N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4

Section 508:4, I requires a breach of contract claim to be filed within three years of the breach or, under the discovery rule, within three years of when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the injury and its causal relationship to the breach.

Berthiaume v. Ticor Ins. · filed 2010-08-13I

Under New Hampshire law, a breach of contract claim must “be brought within three years of the act or omission complained of” o r , under the discovery rule exception, “within three years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.” See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I ( 1997); see also Black Bear Lodge v . Trillium Corp., 136 N.H. 635, 637 (1993)(applying § 508:4 to contract claims).

Section 508:4, I gives a plaintiff three years to bring a breach of contract claim after the alleged breach or after discovering, or reasonably being able to discover, the injury and its causal link to the breach.

Bourne v. Stewart Title · filed 2011-12-07I

Under New Hampshire law, a breach of contract claim must “be brought [ ] within 3 years of the act or omission complained of” o r , under the discovery rule exception, “within 3 years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I ; see Black Bear Lodge v . Trillium Corp., 136 N.H. 635, 637 (1993) (applying § 508:4 to contract claims). In a contract action, the relevant “act or omission” is a party’s alleged breach; thus, the statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged breach occurs, or when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that a breach occurred.

Under § 508:4, a breach-of-contract action accrues when the breach occurs, even if the plaintiff has not yet discovered it.

Roberts v. Richard & Sons, Inc. · filed 1973-04-30

An action for breach of contract unlike a tort action accrues when the breach occurs whether any damage then occurred or not. ... No reason appears to apply a different rule to the six-year statute of limitations applicable to the contract here.

Section 508:4’s limitations period for a contractual underinsured motorist benefits claim begins when the insurer rejects the claim.

Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance v. Walker · filed 1993-02-12

We hold, therefore, that the statute of limitations commenced to run on the date when the insurer rejected the insured’s claim for underinsured motorist benefits. On the facts of this case, the statute of limitations on the contract action to enforce the provisions of underinsured motorist coverage began to run on May 24,1989, after the amendment to RSA 508:4 reduced the statute of limitations to three years.

Part payment of a debt restarts the three-year limitations period from the date of the last payment.

Exeter Hospital v. Hall · filed 1993-07-07I

Nor do they deny the validity of the general rule that “part payment of a debt tolls the statute of limitations such that it commences to run from the date of last payment.” St. Francis Medical Center v. Vernon, 576 N.E.2d 1230, 1231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); see also Yeaton, 100 N.H. at 320, 125 A.2d at 926. Thus, if the hospital had been able to prove that the Halls made a payment on the debt within the past three years, the statute of limitations defense would have failed.

Section 508:4, I does not bar a recoupment defense, even when the underlying claim is time-barred.

Lago & Sons Dairy v. H.P. Hood · filed 1995-06-20I

Further, such a defense is not barred by R S A 508:4, I , the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 508:4, I does not bar recoupment asserted as a defense to reduce an opposing claim arising from the same transaction.

Lago & Sons Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood, Inc. · filed 1995-06-20(I)

As a defense, it is well established that recoupment “may result only in the reduction of the plaintiffs claim, not in affirmative judgment for any excess over that claim.” 20 Am.Jur.2d § 12, at 236. Further, such a defense is not barred by RSA 508:4,1, the applicable statute of limitations.

A new promise to pay, which may be inferred from a debtor’s acknowledgment of an existing debt, can remove § 508:4’s limitations bar.

Soper v. Purdy · filed 1999-10-28

The admission itself does not take the action out of the statute of limitations; rather, it is the new promise that may be inferred from that admission that removes the bar.

The three-year limitations period for a demand-note claim against a guarantor is not tolled by the maker’s payments or by the guarantor’s acknowledgment of liability without a willingness to pay.

Premier Capital, Inc. v. Gallagher · filed 1999-11-02I

The parties agree that the three-year limitations period set forth in RSA 508:4, I (1997) governs. ... We conclude that the foregoing factors do not toll the statute of limitations with regard to the guarantor. Gallagher made no payments to Atlantic in his capacity of guarantor. It is of no consequence that the guarantor may have been aware of the maker’s monthly payments because his awareness does not constitute an acknowledgment of an existing debt and a willingness to pay.

Section 508:4, I limits recovery on unpaid contractual assessments to those due within three years before the claim is filed.

West Gate Village Ass'n v. Dubios · filed 2000-10-11I

Without deciding whether RSA 508:2 would apply under these circumstances, we hold that RSA 508:4, I, limits West Gate’s recovery to within three years of filing their claim and counterclaim.

Section 508:4, I gives a claimant three years to bring a contract claim, measured from when the claim arises.

Coyle v. Battles · filed 2001-10-12I

To be timely, a contract claim must be brought within three years of when it arose. See RSA 508:4,1 (1997).

Section 508:4’s three-year limitations period applies to unpaid-wages actions under RSA 275:53.

Scacchi v. Dycom Indus. · filed 2004-01-09

Therefore, the three-year limitation period provided by RSA 508:4 applies to Scacchi’s claim in Count IV under RSA 275:53.

Section 508:4’s three-year limitation period applies to unpaid-wage actions brought in court under RSA 275:53.

Scacchi v. Dycom Industries, Inc. · filed 2004-01-09

Therefore, the three-year limitation period provided by RSA 508:4 applies to Scacchi’s claim in Count IV under RSA 275:53.

Section 508:4’s limitations period is not tolled against a defendant by another person’s promise to pay the debt.

A&B Lumber Co. v. Vrusho · filed 2005-02-24I

The sole question before us is whether Paul’s promise to pay the plaintiff in June 2000 tolled the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim against the defendants. We conclude that it did not.

Section 508:4(I)’s three-year limitations period runs separately for each rent payment when it becomes due.

Lakeview v. Care Realty, et al. · filed 2009-03-30(I)

The three-year limitations period begins to run as to each Additional Rent payment as it becomes due.

Section 508:4 allows a claim for each daily payment under an installment contract if that payment became due within three years before suit.

Nastasi v. Ronald Brown & a. · filed 2015-07-23I

Accordingly, we conclude that the defendants have failed to show that the court erred in implicitly ruling that the $45 per day obligation was in essence an installment contract and, thus, that the claims for rental payments from July 18, 2010 through the date of the fire were timely.

Section 508:4 requires a contract claim to be brought within three years of the breach; a claim for rent under an alleged oral agreement arose no later than the lease’s termination.

Zen Williams v. Krajcik · filed 2016-08-22

To be timely, a contract claim must be brought within three years of when the breach occurred. Coyle v. Battles, 147 N.H. 98, 100 (2001); see RSA 508:4. ... Thus, any claim for breach of the alleged oral contract must have been brought no later than three years from the lease termination in June 2010. However, the plaintiff did not bring his action until January 28, 2015, more than three years after the lease terminated.

Section 508:4, I does not abrogate the installment contract rule, which can apply to commercial real estate leases.

Slania Enterprises, Inc. v. Appledore Medical Group, Inc. · filed 2018-05-01I

Nor does the plain language of RSA 508:4, I, which sets forth a three-year statute of limitations for “all personal actions, except actions for slander or libel,” evince clear legislative intent to abrogate the installment contract rule. Accordingly, we conclude that commercial real estate leases do not fall outside the bounds of the installment contract rule, and we reverse the trial court’s contrary ruling.

The three-year limit for personal actions may be tolled when a debtor directly and unqualifiedly acknowledges liability for a subsisting debt and willingness to pay it.

TRW Bookkeeping & Tax Services, LLC v. Hayek · filed 2020-01-31I

The limitations period may be tolled, however, by a party’s acknowledgement of a subsisting debt accompanied by a direct and unqualified admission that the party is liable and willing to pay. ... Upon this record, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that the defendant reaffirmed his debt to the plaintiff in 2017 is supported by the evidence and not legally erroneous.

Section 508:4, I requires a contract claim to be brought within three years of the breach.

McLaughlin v. Leonard Jones, III · filed 2021-02-17I

Thus, a contract claim must be brought within three years of breach. Id.; RSA 508:4, I.

Section 508:4 gives contract actions a three-year limitations period that begins at breach unless the plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered the breach then.

Fujifilm North America Corporation et al. v. P M&R Printing Equipment, Inc. et al. · filed 2021-02-24

The statute of limitations for contract actions in New Hampshire is three years. See RSA 508:4. The limitations period begins running at the time of the breach unless the plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered the breach at the time of its occurrence. See id.

Section 508:4 gives breach-of-contract claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the contract is breached.

Behlau v. Tiger Tiger Productions, LLC · filed 2021-03-16

Under New Hampshire law, the limitations period for a breach of contract claim begins when the contract is breached. ... The applicable limitations period is three years. RSA 508:4; Coyle, 147 N.H. at 100.

Section 508:4, I supplies the three-year limitations period for an ERISA benefits claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), while federal common law determines when the claim accrues.

Lund, et al. v. Citizens · filed 1999-09-30I

The most analogous New Hampshire statute of limitations is that governing personal actions, including breach of contract: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I.

Section 508:4 provides a three-year limitations period for a Fourth Amendment Bivens claim brought in New Hampshire.

Schomaker v. United States · filed 2009-06-09

Schomaker does not dispute that his claim was subject to New Hampshire's three- year general personal injury statute of limitations, see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4; Roman v. Townsend, 224 F.3d 24, 26-27, 29 (1st Cir. 2000); accordingly, since his Fourth Amendment claim was not filed until nearly nine years after the date of accrual, it was properly deemed untimely.

Section 508:4, I provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which courts borrow for § 1983 claims filed in New Hampshire.

Tringali v. Attuso · filed 2014-04-24I

Because federal law does not provide a limitation period for § 1983 claims, courts borrow the statute of limitations for personal-injury actions of the state where the federal claim is filed. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276–80 (1985). In New Hampshire, the limitation period for personal-injury actions is three years. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I. ... In this case, plaintiff had three years from the date on which she became aware of her injury to file a § 1983 lawsuit against the defendants to whom she attributes her injury.

Section 508:4 provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 constitutional tort claims brought in New Hampshire.

Dayutis v. Brodeur, et al. · filed 1999-06-23

In the context of a constitutional tort claim brought pursuant to § 1983, I must apply New Hampshire’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Street v . Vose, 936 F.2d 3 8 , 39 (1st Cir. 1991)(citing Wilson v . Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985))(federal courts must borrow statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under law of forum state). In New Hampshire, the applicable limitations period is three years. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4 (1997).

Section 508:4 provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in New Hampshire.

Gorelik v. Costin, Pa-C · filed 2010-05-20

Here, the applicable New Hampshire statute of limitations is three years. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4 (1997).

Section 508:4 supplies the three-year limitations period for a Section 1983 false-imprisonment claim filed in New Hampshire.

Harrington v. Nashua · filed 2009-06-19

Here, the parties agree that Harrington's § 1983 claims are subject to New Hampshire's three year statute of limitations for tort claims. ... As this present action was filed more than three years later, on September 22, 2007, Harrington's false imprisonment claim is time-barred.

Section 508:4 provides the three-year limitations period for a § 1983 false imprisonment claim brought in New Hampshire.

Harrington v. City of Nashua · filed 2010-06-29

In this instance, the parties agree that the section 1983 claims are governed, temporally, by New Hampshire's three-year statute of limitations for personal injury tort claims. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4. Because the plaintiff commenced her action on September 22, 2007, her false imprisonment claim is time-barred if it accrued more than three years prior to that date.

Section 508:4 supplies a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 and Bivens actions filed in New Hampshire.

Schomaker v. USA et al. · filed 2008-05-13

In New Hampshire, the general personal injury statute of limitations is three years. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4. Thus, both § 1983 and Bivens actions are subject to a three-year limitation period in New Hampshire.

Section 508:4 supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in New Hampshire.

Hecking v. Barger, et al. · filed 2010-02-23

In this case, the applicable limitations period is New Hampshire’s three-year statute for personal actions. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4.

Section 508:4 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New Hampshire.

Katz, et al. v. McVeigh, et al. · filed 2013-03-15

The statute of limitations on a § 1983 claim brought in New Hampshire is the three years dictated by N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ... § 508:4.

Section 508:4 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New Hampshire.

Katz v. McVeigh · filed 2013-03-15

The statute of limitations on a § 1983 claim brought in New Hampshire is the three years dictated by N.H.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4.

Section 508:4, I provides the three-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims arising in New Hampshire; that period may be equitably tolled while a prisoner completes required administrative grievances.

Johnson v. Englander · filed 2022-09-15I

In New Hampshire, such claims are subject to a three-year limitations period. See McNamara v. City of Nashua, 629 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I). ... Complete exhaustion of the DOC’s grievance procedures was a prerequisite to bringing this suit, and therefore, the three-year limitations period applicable to this lawsuit may be equitably tolled for the period of time during which Johnson was exhausting the DOC’s administrative remedies, a process which, as described above, could have taken significantly longer than seventeen days.

Section 508:4, I provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims brought in New Hampshire.

Parker · filed 2025-10-08I

As relevant here, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I, bars suits brought more than “3 years of the act or omission complained of.”...

Section 508:4 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising from events in New Hampshire.

Amatucci · filed 2026-04-08

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising out of events occurring in New Hampshire is three years. See Gorelik v. Costin, 605 F.3d 118, 121 (1st Cir. 2010); see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4. As noted above, the allegedly fraudulent traffic violation and ensuing report to the Department of Safety occurred in August 2013. The three-year limitations period for filing suit concerning that occurrence expired no later than August 2016. Nothing in the complaint suggests that the limitations period should be tolled to allow the court to deem it timely filed. Accordingly, the statute of limitations bars Mrs. Amatucci’s claims.

Section 508:4(I) supplies a three-year limitations period for an Education of the Handicapped Act attorney’s fees action.

James v. Nashua School District · filed 1989-07-27(I)

Instead, the Court finds that RSA 508:4 I provides the most appropriate state statute of limitations for an action under the EHA. RSA 508:4 I states: “Except as otherwise provided by law, all personal actions, except actions for slander or libel, may be brought only within 3 years.”

Section 508:4, I supplies a three-year limitations period for ADA claims analogous to personal injury actions.

Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 1995-02-21I

The court finds that RSA 508:4, I, is the statute of limitations applicable to claims most analogous to plaintiffs ADA claims. The court further finds that the application of RSA 508:4 to plaintiffs ADA claims is not inconsistent with any federal law or policy. The court therefore rules that plaintiffs ADA claims are subject to the three-year limitations period in RSA 508:4.

Section 508:4’s three-year period for personal actions does not govern judicial review under EHA § 1415(e)(2).

Bow School District v. Quentin W. · filed 1990-11-09

... leads this Court to the inescapable conclusion that an action under § 1415(e)(2) more closely resembles an administrative appeal under RSA 541:6 than a personal action under RSA 508:4.

Section 508:4 supplies the catch-all limitations period for an IDEA compensatory education claim when no more specific limit applies.

Murphy v. Timberlane Regional · filed 1994-04-28

Thus, absent a more particular limitation applicable to this extraordinary compensatory education claim, we think it appropriate to borrow the New Hampshire catch-all limitation applicable to personal actions generally.

Section 508:4(I) provides the three-year limitations period for Title III ADA discrimination claims, which are analogous to personal injury actions.

Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins · filed 1995-02-21(I)

The court therefore rules that plaintiff's ADA claims are subject to the three-year limitations period in RSA 508:4.

Section 508:4 supplies the three-year limitations period for Title II ADA claims in New Hampshire.

Durante v. Belknap, NH · filed 2004-07-28

First, this court has previously held that claims brought under the ADA are governed by the three-year limitations period prescribed by RSA 508:4.

Section 508:4, I supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New Hampshire.

McCormick v. Wakefield, NH, Town of · filed 2023-09-22I

Because the claim was brought under § 1983, New Hampshire’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies.

Section 508:4 does not bar a party from raising a breach of contract as a defense to a timely ownership claim founded on the same agreements, even after the period for suing over the breach has expired.

National Pasteurized Egg v. Davidson · filed 2011-01-14I

In light of this authority, there is no merit to NPE’s argument that Davidson’s failure to sue it or PEC for breach of the agreements allegedly effecting the assignment of the Jumbo somehow prevents him from raising those breaches as a defense to NPE’s claim that those very agreements gave it sole ownership of the Jumbo.

Section 508:4’s limitations period cannot give a party ownership rights merely because another party’s contract claim has become time-barred.

NATIONAL PASTEURIZED EGGS, LLC v. Davidson · filed 2011-01-14I

NPE cannot use the statute of limitations to secure substantive rights that it does not already possess, as the successor to PEC’s interest in its agreements with Davidson or otherwise.

Section 508:4 does not bar a request for payments when the claimant filed a contempt motion and the opposing party’s maneuvering delayed the ruling.

Johnson v. Coe · filed 1997-07-15

We likewise reject the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant’s request for the $1,500 payments was time-barred. See RSA 508:4 (Supp. 1996). The defendant filed a motion for contempt on January 29, 1989. As the trial court noted, however, it was because of the plaintiff’s “inter-court maneuvering” that the motion was not granted until July 20, 1995.

Section 508:4’s three-year limitations period and discovery rule do not govern implied warranty claims brought under New Hampshire’s UCC; those claims are subject to the UCC limitations period.

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. RFI Supply, Inc. · filed 2006-03-17

Section 508:4 also explicitly contains a discovery rule exception to the statute of limitations, which is why Lockheed is attempting to persuade us that Section 508:4 applies.13 We reject Lockheed's argument for two reasons. First, in its complaint, Lockheed brought tort claims and contract claims. We have already disposed of Lockheed's tort claims, leaving only the contract claim for implied warranties, and both the form and substance of this claim appear to us to be a contract claim.

Section 508:4 does not establish the limitations period for warranty claims.

Carll v. McClain Industries · filed 2001-06-12

In any event, RSA 508:4 does not establish the limitations period for warranty claims.

Section 508:4 supplies a three-year limit for contract claims, but it does not govern when New Hampshire choice-of-law factors favor another jurisdiction’s limitation period.

TIG Insurance v EIFlow Insurance · filed 2015-09-29

EIFlow has moved for judgment on the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), or in the alternative for summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), arguing that New Hampshire’s three-year statute of limitations for breach of contact claims bars TIG’s claim for breach of the reinsurance contract. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4. ... Having considered the five traditional choice of law factors, however, the court concludes that the English statute of limitations should govern this action.

Section 508:4, II's defamation limitations period applies without a choice-of-law analysis when the plaintiff resided in New Hampshire when the claim arose.

Waterfield v. Meredith Corp. · filed 2011-04-14(II)

On remand, should the trial court determine that the plaintiff was a New Hampshire resident at the time of the alleged defamation, our limitations period will apply and no choice-of-law analysis need be made.

Section 508:4’s limitations period runs only in favor of those who are within New Hampshire.

Atwood v. Bursch · filed 1966-04-29

The general statute of limitations (RSA 508:4) runs only in favor of those who are within the state.

Section 508:4’s limitations period is tolled while a prerequisite administrative proceeding is pending.

New Hampshire Division of Human Services v. Allard · filed 1994-06-30

Assuming the right statute of limitations was applied and that it was not satisfied by the commencement of the administrative process, we need not decide when the cause of action accrued or whether sua sponte dismissal was proper because we hold that, even if the cause of action accrued on the date of sale, the limitations period should have been tolled during the pendency of the administrative process.

The three-year period for personal actions under § 508:4(I) is not tolled while a plaintiff pursues administrative proceedings that are not required for the state-law claims.

Rowe v. Foster's Daily Democrat · filed 1995-08-24I

The court finds and rules that plaintiff's state-law claims are prescribed by the expiration of the applicable three-year limitations statute, as said state-law relief represents an avenue of recovery that is "separate, distinct and independent" from that available through Title VII.

Section 508:4’s three-year limitation period is tolled during an administrative proceeding that must precede a civil action.

Chase Home for Children v. New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth & Families · filed 2011-11-22

A statute of limitations is tolled during a pending administrative proceeding if that proceeding is a prerequisite to a civil action. ... Within three years, on December 5, 2008, the providers raised their contract claims and thus RSA 508:4 does not bar them.

Section 508:4’s three-year limitations period is not administratively tolled for claims after the agency determines it lacks jurisdiction over them.

The Travelers Indemnity Company v. Construction Services of New Hampshire, LLC · filed 2017-11-29

After the DOL made its 2010 jurisdictional decision, which was not appealed, there was no administrative proceeding involving the three other subcontractors, and, thus, there could not be any further administrative tolling of the applicable statute of limitations for Travelers’s claims related to them.

Section 508:4, I sets a three-year limitations period; restrictive prison housing does not warrant equitable tolling unless it prevented the plaintiff from filing before the deadline.

Maggi v. P Grafton County Department of Corrections, et al. · filed 2025-01-15I

All of Maggi’s claims are subject to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in RSA 508:4, I. ... Rather, equitable tolling is only justified if such incapacitation or lack of access prevented the plaintiff from bringing his action prior to expiration of the limitations period. ... Here, even if Maggi could not initiate this action while he was housed in the allegedly restrictive settings, for the reasons already discussed these restrictions did not prevent him from initiating and litigating numerous actions during the limitations period, and the asserted restrictions on access to materials pertinent to this action were lifted approximately eighteen months before expiration of the limitations period.

Section 508:4’s statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise by plea or brief statement giving the plaintiff notice.

Yeaton v. Skillings · filed 1956-10-02

While special pleas, although not mandatory, have not been abolished in this state and their purpose may be accomplished by a “brief statement” under the general issue (RSA 515:3), it was essential that the defendant either by plea or brief statement give the plaintiff notice that he was to invoke this defense.

A defendant relying on § 508:4, I bears the burden of proving the limitations defense and must pursue it in time.

Kenneth T. Riso & a. v. Gregory R. Riso & a. · filed 2019-05-10I

These procedures clearly put the burden on the respondent to both raise and timely pursue a statute of limitations defense. As we have previously stated, the statute of limitations constitutes an affirmative defense that the defendant bears the burden of proving.

Section 508:4, I does not support dismissal on limitations grounds when the complaint leaves doubt about whether the claims are timely.

Blackwood v. Atrium Medical Corporation · filed 2019-08-12I

Taking Blackwood’s allegations in the light most favorable to her and resolving reasonable inferences in her favor, her allegations are sufficient to leave doubt as to the timeliness of her claims in Counts I – IV and VII.

Section 508:4, I provides a three-year limitations defense that a defendant may waive by failing to raise it before trial.

Estate of Bowen S. Downes v. Greenwood · filed 2023-05-12I

The defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it did not find the plaintiff’s suit barred by the three-year statute of limitations in RSA 508:4, I (2010). ... We conclude that, under our common law, the defendant waived his statute of limitations defense.

The three-year limitation period for criminal legal malpractice begins when the defendant obtains direct or collateral relief from the underlying conviction.

Therrien v. Sullivan · filed 2006-01-27

An action for malpractice is governed by RSA 508:4 (1997), which establishes a three-year limitation period for all personal injury actions. ... Accordingly, we conclude that an action for criminal legal malpractice does not accrue until a criminal defendant receives post-conviction relief.

Section 508:4 treats an action as commenced on the date of the writ, rather than when the writ is served, for limitations purposes.

Hoyt v. Nick · filed 1973-09-28

Since the date and not the service of the writ indicates the time when an action is commenced, the superior court ... correctly ruled that the plaintiff’s cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations.

An action brought on a judicially sanctioned writ within § 508:4’s three-year period is timely even if the writ is later dismissed.

Berg v. Kelley · filed 1991-05-06

It is inescapable that the plaintiffs brought their action on a judicially sanctioned writ, although it was later dismissed, well within the three-year statute of limitations.

Under these facts, superior court rules cannot extend the statutory time limit in § 508:4.

Arsenault v. Scanlon · filed 1995-06-09

The plaintiffs’ final argument seems to be that even if the trial court properly denied their motion, we should waive any applicable statutes of limitation, see RSA 508:4 (Supp. 1994); RSA 508:10, and remand the case to allow the plaintiffs to pursue their claim. Essentially, they argue that their failure to comply with the applicable procedures was due to accident, mistake, or misfortune, and that failure to waive these statutes would result in substantial injustice. See generally Preface, SUPER. Ct. R. We do not accept this argument. The plaintiffs were given multiple opportunities to perfect their original writ. Under these facts, the superior court rules cannot be used to extend statutory time limits.

Section 508:4 allows three years to bring a personal action; for limitations purposes, the action begins when the writ is served or entered, whichever occurs first.

Donnelly v. Eastman · filed 2003-06-30

RSA 508:4 provides, in pertinent part, that personal actions “may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of.” ... The statute does not define when an action has been “brought.” Rule 2, however, states: “For purposes of complying with the statute of limitations, an action shall be deemed commenced on the date of service of the writ, or the date of entry of the writ, whichever event occurs first.”

Section 508:4’s three-year limitation for personal actions does not govern a petition to pierce the corporate veil to enforce an existing judgment against a corporation.

Norwood Group, Inc. v. Phillips · filed 2003-07-24(I)

The defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ petition to pierce the corporate veil is a personal action governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See RSA 508:4,1 (1997). ... We find the reasoning of these cases persuasive and hold that the plaintiffs’ equitable petition to pierce the corporate veil is governed by the twenty-year statute of limitations for actions to enforce a judgment.

Section 508:4’s three-year limit for personal actions does not apply to a claim enforcing ownership rights in railroad track that is part of real property.

Boston v. Sprague Energy Corp. · filed 2004-12-03

B&M’s action is one to enforce a right to ownership in real property, and therefore the twenty-year limitations period set forth in RSA 508:2 applies.

Section 508:4’s three-year limit does not apply to the State unless the statute expressly makes it applicable to the State.

State v. Lake Winnipesaukee Resort, LLC · filed 2009-06-17I

We follow the doctrine that unless a statute of limitations expressly waives nullum tempus by making a limitations period specifically applicable to the State, the sovereign remains immune from general statutes of limitations.

A claim for real estate sale proceeds that depends on proving breach of contract or fraud is a personal action subject to a three-year limitations period.

Plaisted v. LaBrie · filed 2013-07-16I

Here, construing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor, we agree with the trial court that the plaintiffs action was personal in nature and, therefore, subject to the three-year statute of limitations in RSA 508:4.

Section 508:4’s three-year limitations period applies to personal actions brought in equity.

James Conant & a. v. Timothy O'Meara & a. · filed 2015-05-15

We apply the general three-year limitations period for personal actions notwithstanding that the Conants brought their petition in equity.

Section 508:4 applies to municipalities’ contract claims; nullum tempus does not exempt those claims from its limitations period.

City of Rochester v. Marcel A. Payeur, Inc. & a. · filed 2016-12-13I

Because applying the doctrine of nullum tempus to a municipality’s contract claims is not supported by the public policy underlying nullum tempus and undermines the public policy underlying statutes of limitations, we conclude that nullum tempus does not bar the application of RSA 508:4 to the City’s contract claims.

Section 508:4 applies its three-year limitations period to statutory zoning-enforcement actions seeking equitable relief because they are personal actions.

Sullyville, LLC v. Town of Carroll · filed 2021-04-08I

We conclude that the actions brought by the Trainors pursuant to RSA 676:15 are “personal actions” for the purpose of RSA 508:4, and are thus subject to the three-year limitations period.

Section 508:4’s three-year period for personal actions is not extended by the continuing effects of earlier acts alleged to constitute a corporate freeze-out.

Thorndike v. Thorndike · filed 2006-11-30I

We concur with this reasoning and conclude that the wrongdoing alleged by the petitioner in this case is not a continuing wrong. Even if all that the petitioner alleges is true, and the respondent continues to exclude him from employment at AMD, continues to take a salary without paying a salary to the petitioner, continues to refuse to permit him to participate in AMD’s operations, and continues to ban him from AMD’s premises, the acts causing the petitioner’s injuries occurred prior to February 18, 2002, and the statute of limitations began to run when the acts occurred. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that any action based upon events that occurred prior to February 18, 2002, is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 508:4’s three-year limitations period is not extended by continuing damage from a completed tort.

Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC v. Wyner · filed 2007-12-04

In this case, however, any tortious interference on Singer’s part occurred at two discrete points in time, and concluded once Wyner signed her respective purchase agreements. Only the damage inflicted by Singer’s alleged interference was of a continuing nature. ... Thus, we decline to apply the “continuing wrong” doctrine in this case.

Section 508:4 sets a six-year limitation period and provides a two-year tolling period for claims by minors.

Stratford v. Employers · filed 1996-05-03

However, the six-year statute of limitations governing the students' claims expired in 1989 .3 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4 (1983). ... New Hampshire's two-year tolling provision for claims by minors. New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated § 508:4, would not have significantly extended the statute of limitations.