N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:19

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite recast § 458:19 as definitions; court authority over current term alimony appears in § 458:19-a, while property settlement appears in § 458:16-a. Earlier petitions remain governed by prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19 permits a court to require a husband to disclose his property before a divorce trial, but does not authorize it to compel the wife to do so.

Vasoli v. Vasoli · filed 1956-04-27

The existence of statutory authority to compel disclosure by the husband, with no comparable provision for disclosure by the wife must be deemed to indicate that none was intended.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits a trial court to authorize depositions before a hearing on a motion to renew, modify, or extend an alimony order.

Calderwood v. Calderwood · filed 1972-11-03

We hold that the trial court in its discretion can authorize the taking of depositions before hearing on motions to renew, modify or extend under that part of the statute.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits the superior court to appoint a commissioner to sell marital real estate when a party’s refusal to cooperate makes that necessary to carry out a divorce decree.

Walker v. Walker · filed 1979-07-18

RSA 458:19 empowers the superior court to decree alimony and make property divisions. The last clause of this statutory provision authorizes the court to “make such orders and use such process as may be necessary.” ... Because this is a widely recognized practice, and the New Hampshire divorce statute permits the use of such ancillary powers, we hold that the superior court had the authority to appoint a commissioner to sell the parties’ real estate if warranted by the circumstances of this case.

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite recast § 458:19 as definitions and moved substantive alimony rules to §§ 458:19-a and 458:19-aa; earlier-filed cases retain prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19, VI’s requirement for written reasons is satisfied by detailed findings about the parties’ finances, health, and ability to work.

In the Matter of John Raymond and Jill Raymond · filed 2019-01-18VI

We conclude that the trial court’s analysis satisfies RSA 458:19, VI.

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite replaced former § 458:19’s duration and renewal rules with §§ 458:19-a and 458:19-aa; the new term-alimony duration is generally capped at half the marriage length. Earlier petitions remain governed by prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19’s three-year limit on support orders does not apply when children are involved in the divorce decree.

Angwin v. Angwin · filed 1961-12-27

The case was one in which children were involved and hence the order for support did not come within the three-year limitation.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19’s three-year limit does not apply to a decree affecting both a wife and a minor child, even if the wife’s support begins after child support ends.

Ployer v. Ployer · filed 1970-06-30

In the present case a minor child was involved and the decree affected both wife and child, although the wife’s support as such did not begin until after the child’s support terminated. The limitations imposed upon the payment of alimony in this decree were unrelated to the three-year limitation of RSA 458:19.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the 1983 version of § 458:19, an alimony order automatically expires three years after the youngest child reaches majority unless it is renewed, modified, or extended.

Walker v. Walker · filed 1990-07-18

We have previously held that this “shall be effective” language mandates automatic expiration by the use of the word “shall.” ... Therefore, defendant’s obligation to pay alimony ceased on October 2, 1988, and the master erred when he found defendant $10,120 in arrears.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19’s three-year limit applies when a couple has no minor children at the time of the original alimony order; a child later reaching majority does not start the limit.

Homewood v. Homewood · filed 1981-05-26

On its face, the three-year limitation, which is cast in terms of a proviso, limits the life of an alimony order to those cases in which the divorced couple has no minor children at the time the order for alimony is made.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the pre-1981 version of § 458:19, the three-year alimony limit does not apply when a divorce decree affects both the wife and minor children, unless the decree specifically makes the alimony and child support provisions separate.

Strobel v. Strobel · filed 1983-06-07

Under New Hampshire case law construing RSA 458:19 prior to its 1981 amendment, it is well settled that “[w]here the decree affects both wife and child, the three year time limit is not effective,” and the alimony decree remains in effect until modified.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19’s three-year alimony limit does not apply when a divorce decree addresses custody or support of minor children, even if the alimony recipient lacks custody.

Melvin v. Melvin · filed 1984-08-13

Thus, since the decree involves the parties’ minor children, the alimony provision is not governed by the three-year limitation contained in RSA 458:19.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 allows a court to extend alimony after the initial three-year period expires.

Kinsella v. Kinsella · filed 1983-06-15

Pursuant to the parties’ permanent stipulation in a 1979 divorce decree, the defendant was required to pay to the plaintiff monthly alimony in the amount of $650 for three years, the statutory period set forth in RSA 458:19. ... Based upon the record, we find no abuse of discretion in granting an extension of alimony at a reduced rate in this case.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the pre-1986 version of § 458:19, an alimony order based on a divorce decree entered before 1986 expires three years after its last extension unless renewed or extended again.

Williams v. Williams, No. Fa83 0065370 S (Sep. 7, 1993) · filed 1993-09-07

The 1983 version of the New Hampshire alimony statute applies to the instant case, since the judgments for stipulation extending alimony were orders pursuant to a divorce decree entered in 1980, before the effective date of the new alimony statute. ... Accordingly, the judgment for alimony expired in September of 1989 and, therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits a court to renew or modify an alimony order when justice requires, even after both parties become nonresidents.

Madsen v. Madsen · filed 1965-04-30

It is not unreasonable in these circumstances for the Court to renew the order for alimony or to modify it “if justice requires.” RSA 458:19.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits renewal of alimony when justice requires, with periodic review of the parties’ needs and resources.

Healey v. Healey · filed 1977-07-25

In such circumstances the primary purpose of the three-year provision in RSA 458:19 is “to provide a periodic review of the needs and resources of the parties.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 does not automatically extend an alimony order when the court modifies the payment amount.

Clevesy v. Clevesy · filed 1978-03-10

We avoid this result by holding that no extension results from a modification order.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits the court to consider the parties’ understanding about the duration of alimony when deciding whether to renew an alimony order.

Clevesy v. Clevesy · filed 1978-09-27

The master should have accepted plaintiff’s offer to prove that plaintiff and his wife had an understanding concerning a property settlement and the duration of alimony payments, and, after considering the evidence, should have found and ruled whether there was such an understanding. If there was such an understanding, the master should have treated it as an element to be considered in deciding whether to grant plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the grant of defendant’s petition for a court order to renew plaintiff’s obligation to pay alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits an alimony modification when cohabitation substantially changes the recipient’s financial condition or needs; cohabitation alone does not justify modification.

Bisig v. Bisig · filed 1983-12-29

New Hampshire’s alimony statute does not include criteria for determining alimony, but merely directs the courts to award alimony as they deem “just.” RSA 458:19 (Hupp. 1983). ... Cohabitation, in and of itself, is not a ground upon which alimony may be modified or suspended. Cohabitation by an alimony recipient is, however, to be considered a substantial change in circumstance if it substantially changes the financial condition or needs of the recipient so that a continuance of the original decree would be unjust.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 does not permit parties to prevent a court from modifying an alimony award by agreeing not to seek modification.

Norberg v. Norberg · filed 1992-06-02

RSA 458:19 has been amended numerous times, most recently in 1991, yet it contains no express language prohibiting the court from modifying any alimony award due to a prior agreement between the parties. In light of our longstanding holding that the court retains the authority to modify any alimony decree, and the absence of specific statutory language to the contrary, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to allow the parties to circumvent the court’s authority by agreeing not to seek a modification of alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When a support order expires under RSA 458:19, the party seeking its renewal or extension must show that justice requires it and establish the appropriate amount.

Taylor v. Taylor · filed 1967-06-30

However, on the issue whether an order which has terminated in accordance with RSA 458:19 should be extended or renewed, either in modified or unmodified form, the burden is upon the party in whose favor the order is to run to establish that justice requires a renewal or extension, and if so, what justice requires as to amount.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When an alimony order expires under § 458:19, the recipient bears the burden of showing that justice requires its renewal or extension and the amount sought.

Morphy v. Morphy · filed 1974-01-31

Since this case involves the question whether the order which was terminated under RSA 458:19 should be extended or renewed, the defendant does not have the burden of showing changed circumstances such as to justify a reduction or termination of the order, but rather the plaintiff has the burden of showing that “justice requires a renewal or extension, and if so, what justice requires as to amount”.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits renewal or extension of an expired support order when justice requires it; the petitioner must prove that requirement and the amount at the hearing.

Stone v. Stone · filed 1971-04-30

The need established by the prior orders is sufficient to sustain her petition although on the hearing plaintiff will have to sustain the burden of proving that justice requires a renewal or extension and the amount of the order.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 prevents a former spouse from enforcing an agreement for support for life or until remarriage without a justified extension of the support order.

Madsen v. Madsen · filed 1971-10-05

We agree with the defendant that the policy which prompted enactment of RSA 458:19 requires considerations not present in cases where the only relief sought is modification of a support order upon the ground of changed circumstances. Because of the statute the plaintiff is not entitled to enforce the defendant’s agreement to support her for life or until remarriage.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 makes a support order involving no children expire after three years unless renewed, modified, or extended; an expired order cannot support contempt or arrearages.

Morphy v. Morphy · filed 1972-12-29

Since the support order had expired before the defendant ceased making his support payments, he could not thereby be found in contempt of that order, nor could he be liable for “arrearages” based upon that order.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The 1986 version of § 458:19 applies only to orders based on divorce decrees entered on or after January 1, 1986; earlier decrees are governed by the prior version.

Henry v. Henry · filed 1987-03-06

Because the general amendment to the statute carries an effective date of January 1, 1986, we hold that the “new” provision (RSA 458:19 (Supp. 1986)) is applicable only to orders based upon divorce decrees entered on or after that date. Orders based upon divorce decrees entered before January 1, 1986, will be governed by the “old” provision (RSA 458:19 (1983)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Former RSA 458:19 limited an alimony order involving no children to three years unless a court renewed, modified, or extended it.

In re Estate of Wade · filed 1987-08-06

The version of RSA 458:19 (Supp. 1983) effective at all times relevant to this case provided, however, that if no children were involved, a court order to pay alimony was effective for not more than three years unless such order was renewed, modified, or extended by the appropriate court.

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite moved alimony duration and renewal rules to §§ 458:19-a and 458:19-aa; earlier-filed cases retain prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19 permits a three-year alimony award when evidence supports that the recipient can become self-supporting through employment.

In re Harvey · filed 2006-04-26

The record also supports the trial court’s order of alimony for a three-year period as there was evidence that it could take three to four years for the petitioner to obtain law-related employment. Moreover, the trial court found that the petitioner’s health issues were temporary and that the respondent’s treatment of the petitioner was not the primary cause of the breakdown of the marriage. We, thus, conclude that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in awarding alimony for a period of three years.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

To renew an expired alimony award, the party seeking renewal must show that justice requires it and what amount is justified under the circumstances then existing, whether the award expired by statute or by its own terms.

In the Matter of John G. Lyon and Kimberly Anne White Lyon · filed 2014-05-30(VII)

Our prior cases make clear that when an alimony order has terminated and the issue is whether it should be “extended or renewed, either in modified or unmodified form, the burden is upon the party in whose favor the order is to run to establish that justice requires a renewal or extension, and if so, what justice requires as to amount[,] . . . in the light of all the circumstances then existing.” ... Nonetheless, we conclude that the standard we adopted for alimony awards that expired automatically by statute also applies to awards that expire of their own terms.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits a party to request alimony for up to five years after divorce, even if failure to answer barred an alimony award in the original decree.

In Re Maynard · filed 2007-07-13I

We find that RSA 458:19 and Rule 185 can be construed according to their plain language so that they are not in conflict. Rule 185 specifies the timing of a request for alimony in the original divorce proceedings, whereas RSA 458:19 permits a request for alimony to be filed for up to five years after the divorce. A responding party’s failure to comply with Rule 185 may preclude an award of alimony in the original divorce decree. However, pursuant to RSA 458:19,1, that same party may request alimony post-divorce.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, I requires a request for alimony within five years of divorce, and that deadline applies retroactively when the divorce decree did not award alimony.

In Re Kenick · filed 2007-10-18(I)

We conclude, therefore, that RSA 458:19, I, is remedial in nature and that it applies retroactively.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, III does not bar alimony from beginning when an appellate mandate makes the divorce decree effective, even if a certificate of divorce issues later.

In the Matter of Elizabeth Obrey and Thomas Obrey, Jr. · filed 2015-11-10(III)

However, no such timing problem exists in the trial court’s orders, and there is no inconsistency between the court’s ruling and RSA 458:19. The court ruled that the divorce decree and alimony obligation were effective at the time our mandate issued in November 2012, and we have affirmed the court’s ruling.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the 1983 version of § 458:19, a party may seek to renew alimony many years after the initial award expires.

In the Matter of James R. Britton and Patricia F. Britton · filed 2022-01-05

Contrary to the 2019 version of RSA 458:19, which establishes a five-year cut-off for requests to receive or extend alimony, and which the petitioner asks us to apply here, the 1983 version of RSA 458:19 had no such limitation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it allowed the respondent to file a motion for renewal of alimony many years after the initial alimony award expired.

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite moved substantive eligibility and amount rules from § 458:19 to § 458:19-a, which uses current need and income standards. Earlier petitions remain governed by prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19 supports an allowance toward a spouse’s counsel fees, subject to reasonable restraint.

Yee Chun Helen Kuo v. Shan Sun Kuo · filed 1968-01-30

Although the authority of the Court to make such an order does not appear to us to be questionable, it is to be exercised with reasonable restraint.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits a court extending a support order to consider the wife’s obligation for counsel fees in post-divorce proceedings as part of her needs.

Calderwood v. Calderwood · filed 1974-10-31

We consider that the court’s discretion with respect to extension of support orders under RSA 458:19 permits it to take into account, as an element of the wife’s needs, her obligation for counsel fees in post-divorce proceedings.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 governs a divorce decree’s provision for a wife when an award described as past support has that effect.

Popik v. Popik · filed 1975-11-28

The effect of the decree was to make provision for the wife pursuant to RSA 458:19, Alimony. If the parties seek further proceedings, the issue should be considered in that context..

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 authorizes a court to order a husband to pay a just sum of money even when there is no estate to restore to the wife.

Alther v. Alther · filed 1980-05-12

However, RSA 458:19 also authorizes the court to order the husband “to pay such sum of money, as may be deemed just.” This is sufficient authority for the order.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits a just alimony award; courts should consider the length of the marriage and the parties’ contributions, health, earning capacity, income, needs, and opportunities to acquire assets.

Marsh v. Marsh · filed 1983-06-17

The alimony statute provides that a court may assign to the wife such part of the estate of her husband, and order him to pay such sum of money, as may be deemed just. RSA 458:19 (Supp. 1981). ... Although the statute does not provide criteria for awarding alimony, we have indicated that trial courts should consider the length of the marriage, the contributions of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, stations, occupations and employability of the parties, as well as the amount and sources of their income, their liabilities and needs, and their respective opportunities for acquisition of capital assets.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 requires a court awarding alimony to consider the recipient’s age, health, vocational skills, employability, and other circumstances; when the recipient can support herself, the court must explain the award’s duration and amount.

Tishkevich v. Tishkevich · filed 1989-02-06

The master’s failure to explain the basis on which he determined the duration and amount of the alimony award constituted error. RSA 458:19 (Supp. 1987) requires the court to consider such matters as the age, health, vocational skills, employability and other matters regarding the spouse who is to receive alimony. Such an explanation was required, under the particular facts of this case, where the wife was clearly capable of self-support at the time of the decree. We hold that the master erred in his award of alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

An alimony award under § 458:19 must be just and sufficient to meet the recipient’s needs within the paying spouse’s ability to pay.

Russman v. Russman · filed 1984-03-02

The statute authorizing the award of alimony, RSA 458:19, provides that the court may “order [a party] to pay such sum of money, as may be deemed just. . . .” ... On the evidence before him, the master in the present case could not reasonably have found that the $500 award was just or sufficient to meet the needs of the plaintiff and the children, in light of the relatively high standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage and the defendant’s ability to pay. We therefore conclude that the master abused his discretion.

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite moved substantive alimony award rules to § 458:19-a and recast § 458:19 as definitions; earlier-filed cases retain prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19 permits an alimony award based on the recipient’s reasonable needs and the marital standard of living, even when the payor’s income is expected to rise.

In re Sutton · filed 2002-12-17IV(b)

For these reasons, the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that the petitioner’s combined income of $21,000 per year in expected earnings and $48,000 per year in alimony is sufficient to meet her reasonable needs, considering the marital standard of living. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s award of alimony constitutes a sustainable exercise of discretion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 requires a court setting alimony to consider the parties’ marriage, finances, needs, earning prospects, fault, and federal tax consequences.

In Re Hampers · filed 2006-11-01IV(b)

In determining the amount of alimony, a trial court must consider: the length of the marriage; the age, health,, social or economic status, occupation, amount and sources of income, the property awarded under RSA 458:16-a (2004), vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income; the fault of either party as defined in RSA 458:16-a, II; and the federal tax consequences of the order. RSA 458:19, IY(b). ... Based upon these factors and the evidence supporting them, we cannot say that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by ordering the petitioner to pay monthly alimony of $2,500.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV requires a trial court to consider the listed factors when determining the amount of alimony.

In re Henry · filed 2012-01-13IV

In determining the amount of alimony, a trial court must consider various factors enumerated in RSA 458:19, IV. ... We conclude that on the record before it, the trial court was not compelled to deny the petitioner’s alimony request.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV requires the court to consider statutory factors when determining the amount of alimony.

In the Matter of Maureen Crosson and Samuel Crosson · filed 2015-03-16(IV)

RSA 458:19, IV identifies factors the trial court must consider to determine the amount of alimony. In this case, the trial court explicitly addressed those factors in its order and found facts relevant to them.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The amount of alimony must meet the recipient’s needs within the paying spouse’s ability to pay.

In the Matter of Jill Content and Edward Content · filed 2016-03-03I

The amount of alimony awarded must be sufficient to cover the wife’s needs, within the limits of the husband’s ability to pay. Id. at 433; see RSA 458:19, I (Supp. 2015). ... Based upon this record, we cannot conclude that the court’s alimony award constitutes an unsustainable exercise of its discretion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits lump sum or periodic alimony; an award payable in one payment is a lump sum.

Lowe v. Lowe · filed 2000-07-18IV(a)

The applicable New Hampshire statute, § 458:19 IV (a), provides that “[t]he court may make orders for alimony in a lump sum, periodic payments, or both.” To be considered periodic, an alimony order must include more than one payment. In this case, the court ordered the alimony to be paid in one payment. Under the plain language of the New Hampshire statute, the alimony as framed by the court thus constituted a lump sum payment.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits alimony for a definite or indefinite period and does not require every award to be rehabilitative.

In re Fowler · filed 2000-12-14I

The express language of our alimony statute, however, indicates that alimony awards need not be rehabilitative in all cases.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits rehabilitative alimony based on the recipient’s needs and earning capacity, the payor’s resources, and the statutory factors.

In re Crowe · filed 2002-08-19I, IV(b), IV(d)

The trial court awarded the respondent $100 per week in rehabilitative alimony for a period of three years, provided she remains enrolled in a paralegal program, to assist her in becoming self-sufficient. ... Given the duration and purpose of the alimony award, in addition to the respondent’s limited earning capacity and need to provide for herself and the parties’ child, we cannot say that the alimony award was an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits consideration of the marital standard of living when assessing a spouse’s need for alimony; it does not make that standard an absolute entitlement.

In re Gordon · filed 2002-05-10I(a)

We do not, however, interpret this statement as expressing a belief by the master that Husband would have been required, under any circumstances, to maintain Wife at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Rather, the master’s recommended order as a whole reveals that the master considered a number of factors, including Wife’s need for alimony while pursuing her education, and Husband’s current ability to pay alimony. In particular, the court noted that she earns just over $800 a month while his monthly income is approximately $13,000. We detect neither legal error nor an unsustainable exercise of discretion in the master’s award of alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month for the first two years after the divorce and $1,000 per month for the following three years.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, I requires courts to consider the parties’ marital standard of living when awarding alimony, but does not require them to equalize discretionary expenses.

In the Matter of George Provencal and Laurie Provencal · filed 2016-11-23I

The statute requires the trial court to consider “the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage.” RSA 458:19, I. Although RSA 458:19, I, does not require the trial court to equalize the parties’ discretionary expenses, we cannot conclude, upon this record, that the trial court’s decision to do so constituted an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Temporary alimony under subsection I is awarded before the court’s final determination of alimony, regardless of how long the award lasts.

In the Matter of Steven Hoyt and Lesley Hoyt · filed 2018-10-03(I)

“temporary,” as used in RSA 458:19, I, means an award that is made before the trial court’s final determination concerning a party’s alimony obligation.

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite moved substantive eligibility and amount rules from § 458:19 to § 458:19-a, which uses current need and income standards. Earlier petitions remain governed by prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19 permits an alimony award after a divorce decree even if the decree made no alimony award.

Labrie v. Labrie · filed 1973-05-31

To insure that alimony and support orders continue to reflect the relative needs and abilities of the parties the legislature provided for periodic reevaluations (RSA 458:19) and modification procedures (RSA 458:32). Defendant would have this court undermine this policy by applying the doctrine of res judicata to all issues litigable in the original divorce decree. According to his line of reasoning the trial court’s failure to include any allowance for the libelant’s support in the divorce decree precludes any subsequent award for that purpose. This court has explicitly rejected this approach.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

An alimony award under section 458:19 is an abuse of discretion when the recipient’s income exceeds her expenses and she did not request alimony.

Perron v. Perron · filed 1982-10-12

The plaintiff’s support affidavit indicates, and the master found, that she had total monthly expenses of approximately $800 and a monthly income of about $1,400. Further, neither in her affidavit nor at trial did the plaintiff request an alimony award. In fact, at trial, she emphatically testified that she had received little if any support from her husband throughout the marriage, but nevertheless had been able to save approximately $9,000. On these facts, the master’s award of alimony, in any amount, to the plaintiff was a clear abuse of discretion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19(I) permits alimony when a spouse lacks sufficient resources, cannot meet reasonable needs through appropriate employment, and the other spouse can afford to pay.

Parkhurst v. Gibson · filed 1990-04-13(I)

Mildred presented sufficient evidence for the master to reasonably find that she met the requirements of RSA 458:19, I (Supp. 1989).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits alimony when the recipient needs it or when an award is just and equitable; until then, the other spouse’s ability to pay is immaterial.

Holliday v. Holliday · filed 1994-12-14

Without a finding of need or a decision by the court to exercise its discretion in the interests of justice and equity, no alimony will be awarded. Until then, the defendant’s ability to pay is immaterial.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 requires a finding of need for alimony and permits consideration of the parties’ finances, earning capacity, marital lifestyle, custody arrangement, and support obligations.

Hoffman v. Hoffman · filed 1999-04-21

Furthermore, the trial court made a sufficient finding of need under RSA 458:19.

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite moved substantive alimony eligibility and amount rules to § 458:19-a; earlier-filed cases retain prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19, I requires courts to consider whether a party has enough income to meet reasonable needs and can support themselves through appropriate employment when awarding alimony.

In re Letendre · filed 2002-12-31I

Given the respondent’s age, level of formal education and modest job history, we hold that the trial court did not commit an unsustainable exercise of discretion in concluding that the respondent lacked sufficient income to provide for her reasonable needs and that she could not be self-supporting through appropriate employment.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19(I) permits alimony when the recipient lacks sufficient resources for reasonable needs, the payor can meet their own reasonable needs, and the recipient cannot be self-supporting through appropriate employment.

In the Matter of John Tucker, II and Holly Tucker · filed 2015-06-15I

RSA 458:19, I, authorizes the trial court to award alimony if: (1) the party in need lacks sufficient income, property, or both to provide for her reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; (2) the payor is able to continue to meet his own reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; and (3) the party in need cannot be self-supporting through appropriate employment at a standard of living that meets reasonable needs. ... We conclude that the trial court’s alimony award is reasonable and supported by the record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, I requires alimony to cover the recipient’s needs within the paying spouse’s ability to pay.

In the Matter of Wayne Sarette and Linda Sarette · filed 2015-08-10(I)

The amount of alimony awarded must be sufficient to cover the wife’s needs, within the limits of the husband’s ability to pay. Harvey, 153 N.H. at 433; see RSA 458:19, I (Supp. 2014). ... We conclude that the record supports the court’s alimony award. See id.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, I permits alimony when the recipient lacks sufficient income or property to meet reasonable needs and cannot support themselves through appropriate employment, and the payor can meet both parties’ reasonable needs.

In the Matter of Shawn Pelletier and Shawna Pelletier · filed 2016-10-17I

In this case, the trial court found that the wife lacks sufficient income to provide for her reasonable needs, that the husband has the ability to pay the alimony she needs while meeting his own reasonable needs, and that the wife is unable to be self-supporting through suitable employment. The record supports these findings.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, I permits alimony when the recipient lacks sufficient resources for reasonable needs, the payor can meet their own reasonable needs, and the recipient cannot become self-supporting through appropriate employment.

In the Matter of Coleen Walsh and Steven Walsh · filed 2017-06-08I

RSA 458:19, I, authorizes the trial court to award alimony if: (1) “[t]he party in need lacks sufficient income, property, or both” to provide for her reasonable needs, considering “the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage”; (2) the payor is able to continue to meet his own reasonable needs, considering “the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage”; and (3) “[t]he party in need is unable to be self-supporting through appropriate employment at a standard of living that meets reasonable needs.” ... We further conclude that the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court’s discretionary judgment regarding alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, I permits alimony when the recipient lacks resources to meet reasonable needs and cannot support herself through appropriate employment, while the payor can meet his own reasonable needs.

In the Matter of Christopher Lawton and Christi Lawton · filed 2017-10-17(I)

RSA 458:19, I (Supp. 2016), authorizes the trial court to award alimony if: (1) the party in need lacks sufficient income, property, or both to provide for her reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; (2) the payor is able to continue to meet his own reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; and (3) the party in need cannot be self-supporting through appropriate employment at a standard of living that meets reasonable needs. ... Based upon the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s award of $400 in monthly alimony to the wife for 24 months constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 requires the court to assess the recipient’s reasonable needs and the other party’s ability to meet them when awarding alimony.

In Re Goodlander · filed 2011-02-25I

While the trial court expressly specified the amount of alimony it found attributable to Goodlander’s most basic needs, it erred in failing to first conduct the requisite analysis of Goodlander’s “reasonable needs” under RSA 458:19, as well as Tamposi’s ability to meet those needs.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 limits alimony orders to cases with a divorce decree.

In re Mallett · filed 2012-01-13

RSA 458:19 (Supp. 2011) limits orders for the payment of alimony to cases where there has been a divorce decree.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

RSA 458:19, I permits alimony when the recipient lacks resources for reasonable needs and cannot support herself through appropriate employment, and the obligor can meet his own reasonable needs.

In the Matter of Raymond Hayes and Nisha Hayes · filed 2020-02-03I

Pursuant to RSA 458:19, I (2018) (amended 2018), the trial court may award alimony if it finds that: (1) the recipient lacks sufficient income, property, or both to provide for her reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; (2) the obligor is able to continue to meet his own reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; and (3) the recipient cannot be self-supporting through appropriate employment at a standard of living that meets reasonable needs. ... Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court reasonably determined that the wife does not need alimony, and that the husband does not have the ability to pay it.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the prior version of § 458:19(I), an alimony award depends on the recipient’s need, the payor’s ability to meet their own needs, and the recipient’s inability to support themselves through appropriate employment.

In the Matter of Christopher Taylor and Therese Taylor · filed 2025-04-16I

The petitioner does not challenge the trial court’s application of that statute, which authorizes the trial court to award alimony if: (1) the party in need lacks sufficient income, property, or both to provide for his or her reasonable needs, considering the marital standard of living; (2) the payor is able to continue to meet his or her reasonable needs, considering the marital standard of living; and (3) the party in need cannot be self-supporting through appropriate employment at a standard of living that meets reasonable needs. See RSA 458:19, I (2018) (amended 2018). ... Based upon our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion when it required the petitioner to continue to pay alimony beyond his retirement age.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, I(a) requires a spouse seeking alimony to lack sufficient income or property to meet reasonable needs in light of the marital standard of living.

In the Matter of Jeremiah Comeford and Breanna Comeford · filed 2019-09-27I(a)

Upon this record, we conclude that the trial court reasonably determined that Wife does not lack sufficient income, property, or both to provide for her reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the parties became accustomed during their marriage. See RSA 458:19, I(a).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 makes the parties’ incomes and needs the primary considerations in an alimony determination.

In the Matter of Peter Angerhofer and Melissa Greer Solomon · filed 2024-09-06

Alimony determinations are based primarily upon the parties’ incomes and needs. Id.; see RSA 458:19 (2018). ... Having reviewed the record, we conclude that it contains sufficient information regarding the parties’ incomes and needs to support the trial court’s alimony award.

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite moved term-alimony modification and termination rules to § 458:19-aa; § 458:19 now defines alimony terms. Earlier petitions remain governed by prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19 permits a court modifying alimony to consider the parties’ prior stipulation without treating it as binding.

Madsen v. Madsen · filed 1969-06-30

The stipulation was not binding and conclusive in view of the specific provisions of RSA 458:19 but the stipulation was a factor which the Court may take into account in determining the terms of the modified decree.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 does not convert alimony payments of indefinite duration into a property settlement binding the payor’s estate.

Dupuis v. Click · filed 1992-03-13

We decline to apply RSA 458:19 to convert these alimony payments into a property settlement.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19’s three-year limit does not terminate a mortgage-payment obligation that is part of a property settlement rather than alimony.

Jones v. Jones · filed 1980-09-03

We agree with the trial court that the order to assume and pay the mortgage was a part of the property settlement and did not expire at the end of three years under RSA 458:19. The defendant is therefore liable for the balance of the mortgage.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19’s three-year alimony limit does not apply to a divorce decree involving a minor child, even when the parent paying alimony has physical custody.

Couture v. Couture · filed 1984-02-16

Since the decree at issue involves the parties’ minor daughter, the order for alimony therein does not come within the three-year rule.

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite moved term-alimony modification rules to § 458:19-aa; earlier-filed cases retain prior law under subsection (X).

Section 458:19 applies to motions for alimony payments; a party seeking to terminate an existing alimony order bears the burden of proving changed circumstances.

In re Canaway · filed 2010-12-07

However, RSA 458:19 begins with the limiting phrase, “[u]pon motion of either party for alimony payments,” and is thus inapplicable to the husband’s modification request as neither party has filed a motion for new alimony payments. Instead, the husband seeks to terminate his alimony obligations, and he alone has the burden of proving changed circumstances.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) requires an alimony modification to reflect the parties’ actual circumstances when the modification takes effect, rather than speculative future earnings.

In the Matter of Donald Nixon and Roxanne Nixon · filed 2025-05-30IV(b)

The assertion is speculative as Husband’s actual circumstances following the completion of the nursing program are unknown. Cf. In the Matter of Nassar & Nassar, 156 N.H. 769, 776 (2008) (“Because RSA 458:19, IV(b) requires alimony awards to be based upon the condition of the actual parties, and not solely the economy at large, the trial court erred by making the alimony award subject to the consumer price index.”). ... Any future modifications of alimony shall be based upon the actual condition of the parties at the time the modification is to be implemented. See id.

Law changed since The 1987 enactment placed equitable property division in § 458:16-a; § 458:19 now defines alimony terms. This note construes the former property-division provision.

Section 458:19 allows a court making a property award in a legal separation to consider relevant factors, including fault, the length of the marriage, each spouse’s contributions, family assets, and the children’s housing needs.

Comer v. Comer · filed 1970-12-30

The court here in making the award could properly have considered as relevant factors the fault of the husband, the length of time the parties had been married, the contributions of the wife both as homemaker and wage earner, the modesty of the family fortune, and the fact that the wife was required to maintain a home for the minor children.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits a divorce court to apportion responsibility for premarital debts between spouses without changing creditors’ rights.

Bourdon v. Bourdon · filed 1979-06-27

The effect of the court’s order was to require the defendant to pay to the wife a sum of money equaling one-third of her premarital debts including interest. Such an order is authorized by RSA 458:19, is not precluded by RSA 460:3, and in no way grants any rights to the creditor.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits a divorce court to assign real estate to a spouse; a decree transferring title should expressly assign it and clear the other spouse’s claims.

Trahan v. Trahan · filed 1980-03-13

If all or any part of the title to real estate is to be transferred to one party, it should be specifically assigned, RSA 458:19, and disencumbered from all claims of the other party.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 limits equitable property division to property in the parties’ estates; military retirement pay cannot be distributed as property, though it may be considered when setting support or dividing other property.

Baker v. Baker · filed 1980-09-26

Whether federal law permits or prohibits the distribution of military retirement benefits as a property right in State court divorce proceedings is an issue we need not address because we hold that, as a matter of State law, those benefits may not be termed “property” and be distributed in a divorce order. ... Distribution of property under RSA 458:19 is limited to property within the parties’ estates and must be equitable.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 requires marital property to be divided according to the equities of the circumstances, without requiring an equal division.

Hanson v. Hanson · filed 1981-08-10

Under RSA 458:19 marital property is to be divided not by some magic formula but as the judge or master deems “just.” A master is not obliged to divide property equally, but must apportion the estate according to the equities of the circumstances.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits a divorce court to redistribute property held jointly or individually by either spouse.

Murano v. Murano · filed 1982-03-10

The trial court may order redistribution of any property falling within the joint marital estate, or within the individual estates of either spouse. Baker v. Baker, 120 N.H. 645, 647, 421 A.2d 998, 1000 (1980); see RSA 458:19 (amended by Laws 1981, 275:1); RSA 458:22.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 requires marital property to be divided justly according to the equities of the circumstances.

Parker v. Parker · filed 1982-07-14

RSA 458:19 provides that marital property must be divided as the court deems “just,” according to the equities of the circumstances. ... We have reviewed the transcript of the proceedings in this matter and conclude that the master’s distribution of property between the parties was not so inequitable as to require reversal.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 requires a just division of marital property based on the equities; in a long-term marriage where both spouses worked and lived in their jointly owned home, equality in the home is the starting point.

Rahn v. Rahn · filed 1983-03-31

Under RSA 458:19 (Supp. 1981), marital property is to be divided not by some magic formula but in a manner deemed “just” based upon the evidence presented. ... In such a marriage, especially where both parties have worked and have lived in their jointly owned residence, as the parties in this case did for almost thirty years, there should be a starting point of equality in the home from which a master can deviate, depending upon various factors.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits consideration of inherited property in a divorce property settlement even when one spouse owns it individually.

Weeks v. Weeks · filed 1983-12-12

Regardless whether the property was owned individually by the plaintiff or jointly by the parties, the master must consider it a marital asset when making a property settlement based on the equities of the circumstances.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 requires an equitable distribution of property, but the shares need not be equal.

Hodgins v. Hodgins · filed 1985-07-01

By statute, the trial court may make such a distribution of property “as may be deemed just . . . .” RSA 458:19. We have construed this to mean that, while property must be distributed equitably, it need not always be distributed equally.

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite moved the substantive factors for alimony amount to § 458:19-a; earlier-filed cases retain prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19 requires courts to consider the property awarded when determining the amount of alimony.

Rattee v. Rattee · filed 2001-02-15IV(b)

Indeed, one factor a court must consider in determining the amount of alimony is the property awarded. See RSA 458:19, IV(b) (1992 & Supp. 2000).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) requires the court to consider the property awarded in the marital property division when determining the amount of alimony.

In the Matter of Deborah Munson and Coralee Beal · filed 2016-08-19IV(b)

One of those factors is “the property awarded under RSA 458:16-a.” RSA 458:19, IV(b). We conclude that the court’s division of the marital property under RSA 458:16-a was unsustainable; thus, the court could not have adequately considered it in determining the amount of alimony under RSA 458:19, IV(b). We therefore vacate the court’s alimony award.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 directs courts to consider property awarded in the divorce decree when determining the need for alimony.

In re Jones · filed 2001-03-13

RSA 458:19 (Supp. 2000) addresses the issue of alimony and directs the trial court to consider property awarded under the property settlement portion of the decree in determining the need for alimony. ... Because the plaintiff did not receive one half of that income-producing business, the court was justified in awarding an increased amount of alimony to her.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits alimony when the recipient cannot meet reasonable needs through income, property, or suitable employment and the payer can meet both parties’ reasonable needs; the award must have sufficient findings and evidentiary support.

In re Gronvaldt · filed 2004-02-17

RSA 458:19 (Supp. 2003) authorizes the trial court to award alimony when: (1) the party in need lacks sufficient income, property or both to provide for such party’s reasonable needs; (2) the party from whom alimony is sought has the ability to meet reasonable needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony; and (3) the party in need is unable to be self-supporting through appropriate employment at a standard of living that meets reasonable needs. ... In light of the above, we conclude that the trial court made sufficient findings and rulings for its alimony award and that the evidence was sufficient to support them.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

An incarcerated spouse whose basic needs are met during incarceration may be found to lack the need required for alimony.

In Re Dube · filed 2012-05-11(I)(a)

Moreover, during her incarceration, her basic needs will be met; thus, she does not “lack[] sufficient income, property, or both... to provide for [her] reasonable needs.” RSA 458:19,1(a).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, I(a) requires a finding that the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient income or property to meet reasonable needs in light of the marital standard of living.

In the Matter of James Morse and Vanilla Moonstone · filed 2015-06-19I(a)

An alimony award requires a finding that the party in need lacks sufficient income, property, or both to provide for her reasonable needs, considering the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV requires courts to consider the listed factors when setting alimony; marital fault is a factor but does not bar an award.

In Re Peirano · filed 2007-07-20(IV)

In determining the amount of alimony, a trial court must consider various factors enumerated in RSA 458:19, IV (2004). ... The court’s order also acknowledged the petitioner’s behavior throughout the marriage, which supported its finding of a fault-based divorce. This factor, however, does not preclude an alimony award: “In determining the amount of alimony ... the conduct of the guilty party is not conclusive but is an element to be considered under all the circumstances.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) permits a court to consider fault when setting alimony only as defined in RSA 458:16-a, II(l).

In the Matter of Robert Kempton and Peggy Kempton · filed 2015-06-25IV(b)

This argument is contrary to the alimony statute, which allows the trial court to consider the fault of either party only “as defined in RSA 458:16-a, II(l).” RSA 458:19, IV(b).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 does not permit a court to consider a party’s mere expectation of a future gift when setting alimony.

In Re Nassar · filed 2008-03-07(IV)(b)

For these reasons, we concur with those courts that have held that a party’s mere expectation of receipt of a future gift cannot be considered when making an alimony award.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(c) allows courts to consider veterans’ disability benefits as income when setting alimony to the extent federal law permits.

In Re Brownell · filed 2012-05-11IV(c)

RSA 458:19, IV(c) expressly allows trial courts to “consider veterans’ disability benefits collected by either or both parties to the extent permitted by federal law” when “determining amount and sources of income.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) permits a court setting alimony to consider anticipated pension benefits as a source of future income, even when the pension is not assignable.

In the Matter of Suzanne Brule and Robert Brule · filed 2015-04-03IV(b)

Included in this list of factors that the court must consider are the “amount and sources of income” and the opportunity for future income. See RSA 458:19, IV(b). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in considering the husband’s anticipated pension benefits, a source of future income, in determining the amount of alimony to be awarded to the wife.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) requires a court setting alimony to consider the parties’ circumstances, future earning opportunities, fault, and federal tax consequences.

In the Matter of Keli Eckroate-Breagy and Paul Breagy · filed 2015-07-13IV(b)

After expressly considering these factors, the trial court awarded the wife alimony of $2,000 per month for one year and $1,000 per month for the following two years. ... Based upon this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in its alimony award.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) permits a court to impute income to either party based on earning capacity when determining the amount of alimony.

In the Matter of Leslie Dow and Harry Dow, IV · filed 2017-08-15IV(b)

The language of RSA 458:19, IV(b) explicitly authorizes a trial court to consider the earning capacities of the parties when determining the amount of alimony. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court may impute income to either party as part of that determination.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) requires courts setting alimony to consider each party’s health and needs, along with the other listed factors.

In the Matter of Mitchell Cohen and Marian Richards · filed 2019-03-29IV(b)

At the time of the trial court’s divorce decree, New Hampshire law required the trial court to consider the following specific factors to determine the amount of alimony: the length of the marriage; the age, health, social or economic status, occupation, amount and sources of income, the property awarded under RSA 458:16-a, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income; the fault of either party as defined in RSA 458:16-a, II(l); and the federal tax consequences of the order. RSA 458:19, IV(b). The respondent does not expressly challenge the trial court’s consideration of these factors. Nonetheless, because the respondent argues that the trial court erroneously excluded certain expenses, we construe the respondent’s argument as challenging the trial court’s consideration of the respondent’s health and needs.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) requires a court setting alimony to consider factors including the length of the marriage, each party’s income and needs, and the tax consequences of the order.

In the Matter of Allen McKenzie and Jodi McKenzie · filed 2019-10-15IV(b)

In determining the amount of alimony, a trial court must consider: the length of the marriage; the age, health, social or economic status, occupation, amount and sources of income, the property awarded under RSA 458:16-a, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income; the fault of either party as defined in RSA 458:16-a, II(l); and the federal tax consequences of the order. See In the Matter of Kempton, 167 N.H. at 802; RSA 458:19, IV(b) (2018) (amended 2018).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 requires the court to consider the property awarded in a divorce when determining alimony.

In the Matter of Matthew Kamil and Robin Kamil · filed 2020-07-10IV(b)

Although the trial court did not specifically mention its property division in making its alimony award, we presume that it followed the statute. See RSA 458:19, IV(b) (2018) (amended 2018) (“In determining the amount of alimony, the court shall consider . . . the property awarded under RSA 458:16-a . . . .”). Accordingly, because we have vacated the property division, we also vacate the alimony award and remand for recalculation of alimony in light of, and in conjunction with, the new property division on remand.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 requires courts awarding alimony to consider the recipient’s reasonable needs and ability to support herself; a disability arising during the marriage may inform that assessment without being treated as the other spouse’s fault.

In the Matter of James Connor and Victoria Connor · filed 2020-09-03I(c)

In awarding alimony, the trial court was required to consider the wife’s reasonable needs and her ability to be “self-supporting through appropriate employment at a standard of living that meets [her] reasonable needs.” RSA 458:19, I(c); see also RSA 458:19, IV(b) (in determining amount of alimony, trial court required to consider, among other factors, the parties’ needs, health, economic status, occupation, vocational skills, employability, amount and sources of income, and opportunity for future income). We conclude that, as explained by the trial court on reconsideration, it did not award alimony or determine the amount of alimony based upon the husband’s “fault,” but rather properly considered the circumstances of the wife’s disability in evaluating her needs and ability to be self-sufficient.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) requires the court to consider property awarded under RSA 458:16-a when determining the amount and duration of alimony.

In the Matter of Jonathan Merrill and Lea Merrill · filed 2021-04-20IV(b)

Because we conclude that the trial court erred by including JGM 2012 Trust assets in the marital estate, we vacate the trial court’s property and alimony awards. See RSA 458:16-a, II; RSA 458:19, IV(b) (2018) (requiring the trial court to consider “the property awarded under RSA 458:16-a” in determining amount and duration of alimony).

Law changed since The 2019 rewrite moved ability-to-pay rules for alimony to § 458:19-a; earlier-filed cases retain prior law under § 458:19-aa(X).

Section 458:19 permits an alimony award when the paying spouse can meet reasonable needs while paying; the court may assess ability to pay using evidence beyond reported income.

In the Matter of Garrett Lear and Annette Lear · filed 2015-02-27I

In light of these findings, which are supported by the record, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s determination that the husband has the ability to pay the wife $400 in monthly alimony until the parties’ real estate interests are sold.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) requires courts assessing ability to pay alimony to consider liabilities the obligor is legally required to pay, including taxes and ongoing child support.

In the Matter of Allison Scamman and Bruce Scamman · filed 2015-11-20IV(b)

In determining an obligor’s ability to pay alimony, the trial court is required to consider those liabilities that the obligor is legally obligated to pay, such as federal income, Medicare, and Social Security taxes, and ongoing child support.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A payor’s intent to avoid alimony payments has no bearing on ability to pay under Section 458:19.

In the Matter of Patricia Goldberg and Mark Goldberg · filed 2016-03-03I

To the extent that the husband also argues that his “actions do not indicate an intention to avoid alimony payments,” this factor has no bearing upon whether he has the ability to pay alimony for the purposes of RSA 458:19.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Employer fringe benefits may be considered when determining a spouse’s ability to pay alimony under section 458:19, I(b).

In the Matter of Gwenn Ferdinando and Bryan Ferdinando · filed 2016-08-24I(b)

The trial court properly considered these benefits in determining the husband’s ability to pay alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 allows an alimony award to begin when the paying spouse can afford it, even if that spouse cannot currently pay.

In the Matter of Aileen MacNaughton and Martin Robert · filed 2016-12-22I

Pursuant to RSA 458:19, I (Supp. 2015), the trial court may award alimony only if it finds that “[t]he party from whom alimony is sought is able to meet reasonable needs while meeting those of the party seeking alimony.” ... Because the trial court did not order the husband to start paying alimony until he can afford to do so, we cannot conclude that it erred in awarding alimony despite his present inability to pay.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, I(b) requires a finding that the person asked to pay alimony can meet both parties’ reasonable needs.

In The Matter of Edythe Murphy and Kevin Rogers · filed 2018-03-30I(b)

An alimony award requires a finding that “[t]he party from whom alimony is sought is able to meet reasonable needs while meeting those of the party seeking alimony.” RSA 458:19, I(b) (2004). After conducting a two-day final hearing, the trial court found that the wife lacks sufficient income to pay alimony and to provide for her own reasonable needs.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, I requires an alimony award to cover the recipient’s needs within the paying spouse’s ability to pay.

In the Matter of Rebecca Stanley-Snelling and Randall Snelling · filed 2018-12-22I

The amount of alimony awarded must be sufficient to cover the wife’s needs, within the limits of the husband’s ability to pay. Harvey, 153 N.H. at 433; see RSA 458:19, I (Supp. 2011). ... Based upon this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s alimony award constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 permits a court to consider a payor’s commission earnings when assessing ability to pay alimony.

In the Matter of Jennifer Faherty and Kevin Faherty · filed 2020-01-31I

Husband essentially faults the trial court for considering his earning history, including his commissions, when determining his ability to pay alimony. ... We find no error in this regard.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19 bases alimony on need and ability to pay; a disparity in income alone is insufficient.

In the Matter of Kimberly Bleakley and Scott Bleakley · filed 2020-04-03(I)

We also note that a disparity in income, as such, is not a basis for awarding alimony. See RSA 458:19, I (2018) (amended 2018) (alimony awarded based upon need and ability to pay).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 458:19, IV(b) directs courts to consider each party’s health when setting alimony; speculative future changes in health do not determine the award.

In the Matter of Thomas Gelinas and Karin Gelinas · filed 2019-06-05IV(b)

Although the petitioner contends that “the trial court assumed that [he] will work forever, and that [his] health will remain unchanged into the indefinite future,” the court’s finding is more accurately interpreted as an appropriate refusal to engage in speculation as to future conditions.