N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358

Section 358-A:3(IV-a) exempts transactions entered into more than two years before the complaint, with the limitations period running from the allegedly unfair or deceptive practice rather than from discovery of the deception or resulting harm.

McKenna v. American Institute, et al. · filed 1995-11-03IV-a

Section 358-A:3 states, in pertinent part: "The following transactions shall be exempt from the provisions of this chapter: IV-a. Transactions entered into more than 2 years prior to the complaint . . . "

Section 358-A:3, IV-a required claims under the Consumer Protection Act to be brought within two years of the underlying transaction; because that period was an exemption rather than a statute of limitations, discovery and fraudulent-concealment tolling did not apply, and the 1997 amendment did not revive an expired claim.

Mitchell v. Curtin-Hebert Co. · filed 1997-07-09IV-a

Prior to 1997, the Consumer Protection Act provided that a claim based upon the Act must be brought within two years of the underlying transaction. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:3, IV-a (1995). Because this provision has been construed as an exemption rather than a statute of limitations, the provision "forecloses application of the usual rules for tolling of statutes of limitations, i.e., the discovery and fraudulent concealment rules." Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, 7 92 F. Supp. 895, 901-02 (D.N.H. 1992) (expressly adopted by Catucci v. Lewis, 140 N.H. 243, 244-45 (1995)). ... The Consumer Protection Act was recently amended to allow claims for "[t ]ransactions entered into more than 3 years prior to the time the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, of the conduct alleged to be in violation of this chapter." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:3, IV-a (effective January 1, 1997). ... Absent clear evidence to the contrary. New Hampshire law presumes that statutes are intended to operate prospectively. ... Here, the Mitchells' right to assert a consumer protection claim expired in 1983. The 1997 amendment to the Consumer Protection Act cannot now bring it back to life.

The Consumer Protection Act does not apply to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship.

Bartholomew v. Delahaye · filed 1995-11-08

The CPA lists several examples of prohibited activities, all of which generally deal with the relationship between businesses and consumers, none of which deals with the relationship between employers and employees. ... I decline to extend the protection of the CPA beyond the limit set by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for that state's similar statute. Count VIII of plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.

The New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act does not apply to disputes arising from an employee-employer relationship.

Scouras v. Purity Supreme · filed 1997-07-30

The CPA states, in pertinent part: ... It shall be unlawful for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state. ... I have previously determined that the CPA does not apply to the employee-employer relationship. ... he concedes that Bartholomew applies since it is undisputed that Scouras’s claims derive from his employment relationship with Purity. I therefore grant summary judgment for Purity on Count V.

A § 358-A unfair-trade-practice claim that is essentially an embroidered breach-of-contract claim is subject to the contract's choice-of-law clause, unlike one based on tortious conduct.

Northern Laminate v. Electra Polymers · filed 1996-01-12

Northern bases its unfair trade practice claims on N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A (1994). ... When New Hampshire law is silent on an issue concerning § 358:A, the New Hampshire Supreme Court frequently relies on interpretations of Massachusetts' similar statute, M.G.L.A. c. 93A ("93A"). ... If a 93A claim is essentially an "embroidered 'breach of contract'" claim, it is subject to the choice-of-law clause in the parties' contract and therefore must be dismissed. ... In contrast, if a 93A claim is essentially a claim of tortious conduct, it is not subject to a choice-of-law clause in the parties' contract. ... Northern does not allege that defendants committed any wrongdoing besides breaching the contract in bad faith. ... Therefore, defendants' motion to dismiss Northern's unfair trade practice claims (Counts II and III) is granted.

Section 358-A:10(I) requires a prevailing plaintiff to receive reasonable attorney's fees and costs, with reasonableness determined through judicial discretion and the applicable fee factors.

Pep Boys v. Aranosian · filed 1996-03-26(I)

RSA 358-A:10 does not describe a particular method for calculating fee awards under the Act. See Adolph Coors, supra at 3. However, the New Hampshire Supreme Court and this court have generally considered the eight criteria borrowed from Rule 1.5 of the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct in setting reasonable fees.

Section 358-A:10-a permits a discretionary award of attorney fees and does not require that the award go to named plaintiffs instead of the class as a whole.

Tremblay et al v. Morris · filed 2002-11-08(10-a)

Unlike the statute at issue in In Re Abbott Labs., RSA 358-A:10-a does not require that an award of attorneys fees be made to the named plaintiffs rather than the class as a whole.

Subsection 358-A:2(V) prohibits representing that goods have sponsorship or approval they do not have.

Chemical v. Textiles · filed 1996-03-29(V)

Similarly, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2(V) proscribes "[r]epresenting that goods . . . have sponsorship [or] approval . . . that they do not have . . . ." Id. ... TCI's advertisement could be read, and apparently was read by CFC, to imply sponsorship of TEXLAM by DuPont. However, such a reading is a strained one. The advertisement certainly does not represent that TEXLAM is sponsored, approved, endorsed, or recommended by DuPont. Nor is the advertisement likely to have caused confusion as to the sponsorship of TEXLAM. It simply states that DuPont selected TEXLAM for testing because of its useful attributes, a factually correct, though implicitly puffed, statement. TCI's advertisement did not, therefore, violate either the Lanham Act or the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act.

Section 358-A:2 applies only when the defendant's unfair or deceptive conduct occurs in connection with trade or commerce in New Hampshire.

Harris v. MAN Roland · filed 1996-05-09A:2

The Act covers only unfair acts or practices that a person commits "in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state." Thus, the Consumer Protection Act is inapplicable unless a defendant commits the unfair acts in guestion while engaged in trade or commerce in New Hampshire.

Section 358-A:3, IV-a’s 1997 amendment changing the consumer-protection exemption to three years operates prospectively and cannot revive claims that had already expired.

Seasons at Attitash v. Country Gas · filed 1997-09-12IV-a

I reject the Owners’ argument that the three-year exemption can be applied in this case. Absent clear evidence to the contrary, New Hampshire law presumes that statutes are intended to operate prospectively. ... Here, the Owners’ right to assert consumer protection claims arising out of pre-January 1994 installments expired in January 1996. The 1997 amendment to the Consumer Protection Act cannot now bring them back to life.

The New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act covers intentional misrepresentation in a commercial context that causes substantial injury to a consumer or business as an unfair or deceptive act or practice.

Miller Brewing v. Silver Bros. · filed 1997-09-12

Having reviewed the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s opinions in Roberts and Gautschi, I am satisfied that a claim of intentional misrepresentation in a commercial context that results in substantial injury to a consumer or business is the type of action that ordinarily would fall within the scope of the FTC Act. Therefore, it is also sufficient to qualify as an unfair and deceptive act or practice under New Hampshire’s CPA.

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce and requires actionable misrepresentations to meet a sufficiently egregious standard, not merely vague advertising.

Evans v. Taco Bell · filed 2005-09-23V and VII

New Hampshire’s Consumer Protection Act prohibits, in relevant part, “any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2. ... As Evans recognizes, “‘[t]o be actionable [under RSA 358-A : 2 ] , the objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.’” ... The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that the statute’s prohibition extends to misrepresentations made in the course of a business transaction. ... Such a vague account of the content of Taco Bell’s advertising simply cannot support a Consumer Protection Act claim based on Taco Bell’s allegedly false statements.

The Consumer Protection Act does not cover ordinary breach-of-contract claims, prohibits specified confusion-based unfair or deceptive practices, and does not require proof of actual confusion or misrepresentation.

Nordica Health v. Icon Health · filed 2009-08-112, 11

The Consumer Protection Act is not applicable to "ordinary" breach of contract actions. New Hampshire v. Sideris, 951 A. 2d 164, 168 (N.H. 2008). Rather, it proscribes unfair and deceptive trade practices, specifically, "causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services; causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection or association with, or certification by, another." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2. Proof of actual confusion or misrepresentation is not reguired. § 358-A:11.

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce; unenumerated conduct must be of the same type as the listed categories and reach a level of commercial rascality.

Franchi v. New Hampton School · filed 2009-09-18I-XIV

That is not the end of the matter, though, because the Act outlaws conduct “includ[ing], but not limited to” that listed in the categories; thus, other conduct may amount to unfair or deceptive acts or practices, provided it is “of the same type as proscribed by the enumerated categories.” ... But, in addition, “‘[t]he objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.’” ... NHS’s alleged conduct--which the amended complaint specifies as “making misrepresentations as to [the school’s] ability and willingness to educate [CF]”--does not meet this standard. ... NHS’s motion to dismiss Franchi’s Consumer Protection Act claim is granted.

Section 358-A:2 does not cover every act in trade or commerce; an ordinary breach of contract alone is not actionable under the Consumer Protection Act, and whether conduct is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact.

Bethlehem v. NCES · filed 2010-07-29:2

The New Hampshire Supreme Court has recognized that although "the general provision of [N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2] is broadly worded, . . . not all conduct in the course of trade or commerce falls within its scope." ACAS Acguisitions (Precitech) Inc. v. Hobert, 155 N.H. 381, 402 (2007). As such, "[a]n ordinary breach of contract claim does not present an occasion for the remedies under the Consumer Protection Act." Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 390 (1996); see State v. Moran, 151 N.H. 450, 453 (2004). "Whether a party has committed an unfair or deceptive act, within the meaning of the consumer protection act, is a question of fact." Chroniak v. Golden Inv. Corp., 983 F.2d 1140, 1146 (1st Cir. 1993) (guotations and brackets omitted). The parties vehemently dispute, in conflicting affidavits, whether NCES's refusal to approve CRMCB's expansion plans result from a genuine concern about the impact on landfill operations or that concern is mere pretext. It would be inappropriate, therefore, to grant summary judgment where there exists, at the most basic level, a genuine issue of material fact, namely, whether NCES acted in a deceptive or unfair manner.

The exemption applies only when the specific challenged conduct is otherwise permitted by an authorized regulatory board or officer, not merely when the defendant's industry is subject to regulation.

Ford Motor v. Motor · filed 2000-08-24A:3, I

As both the New Hampshire Supreme Court and this court have explained, the applicability of this exemption turns on whether the specific conduct challenged by a plaintiff is “otherwise permitted” by an authorized regulatory board or officer, not on whether the defendant’s business or industry is subject to regulation by such an authority. ... Because the exemption does not apply, Meredith has stated a cognizable claim under chapter 358-A.

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce, including non-enumerated conduct meeting the rascality test.

Derry & Webster v. Bayview · filed 2014-12-29A:2

The CPA broadly proscribes “any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state” and enumerates a non-exhaustive list of such “deceptive act[s] or practice[s].” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2. To determine whether the statute prohibits a non-enumerated act or practice, courts apply what the New Hampshire Supreme Court has called the “rascality test.” ... To be actionable under the rascality test, the challenged conduct “must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.” ... An ordinary breach of contract does not generally meet the rascality test and, therefore, does not usually impose liability under the CPA. ... The New Hampshire Supreme Court has consistently held that inducing another to enter a contract based on a knowing misrepresentation of the promisor’s intent to perform under the contract violates the CPA. ... Derry & Webster, therefore, has stated a claim for relief under the CPA.

Section 358-A:2 broadly prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce and can encompass abusive litigation practices in appropriate circumstances.

Gallagher v Funeral Source et al. · filed 2015-02-24358-A:2

As codified by Section 358-A:2 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes, the CPA broadly proscribes “any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2. I see no reason why abusive litigation practices could not rise to this threshold under certain factual circumstances, and nothing in § 358-A:2 suggests otherwise. See id. Furthermore, although the CPA expressly exempts certain types of transactions from its ambit, abusive litigation practices are not included on this list. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:3. Thus, I can find no basis in the CPA’s plain text to conclude that CPA liability does not extend to abusive litigation practices.

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in New Hampshire trade or commerce, including disparaging another's business by false or misleading factual representations, and its reach is not limited to the specifically listed acts.

Micronics Filtration Holdings, Inc., v. Timothy Miller, Peter Kristo, and Pure Filtration, LLC · filed 2018-10-04

The NHCPA makes it “unlawful for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within” New Hampshire.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2. The prohibited conduct explicitly includes “disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact,” but is not limited to acts specifically listed.

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce; unlisted conduct must reach the required level of rascality, and an ordinary breach of contract alone is not a Consumer Protection Act violation.

Anderson v. Trustees of Dartmouth College · filed 2020-12-04A:2

New Hampshire’s Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2, provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” The Act lists several “actions that fall within its prohibition, but that is not an exhaustive list of prohibited methods, acts, or practices.” ... “If the challenged conduct is not listed in RSA 358-A:2, to be actionable it ‘must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.’” ... Under New Hampshire law, “[a]n ordinary breach of contract claim . . . is not a violation of the CPA.” ... Such an allegation – an ordinary contract claim – does not rise to an actionable level of “rascality” under the Consumer Protection Act. Dartmouth is entitled to judgment on Anderson’s claim under New Hampshire’s Consumer Protection Act.

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce; conduct not specifically listed is actionable only if it reaches the required level of rascality.

Andrea Pollack and Angela Garozzo Scopelianos, Plaintiffs v. Goodwin & Associates Hospitality Services, LLC d/b/a Goodwi · filed 2021-08-25A:2

New Hampshire's Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2, prohibits the use of “any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” The Act lists several “actions that fall within its prohibition, but that is not an exhaustive list of prohibited methods, acts, or practices.” ... “If the challenged conduct is not listed in RSA 358-A:2, to be actionable it ‘must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.’”

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce, and unlisted conduct must reach a high level of rascality to be actionable.

Andrea Pollack and Angela Garozzo Scopelianos, Plaintiffs v. Goodwin & Associates Hospitality Services, LLC d/b/a Goodwi · filed 2021-08-27A:2

New Hampshire's Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2, provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” ... “If the challenged conduct is not listed in RSA 358-A:2, to be actionable it ‘must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.’” ... However, plaintiffs’ CPA claim fails because plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that defendants’ conduct constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice.” RSA 358-A:2. ... Because plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that defendants’ purported conduct “attain[s] a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce,” George v. Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., 162 N.H. 123, 129 (2011), they have not stated a claim under New Hampshire’s Consumer Protection Act. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ CPA claim is granted.

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce; conduct not specifically listed must reach a level of commercial rascality to be actionable.

Pollack v. Goodwin & Associates Hospitality Services, LLC · filed 2021-08-27

New Hampshire's Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2, provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” The Act lists several “actions that fall within its prohibition, but that is not an exhaustive list of prohibited methods, acts, or practices.” Moulton v. Bane, No. 14-CV-265-JD, 2016 WL 1091093, at *11 (D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2016) (citing ACAS Acquisitions (Precitech) Inc. v. Hobert, 155 N.H. 381, 402 (2007)). “If the challenged conduct is not listed in RSA 358-A:2, to be actionable it ‘must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.’” Moulton, 2016 WL 1091093, at *11 (quoting Axenics, Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 164 N.H. 659, 675 (2013)).

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce; unlisted conduct is actionable when it reaches a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of commerce.

Homes Development Corp. v. Edmund & Wheeler, Inc. · filed 2022-09-29

New Hampshire's Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2, provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” The Act lists several “actions that fall within its prohibition, but that is not an exhaustive list of prohibited methods, acts, or practices.” ... “If the challenged conduct is not listed in RSA 358-A:2, to be actionable it ‘must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.’” ... The court disagrees. Plaintiffs have plausibly pled that defendants’ alleged conduct constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice.” RSA 358-A:2.

Section 358-A requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice; § 358-A:2 lists unlawful acts.

Martha I.O. Mogaji v. Tom Chan, Rosa Chan, TRC Trust, Nan King Restaurant · filed 2022-10-07

The claim also fails under the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-a, as Ms. Mogaji presented no evidence or argument that the defendants engaged in any “unfair or deceptive act or practice” as is required by that statute.

For conduct not covered by an enumerated violation, the Act reaches trade or commerce only when the conduct rises to the level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to commerce; an ordinary breach of contract is not enough.

Ingemi v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, as Indenture Trustee · filed 2023-07-13A:2

Pursuant to N.H. Rev. Stat. An. § 358-A:2, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” Although the statute is broadly worded, “not all conduct in the course of trade or commerce falls within its scope.” ... “An ordinary breach of contract claim, for example, is not a violation of the CPA.” ... Where, as here, a plaintiff does not rely on an enumerated NHCPA violation, conduct falls within the NHCPA’s prohibition if it “attain[s] a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.”

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce, but an ordinary breach of contract is not enough and unenumerated conduct must reach the required level of rascality.

Christine Ingemi Richard Ingemi v. Civ. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, As Indentured Trustee for the Registered Holde · filed 2023-08-07A:2

Pursuant to N.H. Rev. Stat. An. § 358-A:2, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” Although the statute is broadly worded, “not all conduct in the course of trade or commerce falls within its scope.” ... “An ordinary breach of contract claim, for example, is not a violation of the CPA.” ... Where, as here, a plaintiff does not rely on an enumerated NHCPA violation, conduct falls within the NHCPA’s prohibition if it “attain[s] a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.”

Foreclosure initiation and property inspections that are not unfair or deceptive and do not reach the CPA's rascality standard do not violate § 358-A.

Galvin v EMC Mortgage Corporation · filed 2014-10-03A:2

The Galvins have failed to establish that any of the defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice prohibited by N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A. Judgment shall be entered in favor of the defendants on Count 3.

A CPA claim requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice, and conclusory allegations that merely track statutory elements do not state a claim.

Kacey Lynn and Aniecia Vargas v Merrimack College · filed 2021-06-24A:2

Because plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to support their CPA claim, I agree with Merrimack that the claim must be dismissed.

A CPA claim requires sufficient factual allegations of an unfair or deceptive act or practice; conclusory assertions that track the statutory elements are insufficient.

Lynn v Merrimack College · filed 2021-06-24A:2

Because plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to support their CPA claim, I agree with Merrimack that the claim must be dismissed.

The NHCPA uses a non-exhaustive list of prohibited practices and applies the rascality test to other conduct of the same type as the listed categories.

Bellwether Community Credit Union v Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc · filed 2018-10-24A:2

and enumerates seventeen unlawful types of unfairly competitive or deceptive acts.

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce, including misrepresentations about a product’s characteristics or quality and advertising goods with intent not to sell them as advertised.

CILLUFFO v. SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC. · filed 2024-03-26(V), (VII), (IX)

To state a valid claim under § 358-A:2 of the NHCPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in an “unfair method of competition” or an “unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” ... A misrepresentation is made “within this state” for purposes of the NHCPA “whenever a person receives a misrepresentation in the State of New Hampshire.” ... We find that Plaintiff Cilluffo has sufficiently pleaded a claim under the NHCPA. Construing Plaintiffs’ facts as true, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, Defendants plausibly engaged in an “unfair or deceptive act or practice” in its sale of a Class Vehicle containing the Starlink system in the state of New Hampshire. ... His problems with the system indicate that he received less than the “standard” and “quality” of the product than was represented at the time of his purchase. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2.

Section 358-A:2 reaches conduct that falls within the protective purpose of another consumer-protection statute; failure to disclose the percentage interest rate required by the Second Mortgage Home Loans Act can be a predicate unfair or deceptive practice.

Chroniak v. Golden Investment Corp. · filed 1993-01-192

We conclude that the appellants' failure to disclose the percentage interest rate as required under SMHLA, section 3, was sufficient to form a predicate "unfair or deceptive practice or act" under CPA, section 2, and that the plaintiff was entitled to such an instruction.

Section 358-A:2 reaches only conduct of the types particularized in its enumerated categories, even though the list is nonexclusive.

Schwartzco Enterprises LLC v. TMH Management, LLC · filed 2014-11-17358-A:2

“Although the NHCPA provides a non-exclusive list of prohibited conduct, the statute precludes only those ‘types of [acts] therein particularized.’ ... “In other words, a plaintiffs claim must fall within the [fourteen] enumerated categories in order to be actionable.” ... In the present case, the gravamen of the proposed amended complaint is that the Defendants, including Brown, pitched certain investment ventures directly to the Plaintiffs, and induced them to invest by making false and misleading representations about the financial profitability of The Meat House franchise system and the Plaintiffs’ ability to obtain a return on those investments. In the Court’s view, such allegations do not fall within “the type” of conduct proscribed by the NHCPA.

The exemption in § 358-A:3, I covers the commercial relationship between motor vehicle dealers and distributors or manufacturers when regulated by the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act.

Colonial Imports v. Volvo · filed 2001-01-09I

Accordingly, I conclude that the commercial relationship of motor vehicle dealers to distributors, or manufacturers, falls within the exemption to the Consumer Protection Act provided by § 358-A:3, I .

Section 358-A:3 exempts trade or commerce subject to the jurisdiction of the bank commissioner or federal banking regulators that have authority to regulate unfair or deceptive practices.

Aubertin v. Fairbanks Capital · filed 2005-02-11:3

The Consumer Protection Act does not cover “trade or commerce that is subject to the jurisdiction of the bank commissioner . . . or federal banking or securities regulators who possess the authority to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices.” ... Chapter 397-B is a comprehensive regulatory scheme that empowers the Commissioner to protect consumers from the same types of fraudulent, unfair and deceptive practices that are targeted by the Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, Fairbanks is correct in claiming that the transactions on which Aubertin’s claim against it are based are exempt from coverage under the Consumer Protection Act. ... Accordingly, because Aubertin’s claim against U.S. Bank is based on conduct that is subject to the jurisdiction of a federal banking regulator, it is exempt from suit for a violation of the Consumer Protection Act.

The Consumer Protection Act’s securities-regulation exemption does not cover deceptive conduct occurring in the practice of law merely because the underlying transaction involves issuing securities.

Elmo, et al. v. Callahan, et al. · filed 2012-08-24I

The defendants’ alleged unfair and deceptive conduct, however, did not occur in the course of the issuance, offer, or sale of securities. The trade or commerce in which defendants’ conduct occurred was the practice of law; specifically, their representation of the plaintiffs in the S3 transaction. ... That the underlying transaction ultimately involved the issuance of securities by S3 to plaintiffs is of no moment. ... The director inarguably lacks the authority to supervise or regulate the practice of law. Because that particular trade or commerce is not subject to the director’s jurisdiction, the CPA exemption set forth in N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:3, I does not apply. Defendants’ motion is denied as to the CPA claim.

The New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act reaches conduct that is part of trade or commerce having direct or indirect effects on New Hampshire residents.

Meijer, Inc. v. Ferring B.V. · filed 2012-10-17

The New Hampshire legislature intended for the NHCPA to have a “broad sweep,” and thus any “conduct which was part of trade or commerce that had direct or indirect effects on the people of [New Hampshire]” satisfies the statute.

The CPA exempts trade or commerce subject to the jurisdiction of federal banking or securities regulators, and the party claiming an exemption bears the burden of proving it.

LeDoux v. JP Morgan Chase N.A., et al. · filed 2012-11-20A:3(I), A:3(V)

As this court recently noted, to determine whether trade or commerce is “subject to the jurisdiction of” a regulator, the court “must examine the statutes that define the [regulator’s] powers and authority.” ... “If those statutes grant the [regulator] the authority to supervise or regulate the trade or commerce in which the defendants’ deceptive practice occurred, then that trade or commerce is ‘subject to the jurisdiction of’ the regulator, and the CPA does not apply.” ... “The burden of proving exemptions from the provisions of [the CPA is] upon the person claiming the exemption.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:3, V. By sketching the outline of an argument in a footnote and leaving it to the court to fill in key details, defendants have not carried that burden.

Section 358-A:10 provides prevailing plaintiffs attorneys' fees as a matter of course and enhanced damages upon a showing that the violation was willful or knowing, and its remedial rules are not preempted by the Lanham Act.

Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corporation · filed 2006-01-2710

New Hampshire, by contrast, provides attorneys' fees as a matter of course and only to plaintiffs, and offers enhanced damages automatically upon a showing that the violation was willful or knowing. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10. ... By contrast, the Lanham Act primarily provides a federal forum for what is in substance a traditional common-law claim. If state substantive regimes are (ordinarily) not preempted by the Lanham Act, neither is New Hampshire's tinkering with the remedial components.

The Consumer Protection Act exempts transactions occurring more than three years before the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the alleged violation.

Patrick Short, et al. v. Civ. Amerada Hess Corp. et al. · filed 2019-03-29A:3, IV-a

The Act exempts from its provisions, among other things, “[t]ransactions entered into more than 3 years prior to the time the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, of the conduct alleged to be in violation of this chapter . . . .” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:3, IV-a. “To determine whether a claim is exempt from the CPA, [the court] look[s] back from the time that the plaintiffs ‘knew or reasonably should have known’ of the alleged violation. If the transaction at issue occurred more than three years before that time, then it is exempt.” ... There is no dispute, however, that New Hampshire banned MTBE in 2007 or that the defendants’ actions alleged to violate the Consumer Protection Act all occurred before 2007. Thus, even crediting the plaintiffs’ representations concerning when they knew of the alleged violation, those allegedly actionable activities occurred more than three years prior to the plaintiffs’ knowledge, and are thus exempted from the Act. The defendants are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ Consumer Protection Act claim as well.

The CPA exempts national-bank trade or commerce subject to comprehensive OCC regulation of unfair or deceptive practices.

Atkins v U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2014-01-02A:3(I)

Because each defendant is exempt as a national bank, I need not decide the applicability of exemptions pursuant to the jurisdiction of the state bank commissioner.

The CPA exempts a national bank's mortgage-servicing conduct when it is subject to the OCC's authority to regulate unfair or deceptive practices.

Campbell v Specialized Loan Servicing · filed 2014-01-23A:3(I)

Bank of America invoked the OCC's power in its motion to dismiss, and cited relevant law to support its exemption argument. It need do no more.

A plaintiff claiming trademark infringement or unfair competition under § 358-A:2 must show that the mark is distinctive and that the challenged use is likely to confuse consumers.

Ligotti v. Garofalo · filed 2008-06-26I-III

Each side seeks to enjoin the other's continued use of "The Guy from Boston" as trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and New Hampshire law, specifically, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2, I-III. To succeed on this claim under either federal or state law, a plaintiff must show, first, that its mark is distinctive and, second, that the defendant's allegedly infringing use of the mark is likely to cause confusion among consumers.

Section 358-A:2 does not make an ill-motivated termination of an at-will agreement an unfair trade practice without additional facts implicating public-policy concerns.

Harbour Capital v. Allied Capital · filed 2011-02-03

The termination of an at-will agreement, even with the motive alleged, does not, without more, amount to an unfair trade practice under RSA § 358:A-2. It is clearly evident, and Harbour does not argue otherwise, that the alleged conduct does not meet any of RSA § 358:A-2’s enumerated categories. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358:A-2. Nor is it analogous to any of those categories.7 See Sideris, 951 A.2d at 168.

Section 358-C:1(VIII)(a) defines a debt collector broadly enough that a single instance of debt-collection activity may support liability under the Acts.

D’Angola v. Upstate Mgt Svs./Benson · filed 2011-11-09(VIII)(a)

New Hampshire defines a “debt collector” more broadly than the FDCPA, such that a single instance of debt collection activity can suffice to render a defendant liable for violation of the Acts. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-C:1(VIII)(a). D’Angola’s allegation that Benson sought to collect the debt in his case i s , therefore, sufficient to state a claim for relief under state law.

Section 358-A:3, IV-a excludes transactions entered into more than three years before the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the alleged violation; it does not establish the time to file suit.

Forrester v. Wheelabrator · filed 2011-12-163, IV-a

Rather than requiring plaintiffs to bring suit within three years of the date they learn of the violation, section 358-A : 3 , IV-a exempts “[t]ransactions entered into more than 3 years prior to the time the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, of the conduct alleged to be in violation of this chapter” from the Consumer Protection Act. It does not govern the time-period within which a plaintiff must bring suit.

A simple breach of an assignment obligation, without more, cannot amount to a violation of New Hampshire's Consumer Protection Act.

Beane v. Beane · filed 2012-03-01

(Even as to Materials, the re-assignment was at worst a breach of the assignment agreement on the theory that Glenn failed to provide the required notice of termination, see id., a transgression that cannot support a § 358-A claim regardless, see, e.g., Barrows v . Boles, 141 N.H. 3 8 2 , 390 (1996)).

The New Hampshire Unfair, Deceptive or Unreasonable Collection Practices Act does not require a debt collector to validate a debt.

Himes v. Client Services, Inc. · filed 2012-03-29C:2; C:3, VII, VIII, X

The UDUCPA does not have a validation requirement.

Section 358-A:10 permits a person injured by an unlawful method, act, or practice under the Consumer Protection Act to seek damages and equitable relief; the court held that a plaintiff must establish at least injury or privity to state a claim.

Forrester Environmental v. Wheelabrator Technologies · filed 2012-08-15358-A:10

Under § 358-A:10 of the CPA, “[a]ny person injured by another’s use of any method, act or practice declared unlawful under this chapter may bring an action for damages and for such equitable relief . . . as the court deems necessary and proper.” ... This court believes that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would adopt this latter construction of the CPA, and hold that a plaintiff must, at a minimum, establish either injury or privity to state a claim under the CPA.

Section 358-A requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant is a person, used an unfair or deceptive practice, and acted in trade or commerce; “person” and “trade” or “commerce” include the entities and commercial activities described in § 358-A:1.

Forrester Environmental v. Wheelabrator Technologies · filed 2012-08-15A:1, I; A:1, II

To state a claim under the CPA, a plaintiff must prove, at a minimum, that: “(1) the defendant is a person; (2) the defendant used an unfair method of competition or a deceptive act or practice; and (3) the act occurred in trade or commerce.” ... Wheelabrator is a “person” within the meaning of the CPA, and as far as the court can tell, has been since its inception. ... Its alleged misrepresentations to Kobin, which, with the exception of Mark Lyons’ June 1 4 , 2007 statements, occurred before the end of 2006, were made in the course of its trade or commerce. See id. § 358-A:1, II (defining “trade” and “commerce” as including “the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate”).

A person deceived by a pretextual phone call may recover under the Consumer Protection Act when the investigator obtains and sells the person's work address, and standing is not limited to parties in privity with the defendant.

Remsburg v. Docusearch Inc. · filed 2003-02-18(A):2(III), (A):10

Accordingly, we conclude that an investigator who obtains a person’s work address by means of pretextual phone calling, and then sells the information, may be liable for damages under RSA chapter 358-A to the person deceived.

Non-enumerated conduct may violate the Consumer Protection Act when it is of the same type as the listed categories and reaches the required level of commercial rascality; whether conduct is unfair or deceptive is a fact question.

Fin Brand v. Take 2 Dough · filed 2011-12-06(A):2

Summary judgment on this claim is therefore inappropriate, particularly in light of the rule that “[w]hether a party has committed an unfair or deceptive act, within the meaning of the consumer protection act, is a question of fact.”

The UDUCPA requires a plaintiff to identify a prohibited deceptive act or a failure to perform a statutory requirement; allegations about how a debt was incurred do not, by themselves, identify a prohibited debt-collection practice.

Lehane v. Wachovia Mortgage, et al. · filed 2013-04-16C:3

In order to state a viable claim for relief under the New Hampshire UDUCPA, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, that “the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act or has failed to perform a requirement imposed by the [Act]”. ... Here, the plaintiffs object to the means by which they became indebted to Wells Fargo: the allegedly fraudulent origination of the mortgage loan in 2008 and the alleged coercion of M r . Lehane into signing the promissory note in 2011. They make no attempt to identify a deceptive act that the UDUCPA prohibits, and I am unable to discern which category of deceptive or unreasonable debt collection practices in § 358-C:3 might plausibly encompass Wells Fargo’s alleged actions. Thus, the Lehanes have failed to establish that defendants’ conduct is a prohibited deceptive practice for purposes of the statute. Accordingly, I dismiss Count II for failure to state a claim.

Under § 358-C:3(VII-VIII, X), alleged discrepancies in debt amounts or account numbers do not establish unlawful collection conduct without evidence of a misrepresentation or an attempt to collect a sum not legally owed.

Himes v. Client Services, Inc. · filed 2014-01-02C:3(VII-VIII, X)

Himes alleges that the defendants violated section 358-C:3(VII-VIII, X) of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes by "falsely represent[ing] the character, extent or amount of the debt or its status in a[] legal proceeding by attempting to collect various amounts at various times from [Himes] for the same alleged account, as well as fees or other charges not legally added to any existing obligation that was expressed in the authorized agreement and legally charged to [Himes]." Doc. No. 28. This claim, which tracks the statutory language, fails because Himes has presented no supporting evidence that a reasonable jury could credit.

A trademark-based claim under § 358-A requires proof that the mark is distinctive and that the alleged infringement is likely to cause consumer confusion.

Granite State Trade School v. The New Hampshire School of Mechanical Trades · filed 2015-08-03

Granite State has brought claims against NHSMT for unfair competition, violation of the New Hampshire consumer protection statute, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A, and violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a) and (d). While distinct causes of action, all three require Granite State to show that: (1) its mark is distinctive; and (2) NHSMT’s alleged infringement is likely to cause confusion among consumers. See Ligotti v. Garofalo, 562 F. Supp. 2d 204, 214 (D.N.H. 2008).

The NHCPA exempts consumer protection claims concerning national banks from its scope when federal regulators have authority to regulate their unfair or deceptive practices.

In re TD Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-12-10(I)

The NHCPA expressly exempts consumer protection claims regarding the behavior of national banks from its purview because of the OCC’s comprehensive power -to regulate those banks.

Section 358-A:4 empowers New Hampshire’s Attorney General to bring parens patriae claims in the State’s name for injunctive relief and restitution on behalf of private parties for Consumer Protection Act violations.

State of New Hampshire v. Purdue Pharma, et al. · filed 2018-01-09

In addition to authorizing injured persons to bring class actions, the CPA specifically empowers New Hampshire’s Attorney General to bring parens patriae claims in the name of the State to obtain injunctive relief and restitution on behalf of private parties for CPA violations. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:4. The State has based its CPA claims on this provision rather than the Act’s class action provision. Because the State is the master of its complaint, see Purdue Pharma, 704 F.3d at 216 n.7, that ends the matter.

Section 358-C:3, VII treats a debt collector’s material false representation of the character, extent, or amount of a debt as an unfair, deceptive, or unreasonable collection practice.

Moody v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, et al. · filed 2018-03-27C:3, VII

Construing these allegations liberally, Moody has alleged that PennyMac, through Stawiarski, falsely represented the extent or amount of the deficiency when attempting to collect the deficiency balance. Moody has therefore stated a claim under § 358-C:3, VII.

A consumer plausibly alleges a CPA misrepresentation when allegedly fictitious former prices could mislead buyers about the value or quality of outlet goods.

Marino v Coach Inc · filed 2017-08-28A:2

The Court finds that Marino has adequately alleged a misrepresentation.

Section 358-A:2(V)-(VII) prohibits misrepresenting a service’s characteristics or quality, and § 358-A:2(IX) prohibits advertising services with intent not to sell them as advertised.

Biscan v. Shields Health Care Group, Inc. · filed 2024-03-05A:2(V)-(VII), (IX)

The NHCPA forbids practices that include “[r]epresenting that goods or services have . . . characteristics . . . that they do not have,” or that they “are of a particular standard, quality, or grade . . . if they are of another.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 358-A:2(V)-(VII). It also prohibits “[a]dvertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.” Id. § 358-A:2(IX). ... Here, Plaintiffs allege that Shields’s websites affirmatively stated that Shields “[m]aintain[s] the privacy of [patients’] health information as required by law” when it was not doing so. Dkt. 64 at 23. As a result, Tapper has stated a claim under the NHCPA.

A competitor may sue under the CPA for false or misleading commercial statements when the injury is felt directly or indirectly in New Hampshire.

Sarah’s Hat Boxes v Patch Me Up · filed 2013-04-12A:2, A:10

A plaintiff must prove that an injury was felt, either directly or indirectly, in New Hampshire in order to state a claim under the CPA.

The court declined to resolve the split over whether a nationwide antitrust scheme with New Hampshire price effects satisfies the CPA's in-state trade-or-commerce requirement and therefore allowed the claim to proceed past dismissal.

In re Dealer Management Systems Antitrust Litigation · filed 2019-01-25A:2

Although both parties cite to cases supporting their respective positions on whether Plaintiffs' allegations of conduct of trade or commerce within New Hampshire are sufficient to state a claim, neither party addresses the split in authority or why the Court should follow the cases supporting their respective positions. Accordingly, a definitive ruling on this issue would be premature. The Court thus denies Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' New Hampshire consumer protection claim (Count XLIII) on that basis.

Section 358-A:2 applies only to unfair or deceptive conduct occurring within New Hampshire, and the location of the offending conduct is assessed by whether it had direct or indirect effects on New Hampshire's people or market.

In Re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation · filed 2010-09-21

Commercial conduct is actionable under § 358-A:2 “only if it occurs within New Hampshire.” ... To ascertain whether this prerequisite has been satisfied, the court must focus upon the “offending conduct” itself rather than the locus of actual sales or the site of product manufacture. ... The New Hampshire Supreme Court has emphasized that this statute is broad in sweep, explaining that a pleading sufficiently states a claim if the “allegations encompass conduct which was part of trade or commerce that had direct or indirect effects on the people of [New Hampshire].” ... Under this broad standard, the IEU plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for relief under § 358-A:2. ... This purported behavior encompasses conduct that was part of trade or commerce that, at the very least, had indirect effects on the New Hampshire market and its residents. ... The court concludes that the allegations of the second amended complaint state a plausible claim for relief under § 358-A:2, and defendants’ motion to dismiss this cause of action will be denied.

Section 358-A:2 applies only to unfair or deceptive conduct occurring within New Hampshire; injury felt in New Hampshire alone is insufficient.

Wilcox Industries Corp. v. Hansen · filed 2012-05-07

The New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (“NHCPA”) prohibits the use of “any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2. ... The NHCPA permits relief only for unfair competition that occurs “within this state.” N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2. ... Although Wilcox alleges that the harm from defendants’ conduct occurred in New Hampshire, where Wilcox has its principal place of business, that fact alone is insufficient to bring the offending conduct within the fold of the NHCPA.

Section 358-A:2 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce within New Hampshire, reaches offending conduct occurring there, and is not limited to parties that directly transact with consumers.

In Re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation · filed 2004-12-08

New Hampshire prohibits the “use [of] any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2 (emphasis added). ... New Hampshire federal court decisions have interpreted the statute to require that the offending conduct occur within New Hampshire. ... I conclude that the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged intrastate activity whether the trade or commerce or the offending conduct must occur in New Hampshire. ... The involvement of New Hampshire dealers in the conspiracy constitutes “offending conduct” in New Hampshire. ... As with Maine and Montana, the New Hampshire consumer protection statute does not apply only to those who have directly engaged in trade or commerce with consumers. CADA and NADA are thus not exempt from the reach of the New Hampshire consumer protection statute.

Section 358-A:2 broadly reaches unfair or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce that directly or indirectly affects New Hampshire's people, so allegations that consumers bought Niaspan and incurred overcharges in the state satisfy the within-New-Hampshire requirement at the pleading stage.

In re Niaspan Antitrust Litigation · filed 2014-09-05:2

Although the case law is admittedly mixed, the Court concludes that a broad construction of the statute is consistent with the New Hampshire legislature’s intent that “the CPA ... be construed broadly.” ... Moreover, the statute “defines ‘[t]rade’ and ‘commerce’ to ‘include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state.’ ” ... Given that the statute is broadly worded, and in the absence of detailed briefing on this issue, the Court finds this line of cases persuasive on the record before it. The Court therefore denies defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the end-payor plaintiffs’ NHCPA claim.

Section 358-A:2 requires plaintiffs to allege some intrastate conduct to state a claim under New Hampshire's consumer protection law.

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE v. MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. · filed 2023-11-20A:2

Merck is correct that the consumer protection laws of these states likely require some allegation of intrastate conduct to state a claim. ... But like the nexus arguments involving the Mississippi and Tennessee antitrust laws, I do not view Plaintiff’s complaint as deficient in this respect. The Complaint alleges that Merck has engaged in intrastate anticompetitive conduct in all these jurisdictions by, among other things, shipping and selling to these jurisdictions, pushing coercive purchasing agreements in these jurisdictions, and forcing class members to pay supra-competitive prices in these jurisdictions. ... Plaintiff’s allegations of intrastate effects are therefore sufficient to support these consumer protection claims.

The New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act requires the deceptive conduct to occur in New Hampshire, and sales of the offending goods into the state can satisfy that intrastate-conduct requirement at the pleading stage.

McCabe v. National Presto Industries, Inc. · filed 2025-08-14

This is sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage to meet the requirements under the Massachusetts and New Hampshire statutes that the conduct occur in the state.

The Consumer Protection Act requires a plaintiff seeking damages to allege a loss, injury, or damages.

Hubbard v. Google LLC · filed 2024-07-01

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the consumer-protection statutes of 14 states when they appropriated Plaintiffs’ information without parental consent. Under each statute in question, a plaintiff may recover damages only after experiencing a loss, injury or damages. ... In the absence of such facts, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ consumer-protection claims for failure to sufficiently allege that Plaintiffs suffered a loss.

Subsection VII prohibits deceptive representations that goods or services have a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model when they do not.

Drapeau v. Bluestem Brands, Inc. · filed 2025-04-14VII

The CPA prohibits any “unfair method of competition or [. . .] deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within the state.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2. The statute provides a nonexhaustive list of unfair or deceptive acts and practices. Id. Plaintiffs base their CPA claim on subsection VII, which prohibits a person from deceptively “[r]epresenting that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another[.]” Id. § 358-A:2 VII. The only allegedly false or deceptive representations that plaintiffs cite in support of their CPA claim concern unspecified performance and safety features of the product that were delivered with the pressure cooker when it was sold. Doc. 73 at 29, 32-33. Because the complaint does not tie ITS to any of these alleged representations, plaintiffs have failed to state a viable CPA claim against ITS.

The New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act requires pre-sale knowledge of a product defect to support a claim.

Tapply v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 2025-08-06

New Hampshire. Plaintiffs allege Whirlpool violated the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:1, et seq. New Hampshire’s consumer protection statute requires pre-sale knowledge of a defect. See Kelton v. Hollis Ranch, LLC, 927 A.2d 1243, 1246 (N.H. 2007) (explaining that “[t]he plain language of” New Hampshire’s consumer-protection statute “indicates that some element of knowledge on the part of the defendant is required”). Because plaintiffs plausibly alleged pre-sale knowledge, they plausibly allege claims under the New Hampshire Act.

Section 358-A:10 permits two- to threefold damages for a willful or knowing Consumer Protection Act violation, and those enhanced damages count in determining the amount in controversy.

Evans v. Yum Brands, Inc. · filed 2004-07-14(10)

Evans also seeks multiple damages under the state Consumer Protection Act, which, as she notes, provides for an award of between two and three times a plaintiffs actual damages in the event of a “willful or knowing” violation. N.H.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10. When a plaintiff makes a claim under a statute including a damage multiplier, a court must apply that factor in evaluating the amount in controversy. ... Thus, as the defendants argue, Evans’s claims cross the jurisdictional threshold even if her asserted compensatory damages barely exceed $25,000.

Section 358-A:2(XIII) prohibits selling gift certificates valued at $100 or less with expiration dates and prohibits dormancy, latency, administrative, or service fees that reduce the holder’s redemption amount.

Spggc, LLC Metabank U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Kelly A. Ayotte, New Hampshire Attorney General · filed 2007-05-30(XIII)

The New Hampshire CPA prohibits the sale of a giftcard with a value of less than $100 that carries an expiration date or administrative fees.

Section 358-A:3(I) exempts trade or commerce subject to the New Hampshire bank commissioner's jurisdiction from the Consumer Protection Act.

Maroun v. New York Mortgage Co. (In Re Maroun) · filed 2010-02-11(I)

When New York Mortgage acts in the capacity of a mortgage broker or mortgage banker in the State of New Hampshire, it is subject to the jurisdiction of the New Hampshire bank commissioner pursuant to N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 397-A:2. Section 397-A regulates mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers and protects consumers from the same practices as proscribed under the CPA. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 397-A-.2, VI. Moreover, N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 383:10—d provides that the banking commissioner “shall have exclusive authority and jurisdiction to investigate conduct that is or may be an unfair or deceptive act or practice under RSA 358-A and exempt under RSA 358-A:3, I.... ” Thus, New York Mortgage falls within the exception under § 358-A:3, I and is exempt from claims arising under the CPA. As such, Counts I and II of the complaint are dismissed.

Section 358-A:10 does not require proof of actual damages to recover the statutory minimum and attorney's fees when a claimant can show injury from a violation.

Glynn v. IMPACT SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, INC. · filed 2011-08-25A:10

Indeed, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire has held that "[NHCPA] § 358-A:10 does not require a showing of actual damages for the claimant to be awarded the statutory minimum and attorney's fees." ... Even if IST cannot prove actual damages, a rational juror could find that IST was injured by Glynn's alleged violations of the NHCPA and is therefore entitled to statutory damages and attorney's fees under NHCPA § 358-A:10.

Section 358-C:2 bars debt collectors from collecting or attempting to collect a debt in an unfair, deceptive, or unreasonable manner as defined in the chapter.

Moore v. Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. · filed 2012-01-27C:2

As just discussed, the UDUCPA bars a debt collector from “collect[ing] or attempt[ing] to collect a debt in an unfair, deceptive or unreasonable manner as defined in this chapter.” N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 358-C:2. ... Because the Moores have not pleaded any factual basis for holding Harmon liable under the UDUCPA, Harmon’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Count 6.

Section 358-A:10(I) cannot provide a state-law attorney-fee remedy for defending an ERISA action because ERISA preempts that alternative remedy.

Beane v. Beane · filed 2012-03-01(10)(I)

Thus, Alan argues, he is entitled to recover his resulting “attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses” under New Hampshire law, including the Consumer Protection Act, N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10, I (count 18), another statute providing for attorneys’ fees in “contract or tort” actions, id. § 507:15 (count 19), and the common-law, specifically, the decision in Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977) (count 20). ... Accordingly, Alan’s claims under New Hampshire law to recover the “attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses” of defending Glenn’s ERISA claim — including § 358-A (count 18), § 507:15 (count 19) and the common-law doctrine recognized in Harkeem v. Adams, supra (count 20) — are preempted.

Section 358-A:10 permits statutory damages without injury legally caused by the defendant, but still requires a plaintiff to show personal harm from the unlawful conduct.

Pagan v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2012-10-20(10)

With respect to the New Hampshire class, although the plain language of NHCPA § 358-A:10 “would seem to mandate that only persons injured by an unlawful act or practice may bring suit, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has held to the contrary, and has interpreted the [NHjCPA to permit plaintiffs to recover statutory damages even in the absence of an injury legally caused by the defendant.” ... Nevertheless, the NHCPA still requires that the Plaintiffs show that the class members were personally harmed in some way by the Defendant’s unlawful conduct.