Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726

Section 34.726(1) permits late filing for good cause when the delay is not the petitioner’s fault and dismissal would cause undue prejudice.

Lani v. McDaniel · filed 2001-05-31(1)

Although Lani’s pending state court motions may have been untimely filed, the applicable Nevada statute permits exceptions for good cause. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 34.726(1) (permitting late filing where delay is not petitioner’s fault and dismissal would cause undue prejudice). Because Lani’s motions were not untimely on their face, the one-year limitation was tolled while they were pending.

Counsel’s failure to file a timely post-conviction petition is not good cause to excuse a delay under § 34.726(1).

Randolph v. Helling · filed 2007-11-05(1)

Here, the state court stated that its basis for denying Randolph’s petition was section 34.726(1) and did not reference or rely on any federal law. Randolph’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely post-conviction petition is not good cause to excuse the delay.

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause exception does not cover counsel's failure to send a petitioner his files when that failure did not prevent a timely filing.

Hood v. State · filed 1995-03-02(1)

Counsel’s failure to send appellant his files did not prevent appellant from filing a timely petition, and thus did not constitute good cause for appellant’s procedural default.

An allegation that counsel failed to advise a petitioner of the right to appeal, or otherwise deprived the petitioner of a direct appeal without consent, does not by itself establish good cause for an untimely petition under § 34.726.

Harris v. Warden, Southern Desert Correctional Center · filed 1998-09-24(1)(a)

We now reaffirm our conclusion and hold that an allegation that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to inform a claimant of the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction, or any other allegation that a claimant was deprived of a direct appeal without his or her consent, does not constitute good cause to excuse the untimely filing of a petition pursuant to NRS 34.726.

An untimely post-conviction habeas petitioner must demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural default.

Little v. Warden · filed 2001-11-15

Where a defendant raises a claim in an untimely or successive post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural default.

A petitioner can show good cause for filing late by establishing a reasonable belief that counsel filed a direct appeal and filing a habeas petition within a reasonable time after learning no appeal was filed.

Hathaway v. State · filed 2003-06-26(1)

Thus, a petitioner can establish good cause for the delay under NRS 34.726(1) if the petitioner establishes that the petitioner reasonably believed that counsel had filed an appeal and that the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition within a reasonable time after learning that a direct appeal had not been filed.

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bar for an untimely post-conviction petition; a previously unavailable legal basis may establish good cause.

Rogers v. State · filed 2011-12-29(1)

Thus, Rogers was required to demonstrate good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default. NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). This court has recognized that good cause may be established where the legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to be raised in a prior, timely petition.

Section 34.726(1) requires an untimely post-conviction habeas petitioner to show that the delay was not their fault and that dismissal would unduly prejudice them.

State v. Huebler · filed 2012-04-26(1)

To show good cause for delay under NRS 34.726(1), a petitioner must demonstrate two things: "[t]hat the delay is not the fault of the petitioner" and that the petitioner will be "unduly prejudice[d]" if the petition is dismissed as untimely. ... Because Huebler fails to demonstrate materiality, he fails, as a matter of law, to demonstrate that any errors in the disclosure of the tapes prejudiced him. The petition therefore is procedurally barred pursuant to NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1)’s good-cause requirement is not satisfied by ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel when appointment of that counsel was not legally required.

Ruiz (Carlos) v. State · filed 2013-04-09(1)

Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel would not be good cause in the instant case because the appointment of counsel in the prior post-conviction proceedings was not statutorily or constitutionally required.

Section 34.726(1)'s filing deadline can be overcome when actual innocence establishes a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Mitchell v. State · filed 2006-12-21(1)

The conviction of a petitioner who was actually innocent would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice sufficient to overcome the procedural bars to an untimely or successive petition.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction petition absent good cause and prejudice; a retroactive decision raised within a reasonable time after it became available can establish good cause for the delay.

Wilson v. State · filed 2011-10-27(1)

Because Wilson filed his petition approximately 22 years after this court issued its remittitur on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and he had previously sought post-conviction relief, the petition was untimely under NRS 34.726(1) and successive under NRS 34.810(2). ... We therefore conclude that Wilson demonstrated good cause to excuse his delay in raising this challenge to his death sentence and in raising it in this successive petition.

Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar requires a petitioner to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice to obtain relief.

Greenberg (Jesse) v. State · filed 2013-04-09(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows good cause to excuse the delay.

State v. Greene · filed 2013-08-01(1)

Greene filed his fifth habeas petition more than six and a half years after this court affirmed his amended judgment of conviction on direct appeal and issued its remittitur. Thus, Greene's petition was untimely. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction petition absent good cause and actual prejudice; youth and lack of legal knowledge do not establish good cause.

Minor (Phillip) v. State · filed 2014-04-10(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). ... First, appellant claimed that he had good cause because he was young when he committed the crime and did not have knowledge of the law. These were insufficient to demonstrate good cause.

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause and actual prejudice to excuse a procedural bar; listing unsupported claims does not establish good cause.

Smith (Michael) v. State · filed 2013-04-10(1)

procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). Appellant claimed he had good cause to excuse the procedural bars because the State "imposed an impediment," judicial misconduct, fraudulent misrepresentation, the inadequate law library, lack of access to the law library, and clerical malfeasance. Appellant failed to demonstrate good cause as he merely listed these claims and provided no specific facts to support them.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice to overcome its procedural bar.

Martin (Donald) v. Warden · filed 2013-04-10(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to show good cause and actual prejudice to overcome its procedural bar.

Harris (Sammy) v. State · filed 2013-04-12(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). ... Appellant failed to demonstrate good cause.

Section 34.726(1) requires good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar on a post-conviction habeas petition.

Richardson (Lorne) v. State · filed 2013-05-14(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) requires a showing of good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar to a post-conviction habeas petition.

Gallimort (Jose) v. State · filed 2013-06-12(1)

was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). ... We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying the petition as procedurally barred, and we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar requires a showing of good cause and actual prejudice to overcome it.

Singer (Maury) v. State · filed 2013-06-13(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction habeas petition absent a showing of good cause and actual prejudice.

Moraga (Roy) v. State · filed 2013-07-23(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction habeas petition absent a showing of good cause and actual prejudice.

Garcia (Juan) v. State · filed 2013-07-23(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Deavila (Rodney) v. State · filed 2013-07-23(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

A petitioner must show good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar under § 34.726(1).

Viray (Benjardi) v. State · filed 2013-10-16(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar requires a showing of good cause and actual prejudice to overcome it.

Hull (Roger) v. State · filed 2013-10-16(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to show good cause and actual prejudice to overcome its procedural bar.

Evans (Vernell) v. State · filed 2013-10-16(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice to overcome its procedural bar.

Hawkins (Farrin) v. State · filed 2014-04-10(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction petition absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Greenberg (Jesse) v. State · filed 2014-04-10(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

A petitioner seeking to overcome Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar must show good cause and actual prejudice.

Moraga (Roy) v. State · filed 2014-04-10(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2). Appellant made no cogent good cause argument excusing his procedural defaults and failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the petition as procedurally barred and barred by laches.

Section 34.726(1) bars a petition absent a showing of good cause and actual prejudice.

Brown (Howard) v. State · filed 2014-04-10(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows good cause and actual prejudice.

De La Hoya (Jorge) v. State · filed 2014-04-10(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Section 34.726(1)’s time bar is not excused merely because a petitioner seeks to exhaust state remedies for federal review.

Fields (Matthew) v. State · filed 2013-05-14(1)

Further, exhaustion of state remedies in order to seek federal court review was insufficient to demonstrate cause to excuse the delay.

Section 34.726(1)’s deadline is not excused by pursuing federal habeas relief.

Armstead (Joe) v. State · filed 2013-06-13(1)

The pursuit of federal habeas relief does not constitute good cause to excuse a late and successive petition in Nevada.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner seeking to excuse an untimely filing to show that the delay arose from a circumstance outside the defense team's control, not merely outside the defendant's personal control.

Castillo (William) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2013-07-18(1)

We have held that NRS 34.726 requires "a petitioner [to] show that an impediment external to the defense prevented him or her from complying with the state procedural default rules." Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252, 71 P.3d at 506. This language contemplates that the delay in filing a petition must be caused by a circumstance not within the actual control of the defense team as a whole, not solely the defendant.

A claim must be raised within a reasonable time after discovery to establish good cause for an untimely post-conviction petition.

Carroll (Deangelo) v. State · filed 2013-07-23(1)

Rather, a claim must be raised within a reasonable time after discovering it to satisfy good cause.

Section 34.726(1)'s procedural bar is not excused by later Supreme Court decisions when the petitioner fails to show that those decisions apply retroactively to his final case.

Tiffany (David) v. State · filed 2013-09-18(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). ... Appellant's good-cause argument was without merit because his case was final when Cooper and Frye were decided, and he failed to demonstrate that the cases would apply retroactively to him.

Section 34.726(1) bars untimely post-conviction motions unless the petitioner shows cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Ramos (Gilberto) v. State · filed 2013-09-18(1)

Thus, the motion was untimely and procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause—cause for the delay and undue prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1). Appellant did not attempt to provide cause for the delay. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion.

Section 34.726 requires a petitioner to show good cause to excuse a delayed petition.

Matthews (Rondale) v. State · filed 2013-09-19

Appellant did not attempt to provide any good cause argument to excuse his delay.

An untimely post-conviction habeas petition requires good cause and actual prejudice, and good cause must account for the entire delay.

Duarte (Pedro) v. State · filed 2013-09-19(1)

Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). ... Further, appellant waited nearly three years after Bolden was decided and nearly six years after Sharma was decided to file these claims and failed to demonstrate good cause for the entire length of his delay.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner relying on a new decision as good cause to explain why an external impediment prevented raising the claim within a reasonable time after that decision.

Jones (Robert) v. State · filed 2014-04-10(1)

Further, Nika did not provide good cause to overcome the procedural bars as that case was decided nearly a year before appellant filed his December 4, 2009, post-conviction habeas petition and nearly five years before he filed his September 6, 2013, petition. Appellant failed to explain how an impediment external to the defense prevented litigation of these claims within a reasonable time of the decision in Nika.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner seeking relief from the filing deadline to show undue prejudice; claims that lack merit do not establish it.

Rosado (Julio) v. State · filed 2013-09-19(1)

Even assuming without deciding that entry of the second amended judgment of conviction would explain the delay in this case, appellant failed to demonstrate that he would be unduly prejudiced by the denial of his petition as procedurally time-barred, see NRS 34.726(1), because his claims challenging the second amended judgment of conviction lacked merit.

Section 34.726(1)'s time bar is mandatory and has no exception for claims of sentencing error.

Harris (Gregory) v. State · filed 2013-09-19(1)

Procedural bars are mandatory in habeas corpus, and there is no exception based on a claim of sentencing error. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005); see also NRS 34.726.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner who files late to show good cause for the delay and prejudice; the court rejected equitable tolling of that requirement.

Lancaster (Doyle) v. Warden · filed 2013-10-16(1)

To the extent appellant argues that NRS 34.726 should be subject to equitable tolling, we reject that argument because the plain language of that statute provides that a petitioner must demonstrate good cause for a delay in filing a post-conviction petition and that good cause may exist if he demonstrates that the delay was not his fault and prejudice.

A petitioner does not establish cause for delay by claiming an earlier petition was wrongly held untimely when that ruling was correct.

Chavez (Jafet) v. State · filed 2014-07-23(1)

Appellant failed to demonstrate cause for the delay because the district court and this court correctly determined that his first petition was untimely.

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause exception does not cover ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel when appointment of that counsel was not statutorily or constitutionally required.

Hatfield (Gregory) v. Warden · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Ineffective assistance of post- conviction counsel would not be good cause in the instant case because the appointment of counsel in the prior post-conviction proceedings was not statutorily or constitutionally required.

Section 34.726(1) permits dismissal of an untimely post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner does not establish a sufficient excuse for the delay.

Partida (Marcelo) v. Warden · filed 2014-06-11(1)

We conclude that the district court did not err by dismissing Partida's petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Moss (Kevin) v. State C/W 66229/66230 · filed 2014-12-11(1)

Appellant's petitions were therefore untimely filed and procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause—cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely petition challenging a conviction when the petitioner fails to show good cause for the delay.

Costantino (Derek) v. State · filed 2015-09-11(1)

To the extent that appellant challenged the validity of the judgment of conviction, appellant's petition was procedurally barred as the petition was untimely filed (more than 17 years after issuance of the remittitur from his direct appeal in Costantino v. State, Docket No. 28854 (Order Dismissing Appeal, February 26, 1997)), ... and appellant's arguments regarding NRS 193.165 and the effect of his having expired the sentence for the primary offense did not provide good cause to excuse the procedural defects.

The actual-innocence exception to the time bar for a death-sentence challenge concerns first-degree murder and aggravating circumstances, not new mitigating evidence.

LISLE (KEVIN) VS. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-PC) · filed 2015-06-25(1)

In the context of a challenge to a death sentence, the actual-innocence exception to the procedural bars is focused on the elements of first-degree murder and the aggravating circumstances, not mitigating circumstances, because it is the former that determine death eligibility.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Jones (Roger) v. State · filed 2016-06-17(1)

Thus, Jones's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Jones's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and prejudice.

Flanagan (Dale) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2016-07-22(1)

Thus, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). ... Accordingly, the petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and prejudice.

Zakouto (Vitaly) v. State · filed 2016-09-16(1)

Because appellant filed his petition six years after this court issued remittitur from his direct appeal, his petition was untimely filed and therefore procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1).

Good cause under NRS 34.726(1) must account for the entire delay in filing a postconviction petition.

State v. Cardenas (Esaul) · filed 2017-03-10(1)

Even assuming that his allegations of misrepresentations by the State and the courts demonstrate official interference, the allegations fail to account for the entire period of delay.

Section 34.726(1) does not treat counsel’s failure to request a stay of the remittitur as good cause for an untimely petition when that failure did not prevent timely filing.

Chao (Greg) v. State · filed 2017-03-15(1)

Counsel's failure to request a stay of the issuance of the remittitur is not an impediment external to the defense constituting good cause because Chao was not prevented from timely filing his postconviction habeas petition.

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year time bar may be excused for a fundamental miscarriage of justice only when new evidence shows factual innocence such that no reasonable juror would convict the petitioner.

Lay (Orlando) v. State · filed 2016-04-15(1)

Therefore, to avoid NRS 34.726(1)'s time-bar based on a "fundamental miscarriage of justice," the petitioner must present (1) new evidence, (2) showing he is factually innocent, (3) such that no reasonable juror would convict him.

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause exception does not excuse a procedurally barred claim seeking retroactive application of a nonconstitutional rule based on Welch and Montgomery.

Branham v. Baca · filed 2018-12-13(1)

We hold that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Welch and Montgomery do not constitute good cause to raise a procedurally barred claim arguing that a nonconstitutional rule should be applied retroactively.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows good cause and actual prejudice.

Holmes (Lafayette) v. State · filed 2019-01-17(1)

Holmes' postconviction habeas petition was untimely because it was filed more than two years after remittitur issued on direct appeal on July 27, 2015.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Ray (Kyle) v. Warden · filed 2019-03-14(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely and procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause—cause for the delay and undue prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Bowling (Thomas) v. State · filed 2019-03-15(1)

Appellant filed his petition on May 23, 2018, more than 37 years after entry of the judgment of conviction on March 23, 1981. Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. 2 See NRS 34.726(1). Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause— cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner relying on a later decision to establish good cause for delay to show that the decision announced a new rule.

Roginsky (Robert) v. State · filed 2019-03-29(1)

To provide good cause, the decision sought to be applied must announce a new rule, otherwise the legal basis for the claim was reasonably available during the statutory time period.

NRS 34.726(1) requires good cause for a delayed postconviction habeas petition.

Tellis (Michael) v. State · filed 2019-02-20(1)

Tellis' motion was filed almost four years after entry of the judgment of conviction and he did not allege good cause for the delay as required by NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner shows cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Duenas (Antonio) Vs. State · filed 2019-10-24(1)

Thus, his petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner to show undue prejudice as part of good cause for filing a late post-conviction petition.

Azcarate v. Williams · filed 2020-05-31(1)

In other words, for the purposes of § 34.726(1), "prejudice" is a component of "good cause."

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Pritchett (Shawn) Vs. State · filed 2021-02-16(1)

Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). ... Pritchett's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b), (3).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition when the petitioner does not allege good cause to excuse the delay.

Leibel (Tatiana) Vs. State · filed 2021-12-17(1)

Appellant's habeas corpus petition was untimely, successive, and an abuse of the writ, and appellant did not allege good cause to excuse the procedural bars.2 See NRS 34.726(1), NRS 34.810(1)(b), (2), (3).

Section 34.726(1) makes a post-conviction habeas petition untimely when it is filed nearly 10 years after remittitur from the conviction appeal without good cause for the delay.

LISLE (KEVIN) VS. STATE (DEATH PENALTY-PC) · filed 2015-06-25(1)

The petition was untimely because it was filed nearly 10 years after the remittitur issued ... from the appeal of his judgment of conviction. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1)(a) does not penalize a petitioner who filed an initial petition on time for a later delay that apparently was not the petitioner’s fault.

Bennett v. State · filed 1995-08-24(1)(a)

Although Bennett waited over three years to proceed to hearing on his post-conviction remedy, he filed his initial petition in a timely manner, and it was only after counsel was appointed that the three-year delay transpired. In fairness to Bennett, we decline to penalize him on the basis of a delay that apparently was not his fault. See NRS 34.726(1)(a).

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year filing period runs from the remittitur only after a timely direct appeal; if no timely direct appeal is taken, it runs from entry of the judgment of conviction.

Dickerson v. State · filed 1998-11-25(1)

We now construe NRS 34.726(1) to mean that the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition begins to run from the issuance of the remittitur from a timely direct appeal to this court from the judgment of conviction or from the entry of the judgment of conviction if no direct appeal is taken.

Section 34.726(1) requires a post-conviction habeas petition to be filed within one year after remittitur on direct appeal unless the petitioner shows good cause for the delay and prejudice.

Klein v. Warden, Ely State Prison · filed 2002-04-16(1)

Klein’s petition was filed nearly seven years after the remittitur issued in his direct appeal. Moreover, Klein’s petition was successive because he had previously filed numerous petitions and motions seeking post-conviction relief. Thus, the instant petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice excusing his failure to previously assert his claims relating to DNA testing of the cigarette filters in a timely manner.

Section 34.726(1) requires a habeas petition to be filed within one year after conviction or the issuance of remittitur on direct appeal, unless the petitioner shows good cause for the delay and prejudice.

State v. Haberstroh · filed 2003-05-30(1)

NRS 34.726(1) also provides that a habeas petition "must be filed" within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction or after issuance of remittitur on direct appeal, absent good cause for the delay and prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) gives a petitioner one year to challenge a conviction or sentence, measured from the judgment or, after an appeal, from remittitur, unless good cause excuses the delay.

Gould v. Hatcher · filed 2005-03-03(1)

Under Nevada Law, unless good cause is shown for delay, a petitioner has “1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year after the supreme court issues its remittitur” in which to file a petition challenging the validity of a judgment or sentence. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 34.726(1). At the time Mr. Gould filed his second amended federal habeas corpus petition raising Grounds 1, 2, 3, and 5(c), twelve years had elapsed since the Nevada Supreme Court entered its Amended Judgment of Conviction on April 17, 1987.

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year habeas filing rule did not bar federal review when its application to amended judgments and appeals from sentence correction motions was not well established at the time of the asserted default.

Collier v. Bayer · filed 2005-06-03(1)

The rules applying Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726(1) were not clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of Collier’s purported default.

Section 34.726(1)'s one-year deadline could not bar federal review of a 1997 default based on an amended judgment and an appeal from a motion to correct an illegal sentence, because those applications of the deadline were not then clearly established.

Collier v. Bob Bayer · filed 2005-06-03(1)

The Nevada procedural rules applied by the Nevada state courts to bar Collier's habeas petition are not adequate to preclude federal review of his habeas petition. The rules applying Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1) were not clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of Collier's purported default. When Collier filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence in 1997 and subsequent habeas petitions, it appeared under state law a habeas petition could follow a remittitur from such an appeal and amended judgment.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petition challenging a judgment or sentence to be filed within one year after remittitur on direct appeal unless the petitioner shows good cause for delay; a district court must consider that bar when it applies.

State v. Dist. Ct. · filed 2005-06-09(1)

NRS 34.726(1) provides in part that absent a showing of good cause for delay, a petition challenging the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within one year after this court issues its remittitur on direct appeal. ... Given the untimely and successive nature of Riker's petition, the district court had a duty imposed by law to consider whether any or all of Riker's claims were barred under NRS 34.726, NRS 34.810, NRS 34.800, or the law of the case previously pronounced by this court.

Section 34.726(1) requires a district court to consider whether an untimely post-conviction habeas petition is barred before granting an evidentiary hearing.

State v. Eighth Judicial District Court · filed 2005-06-09(1)

Given the untimely and successive nature of Riker’s petition, the district court had a duty imposed by law to consider whether any or all of Riker’s claims were barred under NRS 34.726, NRS 34.810, NRS 34.800, or the law of the case previously pronounced by this court. The district court, however, did not refer to or apply these legal standards in granting the evidentiary hearing.

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year filing deadline applies to post-conviction petitions seeking presentence credit because they challenge the validity of the judgment or sentence; it does not apply to petitions challenging the computation of time served.

Griffin v. State · filed 2006-07-13(1)

Pursuant to NRS 34.726(1), the procedural time bar applies to “a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence.” It does not, however, apply to a petition that challenges the computation of time served.

Section 34.726(1) makes a post-conviction habeas petition untimely if filed more than one year after remittitur from a timely direct appeal.

Bejarano v. State · filed 2006-11-16(1)

Bejarano’s instant habeas petition was filed over 15 years after this court issued the remittitur from his direct appeal. It was clearly untimely under NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year filing period does not begin when a judgment imposes restitution but leaves its amount and terms unspecified.

Whitehead v. State · filed 2012-05-31(1)

In those circumstances, the intermediate judgment is not sufficient to trigger the one-year period under NRS 34.726 for filing a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 34.726(1) bars a post-conviction claim raised more than one year after the prior petition's decision unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause for the delay.

Leslie (Wilbert) v. State · filed 2013-04-09(1)

Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is procedurally barred as he failed to raise it within one year from the decision on his first post-conviction petition and he did not demonstrate good cause for his failure to do so.

Section 34.726(1) starts the one-year filing period when the supreme court issues its remittitur after a timely direct appeal, and delivery to a prison official does not count as filing.

Gonzales v. State · filed 2002-09-13(1)

We conclude that where a timely direct appeal is taken from a judgment of conviction, a post-conviction petition challenging the judgment of conviction must be filed within one year after this court issues its remittitur. ... We further conclude that the prison mailbox rule adopted in Kellogg does not apply to the filing of post-conviction habeas petitions. Those petitions must be filed in the district court within the applicable time period set forth in NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726’s one-year filing period does not prevent amendment to cure a timely petition’s defective verification when the State seeks dismissal after that period expires and counsel has filed a supplement.

Miles v. State · filed 2004-06-10

Moreover, where, as here, the State did not move to dismiss the petition until: (1) after the 1-year period for filing a timely petition under NRS 34.726 had expired; and (2) counsel had been appointed to represent the petitioner and counsel had filed a supplement to the petition, we conclude the district court should allow the petitioner to amend the petition.

Section 34.726 imposes a one-year time bar on post-conviction habeas petitions.

Clem v. State · filed 2003-12-30(1)

Thus, the one-year time bar at NRS 34.726 and the successive petition bar at NRS 34.810(2) apply here.

Section 34.726(1)'s filing deadline makes a state habeas petition filed more than eleven years after remittitur untimely and provides an independent and adequate state ground for dismissal.

Foote v. Del Papa · filed 2007-05-22(1)

Because Foote filed his 2000 State Petition more than eleven years after remittitur issued from his direct appeal, the petition was also untimely. See NRS § 34.726(1). To the extent Foote argues that NRS § 34.726(1) is neither an independent nor adequate state law basis for the Nevada Supreme Court’s dismissal of the petition, the argument is foreclosed.

Section 34.726(1) generally requires a habeas petition within one year of the conviction judgment or, after an appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court’s remittitur; a late petition requires a showing of good cause, lack of fault, and undue prejudice from dismissal.

Cranford v. Nevada Department of Corrections · filed 2010-10-05(1)

Generally, a prisoner must file a habeas petition “within [one] year after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within [one] year after the Supreme Court issues its remittitur.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1) (2009). A prisoner may file a petition after this time period expires only if he demonstrates good cause for the delay, that the delay was not his fault, and that the dismissal of the petition as untimely would result in undue prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) measures timeliness from the remittitur on direct appeal, not from a post-conviction appeal.

Balsamo (Stephanie) v. State · filed 2013-04-09(1)

This argument lacks merit as the remittitur referenced in NRS 34.726 as one of the measures for a timely petition is the remittitur from direct appeal.

Section 34.726(1) requires a post-conviction petition to be filed within one year of the later of the judgment of conviction or the remittitur after appeal.

Pinkston v. Foster · filed 2013-01-23(1)

If Pinkston were to file for relief in state court, her claim would be denied as untimely under well-established and consistently-applied Nevada state law.

When no remittitur will issue, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Venable (James) v. State · filed 2013-06-03(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur will issue, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Liner (Quintay) v. State · filed 2013-06-13(1)

Becauseno remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1) requires a post-conviction habeas petition within one year of the judgment of conviction or the remittitur from a direct appeal; an appeal from denial of sentence modification does not restart that period.

Samora (Jay) v. State · filed 2013-07-23(1)

NRS 34.726(1) provides that a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be filed within one year after the entry of the judgment of conviction or the issuance of the remittitur from the denial of a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.

When no remittitur will issue, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Odong (Ini) v. State · filed 2013-09-17(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur will issue, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Nehrenberg (Barbara) v. State · filed 2013-09-17(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur will issue, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Starcevich (Timothy) v. State · filed 2013-10-01(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1) requires a habeas petition challenging a probation revocation order to be filed within one year of that order unless the petitioner shows good cause for the delay.

De La Hoya (Jorge) v. Warden · filed 2013-10-16(1)

Appellant challenged the order revoking probation; a challenge that should have been raised in an appeal from the order revoking probation or a habeas corpus petition filed within one year from the order revoking probation.

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Cahun (Luis) v. State · filed 2013-10-21(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1) treats a post-conviction habeas petition filed more than two years after the direct-appeal remittitur as untimely.

Rowell (Lamarr) v. State C/W 61870 · filed 2013-05-13(1)

Appellant filed his petition on June 14, 2012, more than two years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on January 15, 2010. ... Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) imposes a filing deadline on post-conviction habeas petitions.

Craig (Dale) v. Warden C/W 60956 · filed 2013-05-13(1)

Appellant's petitions were therefore untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1); Sullivan v. State, 120 Nev. 537, 541, 96 P.3d 761, 764 (2004).

Section 34.726(1)'s good-cause exception is not satisfied by reliance on another inmate for legal work or by having a first language other than English.

Ramos (Fransisco) v. State · filed 2013-05-15(1)

In addition, that appellant relied on a fellow inmate for legal work and that English is not his first language did not demonstrate good cause.

Section 34.726(1) requires a petitioner claiming good cause for a late petition to excuse the entire delay before filing.

Garner (Tyrone) v. State · filed 2013-05-15(1)

Even assuming Nika provided good cause when that decision was issued, appellant failed to excuse the entire delay because he waited approximately four years from the Nika decision before he filed this petition.

An ineffective-assistance claim that is itself untimely cannot establish good cause to excuse a late petition under section 34.726(1).

Clark (Darryl) v. State · filed 2013-06-12(1)

To the extent appellant claimed that ineffective assistance of counsel excused his delay, that claim was itself untimely such that it could not afford good cause.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction petition unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Carillo, Jr. (Gilberto) v. State C/W 61312 · filed 2013-06-13(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed and procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause—cause for the delay and undue prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely post-conviction habeas petition when the petitioner fails to demonstrate good cause, prejudice, or a miscarriage of justice.

Daniels (James) v. State · filed 2013-07-22(1)

Daniels' petition was untimely because it was filed 20 months after this court issued its remittitur in his direct appeal and, failing to demonstrate good cause, prejudice, or a miscarriage of justice, the district court should have denied his petition on this basis alone.

Section 34.726(1) requires the district court to address whether an untimely post-conviction habeas petition is procedurally barred.

Williams (Jessica) v. State · filed 2013-10-17(1)

Given the untimeliness of the petition, see NRS 34.726(1), the presumption of prejudice to the State, see NRS 34.800, and the nature of Williams' grounds for relief, see NRS 34.810(1)(b), the district court had a duty to determine whether any or all of Williams' grounds for relief were procedurally barred and its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.

Vague claims of new case law, knowledge, or information do not excuse a late petition without specific facts or arguments explaining the delay.

Allen (Brian) v. State · filed 2014-04-10(1)

Appellant's claim that new case law, knowledge and information excused his procedural defaults was insufficient as he failed to provide any facts or specific arguments identifying the new case law, knowledge or information or explain how these excused his fourth late petition.

When a dismissed appeal produces no remittitur, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

O'Donnell (Thomas) v. State · filed 2013-09-25(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur will issue after an appeal is dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Ormond, Jr. (Rodney) v. State · filed 2014-08-13(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1) generally gives a petitioner one year after the Nevada Supreme Court issues its remittitur to file a state post-conviction petition when the conviction was appealed.

Rudin v. Myles · filed 2014-09-10(1)

Thus, from the date on which the Nevada Supreme Court issued its remittitur, which was April 27, 2004, Rudin had one year, or until April 27, 2005, to file a petition for post- conviction relief in state court.

Section 34.726(1) sets a filing deadline for post-conviction habeas petitions measured from the judgment or, after a direct appeal, the remittitur.

Lewis (Clyde) v. State · filed 2014-07-22(1)

The instant petition was filed 18 years after entry of the 1995 judgment of conviction and more than 10 years after the issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal of the 1997 judgment of conviction. Appellant's petition was therefore untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a post-conviction habeas petition filed more than three years after remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

McMahon (Johnny) v. State · filed 2014-09-16(1)

Appellant's petition was therefore untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) treats a postconviction motion filed more than twelve years after the remittitur on direct appeal as untimely.

Sutton (Kevin) v. State · filed 2014-09-18(1)

Thus, appellant's motion was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) requires a post-conviction habeas petition to be filed within one year of entry of the judgment of conviction or issuance of the remittitur from a timely direct appeal.

Morales (Thomas) v. State · filed 2014-12-11(1)

Appellant's petition was required to be filed within one year from either entry of the judgment of conviction or issuance of the remittitur from a timely direct appeal. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) generally gives a petitioner one year after the Nevada Supreme Court issues its remittitur to file a state post-conviction petition when the conviction was appealed.

Rudin v. Myles · filed 2015-03-10(1)

Thus, from the date on which the Nevada Supreme Court issued its remittitur, which was April 27, 2004, Rudin had one year, or until April 27, 2005, to file a petition for post- conviction relief in state court.

When no remittitur issues, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the order.

Cunningham (Tony) v. State C/W 67687/67688 · filed 2015-04-21(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing post-conviction habeas corpus petitions under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1) makes a post-conviction habeas petition filed twelve years after remittitur untimely.

Doyle (Antonio) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2015-09-22(1)

Doyle filed his second post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court twelve years after this court issued its remittitur on his direct appeal. Therefore, the petition was untimely.

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year filing period does not restart when a petitioner is denied relief in federal court.

Carey (Gordon) v. State · filed 2015-12-18(1)

We reject Carey's argument that we should construe his petition as timely, despite the unequivocal language in NRS 34.726, because it was filed within one year after he was denied relief in the federal courts.

Section 34.726(1)’s one-year filing period begins on the date of the dismissal order when no remittitur will issue.

Villela (Javier) v. State · filed 2016-01-26(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Pinedo (Efraim) v. State · filed 2016-02-01(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues, Section 34.726(1)’s one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Lovins (Cliff) v. State · filed 2016-02-12(1)

Becauseno remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726 requires a postconviction habeas petition to be filed within one year of the remittitur on direct appeal or the judgment of conviction, unless the petitioner shows cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Thomas (Kenneth) v. State · filed 2016-03-17(1)

Pursuant to NRS 34.726, a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be filed within one year of the issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal or the filing of the judgment of conviction unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the delay and undue prejudice.

Section 34.726(1) bars untimely post-conviction habeas petitions.

Hatfield (Gregory) v. State C/W 66489 · filed 2015-01-15(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) measures timeliness from the date a petition is filed; an order appointing counsel does not satisfy the filing requirement.

Martinez-Orellano (Rogelio) v. Dist. Ct. (State) · filed 2015-07-21(1)

And the filing of the petition is critical in one other respect—the filing date of the petition determines the timeliness of the petition, NRS 34.726(1); an order appointing counsel would not satisfy the filing ... requirement of NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed approximately four years after remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

Murray (Steven) v. State · filed 2015-12-16(1)

Appellant filed his postconviction petition on April 4, 2015, approximately four years after issuance of remittitur on direct appeal on February 28, 2011. Murray v. State, Docket No. 54115 (Order of Affirmance, February 3, 2011). Therefore, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed 21 years after remittitur from the direct appeal untimely.

Gurry (Carlos) v. State · filed 2016-02-10(1)

Appellant filed his petition on January 26, 2015, 21 years after remittitur issued from his direct appeal on January 25, 1994. Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726 makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than eight years after remittitur from the direct appeal untimely.

Brown (Kasard) v. State · filed 2016-03-17

Brown filed his petition on March 7, 2014, more than 8 years after remittitur issued from his direct appeal on December 8, 2005. ... Thus, his petition was untimely filed. NRS 34.726.

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than two years after remittitur on direct appeal untimely.

Jimenez (Francisco) v. State · filed 2016-02-10(1)

Appellant filed his postconviction petition on March 12, 2015, more than two years after issuance of remittitur on direct appeal on August 21, 2012. Jimenez v. State, Docket No. 58787 (Order of Affirmance, July 25, 2012). Therefore, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.

Ford (Tiyon) v. State · filed 2016-02-10(1)

Therefore, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

A postconviction petition filed more than 15 years after remittitur from direct appeal is untimely under § 34.726(1).

BERRY (DEMARLO) VS. STATE · filed 2015-12-24(1)

Berry filed the petition underlying this appeal on May 2, 2014, more than 15 years after this court's February 9, 1998, issuance of remittitur from his direct appeal. Therefore, Berry's petition is untimely. See NRS 34.726(1).

When no remittitur issues after an appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Tomlinson (Curtis) v. State · filed 2016-03-25(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a voluntary dismissal of an appeal, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Garcia (Luis) v. State · filed 2016-03-25(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after an appeal is voluntarily dismissed, Section 34.726(1)'s one-year filing period begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Campana (Corey) v. State · filed 2016-06-10(1)

Becauseno remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a voluntary dismissal, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Piper (Fernando) v. State · filed 2016-06-23(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one -year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after an appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Miller (Heather) v. State · filed 2016-07-11(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur will issue after an appeal is dismissed, NRS 34.726(1)'s one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

George (Joreen) v. State · filed 2016-08-10(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a direct appeal is dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Lopez (Daniel) v. State · filed 2016-09-02(1)

... one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726 (1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, Section 34.726(1)’s one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Sperlin (Dan) v. State · filed 2016-11-23(1)

'Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur issues after a direct appeal is voluntarily dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Camacho (Alberto) v. State · filed 2016-12-02(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When no remittitur will issue, the one-year period under NRS 34.726(1) begins on the date of the order dismissing the appeal.

Chisam (David) v. State · filed 2016-12-12(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726 (1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition untimely when filed more than one year after remittitur on direct appeal.

Middleton (David) v. Warden (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2016-12-21(1)

The petition was untimely as it was filed more than one year after this court issued its remittitur on direct appeal. NRS 34.726(1).

When a direct appeal is voluntarily dismissed without a remittitur, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Gallarde (Camille) v. State · filed 2017-01-19(1)

'Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When an appeal is dismissed without a remittitur, Section 34.726(1)’s one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Owens (Joshua) v. State · filed 2017-03-13(1)

one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

Section 34.726(1) bars a postconviction habeas petition filed more than one year after remittitur on direct appeal absent good cause and prejudice.

Crump (Thomas) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2016-03-25(1)

The petition was therefore procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice.

Section 34.726 makes a postconviction habeas petition filed more than 12 years after remittitur untimely.

Shepard (Gary) v. State · filed 2016-04-14

Shepard filed his petition April 24, 2015, more than 12 years after remittitur issued from his direct appeal on October 8, 2002. ... Thus, the petition was untimely. See NRS 34.726.

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and prejudice.

Holmes (Kevin) v. State · filed 2016-04-14(1)

Thus, his petition was untimely filed. NRS 34.726(1). ... The petition was therefore procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice. NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810.

Section 34.726 makes a postconviction habeas petition untimely when it is filed more than 15 years after remittitur from the direct appeal.

Aguilar (Gilbert) v. State · filed 2016-04-14

Appellant filed his petition on July 2, 2015, more than 15 years after remittitur issued from his direct appeal on January 18, 2000. Aguilar v. State, Docket No. 31595 (Order of Affirmance, December 20, 1999). Thus, his petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726.

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed approximately 23 years after resolution of the direct appeal untimely.

Emil (Rodney) v. State (Death Penalty-Pc) · filed 2016-04-22(1)

Because he filed his petition on October 7, 2013, approximately 23 years after this court resolved his direct appeal, the petition was untimely under NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) bars an untimely postconviction habeas petition unless the petitioner demonstrates good cause and actual prejudice.

Friedman (Kenneth) v. State C/W 65639/65891 · filed 2017-01-12(1)

Thus, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

A postconviction habeas petition filed more than 22 years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal is untimely under § 34.726(1).

Lee (Donald) v. State · filed 2016-04-14(1)

Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726(1) makes a postconviction habeas petition filed approximately eight years after remittitur untimely.

Allen (Taiwan) v. State · filed 2016-04-14(1)

Therefore, the petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1).

Section 34.726 imposes a filing deadline for postconviction habeas petitions; a petition filed more than nine years after judgment is untimely.

Phillips (Vornelius) v. State · filed 2016-04-15(1)

Appellant filed his petition' on February 5, 2014, more than 9 years after his judgment of conviction was entered on April 27, 2004. Thus, appellant 's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726.

When no remittitur issues after a direct appeal is dismissed, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Vannata (Anthony) v. State · filed 2017-04-11(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.

When a direct appeal is voluntarily dismissed and no remittitur issues, the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas petition begins on the date of the dismissal order.

Scherer (Donald) v. State · filed 2017-04-21(1)

Because no remittitur will issue in this matter, see NRAP 42(b), the one-year period for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus petition under NRS 34.726(1) shall commence to run from the date of this order.