Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726

Section 34.726(1) governs the timeliness of postconviction habeas petitions.

Ramsundar (Leo) v. State · filed 2022-04-29(1)

Ramsundar timely filed the petition here. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed five years after remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

Slaughter (Rickie) v. State · filed 2022-02-17(1)

Slaughter filed the petition five years after remittitur issued on his direct appeal. Slaughter v. State, No. 61991, 2014 WL 989706 (Nev. Mar. 12, 2014) (Order of Affirmance). Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year period for filing a postconviction habeas petition begins on the date of the order dismissing a direct appeal when no remittitur issues.

Ervin (Archie) v. State · filed 2022-11-10(1)

1Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year pericd for filing a postconviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726 gives a petitioner one year from the appellate court’s remittitur to file a petition challenging a judgment or sentence.

Arenas v. Warden High Desert State Prison · filed 2022-11-28

Arenas is correct about the triggering date for his state petition12 but wrong with respect to his federal petition.

Section 34.726(1) requires a state habeas petition filed after an appeal to be filed within one year after remittitur.

Herndon v. Neven · filed 2023-03-30(1)

Petitioner filed his state petition on August 24, 2018, two days after the deadline to file his state petition under N.R.S. § 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) gives a petitioner one year after entry of a conviction, or after appellate remittitur, to file a Nevada habeas petition challenging the conviction or sentence.

Velasco v. Balaam · filed 2024-12-19(1)

In Nevada, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within one year after the appellate court of competent jurisdiction issues its remittitur. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1). ... That means that, based on the pleadings, more than four years had passed between the closing of Velasco’s 2013 habeas petition and when he first entered Oliver’s facility, well beyond the one-year statute of limitations for federal or state claims.

Section 34.726 bars a state post-conviction habeas claim when the applicable limitations period has expired.

Berman v. Johnson · filed 2024-06-04

Furthermore, if Berman were to assert this claim in state court now, it would be ruled procedurally barred under Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.726 and 34.810, because the state-law statute of limitations applicable to the claim has expired and because Berman could have, but did not, assert the claim in a prior state habeas petition.

Section 34.726(1) gives a petitioner one year to seek post-conviction relief after entry of judgment or, following an appeal, after the Nevada Supreme Court issues its remittitur.

Sonner v. Bean (DEATH PENALTY) · filed 2025-02-11(1)

Sonner’s claims are procedurally defaulted because he failed to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1), Nevada’s time limit for seeking post-conviction relief. ... Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1) provides that a petition for post-conviction relief is untimely if filed later than one year after the entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within one year after the Nevada Supreme Court issues its remittitur.

Section 34.726’s one-year time limit applies to a second postconviction petition.

Hernandez · filed 2026-01-05

Although the definition of “reasonable time” may not have been definitively fleshed out until 2016, this argument fails because Hernandez was on notice that NRS § 34.726—the 1-year time limitation requirement—would be applied to his second postconviction petition.

Section 34.726’s one-year limitations period would bar a postconviction claim first raised in a new state petition after the deadline.

Woods v. The Attorney General of the State of Nevada · filed 2025-01-22

The record is clear that both of those procedural bars would apply if Woods attempted to return to state court and exhaust his claim, so ground one is technically exhausted because it would be denied under Nevada’s procedural rules.

When no appeal is taken, § 34.726(1) requires a state habeas petition to be filed within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction.

Proctor v. Najera · filed 2023-09-05(1)

Under Nevada state law, a habeas petition must be filed within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction if no appeal is taken.

Section 34.726(1) bars a postconviction habeas petition filed more than one year after the remittitur from a direct appeal unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and prejudice.

Antonetti (Joseph) v. State · filed 2017-06-15(1)

Therefore, the petition was untimely filed and procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) requires a timely post-conviction habeas petition to be filed within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction when no timely direct appeal was filed.

Vontress (George) v. State · filed 2013-03-14(1)

In the instant case, because appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal from his judgment, a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be filed in the district court before June 17, 2013 (a Monday), one year from entry of the judgment of conviction.

Section 34.726(1) treats a post-conviction filing made within one year of entry of the judgment of conviction as timely.

Midby (Ronald) v. State C/W 61314 · filed 2013-04-09(1)

However, the motion was timely as it was filed within one-year from entry of the judgment of conviction on July 21, 2011, in C261607. NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction habeas petition filed more than one year after entry of judgment unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Ramos (Fransisco) v. State · filed 2013-05-15(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed and procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause—cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

NRS 34.726 requires a habeas corpus petition to be filed within one year of the entry of the judgment of conviction.

King v. Warden · filed 2013-10-17

petition would have been dismissed regardless of his response as it was time-barred pursuant to NRS 34.726, which requires such a habeas corpus petition to be filed within one year of the entry of the judgment of conviction.

Section 34.726(1) makes a post-conviction habeas petition filed more than 12 years after entry of judgment untimely.

De La Hoya (Jorge) v. State · filed 2014-06-12(1)

Appellant's petition was filed more than 12 years after entry of the judgment of conviction on July 10, 2001. Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. 3 See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction habeas petition filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction when no direct appeal was taken, unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and prejudice.

Phillips (Vornelius) v. State · filed 2014-11-13(1)

NRS chapter 34 bars petitions that are successive, abusive, and/or are filed more than one year after the filing of the judgment of conviction where no direct appeal was taken, unless the petitioner can demonstrate good cause and prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction habeas petition filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction when no direct appeal was taken, unless the petitioner shows good cause and prejudice.

Mendoza (Andres) v. State · filed 2014-11-13(1)

NRS chapter 34 bars petitions that are successive, abusive, and/or are filed more than one year after the filing of the judgment of conviction where no direct appeal was taken, unless the petitioner can demonstrate good cause and prejudice.

Section 34.726 makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than one year after entry of judgment untimely unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and prejudice to excuse the delay.

Vail (Thomas) v. Warden · filed 2016-06-17

See NRS 34.726. Thus, his petition was untimely filed. Vail failed to ... demonstrate good cause and prejudice to excuse the untimely filing.

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than two years after entry of judgment untimely.

Lay (Orlando) v. State · filed 2016-09-19(1)

Lay filed the instant petition more than two years after the entry of his judgment of conviction. Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition untimely when it is filed more than one year after entry of the judgment of conviction.

Sigal (Jeremy) v. State · filed 2017-06-15(1)

The petition filed on August 31, 2016, was untimely as it was filed more than one year after entry of the judgment of conviction, NRS 34.726(1); it was successive because Sigal had previously filed a postconviction petition that was denied on the merits, NRS 34.810(2); and it was an abuse of the writ as it raised new and different grounds that could have been raised in the prior petition, id.

Section 34.726(1) treats a postconviction habeas petition filed more than two years after entry of judgment as untimely.

Banks (Gregory) v. State · filed 2017-06-15(1)

Banks filed the petition at issue here more than two years after the entry of the judgment of conviction. The petition thus was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

A postconviction habeas petition filed more than 12 years after entry of judgment is untimely under § 34.726(1).

Hubble (Christopher) v. State · filed 2018-05-15(1)

Hubble filed his petition on November 23, 2016, more than 12 years after his judgment of conviction was entered on April 24, 2004. His petition was therefore .untimely pursuant to NRS 34.726(1).

A postconviction habeas petition filed exactly one year after entry of the judgment of conviction is timely under § 34.726(1).

Class (Anthony) v. State · filed 2019-03-14(1)

It appears from ... our review of the record that the petition would have been timely filed in Case No. C317115, as it was filed exactly one year after that judgment of conviction was entered on December 13, 2016.

Section 34.726(1) requires a postconviction habeas petition to be filed within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction.

Carley (Elizabeth) v. State C/W 75404 · filed 2019-03-14(1)

Appellant filed her petitions on December 4, 2017, and February 16, 2018, more than one year after entry of the judgment of conviction on June 28, 2012. Thus, the petitions were untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than one year after entry of judgment untimely and subject to dismissal absent good cause and prejudice.

Ramirez (Roberto) v. State · filed 2019-03-14(1)

Appellant Roberto Ramirez filed his petition on November 22, 2017, more than one year after entry of his judgment of conviction. 2 The petition was therefore untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Accordingly, the petition was subject to dismissal absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice. See id.

Section 34.726(1) requires a postconviction habeas petition to be filed within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction.

Arias (Melissa) v. State C/W 75982 · filed 2019-03-14(1)

Appellant filed her petitions on December 4, 2017, and February 16, 2018, more than one year after entry of the judgment of conviction on June 28, 2012. Thus, the petitions were untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) requires a habeas petition to be filed within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction if no appeal is taken.

Hodges v. Dreesen · filed 2023-10-31(1)

Under Nevada law, a habeas petition must be filed within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction if no appeal is taken.

Section 34.726(1) is an independent and adequate state procedural rule that can bar federal habeas review of claims rejected under it.

Hunter v. Baca · filed 2024-01-05(1)

Indeed, Nevada’s state procedural rules employed here—NRS 34.726(1) and NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2), (2)—have been found to be independent and adequate.

Section 34.726’s time bar is an adequate state ground for denying federal habeas review because Nevada consistently applies its requirement that an untimely petitioner show cause.

Richard Allan MORAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. E.K. McDANIEL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee · filed 1996-03-28

We reject Moran’s argument. The Nevada Supreme Court has consistently applied the state rule which prohibits review of the merits of an untimely claim unless the petitioner demonstrates cause.

Section 34.726(1)'s time bar furnished an adequate and independent ground for denying a petition even though the state court also rejected it on the merits.

Loveland v. Hatcher · filed 2000-11-03(1)

Here, the Nevada Supreme Court relied on an adequate and independent state law ground when it dismissed Loveland’s petition by applying Nevada’s procedural bar rule, even though that court also dismissed the petition on the merits.

Section 34.726(1)'s one-year filing rule does not bar federal habeas review when the state applies a timely-direct-appeal requirement announced only after the default.

Tanner v. McDaniel · filed 2004-05-18(1)

Application of this generally sound rule to the particular circumstances of this case, however, renders the rule inadequate to foreclose federal habeas review. ... In dismissing Tanner’s petition, however, the Nevada Supreme Court cited Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 967 P.2d 1132 (1998), which construed section 34.726(1) to mean that the one-year period for filing a petition for post-conviction relief begins to run from the issuance of the remittitur from a timely direct appeal. Dickerson was filed after Tanner’s default occurred in February 1997. The provision of the rule dispositive of Tanner’s petition for post-conviction relief was therefore not “firmly established and regularly followed” at the time it was applied by the state court.

Section 34.726 provides an independent and adequate state procedural bar that can preclude federal habeas review of untimely claims.

Felder v. Hildreth · filed 2005-05-16

We have previously held that Nev.Rev.Stat. § 34.726 constitutes an independent and adequate state bar for the purposes of precluding federal habeas review. ... Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed Felder’s first seven claims.

Section 34.726 is an independent and adequate state procedural bar to federal habeas review.

Williams v. Filson · filed 2018-11-09

Because Nevada Revised Statutes § 34.726 is an independent and adequate state procedural bar to federal review, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing the following claims: 3, 5–7, 10–13, 15, and 17–38.

Section 34.726 is an adequate state procedural bar that prevents federal review of claims defaulted under it unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Emil V. Gittere · filed 2019-09-27

Accordingly, this court concludes that Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726 was a "clear, consistently applied, and well-established” procedural rule at the time of Emil’s defaults. Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court’s application of the rule serves to bar this court’s review of Emil’s defaulted claims absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Section 34.726(1) makes an untimely postconviction habeas petition procedurally barred absent a showing of good cause and undue prejudice.

Regala (Joseph) Vs. State · filed 2019-11-15(1)

Thus, Regala's petition was untimely filed and procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and undue prejudice.

Section 34.726’s timeliness bar is an adequate state procedural ground when it was clear, consistently applied, and well established at the time of default.

Leonard v. Gittere (DEATH PENALTY) · filed 2020-05-14

Leonard’s arguments do not place the adequacy of NRS § 34.726 at issue so as to shift the burden to Respondents. Accordingly, the Court concludes the provision was a “clear, consistently applied, and well-established” procedural rule at the time of Leonard’s defaults.

Section 34.726(1)’s timeliness rule can provide an independent and adequate state ground for procedural default when the state court applies it without relying on federal law.

Young v. State of Nevada · filed 2019-10-15(1)

The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the denials as successive and untimely under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.810 and § 34.726. The Ninth Circuit has held that the Nevada courts’ application of the timeliness rule in § 34.726(1) is an independent and adequate state law ground for procedural default. ... The Nevada Court of Appeals’ decision in this case did not depend on the application of federal law in deciding that the claim was procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Nevada Court of Appeals relied on independent and adequate state law grounds in affirming the dismissal of the petitions as untimely and successive.

Section 34.726 provides an adequate and independent state law ground for procedural default in non-capital habeas cases.

Rosas v. Filson · filed 2019-11-15(1)

As we have held before, NRS § 34.726 is an adequate and independent state law ground for procedural default in non-capital cases, such as Rosas’s.

Section 34.726 sets a one-year limit for post-conviction petitions and is an independent and adequate state procedural rule for federal habeas review.

Morris v. Baker · filed 2020-08-13

Nevada’s one-year statute of limitation for post-conviction petitions, NRS § 34.726, and prohibition on second or successive post-conviction petitions, NRS § 34.810, are independent and adequate state procedural rules.

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year limit is an independent and adequate state procedural rule in non-capital cases.

Turner v. Filson · filed 2020-09-02(1)

Nevada’s one-year statute of limitation for post-conviction petitions and prohibition on second or successive post-conviction petitions56 are independent and adequate state procedural rules as applied to non-capital cases.

Section 34.726’s one-year limit on post-conviction petitions is an independent and adequate state procedural rule in non-capital cases.

Yaag v. LeGrand · filed 2020-10-02

Nevada’s one-year statute of limitation for post-conviction petitions, NRS 34.726, and prohibition on second or successive post-conviction petitions, NRS 34.810(2), are independent and adequate state procedural rules as applied to non-capital cases.

Section 34.726 is an adequate state procedural rule that can support procedural default in federal habeas proceedings.

Moore v. Gittere · filed 2021-02-26

Accordingly, this court concludes that Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.726 and 34.800 are adequate to support application of the procedural default doctrine in this case.

Section 34.726’s timeliness bar can be an adequate procedural bar to federal habeas review when applied to successive petitions.

McNelton v. William Gittere (DEATH PENALTY) · filed 2021-03-29

Likewise, with respect to the adequacy of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726 as applied to successive petitions, the court adequately analyzed that issue in its prior order and sees no reason to alter that decision.

Section 34.726 can support a procedural default defense in federal habeas proceedings when the petitioner fails to put its adequacy at issue.

Moore v. Gittere · filed 2021-04-12

Accordingly, this court concludes that Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.726 and 34.800 are adequate to support application of the procedural default doctrine in this case.

Section 34.726 sets a one-year limit for Nevada post-conviction petitions; its application can support procedural default in federal habeas review.

Stiegler v. Neven · filed 2021-02-18

Nevada’s one-year statute of limitation for post-conviction petitions, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726, and prohibition on second or successive post-conviction petitions, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.810(2), are independent and adequate state procedural rules as applied to non-capital cases.

Section 34.726 is an adequate state procedural bar that can prevent federal habeas review of claims rejected as untimely in state post-conviction proceedings.

Madrid v. Howell · filed 2021-03-31

Both Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726 and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.810 have been recognized as adequate procedural bars to federal review. ... Madrid has not alleged specific facts challenging the adequacy or independence of either rule as applied to him. ... Thus, the claims at issue are barred from federal court consideration unless Madrid can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Section 34.726(1)’s filing limit can provide an independent and adequate state procedural ground that bars federal habeas review of a claim.

Edwards v. Williams · filed 2021-05-17(1)

The Nevada Court of Appeals’ determination that grounds 1(b), 1(c), and 2 were procedurally barred under NRS 34.726(1) and NRS 34.810(2) was an independent and adequate ground to affirm the denial of the claims in Edwards’s second state habeas petition.

Section 34.726’s timeliness rule can serve as an adequate state procedural bar to federal habeas review.

Mulder v. Baker · filed 2021-09-30

In sum, Mulder’s arguments do not place the adequacy of NRS § 34.726 at issue so as to shift the burden to the respondents. I thus conclude that the provision was a clear, consistently applied, and well-established procedural rule at the time of Mulder’s defaults.

Section 34.726 can support federal habeas procedural default when the petitioner fails to substantiate a challenge to its adequacy.

McConnell v. Gittere · filed 2022-07-24

McConnell does not satisfy his burden under Bennett with respect to section 34.726. The Court determines that Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726 is adequate to support application of the procedural default doctrine in this case.

Section 34.726(1)’s untimeliness bar is an adequate and independent state procedural rule that can support federal habeas procedural default.

Thomson v. Williams · filed 2021-07-28(1)

In the appeal from the denial of the second petition, the Nevada Court of Appeals ruled that the second petition was untimely under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1), and that it was successive and abusive under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.810. R. Ex. 125 (ECF No. 53-11). These state-law grounds are adequate and independent state rules.

Section 34.726(1)’s time limit is an independent and adequate state procedural ground for barring federal habeas review in non-capital cases.

Langford v. Baker · filed 2021-12-13(1)

The Nevada Court of Appeals’ determination that Grounds 2(B), (C), (D), (F), (Q), (R), and (B1) are procedurally barred under NRS § 34.726(1) and NRS § 34.810(2) was an independent and adequate ground to affirm the denial of the claims in Langford’s second state habeas petition.

Section 34.726 can provide an independent and adequate state ground for barring federal habeas review of a claim.

McCallister v. Williams · filed 2022-02-11

Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court’s determination that federal ground 1 was procedurally barred under NRS 34.726 and 34.810 were independent and adequate grounds to affirm the denial of the claims in the state petition.

Section 34.726’s time bar can make an unexhausted claim procedurally defaulted when Nevada courts would dismiss a new petition as untimely.

Fergason v. Johnson · filed 2022-12-05

The Court determined that Ground 2(B) is procedurally defaulted because the state courts would dismiss a petition raising this claim as untimely and successive under NRS 34.726 and 34.810. ... For the reasons explained in the Court’s September 30, 2021, order, Ground 2(B) is dismissed with prejudice as procedurally defaulted.

Section 34.726(1) supplies an independent and adequate state procedural ground in noncapital habeas cases.

Randolph v. Baker · filed 2023-03-17(1)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, at least in non-capital cases, application of the procedural bars at issue in this case – NRS 34.726(1) and 34.810(1)(a) – are independent and adequate state grounds. Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court’s determination that federal ground 3 was procedurally barred under NRS 34.726(1) and 34.810 were independent and adequate grounds to affirm the denial of the claim in the state petition.

Section 34.726(1)'s untimeliness bar can provide an independent and adequate state ground that bars federal habeas review, but its application does not do so when the state decision is intertwined with federal law.

Villaverde v. Hutching · filed 2023-12-28(1)

Therefore, the Nevada Court of Appeals’ determination that federal grounds 1, 3, 4, and 5 were procedurally barred under NRS 34.726 and 34.810 were independent and adequate grounds to affirm the denial of the claims in the state petition.

Section 34.726’s one-year limit is an independent and adequate state procedural rule in noncapital cases; claims denied as untimely under it may be procedurally defaulted in federal habeas.

Bailey v. Williams · filed 2024-07-24

Nevada’s one-year statute of limitation1 for post- conviction petitions and prohibition on second or successive post-conviction petitions are independent and adequate state procedural rules as applied in non-capital cases.

Section 34.726’s timeliness rule is a consistently applied, independent and adequate state procedural ground that can bar federal habeas review.

Connors v. Williams, Sr. · filed 2025-02-14

The Ninth Circuit has specifically upheld Nevada’s rules barring untimely and successive petitions and denying petitions by laches as independent and adequate state bars for the time period relevant to Connors’s claims.63 So I am not persuaded by Connors’s hollow argument that the procedural bars applied here are not sufficiently well-established.

Section 34.726 is an adequate state procedural time bar for federal habeas review.

Lavoll v. Howell · filed 2025-03-04

But NRS 34.726 is an adequate state procedural bar.

Section 34.726’s timeliness bar is an independent and adequate state law ground for procedural default of federal habeas claims when the petitioner does not challenge its adequacy.

Marshall v. Bean · filed 2025-03-11

The respondents argue that Grounds One through Ten of Marshall’s federal petition are barred by the procedural default doctrine because the Nevada courts dismissed the claims as untimely under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726 and successive under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.810. ... Accordingly, Nevada’s rules regarding timeliness and successive petitions were independent and adequate state law grounds to support the procedural default of Marshall’s federal habeas claims.

Section 34.726(1)’s filing deadline does not apply to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea brought after entry of the judgment of conviction.

Hart v. State · filed 2000-06-14(1)

This is a proper person appeal from a district court order denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea brought subsequent to entry of the judgment of conviction. We hold that the district court erred in considering the motion as a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus and in concluding that it was untimely, pursuant to NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1)'s filing deadline applies to habeas petitions, not supplemental pleadings.

State v. Powell · filed 2006-07-13(1)

On its face NRS 34.726, which sets forth the relevant limitations period, applies to habeas petitions, not supplemental pleadings.

Section 34.726(1)'s timing restrictions cannot be set aside merely to permit another habeas petition after a prior petition was denied as untimely.

Barton v. State · filed 2013-05-15(1)

Presuming, as we must, that the factual allegations in appellant's complaint are true, these allegations do not provide a basis for ignoring NRS 34.726(1)'s timing restrictions and allowing appellant to file another habeas corpus petition.

NRS 34.726 does not apply to a petition that does not challenge the validity of a judgment of conviction.

Daniels (Aaron) v. State · filed 2014-11-13

2The district court also denied the petition as procedurally barred pursuant to NRS 34.726, but that statute was not applicable to this petition as appellant did not challenge the validity of a judgment of conviction.

When no remittitur will issue, Section 34.726(1)'s one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Ofeldt (James) v. State · filed 2014-11-17(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, Section 34.726(1)’s one-year filing period begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Johnson (Robert) v. State · filed 2016-01-12(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726’s procedural default does not apply to a timely first postconviction petition or its claims.

Lobato (Kirstin) v. State · filed 2016-11-23

Accordingly, the procedural defaults in NRS 34.726 and NRS 34.810(2) are not implicated as to the petition or any of the claims therein.

Section 34.726's procedural bar does not apply to a petition under NRS 34.360 claiming confinement without an authorizing judgment of conviction.

Wetzel (Gary) v. State · filed 2017-06-15

2It appears that appellant sought relief under NRS 34.360, asserting that he was being unlawfully confined because there was no judgment of conviction authorizing his confinement. As such, the petition was not subject to the procedural bars set forth in NRS 34.726, 34.800, and 34.810.

Section 34.726(1) does not bar a timely filed third postconviction habeas petition.

Brown (Marlon) v. Warden · filed 2022-11-30(1)

We note that Brown's third petition is not time-barred because it was timely filed pursuant to NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year filing limit applies to successive post-conviction petitions.

Pellegrini v. State · filed 2001-11-15(1)

We now specifically hold that NRS 34.726 applies to successive petitions.

Section 34.726(1)'s filing deadline applies to successive petitions challenging a judgment of conviction and sentence.

Hill (James) Vs. State · filed 2019-10-23(1)

NRS 34.726 unambiguously sets forth the time limit for filing any petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction and sentence. Nothing in NRS 34.726(1) suggests that it does not apply to a successive petition.

Section 34.726(1) does not automatically restart the one-year filing period when a judgment is amended, though an amendment may provide good cause for a claim relating to it.

Sullivan v. State · filed 2004-09-03(1)

Absent a showing of good cause as defined by this statute, untimely post-conviction claims that arise out of the proceedings involving the initial conviction or the direct appeal and that could have been raised before the judgment of conviction was amended are procedurally barred. We emphasize, however, that the entry of an amended judgment may in and of itself provide the good cause required by the statute to present appropriate post-conviction claims relating to the amendment at issue.

Section 34.726(1)’s limitations period is not restarted by an amended judgment that merely corrects a clerical error in credit for time served.

Paine (Frederick) v. State · filed 2014-05-13(1)

The filing of the third amended judgment of conviction on July 5, 2012, also failed to demonstrate good cause because it merely corrected a clerical error in the credit for time served and thus had no effect on the running of the limitations period for filing a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 34.726(1)'s one-year filing period does not automatically restart when a court enters an amended judgment of conviction.

Lyons (Phillip) v. State · filed 2014-07-23(1)

Appellant's assertion was incorrect. The one-year time period to challenge a conviction does not automatically restart simply because the district court entered an amended judgment of conviction.

When a death sentence is reversed on direct appeal and remanded for a new penalty hearing, Section 34.726(1)'s one-year filing period begins after remittitur issues from the direct appeal of the new judgment of conviction.

JOHNSON (DONTE) VS. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-PC) · filed 2017-10-05(1)

We hold that when this court reverses a death sentence on direct appeal and remands for a new penalty hearing, there no longer is a final judgment that triggers the one-year period set forth in NRS 34.726(1) for filing a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

For a petition challenging the guilt phase, a later amended judgment does not restart the timeliness period under § 34.726(1).

Leslie, III (Wilbert) v. State · filed 2019-05-15(1)

Because appellant challenged the guilt phase in his 2017 petition, we conclude that the amended judgment of conviction did not provide good cause and the proper measure for timeliness purposes is the 1998 decision on direct appeal.

Section 34.726(1)'s limitations period does not begin when remittitur issues from the original direct appeal if a remand for resentencing leaves the conviction nonfinal.

Delapinia (Ryan) Vs. State · filed 2019-09-12(1)

Because Delapinia's conviction was not final when this court reversed the deadly- weapon enhancement on his sentences and remanded to the district court to make the relevant findings and resentence Delapinia, the limitations period for his habeas petition did not begin to run on the issuance of remittitur in his direct appeal from the original judgment of conviction.

An amended judgment of conviction does not restart the one-year deadline for a postconviction habeas petition, though it may provide good cause for claims related to the amendment.

Morales (Steven) Vs. Warden · filed 2021-02-16(1)

Appellant next argues that the 2018 amended judgment of conviction restarted the clock for filing a timely postconviction habeas petition. Appellant is mistaken. See Sullivan v. State, 120 Nev. 537, 541, 96 P.3d 761, 764 (2004) (explaining that entry of an amended judgment of conviction does not restart the one-year period for filing a timely postconviction habeas petition but may provide good cause to present postconviction claims relating to the amendment at issue); see generally Jackson v. State, 133 Nev. 880, 881-82, 410 P.3d 1004, 1006 (Ct. App. 2017) (recognizing that an amended judgment of conviction is substantively appealable, but that the scope of the appeal is limited to issues related to the amendment). Thus, the district court did not err in rejecting this argument.

Section 34.726(1)’s time bar is not excused by post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness when the petitioner fails to explain why it prevented filing within a reasonable time.

Atkins (Sterling) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2014-04-23(1)

Because the instant petition was filed more than seven years after this court resolved the appeal involving his first post-conviction petition, see Atkins v. State, Docket No. 37292 (Order of Affirmance, May 14, 2002), and Atkins failed to demonstrate how post-conviction counsel's deficiencies precluded him from filing the instant petition within a reasonable time, we conclude that the district court did not err by determining that this ground was insufficient to excuse the procedural bars.

Section 34.726(1) does not treat filing a late petition to exhaust claims for federal review as good cause when the claims could have been raised in a timely petition.

Carpenter (Ernest) v. State · filed 2014-06-11(1)

Filing a late, successive petition for exhaustion purposes is not good cause. The claims raised were reasonably available to be raised in a timely petition.

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause to excuse an untimely petition; ignorance of the law does not establish good cause.

Brown (Erick) v. State · filed 2014-06-11(1)

Ignorance of the law is not an impediment external to the defense and thus would not provide good cause.

Section 34.726(1)'s time bar is not overcome by a later decision offered as good cause when the petition is not filed within a reasonable time after that decision is published.

Norman (Zel) v. State · filed 2014-07-22(1)

Even assuming without deciding that Martinez applies to state habeas corpus proceedings, appellant was still untimely because his petition was not filed within a reasonable time of the publishing of that decision.

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause and actual prejudice to overcome an untimely post-conviction habeas petition; Martinez does not establish good cause when the claim was available before Martinez was decided.

Matylinsky (Frank) v. State · filed 2014-07-23(1)

Even assuming Martinez applies to state courts and is retroactive, Martinez does not provide good cause because appellant was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel for his first post- conviction petition as a matter of state law. Therefore, that claim was available to be asserted as good cause long before Martinez was decided.

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause and actual prejudice to overcome its procedural bar; reliance on incompetent inmate law clerks does not establish good cause without an external impediment to timely filing.

Garcia (Juan) v. State · filed 2014-07-23(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Appellant first claimed he had good cause due to his reliance upon incompetent inmate law clerks. This claim did not provide good cause to overcome the procedural bars as it failed to demonstrate that there was an impediment external to the defense that prevented appellant from raising his claims in a timely petition.

Section 34.726(1) requires a delay caused by circumstances outside the control of the defense team as a whole; the petitioner's personal lack of fault is insufficient.

Nika (Avram) v. Warden (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2014-07-30(1)

This language contemplates that the delay in filing a petition must be caused by a circumstance not within the control of the defense team as a whole, not solely the defendant.

Section 34.726 bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and prejudice.

Howard (Samuel) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2014-07-30(1)

Because Howard filed his petition nearly 21 years after the remittitur issued on direct appeal and he had previously filed three other post-conviction petitions, the petition was untimely under NRS 34.726 and successive pursuant to NRS 34.810(2). The petition therefore was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice.

Section 34.726(1)'s filing deadline is not excused by ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel unless appointment of that counsel was mandated by statute.

Brown v. McDaniel · filed 2014-08-07(1)

We conclude that Martinez does not alter our prior decisions that a petitioner has no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel and that post-conviction counsel's performance does not constitute good cause to excuse the procedural bars under NRS 34.726(1) or MRS 34.810 unless the appointment of that counsel was mandated by statute.

Prior counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance does not establish good cause under § 34.726(1) unless it explains the delay in filing the petition.

Wilson (Edward) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2014-09-12(1)

Wilson failed to explain how appellate and post-conviction counsels' alleged deficiencies precluded him from filing his fourth petition until over 25 years after the resolution of his direct appeal and over 9 years after the order affirming the district court's denial of his first post-conviction petition.

Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not establish good cause for an untimely petition when the petitioner had no statutory right to that counsel.

Wheeler (Michael) v. Warden · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Appellant's claim lacked merit as appellant had no statutory right to post-conviction counsel, and thus the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel did not provide good cause for a successive and untimely petition.

Section 34.726(1)’s good-cause exception does not excuse a late petition based on the failure to appoint counsel in the first post-conviction proceeding or the decision in Martinez v. Ryan.

Sandoval (Lawrence) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). ... Thus, the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition.

Section 34.726(1)’s good-cause requirement is not satisfied by relying on Martinez v. Ryan to excuse a late petition.

Rodriguez (Jose) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Thus, the decision in Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition.

Section 34.726(1)’s good-cause requirement for a late petition is not satisfied by the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel or by Martinez v. Ryan.

Mulder (Ronald) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Thus, the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition.

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause requirement for a late petition is not satisfied by the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel or by Martinez v. Ryan.

Lyons (Phillip) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Thus, the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition.

Section 34.726(1)’s good-cause requirement is not satisfied by ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel when that counsel’s appointment was not required.

Jones (Christopher) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Ineffective assistance of post- conviction counsel would not be good cause in the instant case because the appointment of counsel in the prior post-conviction proceedings was not statutorily or constitutionally required.

Section 34.726(1)’s good-cause exception does not cover ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel when the petitioner had no statutory right to that counsel.

Hanson (Mark) v. Warden · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Further, appellant's argument regarding post-conviction counsel as good cause lacked merit as appellant had no statutory right to post-conviction counsel, and thus the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not provide good cause for a successive and untimely petition.

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the time bar; a claim that was available earlier does not establish good cause for a delay of more than 10 years.

French (William) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. ... Appellant's good cause argument was without merit because this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was always available to be raised and appellant failed to demonstrate why he waited more than 10 years to raise it.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to show good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar on a late petition.

Escobar (Carlos) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause exception is not satisfied by ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel when appointment of that counsel was not legally required.

Duke (David) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Ineffective assistance of post- conviction counsel would not be good cause in the instant case because the appointment of counsel in the prior post-conviction proceedings was not statutorily or constitutionally required.

Section 34.726(1)’s good-cause requirement for a late petition is not satisfied by the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel or by Martinez v. Ryan.

Bacon (Percy) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Thus, the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition.

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause exception is not satisfied by litigating in federal court or exhausting claims for federal review.

Aytch (Martinez) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Litigating a petition in federal court and exhaustion of claims in order to seek federal court review do not provide good cause.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Balboni, Jr. (Thomas) v. State · filed 2014-09-17(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Section 34.726(1)'s time bar requires good cause to excuse an untimely petition; proceedings on a previous petition do not establish good cause unless they were an impediment external to the defense.

Garcia (Adam) v. State · filed 2014-09-18(1)

Appellant did not demonstrate that the proceedings for appellant's previous petition amounted to an impediment external to the defense that should excuse the procedural bars.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner relying on mental illness to excuse a late petition to explain how the illness prevented filing within a reasonable time.

Hernandez (Fernando) v. McDaniel (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2014-09-24(1)

Hernandez has not provided any reason why this court should depart from that holding with respect to Hernandez's "severe and profound mental illness" and untimely successive petitions under NRS 34.726(1). Without an explanation for how Hernandez's dissociative and delusional disorders prevented him from filing his petition in a reasonable amount of time after remittitur, his mental illness does not excuse his delay in filing his petition.

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause exception does not excuse a late petition based on Martinez v. Ryan.

Vang (Kou) v. State · filed 2014-10-16(1)

Further, this court has recently held that Martinez does not apply to Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures, see Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. , 331 P.3d 867 (2014), and thus, Martinez does not provide good cause for this late and successive petition.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition absent a showing of good cause and actual prejudice.

Lopez (Ricardo) v. State C/W 65470 · filed 2014-10-16(1)

were untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). ... Appellant's petitions were procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1)'s time bar applies to claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel; a claim raised about 11 months after it became available was raised within a reasonable time.

Blake (Alfonso) v. Warden (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2014-07-30(1)

Here, the post-conviction-counsel claim is subject to the time bar set forth in NRS 34.726(1). ... Having filed his second post-conviction petition within approximately 11 months after this court resolved his first post-conviction appeal; we conclude that Blake raised his claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel within a reasonable time after they became available.

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the bar on an untimely post-conviction habeas petition.

Bacon (Percy) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). ... This claim did not demonstrate good cause for filing a petition five years late.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Wilcox (Roy) v. State C/W 65964 · filed 2014-11-13(1)

Appellant's petition was therefore procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction motion unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Suggs (Joe) v. State · filed 2014-11-13(1)

Appellant's motion was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). Appellant did not attempt to provide cause for the delay.

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause requirement is not satisfied by ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel when appointment of that counsel was not required.

Jones (Leroy) v. State · filed 2014-11-13(1)

Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel would not be good cause in the instant case because the appointment of counsel in the prior post-conviction proceedings was not statutorily or constitutionally required.

Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar is not excused for federal exhaustion when the claims were reasonably available for a timely petition.

Maki (Charles) v. State · filed 2014-12-11(1)

Filing a procedurally barred petition for exhaustion purposes is not good cause because appellant's claims were reasonably available to be raised in a timely petition.

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause to excuse an untimely plea-breach claim; learning of a sentence structure years later does not establish good cause when the claim was reasonably available earlier.

French (Michael) v. State · filed 2014-12-11(1)

To the extent that appellant raised a claim challenging an alleged breach of the plea agreement, the motion was untimely filed and appellant failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse his procedural defects.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Chipeta (Pachalo) v. State · filed 2014-12-11(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Delayed receipt of counsel’s files does not establish good cause to excuse an untimely petition when the petitioner waited nearly a year after judgment to request them.

Caheuc (Hugo) v. State C/W 64685 · filed 2015-01-29(1)

Appellant did not attempt to obtain his files from counsel until nearly one year after entry of the judgment of conviction and thus has not demonstrated diligence in attempting to obtain his files. Accordingly, any delay in obtaining the files does not demonstrate good cause.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to show good cause and prejudice to overcome its time bar.

Leonard (William) v. Warden (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2015-10-22(1)

To overcome the statutory procedural bars, Leonard must demonstrate good cause and prejudice. NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows good cause and actual prejudice; a newly available legal basis can supply good cause.

STATE VS. BOSTON (ANDRE) · filed 2015-12-31(1)

Boston filed his petition on January 5, 2011—more than 21 years after this court issued the remittitur from his direct appeal. Thus, Boston's petition was untimely. See NRS 34.726(1). ... Because the decision in Graham applies to juvenile offenders with aggregate sentences that are the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, we conclude that Boston demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bars, and his ground for relief has merit.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition absent a showing of good cause and prejudice.

Adams (Larry) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2016-01-22(1)

Because Adams filed the petition approximately 20 years after remittitur issued in his direct appeal and he had previously filed two other postconviction petitions, the petition was untimely under NRS 34.726(1) and successive pursuant to NRS 34.810(2). The petition therefore was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner seeking to excuse an untimely postconviction habeas petition to show that the delay was not his fault and that dismissal would unduly prejudice him.

Lewis (Willie) v. Warden · filed 2016-02-10(1)

Good cause requires the petitioner to demonstrate that the delay was not his fault and that dismissal of the petition will unduly prejudice him. NRS 34.726(1).

Under § 34.726(1), a petition raising ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel within one year after the prior petition is resolved, or within one year after remittitur from a timely appeal, raises that claim within a reasonable time for good-cause purposes.

RIPPO (MICHAEL) VS. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-PC) · filed 2016-02-25(1)

We therefore conclude that a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel has been raised within a reasonable time after it became available so long as the postconviction petition is filed within one year after entry of the district court's order disposing of the prior postconviction petition or, if a timely appeal was taken from the district court's order, within one year after this court issues its remittitur.

Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar is not excused by a document's unavailability unless an impediment external to the defense prevented the petitioner from obtaining it earlier.

Martin, Jr. (Orlando) v. Warden · filed 2014-12-11(1)

Appellant failed to demonstrate that an impediment external to the defense prevented him from previously obtaining his own sentencing memorandum.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to demonstrate good cause to overcome its procedural bar; filing years after the decisions invoked can defeat that showing.

Carpino (Joseph) v. State · filed 2015-02-12(1)

Further, Carpino filed this petition fourteen years after Byford and seven years after Polk. Accordingly, Carpino has failed to demonstrate good cause to overcome the procedural bar. NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar is not excused by reliance on Martinez or Nguyen when appointment of counsel in the prior post-conviction proceeding was not legally required.

Petty (Anthony) v. State · filed 2015-05-19(1)

Petty's reliance on these cases is misplaced because the appointment of counsel in his prior post-conviction proceedings was not statutorily or constitutionally required.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction petition when the petitioner does not demonstrate good cause for the delay.

Malone (Barry) v. State · filed 2015-09-11(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Appellant did not attempt to demonstrate good cause for the delay. Although the district court erred in failing to apply the procedural time bar, we affirm because the district court reached the correct result in denying the petition.

Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar applies when a petitioner does not attempt to show good cause to excuse the defect.

Henderson (Joseph) v. State · filed 2015-09-11(1)

NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Appellant did not attempt to demonstrate good cause to excuse the procedural defects on the face of the petition. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the petition as procedurally barred.

A conflict of interest involving postconviction counsel does not establish good cause to excuse an untimely petition under § 34.726(1) in a noncapital case.

Williams (Jessica) v. State · filed 2016-02-26(1)

Because there is no constitutional or statutory right to postconviction counsel and no right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel, postconviction counsel's conflict of interest cannot provide good cause in Nevada.

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause exception does not cover waiting for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to be resolved, because that motion does not prevent timely filing.

Hearring, Jr. (Frank) v. State · filed 2016-04-14(1)

However, the filing of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea is not an impediment external to the defense that prevented him from timely filing his postconviction petition.

Section 34.726(1) requires a delay in filing to be caused by a circumstance outside the control of the defense team as a whole, not merely outside the petitioner's personal control.

Powell (Kitrich) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2016-06-24(1)

This language contemplates that the delay in filing a petition must be caused by a circumstance not within the control of the defense team as a whole, not solely the defendant. Considering the nature and purpose of legal representation, we conclude that Powell's view that NRS 34.726(1) contemplates only delay personally caused by a petitioner is untenable. Therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting this claim of good cause.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner who files an untimely postconviction habeas petition to demonstrate good cause and prejudice before the petition can be considered on its merits.

Robins (Charles) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2016-09-22(1)

Because the petition was filed approximately 23 years after this court issued its remittitur on direct appeal and he had previously filed two other postconviction petitions, the petition was untimely under NRS 34.726(1) and successive under NRS 34.810(2). Accordingly, for the petition to be considered on the merits, Robins had to demonstrate good cause and prejudice, NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

A good-cause determination under NRS 34.726 is premature before a postconviction habeas petition is filed.

Hockemier (Devon) v. the Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct. · filed 2016-12-16

Second, any determination of good cause under NRS 34.726 would be premature as it does not appear that petitioner has filed a postconviction habeas petition.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition absent a showing of good cause and prejudice.

LEAVITT (TODD) VS. STATE · filed 2016-12-29(1)

Thus, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). ... Accordingly, the petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1), NRS 34.810(1)(b), (3).

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause to excuse an untimely postconviction habeas petition; limited mental capacity, low-level autism spectrum disorder, and incarceration do not establish it.

Dollar (Christopher) v. State · filed 2017-02-16(1)

The petition was untimely filed, see NRS 34.726(1); successive, see NRS 34.810(2); and an abuse of the writ, see NRS 34.810(2). Dollar was thus required to demonstrate good cause to excuse the procedural defects. ... Dollar's limited mental capacity, low-level autism spectrum disorder, and incarcerated status are not impediments external to the defense and would not provide good cause to excuse the procedural defects.

Section 34.726(1)'s time limit applies to claims of ineffective assistance by prior postconviction counsel, which must be raised within a reasonable time after they become available.

Weber (Timmy) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2016-06-24(1)

Here, the postconviction-counsel claim is subject to the time limit set forth in NRS 34.726(1), State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 235, 112 P.3d 1070, 1077 (2005), so the postconviction-counsel claim had to be raised within a reasonable time after it became available, Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252-53, 71 P.3d at 506.

Section 34.726(1) requires ineffective-assistance claims against postconviction counsel to be raised within a reasonable time after they become available.

Greene (Travers) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2016-06-24(1)

Although his postconviction- counsel claims are subject to the time limit set forth in NRS 34.726(1), ... and they therefore had to be raised within a reasonable time after they became available, ... Greene's claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel were not available until this court affirmed the district court order denying his first postconviction petition.

Section 34.726 bars an untimely postconviction habeas claim absent a showing of good cause and prejudice.

Luna (Homar) v. Warden · filed 2017-06-15

The petition therefore was untimely absent a showing of good cause and prejudice. NRS 34.726. Luna did not acknowledge the untimely filing in the petition or assert good cause for his delay. The district court also did not acknowledge the procedural bar. We conclude that any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in the petition are procedurally barred.

Section 34.726(1)(a) excuses a late postconviction petition when official interference caused the delay rather than the petitioner's fault.

Flowers (Norman) v. State · filed 2017-07-12(1)(a)

Under these circumstances, we conclude that Flowers had demonstrated that the 6-day-delay was not his fault but instead was attributable to an impediment external to the defense.

Section 34.726(1) makes an untimely postconviction habeas petition procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice.

Vignolo (Leonard) v. State · filed 2017-09-13(1)

Thus, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). ... Accordingly, the petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b), (3).

Section 34.726(1) does not excuse an untimely petition for good cause when the evidence was available for use in a timely petition and no external impediment prevented compliance.

Jones (Ian) v. State · filed 2017-12-14(1)

This evidence did not itself establish good cause because it did not show an impediment external to the defense that prevented Jones from complying with the procedural default rules when the medical opinion was described in Jones's arrest report and available to Jones for use in a timely postconviction petition.

Section 34.726(1)(a) allows counsel’s representation followed by abandonment to establish cause for a late postconviction petition when the petitioner reasonably believed counsel filed it and filed within a reasonable time after the petitioner should have known otherwise.

Harris v. State · filed 2017-11-16(1)(a)

We hold counsel's affirmative representation that counsel has, or will, timely file a postconviction petition, combined with counsel's subsequent abandonment of the petitioner without timely filing the petition, presents a circumstance where counsel's actions or omissions can constitute cause for the delay under NRS 34.726(1)(a) for filing an untimely postconviction petition. To demonstrate cause for the delay based on such a circumstance, a petitioner must show: (1) a reasonable belief counsel filed a petition on petitioner's behalf; (2) this belief was objectively reasonable; (3) counsel abandoned the petitioner without notice and failed to file the petition; and (4) the petitioner filed a petition within a reasonable time after the petitioner should have known counsel did not file a petition.

Section 34.726(1)’s good-cause exception does not excuse a delayed petition when the legal basis for the claim was available years earlier.

Turner v. State · filed 2018-04-10(1)

As a claim based on Sharma could have been raised after it was decided in 2002, Welch and Montgomery do not provide good cause to excuse Turner's 14-year delay. ... Turner has thus failed to demonstrate good cause to overcome the procedural bar. NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) allows one year to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-postconviction-counsel claim after the prior postconviction proceeding ends, measured from the district court’s order or, after a timely appeal, from remittitur.

RIPPO (MICHAEL) VS. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-PC) · filed 2018-08-02(1)

We therefore conclude that a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel has been raised within a reasonable time after it became available so long as the postconviction petition is filed within one year after entry of the district court's order disposing of the prior postconviction petition or, if a timely appeal was taken from the district court's order, within one year after this court issues its remittitur.

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause exception is not satisfied by Welch and Montgomery when a petitioner seeks retroactive application of a nonconstitutional rule.

BRANHAM (WILLIAM) VS. WARDEN · filed 2018-12-13(1)

Because the decisions in Welch and Montgomery do not alter this threshold requirement, we hold those decisions do not constitute good cause for raising a procedurally barred claim arguing a nonconstitutional rule should be applied retroactively.

Section 34.726(1)’s good-cause exception does not permit an untimely petition based on Welch and Montgomery when the petitioner seeks retroactive application of a nonconstitutional rule.

Branham v. Baca · filed 2018-12-13(1)

Because the decisions in Welch and Montgomery do not alter this threshold requirement, we hold those decisions do not constitute good cause for raising a procedurally barred claim arguing a nonconstitutional rule should be applied retroactively.

Under § 34.726(1), ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel does not establish good cause for an untimely petition when the petitioner was not entitled to appointed postconviction counsel.

Smith (Montrail) v. State · filed 2019-01-17(1)

Smith is essentially arguing that the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel provides good cause for his untimely and successive petition. This cannot suffice as good cause because he was not entitled to the statutory appointment of postconviction counsel.

Section 34.726(1)’s good-cause exception cannot rest on claims that are themselves untimely.

Jones (Christopher) v. State · filed 2019-01-17(1)

Jones filed his petition on April 18, 2017. Thus, it was filed over one year after the decision in Montgomery (decided January 25, 2016) and 366 days after the decision in Welch (decided April 18, 2016). Accordingly, Montgomery and Welch could not provide good cause because claims based on them were themselves untimely.

NRS 34.726(1) makes an untimely postconviction habeas petition subject to dismissal unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Denson (Steven) v. State · filed 2019-03-14(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed and subject to dismissal unless he demonstrated good cause—both cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

An amended judgment of conviction provides good cause for an untimely petition only for challenges to the amendment, not for claims that could have been raised in a timely petition.

Williams (Michael) v. State C/W 76286 · filed 2019-04-12(1)

The amended judgment of conviction only provided good cause as to challenges to the amendment, not as to claims that could have been raised in a timely petition.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Sena (Terrie) v. State · filed 2019-04-12(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause: cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause to excuse an untimely postconviction habeas petition.

Torres, Jr. (Narciso) v. State · filed 2019-05-15(1)

Appellant further failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse the filing of an untimely and successive ... habeas corpus petition. 3 See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b), (2), (3); Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003).

Mental health issues that are not external to the defense do not establish good cause to excuse an untimely petition under § 34.726(1).

Jackson (Jovan) v. State · filed 2019-05-15(1)

Appellant's mental health issues were not external to the defense and thus could not provide good cause.