N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 491:22

Section 491:22 permits a person claiming a present legal or equitable right to seek a declaratory judgment when an adverse claim creates a justiciable controversy.

Villars v. City of Portsmouth & American Fidelity Insurance · filed 1957-02-28

A justiciable controversy is presented by the plaintiff’s claim of a right to inspect the policies of insurance held by the city, and by the city’s denial of that right through its city clerk and through the motion filed herein, alleging that the plaintiff “is not entitled to be informed as to the contents” of the policies. With respect to this controversy the rights of the parties were properly determinable on petition for declaratory judgment.

Section 491:22 permits a declaratory judgment action to test the legality of a zoning restriction, with the challenger bearing the burden to show the zoning board's decision was unreasonable or unlawful.

Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head District · filed 1958-11-28

The use of a declaratory judgment to test the legality of a zoning restriction allegedly in excess of the jurisdictional authority of the zoning power is not without precedent in this state. ... In this declaratory judgment proceeding, as would be the situation in an appeal (RSA 31:78), the party seeking to set aside a decision of the zoning board of adjustment has the burden of establishing that the board’s decision is unreasonable or unlawful; and all findings of the board on questions of fact are deemed prima facie lawful and reasonable.

Section 491:22 permits taxpayers to challenge certain government votes or decisions through a declaratory judgment petition when a ripe controversy exists.

Chwalek v. Dover School Committee · filed 1980-12-23

There is clearly a controversy concerning who is legally the chairman of the Dover School Committee and the matter is ripe for judicial determination under RSA 491:22.

Section 491:22 permits declaratory relief when a present right faces an adverse claim, even before an actual invasion of that right.

Beaudoin v. State · filed 1973-10-31

In order to justify declaratory relief, an action must be within the terms of RSA 491:22, which requires that a present right of the plaintiff be subjected to an adverse claim.

Section 491:22 permits declaratory relief before a formal dissolution proposal when the parties face a concrete uncertainty about their rights.

In re Hitchcock Clinic, Inc. · filed 1985-08-05

Thus, this is not an action “based on a hypothetical set of facts,” ... but one intended to afford “relief from uncertainty and insecurity created by a doubt as to rights, status, or legal relations existing between the parties.” ... It is accordingly an appropriate case for declaratory relief.

Section 491:22 requires a present legal or equitable right and a concrete adverse claim before a court may grant declaratory relief.

Delude v. Town of Amherst · filed 1993-07-02

A declaratory judgment will not be issued unless the plaintiffs have demonstrated a present legal or equitable right, RSA 491:22 (1983) (amended 1992), and an adverse claim that is “definite and concrete touching the legal relations of parties having adverse interests. . . . The action cannot be based on a set of hypothetical facts.” ... We hold that the facts of this case make declaratory judgment inappropriate as to the plaintiffs’ “as applied” claims, which include their equal protection and due process claims.

Section 491:22 requires a petitioner to have a present legal or equitable right; an interest in a license is insufficiently immediate when no application has been filed.

Silver Brothers, Inc. v. Wallin · filed 1982-12-29

Taylor and the other plaintiffs attack RSA 181:9-a by seeking a declaratory judgment under RSA 491:22. That statute, however, requires the petitioner to have a “present legal [or] equitable right.” (Emphasis added.) The record shows that Taylor only consulted the defendants about the possibility of receiving a wholesaler’s license and that no formal application has been made to the liquor commission.

Section 491:22 permits a declaratory judgment action to determine first-party insurance coverage claims.

Andrews v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1983-10-28

We believe that the language of RSA 491:22 is clearly broad enough to encompass the type of claim raised here. ... we hold that a petition for declaratory relief is a proper means for determining first-party insurance coverage claims.

Section 491:22 permits a declaratory judgment action only when adequate relief through other proceedings is unavailable.

Morin v. Berkshire Mutual Insurance · filed 1985-05-08

Under RSA 491:22, a declaratory judgment action may be maintained only if “adequate relief through other proceedings” is unavailable.

Section 491:22 permits a court to treat an ill-pleaded mandamus request as a petition for declaratory judgment when the plaintiff shows a genuine controversy.

Guy J. v. Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Education · filed 1989-07-13

Where a plaintiff has made a showing that the issues raised express a genuine controversy with the defendant, ... as is the case here, we have traditionally regarded ill-pleaded requests for mandamus as petitions for declaratory judgment under RSA 491:22, ... We therefore address the merits as if on appeal from the dismissal of a petition for declaratory judgment.

Section 491:22 permits a declaratory judgment action directly challenging the validity of a zoning enactment after the thirty-day appeal period has expired.

Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin · filed 1989-12-13

The adequate legal ground in this instance is existing authority for two related propositions: that the rehearing requirement of § 2 is not absolute, and that a declaratory judgment action is a legitimate procedure for directly testing the validity of zoning enactments beyond the thirty-day period prescribed by § 4.

Section 491:22 requires a present legal or equitable right or title facing an adverse claim; a request to establish eligibility for benefits does not meet that requirement.

Jaskolka v. City of Manchester · filed 1989-12-28

A declaratory judgment action, in contrast, is available when “[a]ny person claiming a present legal equitable right or title” is faced with a claim adverse to that right or title. RSA 491:22. This case cannot properly be characterized as one for declaratory judgment, as the plaintiff lacks the requisite “present legal [or] equitable right or title” necessary for her case to proceed. The plaintiff seeks to obtain a judicial decree that she has the requisite number of continuous years of city service to entitle her to certain salary and fringe benefits, rather than already possessing those benefits and being faced with a threat of losing them.

Section 491:22 does not treat a petition to enjoin arbitration of an allegedly nonarbitrable dispute as a declaratory judgment action.

Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Martin · filed 1991-03-27

Aetna’s bill in equity was not a disguised declaratory judgment petition. Aetna was not asking the superior court to determine the issue of breach of contract; rather, it claimed that issue was not arbitrable, and consequently asked the court to enjoin arbitration proceedings. Aetna properly pled its action as a bill in equity and petition for injunction.

Section 491:22 requires a definite, concrete adverse claim; a declaratory judgment petition is moot when a later ordinance removes the controversy.

Real Estate Planners, Inc. v. Town of Newmarket · filed 1991-10-09

The adverse claim must be “definite and concrete.” ... The trial court properly ruled that the 1990 ordinance, whose valid adoption was not challenged by RER removed the controversy from the declaratory judgment petition and that the petition was therefore moot.

Section 491:22 permits a first-party insurance coverage action even when no underlying lawsuit has been filed in New Hampshire state court.

Plaza 28 Assoc, v. Vermont Mu t 'l Ins. · filed 1995-02-28

The court finds the absence of an underlying New Hampshire state court lawsuit does not impair the plaintiff's ability to maintain its first-party action under RSA § 491:22.

Section 491:22 allows a declaratory judgment action challenging an administrative hearing process when an appeal or petition for certiorari does not provide adequate alternative relief.

Asmussen v. Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Safety · filed 2000-12-28

We reject the State’s argument that the availability of an appeal under RSA 265:91-d or a petition for certiorari precluded the intervenors’ constitutional challenges under RSA 491:22.

Section 491:22 permits declaratory relief even when an adequate legal or equitable remedy exists.

Carrier v. American Bankers Life · filed 2006-04-21

Under RSA 491:22, “[a]ny person claiming a present legal or equitable right or title may maintain a petition against any person claiming adversely to such right or title to determine the question as between the parties, and the court's judgment or decree thereon shall be conclusive. The existence of an adequate remedy at law or in equity shall not preclude any person from obtaining such declaratory relief.” Therefore, an adequate legal remedy does not require dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim.

Section 491:22, III gives an insurer standing to petition for a declaratory judgment about its potential coverage obligation.

Tothill v. Estate of Center · filed 2005-06-24(III)

Mt. Washington had standing to file its petition for declaratory judgment pursuant to RSA 491:22, III (1997).

Section 491:22 permits a declaration that a fiduciary duty was breached even if the defendant can later cure the default that resulted from the breach.

Kessler v. Gleich · filed 2007-12-06

The defendant’s failure to contract with an approved managing agent, thereby causing the partnership to go into default, constituted a breach of his fiduciary duties; whether or not he can “cure” the default is irrelevant, as the breach has already occurred. Such a claim is appropriate for declaratory judgment.

Section 491:22 permits a declaration of present legal or equitable rights, but does not provide relief for past wrongs.

Galvin v. EMC Mortgage Corporation, et al. · filed 2014-10-03

The Galvins may not use their § 491:22 declaratory judgment claim as a vehicle for challenging Mellon’s foreclosure attempts in 2010 and 2012. As the language of the statute itself, quoted above, suggests, a claim under § 491:22 is a means to determine the existence of a legal or equitable right or title at “present”–-i.e., at the time of judgment–- and not a means “to enforce a claim against the defendant” for past wrongs.

Section 491:22 provides relief from uncertainty about rights, but a constitutional challenge based on uncertain future costs is not ripe for declaratory judgment.

New Hampshire Ass'n v. State · filed 2009-01-16

While the declaratory judgment statute, RSA 491:22 (1997), is meant to relieve parties of uncertainty about their rights, see Werme’s Case, 150 N.H. 351, 353 (2003), we conclude that the uncertainty surrounding potential cost increases does not create a clear and substantial conflict with the constitution. Accordingly, the issue is not ripe for review.

Section 491:22 permits an insured to seek a declaration of coverage before the insurer denies coverage when the insured knows or can reasonably discover facts giving rise to a coverage dispute.

Kierstead v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2010-09-17

To the contrary, the declaratory judgment statute, RSA 491:22 (2010), “does not... require an actual denial of coverage by an insurer before an insured [may] seek a determination of coverage.”

Section 491:22, I permits a person claiming a present interest in real property to seek a declaratory judgment in superior court against someone claiming an adverse interest.

Gordon v. Town of Rye · filed 2011-06-15I

In this state, “[t]he legislature has specifically provided that declaratory judgment actions can be brought in superior court by parties faced with adverse claims to an interest in real property.”

Standing under RSA 491:22 requires a claimed impairment of a present legal or equitable right; injury alone is insufficient.

Avery v. New Hampshire Department of Education · filed 2011-10-27I

Contrary to the petitioners’ suggestion, a party does not obtain standing under RSA 491:22 merely by demonstrating that he has suffered an injury.

Section 491:22 allows a tort victim to seek a declaration of liability insurance coverage before obtaining a judgment or settlement against the insured.

Melissa Currier, as Administrator of the Estate of Nicholas B. Carpenter, et al., v. Newport Lodge No. 1236, Loyal · filed 2022-01-31

A different rule applies in declaratory judgment actions to establish the scope of insurance coverage, as here. ... a judgment or settlement in the underlying tort case is not a prerequisite to standing.

A judgment creditor who is a third-party beneficiary of a liability insurance policy has standing under § 491:22 to seek a declaratory judgment against the insurer.

Morel v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America · filed 2024-02-02

Thus, Rodriguez Morel became third-party beneficiary with standing to maintain a declaratory judgment action against Travelers by virtue of obtaining a final judgment against Mammoth.

Section 491:22 requires a pleading to present a genuine controversy and seek a declaration of the parties’ rights; calling a mandamus petition a “petition in equity” does not make it a declaratory judgment claim.

Morrissey v. Town of Lyme · filed 2011-12-08

Moreover, the mere use of the phrase “petition in equity” in the caption of the pleading is, in and of itself, insufficient to transform the underlying nature of this action, which is an action seeking mandamus relief, to one for declaratory judgment.

Section 491:22 permits tort victims to seek a declaration of liability insurance coverage even if they are not parties to or recognized beneficiaries of the policy.

Currier v. Newport Lodge No. 1236, Local Order of Moose · filed 2022-01-31

The fact that the plaintiffs are not parties to the insurance policies or recognized third-party beneficiaries of those policies does not deprive them of standing to bring this action.

Section 491:22 requires declaratory judgment actions to be brought by petition but preserves a jury trial when the same issues would be triable in a common-law action.

American Employers' Insurance v. Liberi · filed 1958-12-31

Petitions for declaratory judgment were first authorized by Laws 1929, c. 86, now RSA 491:22. The right to trial by jury of issues presented by such a petition was considered by this court in Employers Assurance Co. v. Tibbetts, 96 N. H. 296. As was then pointed out, the provision of the statute that such actions be presented by “petition” does not make them proceedings in equity for that reason alone; and the parties have a right to trial by jury of issues presented in actions for declaratory relief if the same issues would be so triable when presented in common-law actions. Id., 298.

Section 491:22 does not impose a legal duty on an insurer to seek a declaratory judgment.

Lalos v. Tickler · filed 1961-05-31

With regard to the failure of Allstate to seek a declaratory judgment, nothing appears in the statute (RSA 491:22) to suggest that there is a legal duty on an insurer to invoke such a remedy. There is no such legal duty.

Section 491:22 does not require a liability insurer to seek a declaratory judgment to determine its liability and coverage.

Fisk v. Atlantic National Insurance · filed 1967-12-29

These courses of action might have been better public relations and might have settled the questions with more dispatch but as was pointed out in Lalos v. Tickler, 103 N. H. 292, 297, it was not a mandatory duty that the liability insurer invoke the provisions of the declaratory judgment statute. RSA 491:22.

Section 491:22, I requires a declaratory judgment plaintiff to claim a present legal or equitable right or title.

Benson v. New Hampshire Insurance Guaranty Ass'n · filed 2004-12-29I

We conclude that the Medical Society has not asserted a legal or equitable right sufficient to bring a declaratory judgment action. In order to maintain a petition for a declaratory judgment, a plaintiff must claim a “present legal or equitable right or title.” RSA 491:22, I (1997).

Section 491:22, I, requires a person seeking a declaratory judgment to show an adverse interest that impairs or prejudices the person’s rights.

Carolyn J. Carlson, Trustee of the Carolyn J. Carlson Living Trust v. Latvian Lutheran Exile Church of Boston and Vicini · filed 2017-09-21(I)

To establish standing to bring a declaratory judgment proceeding under RSA 491:22, I, a party must show that some right of the party has been impaired or prejudiced.

Section 491:22 does not give the court power to award counsel fees merely because declaratory judgment actions have equitable attributes.

Utica Mutual Insurance v. Plante · filed 1965-12-07

If by reason of the fact that actions for declaratory judgments (RSA 491:22) are called petitions and are commonly placed upon the equity docket they may be said to possess certain attributes of equity proceedings (American Employers Ins. Co. v. Liberi, 101 N. H. 480, 482), this fact would not in itself give the Court power to allow counsel fees.

An insurer that seeks a declaratory judgment under § 491:22 cannot deny the statute’s applicability after losing to avoid paying the insured’s fees and costs.

Avemco v. Pond · filed 1996-06-11(b)

Having sought relief based on section 491:22, it cannot contend now that it has lost the case that the statute is inapplicable.

Section 491:22 permits a declaratory judgment petition to determine the legality of a proposed public expenditure by a municipality.

Jones v. Merrimack Valley School District · filed 1966-03-30

A petition for a declaratory judgment (RSA 491:22 ) is a proper method of determining the legality of a proposed expenditure of public funds (Leavitt v. North Hampton, *146 98 N. H. 193) and this applies to towns, school districts, village districts and other forms of municipal government.

Section 491:22 permits a declaratory judgment action to determine existing rights before a potential invasion of those rights.

Reardon v. Lemoyne · filed 1982-12-23

In addition, we hold that a declaratory judgment action was a viable means for resolving the issues in this case. The plaintiffs were not seeking an advisory opinion concerning their future rights; they were seeking a determination as to their existing rights. See RSA 491:22; see also State Employees' Ass'n of N.H. v. Belknap County, 122 N.H. 614, 624, 448 A.2d 969, 974 (1982) (court has authority under declaratory judgment act to declare rights and obligations of parties). Furthermore, the declaratory judgment action was appropriate because it was filed while the plaintiffs were still teaching at the Sacred Heart School, and it might have prevented a potential invasion of their rights.

Section 491:22 provides an optional procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment.

Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead School District · filed 1999-02-09

The statutory procedure, however, for obtaining a declaratory judgment does not impose a mandatory duty to use that procedure.

Section 491:22 permits a declaratory judgment when a party claims a present legal or equitable right or title that another party disputes; it does not provide a way to challenge an adverse administrative decision through declaratory relief.

McNamara v. New Hampshire Retirement System · filed 2017-01-27

A declaratory judgment, by contrast, is available when a party claims a present legal or equitable right or title to which another party claims adversely. See id.; RSA 491:22 (Supp. 2016). ... Viewing the allegations in this case most favorably to the petitioner, we agree with NHRS that the petitioner did not assert a present legal or equitable right or title.

Section 491:22 permits a declaratory judgment petition without joining persons whose rights are not affected by the decree.

Portsmouth Hospital v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America · filed 1968-05-29

The fact that Mark Ward and his parents are not parties to these proceedings does not prevent this petition for declaratory judgment from being entertained. Unlike section 11 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act(9A U.L.A., p. 351), RSA 491:22 does not provide that “all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration.” On the contrary it provides that “any person claiming a . . . right . . . may maintain a petition against any person claiming adversely ... to determine the question as between the parties.” Thus the rights of persons not made parties to the petition are not affected by the resulting decree.

Section 491:22 does not confer jurisdiction to give advice about future cases.

Piper v. Meredith · filed 1969-03-20

It is argued that this case comes within the provisions of the declaratory judgment act. RSA 491:22. We do not agree. That act does not confer jurisdiction to give advice as to future cases.

Section 491:22 permits a party to petition for declaratory judgment to determine equitably the parties' rights in particular property even without a valid marriage.

JOAN S. v. John S. · filed 1981-03-06

Even without alleging a valid or “de facto” marriage, either party may bring a bill in equity or petition for declaratory judgment to determine equitably the rights of the parties in particular property. See RSA 498:1; RSA 491:22.

RSA 491:22 authorizes declaratory judgments in disputes between parties making adverse claims to a present legal or equitable right or title.

Eno v. Abdel-Fattah · filed 2024-02-27

The superior court is a court of general jurisdiction with authority to decide common law civil disputes between parties, including contractual disputes between parties, and to issue declaratory judgments in disputes between parties making adverse claims to a present legal or equitable right or title. See Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 743 (2019); RSA 491:7 (Supp. 2023); RSA 491:22 (Supp. 2023); cf. RSA 304-C:190 (2015) (providing that “[n]othing in this subdivision shall be construed to restrict the right of a member [of a New Hampshire limited liability company] to bring a direct action on his or her own behalf against [another] member” of the limited liability company). Here, the parties’ dispute as to the proper distribution of sale proceeds held by the relevant limited liability companies under the relevant operating agreement terms fell squarely within the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 491:22 requires a declaratory judgment to conclusively determine the rights of the parties.

Wuelper v. University of New Hampshire · filed 1972-12-29

Whatever declaratory decree we could fashion now would not conclusively determine any rights of the present litigants as required by our declaratory judgment statute. RSA 491:22.

Section 491:22 authorizes the superior court to declare litigants’ rights and obligations, but does not authorize an order requiring affirmative action.

State Employees' Ass'n of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Belknap County · filed 1982-07-07

This argument is correct from a procedural standpoint because RSA 491:22 (declaratory judgments) grants the superior court only the authority to declare the rights and obligations of litigants.

Section 491:22 makes a declaratory judgment conclusive as to the rights declared, but a plaintiff who obtains declaratory relief alone may generally bring a later action for coercive relief.

Radkay v. Confalone · filed 1990-05-24

Thus, declaratory judgments do have a res judicata effect to the extent that the relationship between the parties has been determined and their respective interests, rights or titles have been settled. ... Generally, a plaintiff who has successfully obtained a judgment for declaratory relief is not precluded from maintaining a subsequent action for coercive relief.

Section 491:22 does not authorize damages and bars attorney’s fees and costs in declaratory judgment actions that do not determine insurance coverage.

New England Backflow, Inc. & a. v. Daniel Gagne & a. · filed 2019-11-13I

It does not authorize the trial court to award damages, and it expressly prohibits an award of attorney’s fees and costs in declaratory judgment actions “that are not for the purpose of determining insurance coverage.”

Section 491:22 requires an insurance coverage declaratory judgment petition to be filed within six months after the underlying writ, subject to stated exceptions.

Fireman's Fund American Insurance Companies v. Webber · filed 1972-12-29

This ruling is in error since the statute applies to all petitions “to determine coverage.” RSA 491:22.

Section 491:22 gives an insurer six months to file a declaratory judgment petition after learning facts that create a coverage dispute, subject to an exception for facts not previously known or reasonably discoverable.

National Grange Mutual Insurance v. Oliver N. Watterson Fireman's Fund American Insurance · filed 1980-03-05

Because the amended writ alleges significant new facts which may give rise to coverage disputes not previously raised, National Grange has six months to resolve such disputes by filing a petition for declaratory judgment. Any coverage disputes that were fairly raised by the facts pled in the original writ, however, may not now be challenged by a petition for declaratory judgment because those facts were known by the insurer at the time the original writ was brought and the original six-month limitation period has passed.

Section 491:22 permits either party to bring a declaratory judgment petition after six months when the insurer did not know and could not reasonably discover the facts giving rise to the coverage dispute.

Singer v. Travelers Indemnity Co. · filed 1980-12-26

RSA 491:22 does not limit the right to bring a petition for declaratory judgment to the insurer when the six-month limitation does not apply because of the exclusion contained in the statute. The statute expressly provides that the six-month “prohibition shall not apply where the facts giving rise to such coverage dispute are not known to, or reasonably discoverable by, the insurer. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Once it is determined that this section of the statute is applicable, the six-month prohibition does not apply to either party.

Section 491:22 requires an insurer to file a coverage declaratory judgment petition within six months of the underlying writ when it learns the relevant facts during that period; discovery does not restart the clock.

Hartford Insurance v. Bird · filed 1984-04-16

RSA 491:22 does not set forth a discovery rule such that the six-month period begins to run from the date of the discovery of the facts giving rise to the dispute over insurance coverage.

Section 491:22 bars an insurance coverage declaratory judgment petition filed after the six-month period when the insured knew the facts bearing on coverage within that period.

Mottolo v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1985-08-16

Since within six months of the State’s writ Mottolo was aware of the facts upon which coverage depended, he was not entitled to extend the period for bringing the declaratory judgment action and is barred by the six-month limitation.

Section 491:22 requires an insurance coverage declaratory judgment petition to be filed within six months after the underlying writ, subject to exceptions for facts discovered after that period or a late filing caused by accident, mistake, or misfortune rather than neglect.

Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance v. Croteau · filed 1986-02-27

In general, a petition for declaratory judgment raising questions of coverage under an insurance policy must be filed within six months of the date that the underlying writ is filed. RSA 491:22. The statute provides two exceptions to this general rule: (1) where the facts giving rise to the coverage dispute first become known to or reasonably discoverable by the insurer after the six-month period has expired; and (2) where the superior court makes a finding that the failure to file the petition within the six-month period is the result of accident, mistake, or misfortune and not neglect.

Section 491:22 requires an insurer to file a coverage petition within six months of the underlying writ; negligent handling of its file does not excuse a late filing.

Allstate Insurance v. Aubert · filed 1987-06-05

In this case, the only apparent reason for Allstate’s failing to file its declaratory judgment petition on time was the neglect of adjuster Better, due to problems he was having in his personal life. While these exigencies were unfortunate, they do not indicate that the monitoring of the Aubert file was beyond the control of Allstate. Clearly the handling of the Aubert file by Better, and the conduct of Allstate in failing to supervise the matter, fell below the reasonably prudent person standard. Under such circumstances, the trial court’s failure to dismiss the declaratory judgment petition as untimely filed was error.

An insurer whose declaratory judgment action is dismissed as untimely may still assert its policy coverage defenses in a later proceeding.

Howard v. Hartford Insurance · filed 1986-03-03

It follows that where the declaratory judgment action is dismissed for failure to file timely, the insurer should not thereby be estopped from asserting prior defenses on the merits in a later proceeding.

Section 491:22(III)’s six-month filing period begins when a pleading initiates an underlying lawsuit; an agency directive letter does not trigger it.

EnergyNorth Natural Gas v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Services, Ltd. · filed 1998-09-30(III)

Because the ordinary meaning of the provision at issue and the legislative history of the provision reveal that it refers to documents that actually initiate a lawsuit, I hold that the 1992 NHDES letter to EnergyNorth (a type of document that does not initiate a lawsuit) is not a “writ, complaint, or other pleading” for the purpose of triggering the section 491:22(111) period of limitations.

Section 491:22, III starts the six-month deadline for an insurance coverage declaratory judgment petition when the pleading that raises the coverage question is filed, rather than when a coverage dispute first arises.

Craftsbury Co. v. Assurance Co. of America · filed 2003-07-21(III)

The general rule of RSA 491:22, III makes clear that the six-month limitations period runs from “the filing of the writ, complaint, or other pleading initiating the action which gives rise to the question” of insurance coverage. The limitations period does not, as Craftsbury asserts, run from the time there first exists a dispute as to insurance coverage.

Section 491:22, III requires an insurance coverage declaratory judgment petition within six months of the original complaint when that complaint raises a coverage issue; a later amended complaint does not restart the period unless it raises a coverage issue for the first time.

Enterasys v. Clarendon Insurance · filed 2006-08-29III

Accordingly, the six-month limitations period began to run upon the filing of the original class action suits (i.e., the so-called “placeholder” suits), not the subsequently-filed amended complaint in the consolidated class action suit.

An amended writ starts a new six-month period for a coverage declaratory judgment petition when new factual or legal allegations change the cause of action and raise a coverage issue for the first time.

Binda v. Royal Insurance · filed 2000-01-31III

Therefore, we conclude that an amended writ triggers a new six-month limitations period under RSA 491:22, III when new factual or legal allegations change the cause of action in a manner that raises a coverage issue for the first time.

Section 491:22, III limits the time to file a declaratory judgment petition to determine insurance coverage; it does not bar coverage arguments raised in other pleadings.

Ob/Gyn Associates v. New Hampshire Insurance Guaranty Ass'n · filed 2006-12-19III

RSA 491:22, III does not apply, and NHIGA was not time-barred from asserting a defense that relied upon an interpretation of the Covenant policy.

Section 491:22, III starts the six-month period for an insurance coverage petition when a pleading initiates judicial proceedings; notice of a coverage dispute or an administrative filing does not start it.

Matosantos International Corporation v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2021-11-29(III)

The statute of limitations begins to run not when the plaintiff has notice of the coverage dispute, but rather when the “writ, complaint, or other pleading initiating the action” is filed. ... Administrative proceedings—such as those in the DOL here—are not “judicial” and thus do not qualify.

Section 491:22(III)’s late discovery exception does not extend the filing period when the insured could reasonably discover the facts underlying a coverage dispute within six months of the underlying complaint.

Bunker v Midstate Mutual · filed 2014-08-25(III)

Here, Nadeau “kn[ew] or [was] able to reasonably discover” all of the relevant facts that formed the basis of the coverage dispute – those concerning the underlying negligence suit and the potential applicability of the Midstate policy to Bunker’s claims – when Bunker filed her negligence action against him in October 2013. He did not file his declaratory judgment claim until June 26, 2014, some nine months later. The statute of limitations thus bars Nadeau’s request for a declaratory judgment.

Section 491:22, III requires an insurer to seek a declaration of coverage within six months of the underlying complaint; consolidating that action with other suits does not restart the period when it raises no new coverage issue.

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. SoClean, Inc. · filed 2023-08-18III

It is undisputed that Central did not file a declaratory judgment complaint within six months of the filing of the original ten class action complaints. The inclusion of those ten class actions in the Consolidated Action did not “change the cause of action in a manner that raise[d] a coverage issue for the first time.”

Section 491:22, III generally requires an insurance coverage declaratory judgment action within six months of the underlying complaint, subject to a late-discovery exception.

Mount Prospect Academy, Inc. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company · filed 2026-03-11(III)

As a general rule, New Hampshire law requires an insured to file its declaratory judgment action “to determine coverage of an insurance policy . . . within 6 months after the filing of the writ, complaint, or other pleading initiating the action which gives rise to the question” of coverage. RSA 491:22, III. ... The court therefore declines to dismiss plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claim to the extent it seeks a determination of coverage for such cases.

Section 491:22 permits a court to allow an insurance coverage declaratory judgment petition after six months when the failure to file timely resulted from accident, mistake, or misfortune rather than neglect.

Guarantee Mutual Assurance Co. of America v. Middlesex Mutual Insurance · filed 1975-05-30

RSA 491:22 by its terms confers discretion on the trial court to permit the filing of a petition for declaratory judgment beyond the specified six-months period if the facts in the particular case warrant it.

Section 491:22(a) places the burden of proving noncoverage on the insurer in a declaratory coverage action.

Olszak v. Peerless Insurance · filed 1979-08-20(a)

We sustain the court’s ruling that the defendant company failed in its burden of proving noncoverage placed upon it under RSA 491:22(a) (Supp. 1977).

Section 491:22(a) places the burden of establishing non-coverage on the insurer.

Robbins Auto Parts, Inc. v. Granite State Insurance · filed 1981-09-16(a)

In interpreting an insurance policy, we are cognizant that the burden of establishing non-coverage is upon the insurer, Olszak v. Peerless Ins. Co., 119 N.H. 686, 691, 406 A.2d 711, 715 (1979); RSA 491:22(a) (Supp. 1979), and that any ambiguities in the language of the policy will be “construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980).

Section 491:22 permits constitutional challenges to actions by the State or its branches through a declaratory judgment petition.

Grinnell v. State · filed 1981-09-28

RSA 491:22 has long been construed to permit challenges to the constitutionality of actions by our government or its branches.

Section 491:22 permits a declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, particularly when important public interests call for a speedy decision.

Boehner v. State · filed 1982-02-12

Before proceeding to the substantive aspects of this case, we first dispose of the defendants’ claim that a declaratory judgment action under RSA 491:22 is an improper means of attacking the constitutionality of RSA ch. 502-A. ... Moreover, “[a] petition for a declaratory judgment is particularly appropriate to determine the constitutionality of a statute when the parties desire and the public need requires a speedy determination of important public interests involved therein.”

Section 491:22 permits declaratory challenges to the constitutionality of government actions.

Claremont School District v. Governor · filed 1999-12-30

The declaratory judgment statute, RSA 491:22 (1997), “has long been construed to permit challenges to the constitutionality of actions by our government or its branches.” ... Because the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the system by which the State funded public education was unconstitutional and thus void, the court had jurisdiction to grant equitable relief.

Section 491:22 provides declaratory relief as a suitable way to challenge a statute’s constitutionality.

Werme's Case · filed 2003-12-19

Alternatively, Werme had the option to petition for declaratory relief. ... In this situation, a declaratory judgment would have been a suitable method to determine whether the confidentiality provisions of RSA 169-C:25 violate her right to free speech.

Section 491:22’s state declaratory judgment remedy is unavailable to litigants proceeding in federal court.

Volpe v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company · filed 1986-09-04

Since Blondeau could not have invoked § 491:22, she cannot claim the attorneys’ fees that that statute makes available to a prevailing insured.

Section 491:22 provides a declaratory judgment remedy to determine liability insurance coverage when the underlying action was brought by writ in state court.

Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. The City of Keene, New Hampshire · filed 1990-03-15

In this case, though, the underlying action was brought by writ in state court, so the state remedy was available.

Section 491:22 permits a first-party insurance coverage action without an underlying lawsuit or a writ filed in New Hampshire state court.

General Linen Service Co., Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. · filed 1995-06-20

Thus, the absence of a writ in an underlying New Hampshire state court lawsuit or, for that matter, the absence of an underlying lawsuit in any court, does not impair a litigant’s ability to maintain a first-party action under RSA § 491:22.

The 1994 amendment allowing declaratory judgment actions when the underlying writ was filed in federal court is procedural and applies retrospectively to pending cases.

Workplace Systems, Inc. v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1999-02-08

The fact that implementation of the amended version of RSA 491:22 may alter the parties’ relative positions by allowing the plaintiff to file a declaratory judgment action does not in itself make the amendment substantive. Accordingly, we find that the superior court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Section 491:22 provides a declaratory judgment cause of action but does not confer jurisdiction on a federal court.

SIG Arms v. Employers Ins. of Wausau · filed 2000-04-26

Although the declaratory judgment cause of action is based on RSA § 491:22, in this diversity case removed from state court, see General Linen Serv. Co., Inc. v . Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 951 F. Supp. 1 5 , 17-18 (D.N.H. 1995), the statute does not afford jurisdiction in federal court.

Section 491:22 applies to a New Hampshire declaratory judgment action filed in state court and later removed to federal court on diversity grounds.

EKCO Group v. Travelers Indemnity C o . · filed 2000-11-29(III)

Because EKCO brought its declaratory judgment action in state court under the New Hampshire declaratory judgment statute, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § (“RSA”) RSA 491:22, following removal based on diversity jurisdiction, RSA 491:22, rather than the federal declaratory judgment statute, applies here.

Section 491:22 can provide a basis for a declaratory judgment claim in federal court.

Gray v. Chester L. Gray, III · filed 2019-05-14

RSA 491:22 is an appropriate vehicle for Skip to advance his declaratory judgment claim.

Section 491:22 cannot support a declaratory judgment claim for disability benefits under an ERISA-governed plan because ERISA preempts that claim.

Patuleia v. Sun Life · filed 1996-01-19

Accordingly, her claims against Sun Life, which were brought pursuant to N.H. RSA 491:22, are preempted.

Section 491:22 does not exempt a declaratory judgment claim for ERISA plan benefits from ERISA preemption because it does not regulate the business of insurance.

Webster v. ITT-Hartford · filed 1998-11-02

Ms. Webster's state law claim seeking a declaration of her right to benefits under RSA § 491:22 is not exempt from ERISA governance since the New Hampshire declaratory judgment statute does not regulate the business of insurance within the meaning of section 1144(b)(2)(A).

Section 491:22 requires a taxpayer seeking a declaratory judgment to show an injury or impairment of personal rights; taxpayer status alone does not establish standing.

Baer v. New Hampshire Department of Education · filed 2010-09-24

Accordingly, we hold that taxpayer status, without an injury or an impairment of rights, is not sufficient to confer standing to bring a declaratory judgment action under RSA 491:22.

Section 491:22 does not give taxpayers standing to challenge an agency decision when another statute limits appeals of that decision to a class of persons to which they do not belong.

David P. Eby & a. v. State of New Hampshire · filed 2014-06-13(I)

Put another way, where the Legislature has already conferred standing, by statute, upon a certain class of persons to challenge the decision of a board, commission, agency or other authority, RSA 491:22 does not confer standing upon a larger class of petitioners, simply because they are taxpayers.

Section 491:22 permits a declaratory judgment action seeking relief for interference with vested land uses when the claim extends beyond a particular zoning permit decision.

Rochester Agricultural & Mechanical Association v. City of Rochester · filed 2023-10-31

Thus, as RAMA correctly asserts, this action “is not an RSA 677:4 appeal” but, rather, is a claim “for equitable relief from the City’s concerted interference, since the breakdown in talks over the sale of RAMA’s land to the City, with RAMA’s vested rights and unconstitutional limiting of . . . RAMA’s vested uses to just the fair.”