Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190

Subsection 3(d) delays the limitations period until fraud is discovered for actions that have their inception in fraud, but it does not apply to a conversion action that is complete without an allegation of fraud.

Palludan v. Bergin · filed 1962-10-30(3)(d)

Appellant claims, however, that because he alleged that the respondents converted and disposed of appellant’s interest in the baler “with intent to defraud” the appellant, and because his counter affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment states that “plaintiff had no reason to suspect defendants of fraudulently depriving plaintiff of his half interest in the baler,” the action should have been treated as one for fraudulent conversion, in which case the statute of limitations by virtue of paragraph (d) of subsection 3 of NRS 11.190 did not commence to run until 1959 when the fraud was discovered. For this reason appellant maintains that his action commenced February 6, 1961 was timely. Said paragraph (d) relates to actions which have their inception in fraud, and does not apply to an action in conversion which is complete without an allegation of fraud. See Miller v. Walser, 42 Nev. 497, 181 P. 437.

The fraud-discovery rule in subsection 3(d) delays accrual only for a party seeking relief on the ground of fraud.

Sierra Pacific Power Company v. Nye · filed 1964-02-19(3)(d)

Paragraph (d) of subsection 3 of NRS 11.190 is applicable to a party seeking relief on the ground of fraud. This, the plaintiffs concede. But they argue that the conduct of the defendant in placing plaintiffs under Schedule C when they were eligible for Schedule K and maintaining an unwritten policy of not serving trailer parks under Schedule K constituted fraud.

Section 11.190(3) requires a fraud action to be commenced within three years, with accrual delayed until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Aldabe v. Adams · filed 1965-05-14(3)

As indicated in Footnote No. 1, the bar of limitations is available against a claim for relief grounded on fraud if such claim is not asserted within three years “after discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.”

Section 11.190(3)(d) gives three years to bring an action based on fraud or mistake, with accrual delayed until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.

Crescent v. White · filed 1972-02-17(3)(d)

The court evidently believed recording the deed constituted constructive notice to creditors, as well as to “subsequent purchasers and mortgagees,” NRS 111.320, thus conclusively establishing an affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations, NRS 11.190 (3) (d). ... “It is not our understanding, however, that the statute gives notice to all persons in all situations. ... We are satisfied, however, that the statute of this state concerning records (section 2594, Gen.St.) is not intended to impart notice other than to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. . . .” ... NRS 11.190(3)(d) allows 3 years to commence “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake,” providing further that the cause of action in such case is “not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.”

Section 11.190(3)(d) imposes a three-year limitations period on fraud-or-mistake claims, running when diligent discovery of the facts would have enabled the aggrieved party to learn of the fraud or mistake.

Millspaugh v. Millspaugh · filed 1980-05-22(3)(d)

The cause of action in this case was based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentations or mistake which induced appellant to make the 1971 conveyance. Thus, the applicable limitation is the 3-year period for actions for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake set forth in NRS 11.190(3)(d). This period began to run from the date of the discovery of facts which, in the exercise of proper diligence, would have enabled appellant to learn of the fraud or mistake. Howard v. Howard, 69 Nev. 12, 239 P.2d 584 (1952).

Section 11.190(3)(d) makes the three-year fraud limitations period accrue when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting fraud, and a fact dispute about that discovery date requires denial of summary judgment.

Sierra Diesel Injection Service v. Burroughs Corp. · filed 1986-10-14(3)(d)

In this case, the independent expert’s report raises such an issue regarding the date of the discovery of facts constituting fraud, and summary judgment must therefore be denied as to those counts.

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on wrongful-death and personal-injury damages actions, and the day of death is excluded when computing that period under NRCP 6(a).

Goldberg v. Charter Medical Corp. · filed 1982-09-23(4)(e)

In Romaine v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 87 Nev. 257, 485 P.2d 102 (1971), we held that NRCP 6(a)2 governs computation of the two-year limitations period set forth in NRS 11.190(4)(e).

Section 11.190(3)(d) makes accrual of a fraud limitations period depend on when the plaintiff knew or, through proper diligence, should have known of the fraud, and competing inferences about that knowledge present a fact question for trial.

Sierra Diesel Injection Service v. Burroughs Corp. · filed 1987-01-28(3)(d)

see also NRS § 11.190(3)(d). ... In Nevada, therefore, the question of what constitutes sufficient knowledge to place a party under an affirmative duty to discover the fraud or mistake is normally a jury question. ... These equally possible inferences indicate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, which precludes summary judgment.

Section 11.190(3)(d) supplies a three-year limitations period for tax claims based on fraud or mistake, and the period is tolled until the claimant knew or had reason to know its rights were violated.

Metropolitan Water District v. State · filed 1983-06-22(3)(d)

Where a claim is based upon fraud or mistake, a three year statute of limitations applies as set forth in NRS 11.190(3)(d). ... Under NRS 11.190(3)(d) the statute of limitations would be tolled until the Water District knew, or had reason to know, that its rights had been violated. ... Thus, under the facts as alleged in its complaint, the Water District commenced its action within the statutory period and should therefore be allowed to commence its action in district court.

Section 11.190(3)(d) provides a three-year limitations period for an action seeking relief on the ground of fraud.

Hay v. Wells Cargo, Inc. · filed 1984-09-11(3)(d)

Plaintiff has accused his employer of secretly conspiring with the Union to deny him of his right to fair representation. Such conduct, if proven, closely resembles fraud. We therefore conclude that plaintiffs fair representation claim against both the Union and Wells Cargo is subject to the three year limitations period established under NRS 11.190(3)(d) for actions for relief “on the ground of fraud ____”, and that his claim was timely filed.

Section 11.190(3)(d) gives fraud- or mistake-based actions three years, with accrual when the aggrieved party knew or should have known through proper diligence the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.

Vari-Build, Inc. v. City of Reno · filed 1985-10-10(3)(d)

The statute itself declares that the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the mistake. This has been construed to mean that the statute of limitations shall run from the time the aggrieved party knew, or in the exercise of proper diligence should have known, of the facts constituting the elements of his claim for relief for mistake.

Section 11.190(3)(d) gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the claimant discovers, or with proper diligence should discover, facts enabling the claimant to learn of the fraud.

Nevada Power Co. v. Monsanto Co. · filed 1992-02-05(3)(d)

There is no disagreement that a three-year statute of limitations applies the fraud claim. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190, subd. 3(d) (1989) (actions for “fraud or mistake” must commence within 3 years). Such actions are “deemed to accrue upon the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” Id. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, has interpreted this statute to mean not that an action in fraud accrues only when the plaintiff has all the facts needed to constitute a fraud claim, but rather that “the statute of limitation commence[s] to run from the date of the discovery of facts which in the exercise of proper diligence would have enabled the plaintiff to learn of the fraud.” Howard v. Howard, 69 Nev. 12, 239 P.2d 584, 589 (1952).

Section 11.190(3)(d) gives fraud-or-mistake actions a three-year limitations period that accrues when the aggrieved party discovers, or with proper diligence could discover, the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.

Nevada Power Co. v. Monsanto Company · filed 1992-04-14(3)(d)

There is no disagreement that a three-year statute of limitations applies the fraud claim. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190, subd. 3(d) (1989) (actions for "fraud or mistake" must commence within 3 years). Such actions are "deemed to accrue upon the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." Id. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, has interpreted this statute to mean not that an action in fraud accrues only when the plaintiff has all the facts needed to constitute a fraud claim, but rather that "the statute of limitation commence[s] to run from the date of the discovery of facts which in the exercise of proper diligence would have enabled the plaintiff to learn of the fraud." Howard v. Howard, 69 Nev. 12, 239 P.2d 584, 589 (1952). Accord Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Nye, 80 Nev. 88, 389 P.2d 387, 390 (1964) ("mere ignorance of the existence of ... the facts which constitute the cause will not postpone the operation of the statute of limitations ... if the facts may be ascertained by inquiry or diligence").

For fraud claims, § 11.190(3)(d) requires suit within three years after the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting fraud, and the limitations period is tolled while the parties pursue the required administrative process.

State, Department of Human Resources, Welfare Division v. Shively · filed 1994-03-30(3)(d)

We conclude that the limitations period applicable in the instant case was tolled while the litigants were entrenched in the administrative process. ... In accordance with NRS 11.190(3)(d), an action for fraud must commence within three years from the date the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting fraud.

For fraud actions, § 11.190(3)(d) sets a three-year limitations period that begins when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud; whether discovery occurred is ordinarily a fact question unless uncontroverted evidence establishes it as a matter of law.

Siragusa v. Brown · filed 1998-12-30(3)(d)

NRS 11.190(3)(d) provides for a three-year statute of limitations for fraud actions which accrues “upon the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” ... However, we conclude that such awareness did not, as a matter of law, constitute discovery by Joanne of facts constituting the fraud allegedly perpetrated by Brown.

Section 11.190(3)(d) sets a three-year limitations period for fraud claims in Nevada.

Dummar v. Lummis · filed 2008-09-12(3)(d)

A three-year limitations period applies to fraud claims in both Nevada and Utah.

Section 11.190(3)(d)'s discovery rule applies only to actions for relief based on fraud or mistake, not a judicial-review petition based on abuse of the foreclosure-mediation process.

NATIONSTAR MORTG. VS. RODRIGUEZ · filed 2016-07-28(3)(d)

The foundation for Rodriguez's petition for judicial review is abuse of the foreclosure mediation process, so NRS 11.190(3)(d) is not applicable.

Section 11.190(3)(d) gives common-law fraud claims a three-year limitations period running from when the plaintiff discovered or, through proper diligence, should have discovered the underlying facts.

NNN Siena Office Park I 2, LLC v. Wachovia Bank National Ass'n · filed 2016-12-23(3)(d)

Claims based on common-law fraud are subject to a longer statute of limitations, which expires three years after the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered through “the exercise of proper diligence,” the facts underlying the alleged fraud. ... Because the investors filed their complaint in July 2012, more than three and a half years after they should have discovered the facts underlying the alleged fraud, their claims are barred by both of the cited statutes of limitation.

Section 11.190(3)(d) gives an action for relief based on mistake a three-year limitations period that accrues when the aggrieved party discovers, or should discover through due diligence, the facts constituting the mistake.

STATE, DEP'T. OF TRANSP. VS. DIST. CT. (NASSIRI) · filed 2017-09-27(3)(d)

An action for relief on the grounds of mistake is subject to a three-year limitations period, which "shall be deemed to accrue upon the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the . . . mistake." NRS 11.190(3)(d). "In a discovery based cause of action, a plaintiff must use due diligence in determining the existence of a cause of action." Bemis u. Estate of Bemis, 114 Nev. 1021, 1025, 967 P.2d 437, 440 (1998). "Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is only appropriate when uncontroverted evidence irrefutably demonstrates plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the facts giving rise to the cause of action." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 11.190(3)(d) imposes a three-year limitation period for fraud or mistake actions, accruing when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud or mistake, subject to the discovery rule.

Rancho Bel Air Prop. Owners Ass'N, Unit 2, Inc. Vs. Friedrich · filed 2019-11-22(3)(d)

The statute of limitations for an action on the grounds of fraud or mistake is three years, but the cause of action accrues from "discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." NRS 11.190(3)(d). A statute of limitations generally begins to run "when the wrong occurs and a party sustains injuries for which relief could be sought." Petersen v. Bruen, 106 Nev. 271, 274, 792 P.2d 18, 20 (1990). "Under the discovery rule, the statutory period of limitations is tolled until the injured party discovers or reasonably should have discovered facts supporting a cause of action." Id. The HOA here seeks to turn this rule on its head by arguing that receipt of the CC&Rs at closing in 2003 triggered the statute of limitations for misrepresentations that had not yet occurred and assessments that had not yet been paid, i.e., before either the wrong or the injury had occurred. This court hereby rejects the invitation to adopt this novel rule.

Section 11.190(3)(d) starts the three-year limitations period for fraud when the injured party discovers, or in the exercise of proper diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud; a fiduciary's bare disclosure of a transaction may not be enough to trigger accrual.

Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Ham · filed 1979-01-17(3)(d)

Mere disclosure of a transaction by a director, without disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the transaction, is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to commence the running of the statute. ... We have held that when a party who is relied upon in a fiduciary capacity fails to fulfill his obligations thereunder, and does not tell the other party of his failure, his omission constitutes constructive fraud, tolling the statute of limitations until the facts constituting the fraud are discovered, or should have been discovered, by the injured party.

Section 11.190(3)(d) imposes a three-year limitations period on an action for relief based on fraud or mistake, accruing upon discovery of facts constituting the fraud or mistake.

Shupe v. Ham · filed 1982-01-28(3)(d)

breach of fiduciary duty is a fraud giving rise to the application of the three year statute of limitations. NRS 11.190(3)(d).

Section 11.190(3)(d) supplies a three-year limitations period for a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim.

Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Ham · filed 1982-06-25(3)(d)

The applicable statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty is the three year period provided by NRS 11.190(3)(d).

Section 11.190(3)(d) imposes a three-year limitations period on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, beginning when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known the facts constituting the breach.

Nevada State Bank v. Jamison Family Partnership · filed 1990-11-28(3)(d)

A breach of fiduciary duty is fraud and, therefore, the three-year statute of limitation set forth in NRS 11.190(3)(d) is applicable. Shupe v. Ham, 98 Nev. 61, 64-65, 639 P.2d 540, 542 (1982). However, the statute of limitation will not commence to run until the aggrieved party knew, or reasonably should have known, of the facts giving rise to the breach. Id.

Section 11.190(3)(d) gives fraud and mistake claims a three-year limitations period that accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.

Quinn v. Elliott · filed 1996-05-07(3)(d)

Under Nevada law, a breach of fiduciary duty is considered fraud and therefore the three-year statute of limitations set forth in NRS § 11.190(3)(d)1 is applicable.

Section 11.190(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on fiduciary-duty claims.

Asian American Entertainment Corp. v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc. · filed 2009-04-10(3)

Because Nevada’s statutes of limitations govern, AAE’s fiduciary-duty claims are barred by Nevada’s three-year statute of limitations for such claims. See Shupe v. Ham, 98 Nev. 61, 639 P.2d 540, 542 (1982) (citing Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(3)).

Section 11.190(3)(c) gives three years to sue for injury to personal property.

Cal-Farm Insurance Company v. Oliver · filed 1962-11-19(3)(c)

The statute of limitations in an action for damages to personal property is three years. NRS 11.190(3) (c). This action was commenced more than three years after the accident, and service was obtained on respondent Weidner by service upon the Secretary of State as provided by NRS 14.070.

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on tort actions seeking damages for personal injuries.

Blotzke v. Christmas Tree, Inc. · filed 1972-07-26(4)(e)

The gravamen of this action is in tort to recover damages for personal injuries and is to be so treated in considering the bar of limitations.

Section 11.190(4)(e) generally bars wrongful-death actions commenced more than two years after the death, subject to tolling for minor heirs under § 11.250(1)(3).

Parker v. Chrysler Motors Corp. & Reno Dodge, Inc. · filed 1972-10-30(4)(e)

As a general proposition, an action to recover damages for wrongful death must be commenced within two years, otherwise it is subject to the bar of limitations specified in NRS 11.190(4) (e). ... It is equally clear that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended during the period of their minority. NRS 11.250(1)(3).

Subsection (4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions seeking damages for personal injuries caused by another's wrongful act or neglect.

Meadows v. Sheldon Pollack Corp. · filed 1976-11-19(4)(e)

However, the gravamen of his cause of action is in tort to recover damages for personal injuries; thus, the two-year limitation of NRS 11.190(4) (e) is applicable.

Section 11.190(3)(c) imposes a three-year limitation on actions for injury to personal property, while the statute does not cover the real-property damages at issue.

Hartford Insurance Group v. Statewide Appliances, Inc. · filed 1971-05-03(3)(c)

Suit for recovery of damages to the personalty is barred by NRS 11.190(3)(c). Suit for recovery of damages to the realty is not covered by NRS 11.190, but instead falls within NRS 11.220.

Section 11.190(4)(c) gives battery claims a two-year limitations period, and a later amendment does not avoid that period when the earlier pleadings gave no notice of the battery allegations.

Nelson v. City of Las Vegas · filed 1983-06-23(4)(c)

The district court held Káthleen Nelson’s claim for battery barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See NRS 11.190(4)(c). She made the battery allegation in appellants’ Second Amended Complaint, which was filed over four years from the occurrence of the alleged battery. ... Appellants’ original complaint and first amended complaint gave absolutely no indication that a claim for battery existed. They did not allege any physical contact whatsoever between the officers and Kathleen Nelson. The district court properly held the battery claim barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, running from the date the cause of action accrues.

Faile v. Geary · filed 1992-03-17(4)(e)

In Nevada, the residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e), which provides for a limitations period of two years from the date the cause of action accrues. ... The state of Nevada has not enacted a tolling statute that suspends the running of section 11.190(4)(e) for prisoners.

Section 11.190 gives plaintiffs two years to file personal-injury actions, measured from when the injury was sustained.

Brown v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc. · filed 1992-12-04

Both parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations on this case is set by NRS 11.190. This statute provides for a two year period for filing personal injury actions running from the date on which the injury was sustained. ... This Court finds that under the amended version of Rule 15(c), Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint relates back to the date on which the original Complaint was filed. As such, Plaintiffs’ suit falls within the permissible time for filing an action under the applicable statute of limitations.

Subsection (4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal injury actions in Nevada.

McDonald v. David Hatch, Detective Richard K. Good, Sr., Police Officer Charles Paine Robert Lucherini · filed 1993-07-01(4)(e)

In Nevada, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years.

Subsection (4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for personal injuries caused by another’s wrongful act or neglect.

Linschoten v. Gedney · filed 2001-05-30(4)(e)

Because Linschoten filed his complaint more than two years after the alleged Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Counts I, III, and IV. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e) (1999).

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on tort claims.

Williams Ex Rel. Estate of Williams v. Clark County Public Administrator · filed 2012-11-20(4)(e)

The Nevada district court properly dismissed Williams’s fraud claim for failure to plead the alleged fraud with particularity, her state law tort claims as time-barred, and her accounting claim for failure to identify a fiduciary relationship with any defendant. See ... Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e) (tort claims have a two-year statute of limitations); ... .

Section 11.190(4)(e) requires personal-injury damages actions to be brought within two years after the cause of action arises.

Milton v. Nevada Department of Prisons · filed 2003-05-14(4)(e)

NRS 11.190(4)(e) requires that actions seeking damages for personal injuries must be brought within two years from the date upon which the cause of action arises.

Section 11.190(1) provides a six-year limitations period for actions founded on a written contract.

Kaufman v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2011-07-18(1)

Under Nevada law, the statute of limitations for actions founded on a written contract is six years. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(1).

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, including strict-liability claims.

Ridenour v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2012-05-31(4)(e)

Based upon the well-reasoned decision in Campos, we hold that Nevada’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations period applies to Ridenour’s strict liability claim. The district court properly concluded that Ridenour’s strict liability claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, as it accrued in October 2007.

Subsection (4) imposes a two-year limitations period that barred Scales’s civil-rights action filed more than five years after the alleged violation.

Scales v. Lalli · filed 2006-03-14(4)

The district court properly concluded that Scales’s action, filed over five years after defendant allegedly violated her civil rights, was barred by a two year statute of limitations. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4); Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir.1989) (per curiam).

Subsection 11.190(4)(c) applies a two-year limitations period to personal-injury claims in Nevada.

Robert Holmes, III v. Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2017-10-05(4)(c)

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Holmes’s claims against Sullivan, Kelly, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Department defendants, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement because Holmes filed this action more than two years after any claim accrued.

Section 11.190(4)(e) covers damages actions involving personal injury or death caused by another's wrongful act or neglect, not prospective declaratory or injunctive relief.

McCormick v. Bisbee · filed 2017-09-19(4)(e)

We note, however, the district court's error in applying the facially inapplicable NRS 11.190(4)(e) ... This error, however, is nondispositive.

Section 11.190(4)(c) and (4)(e) impose a two-year limitations period on the claims at issue.

Woods v. Kings Row Trailer Park · filed 2015-05-13(4)(c), (4)(e)

The statute of limitations on these claims is two years, NRS 11.190(4)(c); Lund v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. , n.6, 255 P.3d 280, 285 n.6 (2011) (applying NRS 11.190(4)(c) to a defamation claim); NRS 11.190(4)(e), and it does not appear from the face of the complaint that this statute ran out before the complaint was filed.

Subsection 11.190(4)(e) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Nevada.

Lisle v. McDaniels · filed 2017-03-07(4)(e)

Lisle’s claim regarding his High Risk Potential (“HRP”) status between 1996 and 2001 is barred by the statute of limitations. In Nevada, the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is two years. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); McIntyre v. Bayer, 339 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, which barred Kinford’s medical deliberate-indifference claim.

Kinford v. Pincock · filed 2018-02-23(4)(e)

The district court properly dismissed Kinford’s medical deliberate indifference claim and medical malpractice claim because they were barred by the statute of limitations. See NRS 11.190(4)(e); Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims and Nevada’s relevant statute of limitations is two years); Libby v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 325 P.3d 1276, 1279-80 (2014) (Nevada law “requires a plaintiff to satisfy both the one-year discovery rule and the three-year limitations period” for medical malpractice claims under NRS 41A.097(2)).

Section 11.190(4)(c) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on assault and battery claims.

Dante Magdaluyo, Jr. v. Mgm Grand Hotel, LLC · filed 2019-01-04(4)(c)

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Magdaluyo’s workplace violence claims relating to allegations that took place in 2012 and 2013 because these claims were time-barred. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(c) (two-year statute of limitation for assault and battery).

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims.

Tidmarsh v. Nye County · filed 2019-02-26(4)(e)

Two of Tidmarsh’s state law claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy, also are untimely. The statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress is two years. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e). The statute of limitations for civil conspiracy is four years and runs from the date of injury. Siragusa v. Brown, 971 P.2d 801, 806 (Nev. 1998). The alleged misconduct occurred in 2009, more than six years before suit was filed.

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions to recover damages for personal injuries caused by another's wrongful act or neglect.

Luciano v. Saint Mary's Preferred Health Ins. Co. · filed 2016-05-06(4)(e)

A two-year limitations period applies to "an action to recover damages for injuries to a person . . . caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another." NRS 11.190(4)(e).

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on claims for injuries to the person, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Leon v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC · filed 2019-11-27(4)(e)

Nevada for injuries to the person, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, is two-years pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e).

Section 11.190(4)(e) generally imposes a two-year statute of limitations on negligence claims.

U.S. Bank, National Association v. Antigua Maintenance Corporation · filed 2019-07-30(4)(e)

Under Nevada law, negligence claims generally are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e).

Subsection 11.190(3) supplies a three-year limitations period for claims based on alleged statutory violations.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 7517 Apple Cider · filed 2019-09-25(3)

Because a three-year statute of limitations bars Chase’s claims based on alleged statutory violations and a four-year statute of limitations bars its claims based on constitutional violations and equitable principles, the Court grants the motion to dismiss in part and dismisses claim one and claim two.

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period for negligence claims, running when the injured party knew or reasonably should have known through proper diligence of the facts causing the injury.

H&H Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Chattem Chemicals, Inc. · filed 2020-01-23(4)(e)

A negligence claim is governed by a two-year statute of limitations that commences to run when the aggrieved party knew, or reasonably should have known through the exercise of proper diligence, the facts giving rise to the damage or injury. NRS § 11.190(4)(e); see Nevada Power Co. v. Monsanto Co., 955 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1992). As such, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s negligence claim began to run in October 2013, when Plaintiff discovered Chattem’s sale. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44, 45). Because Plaintiff filed its Complaint, (Ex. A to Petition for Removal, ECF No. 1), on August 9, 2016, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is untimely.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year statute of limitations for negligence claims, which runs from accrual of the claim.

West Edna Associates, Ltd. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Company · filed 2020-03-18(4)(e)

In Nevada, the statute of limitations for a negligence claim is two years. NRS 11.190(4)(e). Further, a negligence cause of action accrues “when the wrong occurs and a party sustains injuries for which relief could be sought,” and “the injured party discovers or reasonably should have discovered facts supporting a cause of action.” ... In short, Plaintiff’s claim accrued on December 12, 2013, and under settled Nevada law, the negligence claim brought against Harris on March 7, 2019, is time-barred.

Subsection (4)(c) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on defamation, libel, and slander claims.

Saterstad v. State of Nevada · filed 2019-07-31(4)(c)

Like plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, the statute of limitations for defamation, libel, and slander claims is two years. See NRS 11.190(4)(c); Lund v. Eight Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 358, 364 n.6, 255 P.3d 280, 285 n.6 (2011).

NRS 11.190(4)(c) and (e) provide a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which supplies the limitations period for analogous § 1983 claims.

Miller v. Nash · filed 2019-08-19(4)(c) and (e)

Nevada’s most analogous statute of limitations is found in NRS 11.190(4)(c) and (e), which applies a two year limitations period to personal injury.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for actions seeking damages for personal injuries caused by another’s wrongful act or neglect.

Lescinsky v. Clark County School District · filed 2019-09-17(4)(e)

Nevada’s residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is codified at NRS 11.190(4)(e), which provides a two-year period for “an action to recover damages for injuries to a person . . . caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.”

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on wrongful-termination claims because they are analogous to actions for personal injuries caused by another's wrongful act.

PATUSH VS. LAS VEGAS BISTRO, LLC C/W 76636 · filed 2019-09-26(4)(e)

NRS 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for "an action to recover damages for injuries to a person or for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another."

Section 11.190(4)(c) imposes a two-year statute of limitations that bars a defamation claim filed almost three years after the plaintiff became aware of the allegedly defamatory statement.

Wegner v. Wells Fargo Bank, Na · filed 2020-01-27(4)(c)

Regardless of whether Nevada or California law applies, Wegner’s claim—which was filed almost three years after Wegner became aware of the alleged defamatory statement—is barred. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(c) (two-year statute of limitations); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(c) (one-year statute of limitations).

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on actions seeking damages for personal injuries caused by another's wrongful act or neglect, including strict liability actions.

Cecconi v. Beneficial Solutions, LLC · filed 2020-03-02(4)(e)

In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's single claim is time-barred because the two-year statute of limitations under NRS § 11.190(4)(e) applies to this action.

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitation period on claims for personal injuries caused by another person’s wrongful act or negligence, including product-liability claims.

Heinrich v. Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2020-04-17(4)(e)

These remaining claims are governed by a two-year limitation period for personal injuries caused by another person’s wrongful act or negligence.

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 personal-injury actions in Nevada.

Polk v. Carpenter · filed 2020-05-22(4)(e)

In Nevada, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims, and therefore section 1983 actions, is two years.

Section 11.190(4)(d)’s two-year limitation applies only to personal injury and wrongful death actions.

Hanneman v. Downer · filed 1994-03-30(4)(d)

The reference to a two-year period of limitation for tort actions was overbroad, as 11.190(4)(d) (the two-year provision) applies only to personal injury and wrongful death actions.

Section 11.190(5)(c)'s one-year limitation for tort claims against the State is invalid because it depends on an invalid claims-notice provision and is not severable; the standard two-year tort limitation in § 11.190(4)(e) applies instead.

Jiminez v. State of Nevada, Nevada Department of Prisons · filed 1982-05-12(5)(c), (4)(e)

Although Turner is silent concerning the issue of disparate statutes of limitations, NRS 11.190(5)(c) depends, at least in part, on the invalid claims notice provision for commencement of the one-year limitation period. That portion of NRS 11.190(5)(c) referring to NRS 41.036 is likewise invalid. ... We conclude that the constitutionally unobjectionable portion of NRS 11.190(5)(c) is not severable from that part which was invalidated by our decision in Turner. ... The effect of Turner is, as appellant argues, to overturn the one-year statute of limitations for tort claims against the state. Thus, the standard two-year tort statute of limitations is applicable. NRS 11.190(4)(e).

For § 1983 claims in Nevada, § 11.190(4)(e) supplies a two-year personal-injury limitations period prospectively, while § 11.190(3)(a)'s three-year period governs this pre-Wilson action.

Ruley v. Nelson · filed 1985-06-28(4)(e), (3)(a)

Parenthetically, it is noted that the Wilson opinion (decided April 17, 1985) requires that the state statute of limitations for the recovery of damages for personal injuries govern § 1983 actions. Id. at 1947 and 1949. Thus, in the future the limitation period in Nevada will be two years. NRS 11.190(4)(e). However, the instant action was commenced prior to the Wilson decision, so that the three-year limitation specified in NRS 11.190(3)(a) for liability created by statute is controlling. Mason v. Schaub, 564 F.2d 308, 309 (9th Cir.1977). ... The three-year statute of limitations clearly bars the plaintiff’s claim for relief based on those tortious acts, in this case.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury and § 1983 claims, but section 11.190(3)'s three-year period applies to claims accruing earlier when retroactive use of the shorter period would reduce the limitations time.

Cooper v. Sumner · filed 1987-10-14(4)(e) and (3)

In Nevada, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions (and thus for § 1983 actions) is two years. NRS § 11.190(4)(e). However, at the time plaintiff’s cause of action accrued, the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Nevada was three years. Mason v. Schaub, 564 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.1977). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Wilson should not be applied retroactively where such application would shorten the limitations period. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1986). Therefore, here, where the retroactive application of Wilson would shorten the limitations period, plaintiff’s claims are subject to the three-year limitations period set forth in NRS § 11.190(3).

Section 11.190(4)(e) sets a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims in Nevada.

Wilson v. Don Helling, Counselor Baca, Ltd. Budge and C/o Odell · filed 1992-05-08(4)(e)

In Nevada, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e).

Section 11.190(4)(e) is the residual two-year statute of limitations for all personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims, while § 11.190(4)(c) specifically identifies certain intentional torts without narrowing § 11.190(4)(e).

Perez v. Seevers · filed 1989-03-08(4)(c) and (4)(e)

The language of section 11.190(4)(e) “wrongful act or neglect of another” encompasses all personal injuries whether intentional or negligent and, in effect, is the residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Section 11.-190(4)(c) is more specific in identifying certain intentional torts, but this does not abridge the general all encompassing language of section 11.190(4)(e). That section, being the residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the statute of limitations applicable to section 1983 cases in Nevada.

Section 11.190(4)(e) supplies the two-year personal-injury limitations period used for a § 1983 claim under Nevada law.

Harris v. Henry · filed 1992-11-16(4)(e)

Under Nevada's applicable statute of limitations, Harris had two years from the date he knew or should have known of the facts supporting a cause of action, within which to commence his section 1983 claim. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); see also Perez, 869 F.2d at 426.

Section 11.190(4)(e) sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, and that period applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Reed v. Angelone · filed 1993-06-08(4)(e)

Nevada's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 11.190(4)(e) supplies Nevada’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which governs § 1983 claims; the period may be tolled under Nevada’s discovery rule until the injured party discovers or reasonably should have discovered facts supporting the cause of action.

Reynolds v. Wolff · filed 1996-02-12(4)(e)

It is well established that the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims. ... In Nevada, personal injury claims are subject to a two year statute of limitations. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e). ... The Nevada Supreme Court has recognized that the statute of limitations may be tolled pursuant to the “discovery rule”: ... Under the discovery rule, the statutory period of limitations is tolled until the injured party discovers or reasonably should have discovered facts supporting a cause of action. ... The transcript attached to plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss supports this contention and is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year residual limitations period for personal-injury claims and applies to Lyons’s § 1983 claims.

Lyons v. Thomas Steffen Nevada Supreme Court Nevada Supreme Court Justices · filed 1996-12-06(4)(e)

Nevada's two-year residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e), applies to Lyons' section 1983 claims.

Section 11.190(4)(e)'s two-year limitations period barred the plaintiff's constitutional claims arising from his termination.

Watson v. William Szczepaniak Las Vegas Valley Water District · filed 1997-09-12(4)(e)

To the extent that Watson's claims of violation of his constitutional rights arise from his termination, the district court correctly dismissed them as barred by the relevant statute of limitations, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e).

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims in Nevada.

Chudacoff v. University Medical Center · filed 2013-06-21(4)(e)

The Newly Added Doctor Defendants request that the claims against them be dismissed as untimely. Nevada’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e). Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir.2001). “A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id. at 1013 (quoting TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir.1999)). ... For that reason, the Motions to Dismiss shall be denied with respect to the argument concerning timeliness, but Defendants shall be permitted to file a motion for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff requested leave to amend to add additional defendants on a false basis.

Section 11.190(4)(e) establishes a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Lancaster v. City of Reno, Nevada · filed 2012-07-11(4)(e)

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred the claims against the City of Reno and Washoe County defendants because all of the actions or omissions attributed to these defendants occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Douglas, 567 F.3d at 1109 (§ 1983 actions governed by forum state personal injury statute of limitations); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (state personal injury statute of limitations applies to Americans with Disabilities Act claims); see also Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[u]nder federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action” (internal citation omitted)).

Section 11.190(4)(e) sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, while § 11.190(3)(c) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion actions.

Voss v. State · filed 2013-05-15(4)(e), (3)(c)

§ 1983 actions are considered to be personal injury actions and are subject to the forum state's applicable statute of limitations. ... Nevada's statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. ... So construed, this cause of action would also be time-barred. See Shupe & Yost, Inc. v. Fallon Nat'l Bank of Nev., 109 Nev. 99, 102, 847 P.2d 720, 721 (1993) (indicating that a conversion action is subject to NRS 11.190(3)(c)'s three-year statute of limitations).

Section 11.190(4)(e) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims filed in Nevada.

Stevenson v. Evans · filed 2004-02-24(4)(e)

The district court properly determined that Stevenson’s section 1983 action was time-barred because he filed his complaint more than two years after the action accrued. See Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims); Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (stating that Nevada’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years); Nev. Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e) (2002).

Subsection (4)(e) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, so a § 1983 claim filed more than two years after the alleged violations is time-barred when federal courts borrow Nevada's limitations period.

Shipley v. D'Amico · filed 2007-12-10(4)(e)

Because Shipley filed his complaint more than two years after the alleged Eighth Amendment violations, the district court correctly concluded counts I, II, and III were barred by the statute of limitations. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); see also Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (federal courts should borrow the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims from the state in section 1983 actions).

Section 11.190(4)(e) requires a personal-injury action, including a § 1983 claim, to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Hralima v. Prison Health Services · filed 2011-08-10(4)(e)

The district court properly dismissed Hralima’s action because his § 1983 claims, filed more than two years after his causes of action accrued, were barred by the statute of limitations. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); Taylor v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims).

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides the two-year limitations period applicable to Nevada § 1983 claims, and equitable tolling can extend that period for mandatory administrative proceedings and a prior dismissed action in appropriate circumstances.

Wisenbaker v. Farwell · filed 2004-09-29(4)(e)

The Nevada Supreme Court has not published a case in which it was faced with the prospect of applying the doctrine of equitable tolling to Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e), which is the applicable statute of limitations for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff could present facts that would prove the timeliness of his claims, and the statute of limitations will be tolled for the 289 days during which the Plaintiff was exhausting his administrative remedies and for the time during which his prior dismissed action was pending before the previous federal district court.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury, intentional infliction of emotional distress, right-to-work, and harassment claims.

Armstrong v. City of North Las Vegas · filed 2005-06-17(4)(e)

Armstrong’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and state law claims are also time-barred by the relevant statute of limitation. Section 1983 claims are governed by state statutes of limitation for personal injury. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In Nevada, there is a two year *43statute of limitation for not only personal injury claims, but for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, right to work, and harassment, as well. See Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir.1989); see also Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e). There is no material dispute (despite counsel’s attempt unilaterally to change the date) that Armstrong was terminated on May 13, 1999, and did not file his complaint until May 25, 2001. The mere filing, without leave of the court, of an amended complaint altering his termination date from May 13, 1999, to May 31, 1999, does not present the court with a triable issue of material fact regarding the statute of limitation issue, nor does reliance on his own affidavit attesting to the fact that he was not aware of his termination until May 31, 1999.

Section 11.190(4)(e) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Nevada.

Kinford v. Bannister · filed 2012-12-18(4)(e)

In Nevada, the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is two years. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir.1989).

Section 11.190(4) supplies Nevada's two-year statute of limitations for the § 1983 claims.

Foley v. Graham · filed 2020-02-11(4)

In Nevada, the applicable statute of limitations is two years.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides Nevada's two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which federal courts borrow for § 1983 actions.

Entsminger v. Aranas · filed 2021-09-24(4)(e)

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations; therefore, federal courts borrow the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims applicable to personal injury claims in the forum state. See Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2012). In Nevada, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims, and therefore section 1983 actions, is two years. See NRS § 11.190(4)(e); see also Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 1165 (D. Nev. 2004) (citing State of Nev. v. Shively, 871 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Nev. 1994)).

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides Nevada's two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to Bivens claims.

Manansingh v. USA · filed 2023-03-28(4)(e)

The statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Nevada is two years.

Subsection 11.190(4)(e) supplies a two-year period for civil-rights and personal-injury tort claims, while subsection (3)(d) supplies a three-year period for extrinsic-fraud claims.

Kohlman v. Mudgett · filed 2024-08-15(4)(e), (3)(d)

The “extrinsic fraud” that she alleges occurred from 2017–202037 is governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 11.190(4)(e) provides Nevada's two-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Brown v. Board of County Commisioner · filed 2025-06-30(4)(e)

However, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years.

Section 11.190(4)(e) supplies Nevada's two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Santacruz v. Daniels · filed 2025-02-16(4)(e)

Instead, § 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Id. In Nevada, that period is two years. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e).

The six-year limitations period under § 11.190(1)(b) applies to coercive contract relief, but it does not bar a defense raised in a declaratory action; its application to damages depends on disputed facts about when the breach occurred.

Dredge Corporation v. Wells Cargo, Inc. · filed 1964-02-20(1)(b)

The lower court held that the six-year statute of limitations (NRS 11.190(1) (b)) was a bar. We reverse for the reasons stated. ... Limitations do not run against defenses. The statute is available only as a shield, not as a sword. ... We hold that the lower court erred in applying the statute of limitations to the request by Dredge for a declaration of nonliability. Of course a claim for coercive relief (damages and an accounting) is subject to the bar of limitations. However, in this case, the applicability of the statute of limitations depends upon a prior determination of material questions of disputed fact which should have been reserved for decision after a full trial.

Section 11.190(5)(b)'s one-year limitation period for claims against a county did not bar this action because the county's promise not to assert prescriptive rights avoided the limitations bar.

Alper v. Clark County · filed 1977-11-17(5)(b)

Respondent argues that NRS 11.190(5) (b), which provides a one-year limitation period for all claims against a county, bars the action. ... Here, however, the record shows an avoidance of the statute. The Respondent County, in its letter of June 19, 1968, promised not to assert any prescriptive rights in the property. See footnote 3, supra. As a result, the appellants are not now barred from proceeding in the instant case.

Section 11.190(2)(c)'s four-year limitation period cannot be applied until the reasonable time for demanding performance under a contract is determined from the agreement and the surrounding circumstances.

MacDonald v. Kassel · filed 1981-06-24(2)(c)

Thus, whether appellant’s demand for performance was made within a reasonable time is a question which must be resolved before the statute of limitations issue can be determined. We have suggested that under certain circumstances a period of time may be deemed as a matter of law an unreasonable amount of time within which to delay making a demand for performance, see Southward v. Foy, supra. Upon the record before this court at this time, however, we cannot agree with respondents’ contention that, as a matter of law, the appellant could not call for performance beyond 1975.

Section 11.190(1)(b) gives six years to bring an action for violating a contract or written instrument.

Trustees of the Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. O'Dell · filed 1988-03-07(1)(b)

NRS 11.190(1)(b), however, provides for a six-year period within which to file an action for violation of a contract or written instrument.

Section 11.190(1)(b) allows six years to commence an action founded on a written contract, unless another statute further limits it.

Lavery v. Wolden · filed 1988-08-25(1)(b)

However, Wolden alternatively asserts that because NRS 11.205 was found to be unconstitutional, the only available statute applicable was the statute of limitations for written contracts, NRS 11.190, which provides for a six-year period of limitations.3 We agree. The statute of limitations for written contracts, NRS 11.190, had run prior to the filing of Laverys’ complaint. The Laverys’ suit was not timely filed; therefore, their claims are barred.

NRS 11.190(1)(b) supplies a six-year limitations period for an action on a written contract, obligation, or liability, and that period governs a contract-based dispute underlying an arbitration demand.

Lane-Tahoe, Inc. v. Kindred Construction Company · filed 1975-06-11(1)(b)

Since the underlying dispute concerns whether McKenzie or Lane-Tahoe breached contractual duties, the contract language must mean that the “applicable statute of limitations” is the one governing “an action upon a contract.” ... NRS 11.190(1): “Within 6 years: ... (b) An action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing. . . .”

Section 11.190(l)(b) requires an action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument to be commenced within six years, unless covered by an earlier section.

Trustees of the Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local No. 3 Health & Welfare Trust v. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co. · filed 1990-09-10(l)(b)

Therefore, the only applicable statute of limitations for Reeco’s action relating to the performance bond is Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(l)(b) for a cause of action based on the contract. Using this statute, Reeco’s action against INA on the performance bond is timely.

Section 11.190 bars contract actions brought more than six years after accrual when based on a written instrument and more than four years after accrual when not in writing; accrual occurs when the claimant knew or should have known the facts constituting the breach.

Soper Ex Rel. Soper v. Means · filed 1995-10-04(1) and (2)

The statute began to run as soon as Means knew or should have known of facts constituting breach of contract. Since the contract did not specify a time by which Soper had to perform, a reasonable period of time for performance had to be determined from the nature of the agreement and the particular circumstances involved. If a demand for performance by Means was necessary before the cause of action accrued, he had to make it within a reasonable period of time under the circumstances.

Section 11.190(1)(b) imposes a six-year limitations period on an action founded on a written contract, with the period running separately for each installment unless the lender accelerates the entire debt.

Clayton v. Gardner · filed 1991-06-28(1)(b)

It is further settled that where contract obligations are payable by installments, the limitations statute begins to run only with respect to each installment when due, unless the lender exercises his or her option to declare the entire note due. ... An application of these principles to the instant case reveals that the action taken by the district court was clearly proper. To begin, the trial court was correct in holding that no implied acceleration took place, since the acceleration clause required affirmative action on the part of the lender, and Gardner took no such action until 1988. Thus, until 1988, the statute of limitations began to run only with respect to each installment when due. Consequently, only those installments that were due more than six years prior to January 11, 1989 (the day when this action was initiated), are barred by the limitations statute.

For breach of a written contract, the six-year limitations period begins when the cause of action accrues; here, accrual occurred when the insurer suffered an actual loss by paying the policyholder claims.

American Title Insurance Company, a Florida Corporation v. First Commercial Title · filed 1992-07-08(1)(b)

Under this language, American has no cause of action until there is a "loss ... on account of [a] claim," and a claim not resulting in a loss does not trigger the section 13 indemnity obligation. The requirement of loss as a condition of indemnification necessarily implies that the cause of action does not accrue until there is a loss, not just a claim of which American has notice. Accordingly, the statute of limitations on all three claims did not begin to run until after American paid the claims in May of 1983.

Section 11.190(l)(b) gives contract actions a six-year limitation period, and in cases of wholly anticipatory repudiation the cause of action accrues when performance is due or, if the plaintiff elects to sue early, when the plaintiff sues on the anticipatory breach.

Schwartz v. Wasserburger · filed 2001-09-17(l)(b)

We therefore hold that under NRS 11.190(l)(b), a cause of action in contract cases involving a wholly anticipatory repudiation accrues either on the date that performance under the contract is due or, if the plaintiff so elects, on the date that the plaintiff sues upon the anticipatory breach.

Section 11.190(1)(b) gives six years to bring an action on a written contract, measured here from the insurer’s claim denial.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Fitts · filed 2004-11-10(1)(b)

Because he had six years after claim denial within which to press this claim under NRS 11.190(l)(b), and because he commenced his action within that period, State Farm may not deny coverage under the limitation clause at issue here.

Section 11.190(1)(b) requires breach-of-contract actions to be brought within six years.

Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc. · filed 2013-11-13(1)(b)

It is not entirely clear whether the district court did so, but to the extent it did, it was in error. Nevada law provides a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(1)(b).

Section 11.190(1)(b) gives actions based on written contracts a six-year limitations period, running separately for each installment when it becomes due.

Wallace v. Smith · filed 2014-09-26(1)(b)

NRS 11.190(1)(b) provides a six-year period of limitations for actions based on written contracts. ... Accordingly, Wallace's claims are barred by the statute of limitations only as to those installments that became due more than six years before Wallace filed the complaint unless the parties mutually abandoned the contract, which, as discussed below, presents a question of fact on the record here.

Section 11.190's customary contract limitations are four years for contracts not in writing and six years for written contracts.

DOUBLE DIAMOND RANCH MASTER ASS'N VS. DIST. CT. (THE CITY OF RENO, NEV.) · filed 2015-07-30(1)(b) and (2)(c)

The second and third purposes would be incongruent with the customary statute of limitations for contracts (either four or six years depending on if the contract is in writing).

For contract actions, § 11.190 provides a six-year limitations period when the contract is founded on a written instrument and a four-year period when it is not.

DOUBLE DIAMOND RANCH MASTER ASS'N VS. DIST. CT. (THE CITY OF RENO, NEV.) · filed 2015-07-30(1)(b) and (2)(c)

Rather, upon notice from an association, the notice recipient would then have the customary period of limitations for contracts under NRS 11.190 in which to commence an action.

Section 11.190(1)(b) gives claims founded on a written contract or instrument a six-year statute of limitations.

Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortg. Corp. v. Vargas · filed 2017-12-22(1)(b)

NRS 11.190 provides that a statute of limitations for lain action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" is six years. NRS 11.190(1)(b).

Section 11.190(1)(b) provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract actions founded on a written instrument.

Castillo v. Western Range Association · filed 2019-06-19(1)(b)

The district court erred in applying a two-year statute of limitations to Cantáro’s breach of contract claims. Nevada law provides that the applicable statute of limitations is six years on breach of contract actions “founded upon an instrument in writing.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(1)(b).

Section 11.190(1)(b) gives parties six years to sue for breach of contract.

1600 East Newlands Drive, LLC v. Amazon.com.NDVC, LLC · filed 2019-08-23(1)(b)

However, when a statute of limitations has been enacted by the legislature, the courts should rely on the statute and not apply the doctrine of laches absent “[e]specially strong circumstances.” ... In Nevada, a party has six years to bring a breach of contract claim, which the Defendants are well within. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(1)(b). Accordingly, the affirmative defense could only succeed if it were able to show especially strong circumstances.

Section 11.190 imposes a six-year statute of limitations on breach-of-contract claims under Nevada law.

The Bank of New York Mellon v. Khosh · filed 2019-10-02

The Court finds that the breach of contract claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations period. The statute of limitations period for a breach of contract claim under Nevada law is six years. See NRS § 11.190.

Section 11.190(1)(b) applies when an agreement is founded upon an instrument in writing, and a writing fairly importing an obligation to pay may satisfy that requirement.

Taber · filed 2025-12-02(1)(b)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Taber, the Employment Verification fairly imports Exemplar’s obligation to pay Taber for his labor on the Screw Project.

Section 11.190(1)(b) gives actions on written contracts a six-year limitations period, and for a UIM claim the period begins when the insurer refuses payment rather than when the accident occurs.

Grayson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1999-03-19(1)(b)

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in granting State Farm’s motion for summary judgment because Grayson’s claim was not time-barred. The statute of limitations did not begin to run until State Farm refused payment of Grayson’s claim. The date of this refusal is an issue of fact to be determined upon remand.

The six-year limitations period in subsection 1(b) governs actions to enforce forfeitures of bail bonds.

State v. American Bankers Insurance · filed 1989-11-27(1)(b)

For these reasons, contrary to the district court, we reaffirm the reasoning of Murphy and hold that the six-year period of NRS 11.190(l)(b) is the statute of limitations governing actions to enforce forfeitures of bail bonds.

Section 11.190(l)(b) gives six years to bring a contract action, and a claim against an insurer for breach of its duty to defend accrues when the underlying litigation ends in a final judgment.

Home Savings Ass'n v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1993-06-15(l)(b)

Aetna also contends the district court did not err in dismissing the action with prejudice because the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions in NRS 11.190(l)(b) barred any subsequent action by Home/Nevada, including Home/Nevada’s second complaint for damages. We disagree. ... The statute of limitations on a claim against an insurer for breach of its duty to defend commences when a final judgment in the underlying litigation against the insured is entered. ... We conclude that, in filing a second complaint seeking damages for Aetna’s breach of contract in declining to defend Home/Nevada, Home/Nevada asserted its claim well within six years of the final judgment in the underlying litigation. Therefore no statute of limitation bars Home/Nevada’s action against Aetna.

Section 11.190 applies the general six-year statute of limitations to preclude child-support-arrearage claims that were already time-barred when the action was commenced.

McKellar v. McKellar · filed 1994-03-30

We therefore hold that the amendment to NRS 125B.050 does not apply retroactively and that NRS 11.190 applies to preclude recovery for any of Metzler’s claims which were time-barred at the commencement of her action.

For a valid foreign judgment filed in Nevada, the six-year limitations period for an action on the judgment begins when the judgment is filed in Nevada.

Trubenbach v. Amstadter · filed 1993-03-24(1)(a)

Based on the foregoing cases and the fact that Nevada does not limit the number of times a party may renew a judgment, we conclude that when a party files a valid foreign judgment in Nevada, it constitutes a new action for the purposes of the statute of limitations. Thus, when Trubenbach filed a notice of a valid foreign judgment in a Nevada district court in July, 1991, NRS 11.190(1)(a) began running. Because the six-year statute of limitations has not expired, Trubenbach’s claim is valid and enforceable in Nevada.

Section 11.190 gives judgment creditors six years to enforce a judgment, and its limitations period is not tolled for every day the debtor is in bankruptcy.

O'LANE v. Spinney · filed 1994-05-19(1)(a)

Spinney also contends that NRS 11.190 was tolled by 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) during the time O’Lane was in bankruptcy. Assuming, but not deciding, that 108(c) operated to extend Spinney’s judgment for thirty days beyond the stay’s termination, we do not agree that the period of limitations applicable to the judgment would have been tolled for each of the 327 days O’Lane was in bankruptcy.

Before July 1, 1987, NRS 11.190(1)(a) imposed a six-year limitation period on actions to recover child-support arrears, running separately from each installment's due date, and it did not revive claims already barred as of July 1, 1987.

State of Washington v. Bagley · filed 1998-09-01(1)(a)

Prior to July 1, 1987, actions to recover child support arrears were subject to a six-year period of limitation pursuant to NRS 11.190(l)(a). Where child support was payable in installments, the six-year period of limitation began to run against each installment as it became due. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Giles, 96 Nev. 243, 607 P.2d 118 (1980); Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 579 P.2d 1246 (1978). ... Applying NRS 125B.050(3) in this manner does not revive any claims that were barred by NRS 11.190(1)(a) as of July 1, 1987.

Section 11.190(1)(a)'s six-year limitation on actions to enforce judgments does not bar a creditor from domesticating a renewed foreign judgment when the underlying judgment remains valid and enforceable in the issuing state.

Bianchi v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2008-07-03(1)(a)

We conclude that a judgment creditor may enforce a renewed domesticated foreign judgment in Nevada, even if Nevada’s limitation period for the enforcement of judgments has run on the original domesticated foreign judgment, when the underlying foreign judgment is valid and enforceable in the issuing state.

Section 11.190(1)(a) imposes a six-year limitations period on claims enforcing property-distribution provisions in divorce decrees.

DAVIDSON VS. DAVIDSON · filed 2016-09-29(1)(a)

We hold that the six-year statute of limitations in NRS 11.190(1)(a) applies to claims for enforcement of a property distribution provision in a divorce decree entered in the family divisions of the district courts.

Section 11.190(1)(a) requires an action on a judgment or its renewal to be commenced within six years, after which the judgment expires by limitation.

Morales v. Aria Resort & Casino, LLC · filed 2020-02-05(1)(a)

“An action on a judgment or its renewal must be commenced within six years under NRS 11.190(1)(a); thus, a judgment expires by limitation in six years.”

A judgment is subject to a six-year limitation period, and filing a renewal affidavit alone does not toll that period; without a proper statutory renewal, the judgment expires by limitation.

Worsnop Vs. Karam · filed 2020-02-27(1)(a)

In light of our decision in Leven, we conclude that the district court erred when it determined that the filing of the affidavit alone tolls the limitation period under NRS 11.190(1)(a). A judgment creditor must file a compliant affidavit of renewal under NRS 17.214 prior to the judgment's expiration by limitation and record it within three days thereafter (if the judgment was recorded) to effectively complete the renewal process.

Section 11.190(1)(a) makes a domesticated foreign judgment enforceable in Nevada for six years from the date of registration.

FLANGAS v. PERFEKT MARKETING, LLC · filed 2022-04-14(1)(a)

Under the UEFJA, Nevada courts must enforce any foreign judgment entitled to full faith and credit as if that judgment was rendered in this state. The district court properly concluded that a foreign judgment's enforceability is determined on the date the foreign judgment is domesticated in Nevada district court pursuant to NRS 17.360(2), and that a domesticated foreign judgment is enforceable in Nevada for six years from the date of registration according to NRS 11.190(1)(a).

For a sale claim, a writing that fairly imports an obligation to pay qualifies for the longer limitations period under § 11.190(1)(b), rather than the four-year period for an open account under § 11.190(2)(a).

El Ranco, Inc. v. NEW YORK MEAT AND PROVISION CO. · filed 1972-02-24(1)(b), (2)(a)

This is not an action on an open account for goods sold and delivered to which NRS 11.190(2) (a) is applicable. One selling upon an “open account” may properly protect himself by obtaining written evidence of the sales he makes, and if a seller does obtain a sufficient instrument in writing, there is no reason why he should be precluded from enjoyment of the longer limitations statute. ... Under our statute, as interpreted by authorities that have concerned themselves with the same language, all that is required is that there be a writing which fairly imports the obligation to pay. This is a fair construction of the statute, consistent with its language and with the legislative purpose to allow a longer time to commence an action for which there is solid written proof.

Section 11.190 gives six years to sue on an obligation founded on a written instrument, compared with four years for an open account for goods sold and delivered.

State v. Jarman · filed 1968-03-04(1)(b), (2)(a)

Furthermore, the moment when the limitations of actions began to run was advanced to the 21st of April, 1967, and instead of a four year limitations of actions on the open account, the market gained the benefit of a six year limitations of actions.

Subsection 2(c) imposes a four-year limitations period on actions upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing, including a claim to recover usurious interest.

Miller v. York · filed 1976-04-16(2)(c)

We believe, and so hold, that the right to recover usurious interest payments is governed by our 4-year statute of limitations, as set forth in NRS 11.190, subsection 2(c).

Section 11.190 gives claims founded on written instruments a six-year limitations period and claims not founded on written instruments a four-year limitations period.

Saye v. Paradise Memorial Gardens, Inc. · filed 1976-09-081(b), 2(c)

Appellant contends it was error to dismiss his claim based upon seven promissory notes because those notes were *528not barred by the six-year statute of limitations prescribed by NRS 11.190.1 Appellant argues that statute was tolled, pursuant to NRS 11.390, by an acknowledgment in the form of an affidavit signed by respondent’s president.2 However, the affidavit neither directly, distinctly and unqualifiedly admits nor manifests any willingness or intent to pay the debt, and thus is insufficient to satisfy the mandate of NRS 11.390. See: Western Coal Mining Co. v. Jones, 167 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1946). ... Appellant next contends his claim for goods and services rendered was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations of NRS 11.190, because that limitation was tolled by an alleged “account stated” prepared by appellant. We have previously held that the genesis of an account stated is the express or implied agreement of the parties concerning the amount of the account. Old West Enterprises, Inc. v. Reno Escrow Company, 86 Nev. 727, 476 P.2d 1 (1970). Here, appellant purportedly submitted a document entitled “Statement of Account” to respondent demanding reimbursement for goods and services rendered, and no agreement, express or implied, regarding the obligation, nor the amount thereof, is apparent to us from the record. Thus, except for the deferred commissions, appellant’s claim is barred by the four-year statute of limitations.

Section 11.190(l)(b) provides a six-year limitation period for actions on written contracts, while section 11.190(2)(c) provides a four-year limitation period for liabilities not founded on a written instrument; a bad-faith insurance tort claim falls under the latter.

Davis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1982-08-11(l)(b) and (2)(c)

Generally, a cause of action on a written contract is controlled by the six-year statute of limitations contained in NRS § 11.190(l)(b). ... For the action to be timely under a tort theory it would have to be covered by the six-year statute of limitations contained in § 11.190(l)(b). Davis argues that the bad faith tort claim comes within this section because it is “founded” upon the insurance contract, but it has been established that tort action for an insurer’s bad faith is not “founded upon an instrument in writing” as contemplated by § 11.-190(l)(b). ... Instead, the bad faith tort claim is controlled by the four-year statute of limitations covering actions upon a “liability not founded upon an instrument in writing.” NRS § 11.190(2)(c); ... This section controls claims concerning obligations imposed by law as opposed to obligations created by an instrument in writing. ... Thus, a bad faith tort claim must be commenced within the four-year statute of limitations contained in NRS 11.190(2)(c).

Section 11.190(2)(c) gives a four-year limitations period for actions on contracts, obligations, or liabilities not founded on a written instrument, and the period begins after a reasonable time to demand performance when demand is a condition to suit.

DeLee v. Roggen · filed 1995-12-11(2)(c)

NRS 11.190(2) (c) provides that an action must be brought within four years “upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing.” ... In the present case, Morris purchased the property, paid all taxes and other costs and held title to the property at all relevant times. Sometime between 1974 and 1976, Morris and Sol made an oral agreement. By 1978 Sol had performed his part of the agreement. For reasons beneficial to himself, Sol refrained from demanding the property for over ten years. Sol cannot, by withholding his demand, forever stay the running of the statute of limitations and then demand the property when it is most profitable to him. See Southward, 65 Nev. at 704, 201 P.2d at 307. Given the nature of the agreement and the particular circumstances involved, Sol did not make a demand within a reasonable time after he had performed in 1978 and, therefore, the four-year statute of limitations ran prior to his 1990 claim for the property.

Section 11.190(2)(c) supplies a four-year limitations period for an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument.

Csomos v. Venetian Casino Resort LLC · filed 2013-09-26(2)(c)

Under NRS 11.190, an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability is subject to a four-year statute of limitation.

Section 11.190(2)(c) requires actions on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument to be brought within four years, and applies that period to equitable indemnity claims because they are based on implied contract.

Saylor v. Arcotta · filed 2010-03-04(2)(c)

In line with this view, we hold that equitable indemnity claims that arise out of medical malpractice allegations are not subject to NRS 41A.097(2)’s limitations period for medical malpractice claims, but are instead subject to NRS 11.190(2)(c)’s limitations period for actions on implied contracts. NRS 11.190(2)(c) prescribes the limitations period for actions on implied contracts, providing that “action[s] upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing” must be brought within four years. Because claims for equitable indemnity are based upon a theory of implied contract, we conclude that NRS 11.190(2)(c) provides the applicable statute of limitations for equitable indemnity claims.

Section 11.190(2)(c) imposes a four-year limitations period on actions based on a liability not founded upon an instrument in writing.

Schumacher v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2006-12-18(2)(c)

A bad faith tort claim is controlled by the four-year statute of limitations covering actions upon a “liability not founded upon an instrument in writing.” Davis, 545 F.Supp. at 372; NRS § 11.190(2)(c). This four-year period is longer than the contractual two-year period and therefore, the Nevada limitation provision applies. As Schumacher’s claim was brought within the four-year statutory limitation provision, State Farm’s bad faith claim was timely filed.

Section 11.190(2)(c)'s four-year period applies to an unjust-enrichment claim, but the accrual date may present a fact question that defeats summary judgment.

Nanyah Vegas, LLC v. Rogich · filed 2016-02-12(2)(c)

As Eldorado Hills failed to demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether the limitations period on appellant's unjust enrichment claim commenced when Eldorado Hills received the $1.5 million or at a later date when Eldorado Hills allegedly failed to issue a membership interest to appellant or to repay the money as a loan, the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitation.

Section 11.190(2)(c) affords four years to sue on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon a written instrument, but it does not apply to the MWA minimum-wage claim here.

PERRY VS. TERRIBLE HERBST, INC. · filed 2016-10-27(2)(c)

Our holding that Perry's MWA claim is most closely analogous to a claim under NRS 608.260 for purposes of applying the latter's two-year statute of limitations also makes unavailing Perry's alternative suggestion that we apply NRS 11.190(2)(c), which affords four years to sue "upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing."

Section 11.190(2)(c) supplies a four-year limitations period for unjust-enrichment claims, while § 11.190(3)(a) does not govern equitable quiet-title claims that impose no statutory liability.

U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC · filed 2019-03-27(3)(a), (2)(c)

U.S. Bank missed that window by four months, so its unjust-enrichment claim against SFR is also time-barred.

Section 11.190(3)(c) imposes a three-year limitations period on intentional-interference-with-contractual-relations claims.

V5 Technologies v. Switch Ltd. · filed 2021-01-15(3)(c)

The Court finds that the plain language of the Nevada Supreme Court’s decisions gives the claims different statutes of limitations. The claim for intentional interference with contractual relations therefore has a three-year statute of limitations.

Subsection 11.190(3) applies its three-year limitations period for liabilities created by statute to tax liabilities.

State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Cord · filed 1965-07-22(3)

We are satisfied that NRS 11.190(3) applies to tax liabilities. State v. Yellow Jacket Mining Co., 14 Nev. 220.

Section 11.190(3)(d) bars a fraud action not commenced within three years after discovery, and section 11.190(3)(a) bars an action on liability created by statute unless commenced within three years.

Kellar v. Snowden · filed 1971-10-05(3)(a), (3)(d)

If an action for relief on the ground of fraud is not commenced within three years from its discovery by the aggrieved party, it is barred. NRS 11.190(3) (d). Here the action against Weiss and Cantwell was not commenced for more than six years. ... If the appellant ever had a cause of action against Weiss and his successor in interest, Cantwell, because of the alleged failure of Weiss to comply with the Bulk Sales Act, his action was barred by the statute of limitations because it was not commenced within three years of April 4, 1963. NRS 11.190(3) (a).

The three-year limitations period applies to an action on a liability created by statute.

Nevada Land & Mortgage Co. v. Lamb · filed 1974-07-03(3)(a)

2. Appellants contend also that the period of limitations of NRS 11.190(3) (a) applies and that this action is barred because it was not brought within three years. The liability is not one created by statute. Gonzales v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 99 F.Supp. 1012 (Nev. 1951). The lower court correctly applied NRS 11.220 providing for the four-year period.

Section 11.190(3)(c) imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion claims, which may be suspended during applicable bankruptcy proceedings.

Bader Enterprises, Inc. v. Becker · filed 1979-11-30(3)(c)

It appears to this court that a question of fact remains. The record before this court does not contain a finding as to who had possession of the building or the equipment at the time of Brathendale’s filing of its petition in bankruptcy. If Brathendale indeed had possession at the time of the filing of the petition, the statute of limitations was suspended by 11 U.S.C. §§ 29(f) and 791.

Section 11.190(3)(a) supplies Nevada’s three-year limitations period for actions involving violations of statutorily created rights, including this LMRDA action.

Stolz v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local Union No. 971 · filed 1986-12-02(3)(a)

Thus, the relevant state statute is longer than the six-month Delcostello limitation, and the federal statute need not be applied retroactively to extend the state limitation in this case.

Section 11.190(3)(a) supplies a three-year limitations period for federal civil-rights actions when Nevada's period for liability created by statute is borrowed.

Vari-Build, Inc. v. City of Reno · filed 1984-09-18(3)(a)

The appropriate Nevada statute is NRS 11.190(3)(a), which imposes a three-year limitation. Mason v. Schaub, supra at 309.

Section 11.190(3)(a) supplies the applicable three-year limitations period for an overcharge claim, while federal law governs accrual and tolling of the federally created cause of action.

Western Mountain Oil, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. · filed 1983-12-22(3)(a)

Although Nevada’s statute of limitations decides the period of time within which the plaintiff must sue once its cause of action has accrued, “any issue relating to accrual and tolling is governed by federal law.”

Section 11.190(3)(c) imposes a three-year limitations period on an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including specific recovery, and the court rejected applying the six-year period in subsection (1)(b) to this conversion claim.

Shupe & Yost, Inc. v. Fallon National Bank of Nevada · filed 1993-02-23(3)(c), (1)(b)

The district court did not err when it applied the three-year statute of limitations for conversion under NRS 11.190(3)(c). Shupe’s causes of action for conversion on all the checks are time barred, as it did not bring suit within three years of the date of which any of the checks were issued.

Section 11.190(3)(a) gives a three-year limitations period for an action on a liability created by statute, and the claim accrues when the Board determines that the workers were employees, not when they were first contracted.

State ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Public Employees' Retirement System · filed 2004-01-30(3)(a)

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is NRS 11.190(3)(a), which provides that the statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute” is three years. ... The cause of action against NDOT arose when the Board determined that the archeologists were employees, which occurred on April 14, 1999. Until that determination was made, there was no cause of action. After various attempts by PERS to collect from NDOT failed, PERS filed a petition with die district court on February 25, 2000, well within the three-year statute-of-limitations period.