N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101

Section 3101(a)(4) permits disclosure from a nonparty when the information sought is material and necessary to a party’s liability or damages claims.

Cyberbit, Inc. v. Cloud Range Cyber, LLC · filed 2025-01-06(a)(4)

Under CPLR 3101 (a)(4), a party may seek all matter “material and necessary” from non-parties in an action. ... The discovery sought is “material and necessary” to both the theories of liability and also the plaintiff’s damages. As such, the motion is denied.

Section 3101(a)(4) requires a subpoena seeking disclosure from a nonparty to state the circumstances or reasons for the request.

CK Opportunities Fund I, L.P. v. Morgan Stanley Senior Funding, Inc. · filed 2024-10-31(a)(4)

CPLR 3101(a)(4) provides that when serving a subpoena on a nonparty, the subpoenaing party is required to sufficiently state the “circumstances or reasons such disclosure is sought or required.”

A nonparty subpoena can satisfy the requirement to state the reasons for disclosure by incorporating the complaint by reference.

Lipari v. Zigman · filed 2025-01-21(a)(4)

And this court agrees with plaintiff that the subpoena's incorporation-by-reference of the complaint provided a sufficient description of reasons for seeking the information.

Section 3101(a)(4) requires a party seeking nonparty disclosure to show that its request is reasonably calculated to yield information material and necessary to the case.

Matter of Newsmax Media, Inc. v. Catsimatidis · filed 2025-03-03(a)(4)

However, the party that seeks the discovery has the "threshold requirement" of showing "that the request is reasonably calculated to yield information that is 'material and necessary' - i.e., relevant ... " to the underlying case (Forman, 30 NY3d at 661, quoting CPLR § 3101 [a] [4]).

Section 3101(a)(4) entitles a party to third-party discovery relevant to the prosecution or defense of the action.

NG Crown 20 E. 46th St. LLC v. 18-20/22 E. 46th St. L.L.C. · filed 2025-01-31(a)(4)

Even if this were not the case, and/or additional third-party discovery is needed, the defendant is entitled to all third-party discovery “relevant to the prosecution or defense of [this] action” (Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d 32 [2014]; CPLR § 3101 [a][4].

Section 3101(a)(1)'s notice requirement for a nonparty deposition can be satisfied by attaching a complaint that gives the witness sufficient notice of why disclosure is sought, even if it does not name the witness.

CK Opportunities Fund I, L.P. v. Morgan Stanley Senior Funding, Inc. · filed 2025-03-27(a)(1)

The subpoena to depose Edens satisfies the notice requirements under CPLR 3101(a)(1) because it was accompanied by a copy of the complaint ( see Matter of Kapon v Koch , 23 NY3d 32, 39 [2014]). Although the complaint did not identify Edens by name, Fortress, the manager of private equity funds that own defendant Brightline Holdings LLC, concedes that Edens is, in fact, the individual referenced in paragraphs 81 and 82 of the complaint. ... Thus, the record establishes that Edens had sufficient notice of the "circumstances or reasons [the] disclosure [wa]s sought or required" ( Velez v Hunts Point Multi-Serv. Ctr., Inc. , 29 AD3d 104, 105 [1st Dept 2006]; see Matter of Kapon v Koch , 23 NY3d 32, 39 [2014]).

Section 3101(a)(4) permits nonparty disclosure when the information sought is relevant to a proper inquiry; overbroad subpoena demands may be narrowed without quashing the subpoenas.

Sawyer v. 1120 Fifth Ave. Corp. · filed 2025-05-13(a)(4)

The motion court providently exercised its discretion in denying appellants' motion to quash the nonparty subpoenas ( see CPLR 3101[a][4]; Matter of Kapon v Koch , 23 NY3d 32, 38 [2014]). The court properly found that the information sought in the subpoenas was "not utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry" ( Kapon , 23 NY3d at 38 [internal quotation marks omitted]), while finding some of the requests to be overbroad. Thus, rather than quash the subpoenas outright, the court directed the parties to meet and confer in an effort to narrow the scope of them.

A subpoena satisfies CPLR 3101(a)(1)'s minimal notice requirement when it and its accompanying materials give the witness enough information to challenge it.

Matter of Anheuser-Busch in Bev SA/NV v. BBSR, LLC · filed 2025-06-03(a)(1)

The subpoena to depose Marcondes, Anheuser InBev's chief marketing officer, with its accompanying document demand and related correspondence satisfies the minimal notice requirements under CPLR 3101(a)(1) and provided Marcondes with sufficient information to challenge the subpoena ( see Matter of Kapon v Koch , 23 NY3d 32, 39 [2014]).

Section 3101(a)(4) requires a subpoena to a nonparty to state the circumstances or reasons why disclosure is sought or required.

Dordi v. Shah · filed 2025-06-30(a)(4)

Defendant’s motion to quash a subpoena served by plaintiff on Google, Inc. is granted, as the subpoena fails to comply with CPLR 3101(a)(4) (Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d 32 [2014] [subpoena addressed to nonparty must provide circumstances or reasons why disclosure is sought or required]).

Section 3101(a)(4) requires a nonparty subpoena to provide enough information for a party to challenge it.

Malekan v. Malekan · filed 2025-10-21(a)(4)

The subpoenas seeking documents from the nonparty bank and accountant satisfied the minimal notice requirements under CPLR 3101(a)(4) by providing defendants with sufficient information to challenge the subpoenas ( see Matter of Kapon v Koch , 23 NY3d 32, 39 [2014]).

Section 3101(a)(4) requires a nonparty subpoena to state the circumstances or reasons for seeking testimony.

Matter of Icahn Partners LP v. AllianceBernstein L.P. · filed 2025-11-06(a)(4)

The subpoena gave "the circumstances or reasons" for the testimony sought (CPLR 3101[a][4]) and "describe[d]" the "matters upon which the person is to be examined . . . with reasonable particularity" (Uniform Rules for the Trial Cts [22 NYCRR] § 202.20-d[b]; see Nev R Civ P 30[b][6]).

Section 3101(a)(4) requires a nonparty subpoena or accompanying notice to state why disclosure is sought; a subpoena lacking that notice must be quashed even if the nonparty has not shown that the requested disclosure is irrelevant or futile.

Ruppert v. Ruppert · filed 2025-12-10(a)(4)

Here, the subpoenas were defective, since neither the subpoenas nor any accompanying documents set forth "the circumstances or reasons [the] disclosure is sought or required" (CPLR 3101[a][4]; see Capacity Group of NY, LLC v Duni , 186 AD3d 1482, 1484; Gandham v Gandham , 170 AD3d 964, 966). Thus, the Supreme Court should have granted Daniel's motion to quash the subpoenas, irrespective of whether Daniel established that the requested disclosure was utterly irrelevant to the action or that the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate was inevitable or obvious ( see Gandham v Gandham , 170 AD3d at 966).

Section 3101(a) permits a party to obtain material and necessary discovery from a nonparty when the nonparty is told why the disclosure is sought.

Frenkel v. 532 Neptune Residential, LLC · filed 2025-08-06(a)

Pursuant to CPLR 3101(a), a party may obtain discovery from a nonparty of "matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action," as long as the nonparty is apprised of the reasons such disclosure is sought ( see Elavon, Inc. v Meyer , 203 AD3d 1030, 1031). ... Here, it is undisputed that the defendant satisfied the notice requirement.

Section 3101(a)(4) permits disclosure from a nonparty with material and necessary evidence when the nonparty is told why disclosure is required.

Castellano v. Estrada · filed 2025-08-06(a)(4)

"Pursuant to CPLR 3101(a)(4), a party may obtain discovery from a nonparty in possession of material and necessary evidence, so long as the nonparty is apprised of the circumstances or reasons requiring disclosure" ( Cioffi v S.M. Foods, Inc. , 178 AD3d 1003, 1005; see Coads v Nassau County , 231 AD3d 906, 908). ... Here, in support of their motion, the nonparties established that the subpoenas sought information that was irrelevant to any proper inquiry ( see Lurie v Lurie , 226 AD3d 992, 996), and, in opposition, the plaintiff failed to establish that the requested disclosure was material and necessary to the prosecution of this action ( see U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Carter , 204 AD3d at 730; Humphrey v Kulbaski , 78 AD3d 786, 788).

Section 3101(a)(4) requires notice explaining why nonparty disclosure is sought; adequate notice shifts the burden to the party seeking to quash the subpoena.

Dorman v. Luva of NY, LLC · filed 2025-11-12(a)(4)

Here, the plaintiffs established that they provided the credit union with adequate notice of the circumstances or reasons requiring the disclosures of the bank statements and other documents sought, shifting the burden to Luva to establish that the disclosures sought were "utterly irrelevant to the action" ( id. at 34 [internal quotation marks omitted]; Nunez v Peikarian , 208 AD3d at 671).

Section 3101(a)(4) permits disclosure from nonparties when the requested material is reasonably likely to be necessary and material to the action.

J.O. v. LA Fitness Intl., LLC · filed 2025-08-19(a)(4)

LA Fitness' moving papers preliminarily demonstrate that the subpoenas sought are reasonably likely to produce evidence that is necessary and material to the prosecution or defense of this action ( see Forman v Henkin , supra ; CPLR 2307; 3101[a]4]; and 3120). The motion is therefore granted without opposition to the extent that the agencies shall provide the documents demanded on or before October 31, 2025.

In deciding a motion for nonparty discovery under CPLR 3101(a)(4), the Appellate Division may exercise its own discretion to deny disclosure.

Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1984-11-20(a)(4)

The only issue presented by the question certified is whether the Appellate Division had the power to deny the discovery motions in the exercise of its own discretion. We conclude that the Appellate Division had that power, and pass on no other issue (Serenity Homes v Town Bd., 37 NY2d 841).

Section 3101(a)(4) allows a nonparty deposition when the requesting party meets the test for deposing a nonparty witness.

New York TRW Title Insurance v. Wade's Canadian Inn & Cocktail Lounge, Inc. · filed 1996-03-07(a)(4)

Defendants’ remaining contentions, including their assertion that plaintiff failed to meet the test for deposing a nonparty witness (see, CPLR 3101 [a] [4]), have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

Section 3101(a)(4) permits disclosure from a nonparty upon notice stating why the disclosure is sought or required.

People v. Legrande · filed 1999-10-20(a)(4)

“any other person upon notice stating the circumstances or reasons such disclosure is sought or required.” (CPLR 3101 [a] [2], [4].) ... Based upon the above, it is ordered that defendant’s attorney Shelley D. Miller or her duly appointed employee shall be permitted to enter onto the premises known as 37 Mountain View Meadows, Town of Liberty, County of Sullivan, for the purposes of diagraming and/or photographing the premises in question, and it is further ordered that said diagraming and/or photographing shall take place within a duration of 15 minutes and there shall be no conversations between the defendant’s attorney or her employee and the homeowners, and it is further ordered that the homeowners shall have the right to have a court officer or attendant present upon oral application to the court.

Section 3101(a)(4) allows a court to deny leave to depose a party’s treating physician.

Gilliam v. One Bryant Park, LLC · filed 2011-12-27(a)(4)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion for leave to depose the plaintiffs treating physician (see CPLR 3101 [a] [4]; Kooper v Kooper, 74 AD3d 6 [2010]; Abbadessa v Sprint, 291 AD2d 363 [2002]).

Section 3101(b) bars discovery of privileged physician-patient communications on objection, but does not shield the underlying medical facts.

Williams v. Roosevelt Hospital · filed 1985-12-19(b)

However, "[u]pan objection of a party privileged matter shall not be obtainable” (CPLR 3101 [b]). Potentially shielded from discovery, therefore, are communications deemed privileged under CPLR 4504, which provides in part that: "Unless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine, registered professional nursing, licensed practical nursing, or dentistry shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity.”

Section 3101(b) protects privileged medical records from disclosure, though a party may waive the privilege by affirmatively placing their physical or mental condition in issue.

Zimmer v. Cathedral School of St. Mary & St. Paul · filed 1994-05-16(b)

The discoverability of such records, however, is subject to any applicable privilege (see, CPLR 3101 [b]), which may be waived by parties who affirmatively place their physical or mental condition in issue (see, Dillenbeck v Hess, supra; Koump v Smith, supra).

CPLR 3101 does not shield medical information from disclosure when no physician-patient relationship exists.

Greico v. Albany Ambulette Service, Inc. · filed 1996-10-31

Initially, inasmuch as defendants failed to timely object to plaintiffs’ demands within 20 days in accordance with CPLR 3122 (a), our review is limited to determining if the material requested is privileged under CPLR 3101 or otherwise palpably improper (see, Titleserv, Inc. v Zenobio, 210 AD2d 314, 315; Smith v International Paper Co., 142 AD2d 858, 860). Absent the existence of a physician-patient relationship, we cannot conclude that the medical information sought by plaintiffs is privileged (see, State of New York v Town of Moreau, 201 AD2d 802; Smith v International Paper Co., supra).

Section 3101(b) protects information covered by the physician-patient privilege from discovery unless the privilege has been waived.

Neferis v. DeStefano · filed 1999-10-18(b)

If this burden is satisfied, discovery may still be precluded if the requested information is subject to the physician-patient privilege (see, CPLR 3101 [b]; CPLR 4504; Navedo v Nichols, supra). If the information sought falls within the privilege, discovery can only be compelled if the privilege has been waived (see, Dillenbeck v Hess, supra, at 287).

Under section 3101(b), a party seeking medical records must first show that the person’s physical or mental condition is in controversy before the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish privilege.

Joyner v. Oakfield Alabama Central School District · filed 2001-06-08(b)

Plaintiff failed to meet her initial burden (see, Conlin v Birritella, supra, at 382; Navedo v Nichols, 233 AD2d 378, 379), and thus the burden never shifted to Coopenburg and the District to establish that the requested information is privileged and thus exempt from disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (b) and 4504 (see, Dillenbeck v Hess, supra, at 287; Scinta v Van Coevering, supra, at 889).

Section 3101(b) permits disclosure to be precluded when requested medical information is protected by the physician-patient privilege, even if the defendant’s condition is in controversy.

Bongiorno v. Livingston · filed 2005-07-05(b)

Even when this preliminary burden has been satisfied discovery may still be precluded where the information requested is subject to the physician-patient privilege (see CPLR 3101 [b]; 4504 [a]; Dillenbeck v Hess, supra at 287; Lombardi v Hall, supra at 740; Neferis v DeStefano, 265 AD2d 464, 465 [1999]). ... While the plaintiff sustained her initial burden of demonstrating that the individual defendant’s physical and mental condition at the time of the alleged malpractice was in controversy, the individual defendant validly asserted the physician-patient privilege with respect to the medical information contained in the admission records of Marworth Rehabilitation Center.

Section 3101(b) permits compelled disclosure of physician-patient privileged information only if the privilege has been waived; treating providers’ names and addresses are outside that privilege.

Kivlehan v. Waltner · filed 2007-01-09(b)

If the information sought falls within the privilege, discovery can only be compelled if the privilege has been waived (see CPLR 3101 [b] ; 4504 [a]; Dillenbeck v Hess, supra at 287; Lombardi v Hall, supra; Neferis v DeStefano, supra). Here, the names and addresses of those who treated Dr. Waltner during the time period of the alleged malpractice were not subject to the physician-patient privilege (see Bongiorno v Livingston, 20 AD3d 379, 381-382 [2005]; Neferis v DeStefano, supra at 465).

Section 3101(b) does not bar disclosure of relevant mental health records when a personal injury plaintiff places her mental and physical condition at issue and waives the privilege.

Aesch v. Lambarski · filed 2024-07-18(b)

Here, inasmuch as plaintiff brought an action sounding in personal injury, she has placed her mental and physical condition at issue and therefore waived privilege to documents and information referencing such ( see CPLR 3101 [b]; 4504 [a]; Arons v Jutkowitz , 9 NY3d 393, 409 [2007]; Kanaly v DeMartino , 162 AD3d at 146).

Section 3101(b) protects privileged medical information from disclosure when a party has not waived the physician-patient privilege by affirmatively placing their medical condition in issue.

In re Flowers · filed 1990-05-24(b)

However, where a defendant has not affirmatively placed his or her medical condition in issue either by way of counterclaim or to excuse the conduct complained of by the plaintiff, he or she does not waive the physician-patient privilege and may object to the disclosure sought based on that privilege. (See, Dillenbeck v Hess, 73 NY2d 278; Koump v Smith, supra; CPLR 3101 [b].)

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires disclosure of an expert’s qualifications, including skill, training, education, knowledge, and experience, without exposing the expert’s identity in a malpractice action.

Hamilton v. Wein · filed 1986-07-07(d)(1)(i)

Thus, it is fair to conclude that CPLR 3101 (d) (1) as it relates to the qualifications of experts, requires disclosure of information concerning the expert’s "skill, training, education, knowledge or experience” provided that the witness’ identity (in a malpractice action) is not thereby exposed.

Section 3101(d)(1) requires disclosure of an expert witness’s occupation and field of specialization as part of the expert’s qualifications.

Avila v. State · filed 1986-09-03(d)(1)

Defendant also objects to the demand for the expert’s occupation and field of specialization. The statute requires disclosure of the "qualifications” of each expert witness. The information requested is encompassed by the enumerated category and should be disclosed.

Section 3101(d) limits disclosure of a medical or dental expert’s qualifications when the details would reveal the expert’s identity.

McGoldrick v. Whitney M. Young, Jr. Health Center, Inc. · filed 1987-04-13(d)

The court concludes that defendant is properly opposing answering the rest of the items under paragraph 1. With answers to all those questions, it would not take an experienced detective to easily discover the name of the medical expert. This court is of the opinion that the Legislature, by adding the specific requirement that the name of a medical or dental expert does not have to be revealed, meant to sharply curtail what has to be disclosed as to qualifications.

Section 3101(d) allows disclosure of expert opinions, but its amendment did not change what a bill of particulars must contain.

Galtman v. Edelman · filed 1987-02-03(d)

Contrary to Salander v Central Gen. Hosp. (supra) this court holds that in amending CPLR 3101 (d) there was no legislative intent to change the requirements for a bill of particulars pursuant to CPLR 3043.

Section 3101(d) treats a demand for experts’ reports as continuing until an expert is retained and a report is rendered.

Trophia v. Valvo · filed 1987-03-09(d)

Finally, plaintiffs have properly treated defendants’ demand for experts’ reports (CPLR 3101 [d]) as a continuing demand until such time as an expert is retained and a report rendered.

Section 3101(d)(1) limits disclosure of an expert’s report to the information it requires, even when the report must be exchanged under CPLR 3121(b).

Benedict v. Pray · filed 1987-03-26(d)(1)

Accordingly, any portions of the expert’s report which contain "opinions as to the propriety of the defendant’s acts or omissions in treating the injured plaintiff” (122 AD2d, at 203) may be redacted except to the extent that such information must be disclosed under CPLR 3101 (d).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a party to withhold a prospective medical expert’s name, but does not bar a demand for the expert’s qualifications merely because the response might identify the expert.

Catino v. Kirschbaum · filed 1987-04-27(d)(1)(i)

While CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) grants a party the right to not disclose the name of a prospective medical expert, its underlying purpose is not to preclude any possibility of identifying an adversary’s medical expert in a medical, dental or podiatric malpractice action. In the instant case, the respondents’ October 2, 1985 demand for the disclosure of the qualifications of the plaintiff’s experts was not unduly burdensome.

Section 3101(d)(1)(ii) requires a showing of special circumstances for further disclosure about an expert’s expected testimony.

Barnes v. P & C Food Markets, Inc. · filed 1987-07-10(d)(1)(ii)

Since defendants have failed to establish such special circumstances, Special Term properly granted plaintiffs motion for a protective order and vacated the notice to take the expert’s deposition.

Section 3101(d)(1) permits a court to require further disclosure of the substance of an expert’s facts and opinions and the basis for those opinions.

Jones v. Putnam Hospital Center · filed 1987-09-28(d)(1)

Otherwise, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s direction for a further response as to the substance of the facts and opinions and the basis for the expert’s opinions (CPLR 3101 [d] [1]).

An expert opinion demand under section 3101(d)(1) may be barred by a protective order, with a motion to compel a response denied.

Etheart v. Winthrop University Hospital · filed 1987-10-13(d)(1)

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion for a protective order is granted in its entirety, and the cross motion to compel the plaintiffs to respond to the demand pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) is denied (see, Cagatay v Caledonian Hosp., 133 AD2d 660).

Section 3101(d)'s expert-disclosure amendment does not permit a demand for a bill of particulars to obtain evidentiary matter.

Coleman v. Richards · filed 1988-03-21(d)

The recent amendment to CPLR 3101 (d) (L 1985, ch 294, § 4) does not require any change in the rule established in Patterson v Jewish Hosp. & Med. Center (supra) that evidentiary matter may not be obtained by a demand for a bill of particulars.

The revised expert disclosure rule in CPLR 3101(d)(1) applies to actions commenced on or after July 1, 1985, even if a defendant in an earlier action was served after that date.

Cagatay v. Caledonian Hospital · filed 1987-10-13(d)(1)

We find, contrary to the Supreme Court, Kings County, that since the plaintiffs commenced the instant action prior to July 1, 1985, CPLR 3101 (d) (1), in its revised form, does not govern the disclosure obligation of the plaintiffs, notwithstanding the fact that some of the named defendants had been served with process subsequent to that date (see, McKinistry v Werner Mach. Co., 133 AD2d 361; Rogowski v Day Co., 130 Misc 2d 801).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) allows a party to keep an expert’s identity confidential, but does not excuse withholding that identity from the trial judge.

Graves v. Rochester General Hospital · filed 1987-12-18(d)(1)(i)

While a party may utilize the statutory procedure to maintain the confidentiality of its expert (see, CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]), this does not justify failing to reveal the identity of the expert to the Special Term Judge.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) does not shield a medical expert’s identity from a defendant facing products liability and warranty claims rather than a medical malpractice claim.

Travis v. Wormer · filed 1988-01-29(d)(1)(i)

Since the causes of action asserted against Du Pont are not for medical malpractice, CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) is inapplicable. Special Term erred, therefore, in denying Du Font’s motion to compel plaintiff to divulge the identity of his medical expert.

Section 3101(d)(1) requires a party, upon request, to identify expected trial experts and disclose the subjects and grounds of their opinions; failure to comply may result in preclusion of their testimony.

Olden v. Bolton · filed 1988-02-04(d)(1)

Next, we conclude that Supreme Court properly precluded plaintiff from introducing expert testimony under CPLR 3101 (d) (1). That provision essentially provides that upon request, parties must identify all persons whom they expect to call as experts at trial and must disclose the subject matter that the experts will discuss and the grounds for their opinion.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires a good-faith, reasonably detailed disclosure of expected expert testimony but sets no specific deadline for designating an expert.

Saar v. Brown & Odabashian, P. C. · filed 1988-03-31(d)(1)(i)

Although sympathetic to the plaintiff’s concern about an eve-of-trial disclosure by defendant Odabashian, the court cannot compel a response where the statute provides no specific time for compliance. ... With respect to the response of the defendant Albany Medical Center, the court finds that it is inadequate and does not fulfill the minimal purpose for which CPLR 3101 (d) (1) was intended. The information provided is so general and nonspecific that the plaintiff has not been enlightened to any appreciable degree about the content of this expert’s anticipated testimony.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits withholding a medical expert’s identity before trial; its protection supports in camera review of an unredacted expert affirmation when opposing summary judgment.

Rubenstein v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center · filed 1988-03-25(d)(1)(i)

The last sentence of paragraph (1) (i) excepts medical, dental or podiatric experts, whose identity can be withheld from pretrial disclosure. ... These considerations are equally compelling on a pretrial motion for summary judgment. The in camera inspection procedure is an extremely practical method to balance a plaintiffs right to protect the identity of his expert from disclosure prior to trial and a defendant’s right to put a plaintiff to the test on the validity of the underlying claim by way of a summary judgment motion.

The revised provisions of CPLR 3101(d) do not apply to actions commenced before July 1, 1985.

Miller v. Marks · filed 1988-07-22(d)

As this action was commenced prior to July 1, 1985, the revised provisions of CPLR 3101 (d) are inapplicable (L 1985, ch 294, § 4).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) exempts a medical malpractice expert’s identity from pretrial disclosure, but that exemption does not apply when the expert’s affidavit is offered in opposition to summary judgment.

Nandy v. Albany Medical Center Hospital · filed 1988-08-18(d)(1)(i)

CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) provides that in medical malpractice cases, the identity of a party’s expert is exempt from pretrial disclosure. Of critical significance upon the issue before the court is the distinction between pretrial disclosure and a motion for summary judgment. ... At that juncture, rules concerning pretrial disclosure are inapplicable.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a medical malpractice plaintiff to withhold an expert’s identity in an affidavit of merit submitted with an application to serve a late notice, if the court receives the unredacted affidavit for in camera inspection.

Bonelli v. New York Hospital · filed 1989-05-30(d)(1)(i)

My holding in Rubenstein was based on the fact that the policy behind the enactment of CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), which exempts from pretrial disclosure the identity of a party’s expert in a medical malpractice action, namely, to address "the perceived problem of the exertion of direct or indirect pressure by some physicians to discourage their colleagues from giving expert testimony against them” (Rubenstein v Columbia Presbyt. Med. Center, supra, at 352), is applicable to experts’ affidavits prepared in opposing summary judgment motions. That policy is equally fostered when an affidavit of merit is offered in conjunction with an application for leave to file a late notice of medical malpractice action.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a court to preclude expert testimony when a party deliberately withholds disclosure and prejudices the other parties.

Fouchet v. Manhattan Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. · filed 1988-09-08(d)(1)(i)

This court in interpreting CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) holds that under the above circumstances, the intentional and deliberate noncompliance of the statute precludes the defendants, Hertz ... and Slotnick, from introducing expert testimony at the trial.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) does not specify how to request expert disclosure; a hospital may seek it through a bill of particulars when a malpractice complaint gives no clue to the alleged wrongs.

Bellen v. Baghei-Rad · filed 1989-03-09(d)(1)(i)

We agree, however, with the Supreme Court in Salander v Central Gen. Hosp. (supra) that the Legislature did not specify the exact procedure to bring about the "request” for discovery when it provided: ... In our view, there should be no prohibition of the hospital’s demand, given the fact that this is a malpractice action in which the complaint gives no clue as to the specific wrongs alleged to have been committed by the hospital.

Section 3101(d)(1) requires disclosure during discovery of the facts on which an expected causation expert will base an opinion.

In re Love Canal Actions · filed 1989-05-17(d)(1)

Moreover, the recently enacted provisions of CPLR 3101 (d) are applicable in all actions commenced on or after July 1, 1985. ... Clearly, plaintiffs will have to reveal during discovery stages evidence upon which their causation expert will base his or her opinion.

Section 3101(d)(1) imposes a continuing obligation to disclose information about an expert expected to testify at trial.

Orlich v. Helm Bros. · filed 1990-01-12(d)(1)

That branch of the motion is denied in light of the plaintiff’s contention that no expert has yet been retained who is expected to testify at trial. However, the plaintiff is reminded that the obligation to furnish such information is a continuing one (CPLR 3101 [d] [1]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires reasonable detail about each expert’s expected testimony and a summary of the grounds for each opinion, but does not require disclosure of expert reports.

In re Love Canal Actions · filed 1990-05-11(d)(1)(i)

CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not provide for the disclosure of expert reports as ordered by the Justice to whom the cases have been assigned for trial; instead, it provides for the disclosure in reasonable detail of the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each expert’s opinion.

Section 3101(d)(1) does not require a separate breakdown of general damages for each cause of action when the disclosed expert information and damage calculations are sufficient.

Zimmer-Masiello, Inc. v. Zimmer, Inc. · filed 1990-08-30(d)(1)

The IAS court properly denied further discovery. Plaintiffs response to defendant’s interrogatories set forth the identity of its experts, the subject matter about which each expert would testify, the formulas utilized, the qualifications of each expert witness, a summary of the grounds for the expert’s opinion, the value of its business and the method for calculating claimed damages. (CPLR 3101 [d] [1].) In view of the information provided, the IAS court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiff need not provide defendant with a "breakdown” of its general damage claims for each cause of action.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) governs disclosure of proposed expert testimony, and repeated inadequate responses may justify an order requiring experts to submit to examination before trial.

DiBiase v. New York State Thruway Authority · filed 1990-10-05(d)(1)(i)

The court properly determined that claimant adequately responded to defendants’ request for information concerning the proposed testimony of claimant’s expert witnesses (see, CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]). Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that defendants’ experts submit to an examination before trial in light of defendants’ repeated failure to provide claimant with an adequate response to his request for information concerning the proposed testimony of defendants’ expert witnesses.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits an expert’s identity to remain confidential when counsel receives a redacted affirmation and the court reviews an unredacted copy in camera.

Zuck v. Sierp · filed 1991-01-14(d)(1)(i)

We find that this procedure preserved the confidentiality of the expert’s identity, consistent with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), while permitting the plaintiffs to meet their burden of establishing by competent evidence the causal relationship between the malpractice and the decedent’s death (see, Graves v Rochester Gen. Hosp., 135 AD2d 1130).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires disclosure of the facts and grounds underlying an expert’s opinion; stating only the ultimate conclusion is insufficient.

Brossoit v. O'Brien · filed 1991-01-24(d)(1)(i)

Turning to defendants’ appeal, we agree that plaintiffs did not adequately comply with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) in merely disclosing their economist’s opinion of the value of Shelly Brossoit’s lost services. ... In our view, defendants are entitled to a statement as to what services were considered in the estimate, how the alleged losses were computed and the manner in which the losses were converted to present value.

Section 3101(a) requires disclosure of the names of witnesses with notice of an alleged defective condition.

Carvache v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1991-07-11(a)

CPLR 3101 (a) has been interpreted liberally in favor of disclosure "of any facts bearing on the controversy” (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406). In applying this principle, it is now established that a party is entitled to the names of notice witnesses to a defective condition (see, Hoffman v Ro-San Manor, 73 AD2d 207; Zayas v Morales, 45 AD2d 610).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits discovery of an expert’s qualifications in a malpractice action, but demands must be limited when the requested details could reveal the expert’s identity.

Jasopersaud v. Tao Gyoun Rho · filed 1991-07-22(d)(1)(i)

While each case will necessarily vary upon the particular circumstances involved and the nature of the demands made, a Trial Judge assessing the propriety of a request for expert witness information must weigh the relevant policy interests involved, i.e., the Legislature’s intent to materially expand discovery relating to experts and the competing concern reflected by the statutory provision authorizing a party to refrain from disclosing an expert’s identity.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires an expert disclosure to fairly and accurately reveal the substance of the expert’s expected testimony.

Parsons v. City of New York · filed 1991-08-29(d)(1)(i)

This testimony was not fairly and accurately reflected in the "summary” given to plaintiffs and did not comply with the requirements of CPLR 3101 (d).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires disclosure of the substance of an expert’s expected facts and opinions, but not the underlying factual information.

Krygier v. Airweld, Inc. · filed 1991-10-07(d)(1)(i)

The requesting party is entitled only to the substance of those facts and opinions (see, Renucci v Mercy Hosp., 124 AD2d 796, 797; CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires disclosure of expert witnesses after a proper demand and permits preclusion when a party fails to disclose an expert without good cause.

Corning v. Carlin · filed 1991-12-23(d)(1)(i)

In this case, the plaintiff failed to show good cause why she did not retain an expert until the very eve of trial and then failed to disclose his existence until after opening statements had been made. Under such circumstances, the trial court’s preclusion order was proper (see, Simpson v Bellew, 161 AD2d 693, 698; Zarrelli v Littauer Hosp., 176 AD2d 1181).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires notice of expert witnesses, and failure to provide it can justify excluding their testimony.

Bisbee v. Independent Coach Corp. · filed 1992-04-13(d)(1)(i)

We find the defendants’ claims that the court improperly excluded certain testimony and medical records from evidence to be without merit. The defendants failed to provide the plaintiff with the required statutory notice of the expert witnesses whose testimony is at issue (see, CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]; 22 NYCRR 202.17 [g], [h]; Stern v Calzado, supra) and to lay a proper foundation for the medical records (see, CPLR 4518 [a]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires disclosure of the substance of an expert’s expected testimony and the expert’s qualifications; inadequate responses may be corrected before preclusion when the requesting party has shown no prejudice.

Busse v. Clark Equipment Co. · filed 1992-04-16(d)(1)(i)

Plaintiffs’ numerous responses to Japan Air’s request in this case fail to set forth the substance of the facts or opinions to be testified to by the named experts, and no qualifications have been supplied with respect to the purported engineering expert. ... The information supplied by plaintiffs falls short of fulfilling the intent of the statute. Nevertheless, Japan Air has failed to demonstrate any prejudice warranting the extreme remedy of preclusion. In such circumstances, plaintiffs should be afforded a final opportunity to comply with the third-party defendant’s request.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires an expert disclosure to describe in reasonable detail the substance of the expert’s expected facts and opinions and summarize the grounds for the opinion.

Lafontant v. Hollymatic Corp. · filed 1992-05-04(d)(1)(i)

We agree with both the appellant and Hollymatic Corp. that the plaintiff’s response did not go into “reasonable detail” either with respect to the “substance of the facts and opinions” to which her expert is expected to testify, or with respect to "a summary of the grounds” for the expert’s opinion (CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]; see also, Parsons v City of New York, 175 AD2d 783; Brossoit v O’Brien, 169 AD2d 1019).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) gives courts discretion to allow expert testimony despite a failure to disclose the expert before trial.

Campoli v. Lobmeyer · filed 1992-05-14(d)(1)(i)

And although CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does have application to defendant herein, that disclosure rule, like 22 NYCRR 202.17 (h), is not absolute, for it stipulates that "the court may make whatever order may be just”.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a party to withhold the identity of a medical expert who will testify only on a medical malpractice claim from a codefendant sued for a different kind of negligence, absent prejudice.

Rivera v. City of New York · filed 1991-03-18(d)(1)(i)

Since the legislative intent is to protect the medical expert from potential pressure not to testify, the identity of the medical expert who will testify strictly on plaintiffs action for medical malpractice should not be freely disclosed to the other defendant in the absence of prejudice since all the defendants share a common interest in defeating plaintiffs claim.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a party to withhold a medical expert’s identity, including by redacting the expert’s name and address from a disclosed medical report.

Wagner v. Kingston Hospital · filed 1992-04-06(d)(1)(i)

CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), which governs the disclosure of information from expert witnesses, includes a provision which permits a party to withhold the identity of a medical expert.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) protects an expert’s identity in a malpractice action even when the expert also examined the plaintiff.

Rivera v. Interfaith Medical Center · filed 1992-05-15(d)(1)(i)

Therefore, the confidentiality of an expert must be protected despite it resulting in the nondisclosure of the identity of an examining physician, when fortuitous or otherwise, that person is one and the same.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits disclosure of an expert’s training and licensing states when the need to assess qualifications outweighs the small chance of identifying the expert.

Yablon v. Coburn · filed 1995-09-28(d)(1)(i)

The demands in dispute are proper inquiries bearing upon the qualifications of the expert, the need for which outweighs the unlikelihood that the information would allow identification of the expert’s name (CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]; see, Jasopersaud v Rho, 169 AD2d 184).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires disclosure of a medical expert’s qualifications in reasonable detail, even when the party withholds the expert’s name.

Esquilin v. Brooklyn Hospital Center — Downtown Campus · filed 2002-01-08(d)(1)(i)

The statute’s use of the word “shall” to describe a party’s disclosure obligation regarding qualifications as contrasted with the use of the word “may” regarding a disclosing party’s preference to withhold naming the expert suggests a strong legislative commitment to ensuring appropriate expert disclosure.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires disclosure of expert qualifications in reasonable detail, even when a medical malpractice plaintiff may omit the expert’s name.

Thomas v. Alleyne · filed 2002-12-16(d)(1)(i)

We begin, then, with the observation that the statute, read literally, requires that the qualifications of each party’s expert witnesses be set forth in “reasonable detail” in all cases, without exception.

CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) permits an expert’s deposition when special circumstances exist, including when the expert examined evidence before it became unavailable to the other party.

Dixon v. City of Yonkers · filed 2005-03-21(d)(1)(i)

When the plaintiff served a subpoena upon Charles Peter, a botanist, directing him to appear for a deposition, the defendants had not yet identified Dr. Peter as their expert witness pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i). Where, as here, the complaint alleges that the decedent’s death was caused by a falling tree, which was removed from the accident scene within 48 hours, special circumstances exist to permit the plaintiff to depose Dr. Peter, including that Dr. Peter examined the tree and surrounding vegetation before key evidence was rendered unavailable to the plaintiff ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to quash the subpoena.

Section 3101(d)(1)(iii) permits an expert to be deposed upon a showing of special circumstances, even after a party retains the expert.

Clemons v. Glicksman · filed 2006-01-19(d)(1)(iii)

While “new facts” existed to support a motion for renewal, viz., Dr. Rudelli’s alleged retention as an expert by plaintiff, this retention would not “change the prior determination” (CPLR 2221 [e] [2]) since an expert may always be deposed “upon a showing of special circumstances” (CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [iii]).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) ordinarily requires parties in medical malpractice actions to disclose an expert's qualifications in reasonable detail, even if that information may reveal the expert's identity.

Kanaly v. DeMartino · filed 2018-06-07(d)(1)(i)

Accordingly, we adopt that Court's rule that parties in medical malpractice cases "will ordinarily be entitled to full disclosure of the qualifications of [an opponent's] expert, [except for the expert's name,] notwithstanding that such disclosure may permit such expert's identification," but a party may obtain a protective order under CPLR 3103 (a) by making a factual showing that there exists a reasonable probability, "under the special circumstances of a particular case, that a prospective expert medical witness would be subjected to intimidation or threats if his or her name were revealed before trial" ( id. at 45-46).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) does not disqualify a medical malpractice expert from offering an opinion because the expert is anonymous.

Barahona v. Marcus · filed 2022-03-15(d)(1)(i)

Moreover, plaintiff's expert was qualified to render this opinion notwithstanding that the expert was anonymous (CPLR 3101[d][1][i]; see Vega v Mount Sinai-NYU Med. Ctr. & Health Sys. , 13 AD3d 62, 63 [1st Dept 2004]), from out of state (CPLR 2309[c]; see Ortiz v City of New York , 129 AD3d 611, 612 [1st Dept 2015]), and did not purport to have worked at a New York ambulatory surgery center ( see Almeyda v Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., Inc. , 195 AD3d 437, 437 [1st Dept 2021]).

Section 3101(e) permits a party to discover an adversary’s visual surveillance of that party, though disclosure may be delayed until after a deposition.

Marte v. W.O. Hickok Mfg. Co., Inc. · filed 1990-03-15(e)

While disclosure of the visual surveillance of a civil litigant by the adversary may properly be delayed until the party making the photograph, videotapes or movies has had the opportunity to depose fully the opposing party, thereby memorializing that individual’s testimony so it can be utilized for impeachment purposes, discovery is appropriate to permit the subject of the visual reproductions to challenge the accuracy thereof.

Section 3101 requires disclosure on appropriate demand of surveillance photographs, motion pictures, and videotapes of a plaintiff, either as visual statements or as materials the plaintiff substantially needs and cannot duplicate.

Ancona v. Net Realty Holding Trust Co. · filed 1992-04-01

Rather, whether viewed as "visual statements” under CPLR 3101 (e) or as materials for which plaintiff manifestly has substantial need and is unable to duplicate, under CPLR 3101 (d), surveillance photographs, motion pictures, and videotapes must be disclosed upon appropriate demand.

Section 3101(d)(2) requires disclosure of trial preparation materials when the requesting party has a substantial need and cannot obtain their substantial equivalent without undue hardship.

Kane v. Her-Pet Refrigeration, Inc. · filed 1992-07-27(d)(2)

We agree with the analysis by the majority of the Fourth Department in DiMichel v South Buffalo Ry. Co. (supra). Although surveillance evidence constitutes material obtained in preparation for litigation, its protected status is overcome here by the plaintiffs’ substantial need to verify the accuracy of the potentially devastating films prior to trial (see also, Cleary v City of New York, 177 AD2d 283, supra; Prewitt v Beverly-5Oth St. Corp., 145 Misc 2d 257). ... We also conclude that the plaintiffs satisfy the second requirement for disclosure because it is apparent that they cannot obtain the "substantial equivalent” of the materials by any reasonable means. ... Secondly, if the materials are to be presented or used at trial, they must be produced for examination by the plaintiffs.

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of memoranda relating to surveillance tapes, subject to redaction of privileged attorney work product and confidential communications.

Marigliano v. Krumholtz · filed 1993-11-10(i)

The court directed the defendants’ attorney to turn over any existing memoranda of all surveillance tapes to the plaintiffs’ attorney for examination in accordance with subdivision (i) of CPLR 3101. The court determined that it is discoverable material. Prior to disclosure, the court authorized redaction of any information contained in the memoranda that constitutes attorney’s work product, such as technical notes or confidential communications between attorney and client, as privileged items.

Section 3101(i) requires a party seeking a surveillance tape to state a need for it and an inability to obtain equivalent material; that statement ordinarily suffices for disclosure.

Boulware v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority · filed 1994-06-03(i)

For reasons explored below, this court holds that CPLR 3101 (i) does not obviate the requirement of subdivision (d) (2), that a party seeking disclosure of a surveillance tape must articulate a need for the tape and an inability to secure it from other sources. Nonetheless, once this legal formula has been written or uttered in relation to a surveillance videotape, it appears that access must be granted.

Section 3101(i) does not require disclosure of surveillance invoices, reports, correspondence, bills, footage records, payment records, or logs.

Grossman v. Emergency Cesspool & Sewer Cleaners, Inc. · filed 1994-08-18(i)

CPLR 3101 (i) does not either expressly or impliedly refer to any of the above information demanded such as invoices, reports, correspondence, bills, records of footage, proof of payment, logs of surveillance, etc. Plaintiffs have offered no case law which supports this demand. As such, plaintiffs are not entitled to such information as a matter of law.

Subdivision (i) entitles a plaintiff to all surveillance materials obtained by a defendant, including out-takes, regardless of trial use, but does not specify when disclosure must occur.

Fronckowiak v. City of Buffalo · filed 1994-10-21(i)

The plain language of the amendment restricts it to the issue of a plaintiff’s entitlement to discovery of all surveillance materials obtained by defendant, including out-takes, regardless of whether defendant will use them at trial. The amendment does not address the issue of when the mandated disclosure must occur.

Section 3101(i) requires full disclosure of surveillance materials, including out-takes and portions a party does not intend to use.

Kosovsky v. Zahl · filed 1995-05-04(i)

CPLR 3101 (i) provides for full disclosure of such materials, without limitation, and specifies that disclosure must be of "all portions of such material, including out-takes, rather than only those portions a party intends to use”.

Section 3101(i) permits a court to require a further damages deposition before disclosure of surveillance tapes recorded after the plaintiff’s initial deposition.

Takayesu v. Chuckry · filed 1995-03-22(i)

Pursuant to CPLR 3101 (i), effective September 1, 1993, there shall be full disclosure of any films, photographs, videotapes or audiotapes involving a party to the action. ... Defendants must be afforded the opportunity to examine plaintiff again on the issue of damages before disclosing the surveillance tapes taken after plaintiff’s initial examination before trial.

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of surveillance films but does not authorize depositions of the people who made them without the showing of substantial need and undue hardship required by section 3101(d)(2).

Hicklen v. Broadway West Street Associates · filed 1995-07-18(i)

This court is unwilling to extend CPLR 3101 (i) so as to include the directing of deposition(s) of the person(s) who took the surveillance film. While CPLR 3101 (i) requires the exchange of surveillance films it does not abrogate the need of the plaintiff to make a factual showing of substantial need and undue hardship, as required by CPLR 3101 (d) (2), in order to prevail in their request for depositions of the person(s) who took the videotape.

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of all surveillance tapes, but surveillance does not automatically entitle the producing party to another deposition before disclosure.

Jannello v. Parker · filed 1995-10-31(i)

In 1993, the Legislature enacted CPLR 3101 (i) (L 1993, ch 574, § 1) to codify DiMichel (supra) and to answer the question left open by the Court of Appeals in that case, directing that a party must disclose all tapes, not just those parts to be relied upon or to be introduced in evidence at trial. ... The mere fact that there has been surveillance or additional surveillance does not automatically carry with it the necessity of a new deposition, on each and every occasion.

Section 3101(i) permits disclosure of surveillance video depicting an accident to be delayed until after the plaintiff's deposition to prevent tailored testimony.

Rankin v. Waldbaum, Inc. · filed 1998-03-16(i)

Accordingly, the request for a protective order is granted to the extent that the surveillance videotape shall be exchanged after the conclusion of the plaintiffs deposition.

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of recordings involving a party, but trial courts retain discretion to decide whether a disclosure violation warrants preclusion.

Noble v. Ackerman · filed 1998-07-09(i)

Contrary to plaintiffs argument, we do not believe that this section removes the trial court’s discretion in determining whether disclosure violations warrant the sanction of preclusion (see, Lamagna v New York State Assn. for Help of Retarded Children, 222 AD2d 559, 560; DeCandia v Hudson Waterways, 194 AD2d 314, 315, lv denied 82 NY2d 659).

Section 3101 (i) gives plaintiffs an unqualified right to disclosure of defendants’ surveillance videotapes made in preparation for litigation.

Hawkins v. Lucier · filed 1998-11-30(i)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, pursuant to CPLR 3101 (i), the plaintiffs have an unqualified right to disclosure of ...the videotapes taken by the defendants in preparation for litigation (see, DiMichel v South Buffalo Ry. Co., 80 NY2d 184, 197, cert denied sub nom. Poole v Consolidated Rail Corp., 510 US 816; see also, Kane v Her-Pet Refrig., 181 AD2d 257).

CPLR 3101 (i) requires disclosure of surveillance materials upon demand, including before the plaintiff’s deposition.

Rotundi v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance · filed 2000-01-13(i)

Accordingly, we hold that such materials covered by CPLR 3101 (i) are discoverable upon demand pursuant to CPLR 3120 (a).

Section 3101(i) entitles a party to production of an opposing party’s surveillance tape.

Young v. Knickerbocker Arena · filed 2001-03-15(i)

Absent such an excuse, and in view of the fact that plaintiffs plainly were entitled to production of the tape (see, CPLR 3101 [i]), we cannot say that Supreme Court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion to preclude (see, Evans v Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 277 AD2d 874, 874-875).

Section 3101(i) permits discovery of surveillance tapes an insurer created to defend claims arising from an accident, even when the insurer is not a party to the civil action.

Lindsey v. County of Erie · filed 2001-05-15(i)

The company insured against both eventualities and created the surveillance tapes as part of its overall defense of claims against its insured. That one law firm was used to defend one aspect of the claim in one venue, and another law firm in this Court is immaterial. The insurer has acted to produce surveillance tapes in defense of the claim. The tapes are discoverable pursuant to CPLR 3101 (i).

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of a party’s personal videotape when it is relevant to claimed injuries.

Sgambelluri v. Recinos · filed 2002-09-04(i)

Although plaintiffs videotape is clearly not a “surveillance tape,” subdivision (i) appears to address this set of facts as well, using language broad enough to encompass “any film, photograph or videotape * * * involving a person referred to in paragraph one of subdivision (a),” i.e., a party. ... Nevertheless, applying the “material and necessary” standard to plaintiff’s wedding video makes it quite clear that it is relevant to the claim. Accordingly, plaintiff must provide a copy of the wedding reception video to defendant, the cost of duplication to be paid by defendant.

Section 3101(i) requires full disclosure of surveillance tapes without waiting until the plaintiff is deposed.

Tran v. New Rochelle Hospital Medical Center · filed 2003-02-20(i)

While we articulated our solution to the tailored-testimony problem in DiMichel, we are not now free to impose a timing requirement under section 3101 (i) given the Legislature’s pointed recasting of the relevant discovery provisions and its mandate for “full disclosure.”

Section 3101(i) requires a party to turn over audiotapes in its possession before deposing the opposing parties.

Sun Plaza Enterprises Corp. v. Crown Theatres · filed 2003-07-28(i)

We agree with the defendants that the plaintiff must turn over any audiotapes in its possession prior to deposing the defendants (see Falk v Inzinna, 299 AD2d 120 [2002]).

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of surveillance videotape memoranda, including letters or reports, unless they contain attorney-client privileged communications.

Beckford v. Gross · filed 2004-03-25(i)

In its simplest terms, the issue becomes whether the letter accompanying the surveillance tape from the investigator to the claims adjuster constitutes a “memoranda” expressly subject to disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (i). ... This court declines to adopt that part of the Grossman decision which included reports and correspondence within those types of materials subject to the substantial need and undue hardship standard. ... There is no substantive difference in the content between documents styled as memoranda, letters or reports. If they concern a videotape of a party to litigation, whether they are subject to disclosure should not turn on the style of the written transmittal.

Section 3101(i) requires full disclosure of relevant, non-privileged films, photographs, videotapes, and audiotapes, including all portions and outtakes.

Zegarelli v. Hughes · filed 2004-07-01(i)

We hold here that the “full disclosure” required by this statute is simply the disclosure normally required by the CPLR for relevant, non-privileged materials.

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of surveillance videotapes and provides an opportunity to examine them before trial.

Dittmer v. Terzian · filed 2004-10-01(i)

Regarding plaintiffs’ application for an order granting them the opportunity to depose defendant Ford’s investigator, the videographer of the three separate videotapes produced to plaintiffs, the court finds that CPLR 3101 (i) is implicated and grants same to the limited extent that defendant Ford, if it has not previously served upon plaintiffs the outtakes, if any, shall forthwith do so and, further, plaintiffs shall be afforded the opportunity to examine the original tapes. (See Zegarelli v Hughes, 3 NY3d 64, 68-69 [2004].)

Section 3101(a) entitles a party to inspect potentially relevant surveillance recordings rather than accept the producing party’s claim that they are immaterial.

Gogos v. Modell's Sporting Goods, Inc. · filed 2011-06-23(a)

To adopt the dissent’s position would invite parties to destroy trial evidence — and permit them to ignore court orders with impunity — merely by employing the expedient of claiming that the evidence is immaterial and unnecessary (CPLR 3101 [a]). ... Plaintiffs were entitled to inspect the tapes to determine for themselves whether the area of the accident was depicted.

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of any recording involving a party, regardless of who made it or whether it will be used at trial.

Bermejo v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2015-11-18(i)

While CPLR 3101 (i) was enacted for the primary purpose of preventing unfair surprise in situations where a defendant uses surveillance video in an attempt to reveal that a plaintiff’s injuries are not as severe as the plaintiff claims they are, the statute employs broad language, which is not limited to such a scenario, but instead requires disclosure of any films, photographs, video tapes or audio tapes of a party, regardless of who created the recording or for what purpose (CPLR 3101 [i] [emphasis added]; see Sgambelluri v Recinos, 192 Misc 2d 777, 779-780 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2002]).

Section 3101(i) does not entitle a party to details about who took disclosed photographs or when and where they were taken; the party may ask about those matters when the photographs are offered at trial.

Koksal v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-01(i)

Plaintiff cites CPLR 3101 (i) for the proposition that she is entitled to, inter alia, full disclosure of information about the photographs including the address, date and time at which the photos were taken. ... The court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to the information she seeks and instead may exercise her right to a voir dire of the witness called to lay the foundation for the admission of the photographs into evidence (Grossman v Emergency Cesspool & Sewer Cleaners, 162 Misc 2d 440, 443 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1994]).

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of surveillance recordings involving a party, including outtakes and related transcripts or memoranda.

Mendez v. Joseph · filed 2024-02-14(i)

CPLR 3101(i) provides, in pertinent part, that "there shall be full disclosure of any films, photographs, video tapes or audio tapes, including transcripts or memoranda thereof, involving a" party. That provision requires the "disclosure of all portions of such material, including out-takes, rather than only those portions a party intends to use" ( id. ).

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of audio recordings of a party, regardless of who made them or why.

Zavala v. Rennew Holding Corp. · filed 2023-08-16(i)

CPLR 3101(i) "requires disclosure of ' any films, photographs, video tapes or audio tapes' of a party, regardless of who created the recording or for what purpose" ( Bermejo v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. , 135 AD3d 116, 146, quoting CPLR 3101[i]; see Tai Tran v New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 99 NY2d 383, 387-389; Pizzo v Lustig , 216 AD3d 38, 46).

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of relevant body camera footage and recordings in the City's possession without requiring the plaintiff to identify them first.

Cruz v. City of New York · filed 2024-04-30(i)

Moreover, the City cites to no authority that supports the imposition of such a duty upon Plaintiff, in contravention of disclosure directed by CPLR §3101 (i), nor does the City invoke the exception pursuant to Public Officers Law § 87. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has specifically held that a plaintiff need not submit to a deposition before disclosure of relevant video recordings (Tran v New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 99 NY2d 383, 389-90 [2003]). As such, any relevant recordings, body camera footage, or audio recordings in the possession of the City are discoverable.

Section 3101(i) requires full disclosure of surveillance videos; a court may preclude videos disclosed so late that the delay prejudices trial preparation.

Gomez v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2025-09-16(i)

This holding was further strengthened by the subsequent passage of CPLR § 3101(i) which mandates that all surveillance tapes are subject to full disclosure. ... Accordingly, this Court correctly precluded the defendants' inexplicably belated surveillance videos.

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of films, photographs, video tapes, and audio tapes of a party upon demand; belated disclosure did not warrant dismissal here without sufficient evidence of willful misconduct or prejudice.

Fox v. Grand Slam Banquet Hall · filed 2016-08-25(i)

Although CPLR 3101 (i) requires disclosure of “any films, photographs, video tapes or audio tapes” of a party upon demand ... there was insufficient evidence of willful or contumacious conduct on plaintiff’s part, or prejudice to Grand Slam, to warrant the dismissal of her complaint in the midst of the jury trial ... even if the dismissal was without prejudice.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) generally does not warrant preclusion of late expert evidence without a showing of willful noncompliance or prejudice.

Widercrantz v. American Biltrite Inc. · filed 2026-03-06(d)(1)(i)

Defendants’ motion to preclude Garza’s supplemental expert report of February 12, 2026, as untimely, is denied. “Preclusion of expert evidence on the ground of failure to give timely disclosure, as called for in CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i), is generally unwarranted without a showing that the noncompliance was willful or prejudicial to the party seeking preclusion. Prejudice can be shown where the expert is testifying as to new theories, or where the opposing side has no time to prepare a rebuttal” (Haynes v City of New York, 145 AD3d 603, 606 [1st Dept 2016] [internal citations omitted]). No such showing has been made here.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a judge in a medical malpractice action to set deadlines for selecting experts and responding to expert disclosure demands.

Carroll v. Nunez · filed 1990-01-17(d)(1)(i)

In that there is no exception in either CPLR 3101 or 3406, with respect to a demand for expert information, it is clear that the IAS Judge has the authority to expedite both the selection of expert witnesses in a medical malpractice case and the prompt response to demands for information relative to same.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a court to lift a physician witness’s preclusion when delayed disclosure is excusable and the records are eventually produced.

Kwant v. Coleman · filed 1990-03-13(d)(1)(i)

Defendants are not persuasive on appeal that the court abused its discretion. Nor are defendants persuasive that, in viewing CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), the court failed to "make whatever order may be just”.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) does not require preclusion solely for lack of advance notice when good cause explains why an expert was retained too late to give notice.

Simpson v. Bellew · filed 1990-05-21(d)(1)(i)

Therefore, pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), the failure to give "appropriate notice” of this expert’s testimony was not, standing alone, a sufficient ground to preclude the defendants from introducing it into evidence.

The 1985 expert disclosure amendment to CPLR 3101(d) does not apply when the original action began before its effective date, even if a third-party action began later.

Myers v. City of New York · filed 1990-05-23(d)(1)(i)

Therefore, the court applies the law as it was in effect on the date the action, rather than on the later date when the third-party action, was commenced. Accordingly, Otis is only entitled to the facts upon which any expert opinion is based but not the opinion itself.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) sets no specific time for retaining an expert and does not require preclusion of expert testimony merely because a party failed to comply with its disclosure requirements.

Lillis v. D'Souza · filed 1991-06-07(d)(1)(i)

CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not require a party to retain an expert at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) allows a court to preclude a newly retained expert’s testimony when the party lacks good cause for failing to disclose the expert earlier.

Zarrelli v. Nathan Littauer Hospital · filed 1991-10-31(d)(1)(i)

Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the circumstances surrounding the predicament in which plaintiff found himself at trial did not constitute "good cause” under CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) (see, Simpson v Bellew, 161 AD2d 693, lv denied 77 NY2d 808).

Section 3101(d) does not apply when a treating physician testifies only about treatment and observations rather than giving responsive expert opinion.

Beck v. Albany Medical Center Hospital · filed 1993-03-11(d)

Plaintiff argues that Rosenberg was an expert witness whose identity had not been disclosed pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d). Initially, we observe that the doctor was one of plaintiff’s treating physicians under subpoena from her to appear at the trial and that one of his reports had been used at trial by plaintiff. Plaintiff was therefore not surprised by the content of Rosenberg’s testimony (see, Sadler v Brown, 108 AD2d 739, 740). It must also be noted that Rosenberg did not give a responsive answer to defendants’ one hypothetical question but only testified to his own medical treatment and to his observations. Accordingly, CPLR 3101 (d) was not applicable in these circumstances.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires requested pretrial expert disclosure and leaves trial courts discretion to decide whether late disclosure warrants preclusion.

Marra v. Hensonville Frozen Food Lockers Inc. · filed 1993-01-21(d)(1)(i)

That the section specifically bars preclusion when "good cause” existed for a party’s delay in retaining an expert to the point where there is "an insufficient period of time before the commencement of trial to give appropriate notice”, does not imply that Supreme Court’s discretion is otherwise restricted in determining whether to impose the sanction of preclusion for a failure of timely disclosure regarding expert testimony (see, CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]).

Section 3101(d) requires timely disclosure of expert witness information so parties can adequately prepare for trial.

Bauernfeind v. Albany Medical Center Hospital · filed 1993-07-15(d)

CPLR 3101 (d) was intended to provide timely provision of expert witness information between parties so that parties could adequately and thoroughly prepare for trial. Here, the noncompliance was willful in that plaintiff had retained Robert Mendelsohn in February 1988 to assist her in the preparation of the case. It was incumbent upon plaintiff to disclose the expert information as close to the date of retention as reasonable (see, Saar v Brown & Odabashian, 139 Misc 2d 328, 335).

A court may preclude expert testimony in its discretion when a party fails to comply with subsection (d)’s disclosure requirements.

Diamond v. Bank of New York · filed 1993-12-09(d)

While the trial court acted within its discretion in precluding the testimony of the Bank’s ladder expert for failure to comply both with CPLR 3101 (d) and a stipulation of the parties, in any event, the Bank was not prejudiced in any way by this ruling since the metallurgical deficiencies in the ladder were latent defects that could not have been discovered by Envirochrome through reasonable inspection, could not have provided it with constructive notice, and thus could not serve as a basis for finding it negligent (see, Delzotti v American LaFrance, 179 AD2d 497).

A trial court has discretion to preclude expert testimony when a party fails to identify a prospective expert witness or disclose the substance of the testimony under CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i).

Lesser v. Lacher · filed 1994-04-26(d)(1)(i)

Whether to preclude expert testimony as a sanction for a failure to identify a prospective expert witness or provide the substance of his or her testimony pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) is a matter best left to the trial court’s discretion (see, Vigilant Ins. Co. v Barnes, 199 AD2d 257), and, under the circumstances of this case, the determination not to preclude was proper (see, Simpson v Bellew, 161 AD2d 693, 698, lv denied 77 NY2d 808).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires expert disclosure upon request but sets no deadline for providing it.

Krajewski v. Rosinski · filed 1995-02-09(d)(1)(i)

Inasmuch as CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not set forth a time frame for expert disclosure but merely requires such information be offered ”[u]pon request”, we find that the ruling of Supreme Court complied with our interpretation of the statute in Bauernfeind v Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp. (195 AD2d 819, 820, lv denied 82 NY2d 885), and with the Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (see, 22 NYCRR 202.17 [g]).

Section 3101(d) conditionally protects litigation appraisals from disclosure, but appraisals substantially shaped by a testifying expert may be disclosed for impeachment.

Erie County Industrial Development Agency v. Muszynski · filed 1995-06-15(d)

The rule in New York is that an appraisal prepared by an expert witness who is not called as a witness and which was intended to be used solely for litigation, or for negotiation in an effort to accomplish a settlement prior to trial, or to establish a basis for a pretaking advance payment is not admissible at trial, as the appraisal enjoys a conditional immunity from disclosure as material prepared for litigation per CPLR 3101 (d). ... Mr. Klauk’s work is, therefore, so inextricably intertwined into the pretaking appraisals that those appraisals prepared by Mr. Pirritano, as well as the files of Mr. Klauk that were subject to this court’s in camera review, should be made available to the respondents as part of discovery.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a court to preclude expert testimony when a party fails to timely disclose the expert’s identity, qualifications, subject matter, and grounds for the opinion.

Ingleston v. Francis · filed 1994-07-21(d)(1)(i)

We reject plaintiff’s contention that Supreme Court erred in precluding testimony by plaintiff’s attending physician. We previously have held that a trial court has "broad discretionary powers in administering pretrial disclosure * * * and disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) is no exception” (Marra v Hensonville Frozen Food Lockers, 189 AD2d 1004, 1005 [citation omitted]).

CPLR 3101(d) permits preclusion of expert testimony when a party delays expert witness disclosure without good cause.

Kalkan v. Nyack Hospital · filed 1995-04-03(d)

...not rise to the level of "good cause” so as to avoid preclusion of expert testimony under CPLR 3101 (d).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) allows a party to seek a just order from the trial court when an opposing party fails to disclose an expert’s identity in a reasonable time.

Kozlowski v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. · filed 1994-11-16(d)(1)(i)

Plaintiffs’ remedy for failure to comply with that section is to move before the IAS Court for "whatever order may be just” (CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]).

A court may exclude expert testimony when a party fails to show good cause under § 3101(d)(1)(i).

Ginsberg v. New York Property Insurance Underwriting Ass'n · filed 1994-12-15(d)(1)(i)

The trial court acted well within its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiffs expert to testify, in view of plaintiffs failure to show good cause pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) and Ms cavalier and vacillating use of that statute.

Under CPLR 3101(d), a court has discretion to deny a request to compel expert disclosure or preclude an expert.

Intagliata v. Peelle Co. · filed 1996-05-13(d)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to preclude the defendant from producing an expert or compelling it to respond to the plaintiffs demand for expert disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (see, e.g., Tamborino v Burakoff, 224 AD2d 609).

A preclusion order for failure to give expert witness notice under § 3101(d)(1)(i) remains effective when the trial is rescheduled if the order applies to the trial of the action.

Ingelston v. Francis · filed 1995-07-20(d)(1)(i)

Plaintiff attempted to comply with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), this time by giving the required notice regarding her expert witness, Alfred, about 30 days before trial. ... First of all, Supreme Court’s order of preclusion read "at the trial of this action”. The trial has yet to be held and was not limited to the initial trial date but clearly applies to the trial on any date. To interpret the order otherwise in the absence of specific provision to do so would frustrate the purposes of the statute and would be wasteful of judicial time and effort.

CPLR 3101(d) permits a court to deny preclusion of expert testimony when a failure to disclose was neither intentional nor willful and caused no surprise or prejudice.

Fuoco v. County of Nassau · filed 1996-01-29(d)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the County’s motion to preclude the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses from testifying at trial since there was no proof of intentional or willful failure to disclose and no surprise or prejudice to the County (see, e.g., CPLR 3101 [d]; McDermott v Alvey, Inc., 198 AD2d 95; Marra v Hensonville Frozen Food Lockers, 189 AD2d 1004, 1005).

A court may defer setting a specific deadline for expert information under section 3101(d)(1) when the case is at an early stage.

DiPiano v. Truchly · filed 1995-11-09(d)(1)

The court acted within its discretion when it determined that the case was at an early stage, such that there was not yet a need for a specific deadline by which defendant had to provide expert information pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1).

Section 3101(d)(1) permits a court to preclude an expert and the expert’s affidavit when a party fails to respond timely to disclosure demands.

Mankowski v. Two Park Co. · filed 1996-03-18(d)(1)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the use of an expert and any expert affidavit due to the plaintiffs’ failure to timely respond to disclosure demands (see, CPLR 3101 [d] [1]; Vigilant Ins. Co. v Barnes, 199 AD2d 257; Bauernfeind v Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 195 AD2d 819; Robinson v New York City Hous. Auth., 183 AD2d 434, 435).

Minor deficiencies in expert disclosure do not justify precluding testimony when the opposing party shows no prejudice or surprise and further disclosure will suffice.

Rook v. 60 Key Centre, Inc. · filed 1997-05-30(d)

A less drastic remedy, such as further disclosure of the basis for the economist’s opinions, would have sufficed and would have better served the policies underlying the expert disclosure statute.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires expert information to be disclosed as close to the expert’s retention as reasonable.

Marks v. Solomon · filed 1997-10-06(d)(1)(i)

Regardless of the particular motive for the delay in serving the expert witness response, what is clear is that, contrary to her obligations under CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), and notwithstanding plaintiffs’ demand for such information almost 14 months earlier, defendant did not "disclose [her] expert information as close to the date of retention as reasonable” (Bauernfeind v Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., supra, 195 AD2d, at 820).

Failure to give timely written notice of expert testimony does not warrant preclusion when the failure was neither willful nor prejudicial.

Flour City Architectural Metals, Inc. v. Sky-Lift Corp. · filed 1997-09-18(d)(1)(i)

Defendant’s motion to preclude plaintiff from offering expert testimony for failure to timely comply with the written notice requirements of CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) was properly denied upon supportable findings that such failure was neither willful nor prejudicial {see, Lesser v Lacker, 203 AD2d 181; Peck v Tired Iron Transp., 209 AD2d 979).

Section 3101(d)(1) leaves the decision whether to preclude expert testimony to the court’s discretion.

Martinez v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1998-05-11(d)(1)

Under the circumstances of this case, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the motion of the defendant New York City Transit Authority to preclude ... the plaintiffs from offering certain expert testimony (see, CPLR 3101 [d] [1]).

Section 3101(i) requires disclosure of surveillance tapes on demand, even before depositions are completed.

DiNardo v. Koronowski · filed 1998-12-31(i)

As written, CPLR 3101 (i) requires disclosure of surveillance tapes upon demand.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) allows a court to preclude expert testimony when expert disclosure is delayed until the eve of trial.

Rassaei v. Kessler · filed 1998-07-27(d)(1)(i)

The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ application to preclude the plaintiff from producing any expert testimony based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) until the eve of trial, and until after the defendants’ in limine application had been made. ... Under all the circumstances, we conclude that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion (see, e.g., Interfilm, Inc. v Advanced Exhibition Corp., 249 AD2d 242; Lyall v City of New York, 228 AD2d 566; Vigilant Ins. Co. v Barnes, 199 AD2d 257).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) requires sufficiently detailed expert disclosures; when a party has had no notice that its disclosure is inadequate, the court may allow supplementation before precluding critical testimony.

Qian v. Dugan · filed 1998-12-10(d)(1)(i)

Given the critical nature of that testimony — which goes to the very theory of liability upon which his case is predicated — and the draconian impact of its preclusion (i.e., dismissal of the case), imposing so drastic a remedy without first affording plaintiff an opportunity to supplement his disclosure to comply with the statutory mandates was inexpedient (see, Herd v Town of Pawling, 244 AD2d 317; Chapman v State of New York, 227 AD2d 867, 868; compare, Kaprelian v Kaprelian, 236 AD2d 369, 370-371).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits a court to preclude expert testimony when a party responds to disclosure demands after trial begins, omits the substance of the testimony, and shows no good cause for the failure.

Hubbard v. Platzer · filed 1999-04-26(d)(1)(i)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the plaintiff from producing expert medical testimony based on her failure to comply with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) (see, Lyall v City of New York, 228 AD2d 566; Vigilant Ins. Co. v Barnes, 199 AD2d 257; Corning v Carlin, 178 AD2d 576). The plaintiff did not respond to disclosure demands until after the trial began, and failed to include the substance of the expert testimony sought to be precluded by the defendant (see, Rassaei v Kessler, 252 AD2d 577). Additionally, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause for her noncompliance with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) (see, Kaprelian v Kaprelian, 236 AD2d 369).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) does not require expert witness notices at least 30 days before trial.

Cutsogeorge v. Hertz Corp. · filed 1999-09-20(d)(1)(i)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court erred in finding that the plaintiff was required to serve the expert witness notices at least 30 days before trial pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i).

Section 3101(a) entitles a plaintiff examined by the defendants’ vocational rehabilitation experts to disclosure of any report, notes, or records generated by that examination.

Neves v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 1999-10-12(a)

Under the circumstances of this case, where the plaintiff submitted to an examination by the defendants’ experts, the plaintiff is entitled, in the interest of fairness, to disclosure of any report, notes, or records which may have been generated as a result of that examination (see generally, Kavanagh v Ogden Allied Maintenance Corp., supra; cf., Barrowman v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 252 AD2d 946).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) leaves preclusion of expert testimony for failure to comply with its disclosure requirements to the court’s discretion.

McGlauflin v. Wadhwa · filed 1999-10-25(d)(1)(i)

A determination regarding whether to preclude a party from introducing the testimony of an expert witness at trial based on the party’s failure to comply with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) is left to the sound discretion of the court (see, Hubbard v Platzer, 260 AD2d 605; Lyall v City of New York, 228 AD2d 566). Under the circumstances here, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion.

A party must show good cause to avoid preclusion of expert testimony when the expert is retained too close to trial for timely disclosure.

Klatsky v. Lewis · filed 2000-01-10(d)(1)(i)

Here, the plaintiffs’ proffered excuse does not rise to the level of “good cause shown” so as to avoid preclusion of the subject expert testimony under CPLR 3101 (d) (see also, Kalkan v Nyack Hosp., 214 AD2d 538).

A failure to provide expert disclosure under this subsection does not warrant precluding the expert’s affidavit without proof of willfulness or prejudice.

Jefferson v. Temco Services Industries, Inc. · filed 2000-05-18(d)(1)(i)

Since there was no proof that plaintiff’s failure to comply with a disclosure request pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) was willful or prejudicial, that failure should not have been utilized to preclude the affidavit of plaintiff’s expert (see, McDermott v Alvey, Inc., 198 AD2d 95; Busse v Clark Equip. Co., 182 AD2d 525).

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits an expert to testify despite late disclosure when the party shows good cause for the delay and the opposing party is not prejudiced.

McCrimmon v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2000-05-23(d)(1)(i)

Since defendant established “good cause” for its failure to timely disclose two expert witnesses who had been retained while the summary judgment motion was pending, and plaintiff was not thereby prejudiced, defendant should not have been precluded from calling the experts at trial (CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]; see, Gallo v Linkow, 255 AD2d 113, 116-117).

CPLR 3101 does not require preclusion of expert testimony for late disclosure when the delay was neither willful nor intentional and caused no prejudice.

McCluskey v. Shapiro · filed 2000-06-12

The court also properly refused to preclude the defendant’s expert’s testimony despite the late service of notice pursuant to CPLR 3101, since the belated disclosure was neither willful nor intentional, and the plaintiff was not prejudiced thereby (see, Cutsogeorge v Hertz Corp., 264 AD2d 752; Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580).

Section 3101(d)(1) permits conditional preclusion of an expert witness when late disclosure suggests intentional withholding, while allowing the court to consider prejudice and give the party a final chance to avoid preclusion.

Herrera v. Persaud · filed 2000-10-10(d)(1)

Despite a specific demand in defendants’ bill of particulars, a CPLR 3101 (d) (1) request, and a preliminary conference order mandating the exchange of all witnesses’ names, plaintiffs failed to disclose the existence of one of their expert witnesses until after they filed their note of issue, and then only in their opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ late disclosure of their expert witness raises the inference of an intentional withholding. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to grant defendants’ motion to preclude conditionally.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) permits preclusion of an expert’s testimony when a party gives late notice and fails to show good cause for retaining the expert shortly before trial.

Nigro v. Moore · filed 2000-11-16(d)(1)(i)

Although CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) provides that “where a party for good cause shown retains an expert an insufficient period of time before the commencement of trial to give appropriate notice thereof, the party shall not thereupon be precluded from introducing the expert’s testimony at the trial solely on grounds of noncompliance with this paragraph,” we agree with Supreme Court that plaintiffs made no showing of good cause for having retained their reconstruction expert more than three years after commencement of the action and a matter of just a few weeks prior to trial.

Section 3101(d)(1)(i) allows a court to admit expert testimony despite late disclosure when the opposing party has sufficient time to prepare cross-examination and rebuttal.

Ostrow v. New London Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2000-12-28(d)(1)(i)

Plaintiffs motion to set aside the verdict on the ground, inter alia, that the defense had failed to give notice of its experts’ opinion that plaintiffs use of steroids had caused her injuries, as required by CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), was denied by the trial court. We affirm on the ground that the trial court’s decision to permit the expert testimony in question cannot be said to have been an improvident exercise of its discretion. ... Under these circumstances, we perceive no reason to disturb the trial court’s determination that plaintiff had sufficient time to prepare cross-examination and rebuttal of the expert opinion in question during recess periods prior to the testimony of the relevant witnesses, which testimony was given from one to two weeks after defense counsel disclosed the opinion.