Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Green (Frederic) v. State · filed 2019-05-15(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition absent good cause and actual prejudice.

Cox (Steven) v. State · filed 2019-05-15(1)

Thus, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). ... Therefore, appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Merritt (William) Vs. State · filed 2019-12-12(1)

Merritt's petition therefore was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed almost eighteen years after the remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

Rowe (Barry) Vs. State · filed 2020-04-15(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726's good-cause exception does not excuse a late petition caused by postconviction counsel's delays when counsel had ample time to meet the one-year deadline.

Cook (Brian) Vs. State · filed 2020-07-16(1)

We agree with the district court that Flowers is distinguishable and that appellant did not demonstrate that an impediment external to the defense prevented him from complying with NRS 34.726.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition absent a showing of good cause and actual prejudice.

Johnson (Timothy) Vs. Warden · filed 2021-02-16(1)

Thus, his petition was untimely filed.2 See NRS 34.726(1). Johnson's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition absent a showing of good cause and actual prejudice.

Melendez (Mauricio) Vs. Warden · filed 2021-03-09(1)

Melendez filed the petition more than six years after remittitur issued on his direct appeal. Melendez v. State, Docket No. 54770 (Order of Affirmance, July 29, 2011). Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) requires a late postconviction habeas petitioner to show good cause and actual prejudice; circumstances known during earlier petitions do not establish good cause for delay.

Leonard (William) Vs. Warden (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2021-04-09(1)

To overcome the procedural bars, Leonard needed to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice. NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2), (3). ... Leonard failed to demonstrate good cause because the circumstances surrounding his counsel's gambling addiction were known during the litigation of his prior postconviction petitions.

A newly available legal basis does not establish good cause for an untimely petition under § 34.726(1) when the petitioner waits more than a year to raise the claim.

Malone (Domonic) Vs. State C/W 80493 · filed 2021-02-16(1)

Malone argues that the Supreme Court's recent decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), provides good cause. He is mistaken, as he filed his petition more than one year after McCoy was decided and therefore did not raise his claim based on McCoy within a reasonable time after it became available.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition absent a showing of good cause and actual prejudice.

Eubanks (Charles) Vs. Warden · filed 2021-09-16(1)

Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). ... Eubanks petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b), (3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Durand (Roberto) Vs. State · filed 2021-11-10(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause: cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows good cause; suppressed evidence that is not material does not establish good cause.

Garcia (Evaristo) v. Director · filed 2022-03-31(1)

Therefore, because Garcia could not demonstrate that the suppressed evidence was material, the district court properly denied Garcia's petition for a writ of habeas corpus as procedurally barred.

Section 34.726(1) makes postconviction habeas claims filed years after remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

Middleton (David) v. Warden (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2022-12-02(1)

Middleton's petition included claims that were untimely, given that he raised them roughly 16 years after this court issued its remittitur on direct appeal. NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) permits a late post-conviction petition when the delay is not the petitioner’s fault and dismissal would unduly prejudice the petitioner.

Nasby v. State of Nevada · filed 2023-08-18(1)

A petitioner filing outside a year can excuse the delay with good cause, meaning “[t]hat the delay is not the fault of the petitioner; and [t]hat the dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner.” § 34.726(1); accord Nasby, 2017 WL 3013073, at *1. Assuming Nika’s change in law excuses the delay, Nasby still would have failed the undue prejudice requirement.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Smith (Michael) v. State · filed 2014-05-13(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) requires a showing of good cause and actual prejudice to overcome its procedural bar.

Braunstein (Steve) v. State · filed 2014-05-13(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar is not overcome by a later decision that has no bearing on the petitioner's case.

Barton (Ross) v. State · filed 2014-05-13(1)

Accordingly, appellant fails to demonstrate that Rose provides goodS cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bars.

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction habeas petition absent a showing of good cause and actual prejudice.

Davis (James) v. State · filed 2014-06-11(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause for the delay and actual prejudice.

Black (Anthony) v. State · filed 2014-06-11(1)

Appellant's motion was therefore procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). Appellant did not attempt to demonstrate good cause to excuse his delay, nor could he have demonstrated prejudice because he received all of the presentence credit to which he was entitled.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar.

Sutton (Kevin) v. State · filed 2014-06-11(1)

demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). ... Appellant did not attempt to demonstrate good cause or overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. ... Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the petition as procedurally barred and barred by laches.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice to overcome a procedural bar.

Franklin (Jeffrey) v. State · filed 2014-07-23(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction petition absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Tilcock (Larry) v. State · filed 2014-07-23(1)

Accordingly, appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars a late post-conviction petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Richard (Antonio) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner whose petition is procedurally barred to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice.

Mortensen (Ronald) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars a late post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Hermanski (Gregory) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause and actual prejudice to overcome its time bar on post-conviction petitions.

Lyons (Phillip) v. State · filed 2014-09-17(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice to overcome its procedural bar.

Houston (Horace) v. State · filed 2014-09-17(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars a procedurally defective petition absent a showing of good cause and actual prejudice.

Heath (Franklin) v. State · filed 2014-09-17(1)

barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Appellant did not attempt to demonstrate good cause for his procedural defects.

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Polk (Renard) v. State · filed 2014-09-18(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to show good cause and actual prejudice to overcome its procedural bar.

Peck (Frank) v. State · filed 2014-11-13(1)

Appellant's petition was therefore procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars a delayed post-conviction motion absent good cause and actual prejudice.

Zessman (Eric) v. State · filed 2014-12-11(1)

Therefore, appellant's motion was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar requires a showing of good cause and actual prejudice to overcome it.

Zacarias-Lopez (Elder) v. State · filed 2014-12-11(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Leslie, III (Wilbert) v. State · filed 2014-12-11(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Caheuc (Hugo) v. State C/W 64685 · filed 2015-01-29(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726 requires good cause and actual prejudice to overcome its procedural bar, but satisfying that requirement does not overcome the separate laches bar in section 34.800.

Lopez (Manuel) v. Warden (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2015-10-23(1)

NRS 34.800 may consequently bar petitions even though a petitioner can show good cause and actual prejudice to satisfy NRS 34.726 and NRS 34.810.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to show good cause and prejudice to overcome its procedural bar.

Sutton (Kevin) v. State · filed 2015-12-18(1)

See NRS 34.726(1). ... Appellant failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default, see Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 60, 331 P.3d 867, 870 (2014), or that the failure to consider his claims amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice, Mitchell v. State, 122 Nev. 1269, 1273-74, 149 P.3d 33, 36 (2006).

Section 34.726(1) procedurally bars a post-conviction petition absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice.

Malone (Deangelo) v. State · filed 2015-12-28(1)

Therefore, Malone's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Jones (Raja) v. State · filed 2016-06-17(1)

Thus, Jones's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Jones's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction petition unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Wilson (Delarian) v. State · filed 2016-10-13(1)

Wilson's petition was therefore untimely filed and procedurally barred absent a demonstration of cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition absent good cause and actual prejudice.

Reberger (Lance) v. State · filed 2017-01-12(1)

Reberger filed his petition more than 18 years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on June 14, 1995. ... Reberger's petition was therefore untimely filed, and it was also successive and an abuse of the writ. ... The petition was therefore procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars a postconviction habeas petition filed more than one year after remittitur on direct appeal unless the petitioner shows good cause and prejudice.

O'Keefe (Brian) v. State · filed 2016-06-22(1)

Therefore, the petition was untimely filed and procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition absent a showing of good cause and prejudice.

Bell (William) v. State · filed 2017-07-11(1)

Bell filed his petition more than nine years after entry of the judgment of conviction. Thus, the petition was untimely filed. NRS 34.726(1). As such, the petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Morales v. Williams · filed 2018-04-10(1)

Morales's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1) ; NRS 34.810(1)(b), (3).

Section 34.726’s time bar requires a petitioner seeking to excuse a late filing to show a legal reason for the delay and actual, substantial disadvantage.

Castillo v. State · filed 2019-05-30

Under Nevada law, a petitioner cannot relitigate his sentence decades after his conviction by continually filing postconviction petitions unless he provides a legal reason that excuses both the delay in filing and the failure to raise the asserted errors earlier, and further shows that the asserted errors worked to his "actual and substantial disadvantage." ... Because Castillo's arguments regarding Hurst lack merit, he fails to demonstrate good cause and prejudice to excuse the various procedural bars precluding him from challenging his sentence at this late date.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Scott (Quadrae) v. State · filed 2019-06-17(1)

Scott's postconviction habeas petition was untimely because it was filed more than 6 years after the entry of his judgment of conviction. See NRS 34.726(1). Thus, his petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows good cause and actual prejudice.

Howard (Nicholas) Vs. State · filed 2020-07-20(1)

Howard's petition was therefore procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) permits an untimely postconviction habeas petition to proceed when the petitioner shows good cause for the delay and actual prejudice to a constitutional right.

State Vs. Gutierrez (Carlos) (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2020-12-04(1)

The district court initially dismissed the second petition on procedural grounds, concluding that it was untimely and successive and Gutierrez had not shown good cause and prejudice as required by NRS 34.726(1) and NRS 34.810(2). ... After considering all of the testimony and post-hearing briefs from the parties, the district court concluded that Gutierrez had shown actual prejudice to his right to effective assistance of counsel in the presentation of mitigation evidence at the penalty phase due to the VCCR violation. Because the district court's exhaustive factual findings are supported by the record and its legal conclusions are sound, we affirm.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Elliott (Anthony) Vs. State · filed 2020-07-16(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause: cause for the delay and undue prejudice. See id.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to show cause for the delay and undue prejudice to excuse an untimely postconviction habeas petition.

State Vs. Gurry (Carlos) C/W 79962 · filed 2020-11-13(1)

The district court granted the petition and ordered a new trial, determining that Gurry had demonstrated good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bars. Having reviewed the record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the district court's findings and the district court did not err as a matter of law.

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed six years after remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

Ayala (Omar) Vs. State · filed 2021-01-15(1)

Ayala filed the petition six years after remittitur issued on his direct appeal. ... Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) allows a prisoner to overcome a Nevada procedural bar by showing cause and prejudice.

Dollar v. Wickham · filed 2017-10-10(1)

When the federal district court dismissed Dollar’s petition, it was clear that Nevada’s procedural rules would bar his new claim, and a state district court had already recognized as much. In Nevada, a prisoner may overcome such hurdles only if he or she can show cause and prejudice. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1); id. § 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) starts the filing period when judgment of conviction is entered or, after a timely direct appeal, when remittitur issues; a pending post-conviction petition does not toll that period.

Woods (Ian) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

NRS 34.726(1) provides two triggers for the timely filing of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus: entry of a judgment of conviction or issuance of remittitur in the timely direct appeal. No tolling motions or petitions are recognized in NRS chapter 34 in regards to the filing of a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 34.726(1) starts the filing period at entry of the judgment of conviction or issuance of remittitur in a timely direct appeal; other motions and petitions do not toll it.

Brown (Beau) v. Warden · filed 2014-09-16(1)

NRS 34.726(1) provides two triggers for the timely filing of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus: entry of a judgment of conviction or issuance of remittitur in the timely direct appeal. No tolling motions or petitions are recognized in NRS chapter 34 in regards to the filing of a timely post- conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 34.726(1)’s filing deadline requires an inquiry into whether a petitioner timely submitted a petition that was prevented from being filed.

Mosby (Marvin) v. State · filed 2014-11-12(1)

We cannot affirm the order of the district court denying the supplemental petition as procedurally time barred. It is unclear from the record whether appellant submitted a petition for filing on or about September 3, 2013, and if he did, what happened to cause the petition not to be filed in the district court. If appellant had mailed a petition to the clerk of the district court on September 3, 2013, the petition would have been timely filed.

Section 34.726(1) treats a postconviction habeas petition filed more than eight years after remittitur on direct appeal as untimely.

Manley (Giles) v. State · filed 2016-04-01(1)

Appellant Giles Manley filed his petition on September 26, 2012, more than eight years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on June 29, 2004. Therefore, Manley's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) treats a postconviction habeas petition filed nearly 15 years after remittitur on direct appeal as untimely.

Pinkston (Barbara) v. State · filed 2016-04-14(1)

Appellant filed her postconviction petition on January 23, 2015, nearly 15 years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on April 3, 2000. ... Therefore, the petition was untimely filed.

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than 15 years after remittitur from the direct appeal untimely.

Porter (Charles) v. State · filed 2016-06-17(1)

Porter filed the instant petition more than 15 years after this court issued the remittitur from his direct appeal. Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) sets a filing deadline for postconviction habeas petitions measured from remittitur on direct appeal.

Dominguez (Demian) v. State · filed 2016-06-22(1)

Appellant filed his postconviction petition on July 30, 2015, nearly five years after the remittitur issued on direct appeal on December 10, 2010. Dominguez v. State, Docket No. 55061 (Order of Affirmance, January 4, 2011). Therefore, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) treats a postconviction habeas petition filed more than seven years after the direct-appeal remittitur as untimely.

Dewey (Shelli) v. Warden · filed 2017-05-09(1)

Dewey's petition was therefore untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than 19 years after remittitur from the direct appeal untimely.

Guy (Curtis) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2017-11-14(1)

His petition was therefore untimely. See NRS 34.726 (1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition untimely when it is filed more than five years after the remittitur on direct appeal.

Williams (Shatanna) v. State · filed 2018-01-10(1)

Appellant Shatanna Shuntay Williams filed her petition on November 4, 2013, more than 5 years after the remittitur issued on direct appeal. See Williams v. State, Docket No. 51249 (Order of Affirmance, September 11, 2008). Thus, her petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed 16 years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

Turner (Vincent) v. State · filed 2018-04-10(1)

Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than five years after remittitur from the direct appeal untimely.

McConnell (Robert) v. Warden (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2018-09-21(1)

Appellant filed his petition more than five years after remittitur issued from his direct appeal, McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. 1043, 102 P.3d 606 (2004); thus, the petition was untimely pursuant to NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed almost six years after remittitur untimely.

Morris (Brent) v. State · filed 2019-03-14(1)

Appellant filed his petition on May 2, 2018, almost 6 years after remittitur issued from the decision affirming his judgment of conviction on May 9, 2012. Morris v. State, Docket No. 58646 (Order of Affirmance, April 12, 2012). The petition was therefore untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction petition filed more than five years after the order dismissing the direct appeal untimely.

Kinford (Steven) v. State · filed 2019-03-14(1)

Kinford filed his petition on October 9, 2014, more than 5 years after the order dismissing his direct appeal was entered on August 10, 2009. 1 Thus, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) imposes a filing deadline on postconviction habeas petitions measured from issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal.

Mitchell (Deangelo) v. State · filed 2019-03-15(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed almost 22 years after the remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

White (Sean) v. State · filed 2019-06-17(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than five years after remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

Walker (James) Vs. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2020-06-19(1)

Walker filed his petition over five years after the remittitur issued on his direct appeal. The petition therefore was untimely under NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) treats a postconviction habeas petition filed more than four years after remittitur as untimely.

Slaughter (Rickie) Vs. State · filed 2020-10-15(1)

Appellant filed his petition on November 20, 2018, more than four years after the remittitur issued on appeal from the judgment of conviction. ... The petition was therefore untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than 19 years after remittitur untimely.

Beraldo (Frank) Vs. State · filed 2020-10-15(1)

Beraldo's instant postconviction habeas petition was untimely because it was filed more than 19 years after remittitur issued on direct appeal on September 8, 1999. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) treats a postconviction habeas petition filed 18 years after remittitur on direct appeal as untimely.

Gallimort (Jose) Vs. State · filed 2020-11-13(1)

Gallimort's postconviction habeas petition was untimely because it was filed 18 years after remittitur issued on direct appeal. See NRS 34.726(1); Gallirnort v. State, 116 Nev. 315, 997 P.2d 796 (2000).

Section 34.726(1) imposes a filing deadline for postconviction habeas petitions measured from remittitur on direct appeal.

Camacho (Eduardo) Vs. State · filed 2020-11-13(1)

Camacho's postconviction habeas petition was untimely because it was filed 11 years after remittitur issued on direct appeal.

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed over eight years after remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

Murray (Steven) Vs. State · filed 2020-12-14(1)

He filed the current postconviction petition on May 10, 2019, over eight years after issuance of remittitur on direct appeal on February 28, 2011. The district court therefore did not err in concluding this petition is untimely and successive. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed nine years after remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

Jardine (Hector) Vs. Warden · filed 2021-01-15(1)

Jardine filed the petition nine years after remittitur issued on his direct appeal. Jardine v. State, Docket Nos. 48736, 48737 (Order of Affirmance, December 19, 2008). Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) treats a postconviction habeas petition filed ten years after remittitur on direct appeal as untimely.

Cortinas, Jr. (Armando) Vs. State · filed 2021-03-09(1)

Cortinas filed the petition ten years after remittitur issued on his direct appeal. Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 195 P.3d 315 (2008). Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) measures the time to file a habeas petition from entry of the judgment of conviction or issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal; resolution of an earlier postconviction petition does not restart the filing period.

Townsend (John) Vs. State · filed 2021-10-18(1)

We reject appellant's argument that he had until the resolution of his postconviction relief petition to file a successive habeas corpus petition because the plain language in NRS 34.726 contains no such exception: the triggers for filing a timely habeas corpus petition are entry of a judgment of conviction or issuance of the remittitur from a direct appeal.

Section 34.726(1) treats a postconviction habeas petition filed seven years after remittitur on direct appeal as untimely.

Cardenas (Joel) Vs. Warden · filed 2021-11-10(1)

Cardenas filed the petition seven years after remittitur issued on his direct appeal. Cardenas v. State, Docket No. 58595 (Order of Affirmance, April 11, 2012). Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

When no remittitur will issue after a direct appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Van Hook (Dwain) v. State · filed 2017-10-23(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues, Section 34.726(1)'s one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Sheffey (Ronald) v. State · filed 2017-10-24(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year filing period begins on the date of the order dismissing an appeal when no remittitur will issue.

Surrell, Sr. (Alvon) v. State · filed 2017-11-29(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When a voluntary appeal dismissal produces no remittitur, Section 34.726(1)’s one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Lopez-Mercado (Juan) v. State · filed 2017-12-01(1)

... one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1)'s one-year filing period begins on the date of an order dismissing an appeal when no remittitur will issue.

Jones (Joseph) v. State · filed 2018-02-01(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after an appeal is dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Redding (Joseph) v. State · filed 2018-02-12(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur will issue, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

James (Jesse) v. State · filed 2018-03-05(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur will issue, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Calder (Christopher) v. State · filed 2018-03-05(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1)'s one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of an order dismissing an appeal when no remittitur will issue.

Garcia (Joey) v. State · filed 2018-07-02(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When a direct appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Benjamin (Ronda) v. State · filed 2018-07-02(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Franklin (Tobiah) v. State · filed 2018-04-16(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Wysinger (Adam) v. State · filed 2018-07-26(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Dixon (Daniel) v. State · filed 2018-07-30(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, the one-year period under § 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Foster (Tarron) v. State · filed 2018-09-17(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Douglas (Cody) v. State C/W 77619 · filed 2019-01-18(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in these matters, seeS NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing post-conviction habeas corpus petitions under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a voluntary dismissal of a direct appeal, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Jackson, III (John) v. State · filed 2018-10-05(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after an appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Mitchell (Richard) v. State · filed 2018-11-02(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur will issue, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Byrom (Otis) v. State · filed 2018-12-10(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year filing period begins on the date of the order dismissing an appeal when no remittitur will issue.

Weiss (Daniel) v. State C/W 69864/69865/69866/69867/69868 · filed 2016-04-19(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in these matters, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after an appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

McKinnon (Patrick) v. State · filed 2016-05-03(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur will issue, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Myers (Eric) v. State · filed 2016-07-15(1)

Becauseno remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a direct appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Finster (Kathy) v. State · filed 2016-12-09(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a voluntary dismissal of an appeal, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Prisco (Nathaniel) v. State · filed 2017-02-28(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a voluntary dismissal of an appeal, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Shurtleff (Ricky) v. State · filed 2017-03-27(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period under section 34.726(1) begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Bumgarner (Steven) v. State · filed 2017-01-06(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a voluntarily dismissed appeal, the one-year period for filing a postconviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Edwards (Harold) v. State · filed 2017-02-28(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a postconviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Owens, Jr. (Perry) v. State · filed 2017-03-03(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1)'s one-year filing period begins on the date of the order dismissing an appeal when no remittitur will issue.

Estrealla (Joseph) v. State · filed 2017-10-16(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a postconviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Miller (Tre) v. State · filed 2017-12-22(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a postconviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Coleman (Versell) v. State · filed 2019-04-22(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under ...NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is dismissed without a remittitur, § 34.726(1)’s one-year filing period begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Hernandez (Robert) v. State · filed 2019-07-05(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Clinkenbeard (Derek) Vs. State · filed 2019-08-08(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a voluntarily dismissed appeal, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Garcia (Maurice) Vs. State · filed 2019-08-16(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Under NRS 34.726(1), when no remittitur will issue, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the order dismissing the direct appeal.

Skaggs (Charles) Vs. State C/W 78847 · filed 2019-08-23(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in these matters, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing post-conviction habeas corpus petitions under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a direct appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Mendonca (Skylar) Vs. State · filed 2019-08-23(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under ... NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a direct appeal is dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Honabach (Edward) Vs. State · filed 2019-08-23(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Elgas, Jr. (Thomas) Vs. State · filed 2019-07-29(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur will issue, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Zapanta (Archie) Vs. State · filed 2019-08-23(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a postconviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Muhammad (Rahim) Vs. State · filed 2019-09-04(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a postconviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after dismissal of a direct appeal, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Blockson (Christopher) Vs. State · filed 2020-01-16(1)

1Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur will issue after dismissal of a direct appeal, the one-year period under § 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Rodriguez (Christian) Vs. State · filed 2020-04-24(1)

Because no rernittitur will issue in this matter, .see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under ... NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1)'s filing period begins upon entry of the original judgment of conviction or issuance of the remittitur from a timely direct appeal.

Weber (Timmy) Vs. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2020-09-11(1)

There are only two triggers for the timely filing of a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus: entry of the original judgment of conviction or issuance of the remittitur from a timely direct appeal. See NRS 34.726(1); see also Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 419, 423 P.3d 1084, 1095 (2018).

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Robinson, Jr. (Michael) Vs. State · filed 2020-07-02(1)

1Because no rernittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after an appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Frank (Tyron) Vs. State · filed 2020-08-24(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1)'s one-year filing period begins on the date of the order dismissing a direct appeal when no remittitur will issue.

Washington (Daniell) Vs. State · filed 2020-12-16(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period under § 34.726(1) begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Conrad (Jordan) Vs. State · filed 2021-01-22(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a postconviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after an appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Amos (Torrence) Vs. State · filed 2021-05-26(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a direct appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Royer (Gary) Vs. State · filed 2021-07-13(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a postconviction habeas petition begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Silva (Alfredo) Vs. State · filed 2021-03-08(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a postconviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When a direct appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, Section 34.726(1)'s one-year filing period begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Rasavong (Nouansavanh) Vs. State · filed 2021-09-16(1)

13ecause no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 2(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year filing period begins on the date of the order dismissing a direct appeal when no remittitur will issue.

Oborny (Thomas) v. State · filed 2022-07-01(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

An untimely petitioner raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims may show undue prejudice under section 34.726 by satisfying the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test.

Azcarate (Ray) v. State · filed 2017-04-14(1)

Where, as here, the untimely petition raises ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims, the petitioner may demonstrate undue prejudice to overcome the procedural bar in NRS 34.726 by satisfying the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test.

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year time bar does not bar a late supplemental petition that relates back to a timely original petition when the district court permits the supplement.

Robbins (Daniel) Vs. State · filed 2019-11-15(1)

Because NRS 34.750(1) allows the district court to permit supplemental pleadings, and because our precedent allows a supplemental petition containing new claims to relate back to the original filing for purposes of the procedural bars, see State v. Powell, 122 Nev. 751, 758, 138 P.3d 453, 457-58 (2006), appellant's petition and supplemental petition were not procedurally time barred.

A petition filed by counsel despite an authorization problem stops the one-year filing clock, making later supplemental pleadings timely.

Honabach (Edward) Vs. Warden · filed 2021-12-17(1)

Despite the problems with the authorization, we conclude that the petition filed by Akin stopped the clock on the deadline to file a timely postconviction petition such that any supplemental pleadings would be timely in this case.

Section 34.726’s time bar can be overcome when actual innocence of the death penalty establishes a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

HOWARD (SAMUEL) VS. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-PC) C/W 81279 · filed 2021-09-16(1)

Thus, Howard demonstrated that he is actually innocent of the death penalty, establishing a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural bars to his untimely and successive petition. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by dismissing the petition as procedurally barred under NRS 34.726 and NRS 34.810.

Section 34.726(1) requires a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel offered as good cause for a late petition to be raised within one year after the proceeding in which the alleged ineffectiveness occurred ends.

CHAPPELL (JAMES) v. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-PC) · filed 2021-12-30(1)

Consistent with Rippo and earlier cases, Chappell's good-cause claims based on first postconviction counsel's performance as to guilt-phase issues were available when the remittitur issued on appeal from the district court's order denying his first postconviction petition in that regard. Because Chappell filed the petition asserting those postconviction-counsel claims more than one year later, those claims were untimely and could not provide good cause.

A claim that first postconviction counsel was ineffective cannot establish good cause under § 34.726(1) if raised more than one year after remittitur in the first postconviction appeal.

THOMAS (MARLO) v. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-PC) · filed 2022-05-26(1)

Thomas thus had to assert first postconviction counsel's ineffectiveness as good cause to raise procedurally barred claims challenging his convictions within 1 year after the remittitur issued in Thornas II on March 9, 2004. Because the instant petition was filed well beyond that date, the claims about first postconviction counsel's performance were untimely and could not provide good cause. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying the petition as to the asserted grounds for relief related to the issue of Thomas's guilt because those grounds are procedurally barred under NRS 34.726(1), NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2), and NRS 34.810(2).