when the Town’s other witnesses cannot provide material and necessary evidence.

Radon Construction Corp. v. Alcon Construction Corp. · filed 2000-11-20(a)

The Supreme Court, however, improperly denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel a Town official to appear for a deposition. The plaintiff established that the witnesses produced by the Town were insufficient to provide testimonial and documentary evidence that is “material and necessary” to the prosecution of its action, as provided in CPLR 3101 (a).

CPLR 3101 permits a party to compel disclosure of information material and necessary to its defense.

Vasquez v. Sokolowski · filed 2000-11-20

Nevertheless, since the subject items in the appellant’s demand for a bill of particulars and Item No. 2 of the notice of discovery and inspection dated December 7, 1999, are material and necessary to the defense of this action (see, CPLR 3101), the court should have granted that branch of the motion which was to compel discovery.

CPLR 3101 permits disclosure of material and necessary evidence; a study that does not meet that standard need not be produced.

Link v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2000-11-27

The Supreme Court properly determined that the study'of the crossing gate system of the defendant Long Island Railroad, which was conducted by the nonparty, Interactive Elements, Inc., and which the plaintiff sought to obtain through discovery, was not material and necessary in the prosecution of the action (see, CPLR 3101; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of records that are material and necessary to the issues in an action.

Liverano v. Devinsky · filed 2000-12-18(a)

The Supreme Court properly directed the disclosure of Dr. Dogali’s ophthalmological records because the information sought is material and necessary to the issues to be determined in the litigation (see, Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., supra).

CPLR 3101 permits discovery of records likely to lead to relevant evidence, but access to records may be denied when their relevance or materiality is not shown.

Montgomery v. Taylor · filed 2000-09-11

However, although the defendants may assert a counterclaim sounding in comparative negligence against the plaintiffs mother, they failed to demonstrate the relevance or materiality of Department of Health records relating to the plaintiff’s siblings which concerned a period of time before the plaintiff was born, or premises where the mother never resided. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which sought access to these records (see, CPLR 3101; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403).

Section 3101(a) permits deposition questions about prior drug use when that information is relevant to the cause of a condition for which the plaintiff seeks damages.

Green v. City of New York · filed 2001-03-08(a)

Accordingly, since parties are entitled to “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (CPLR 3101 [a]), the motion court properly exercised its broad discretion with respect to the conduct of discovery (see, Kamhi v Dependable Delivery Serv., 234 AD2d 34) by directing plaintiff to respond at her deposition to inquiries as to her prior drug use.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of records useful and reasonable for determining whether a defendant’s vehicle was involved in an alleged accident.

Jones v. Beckford · filed 2001-12-04(a)

Such materials are sufficiently related to the issue of ... whether it was defendant’s car that hit plaintiff as to make their discovery useful and reasonable (CPLR 3101 [a]; see, Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406-407).

Section 3101 entitles an objectant in an accounting proceeding to disclosure concerning documents and events occurring before the accounting under challenge.

In re the Estate of Zahoudanis · filed 2001-12-17

In pursuing her objections to a second supplemental accounting dated May 10, 1995, the objectant is entitled to disclosure concerning documents and events occurring prior to that accounting (see, Matter of Ehmer, 272 AD2d 540; Matter of Winston, 238 AD2d 345; CPLR 3101).

Section 3101 does not require disclosure of a trial transcript when the claims arising from that trial have been dismissed as untimely, making the transcript neither material nor necessary.

Ruggiero v. Powers · filed 2001-06-07

To the extent that plaintiff’s claims arise from the earlier action, however, their dismissal for being untimely renders the earlier trial transcript neither material nor necessary in this action (see, CPLR 3101; Dolback v Reeves, 265 AD2d 625).

Section 3101(a) permits depositions of nonparty witnesses when their testimony is material and necessary to the defense.

Spangler v. Benedictine Hospital · filed 2001-08-23(a)

Moreover, even if counsel had not consented to the depositions, plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order would still be properly denied since the depositions were material and necessary to the defense of this complex medical ... malpractice action (see, CPLR 3101 [a]; Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assocs., 94 NY2d 740, 745-746).

CPLR 3101 does not require disclosure of counseling records that are neither germane to the claim nor otherwise material and necessary to the action.

Aliano v. Lusterman · filed 2001-10-09

These records are not germane to the plaintiffs claim of breach of fiduciary duty owed him by the defendant, or otherwise “material and necessary” in the prosecution of the action (see, CPLR 3101; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406; Ferrusi v Suburban Propane Corp., 279 AD2d 447).

Section 3101(a) permits the deposition of an insurer’s employee who directly denied a claim when that employee has information material and necessary to the action.

Walsh v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 2001-12-20(a)

We perceive no basis, on this record, to disturb the court’s discretionary determination that the corporate employee who was directly responsible for defendant’s denial of the claim at issue possessed necessary and relevant information germane to this action, and should therefore be produced (see, Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., supra, at 406-407; Arendt v General Elec. Co., 270 AD2d 622, 622-623).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of records bearing on the parties’ controversy that will assist a party in preparing for trial.

A-Frame, Inc. v. Concord Pools, Ltd. · filed 2001-12-27(a)

Thus, any records stating the sales and costs figures necessary to calculate defendant’s profits before and during the period of alleged unfair competition are subject to disclosure to the extent that they contain facts bearing on the parties’ controversy and will assist in plaintiffs preparation for trial of its claim under the Act.

Section 3101(a) limits disclosure to information reasonably calculated to lead to evidence material and necessary to the action.

Van Horn v. Thompson & Johnson Equipment Co. · filed 2002-02-01(a)

It also goes far beyond what is reasonably calculated to lead to evidence “material and necessary” to the prosecution of the action (CPLR 3101 [a]; see, Kavanagh v Ogden Allied Maintenance Corp., 92 NY2d 952, 954).

Section 3101(a) is interpreted liberally to require disclosure of matter material and necessary to prosecuting or defending an action.

Riverside Capital Advisors, Inc. v. First Secured Capital Corp. · filed 2002-03-18(a)

The requirement of CPLR 3101 (a) that there be “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” is interpreted liberally in favor of disclosure (see, Liverano v Devinsky, 278 AD2d 386, 387).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of evidence that is material and necessary to the prosecution of an action.

Spencer v. City of New York · filed 2002-04-01(a)

The Supreme Court erred when it refused to order James Johnson and Alice Nelson to answer numbers 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 31, and 32 of the plaintiffs’ interrogatories, as those interrogatories requested evidence which was “material and necessary” in the prosecution of the action (Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 NY2d 740, 746; CPLR 3101 [a]; see CPLR 3131).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of evidence useful to trial preparation, but the requested time period must be close enough to the events in dispute to be material.

Wall v. Villa Roma Resort Lodges, Inc. · filed 2002-11-04(a)

While a guest list will assist the plaintiff in preparing for trial regarding the issue of whether other guests were instructed about tobogganing on the hill, guest activity in November and December 1998 and parts of January 1999 is too remote to be material to the issue. Accordingly, as a matter of discretion, the orders are modified to require disclosure for only the dates of January 9, 1999, up to and including January 16, 1999.

Section 3101(a) limits disclosure to material and necessary evidence, and trial courts have broad discretion to decide whether requested testimony meets that standard.

Frontier Insuarance v. State · filed 2002-11-07(a)

Since disclosure is limited to evidence that is material and necessary to an action (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406), and since it is well settled that trial courts have broad discretion to determine what disclosure is material and necessary (see Ruthman Mercadante & Hadjis v Nardiello, 288 AD2d 593, 594), we decline to disturb the determination by the Court of Claims that evidence regarding whether the CBA was intended to effectuate a waiver is not material and necessary to this litigation.

CPLR 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary evidence, but a party seeking additional discovery must show that it is material and necessary to the action.

Palermo Mason Construction, Inc. v. Aark Holding Corp. · filed 2002-12-16(a)

Since the plaintiff failed to show that additional discovery is material and necessary to its defense of Home Depot’s counterclaim, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying its motion to compel Home Depot to comply with its allegedly outstanding disclosure requests (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Miller v Kings Highway Hosp., 225 AD2d 532).

Section 3101(a) does not require disclosure of matters that are not material to the issues in the action.

SKEK Associates v. Benenson · filed 2002-04-29(a)

Contrary to the defendants’ assertion, the court properly refused to compel the plaintiff to comply with the stricken discovery demands, as they sought disclosure of matters which were not material to the issues involved in the action (see CPLR 3101 [a]; cf. Wind v Eli Lilly & Co., 164 AD2d 885; Altesman v Eli Lilly & Co., 164 AD2d 876).

Section 3101(a) calls for full disclosure of material and necessary evidence, but a party may agree to limit discovery, and the court may preclude additional requests made to harass or delay.

Byck v. Byck · filed 2002-05-20(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof.” ... The husband consented to limit the scope of disclosure by entering into the so ordered stipulation and is therefore bound by its terms (see CPLR 2104). Further, it appears that the request for additional further disclosure was an attempt to harass or delay, as the husband has received substantial discovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the husband from obtaining any additional discovery.

Section 3101 permits disclosure of relevant client descriptions and ages, but does not require disclosure of anatomical information immaterial to the discrimination claims.

Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno · filed 2003-01-10

Confronting the policy of liberal discovery pursuant to CPLR 3101 is the competing policy of preventing a particular type of disclosure through the vehicle of CPLR 3103 (Cynthia B. v New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 60 NY2d 452, 457 [1983]). ... This court further finds that defendants have failed to articulate the relevance of their inquiries regarding the anatomical sex, at birth or otherwise, of HAF’s clients to the comments and claims of discrimination allegedly made in this action. ... However, to the extent that the outward physical appearance of HAF’s clients is relevant in light of HAF’s allegations that the building’s other tenants complained “men who think they’re women are using the women’s bathroom,” this court will permit the request for specific physical description of their clients at the time of each alleged incident, and the request for their age.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of another salesperson’s compensation when it is reasonably related to the plaintiff’s commission claim and the defendants’ account-servicing allegations.

McMahon v. Aviette Agency, Inc. · filed 2003-01-16(a)

As to interrogatory number 8, which asked for a statement of the annual compensation paid to defendants’ other salesperson, the requested information is reasonably related to plaintiff’s claims for commissions, as well as defendants’ allegations that the other salesperson was required to service plaintiff’s accounts because plaintiff inadequately performed the duties of his job. Thus, it was properly considered to be “material and necessary” to the prosecution of this action (CPLR 3101 [a]; see Bentley v Fritziner, 95 AD2d 745).

Section 3101(a) does not require production of medical records unless they are material and necessary to the case.

McLane v. Damiano · filed 2003-07-28(a)

In this case, the defendant failed to establish that the medical records that he sought to discover were material and necessary to the defense of this dental malpractice action (see CPLR 3101 [a]; DeStrange v Lind, 277 AD2d 344 [2000]; King v Salvation Army, 240 AD2d 473 [1997]; Manley v New York City Hous. Auth., 190 AD2d 600 [1993]).

CPLR 3101(a) does not require disclosure of a videotape that is not material and necessary to the action.

Brandes v. North Shore University Hospital · filed 2003-11-24(a)

Although the Supreme Court did not explain its reasoning, there is a sound basis in the record for its determination that the videotape was not material and necessary within the meaning of CPLR 3101 (a) (see Allen v CrowellCollier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403 [1968]).

Section 3101(a) requires a party seeking disclosure to show that the requested material is relevant or reasonably likely to lead to relevant evidence; speculation that it might help is insufficient.

Vyas v. Campbell · filed 2004-02-09(a)

We affirm on the ground that there was no indication of what it is the plaintiffs are seeking to discover, and that there was no showing that disclosure of this portion of the defendant’s “business diary” is “material and necessary” (CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) gives trial courts broad discretion to decide whether requested discovery is material and necessary.

Community Development Ass'n v. Warren-Hoffman & Associates, Inc. · filed 2004-02-11(a)

Supreme Court “is invested with broad discretion to supervise discovery and to determine what is ‘material and necessary’ as that phrase is used in CPLR 3101 (a)”

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of relevant testimony that is material and necessary to prosecuting an action, including testimony bearing on a party’s credibility.

Boatswain v. Boatswain · filed 2004-02-24(a)

Clearly, the information plaintiff seeks to obtain by deposing Paul is relevant to the within action. This court rejects defendant’s contention that the testimony of this witness is not material or necessary.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of materials that are material and necessary to assessing a party’s qualified immunity defense.

Samide v. Roman Catholic Diocese · filed 2004-03-08(a)

The materials demanded in the items numbered 22, 23, 25, 26, and 27 of the First Request are material and necessary to the issue of whether Daily’s defense pursuant to Not-For-Profit Corporation Law § 720-a has merit (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406-407 [1968]).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of items that are material and necessary to prosecuting or defending an action, with no disclosure when the same information is available through alternative means.

Altidor v. State-Wide Ins. Co. · filed 2004-06-22(a)

Under CPLR § 3101(a), discoverable items must be material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action. The defendant has failed to specifically state why these documents are material and necessary to their defense. The defendant has also failed to quantify what information they would extract from these documents and how that information would be used. In addition, the defendant has also failed to establish that there are no alternative means available from which it could obtain the same information.

Section 3101 requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to establish affirmative defenses.

Daniel Gale Associates, Inc. v. George · filed 2004-06-28

We agree that the defendants are entitled to documents responsive to those items, because the defendants demonstrated that they are material and necessary to establish their affirmative defenses (see CPLR 3101; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]; Cilone v Willson Safety Prods., 229 AD2d 372, 373 [1996]; Barrow v Lawrence United Corp., 155 AD2d 806, 807 [1989]).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter that is material and necessary to the action.

American Ass'n of Bioanalysts v. New York State Department of Health · filed 2004-11-18(a)

If disclosure has been limited to material and necessary information (see CPLR 3101 [a]), the determination will not be disturbed unless there was a clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion (see Fox v Fox, 309 AD2d 1056, 1058 [2003]; Ruthman, Mercadante & Hadjis v Nardiello, 288 AD2d 593, 594 [2001]; see also Frontier Ins. Co. v State of New York, 299 AD2d 600, 602 [2002]).

Section 3101 requires full disclosure of material and necessary matter while protecting privileged material and attorney work product from discovery.

Giannicos v. Bellevue Hospital Medical Center · filed 2005-02-01(a), (b), and (e)

CPLR 3101 (a) mandates that there “shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” ... Furthermore, CPLR 3101 (b) provides that upon “objection by a person entitled to assert [a] privilege, privileged matter shall not be obtainable.” ... To defeat this motion, plaintiff must first prove that the subpoenaed documents are protected by the attorney work product privilege as “uniquely the product ... of a lawyer’s learning and professional skills.” ... Notes and memoranda made by a lawyer during the interview of a witness or client constitute attorney work product and are “absolutely exempt from discovery.”

Section 3101 permits disclosure of material and necessary matter and protects privileged material from disclosure.

Matter of Coordinated Tit. Ins. Cases · filed 2004-04-15(a)(4), (b)

The issue before the court now is relevance of the subpoena to the issues in this case. See, Farbman v NYC Health & Hospitals , 62 N.Y.2d 75 (1984) (comparing the unfettered discovery of governmental agencies under FOIL with the limitation of CPLR article 31 to discovery of material that is "material and necessary.").

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure to be material and necessary to the prosecution of the action.

Acosta v. Hadjigavriel · filed 2004-04-26(a)

The plaintiffs failed to show that such deposition was material and necessary to the prosecution of the action (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Allen v CrowellCollier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403 [1968]; Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d 417 [2004]; Palermo Mason Constr. v Aark, 300 AD2d 460 [2002]; Kopec v City of New York, 248 AD2d 513 [1998]; Defina v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 217 AD2d 681 [1995]).

Section 3101 requires disclosure of evidence material and necessary to prosecute or defend an action and permits another discovery device when the first is inadequate.

MOPS Medical Supply v. GEICO Insurance · filed 2004-05-03

Moreover, in support of its motion, defendant’s counsel affirmatively asserts that “the examination before trial of plaintiff is necessary and material in order to defend this action properly,” thus meeting the standard set by the Second Department for using a second discovery device (Katz v Posner, 23 AD2d 774, 775 [2d Dept 1965] [“If the device first chosen does not adequately disclose all evidence material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of the action (CPLR 3101), then the other available remedy may be utilized”]).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of all matter material and necessary to prosecuting or defending an action.

Gill v. Mancino · filed 2004-06-07(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) provides for disclosure of “all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof.”

Section 3101 requires disclosure of material and necessary information and permits a defendant to depose a treating physician with relevant information.

Browne v. Horbar · filed 2004-11-17(a)(4)

Here, Dr. Lizza was entitled to depose Dr. Petrylak, who treated Mr. Browne’s cancer. Dr. Petrylak may well possess information “material and necessary in the prosecution or defense” of this action. (CPLR 3101 [a] [4].) Had Dr. Petrylak attempted to resist a deposition, this court would have had no qualms entertaining — and likely granting — a motion to compel his appearance.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action.

Marcano v. Calvary Hospital, Inc. · filed 2004-12-09(a)

In this regard, we note that, if Evelyn’s correction of his deposition testimony is credited, it follows that no spoliation occurred, since a tape not showing any part of the subject incident would not constitute “matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of [this] action” (CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101 requires disclosure of documents that are material and necessary to establish a party's right to money.

Rossi v. Spano · filed 2005-02-07

The appellant demonstrated that the documents generated during this time frame are material and necessary to establish his right to the money at issue (see CPLR 3101; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]; Cilone v Willson Safety Prods., 229 AD2d 372, 373 [1996]; Barrow v Lawrence United Corp., 155 AD2d 806, 807 [1989]).

Section 3101(a) permits deposition questions relevant to a defense, limited here to answers concerning the person arrested with the plaintiff.

Batista v. City of New York · filed 2005-02-24(a)

Defendants’ deposition questions in the three areas the motion court identified as protected by the privilege are relevant to the defense (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Láveme v Incorporated Vil. of Laurel Hollow, supra), but only insofar as the information sought by defendants’ questions relates to Polanco, the person who was arrested with Batista.

Section 3101(a) gives trial courts broad discretion to limit disclosure to material and necessary information.

Mora v. RGB, Inc. · filed 2005-04-14(a)

Plaintiff is not entitled to disclosure of all documents related to the construction of his house. ... Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of disclosure.

Section 3101 permits depositions of family members when their testimony is material and necessary to establish what a facility knew about a patient’s danger to others.

Laura Inger M. v. Hillside Children's Center · filed 2005-04-28

The depositions of the family members are material and necessary to establish Hillside’s knowledge that Reznikov presented a danger to others at the time he was released on home visits (CPLR 3101).

Section 3101 requires full disclosure of information material and necessary to a claim or defense once disclosure is permitted in a special proceeding.

Smilow v. Ulrich · filed 2005-12-01

When leave of court is given, disclosure takes place pursuant to CPLR 3101, which provides mandatory full disclosure of all information material and necessary to a claim or defense.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of relevant and material financial records, including computer data, in a matrimonial case when the records are not privileged.

Etzion v. Etzion · filed 2005-02-17(a)

When discovery which is sought is relevant and material, pursuant to CPLR 3101 (a), and not subject to claims of privilege, pursuant to CPLR 3103 (a), disclosure is proper and should be permitted.

CPLR 3101 permits depositions of family members whose testimony is material and necessary to establish a facility’s knowledge that a patient posed a danger to others.

Laura Inger M. v. Hillside Children's Center · filed 2005-02-22

The depositions of the family members are material and necessaiy to establish Hillside’s knowledge that Reznikov presented a danger to others at the time he was released on home visits (CPLR 3101).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of material and necessary information about alleged assaults through interrogatories.

Samide v. Roman Catholic Diocese · filed 2005-03-14(a)

Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to answers to his interrogatories numbered 30 (b), 30 (c), 30 (d), 31 (b), 31 (c), and 31 (d), which seek “material and necessary” information concerning the alleged assaults (CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of settlement negotiation documents that are material and necessary to a party’s defense.

American Re-Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 2005-06-02(a)

The court properly ruled that the disputed documents relating to the settlement negotiations are discoverable since they are material and necessary to the reinsurers’ defense of the action (CPLR 3101 [a]; see Masterwear Corp. v Bernard, 298 AD2d 249, 250 [2002], appeal after remand 3 AD3d 305 [2004]).

Section 3101(a) does not require disclosure of monthly bank statements that are not material and necessary to the defense.

Altidor v. State-Wide Insurance · filed 2005-10-03(a)

In addition, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff’s monthly bank statements are not material and necessary to the defense of this action (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Manzella v Provident Life & Cas. Co., 273 AD2d 923 [2000]).

Section 3101(a) permits discovery from an insurer’s claim representative when the information is material and necessary to a coverage action.

Gibson v. Encompass Insurance · filed 2005-11-10(a)

We perceive no basis to disturb the determination that defendant’s representative possesses “material and necessary” information regarding the action (CPLR 3101 [a]; see Walsh, 289 AD2d at 843).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of medical records shown to be material and necessary when circumstances warrant it and patient identifying information is redacted.

Seaman v. Wyckoff Heights Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2006-01-17(a)

However, the plaintiff demonstrated that the information in the medical records is “material and necessary” (CPLR 3101 [a]) in the prosecution of the action, and that the circumstances warrant overcoming the privilege and permitting discovery of the records with all identifying patient information appropriately redacted to protect patient confidentiality (see Matter of Hyman v Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 15 NY2d 317 [1965]; Stahl v Rhee, 136 AD2d 539 [1988]; cf. Ramirez v Costagliola, 300 AD2d 559 [2002]; Bordan v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 275 AD2d 335 [2000]).

Section 3101(a) supports a deposition when the testimony sought is likely to help a party prove the case.

Sinosky v. Sinosky · filed 2006-02-03(a)

We conclude that there was a clear abuse of discretion herein because plaintiff has established that the opportunity to depose defendant would likely have assisted him in proving his case (see generally New York County DES Litig., 171 AD2d at 122-123).

Section 3101(a) requires information sought in disclosure to be material and necessary to resolving an issue, under a test of usefulness and reason.

In re the Estate of Nugent · filed 2006-02-03(a)

Proponent’s nonprivileged medical information is not “material and necessary” within the meaning of CPLR 3101 (a) for resolution of that issue, and thus does not pass the test of “usefulness and reason” that is applied in determining whether the information sought is subject to disclosure (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]; see Conrad v Park, 204 AD2d 1011, 1012 [1994]).

CPLR 3101 permits a party to compel discovery material and necessary to its defense.

Primus Automotive Financial Services, Inc. v. Lee · filed 2006-02-14

Moreover, the cross motion to compel discovery was erroneously denied as the discovery sought by the defendants was material and necessary in the defense of the action (see CPLR 3101).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of material and necessary information; a court may deny requests that do not meet that standard.

Casabona v. Huntington Union Free School District · filed 2006-05-16(a)

On this record, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in concluding, inter alia, that the additional discovery sought by the plaintiffs was neither material nor necessary to the prosecution of the claims asserted in the complaint (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Palermo Mason Constr. v Aark Holding Corp., 300 AD2d 460 [2002]).

Section 3101 allows a court to deny palpably improper interrogatories and inspection demands.

Friedler v. Palyompis · filed 2005-12-12(a), (c)

However, Coldwell Banker’s first set of interrogatories and notice for discovery and inspection were palpably improper. Thus, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying Coldwell Banker’s motion with respect to those discovery demands (see CPLR 3101 [a], [c]; Holness v Chrysler Corp., 220 AD2d 721, 722 [1995]; Harris v City of New York, 211 AD2d 663 [1995]; Ritchie v Carvel Corp., 180 AD2d 788 [1992]; Benzenberg v Telecom Plus of Upstate N.Y., 119 AD2d 717 [1986]).

Section 3101(a) requires broad disclosure of material and necessary information, including documents about the alleged defect in products beyond those identical to the product at issue.

Mann v. Cooper Tire Co. · filed 2006-06-01(a)

The scope of disclosure provided by CPLR 3101 ... is generous, broad, and is to be construed liberally. ... Tread separation problems may be present in tires other than those sharing the same green tire specifications, and thus the scope of discovery in this case should include documents relating generally to the tread separation defect or problem.

Section 3101 permits discovery of a medical service corporation’s ownership and licensing information to determine whether it was fraudulently incorporated and eligible for no-fault reimbursement.

Lexington Acupuncture, P.C. v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2006-06-07

We find that defendant’s papers establish that so much of defendant’s discovery requests as seek information regarding ... whether plaintiff was fraudulently incorporated are material and necessary (see CPLR 3101) and, thus, said papers set forth that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot now be stated.

Section 3101(a) limits discovery to information material and necessary to the parties’ claims and defenses; demands concerning an allegedly defective product must be confined to the relevant components.

Mead v. Pentair Pump Group, Inc. · filed 2006-06-15(a)

Thus, we will modify Supreme Court’s order by denying plaintiffs’ motion to compel and granting GE’s cross motion for a protective order unless plaintiffs revise their demands by limiting them to the components of the pump alleged to be defective GE products ... thereby assuring that they seek only information which is material and necessary to their claims against GE and GE’s defenses (see CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101 did not shield information sought for a prohibited self-referral defense where the information was not privileged or palpably improper and the discovery demands drew no timely objection.

Fair Price Medical Supply Corp. v. ELRAC Inc. · filed 2006-07-03

We note that the record is bereft of any indication that plaintiff timely objected to said discovery demands and the information sought to be obtained by defendants was neither privileged under CPLR 3101 nor palpably improper (see Fausto v City of New York, 17 AD3d 520, 522 [2005]; see Marino v County of Nassau, 16 AD3d 628 [2005]; Garcia v Jomber Realty, 264 AD2d 809 [1999]; see generally Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403 [1968]; Shutt v Pooley, 43 AD2d 59 [1973]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of an insurer’s other claims involving the same policy exclusion when its prior interpretation bears directly on an alleged bad-faith refusal to settle.

Diamond State Insurance v. Utica First Insurance · filed 2007-02-01(a)

Disclosure should have been granted with respect to Utica’s other insureds’ claims involving the same policy exclusion, since Utica’s prior interpretation of that exclusion directly reflects on whether its proffered interpretation and its refusal to settle in this case were in bad faith.

Section 3101(a) covers eyewitness accounts in an internal affairs file when they bear on the incident in suit.

Williams v. Suffolk County Sheriff's Department · filed 2007-02-22(a)

The internal affairs file concerning this incident would presumably contain eyewitness accounts of the incident, which would come within the scope of disclosure envisioned by CPLR 3101.

When discovery objections are untimely, review of a demand under CPLR 3101 is limited to whether the material is privileged or the demand is palpably improper.

Coville v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. · filed 2006-06-08

With respect to the two extant discovery issues, because defendants failed to timely object to the demands (see CPLR 3122 [a]; 3133 [a]), this Court’s review “ ‘is limited to determining whether the requested material is privileged under CPLR 3101 or the demand is palpably improper’” (McMahon v Aviette Agency, 301 AD2d 820, 821 [2003], quoting Saratoga Harness Racing v Roemer, 274 AD2d 887, 888 [2000]). So limited, we are constrained to conclude that the ordered material is neither privileged nor palpably improper and thus affirm this aspect of the order.

CPLR 3101(a) requires liberal disclosure of material and necessary information, but courts may deny requests that amount to a fishing expedition.

Auerbach v. Klein · filed 2006-06-13(a)

While the disclosure provisions of the CPLR are ordinarily to be construed liberally, “the scope of permissible discovery is not entirely unlimited and the trial court is invested with broad discretion to supervise discovery and to determine what is ‘material and necessary’ as that phrase is used in CPLR 3101 (a)” (NBT Bancorp v Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 192 AD2d 1032, 1033 [1993]). ... Under the circumstances presented here, where the Supreme Court has been actively involved in managing the case and is intimately familiar with the particularities of the matter, we perceive no basis to disturb its determination that the plaintiff’s discovery requests amounted to nothing more than a fishing expedition (see Latture v Smith, 304 AD2d 534, 536 [2003]).

Section 3101(a) permits discovery only when the information sought is material and necessary to the litigation.

Richbell Information Services, Inc. v. Jupiter Partners L.P. · filed 2006-06-13(a)

First, even if this were a purely domestic dispute, and there were no conflicting foreign law, Jupiter Partners would be entitled to discovery only if the disclosure sought were “material and necessary.” (CPLR 3101 [a].) ... Elias correctly contends that the information sought by Jupiter Partners is neither material nor necessary.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of prenatal and birth medical records when they are material and necessary to the defense.

Lamy v. Pierre · filed 2006-07-18(a)

Since the affidavit of the defendants’ medical expert established that the mother’s medical records relating to the infant’s gestation and birth were material and necessary to the defense of this action (see CPLR 3101 [a]), the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the motion which was for a protective order with respect to those records, and should have granted that branch of the cross motion which was to compel the production of authorizations for the release of those records.

Section 3101 permits discovery about a medical service corporation’s ownership and licensing when that information is material and necessary to determine whether it was fraudulently incorporated.

Midborough Acupuncture P.C. v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2006-07-26

We find that defendant’s papers establish that so much of defendant’s discovery requests as seek information regarding whether plaintiff was fraudulently incorporated are material and necessary (see CPLR 3101) and, thus, defendant’s papers set forth that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot now be stated.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of facts bearing on the controversy that are material and necessary to preparing for trial.

Anonymous v. High School for Environmental Studies · filed 2006-08-31(a)

In the instant case, there can be no dispute that the documents and information sought in the discovery demands at issue are material and necessary to the fair resolution of this action.

Section 3101(a) permits discovery into a medical provider’s alleged fraudulent incorporation because that issue is material and necessary to an insurer’s defense.

Carothers v. Insurance Companies · filed 2006-09-21(a)

Accordingly, discovery on the issue of fraudulent incorporation is “material and necessary” within the meaning of CPLR 3101 (a).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of information about medical personnel available for consultation when it is material and necessary to a malpractice claim alleging failure to obtain proper consultations.

Parise v. Good Samaritan Hospital · filed 2007-01-16(a)

The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was to compel the defendant to produce records identifying the attending physicians, service attendings, specialists, doctors, and employees who were available for consultation during the time of her admission in the emergency room because that information is material and necessary to the claim in her verified bill of particulars that the defendant failed to obtain proper consultations.

Section 3101(a) requires a party seeking disclosure to show that the requested evidence is material and relevant to the action.

Beckles v. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center · filed 2007-01-23(a)

Under these circumstances, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the documents she sought were indeed material and relevant to the prosecution of this action, and the court should not have ordered the disclosure.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of documents material and necessary to a party’s claim or defense.

Kingston v. Breslin · filed 2007-03-13(a)

The Judicial Hearing Officer (hereinafter the JHO) appointed by the Supreme Court to supervise discovery as a referee (see CPLR 3104) providently exercised his discretion in determining, inter alia, that certain documents sought by the defendants Michael Breslin, John Breslin, Ave. Woodward Corp., and 2 Ave. Woodward Corp. (hereinafter the defendants) were not “material and necessary” to their defense of this action, or to the prosecution of their counterclaim alleging tortious interference with prospective economic advantage (CPLR 3101 [a]; see Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]; Arosa v Hilton Hotels Corp., 178 AD2d 573, 573-574 [1991]).

Section 3101(a) gives courts broad discretion to decide what disclosure is material and necessary.

Cain v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2007-03-16(a)

The court is vested with broad discretion to supervise discovery and to determine what disclosure is material and necessary (see Gibson v Encompass Ins. Co., 23 AD3d 1047 [2005]; NBT Bancorp v Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 192 AD2d 1032, 1033 [1993]; see generally CPLR 3101 [a]).

Unsubstantiated hearsay statements by counsel are insufficient to compel production of records under CPLR 3101(a).

Faulkner v. City of New York · filed 2006-08-15(a)

The unsubstantiated and hearsay statements of the plaintiffs counsel were insufficient to warrant the production of an employee of the New York City Fire Department for a deposition ... or New York City Fire Department records (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Chervin v Macura, 28 AD3d 600 [2006]; Crazytown Furniture v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 150 AD2d 420, 421 [1989]).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary matters, and the party seeking disclosure must show how the requested materials are relevant to the issues in the case.

People v. Pharmacia Corp. · filed 2007-04-26(a)

While CPLR article 31 mandates “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (CPLR 3101 [a]), the party seeking disclosure must demonstrate how the requested materials are relevant to issues in the matter (see e.g. Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406-407 [1968]; Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d 417, 418 [2004]). We are not persuaded that respondents have done so here.

CPLR 3101 permits disclosure of evidence material and necessary to prosecuting or defending an action, construed liberally to include facts that help clarify the dispute.

Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Cafaro · filed 2007-07-12

Moreover, defendant’s motion to compel certain discovery should have been granted. Disclosure should be permitted for all evidence “material and necessary” to the prosecution or defense of an action (CPLR 3101).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of all matter material and necessary to prosecuting or defending an action.

Alpha Funding Group, Inc. v. Continental Funding, LLC · filed 2007-10-23(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) sets forth the criterion for disclosure under the CPLR, requiring “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”

Section 3101 permits follow-up deposition questions seeking matter material and necessary to prosecuting an action.

Davenport v. Stein · filed 2007-11-08

We further modify the order to permit additional follow-up questions on the same inquiries depending on the answers given. Straight-jacketing petitioner to the allowable questions propounded in advance cannot be justified on the ground that any additional inquiries would only trigger further motion practice. Petitioner is entitled to full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution of his action (CPLR 3101) or that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (Mass Rules Civ Pro rule 26 [b] [1]).

Section 3101(a) requires broad disclosure of material and necessary evidence, judged by usefulness and reason.

In re Estate of Poldrugovaz · filed 2008-02-05(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) mandates “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” and is to be liberally construed to accomplish that purpose (see Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]). “The test is one of usefulness and reason” (id.).

CPLR 3101(a) permits discovery of prior and subsequent injuries when they are material to defending a claim for injury damages.

Rega v. Avon Products, Inc. · filed 2008-03-11(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) calls for “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof.” ... Here, the evidence sought by Avon and Pitney Bowes regarding plaintiffs prior and subsequent injuries was material for defense of the action.

Section 3101(a) permits a court to limit disclosure to information material and necessary to a party’s prosecution of the action, including information needed to interpret previously produced data.

Feldman v. New York State Bridge Authority · filed 2007-05-17(a)

Having determined that “unusual or unanticipated circumstances” developed subsequent to the filing of the note of issue (see 22 NYCRR 202.21 [d]; see also Audiovox Corp. v Benyamini, 265 AD2d 135, 138 [2000]), the court acted well within its discretion in concluding, at this juncture, that this specific additional information was the only information that was “material and necessary” to plaintiffs’ prosecution of this action (CPLR 3101 [a]; see Walsh v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 289 AD2d 842, 843 [2001]).

Section 3101(a) permits discovery of electronic billing and agreement records that bear on the authenticity of a disputed agreement.

In re the Estate of Maura · filed 2007-06-28(a)

The only items remaining, therefore, are respondent’s requests for access to the computer system to copy all billing records relating to the prenuptial agreement and all existing and deleted records concerning the prenuptial agreement. The court finds that such information is “material and necessary” to the prosecution of the action as such information has a bearing on the issue of the authenticity of the agreement.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of information that is material and necessary to an action, a standard interpreted liberally to mean relevant information.

Morano v. Slattery Skanska, Inc. · filed 2007-11-28(a)

The standard to be applied in determining the discoverability of the requested cell phone records is whether they are “material and necessary” in the prosecution or defense of this action, which is to be interpreted liberally, and really amounts to whether they are relevant (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Allen v Crowell Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406-407 [1968]).

CPLR 3101(a) requires disclosure subject to usefulness and reason; documents that are neither material nor necessary to the action need not be produced.

Reyes v. Riverside Park Community · filed 2008-01-31(a)

The full disclosure requirement of CPLR 3101 (a) is subject to a test of “usefulness and reason” ... and the documents sought by plaintiff, ... including, inter alia, the operating budget of the building in which plaintiffs minor daughter was attacked and the contract that the building had with a prior security company, are neither material nor necessary to this action.

Section 3101(a) treats legal advice concerning disputed transactions as material and necessary to a defense even if it may not be admissible at trial.

People v. Greenberg · filed 2008-02-19(a)

Even if we assume for the sake of argument that plaintiffs are correct on this point, documents reflecting the legal advice AIG received concerning the very transactions under attack plainly constitute “matter material and necessary” to the defense of this action under CPLR 3101 (a), a category long held to be broader than that of evidence admissible at trial (see Siegel, NY Prac § 344, at 550 [4th ed]).

Section 3101(a) requires deposition testimony to be material and necessary to the action.

Smith v. City of New York · filed 2008-03-18(a)

Plaintiff failed to establish that the ADA’s deposition testimony as to her motives for charging plaintiff with possession of a forged instrument in an underlying criminal action, and instructing the grand jury in the way she did, is “material and necessary” to this malicious prosecution action against the City (CPLR 3101 [a]; see generally Blittner v Berg & Dorf, 138 AD2d 439 [1988]).

Section 3101(a) requires requested records to be material and necessary to the action before they may be disclosed.

Napoli v. Crovello · filed 2008-03-18(a)

Dr. Kanner failed to establish that the records she sought to discover were material and necessary to the defense of this action (see CPLR 3101 [a]; McLane v Damiano, 307 AD2d 338 [2003]).

Section 3101(a) does not require disclosure of a shared computer hard drive when it cannot show the plaintiff’s use relevant to employability.

Karim v. Natural Stone Industries, Inc. · filed 2008-01-18(a)

When discovery which is sought is relevant and material, pursuant to CPLR 3101 (a), and not subject to claims of privilege, pursuant to CPLR 3103 (a), disclosure is proper and should be permitted. In the instant case, the computer hard drive is not relevant and material to plaintiffs ability to return to employment. Given the computer’s access by several members of plaintiffs household, it would not be possible for third-party defendant to discern plaintiffs computer usage beyond the use plaintiff testified to at the deposition.

Section 3101 allows a party to obtain material and necessary disclosure without first proving the claim.

Vogel v. Tunick · filed 2008-03-14(a)

The plaintiffs need not prove their claim in order to be entitled to disclosure under CPLR 3101.

Section 3101 provides for broad disclosure of material relevant to a claim or defense.

Johnson v. Association for the Advancement of the Blind & Retarded · filed 2008-07-08

“The scope of disclosure provided by CPLR 3101 is generous, broad, and is to be construed liberally.”

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of financial documents material and necessary to prosecuting an action without a showing of good cause.

One Beacon Insurance Group, LLC v. Midland Medical Care, P.C. · filed 2008-09-09(a)

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the plaintiffs were not required to make a showing of “good cause” for such disclosure ... as the documents were “material and necessary in the prosecution” of this action (see CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) requires full disclosure of evidence material and necessary to prosecuting or defending an action, including relevant documents unless they are protected from discovery.

Miller v. City of New York · filed 2008-10-02(a)

The CPLR defines the scope of discovery, and provides for full disclosure of all evidence necessary and material in prosecution and defense of an action (CPLR 3101 [a]). Trial courts liberally interpret the words “necessary” and “material” in the statutory language to permit discovery of any facts and documents pertaining to the controversy in issue that will assist a party in its preparation for trial, providing the documents sought are not protected from discovery (see Polygram Holding, Inc. v Cafaro, 42 AD3d 339, 340-341 [1st Dept 2007]; see also Anonymous, 32 AD3d at 358).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of information that may bear on the dispute or lead to relevant information.

MD Imaging, P.C. v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co. · filed 2008-10-31(a)

In this court’s opinion, the information the plaintiff seeks to obtain, at the very least, may lead to relevant information that bears on the controversy in question. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to disclosure of this information.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of material and necessary facts, including through depositions reasonably calculated to reveal facts needed to prosecute a claim.

Friel v. Papa · filed 2008-11-18(a)

Pursuant to CPLR 3101 (a), “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” is required.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of an item when the issue it addresses is material and necessary to the defense.

Aloise v. Saulo · filed 2008-05-20(a)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in requiring the plaintiff to produce, at a further deposition, the nail gun that allegedly caused his injuries (see CPLR 3111), as the record demonstrates that the issue of how the nail gun was used during the accident is “material and necessary” to the defense of the action (CPLR 3101 [a]; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]).

Section 3101(a) permits sampling and testing when it is material and necessary to a party’s defense.

Town of Eastchester v. Shawn's Lawns, Inc. · filed 2008-05-20(a)

The respondents made a sufficient showing that such sampling and testing was material and necessary to their defense of the action (see CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(i) can require pretrial disclosure of surveillance material in a custody dispute when the need to verify its accuracy outweighs the harm disclosure might cause.

M.C. v. R.C. · filed 2008-05-20(i)

The husband shall be entitled to discovery of the surveillance material at issue herein as is required pursuant to CPLR 3101 (i).

CPLR 3101(a) gives trial courts broad discretion to determine what disclosure is material and necessary.

DeLeon v. State of New York · filed 2008-06-06(a)

“While disclosure provisions are to be liberally construed, the trial court is vested with broad discretion to supervise discovery and determine what is ‘material and necessary’ under CPLR 3101 (a)” (Mora v RGB, Inc., 17 AD3d 849, 851 [2005]). Here, there has been no showing of the requisite “ ‘clear abuse of discretion [to] prompt appellate action’ ” with respect to claimant’s disclosure requests (Community Dev. Assn. v Warren-Hoffman & Assoc., 4 AD3d 755 [2004]).

Section 3101(a) requires the court to determine whether requested documents are material and necessary to prosecuting the action.

Chardavoyne v. Cohen · filed 2008-11-12(a)

The Supreme Court should have conducted an in camera inspection of the documents responsive to the plaintiffs request to enable it to determine which of the documents, or portions thereof, if any, are entitled to the statutory privileges ... and, furthermore, whether they are “material and necessary” to the prosecution of this action under CPLR 3101 (a).

Section 3101(a) permits a deposition when the testimony is material and necessary to the action.

Warner v. City of New York · filed 2008-12-16(a)

The record establishes that Crowe’s testimony is material and necessary, and the defendants failed to demonstrate that the deposition of Crowe would prejudice them (see CPLR 3101 [a]; 3103 [a]).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to a claim or defense; the adoptive owner's identity was not material and necessary to this claim.

Feger v. Warwick Animal Shelter · filed 2008-12-23(a)

While CPLR 3101 (a) requires “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,” CPLR 3103 (a) authorizes the court to “make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device.” ... The record fails to demonstrate that the identity of the adoptive owner was material and necessary to the plaintiffs claim.

CPLR 3101(a) does not require a party to provide a trial transcript equally available to both parties; the party seeking it must obtain it.

Kane v. Shapiro, Rosenbaum, Liebschutz, & Nelson, L.L.P. · filed 2008-12-31(a)

In addition, the portion of the trial transcript sought by plaintiff is equally available to both parties, and plaintiff has the responsibility to obtain it if he believes that it is necessary to his defense of the counterclaim (see generally CPLR 3101 [a]; Rios v Donovan, 21 AD2d 409, 411 [1964]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of shareholder information when it is material and necessary to determine stock values.

Trimarco v. Data Treasury Corp. · filed 2009-02-17(a)

Parties are entitled to disclosure of all matter “material and necessary” to prosecution of the action (CPLR 3101 [a]; see Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]; Chaudhry v Abadir, 261 AD2d 497 [1999]). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiffs motion which sought certain shareholder information in order to determine stock values (see Chaudhry v Abadir, 261 AD2d 497, 498 [1999]; LoVerde v Interex Design & Equip. Corp., 54 AD2d 1090 [1976]).

Section 3101 limits disclosure to information relevant to the claim; interrogatories seeking unrelated information may be struck.

Jefferson v. State · filed 2009-03-19

When a party fails to timely object to interrogatories, “appellate review is limited to determining whether the requested material is privileged under CPLR 3101 or the demand is palpably improper” (Saratoga Harness Racing v Roemer, 274 AD2d 887, 888 [2000]; see Coville v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 30 AD3d 744, 745 [2006]; McMahon v Aviette Agency, 301 AD2d 820, 821 [2003]; see also Alford v Progressive Equity Funding Corp., 144 AD2d 756, 757 [1988]). ... Review of the interrogatories struck by the Court of Claims demonstrates that they are either vague and indefinite, or irrelevant to the extent that they seek information related to events that occurred at other correctional facilities and subsequent to the alleged identity theft (see Saratoga Harness Racing v Roemer, 274 AD2d at 889; Slate v State of New York, 267 AD2d 839, 841 [1999]; Alford v Progressive Equity Funding Corp., 144 AD2d at 757; cf. Coville v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 30 AD3d at 745).

Section 3101(a) covers deposition questions seeking information material and necessary to a party’s defense.

Parker v. Ollivierre · filed 2009-03-31(a)

The questions were designed to elicit information which was material and necessary to the appellant’s defense of this action (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406-407 [1968]), and the directions not to answer them were not otherwise authorized by 22 NYCRR 221.2.

Section 3101(a) requires liberal disclosure of facts bearing on a controversy when they are material and necessary to a defense.

Rivera v. NYP Holdings Inc. · filed 2009-06-09(a)

Full disclosure is required of “all matter material and necessary” to the defense of an action (CPLR 3101 [a]), and the words “material and necessary” are “to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure ... of any facts bearing on the controversy” (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of material and necessary information relevant to valuing a plaintiff’s contributions, but does not extend to later profits irrelevant to that valuation.

Davis v. CornerStone Telephone Co. · filed 2009-09-18(a)

Plaintiff is, of course, entitled to “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution ... of [his] action” (CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure despite substantial expense unless the burden becomes inordinate.

Insurace v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2010-01-14(a)

Requests should be tapered or rejected, however, only when that imposition becomes inordinate, which Countrywide has not shown. In the absence of persuasive reasons from Countrywide against disclosure, this portion of MBIA’s application is granted.

Section 3101(a) permits a court to deny discovery that is neither material nor necessary.

Constantino v. Dock's Clam Bar & Pasta House · filed 2009-03-03(a)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in concluding, inter alia, that the additional discovery sought by the appellants was neither material nor necessary (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Youngquist v Youngquist, 44 AD3d 1034, 1035 [2007]; Auerbach v Klein, 30 AD3d 451, 452 [2006]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of financial records needed to verify claimed costs, but does not require financial statements when their additional relevance is speculative.

T.A. Ahern Contractors Corp. v. Dormitory Authority · filed 2009-03-19(a)

Turning first to DASNY’s demands for the general ledgers, financial statements, and copies of cancelled checks, the court finds that DASNY is entitled to the general ledgers and cancelled checks, but not to copies of Ahern’s financial statements.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of device records when evidence makes their use relevant to a negligence claim.

Detraglia v. Grant · filed 2009-12-10(a)

This conflicting evidence raised questions as to whether Grant used any technological devices while driving, rendering the records relevant to the question of his negligence.

CPLR 3101(a) excludes information about acts outside the period for which the plaintiff may recover because that information is not material and necessary to the action.

Lee v. Luk · filed 2009-12-15(a)

Thus, information regarding Luk’s acts before August 30, 1999 is not “material and necessary in the prosecution ... of [the] action” (CPLR 3101 [a]; see Nasco, N. Atl. Steel Co. v Da Silva, 167 AD2d 149 [1990]; Matos v City of New York, 78 AD2d 834 [1980]).

Section 3101(a) requires a party seeking disclosure to show that the requested materials are material and necessary to a claim or defense.

Aaron v. Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg & Griffin, P.C. · filed 2010-01-14(a)

As Aaron has failed to demonstrate that these materials are in any way material and necessary to proving a claim of legal malpractice (see AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428, 434 [2007]) or to defending against PSGG’s claims for counsel fees, the motion to compel must be denied (see CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101 (a) gives trial courts broad discretion to decide what discovery is material and necessary, subject to appellate review for a clear abuse of discretion.

Learned v. Faxton-St. Luke's Healthcare · filed 2010-02-11(a)

“Supreme Court is invested with broad discretion to supervise discovery and to determine what is material and necessary as that phrase is used in CPLR 3101 (a) . . . , and only a clear abuse of discretion will prompt appellate action” (Community Dev. Assn. v Warren-Hoffman & Assoc., 4 AD3d 755 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]). We perceive no such clear abuse of discretion here.

Section 3101(a) requires a showing that requested bank records are material and necessary to a claim or defense.

Gitlin v. Chirinkin · filed 2010-03-09(a)

Moreover, the appellants failed to demonstrate that the plaintiffs bank records were material and necessary to their defense or counterclaim (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Auerbach v Klein, 30 AD3d 451 [2006]).

Section 3101 permits denial of a motion to compel discovery when the movant fails to show that the discovery would lead to relevant evidence.

J.J. Cassone Bakery, Inc. v. Neri's Land Improvement, LLC · filed 2009-09-29

Moreover, contrary to Neri’s contention, Cassone’s cross motion for summary judgment was not premature, inasmuch as Neri failed to demonstrate that discovery would lead to relevant evidence ... For that same reason, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Neri’s motion which was to compel discovery (see CPLR 3101).

Section 3101 governs civil disclosure, including protections for privileged communications, attorney work product, and materials prepared in anticipation of litigation.

Maggio v. RTI Donor Services, Inc. · filed 2010-05-04

Upon our in camera inspection of the documents at issue on appeal, and upon application of the relevant law pertaining to civil disclosure in general (see CPLR 3101 [a]), the attorney-client privilege (see CPLR 3101 [b]; 4503 [a]), the work-product doctrine (see CPLR 3101 [c]), materials prepared in anticipation of litigation (see CPLR 3101 [d]), and grand jury secrecy (see CPL 190.25 [4] [a]), we find that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion ... but providently exercised its discretion in granting those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were to compel discovery of the remaining documents at issue and in denying those branches of the cross motion which were for a protective order with respect to those documents (see D’Ambrosio v 85 Crystal Run Co., 37 AD3d 757, 757 [2007]).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of information material and necessary to a proceeding, judged by its usefulness to trial preparation.

Wendy's Restaurants, LLC v. Assessor · filed 2010-06-18(a)

When leave of court for requested discovery is given pursuant to CPLR 408, such “discovery takes place pursuant to CPLR 3101 (a), which provides generally that [t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action [or proceeding]. ... The test is one of usefulness and reason” (Town of Pleasant Val., 253 AD2d at 15-16 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Allen v CrowellCollier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406-407 [1968]). ... We conclude that respondents established that the information sought in their motion will assist them in their preparation for trial (see Matter of Norton Co. v Assessor of City of Watervliet, 3 AD3d 760, 761-762 [2004]; Matter of Farone & Son v Srogi, 96 AD2d 711 [1983], lv denied 60 NY2d 556 [1983]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of matters material and necessary to an action, with the court assessing usefulness and reason.

Akalski v. Counsell · filed 2010-09-21(a)

Article 31 of the CPLR permits liberal discovery of all matters that are material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action (CPLR 3101 [a]). The determination of what is “material and necessary” is within the sound discretion of the court, using usefulness and reason as its guide (Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 NY2d 740 [2000]).

Section 3101(a) permits denial of a request to compel documents when the requester fails to show that access would lead to admissible or relevant evidence.

Pelaez v. Seide · filed 2010-11-03(a)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the appellants’ motion which was to compel the production of certain documents filed in the divorce proceeding of the defendant Peter Glass, as they failed to demonstrate that access to those documents would result in the discovery of admissible or relevant evidence (see CPLR 3101 [a]; DeStrange v Lind, 277 AD2d 344, 345 [2000]).

Section 3101(a) permits courts to limit disclosure to material relevant to the claims still at issue.

Davis v. Cornerstone Telephone Co. · filed 2010-11-04(a)

Inasmuch as plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations from seeking recovery for any services provided prior to August 28, 2001, and he concedes that he had no dealings with defendants beyond 2001, Supreme Court properly limited plaintiffs demands to this time period on the ground that his recovery for unjust enrichment is limited to “the reasonable value of the services rendered by the plaintiff” (Collins Tuttle & Co. v Leucadia, Inc., 153 AD2d 526, 527 [1989]; see Snyder v Bronfman, 13 NY3d 504, 508 [2009]; IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 142 [2009]; Giordano v Thomson, 564 F3d 163, 170 [2009]).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to an action, but does not entitle a party to unrestricted discovery.

Peluso v. Red Rose Restaurant, Inc. · filed 2010-11-09(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) requires, in pertinent part, “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” ... Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ cross motion to compel certain additional discovery (see Spodek v Neiss, 70 AD3d 810 [2010]).

CPLR 3101(a) is interpreted liberally in favor of disclosure of material and necessary documents, subject to consideration of any special burden on the producing party.

M&T Bank Corp. v. Gemstone CDO VII, Ltd. · filed 2010-11-19(a)

Contrary to the contention of DBSI, the court neither abused nor improvidently exercised its discretion in directing DBSI to provide plaintiff with copies of the documents in question, particularly in view of the fact that CPLR 3101 (a) is to be interpreted liberally in favor of disclosure (see generally Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 NY2d 740, 745-746 [2000]).

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure for a requested period when the records are material and necessary to the defense.

Rampersant v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2010-03-23(a)

By submitting the plaintiff’s application for insurance dated August 7, 2005, the defendant demonstrated that the disclosure sought for the time period between August 1, 2005, and December 31, 2005, was material and necessary to the defense of this action (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Insurance Law § 3105 [a]; Cain v United Ins. Co., 232 SC 397, 401, 102 SE2d 360, 361 [1958]; Barkan v New York Schools Ins. Reciprocal, 65 AD3d 1061, 1064 [2009]; Tannenbaum v Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Phila., 53 AD2d 86 [1976], affd 41 NY2d 1087 [1977]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of material relevant to disputed issues in an action.

JRP Old Riverhead Ltd. v. Town of Southampton · filed 2010-05-25(a)

Such material may be relevant to determining what Town officials knew and when they knew it, a determination which bears upon the issues of ratification and estoppel in this action (see JRP Old Riverhead Ltd. v Town of Southampton, 44 AD3d at 910). Therefore, such material is properly subject to disclosure (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Kaplan v Herhstein, 175 AD2d 200 [1991]).

CPLR 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action.

Foster v. Herbert Slepoy Corp. · filed 2010-06-22(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) requires “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”

Section 3101(a) does not require disclosure of information that is no longer material and necessary after the claims to which it relates are dismissed.

Casa De Meadows Inc. (Cayman Islands) v. Zaman · filed 2010-09-28(a)

Given the dismissal of defendants’ defamation and malicious prosecution claims, some of the information they seek ... is no longer “material and necessary” (CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of facts bearing on the controversy that will help prepare for trial, while allowing unrelated information to be withheld.

Batra v. Wolf · filed 2010-09-28(a)

The standard allowing disclosure of “all matter material and necessary” (CPLR 3101 [a]) is by those terms broad and to be “interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity.”

Section 3101(a) requires requested disclosure to be material and necessary to the action.

Humphrey v. Kulbaski · filed 2010-11-09(a)

The plaintiffs failed to satisfy the threshold requirement that the disclosure sought is “material and necessary” in their prosecution of the action (CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) permits a court to deny a second inspection of an accident site when an earlier inspection was completed and the site has since changed.

Mironer v. City of New York · filed 2010-12-28(a)

Although CPLR 3101 (a) provides for “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,” unlimited disclosure is not required, and supervision of disclosure is generally left to the Supreme Court’s broad discretion (see Palermo Mason Constr. v Aark Holding Corp., 300 AD2d 460, 461 [2002]; Silcox v City of New York, 233 AD2d 494 [1996]).

Section 3101(a) permits a court to limit disclosure and deny a request to impound, clone, and inspect an opposing party’s computer equipment.

Buxbaum v. Castro · filed 2011-03-15(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) requires, in pertinent part, “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” ... Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was to direct the defendant to permit him and/or his “authorized computer forensic experts” to “impound, clone and inspect” certain computer equipment, including hard drives and other digital data storage devices, possessed by the defendant (see Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d at 531).

CPLR 3101(a) does not require disclosure about an insurer’s defense or possible indemnification when that information is irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to material and necessary evidence.

Eaton v. Hungerford · filed 2010-12-30(a)

We agree with the court that such discovery is irrelevant to any issues in this action, and that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to evidence “material and necessary” to the prosecution of the action (CPLR 3101 [a]; see generally Van Horn v Thompson & Johnson Equip. Co., 291 AD2d 885, 885-886 [2002]).

CPLR 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to prosecuting or defending an action.

JFK Family Ltd. Partnership v. Millbrae Natural Gas Development Fund 2005, L.P. · filed 2011-04-19(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) requires, in pertinent part, “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of matter material and necessary to an action; a person seeking to quash a subpoena must show that the requested materials are utterly irrelevant.

Ledonne v. Orsid Realty Corp. · filed 2011-04-26(a)

The court properly exercised its discretion in determining, upon review of all the facts, that the nonparties had not shown that the surveillance materials sought are utterly irrelevant to plaintiffs’ claims, brought derivatively on behalf of the cooperative corporation, which allege that defendant, while employed as managing agent for the corporation, acted for the sole benefit of the nonparties and allowed corporate resources and assets to be used for the nonparties’ benefit.

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of relevant medical records when the patient has waived the applicable privilege.

Salazar v. 521-533 West 57th Street Condominium · filed 2011-05-10(a)

Schindler was, however, entitled to disclosure of the records relating to Salazar’s treatment for seizures, inasmuch as the records are relevant and Salazar waived his privilege with respect to them (see CPLR 3101 [a]; 4504).

Section 3101(a) provides for disclosure of material and necessary information, but a court may limit discovery when the remaining issues are narrow.

Congel v. Malfitano · filed 2011-05-24(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) provides for, inter alia, “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” ... Given that the remaining issues to be resolved in this matter are narrow (see Partnership Law § 69 [2] [c] [II]), the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting the scope of discovery and providing for an expedited discovery schedule.

Section 3101(a) limits disclosure to material and necessary information; courts may reject demands concerning defects irrelevant to the action.

Markel Insurance v. Fuel · filed 2011-11-03(a)

The dryers at the camp here had been installed only a short time prior to the fire. As they could not have sustained this type of repetitive wear, disclosure on that issue was irrelevant and unnecessary.

Section 3101(a) requires a showing that requested discovery is material and necessary.

Abrams v. Pecile · filed 2011-04-19(a)

Nor has defendant shown that broad discovery concerning plaintiffs finances, education, immigration status, and educational background is “material and necessary” (CPLR 3101 [a]).

Section 3101(a) permits questions about a prior accident when they are reasonably calculated to lead to evidence material and necessary to the defense.

Mayer v. Hoang · filed 2011-04-29(a)

Further, plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the fall, he injured his back, hip, groin, pelvis, and elbow, areas that are commonly injured in motor vehicle accidents, and thus the question was reasonably calculated to lead to evidence that is “material and necessary” to the defense of the action (CPLR 3101 [a]; see generally Orlando v Richmond Precast, Inc., 53 AD3d 534 [2008]; Rega v Avon Prods., Inc., 49 AD3d 329, 330 [2008]).

Section 3101(a) permits disclosure of health insurance records that may lead to relevant medical evidence even when the plaintiff does not seek medical expenses.

GOETCHIUS, JOYCE A. v. SPAVENTO, M.D., PERRY J. · filed 2011-05-06(a)

We conclude at the outset that, although plaintiff is not seeking damages for medical expenses incurred on behalf of decedent, the records from decedent’s health insurance carrier are nevertheless “material and necessary” to the defense of this action (CPLR 3101 [a]), inasmuch as they may ... contain information “reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence” (Grieco v Kaleida Health [appeal No. 2], 79 AD3d 1764, 1765).