N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4

Section 508:4 imposes a three-year limitations period that bars claims based on conduct more than three years before filing when the claimant already knew of the injury and its cause and has no basis for tolling.

Joyce v. Dartmouth Med. School · filed 2002-10-08

Joyce concedes that he discovered both his injuries and the causal connection between Dartmouth’s improper actions and his injuries when Dartmouth engaged in the conduct on which his claims are based. Thus, he has no claim that § 508:4's three- year limitation period should be tolled after he “discovered” his causes of action. Nor does he plead any facts that would support an equitable tolling or fraudulent concealment defense to the statute of limitations. Finally, he cannot claim that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until he discovered the full extent of his injuries because the New Hampshire Supreme Court has explicitly considered and rejected that argument. See Rowe v . John Deere, 130 N.H. 1 8 , 22-23 (1987). Accordingly, Joyce’s claims are barred by § 508:4 to the extent that they are based on conduct that occurred prior to March 1 2 , 1998.

Section 508:4 sets a three-year limitations period for tort actions, which the court applied to determine whether an action was timely when filed in New Hampshire.

Barrett v. Ambient Pressure Diving, Ltd. · filed 2006-03-31

At the time that this suit was commenced, it would have been timely in New Hampshire, given that New Hampshire’s statute of limitations for tort actions is three years. N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 508:4.

Section 508:4, I gives personal actions a three-year limitations period and incorporates the discovery rule.

Gembitsky v. DeSteph (In re DeSteph) · filed 2010-01-25I

Counts IV through VIII of the Plaintiffs complaint are personal actions. In New Hampshire, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, all personal actions, except actions for slander or libel, may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of....” N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I. Section 508:4 incorporates the discovery rule.

Section 508:4(I) sets a three-year limitations period for personal tort and contract actions.

McNamara v. City of Nashua · filed 2011-01-13(I)

Under New Hampshire law, the statute of limitations for both personal tort and contract actions is three years. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4(I) (2010); Coyle v. Battles, 782 A.2d 902, 905 (N.H. 2001) (three-year period applies to contract claims).

Section 508:4, I bars state-law claims brought more than three years after the challenged act or discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to that act.

Moore v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems · filed 2012-01-27I

Under New Hampshire law, a claim “may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of” or “within 3 years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I . The limitations period on the Moores’ state-law claims against WMC therefore expired, at the latest, in March 2010. Because the Moores did not assert their claims against WMC until November 1 , 2010, those claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and are dismissed.

Section 508:4, I provides the limitations period for an action seeking a constructive trust.

In Re Desteph · filed 2010-01-25I

The Court finds that the proper limitations period for a constructive trust action is found in N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I.

Section 508:4, I supplies the general limitations period for Consumer Protection Act claims when that Act has no applicable limitations period.

Forrester v. Wheelabrator · filed 2011-12-16I

Because the Consumer Protection Act contains no limitations provision applicable to this action, the court will apply section 508:4,I ’s general statute of limitations to plaintiffs’ Consumer Protection Act claim.

Section 508:4(I) bars claims over a 2005 loan as untimely when they arose as the borrowers began repayment and were brought more than three years later.

Rossop, et al v. Bank of America, et al. · filed 2013-12-17(I)

Reading the complaint quite liberally to also include allegations that the plaintiffs suffered economic damages as a result of American Home fraudulently inducing and/or coercing them to enter into an unconscionable loan agreement in 2005 – all assertions unsupported by any evidence - I find that these claims, which arose when plaintiffs began repaying the second loan, are barred by New Hampshire’s three-year statute of limitations. See Lehane v . Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 2013 DNH 059, 8-9 & n.5 (citing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4(I)).

Section 508:4 bars state-law claims filed more than three years after the claimant became aware of the alleged misconduct.

Janet Saunders and Peter Saunders v. First Magnus Financial Corp., et al. · filed 2018-07-16

New Hampshire’s three-year statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs’ state law claims. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4. Plaintiff’s allege that they became aware of the defendants’ alleged scheme during state court litigation in November 2013, more than three years before they filed this suit.

Section 508:4(I) applies a three-year limitations period to a personal action for tortious interference with contract.

Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Schleicher & Stebbins Hotels, LLC · filed 2021-08-06(I)

This proposed claim, however, is barred by N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4(I) as having been brought outside of the three-year limitations period for personal actions.

Section 508:4, I bars fraud claims filed more than three years after the challenged act or when it was or reasonably should have been discovered.

Bradley v Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2013-12-18I

Under New Hampshire law, a personal action must be brought within three years of “the act or omission complained of,” or within three years of when the act or omission was discovered or “in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have [been] discovered.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I (statute of limitations for personal actions). The limitations period on these claims expired, at the latest, in 2012. Because they were only asserted in September 2013, the claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and therefore futile.

Section 508:4 provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury tort claims.

SKINNER v. HADLOCK · filed 2022-11-10

Because New Hampshire has a personal injury torts statute of limitations of three years, Skinner’s claims would be time-barred under New Hampshire law as well and there is no choice-of-law issue regarding this defense. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4.

Section 508:4 requires personal actions to be brought within three years of the act or omission complained of.

Blaisdell v. Rochester, et al. · filed 1998-08-28I

Blaisdell had three years from the date of the "act or omission complained of" to bring his state law claims. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4,1.

Section 508:4, I generally requires personal actions to be filed within three years, subject to its discovery rule.

Brian Goodman, Sr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Golden West Financial Corp. · filed 2018-09-17I

all personal actions, except actions for slander or libel, may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of, except that when the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission were not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the act or omission, the action shall be commenced within 3 years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.

Section 508:4 supplies the three-year personal injury limitations period governing § 1983 actions in New Hampshire.

Cote v. Vetter · filed 1994-07-08

Although Cote has attempted to invoke other statutory limitations periods, New Hampshire's three- year personal injury statute of limitations, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (RSA) 508:4, governs this 1983 action.

Section 508:4 bars a claim based on conduct that occurred more than three years before the complaint was filed.

GEM Realty v. First N/B of Boston · filed 1995-03-20

The court agrees that plaintiff cannot assert a claim for breach of the Bank's duties of good faith and due diligence based on conduct of the defendant which falls outside the applicable three-year statute of limitations; that i s , before November 1 6 , 1990.

RSA 508:4’s three-year limitations period applies to constitutional and contractual claims concerning procedural due process and procedural fairness.

King v. Town of Hanover · filed 1995-07-14

We express no opinion as to the merits of any claims advanced by the plaintiff in his petition in equity and hold only that constitutional and contractual claims relating to procedural due process and procedural fairness would be subject to RSA 508:4 rather than RSA 541:6.

Section 508:4, I’s three-year limitations period applies to actions arising on or after July 1, 1986; actions arising earlier remain subject to the prior six-year period even if the injury is discovered later.

Bronstein v. GZA GeoEnvironmental, Inc. · filed 1995-09-27I

In this case, the plaintiffs’ negligence and contract actions arose when GZA failed to identify the presence of hazardous waste on the site in September 1985. While the plaintiffs were not aware of the injury until July 29, 1986, the actions arose prior to the effective date of the three-year statute of limitations. See id.; RSA 508:4, I (1994). As a result, the trial court correctly ruled that the plaintiffs’ actions against GZA and the Eastman defendants were governed by the pre-1986 six-year statute of limitations and, as a result, were not time barred.

Section 508:4 provides a three-year limitations period for Lanham Act and common-law claims treated as akin to fraud.

Pacamor Bearings v. Minebea C o . · filed 1996-03-11

As to the Lanham Act and common-law claims, the court finds these actions most akin to those sounding in fraud, to which the state's three-year limitations statute applies, RSA 508:4, and thus pushes the window of recovery on those claims to June 1 5 , 1987.

Section 508:4, I bars state-law claims arising from an arrest when they are filed more than three years after the arrest.

Appell v. Giaccone, et al. · filed 1997-12-11I

As the arrest occurred more than three years before plaintiff filed his complaint, his state law claims against all defendants arising from the arrest are barred by the statute of limitations. See RSA § 508:4, I .

Section 508:4, I sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury and contract actions.

Dyne v. Babin · filed 1998-11-10I

Since the statute of limitations for both personal injury and contract actions in New Hampshire is three years, RSA 508:4, I, each of Dyne's claims must have accrued no more than three years prior to January 17, 1997, the date he filed suit.

Section 508:4, I provides the three-year limitations period for Rehabilitation Act claims because it is the most analogous New Hampshire statute.

Green v. Hooksett Police Department · filed 1995-12-06I

The court concludes that RSA 508:4 is the state statute most analogous to claims presented under the federal Rehabilitation Act. This being the case, the correlating statute of limitations that applies to RSA 508:4 claims, and therefore Rehabilitation Act claims, is three years.

Section 508:4’s three-year limitations period applies to wrongful death actions.

Cheever v. Southern New Hampshire Regional Medical Center · filed 1997-01-28

Therefore, in the context of interpreting whether the three-year period set forth in RSA 508:4 applies to wrongful death actions, the differences between the two actions are immaterial.

Section 508:4 gives a plaintiff three years from the date of injury to identify the defendants in a personal action, unless a later deadline applies under the disability tolling provision.

Stewart v. Robinson, et al. · filed 2000-03-07

Accordingly, plaintiff had either three years from the date of Stewart’s injuries (see RSA 508:4) or two years from the date of her appointment (see RSA 508:8), whichever was later, to specifically identify the defendants against whom she was proceeding.

Section 508:4's three-year limitations period applies to personal tort actions and, through the wrongful death statute's reference to RSA 508, wrongful death actions.

English v. Sanderson, et al. · filed 2001-05-25

Since the complaint asserts wrongful death and personal causes of action, and because it was not filed within three years of the accrual1 of those causes of action, the applicable statute of limitations, as authoritatively construed in Cheever, operates to bar their presentation now.

Section 508:4, I requires a personal action to be brought within three years of the act or omission complained of.

Gabrielson v. Coyne · filed 2001-07-31I

Personal actions, such as the defendants' counterclaim, must be brought within three years of the "act or omission complained of." RSA 508:4, I. ... Since the defendants did not assert their joint venture counterclaim within three years of the acts or omissions complained of, the claim would be untimely pursuant to 508:4, I.

Section 508:4’s three-year period excludes the day of the act or omission, so a personal action filed on the third anniversary is timely.

Chesley v. HARVEY INDUSTRIES, INC. · filed 2008-04-22

Unlike RSA 677:2, RSA 508:4 does not contain a specific directive stating a day or date to begin computing the time period. RSA 508:4 states simply that all personal actions “may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of,” without specifying when to begin calculating the three-year period. Therefore, the general rule in RSA 21:35 does apply, and the day upon which the incident occurred in computing the three-year period of time is excluded from the time limit.

Section 508:4, I supplies the general three-year limitations period when the ski statute’s two-year period does not apply because the injured person was not a skier at the time of injury.

Martin v. PAT'S PEAK, INC. · filed 2009-05-21I

We now turn to whether this action is governed by the two-year statute of limitations in RSA 225-A-.25, IV or the general three-year statute of limitations in RSA 508:4, I (1997). ... Since Helen Martin was not a “skier” within the statutory definition at the time she sustained the injuries complained of, RSA 225-A:25, IV, even as in force at the time the Martins filed suit, does not apply to their cause of action. Accordingly, RSA 508:4 applies, and the action is not time-barred.

Section 508:4 gives a claimant three years from the injury-causing act or its discovery to bring a negligent misrepresentation claim.

Coldwell Banker v. Moses · filed 2010-09-08

Second, even if the court were to indulge BM Realty and assume CB owed it a duty, the undisputed record shows that Moses knew the Salem franchise was a bad investment almost immediately after purchasing i t , rendering any claim for negligent misrepresentation based on information conveyed before the January 1 8 , 2001, purchase date barred by New Hampshire’s three year statute of limitations.

Section 508:4 requires a negligent misrepresentation claim to be brought within three years of the injurious act or its discovery.

Coldwell Banker Real Estate, LLC v. Brian Moses Realty, Inc. · filed 2010-09-08

BM Realty filed its counterclaims on March 31, 2008; therefore, the negligent misrepresentations had to have been made, or to have not been discovered, until sometime after March 31, 2005. ... BM Realty needed to file its claim for negligent misrepresentation no later than the middle of 2004. Instead, BM Realty filed it in March 2008. It is, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 508:4’s three-year limitations period applies to false arrest claims; the claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of the arrest and its cause.

Coltin v. Town of Londonderry · filed 1999-05-05

The plaintiff's cause of action therefore accrued and the tolling period began to run on October 31, 1994, the date of the plaintiff's arrest.

Section 508:4, I starts the three-year limitations period for an unpaid-wage claim when the wages become overdue.

Rosenzweig v. Morton · filed 1999-07-13I

RSA 508:4, I, allows an action to be “brought. . . within 3 years of the act or omission complained of.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff’s wages were overdue in violation of RSA 275:43, :44 (1987 & Supp. 1998).

Section 508:4, I’s three-year period for a constructive discharge claim begins when the employee tenders a resignation or retirement notice.

Jeffery v. City of Nashua · filed 2012-06-12I

We conclude, therefore, that an action for constructive discharge accrues when the employee tenders the resignation or retirement notice.

Section 508:4(I) sets a three-year limitations period that applies to a breach of contract claim filed in New Hampshire despite a contractual choice of Massachusetts law.

Hersey v. WPB Partners · filed 2013-07-24(I)

Accordingly, because New Hampshire’s three-year statute of limitations applies to plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, her claim must have been filed before December 2 1 , 2009. It was not.

Section 508:4 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New Hampshire.

Levine v. Pelham · filed 2015-04-15

For § 1983 claims brought in New Hampshire, the applicable statute of limitations is three years, as provided by RSA 508:4.

Section 508:4 provides a three-year limitations period for the state claims.

Lewis B. Sykes, Jr. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., et al. · filed 2015-11-20

The state claims are governed by RSA 508:4, which provides a three-year limitations period.

Section 508:4, I requires a fraudulent misrepresentation damages claim to be filed within three years after the claimant discovers, or reasonably should discover, the injury and its causal relationship to the alleged misrepresentation.

Heino v. US Bank, N.A., as Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust · filed 2016-12-06I

Because she first asserted her claim for damages resulting from fraudulent misrepresentation in March 2016, that claim is barred by the New Hampshire statute of limitations.

Section 508:4 requires personal actions, including tort claims, to be brought within three years of the act or omission complained of.

NIMCO Real Estate Associates, LLC, et al. v. Nadeau, et al. · filed 2017-03-23

New Hampshire’s statute of limitations for personal actions, including torts, is RSA 508:4, which provides that claims must be brought within three years “of the act or omission complained of.”

Section 508:4, I applies a three-year limitations period to medical injury claims.

Ornelas v. City of Manchester, et al. · filed 2017-06-05I

R.S.A. 508:4, I, the applicable statute of limitations, provides that “all personal actions, except actions for slander or libel, may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of.” Here, there is no dispute that the acts causing Ornelas’s injuries occurred at some point on or before October 17, 2013. Because Ornelas filed his amended complaint in February 2017, he did not bring his claim within the three years required under RSA 508:4, I.

Section 508:4, I sets a three-year limitations period for personal actions other than libel or slander.

David Eldridge & a. v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC & a. · filed 2017-10-12I

The motion to amend was brought on March 14, 2016, and the applicable limitations period is three years. See RSA 508:4, I (2010) (three-year statute of limitations applicable to all personal actions other than libel or slander).

Section 508:4 sets a three-year limitations period measured from accrual; a claim accruing less than three years before the defendant’s death is not barred at death.

Anderson v. Estate of Mary D. Wood · filed 2018-11-28

We also agree with the plaintiff that she satisfied the requirement that, at the time of Wood’s death, her claim was not barred by RSA 508:4 — Wood died on January 22, 2015, less than three years from the accrual of the plaintiff’s cause of action on April 5, 2013.

Section 508:4 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in New Hampshire.

Torro v. Mark Goldberg, Marilyn Gordon, and the Town of Bradford · filed 2019-03-22

When a claim under § 1983 arose in New Hampshire, the statute of limitations is three years. Gorelik v. Costin, 605 F.3d 118, 121 (1st Cir. 2010); RSA 508:4.

Section 508:4 barred a medical malpractice action filed after the limitations period expired, even assuming 197 days of tolling while a federal action was pending.

Perfetto v. Cecilia Englander, M.D. · filed 2019-06-20

Even assuming that the statute of limitations was tolled for 197 days, as the plaintiff contends, while his federal action was pending, see 28 U.S.C. §1367(d) (2012), we conclude that he filed his action in the superior court after the statute of limitations had expired.

Section 508:4(I) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal action; once the defendant shows the action was filed more than three years after the underlying events, the plaintiff must show that the discovery rule or another tolling doctrine applies.

Petersen v. Atrium Medical Corporation · filed 2019-09-09I

Atrium has met its initial burden of showing that Petersen failed to bring this action within three years of the underlying events. The burden then shifts to Petersen to show that the discovery rule or another tolling doctrine applies. He has not met, or attempted to meet, that burden.

Section 508:4 gives a party three years from the act or omission to bring breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims, unless the discovery rule or tolling applies.

DiCarlo-Fagioli v. JP Morgan Chase Bank · filed 2015-10-20

Under RSA 508:4, DiCarlo-Fagioli was required to bring her claims “within 3 years of the act or omission complained of” unless the discovery rule ... would apply or another ground for tolling the limitations period existed. ... Therefore, based on the record presented, the claims were filed too late.

Section 508:4 provides a three-year limitations period for New Hampshire wage claims.

Chen v. C&R Rock Inc., et al. · filed 2016-03-22

Similarly, the statute of limitations for the plaintiff’s state wage claims is three years. See RSA §§ 508:4, 275:53, 279:29; Scacchi v. Dycom Indus., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 406, 408 (D.N.H. 2004) (finding that the three-year limitation period provided by RSA § 508:4 applied to the plaintiff’s wage claim).

Under § 508:4, I, allegations supporting delayed discovery or tolling can preclude dismissal of product liability claims as time-barred at the pleading stage.

Hickinbottom v. Atrium Medical Corporation · filed 2019-08-28I

Taking Hickinbottom’s allegations in the light most favorable to her and resolving reasonable inferences in her favor, the allegations are sufficient to preclude dismissal of her product liability claims as time-barred at this stage of the litigation.

Section 508:4, I’s three-year limitations period for a wrongful nonrenewal claim begins when all elements of the claim are present, which may be when the employer gives notice of nonrenewal.

Cluff-Landry v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester · filed 2017-02-24I

Her cause of action, therefore, accrued on April 15, 2012, when all of the elements necessary for the claim were present. ... Because the plaintiff did not initiate her action until May 13, 2015, approximately one month after the limitations period had run, the trial court correctly concluded that her claim was time-barred.

Section 508:4 sets a three-year limitations period for personal actions, including slander, libel, and tortious interference claims.

Chalifoux v. Proto Labs, LLC · filed 2023-08-02

Based on the allegations in the proposed amended complaint, Chalifoux knew that he had been injured by Dirsa’s alleged actions, including making allegedly false statements about him, by the time he was given notice of his termination on October 31, 2019. Therefore, under RSA 508:4, Chalifoux had to bring his claims against Dirsa no later than October 31, 2022. He filed his amended complaint on February 15, 2023, after the expiration of the limitations period.

Section 508:4, I supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983, ADA Title II, and New Hampshire intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

Maggi v. Grafton County Department of Corrections · filed 2025-01-15I

All of Maggi’s claims are subject to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in RSA 508:4, I.

Section 508:4, I gives a person injured in a motor vehicle accident three years to sue from the act or omission, or from when the person discovers or reasonably should discover the injury and its causal relationship to that act or omission.

Pelissier v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co · filed 2024-10-25I

A plaintiff who is injured in a motor vehicle accident has three years from the date of the “act or omission complained of” or three years from when “the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of” to sue the motorist. RSA 508:4, I.

Section 508:4 provides a three-year limitations period for breach-of-contract and fraud claims in New Hampshire.

Austin v. Hanover Insurance Company · filed 2023-05-09

Moreover, the claims, which rely entirely on allegations concerning conduct that occurred roughly thirty years ago, cannot survive Hanover’s challenge under the applicable statute of limitations. See RSA 508:4 (three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract and fraud in New Hampshire); 12 V.S.A. § 511 (six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract and fraud in Vermont); Fincher v. Town of Brookline, 26 F.4th 479, 485 (1st Cir. 2022) (“The limitation period applicable to a § 1983 claim is to be found in the general personal injury statute of the jurisdiction in which the claim arises.” (quotation and alteration omitted)).

Section 508:4’s limitations period for personal injury claims begins when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and that the defendant’s conduct may have caused it.

prod.liab.rep.(cch)p 12,304 Eileen Gagnon v. G.D. Searle & Company · filed 1989-11-15

That is, we understand the New Hampshire discovery rule to provide that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know that he is injured and that the injury may have been caused by the defendant’s conduct.

Section 508:4’s discovery rule can allow an abuse claim based on repressed memories to proceed when the pleadings allege the memories surfaced within three years before suit.

Sinclair v. Brill · filed 1993-02-08

However, the plaintiff counters that the allegations raised in count three of her complaint are governed by the discovery rule in N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 508:4 (Supp.1991). ... The court agrees with the plaintiff that the allegations in count three are not, at this point in the proceedings, time-barred. ... The plaintiff has presented sufficient allegations in the pleadings that she repressed until 1988 the memory of the acts of abuse alleged in count three of the complaint.

Section 508:4 starts the three-year limitations period when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, both the injury and its causal relationship to the defendant’s conduct.

Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Services, Inc. v. Total Waste Management Corp. · filed 1993-03-19

In focusing solely on the plaintiffs injury, however, the defendant appears to overlook that portion of the rule requiring the discovery of a causal relationship between the plaintiffs injury and the conduct of which the plaintiff complains before a cause of action accrues.

Section 508:4’s three-year discovery rule applies to contract actions, and whether the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered the injury may require factual development.

Rook v. Storch · filed 1996-06-05

In Black Bear Lodge v . Trillium Corp., 136 N.H. 635, 638 (N.H. 1993), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the "discovery" rule, embodied in § 508:4, is applicable to contract actions. ... As in Black Bear Lodge, it would be improper to dismiss plaintiff's claim on the factual issue of "reasonable diligence" at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 508:4, I gives a plaintiff three years from discovering, or reasonably being able to discover, both the injury and its possible causal connection to the defendant’s conduct; suspicion of a third party’s dealings alone need not reveal that connection.

Forrester v. Wheelabrator · filed 2012-01-30I

Under the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs’ claims accrued when they “[d]iscovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I . From that date, they had three years within which to file suit. ... This argument fails. For the statute of limitations to begin running under Beane, the plaintiff must know of the possibility “that its injury was proximately caused by conduct of the defendant.” Id. But, viewing Forrester’s letter in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, all it evinces is a suspicion that Kobin had resumed business with Wheelabrator. It does not necessarily evince, as Wheelabrator argues, that plaintiffs suspected that Kobin’s cessation of business with them (or its contemporaneous resumption of business with Wheelabrator) was caused by Wheelabrator’s misconduct.

Section 508:4(1) does not extend the three-year limitations period under its discovery exception when reasonable diligence would have revealed the prospective defendants’ involvement.

Bordner v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 1992-10-28(1)

There has not been any argument advanced by plaintiffs that would explain why a reasonably diligent search would not have uncovered the entire involvement of Mr. Kalil and Sentinel. As to Sentinel, there is written documentation that plaintiffs were informed of Sentinel’s involvement well before the actual closing took place. Mr. Kalil handled the closing for the defendant. His involvement would have been readily ascertainable with a mere modicum of effort. For these reasons, the Court finds that plaintiffs can not invoke the discovery exception to the statute of limitations.

Section 508:4(I)'s three-year limitations period may be tolled when a defendant with a duty to disclose material information fails to do so.

SourceTec v. Smiths Industries · filed 1997-03-31(I)

Second, as a matter of law, the failure to disclose material information will toll the statute of limitations if defendants had a duty to disclose the information.

Section 508:4(I) starts the limitations period for a discrete act when the plaintiff discovers the resulting injury, even if the full extent of the injury is still unknown.

McDonough v. Keniston · filed 1997-09-12(I)

New Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4 provides for a limitations period which begins to run upon the commission of those acts. McDonough has drafted his claims to avoid identifying which specific acts give rise to each individual claim. Instead, he attempts to apply the whole range of defendants’ conduct to each count, arguing that because some acts are within the limitations period, all acts should be considered. New Hampshire law, however, makes clear that a limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff discovers his injury, even if he has not discovered its extent. Rowe v . Deere, 130 N.H. 1 8 , 22 (1987). Once McDonough became aware of defendants’ acts which gave rise to a claim, the limitations period began to run.

Section 508:4(I) bars claims filed more than three years after the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the injury and its cause, while claims based on later conduct remain timely.

Forrester Environmental v. Wheelabrator Technologies · filed 2012-08-15I

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the applicable statute of limitations, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I , bars plaintiffs’ claims except to the extent they are premised upon alleged misrepresentations made to representatives of Kobin Environmental Enterprise Co., Ltd. by Wheelabrator on or around June 1 4 , 2007.

Under § 508:4(I), the discovery rule does not delay the limitations period until foreclosure when borrowers knew or should have known at loan origination that they had assumed an unaffordable secured debt.

Lehane v. Wachovia Mortgage, et al. · filed 2013-04-16(I)

the discovery rule “is not intended to toll the statute of limitations until the full extent of the plaintiff’s injury has manifested itself.” ... Here, the facts that led to foreclosure were apparent at the time of the transaction in January 2008. ... Accordingly, I dismiss plaintiffs’ fraud, conspiracy, and CPA claims as time-barred.

Section 508:4 gives common-law breach-of-contract and negligence-per-se claims a three-year limitations period, running from the injurious act or omission unless the discovery rule tolls it.

Mareld Company, Inc. v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Company n/k/a Verizon New England Inc. · filed 2018-11-28I

The three-year limitations period established in Section 508:4 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes applies to Mareld’s common-law claims for breach of contract and negligence per se. See Black Bear Lodge v. Trillium Corp., 136 N.H. 635, 638 (1993). Unless tolled by the discovery rule, that period begins to run from the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury. Id.; see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I. ... The discovery rule therefore cannot toll the limitations period in this case.

Section 508:4(I) does not delay the three-year limitations period until a plaintiff knows the full extent of an injury or is certain of its cause.

Patrick Short, et al. v. Civ. Amerada Hess Corp. et al. · filed 2019-03-29I

But the plaintiffs misapprehend the requirements of the discovery rule. It does not require “the full extent of the plaintiff’s injury [to have] manifested itself” or that a plaintiff “be certain of th[e] causal connection” between the harm he has suffered and the defendant’s negligent or wrongful act.

Section 508:4’s discovery rule can prevent dismissal of a personal action filed more than three years after the defendant’s last allegedly injurious act when facts bearing on discovery of the injury and its cause remain undeveloped.

Kyle, et al. v. Linden Care, LLC, and Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. · filed 2020-04-13I

Although plaintiffs plainly waited more than three years from Linden Care’s last allegedly injurious act to bring their claims, I cannot determine on the present record whether their claims are time-barred. This is because plaintiffs have invoked the discovery rule, and whether the rule applies turns on issues of fact that have not yet been properly developed.

Section 508:4(I) gives unjust enrichment claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the claimant discovers or reasonably should discover the injury and its causal connection to the complained-of conduct.

McCormick v. Wakefield, NH, Town of · filed 2024-08-28I

In New Hampshire, “all personal actions,” with some exceptions not relevant here, “may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of . . . .” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I. Its discovery rule provides that, when the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission were not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the act or omission, the action shall be commenced within 3 years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of. Id. The three-year limitations period applies to claims of unjust enrichment. Singer Asset Fin. Co., LC v. Wyner, 937 A.2d 303 312 (N.H. 2007). ... In light of the undisputed factual record, Ms. McCormick’s unjust enrichment claims accrued no later than February 21, 2018, the latest date that Ms. McCormick leaned of Ms. Beckwith’s actions. As she commenced this action more than four years later, on March 8, 2022, her claim against the Estate is time-barred and the Estate is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 508:4 imposes a three-year limitations period, subject to tolling under the discovery rule.

Rice v. Wal-Mart Stores, et al. · filed 2004-07-23

I agree with Hartford Life that Rice’s ... claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4. ... Once Hartford demonstrates that the action was not “brought . . . within [three] years of the act or omission complained of,” it meets its burden. Glines, 140 N.H. at 181. Rice then must show that discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations. Id. While Hartford has met its burden, Rice has failed to produce sufficient evidence to support her reliance on the discovery rule. ... Her claims, therefore, are time-barred pursuant to N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4.

Under § 508:4, a malpractice claim based on a foreign object left in a patient’s body accrues when the patient learns, or with reasonable care and diligence should learn, of its presence.

Shillady v. Elliot Community Hospital · filed 1974-05-31

We hold therefore that actions for malpractice based on the leaving of a foreign object in a patient’s body do not accrue until the patient learns or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have learned of its presence.

Section 508:4’s limitations period for attorney malpractice begins when the client discovers, or through reasonable care and diligence should discover, that the underlying action was barred.

McKee v. Riordan · filed 1976-11-30

Accordingly, we hold that in this case the cause of action accrued at the time when the plaintiffs discovered or through reasonable care and diligence should have discovered that their action was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 508:4, I is not tolled when an initial injury alerts the plaintiff to a possible violation of his rights, even if more serious harm appears later.

Rowe v. Deere · filed 1987-10-15I

The first question we are asked to answer is whether our statute of limitations for personal actions, RSA 508:4, I, is tolled when a person sustains an injury at the time of an accident which, while causing damages characterizable as nominal when compared with later-arising damages from the same incident, nevertheless serves to notify him that his rights have been violated. For the reasons that follow, our answer to this question is no.

Under the former § 508:4(I), when a plaintiff should have discovered the injury and its cause requires a developed factual record.

McLean v. Gaudet · filed 1990-10-25(I)

The question whether the plaintiff should have discovered that she was injured and that the allegedly unlawful conduct of her father caused those injuries can be decided only after plenary review of a fully developed record.

Section 508:4 I’s limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the injury and its connection to the defendant’s conduct.

University System of New Hampshire v. United States Gypsum Co. · filed 1991-01-17I

Applying the discovery rule, the court must therefore consider (1) whether plaintiff had, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have had, knowledge of its injury, and (2) whether it had knowledge linking that injury to the conduct of the defendants.

Section 508:4’s discovery rule delays accrual until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the injury and its possible connection to the defendant’s conduct.

Tourist Village Motel, Inc. v. Massachusetts Engineering Co. · filed 1992-06-30

Consequently, at this early stage of the litigation, operation of the discovery rule makes plaintiff's negligence, strict liability, and nuisance claims timely, and defendant’s motion with respect to these claims is therefore denied insofar as it is premised upon a statute of limitations theory.

Section 508:4, I applies its discovery rule to contract as well as tort actions.

Black Bear Lodge v. Trillium Corp. · filed 1993-02-17I

Consequently, we find the cases cited by the superior court and the defendants inapposite, and interpret RSA 508:4,1 (Supp. 1992) according to its plain meaning, finding that the statutory “discovery rule” applies to contract, as well as tort, actions.

Section 508:4, I’s discovery rule requires a plaintiff to understand that the defendant’s wrongdoing caused the injury; awareness of the abusive acts alone may not start the limitations period.

Sinclair v. Brill · filed 1994-03-04I

The court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the acts of abuse “notified” the plaintiff that the defendants violated her rights. Implicitly, the discovery rule requires that the plaintiff understand that her injury was caused by the wrongdoing of the defendant.

Section 508:4’s discovery rule applies when a plaintiff was unaware of the injury or that a wrongful act or omission caused it.

Glines v. Bruk · filed 1995-08-22I

The discovery rule is designed to provide relief in situations where the plaintiff is unaware of either his injury or that the injury was caused by a wrongful act or omission.

For an emotional-distress claim based on a course of harassment, § 508:4, I's discovery rule does not start the limitations period until the plaintiff can reasonably recognize the injury after experiencing at least some emotional distress.

Duguay v. Androscoggin Valley Hosp. · filed 1996-01-25I

The court accepts this position to a certain degree and finds, therefore, that plaintiff cannot reasonably be said to have been alerted to the tort and accompanying injury until the harassment has run at least part of its course and until plaintiff has begun to experience at least some emotional distress.

Section 508:4’s three-year period for tortious misrepresentation is not tolled when the buyer knows upon delivery that the seller’s representations are inaccurate.

Dynaco Corp. v. KLA Instruments Corp. (In Re Dynaco Corp.) · filed 1996-08-30

I conclude that the defendant is correct on this assertion inasmuch as the plaintiffs own allegations indicate that it had to know that the representations were not accurate and could not be relied upon per se at the moment that the machine was delivered and would not perform its intended function.

Under § 508:4, I, a legal malpractice claim accrues when the client should recognize the connection between an injury and the lawyer’s alleged error, even if the underlying decision can still be appealed.

Draper v. Brennan · filed 1998-05-14I

We conclude that the superior court’s adverse decision on the plaintiff’s motion to enforce should have alerted the plaintiff to a potential connection between his being compelled to pay for his insurance and his lawyer’s alleged error in drafting the settlement agreement.

Section 508:4’s limitations period may be tolled by the discovery rule or fraudulent concealment.

Cheshire Medical Center v. W.R. Grace & Co. · filed 1991-05-16

Applying either tolling doctrine to RSA 508:4, the court concludes that Courts I, II, V, and VI were timely filed on December 23, 1988.

Section 508:4, I’s discovery rule is an equitable issue that the trial judge may decide, even when its application requires factual findings.

Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists · filed 1997-07-15I

As an equitable issue, the application of the discovery rule was properly considered by the trial court.

Section 508:4, I delays the start of the limitations period until a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the connection between the harm and the alleged negligence.

Pichowicz v. Watson Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 2001-03-21(I)

Under the “discovery rule,” if the harm and its causal relationship to the negligent act is not discovered or “could not reasonably have been discovered” when the action arose, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiffs discover “or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered” this causal relationship. RSA 508:4, I.

Section 508:4 gives a plaintiff three years to bring an action, subject to a discovery rule when the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission could not reasonably have been discovered; the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the rule applies.

Dobe v. Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2002-02-22I

RSA 508:4,1 (1997) codifies the common law discovery rule by providing that all actions must be brought within three years of the act or omission complained of “except that when the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission were not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the act or omission.” Once a defendant has established that the statute of limitations would bar an action, the plaintiff has the burden of raising and proving that the discovery rule is applicable to an action that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 508:4, I’s discovery rule does not toll the limitations period until the full extent of an injury appears if the plaintiff could reasonably discern some harm caused by the defendant.

Furbush v. McKittrick · filed 2003-04-29I

While the plaintiff may not have understood the full extent of the harm that would result from the loss of his potential third-party claim, the discovery rule is not intended to toll the statute of limitations until the full extent of the plaintiff’s injury has manifested itself.

Section 508:4, I starts the three-year limitations period when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know both of the injury and that the defendant’s conduct caused it.

Big League Entertainment, Inc. v. Brox Industries, Inc. · filed 2003-05-05I

This is a two-pronged rule requiring both prongs to be satisfied before the statute of limitations begins to run. First, a plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that it has been injured; and second, a plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that its injury was proximately caused by conduct of the defendant.

Section 508:4’s discovery rule does not save a claim when the plaintiff should reasonably have discovered the alleged injury more than three years before filing suit.

Keenan v. AIG Life Ins. Co. · filed 2003-07-11

Because Keenan does not argue that the 1993 notice was confusing or ambiguous, I find that Keenan and her late husband should have reasonably discovered their alleged injuries in December 1993, when Wal-Mart notified Robert of its intention to purchase a COLI policy on his life.

Section 508:4, I tolls the three-year limitations period under the discovery rule until the plaintiff knows of a violation of his rights and a resulting injury, even if he does not yet know the injury’s full extent.

Sheeler v. Select Energy · filed 2003-07-28I

The discovery rule, however, tolls the commencement of the limitation period only until the plaintiff is apprised of a violation of his rights and a resulting injury but not until the plaintiff discovers the full extent of his injuries.

Section 508:4’s discovery rule asks when a malpractice plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the lawyer’s actions caused an injury.

Feddersen v. Garvey · filed 2005-01-24

In contrast, for the purposes of the discovery rule, the question is when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that he was injured because of his former lawyers’ actions.

Section 508:4, I applies its three-year discovery rule to contract actions; the period begins when the plaintiff reasonably should know of the injury and its causal relationship to the defendant’s conduct.

Wood v. Greaves · filed 2005-05-20I

We held in Black Bear Lodge v. Trillium Corporation, 136 N.H. 635, 638 (1993), that according to the plain meaning of RSA 508:4, I, the discovery rule contained therein applies to contract actions. That rule embodies a two-pronged test: “First, a plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that it has been injured; and second, a plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that its injury was proximately caused by the conduct of the defendant.” Big League Entm’t v. Brox Indus., 149 N.H. 480, 485 (2003). The record before us compels a finding that the plaintiffs should have known both pieces of required information no later than November 1999, which is the time the trial court ruled the statute of limitations began to run. This action was commenced more than three years later, on July 7, 2003. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that this action is time-barred.

Section 508:4, I shifts the burden to the plaintiff to prove the discovery rule applies once the defendant shows the action was filed more than three years after the alleged act.

Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. · filed 2005-12-15I

Once the defendant establishes that the cause of action was not brought within three years of the alleged act, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise and prove the applicability of the discovery rule.

Section 508:4, I’s discovery rule does not delay the limitations period when a plaintiff knows of the injury and its cause but has not identified a potentially responsible subcontractor.

Perez v. Pike Industries, Inc. · filed 2005-12-30I

Here, the plaintiff knew of his injury and its causal connection to the alleged negligent paving when the injury occurred. In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim against Pike, the trial court correctly reasoned that the plaintiff’s failure to investigate and identify the subcontractor who actually applied the pavement to the highway does not warrant the application of the discovery rule.

Section 508:4, I delays the limitations period for a contract claim until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of both the breach and the resulting harm.

Archdiocese San Salv. v. Inter’l · filed 2006-02-23I

Under the rule, the limitations period on a contract claim does not commence until the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should have known, both that the defendant breached the agreement and that the plaintiff suffered harm as a result.

Section 508:4(I) starts the three-year limitations period when a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the injury and its causal relationship to the complained-of act.

McNamara v. City of Nashua · filed 2010-02-09(I)

With regard to his claim for fraudulent inducement, the discovery rule in RSA 508:4 applies. Under that rule, the limitations period starts when “the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.”

Section 508:4, I’s discovery rule starts the limitations period when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of both the injury and its causal connection to the defendant’s conduct; an IRS deficiency notice can establish that knowledge in an accountant malpractice claim.

Beane v. Dana S. Beane & Co., P.C. · filed 2010-09-22I

Given this legal framework, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it found that the plaintiff’s claim arose no later than April 5,2005, the date of the IRS notice of deficiency.

Section 508:4, I’s three-year discovery period cannot begin before the plaintiff has suffered an injury to discover.

J & M Lumber & Construction Co. v. Smyjunas · filed 2011-04-14I

The discovery rule allows a plaintiff to commence an action within three years “of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.” RSA 508:4,1. ... Here, there was no injury for J & M to discover in 2002.

Under § 508:4(I), whether a plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known an injury’s causal connection to the defendant may be unresolved on a motion to dismiss.

Lamprey v. Britton Construction, Inc. · filed 2012-02-10(I)

The defendants also argue that, even if the plaintiff did not discover the causal connection between the defendants’ acts and her injury when the water staining appeared, as a matter of law, she discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered this connection when Sherwood repaired her terrace in 2006. Based upon the plaintiff’s allegations, we cannot make this determination as a matter of law.

Section 508:4, I requires a CPA claim to be brought within three years of the transaction when the claimant could discern the injury at that time, even if further harm occurs later.

Monzione v. US Bank NH · filed 2013-01-25I

Because, by Monzione’s own reckoning, foreclosure was the inevitable result of his loan from Fremont, and that inevitably was clearly foretold by facts known to him at the time he took the loan, Monzione was obligated to bring his CPA claim within three years of the date on which he entered into the transaction at issue, i.e., no later than October 1, 2008.

Section 508:4’s limitations period for a Consumer Protection Act claim turns on when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its causal relationship to the defendant’s conduct.

Bougopoulos v. Altria Group, Inc. · filed 2013-06-18I

In other words, RSA 358-A:3 focuses on the plaintiffs knowledge of the defendant’s wrongful conduct and RSA 508:4 focuses on the plaintiffs knowledge of his injury and its casual relationship to the defendants’ conduct.

Section 508:4, I gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal action, measured from the act or omission or from when reasonable diligence would have revealed the injury and its cause.

Sykes v. RBS Citizens · filed 2014-03-04I

Under New Hampshire law, a personal action, other than for libel or slander, "may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of" or "within 3 years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of." RSA 508:4,1.

Section 508:4(I)’s discovery rule starts the limitations period for a contract claim when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the breach, even if the plaintiff receives the relevant documents later.

Sykes v. RBS Citizens, N.A. · filed 2014-03-04(I)

Even assuming that Sykes received the notices for the first time in April of 2011, however, that does not change the fact that Sykes knew or should have known about the alleged breach of the mortgage agreement on October 2, 2009, the date of the foreclosure auction.

Section 508:4’s discovery rule does not save a claim filed after the applicable statute of repose has expired.

Ingram v. Drouin · filed 2015-02-12I

Here, although the plaintiffs arguably satisfied the discovery rule, they did not satisfy the statute of repose. Accordingly, the discovery rule does not save their claims.

Under RSA 508:4, evidence that construction defects were latent can prevent judgment as a matter of law that the limitations period began when the house was built.

Murray v. McNamara · filed 2015-03-20I

Given the evidence that the defects in the house were latent, we cannot say that the “sole reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence, which must be viewed in the light most favorable to the [plaintiffs],” is that the defects were plain and obvious and, thus, would have been seen by Downing, as the defendants claim.

Section 508:4’s discovery rule turns on when a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered both the injury and its cause.

Susan Chase Gage, of the Estate of Margaret C. Gage v. State of New Hampshire · filed 2015-06-09

We have reviewed the record and the trial court’s well-reasoned order, and find more than ample support for the trial court’s determination that by February 2009, Margaret Gage reasonably should have discovered both the fact that she had been injured and the cause of her injury.

Section 508:4, I tolls the three-year limitations period until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the injury and its causal connection to the alleged wrongful act.

Ed's Carpet, Tile, and Hardwood, Inc. v. Marshall Law Office · filed 2016-02-11I

Under the “discovery rule,” however, the limitations period is tolled until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the injury and its causal connection to the allegedly negligent or wrongful act.

Section 508:4’s discovery rule cannot be rejected on the theory that a policy disclosed a coverage shortfall when its interrelated-claims terms did not clearly give the insured that notice.

Michael Askenaizer, as Trustee of Chapter 7 Estate of Focus Capital, Inc. v. Foy Insurance Group, Inc. & a. · filed 2017-02-23I

We conclude, therefore, that the trial court erred to the extent that it found that the policy put Focus on notice that its total coverage was limited to $1 million “in most instances” and, thus, rejected the plaintiff’s discovery rule argument with respect to claims that the defendants failed to procure a policy with $1 million of coverage per claim.

Section 508:4, I’s three-year limitations period may be tolled when the plaintiff could not reasonably discover the facts needed to bring suit; factual disputes about tolling can preclude dismissal.

Begley v. Windsor Surry Co., et al. · filed 2018-03-19I

Given these outstanding disputes of fact, defendants are not entitled to dismissal under RSA 508:4 at this juncture.

Section 508:4 gives personal actions a three-year limitations period and applies a discovery rule when the plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered the injury and its cause earlier.

Andrew Hall, Plaintiff v. Lorettann Gascard and Nikolas Gascard, Defendants · filed 2018-07-27

In response, the Gascards have identified no evidence in the record to suggest that, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, Hall could have (or should have) made that discovery earlier. Consequently, Hall’s common law claims (fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and unjust enrichment) are timely under RSA 508:4.

Section 508:4, I tolls the three-year period for legal malpractice claims only until the plaintiff could reasonably discern some harm caused by the attorney’s conduct; certainty about negligence is unnecessary.

Clarizio v. R. David DePuy, Esq. & a. · filed 2018-10-12I

The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice case only until “the plaintiff could reasonably discern that he suffered some harm caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Furbush, 149 N.H. at 431. The plaintiff need not be certain that the defendant actually acted negligently.

Section 508:4, I’s discovery rule tolls the three-year limitations period until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know both of the injury and that the defendant caused it.

Perry v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc. · filed 2019-05-14I

Therefore, the discovery rule will apply to toll the limitations period unless the plaintiff knew or should have known of her injury AND knew or should have discovered that the defendant caused her injury.

Section 508:4, I’s discovery rule tolls the three-year limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known both of the injury and that the defendant caused it.

Langlois v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc. · filed 2019-05-16I

Therefore, the discovery rule will apply to toll the limitations period unless the plaintiff knew or should have known of her injury AND knew or should have discovered that the defendant caused her injury.

Section 508:4(I)’s three-year limit does not warrant dismissal of a product liability claim at the pleading stage when the allegations permit the discovery rule to apply.

Croucher v. Atrium Medical Corporation · filed 2019-09-19(I)

Taking Croucher’s allegations in the light most favorable to him and resolving reasonable inferences in his favor, the allegations are sufficient to preclude dismissal of the product liability claims as time-barred at this stage of the litigation.

Section 508:4, I allows a product liability claim filed more than three years after the underlying events to survive dismissal when the plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently support the discovery rule or tolling.

Sargent v. Atrium Medical Corporation · filed 2019-09-19(I)

If the defendant meets the initial burden of showing that the action was not brought within three years of the underlying events, to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must show that the discovery rule or another tolling doctrine, such as the fraudulent concealment rule, applies. ... Taking Sargent’s allegations in the light most favorable to her and resolving reasonable inferences in her favor, the allegations are sufficient to preclude dismissal of her product liability claims as time-barred at this stage of the litigation.

Section 508:4(I) permits a product liability claim to proceed past dismissal when the allegations support delayed discovery of the injury’s causal relationship to the defendant’s conduct.

Shumaker v. Atrium Medical Corporation · filed 2019-08-13I

Under New Hampshire law, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, all personal actions, . . . may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of.” RSA 508:4, I. ... Taking Shumaker’s allegations in the light most favorable to him and resolving reasonable inferences in his favor, Shumaker’s allegations are sufficient to preclude dismissal of his product liability claims as time-barred at this stage of the litigation.

Section 508:4(I) gives most personal actions, including breach of contract claims, a three-year limitations period that accounts for when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the injury and its cause.

Jeanty v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., Trustee · filed 2020-03-24(I)

New Hampshire provides a three-year statute of limitations for most personal actions, including breach of contract. RSA 508:4, I. The three-year limitations period begins at the time the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.

Section 508:4, I starts its three-year limitations period when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of an injury and its causal connection to the defendant’s conduct.

Balzotti Global Group, LLC & a. v. Shepherds Hill Proponents, LLC & a. · filed 2020-05-27I

According to RSA 508:4, I, the three-year limitations period does not begin to run until two prongs are satisfied: first, a plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that it has been injured; and second, a plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that its injury was proximately caused by conduct of the defendant.

Section 508:4, I's discovery rule can extend the three-year limitations period when a plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered the injury and its cause; reasonable diligence may present a factual question.

Sarah Lampron and Walter Lampron v. Johnson & Johnson and Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2020-06-24I

The remaining question is whether she used reasonable diligence to discover the cause of her injury, and that question cannot be resolved on the current record. Therefore, a factual issue remains as to whether the claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 508:4, I provides a three-year limitations period, and its discovery rule does not delay accrual until a plaintiff learns the legal basis for a claim when the injury and its cause were known.

Maggi v. Grafton County Department of Corrections · filed 2022-09-27I

His claims accrued on the date he should have reasonably known he was injured, not on the date he first learned he had a legal cause of action.

Section 508:4, I's three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know both that she was injured and that the defendants' conduct caused the injury.

P.A. & a. · filed 2023-10-12I

According to RSA 508:4, I, the three-year limitations period does not begin to run until two prongs are satisfied: first, a plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that she has been injured; and second, a plaintiff must know or reasonably should have known that her injury was proximately caused by conduct of the defendants.

Section 508:4, I’s discovery rule requires a plaintiff to show that the injury or its causal relationship to the alleged act could not reasonably have been discovered earlier; actual late discovery alone is insufficient.

Jeffrey T. Piampiano, Ch. 7 Trustee of the Estate of Sky-Skan Inc. v. Stuart B. Ratner and Stuart B. Ratner, P.C. · filed 2023-11-06I

The Trustee’s argument, however, misapprehends the statute. As stated above, RSA § 508:4 tolls the three-year limitation when “the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission were not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the act or omission.” Thus, it is not enough that Sky-Skan did not actually discover Ratner’s alleged breaches until the March 5, 2019 deposition. Rather, the Trustee must also show that Sky-Skan could not reasonably have discovered them.

Section 508:4, I’s discovery rule does not delay the three-year limitations period when a plaintiff knows of an injury when it occurs, even if the plaintiff learns later that the injury is permanent.

Evariste v. Superintendent, Strafford County Department of Corrections & a. · filed 2024-10-25I

And while he may not have known that the pepper spray incident caused permanent blindness in one eye, he knew that the incident caused an immediate loss of vision. Accordingly, we conclude that the discovery rule does not apply, and that the trial court correctly ruled that the plaintiff’s claims are time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 508:4 sets a three-year limitations period that begins with the act or omission, unless the injury could not reasonably have been discovered then.

Kia America, Inc. v. DMO Auto Acquisitions, LLC · filed 2025-03-31

With respect to Kia’s state law claims, the parties agree that the applicable limitations period is set forth in RSA 508:4. That statute establishes a limitations period of three years. RSA 508:4. The limitations period begins running at the time of the “act or omission complained of,” unless the plaintiff could not have reasonably discovered that he was injured by the challenged act or omission at the time of its occurrence.

Section 508:4, I starts the three-year limitations period when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of both its injury and its causal connection to the defendant’s conduct.

BDP Holdings, LLC v. The Eideard Group, LLC & a. · filed 2025-08-01I

As the foregoing demonstrates, the record contains ample evidence that the earliest point at which BDP either knew or should reasonably have discerned that it had suffered some harm caused by the defendants’ conduct was in June 2018.

Section 508:4’s discovery rule allows a claim filed within three years after the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury and its cause.

McLaughlin v. McLaughlin · filed 2025-10-07I

We further conclude as a matter of law that these findings of fact also satisfy the discovery rule standard under the current version of RSA 508:4.

Section 508:4, I’s discovery rule applies to claims brought under RSA chapter 541-B.

Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families · filed 2020-09-30I

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the discovery rule in RSA 508:4, I, applies to claims brought under RSA chapter 541-B.

Section 508:4’s three-year limitation does not govern a contract claim subject to the UCC’s four-year limitation.

Howtek v. Relisys · filed 1996-07-12

Teco argues that summary judgment is warranted on count I of Howtek's claim because the claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations for contract actions under RSA § 508:4. ... The court finds that the 1990 agreement is governed by the UCC and its four-year statute of limitations.

Section 508:4 gives each missed monthly disability insurance payment its own three-year limitations period, allowing recovery only for payments due within three years before suit.

Pierce v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 2004-03-05I

Accordingly, the court concludes that New Hampshire would treat an insurer’s cessation of regular disability payments as the breach of an installment contract for statute of limitations purposes. A separate limitations period therefore runs as to each of the monthly payments which Met-Life withheld from Pierce, beginning with the disbursement due in July of 1999. Because Pierce did not commence this action until August 20, 2003, however, she can recover only for those payments which would have come due within the preceding three-year period.

Section 508:4 sets a three-year limitations period for an action on credit-card debt.

Avery v. First Resolution Management Corp. · filed 2009-05-22

The New Hampshire statute of limitations for an action on a credit card is three years. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4.