Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A

Section 2A’s limitation period for a product liability negligence claim begins when the injury occurs, rather than when the product is manufactured or sold.

Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1978-04-03

The relevant statute is G. L. c. 260, § 2A, inserted by St. 1948, c. 274, § 2. ... It appears clear to us that the statute of limitations in a product liability case of this kind must run from the time of injury, not the time of manufacture or sale.

Section 2A’s limitations period for a client’s negligent title certification claim begins when the client discovers or reasonably should have discovered the misrepresentation.

Hendrickson v. Sears · filed 1974-04-09

A client’s cause of action against an attorney for negligent certification of title to real estate does not “accrue” for the purposes of G. L. c. 260, §§ 2 and 2A, until the misrepresentation is discovered or should reasonably have been discovered, whichever first occurs.

If § 2A governs a negligent title certification claim, its limitations period begins when the misrepresentation is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever occurs first.

Howard D. Hendrickson and Marilyn J. Hendrickson v. Sears · filed 1974-04-30

In its opinion of April 8, 1974 the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that “the cause of action does not accrue until the misrepresentation is discovered or should reasonably have been discovered, whichever first occurs.” Hendrickson v. Sears, Mass. (1974), 310 N.E.2d 131. ... Here the complaint was filed within two years of date of discovery, June 15, 1970, and was therefore within the limitations period under either § 2 or § 2A. Whether the misrepresentation, though “inherently unknowable”, should reasonably have been discovered earlier, and, if so, whether the limitations period of § 2 or § 2A should apply, we leave to the district court.

Section 2A provides a general three-year limitations period for tort, personal-injury contract, and replevin actions when no specific limitations period applies.

Francis J. BURNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Leo SULLIVAN Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1980-12-06

Finally, the Massachusetts general tort statute of limitations is clearly intended to be used in conjunction with conventional tort, contract and replevin actions for which there is no specific statute of limitations. While, in certain circumstances, such conventional actions may be the “most analogous” actions to civil rights actions, that is so only when the state has not prohibited by statute the deprivation of the specific civil right at bar. Where, as here, the state has provided a specific remedy, complete with statute of limitations, for racial discrimination in public employment and promotion, actions under the federal Civil Rights Acts alleging racial discrimination by the state must be governed by that statute of limitations.

Under Section 2A’s former two-year limit for tort actions, even if the discovery rule applies, learning the full extent of a defect later does not postpone accrual.

Town of Mansfield v. GAF Corp. · filed 1977-07-27

Even assuming arguendo that this is an appropriate case for use of the discovery rule, the plaintiff’s action was not brought within two years of the date the defect was discovered, as required by G. L. c. 260, § 2A. ... The fact that it did not appreciate the extent of the damage until later is immaterial.

Under § 2A, a negligence claim for an insidious disease accrues when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known the disease resulted from the defendant's conduct; discovering that the disease is permanent does not restart the three-year period.

Olsen v. BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES, W. ELECTRIC CO. · filed 1983-02-15

We conclude, therefore, that Olsen's cause of action did not accrue before he knew or should reasonably have known that he had contracted asthma as a result of conduct of the defendants. ... For these reasons, we reject Olsen's argument that his claim accrued when he knew of the permanency of his condition.

Section 2A’s three-year period for negligence and misrepresentation claims begins when the claimant has notice of the alleged injury.

Salin v. Shalgian · filed 1984-08-09

We think that at least as of the date when the Salins filed an answer to the neighbors’ complaint in the Land Court (January 31, 1979) they were on notice of the claims which they now assert. This was the time from which the statute of limitations began to run under the rule in Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83 (1974). ... These causes of action against the bank and Shalgian were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, G. L. c. 260, § 2A, when this action was commenced.

Section 2A’s three-year period does not begin until a negligence plaintiff learns or reasonably should learn that the injury was caused by the defendant’s conduct.

Vigeant v. Zimmer, Inc. · filed 1985-07-03

Under these circumstances, the plaintiff should not reasonably be expected to have learned that the prosthetic knee might be defective until after November 15, 1979, well within the three-year limitations period.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period began when the alleged conversion became knowable through the patent’s issuance and recordation.

Wise v. Leo James Hubbard, Precision Handling Devices, Inc., and Precision Handling Devices of Puerto Rico · filed 1985-07-29

We agree with the district court that the conversion alleged became knowable when the patent was issued and recorded in July of 1974.

Section 2A’s three-year period for negligence claims begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know both the injury and its likely cause.

Errichiello v. Eli Lilly and Co. · filed 1985-10-09

Resolution of such a question requires a determination of the reasonableness of plaintiff’s conduct and raises genuine factual issues as to when plaintiff’s cause of action “accrued” within the meaning of M.G.L. c. 260, § 2A.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim, beginning when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the likely cause of the injury.

Shea v. Keuffel & Esser of New Jersey, Inc. · filed 1986-07-14

The Sheas knew or should reasonably have known as early as April, 1981, and no later than October, 1981, that the sepia paper that K & E manufactured and Chester Shea used at work was a likely cause of his skin condition. As such, the Sheas had until October 30, 1984, at the latest, to perfect their claim and file this action.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, starting when the plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of the misrepresentation.

Kent v. Dupree · filed 1982-01-11

Fraudulent misrepresentation, an action sounding in tort, is subject to a three-year statute of limitations after the cause of action accrues. G. L. c. 260, § 2A. In this type of action, a cause of action accrues at the time a plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of the misrepresentation.

For a negligence claim under § 2A, the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff first suffers harm.

Joseph A. Fortin Construction, Inc. v. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency · filed 1983-11-09

It appears from the affidavits and exhibits submitted by the parties that Fortin-Reliable’s cause of action against MHFA accrued in May, 1980, when its execution against Beverly was returned unsatisfied. This was the first time the plaintiff was harmed by MHFA’s failure to require assurances of payment from Beverly.

Section 2A’s three-year limitation period begins anew with each substantial subsidence caused by a breach of the continuing duty to provide lateral support.

Ahern v. Warner · filed 1983-06-23

The statute of limitations begins to run anew when each substantial subsidence occurs and not just from the occurrence of the first such subsidence, or from the first act or omission which permitted it. ... The applicable státute of limitations provides that the action shall be commenced before the expiration of three years from the date when the cause of action accrues. G. L. c. 260, § 2A, as amended by St. 1973, c. 777, § l.

Section 2A’s three-year period for a products liability negligence claim begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its likely cause; knowledge that the defendant breached a legal duty is unnecessary.

Fidler v. Eastman Kodak Company · filed 1983-08-03

We think that under Massachusetts law notice of likely cause is ordinarily enough to start the statute running. Thus on notice, the potential litigant has the duty to discover from the legal, scientific, and medical communities whether the theory of causation is supportable and whether it supports a legal claim.

Section 2A’s limitations period does not remain suspended after an injury becomes manifest while the full extent or permanence of that injury is still unknown.

Gore v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc. · filed 1984-03-20

When an injury or disease resulting from injury becomes manifest, the statute of limitations does not stay in suspense until the full extent, gravity, or permanence of that same injury or consequential disease is known.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim after the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its likely cause.

Kay v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 1989-08-30

By April 21, 1981, when the first attorney she consulted was investigating and evaluating her possible claim, Kay had sufficient notice that Ortho Novum had likely caused her injury. Thus, this action, filed on October 17, 1984, is barred by the three year statutes of limitations.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period began running by the end of 1982 because the visible defects should have prompted inquiry into Dryvit’s role.

Hanson Housing Authority v. Dryvit System, Inc. · filed 1990-10-23

The “falling out” of caulking, the bubbling in the finish coat, the two “big cracks,” the movability of a portion of an exterior wall, and the reference to “Dryvit leaks,” considered together, were sufficient to start the running of any applicable limitation clocks, even when considered “with an indulgence in the plaintiff’s favor.”

Section 2A’s three-year period for negligence claims begins when a reasonable person would know enough facts to suspect an injury and its likely cause; a later ruling on the legal basis does not delay accrual.

A. Greer Edwards, Jr. v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company · filed 1992-09-04

Even assuming the notices of sale were ambiguous, Edwards nonetheless was aware of sufficient facts to alert a reasonable person to the potential negligence claim no later than the time of the foreclosure sale.

Section 2A gives fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims a three-year limitations period that begins when suspicious circumstances put the plaintiff on notice of a claim.

Cargill v. Gilmore · filed 1993-08-18

The claims for negligent misrepresentation and fraud are governed by the three-year statute of limitations for tort claims. G.L.c. 260, §2A. ... The undisputed facts do, however, demonstrate that the tort and c. 93A actions accrued no later than July of 1987. ... By that point, there were enough suspicious circumstances to have started the limitations clock running. ... Accordingly, Gilmore is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on the fraud, negligent misrepresentation and c. 93A claims.

Section 2A’s three-year period can begin when a plaintiff knows her symptoms were probably caused by an exposure, before she identifies the specific harmful ingredient.

Doucette v. Handy & Harmon · filed 1994-01-07

That very investigation led in short order to the discovery that cadmium was the responsible ingredient in the solder, but the cause of action against the solder manufacturers and distributors accrued before that discovery, just as did the plaintiff’s cause of action against those responsible for the inadequate ventilation of the fumes.

For injuries whose cause is initially unclear, Section 2A’s three-year period begins when plaintiffs know or reasonably should know that the defendant’s conduct likely caused their injuries.

Pitts v. Aerolite SPE Corp. · filed 1987-06-02

Thus, once on notice of facts sufficient that they reasonably should have known that their injuries were likely caused by the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiffs have three years to ascertain whether their claims are legally supportable.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim; for an insidious disease, the period begins when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the defendant's conduct likely caused the injury.

Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1989-11-13

For both Pedraza's negligence and breach of warranty claims, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mass.Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2A [4] and Mass.Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-318, [5] respectively. ... To resolve the difficulty, the Massachusetts courts have adopted the "discovery rule," under which a cause of action for the negligent infliction of an insidious disease does not accrue (and the statute of limitations does not begin to run) until the plaintiff "knew or should reasonably have known that he had contracted [the disease] as a result of the conduct of the defendants." Id. 445 N.E.2d at 612. ... In light of the above authorities, and mindful of the inferences which this Court is obligated to make on behalf of the plaintiff, the Court concludes that the defendant has not succeeded in demonstrating that there is no issue of material fact with respect to the plaintiff's knowledge of the likely cause of his injury prior to November 1982. Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate.

Section 2A's three-year limit is not delayed by a later medical opinion that relies on scientific knowledge already available.

prod.liab.rep.(cch)p 12,449 Martha Kay v. Johnson & Johnson and Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation · filed 1990-05-02

We conclude, for substantially the same reasons as those given in the district court’s opinion, that this action is time-barred under Massachusetts law. A different holding would result in a rule which sanctioned delay in proportion to the lack of medical support for a claim. While, as the district court noted, there may be reason to apply a “medical breakthrough” theory in some cases, this is not such a case. Dr. Balsam’s June 1982 opinion supporting plaintiff’s theory did not rest upon newly developed scientific knowledge; for all that appears, it could have been rendered much earlier.

Section 2A's three-year period begins when a plaintiff has reasonable notice that a product or another person's act may have caused the harm, creating a duty to inquire.

Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co. · filed 1990-08-06

Reasonable notice that a particular product or a particular act of another person may have been a cause of harm to a plaintiff creates a duty of inquiry and starts the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 2A gives tort and replevin claims a three-year limitations period, with accrual delayed for an inherently unknowable wrong until the plaintiff knows or should know the facts giving rise to the claim.

Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners · filed 1992-07-20

Under M.G.L. c. 260, § 2A, the statute of limitations for tort and replevin actions is three years. Although a cause of action generally accrues at the time of injury, tort claims are subject to the so-called “discovery rule,” under which a cause of action which “is based on an inherently unknowable wrong” only accrues “when the injured person knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.”

Section 2A gives tort claims a three-year limitations period, but the discovery rule delays accrual until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the defendant may have caused the injury.

Cambridge Plating Co., Inc. v. Napco, Inc. · filed 1993-04-22

Accordingly, as we understand the requisite notice, the statute of limitations will begin to run once the plaintiff has enough information to target the defendant as a suspect, though not necessarily to identify the defendant as the culprit.

Section 2A gives tort claims a three-year limitations period; the discovery rule stops the clock until the plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of the injury.

G.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Posternak · filed 1993-12-28

The statute of limitations for a tort action in Massachusetts is three years. G.L.c. 260, §2A. ... The so-called “discovery rule” stops the running of the statute of limitations until a plaintiff learns, or reasonably should have learned, that it has been harmed by a defendant’s conduct. ... Because I conclude that January 1990, is the date as of which GSEI is charged with knowledge of its cause of action, I rule that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment/dismissal on Count I of the complaint.

Section 2A gives three years to bring tort claims for emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and civil rights violations; claims based on a published article follow the libel accrual rule when the article and harm were knowable.

Flynn v. Associated Press · filed 1988-03-07

In the absence of a specific legislative provision to the contrary, Flynn’s claims for infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and violation of civil rights all are governed by G. L. c. 260, § 2A, the general three-year statute of limitations for tort actions. ... Flynn’s claims of harm all are based on publication of the AP article. As discussed above, neither the harm nor the article was “inherently unknowable” in 1978. On this record, we discern no reason to apply to Flynn’s alternative theories of recovery an accrual rule different from the rule we apply to his libel claim.

Section 2A sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applied to the assault-based § 1983 claim.

Roberts v. Murphy · filed 1988-05-10

In Massachusetts, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. M.G.L. c. 260, § 2A.

Section 2A supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1981 claims governed by the state personal-injury limitation period.

Marsman v. Western Electric Co. · filed 1988-08-23

Thus in this case, the limitation period is three years. M.G.L. c. 260 § 2A.

Section 2A provides a two-year limitations period for causes of action accruing before January 1, 1974, and a three-year period for later causes of action.

Emory v. Logan · filed 1992-09-18

I do note that although the defendant cites three years as the appropriate limitations period, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 260, § 2A was amended in 1973 to extend the limitations period from two to three years, but any cause of action accruing prior to January 1, 1974, is still governed by the former two-year provision.

Section 2A’s three-year period for a negligence claim against an insurance broker begins when the insured suffers appreciable harm, not when it learns that coverage is missing.

International Mobiles Corp. v. Corroon & Black/Fairfield & Ellis, Inc. · filed 1990-09-14

As Mobiles filed its action in negligence against Corroon within three years of the settlement agreement to which Mobiles was bound to contribute, the action was not barred under G. L. c. 260, § 2A.

Section 2A’s three-year limit for tort claims runs from notice of injury; under the discovery rule, a claim does not accrue before harm occurs.

United States v. Rockland Trust Co. · filed 1994-06-17

I find, therefore, that any harm Rockland may have suffered from the misrepresentation occurred for discovery rule purposes not at the time it was made, but rather when the United States began to pursue Rockland directly for Gifford’s unpaid taxes, i.e., in February 1993. Accordingly, Rockland’s present third-party complaint is not time-barred.

The three-year limitations period begins when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of harm caused by the defendant’s conduct; a factual dispute about that knowledge may require a jury.

Magee v. Traister · filed 1994-06-21

Because knowledge of or reasonable belief in the existence of some harm is necessary before the statute begins to run, a jury must decide, if necessary, whether plaintiffs had any knowledge of harm more than three years before commencement of this action.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a tort claim; the period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that the defendant’s conduct may have caused harm.

Szymczuk v. Szymczuk · filed 1996-03-05

Accordingly the statute oflimitations for Ms. Avola’s claims commenced May 26, 1989 at the very latest and thus are barred by the three-year limitation period pursuant to G.L.c. 260, §2A.

Section 2A requires a tort action to be filed within three years after it accrues; when the plaintiff should have discovered the injury may present a question of fact.

Tuffo v. Morisi · filed 1997-05-21

Actions in tort must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. See G.L.c. 260, §2A. ... Given Tuffo’s alleged ongoing relationship with Morisi, it is conceivable that Tuffo did not discover the claim for conversion until after June 1988. Nevertheless, whether Tuffo should have discovered the conversion prior to July 26, 1988 is a question of fact that is not appropriate for disposition at the summary judgment stage.

Section 2A requires tort actions to be brought within three years after accrual; the discovery rule does not delay accrual when the injury was apparent when it occurred.

O'ROURKE v. Jason Inc. · filed 1997-09-10

Under Massachusetts law, tort actions may be brought “only within three years ... after the cause of action accrues.” M.G.L. ch. 260, § 2A. ... Given the particulars of the present matter, however, Plaintiffs reliance on the discovery rule is unavailing.

Section 2A gives fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the misrepresentation and appreciable harm.

RohmTech, Inc. v. Taylor · filed 1997-11-25

There is no dispute that these are tort claims and the applicable statute of limitations is three years. G.L.c. 260, §2A. The question raised by the Taylors’ limitations defense is when the statute began to run, or, put another way, when did RohmTech’s cause of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation accrue. ... The uncontroverted facts in the summary judgment record make it clear that RohmTech knew or reasonably should have discovered that it may have been harmed by the Taylors’ allegedly false representations about the absence of environmental problems related to the Nyanza site by January 1991, when RohmTech received the notice of PRP status from the EPA.

For a child’s loss of parental consortium claim, the limitations period cannot begin before the child is born, even if the parent was injured earlier.

Angelini v. OMD Corp. · filed 1991-07-15

The cause of action in a parental consortium case cannot accrue until the child is born because the loss of consortium cannot occur until the child is born. The statute of limitations, therefore, will not automatically bar actions for loss of parental consortium brought more than three years after the parent is injured.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period applies to claims for reimbursement of environmental assessment costs; each claim accrues when the cost is paid.

Oliveira v. Pereira · filed 1992-12-31

The judge ruled that the three-year statute of limitations under G. L. c. 260, § 2A (1990 ed.), controlled. ... The proper date or dates of accrual of the actions for reimbursement of assessment costs is the date or dates the assessment costs were paid. ... The statute of limitations to be applied is three years.

Section 2A gives a buyer three years to bring a deceit claim after the buyer should have learned of the misrepresentation.

Kusmin v. Nastasi · filed 1995-04-24

Such an action for tort as alleged by the Kusmins must be commenced “within three years next after the cause of action accrues.” G.L.c. 260, §2A. ... Clearly, the fair market value of the house purchased by the Kusmins was inherently knowable in 1987. ... This action was not commenced until November 1993, and therefore, the Kusmins’ claim for deceit is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 2A gives misrepresentation claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of the misrepresentation.

McEneaney v. Chestnut Hill Realty Corp. · filed 1995-05-17

The statute of limitations for this type of action is three years. G. L. c. 260, § 2A. ... However, in this type of action, the cause of action does not accrue until the time that the plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of the misrepresentation. ... We conclude that these allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, because the statute was tolled until the plaintiff experienced the noise and vibration in the unit in June, 1990.

Section 2A’s three-year limit for tort claims arising from childhood sexual abuse is subject to the discovery rule when the claim is against someone other than the perpetrator.

Phinney v. Morgan · filed 1995-08-28

We see no reason in the absence of a statute not to apply the discovery rule to tort actions arising out of incestuous child abuse against the nonperpetrator of the abuse.

Section 2A’s three-year period for tort claims begins when a beneficiary knows or reasonably should know of a concealed breach of fiduciary duty.

Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Seifert · filed 1996-02-15

In sum, because Boston Safe has demonstrated that it did not know and should not have known that the beneficiaries of the trust had been harmed by Seifert’s breach of his fiduciary duties, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations for the plaintiffs claims did not begin to run until Boston Safe’s inadvertent discovery of the deed in 1990.

Section 2A generally gives plaintiffs three years to bring a tort action; under the discovery rule, a claim may accrue when the plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned that the defendant’s conduct caused the injury.

Gagne v. O'Donoghue · filed 1996-06-26

The statute of limitations for tort actions is, generally, three years. G.L.c. 260, §2A. ... Accordingly, this court finds that the discovery rule extends to all of Gagne’s causes of action which are not otherwise limited by statute.

Under § 2A, when a patient knew or should have known that a psychotherapist’s treatment caused injury is generally a question of fact.

Palermo v. Brennan · filed 1996-10-21

We conclude that this action falls well within the further holding of Riley v. Presnell, at 240, that “the question when a plaintiff knew or should have known of [her] cause of action is one of fact which in most instances will be decided by the trier of fact.” Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand this case for a trial which shall include, if then contested, the issue of the statute of limitations.

Section 2A’s three-year period for tort claims is measured from when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the actionable fault.

Salmon v. LeFrancois · filed 1997-05-15

In Massachusetts, one typically measures the statute of limitations under the “discovery” principle: that is, from the point in time at which the claimant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the actionable fault. The amendment here falls well inside that deadline.

Section 2A requires tort actions to be filed within three years after accrual; discovery of an injury can make an action filed later than the underlying acts timely.

Boudrot v. Russo · filed 1996-03-05

Even if G.L.c. 260, §2A is the appropriate statute of limitations, it provides that actions of torts shall be commenced within three years next after the action accrues. The effective date of the statute was January 1, 1974 and Boudrot alleges that the incidents occurred in 1975. Because, for the purposes of this motion, Boudrot did not discover the injury caused by the acts until 1993 the action is timely under G.L.c. 260, §2A.

For an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arising from alleged sexual abuse, § 2A’s three-year period begins when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful and caused her injuries.

Eilert v. Carey · filed 1998-06-02

Carey asserts, therefore, that Eilert may not rely upon the discoveiy rule to enlarge the limitations period applicable to her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. That assertion is without merit, however, because the discovery rule extends to all of Eilert’s causes of action which are not otherwise limited by statute. ... This Court sees no reason not to apply the §4C discovery rule to the intentional infliction count especially where, as here, that count emanates from the alleged sexual abuse.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tort claim, beginning when the plaintiff knew or should have known that an injury was occurring.

Breneman v. Tanner · filed 1999-02-01

Under G.L.c. 260, §2A a plaintiff has three years within which to bring a suit based on tort. That three year period begins to run when the party affected knew or should have known that an injury was occurring.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tort action, with the period beginning when the plaintiff has notice of the injury.

Breneman v. Wolfson · filed 1999-10-21

Under G.L.c. 260, §2A, a plaintiff must bring suit on a tort action within three years of the date on which the cause of action accrued. ... Thus, the leveling of the hill and the removal of the large number of trees placed the Brenemans on notice of Tanner’s trespass and commenced the running of the limitations period. At bar, suit was entered more than three years after that notice and commencement.

Section 2A’s three-year limit bars a tort claim when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the harm and its cause more than three years before filing.

Doe v. Commonwealth · filed 2000-07-20

Consequently, the discovery rule does not apply and plaintiffs action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a fraud claim, with accrual governed by when the plaintiff had sufficient notice of the harm and its cause.

Familienstifung v. Askin · filed 2001-03-01

Massachusetts applies a three year statute of limitations to fraud claims. ... Arbor may-seek to prove at trial that it was reasonable in not discovering that Kidder’s conduct was a cause of its harm before April 1995.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to file a personal injury claim after it accrues; notice of the harm and its likely cause starts the period.

Gray v. Johnson & Johnson Medical · filed 2001-10-23

Based on the forgoing undisputed facts, the court holds that the Plaintiffs cause of action accrued on a date no later than April 28, 1994. Therefore, the present action, filed November 5, 1998, is barred by G.L.c. 260, §2A.

Section 2A gives plaintiffs three years to bring a personal injury tort claim; under the discovery rule, the period begins when they know or reasonably should know of the injury and its likely cause.

Lawton v. TAT Construction Corp. · filed 2001-11-08

Hopkins and Lawton bear the burden of proving this point. ... As they filed their complaint on February 12, 1999, the issue before the court is whether either Hopkins or Lawton has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her claims accrued after February 12, 1996. ... The issue whether a reasonable person in her position would have known before February 12, 1996, that she had been injured and the likely cause of the injury is one of fact for the jury.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence action, with the limitations period tolled until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that the defendant’s conduct harmed or may have harmed it.

Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Associates, Inc. · filed 2002-03-07

The summary judgment materials herein raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable person in Taygeta’s position knew, or reasonably should have known, that it had been harmed or may have been harmed by Varian prior to May 24, 1993. Such a disputed issue of fact should be resolved by a jury. The jury’s decision, in turn, will determine whether Taygeta’s cause of action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2A.

Section 2A’s three-year period began when the insurance conversion took effect; the plaintiff’s claimed need for additional notice did not delay accrual.

DiBiase v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 1999-02-01

We agree with the motion judge that a three-year statute of limitations bars the plaintiff’s claims and that due process of law did not require that she receive more notice than she had before her claims could accrue.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period runs separately for each distinct injury caused by the same negligent act.

Cigna Insurance v. OY Saunatec, Ltd. · filed 2001-02-16

Instead, if there are multiple injuries, there will be multiple causes of action with multiple dates of accrual if the injuries are "separate and distinct."

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tort claim, with the discovery rule tolling the period until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the harm.

Town of Sturbridge v. Mobil Corp. · filed 2002-03-29

The plaintiffs claims for negligence, nuisance and willful contamination of its water in violation of M.G.L. c. 40 § 39G are also subject to a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to M.G.L. c. 260 § 2A (“[Ajctions of tort...shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues”). ... Because in many cases an injury is “inherently unknowable,” courts developed the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known that it has been harmed by the defendant’s conduct.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period for fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims is not tolled when reasonable diligence would have revealed the alleged defects.

Albrecht v. Clifford · filed 2002-05-07

Whether the defects were inherently unknowable or not, we conclude that on the record of undisputed facts, the Albrechts cannot meet their burden of demonstrating that “in the exercise of reasonable diligence, they should not have known” of them. ... The statutes of limitations were therefore not tolled and the Albrechts’ claims for fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of G. L. c. 93A were filed after the applicable statutes of limitations had expired.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury claim, beginning when the plaintiff has reasonable notice of the injury and its cause.

Zamboni v. Aladan Corp. · filed 2004-02-20

Thus, the record establishes that plaintiffs knew of the cause of Zamboni’s skin reactions by March 1995 at the latest, three years and three months prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, therefore, must be allowed with respect to plaintiffs’ common law claims.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tort claim, with the period beginning when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the harm and its cause.

Colecchi v. Gould Title Co. · filed 2004-10-12

The defendant next contends that the instant action is barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contract cases, G.L.c. 260, §2, and the three-year statute of limitations governing actions in tort, G.L.c. 260, §2A. Under either statute, the statutory time period commences “after the cause of action accrues.” ... Applying these principles to the instant case the Court is satisfied that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding when the plaintiff (or Fort Hill) knew or should have known that the title certification was flawed.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal-injury negligence claim, beginning when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its likely cause.

Murphy v. Aero-Med, Ltd. · filed 2004-10-21

Claims of negligence and breach of warranty must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. M.G.L. c. 260 § 2A and M.G.L. c. 106 § 2-318. ... The statute of limitations began running on Murphy’s claims no later than December of 1993. Accordingly, the claims plaintiff brought in February of 1998 are time-barred, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all counts.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a negligence claim; under the discovery rule, disputed facts about notice of the likely cause of injury can prevent summary judgment.

Murphy v. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. · filed 2005-08-10

Claims of negligence and breach of warranty must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. G.L.c. 260, §2A; G.L.c. 106, §2-318. ... Under the discovery rule, representations made to Murphy by her doctor about the cause of her bleed are of material importance to the determination of when the statute of limitations was triggered. Since the parties do not agree on this fact, this case is not resolvable by summaiy judgment.

Section 2A gives a negligent misrepresentation claimant three years from accrual to sue; the discovery rule can delay accrual when the injury was inherently unknowable.

KRR Pembroke, LLC v. Global Data Systems, Inc. · filed 2006-06-19

However, the statute of limitations on negligent misrepresentation claims requires that they “be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues.” G.L.c. 260, §2A. ... Consequently, the size of the premises was not inherently unknowable; it was in plain sight. Therefore, any potential cause of action accrued when Global moved into the premises in 2001. That being over three years ago, Global’s negligent misrepresentation claim is now time-barred.

Section 2A’s three-year tort limitations period begins when the claimant discovers or reasonably should have discovered the harm.

Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Vulcan Industries, Inc. · filed 2002-05-17

Whether these amounts are time barred by G.L.c. 260, §2A must be determined by the facts of the scope of Congdon’s fraudulent scheme in relation to the reasonableness vel non of Vulcan’s failure to discover its losses.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period turns on when plaintiffs should have become aware of their injury, rather than when the injury first developed.

Sawyer v. Indevus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2004-07-26

The relevant point in time is not the point of onset of valvular lesions, but rather the point in time at which the plaintiffs should have been aware they had VHD.

Section 2A provides a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and misrepresentation claims; continuing representation can delay when a client reasonably discovers harm caused by counsel.

Union Products Inc. v. Warner 7 Stackpole, L.L.P. · filed 2004-12-22

Claims for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice and misrepresentation are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See G.L.c. 260, §2A; G.L.c. 260, §4. ... The doctrine of continuing representation means that in the absence of fraud, it is not reasonable to expect clients to question the strategic advice of their attorneys for purposes of determining when the client knows that he, she or it has sustained harm. ... In view of the evidence that the defendants gave assurances to the plaintiffs that they would prevail, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs had notice that the harm was the result of their counsel’s conduct before 2002.

Section 2A's limitations period for a misrepresentation claim begins when the plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of the misrepresentation.

Soltys v. Wellesley Country Club · filed 2002-10-28

However, a misrepresentation accrues at the time a “plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of the misrepresentation.”

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a tort claim; a misrepresentation claim may accrue when an executed and recorded deed reveals the alleged omission.

Falby v. New England Forestry Foundation, Inc. · filed 2003-02-06

Pursuant to G.L.c. 260, §2A, a plaintiff has three years from the date the cause of action accrues to bring a suit that sounds in tort, such as the claims asserted by Ms. Falby. ... To the extent it was a misrepresentation not to place any conservation restrictions on the deed, that should have been known to Ms. Falby, or her attorney, through an inspection of the deed either at the time it was executed or any time after it was recorded with the registry of deeds. Thus, Ms. Falby’s cause of action accrued in 1980, more than twenly years ago, and is, therefore, time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations.

Section 2A allows three years after accrual to bring a personal injury tort action; the claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and has reason to suspect the defendant’s conduct caused it.

Medina v. Pillemer ex rel. Estate of Riskind · filed 2005-12-23

First, under G.L.c. 260, §4, which governs medical malpractice actions, as well as under G.L.c. 260, §2A, which governs tort actions to recover for personal injuries, a tort action against a physician must be commenced within three years “after the cause of action accrues.” ... This Court condudes that, in any personal injuiy tort action, regardless of whether it alleges the negligence of a physician or any other person, a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff (1) knows or should know that he was harmed, and (2) possesses sufficient information or becomes aware of such suspicious circumstances that he recognizes or should recognize that the defendant’s conduct may have caused the harm.

Section 2A gives a claimant three years to bring a fraud claim after due diligence could have uncovered the fraud.

In Re the Receivership Estate of Indian Motorcycle Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2003-08-07

Under both the Massachusetts and Colorado statute of limitation, a suit based on fraud is time barred three years after the fraud could have been discovered with due diligence. ... Mandelman’s statement at the creditors’ meeting was enough to put the Receiver on notice that he should investigate the status of the judgment. ... For the above reasons, the Receiver’s claim is barred by the statute of limitation.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a tort claim; under the discovery rule, accrual begins when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury.

McFarlane v. Commonwealth · filed 2007-07-16

In this case, it appears that McFarlane is bringing his civil claim under negligence. Under G.L.c. 260, §2A, “actions of tort, actions of contract to recover for personal injuries, and actions of replevin, shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues.” Id. Therefore, the statute of limitations in this case is three (3) years from when the cause of action accrued.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a misrepresentation claim, measured from when the plaintiff could first have discovered the misrepresentation.

Ferola v. Allstate Life Insurance · filed 2007-08-30

Rather than looking to the date of the misrepresentation to determine accrual, Massachusetts courts look to the date on which the plaintiff could first have discovered the misrepresentation. ... Because the Court determines that, at this stage, it cannot find that John could have discovered the particulars of his plan before Allstate failed to make continued payments to his beneficiary, the Court cannot determine at this stage that plaintiffs claim for misrepresentation is barred on statute of limitations grounds.

Under Section 2A’s three-year tort limitations period, the discovery rule delays accrual until the plaintiff knows or should know of the harm and has reason to suspect the defendant’s conduct caused it.

Nicolopoulos v. Town of Saugus · filed 2009-09-14

He thoroughly analyzed the state of the law and concluded that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff (1) knows or should know that she was harmed, and (2) possesses sufficient information or becomes aware of such suspicious circumstances that she recognizes or should recognize that the defendant’s conduct may have caused the harm. This Court supports the analysis performed by Judge Gants and adopts his articulation of the discovery rule. As a result, the Court must deny defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tort claim; a plaintiff seeking discovery-rule tolling must show that reasonable diligence would not have revealed the claim.

Sullivan v. Decision One Mortgage (In Re Sullivan) · filed 2006-07-21

In sum, to overcome the statute of limitations set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A, the Debtor had the burden of establishing a fiduciary relationship. ... The Debtor was required to establish that, despite reasonable diligence, she was unable to discover her causes of action against the Lenders.

Section 2A gives tort claims a three-year limitations period; under the discovery rule, the period is tolled until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the harm.

Miles v. Beneficial Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 2007-02-12

The Court concludes that on the record before it, there is a dispute of fact as to whether she filed her complaint within three years of when she alleges she learned of her alleged injury from the $8,000 transfer, so that allegations of tortious conduct in regard thereto are not barred by the limitation statute.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim, beginning when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its cause.

Koe v. Mercer · filed 2007-11-21

Because we conclude that the plaintiff reasonably should have known by February 22, 1999, that there was a causal link between the alleged abuse and the emotional problems he suffered, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court that the plaintiff’s claim is barred by G. L. c. 260, § 2A.

Section 2A gives negligence claims three years from accrual, but the discovery rule can extend that period while the injury is undiscoverable.

LaFranchise v. Fontaine · filed 2008-12-10

Although the provisions of Mass.G.L.c. 260, §2A provide that claims for negligence must be brought within three years of the accrual of the cause of action,... the accrual date of a negligence action, for statute of limitations analysis, is subject to extension or tolling during the period of time that the injury or harm is undiscoverable by the injured party. ... In any event, whether or not the defects were inherently unknowable or undiscoverable within the periods of limitation or whether or not the alleged defective foundation should have been discovered within the limitations period presents questions of fact for determination by the fact finder.

Section 2A gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, appreciable harm.

Massachusetts v. Mylan Laboratories · filed 2008-12-23

The fraud claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A. ... Under the discovery rule, none of the statutes of limitation begin to run until the Commonwealth discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, that it had sustained appreciable harm as a result of the defendant’s conduct.

Section 2A gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period, with the discovery rule delaying accrual until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the harm.

Ellis v. DiPasquale · filed 2009-03-10

The applicable statutes on this point are G.L.c. 260, §2A, and c. 260 §4, which limit causes of action in fraud and malpractice, respectively, to three years from the date of alleged injuiy. ... “This discovery rule also applies to actions for fraud and misrepresentation.” ... As a consequence, Ellis’s claims against Peters are time-barred.

Section 2A gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period; a factual dispute about when the plaintiff should have discovered the claim can prevent dismissal on limitations grounds.

First Choice Armor & Equipment, Inc. v. Toyobo America, Inc. · filed 2010-05-25

In Massachusetts, the statute of limitations for fraud claims is three years from the date the action accrues. M.G.L. c. 260 § 2A. ... The Court finds that, at a bare minimum, a question of fact exists as to whether First Choice, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have detected its fraud claims earlier than August 18, 2006 (three years before the filing of its complaint). ... In light of the factual uncertainty concerning the tolling of the statute of limitations, resolution of that issue is inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 2A imposes a three-year limitations period on tort claims; for an invasion-of-privacy claim, the relevant event is disclosure of private information rather than its acquisition.

Taylor v. Swartwout · filed 2006-07-24

If material, that event would fall outside the three-year scope of the statute of limitations imposed on tort actions in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See M.G.L. c. 260, § 2A. However, that incident is not the basis of Taylor’s claim. A claim for invasion of privacy is based on the disclosure of sensitive, private information, not the tortious or illegal acquisition thereof. Ayash, 443 Mass. at 382, 822 N.E.2d 667. Taylor claims that, between 2000 and 2003, Swartwout disseminated private information in the documents at issue. Because Taylor’s complaint was filed on January 23, 2003, the statute of limitations does not bar his claim.

Section 2A allows three years to bring a tort claim; the period begins when the plaintiff has reason to investigate a possible injury.

Epstein v. C.R. Bard, Inc., Futuremed Interventional, Inc. Crossbow Ventures, Inc. · filed 2006-08-25

The relevant statute of limitations periods are: three years for tort claims (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A); four years for 93A violations (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 5A); and four years for breach of contract claims governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 2-725(1) and (2)). ... We agree that a reasonable person would have inquired into the issue and therefore find that the district court properly deemed Epstein to have been on inquiry notice as of October 10, 1999.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period begins when claimants have notice of facts sufficient to inform them of their claim.

Clay v. J.L. Hammett Co. · filed 2010-10-08

The limitations period of three years, see G.L.c. 260, §2A, began to run in 2000. This action, commenced in 2006, falls outside the limitations period and is thus time-barred.

Section 2A requires tort claims to be filed within three years; the discovery rule does not extend that period when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the harm.

D'Alessandro v. Nipmuc, Inc. · filed 2007-01-16

Under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must file tort claims within three years of the incident giving rise to the cause of action. G.L.c. 260, §2A. ... A plaintiff can claim ignorance only up to the point where the plaintiff “in the exercise of reasonable diligence should not have known” about the harm.

Section 2A requires tort actions, including tort-based contribution claims, to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Brooslin v. Kimball · filed 2007-05-25

A tort action in Massachusetts must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. G.L.c. 260, §2A. Here, the cause of action upon which the plaintiffs’ claim for contribution is based accrued when McGahan filed her complaint with MCAD in 1994, and therefore such a tort-based claim for contribution is time barred.

Section 2A’s three-year limit for tort actions applies to common-law claims for post-arbitration interest based on a duty imposed by law rather than an agreement.

Meaney v. OneBeacon Insurance · filed 2010-03-05

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions imposed by G.L.c. 260, §2A applies to the plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 2A imposes a three-year limitations period on tort claims, subject to the discovery rule.

Kelley v. Iantosca · filed 2010-10-21

See G. L. c. 260, § 2A. The three-year period is subject to the discovery rule, see Patsos v. First Albany Corp., 433 Mass. 323, 328 (2001), but the record in this case shows unequivocally that Kelley was on notice of these defendants’ alleged misrepresentations no later than February 17, 2002, when he received the report of subsurface deficiencies. Nevertheless, he did not commence this action until January 12, 2006, more than three years later.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period does not begin based on an heir’s knowledge of an estate claim when the heir lacked authority to sue and that knowledge cannot be imputed to the administrator.

Heavey v. Maloof · filed 2009-02-20

The plaintiff initiated the present action within the three-year statute of limitations. Whatever knowledge he acquired, it was not before his appointment as administrator, on January 14, 1999. ... There is no basis to impute Suzanne’s knowledge to the plaintiff. Thus, suit was timely commenced on December 12, 2001.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period for a medical-monitoring tort claim begins when physiological changes substantially increase the risk of cancer and accepted diagnostic testing becomes medically necessary.

Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. · filed 2009-10-19

In short, the statute begins to run when (1) there is a physiological change resulting in a substantial increase in the risk of cancer, and (2) that increase, under the standard of care, triggers the need for available diagnostic testing that has been accepted in the medical community as an efficacious method of lung cancer screening or surveillance.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period begins no earlier than when the plaintiff suffers an injury.

Gallant v. City of Fitchburg · filed 2010-08-13

Defendants first argue that the complaint is barred by the three-year limitations period contained in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A. ... A cause of action does not accrue, at the earliest, until a plaintiff has suffered an injury. ... Because the complaint was filed within three years of the date of the injury, it is timely.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury action, beginning when the plaintiff reasonably knows of the injury and its likely cause.

Cormier v. Paris · filed 2010-02-04

The parties agree that the applicable statutes prescribe a three-year limitations period. G.L.c. 260, §2A; G.L.c. 106, §2-318. ... Anyone in Cormier’s position should have known that any injuries she sustained were caused by L’Oreal no later than May 22, 2003; therefore, the statutes of limitations expired by May 22, 2006 at the latest — nine days before this action was commenced.

Section 2A’s three-year limit barred fraud and conspiracy claims filed more than three years after the plaintiff learned of the allegedly wrongful sale.

Torrance Van & Storage Co. v. Depietri · filed 2011-09-23

Accordingly, for purposes of the statute of limitations, February 1,2005 is the date when Torrance’s causes of actions as to counts I and II accrued. As such, Torrance was obligated to file such claims by Februaiy 1, 2008. Because Torrance failed to do so, this court finds that Torrance’s fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations and must be dismissed.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to file a civil conspiracy claim; the discovery rule does not toll that period when the injury was reasonably apparent at the mortgage closing.

Ossers v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P. · filed 2012-10-12

A claim for civil conspiracy is an action in tort and must “be commenced . . . within three years next after the cause of action accrues.” G.L.c. 260, §2A; ... The court concludes that BNY, Litton, and WMC are correct and that the claim for civil conspiracy began to accrue at the closing, on July 1, 2005, and thus, it should have been filed on or before July 1, 2008.

Section 2A’s three-year period for tort claims does not begin until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and that the defendant caused it.

Scott v. Mage, LLC · filed 2014-02-24

“Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations period of §2A does not start to run ‘until a plaintiff has first, an awareness of [his] injuries and, second, an awareness that the defendant caused [his] injuries.’ ” ... As a result, Scott’s direct claims against Davis, Freedman and Mage survive a summary judgment challenge based upon the applicable statutes of limitations.

Section 2A’s three-year limit for tort claims is subject to the discovery rule when earlier water leaks gave no indication of hazardous mold contamination.

Doherty v. Admiral's Flagship Condominium Trust · filed 2011-08-15

Tort claims in Massachusetts are governed by the three-year limitations period set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2A, amended by St. 1973, c. 777, § 1. ... We agree with the foregoing cases that without some indication of a hazardous contamination, the plaintiff could not have been aware that she was being exposed to toxic mold, regardless of when the leak began. ... We accordingly hold that the plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed, as the discovery rule applies to the negligence allegations as set forth in her complaint.

Section 2A gives fraud and fraudulent inducement claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the fraud.

First Choice Armor & Equipment, Inc. v. Toyobo America, Inc. · filed 2012-02-17

The statute of limitations period for fraud and fraudulent inducement claims is three years from the date the action accrues. ... To determine whether plaintiffs claims are time-barred, the Court must decide whether the undisputed facts, construed in the light most favorable to First Choice, establish that First Choice discovered or reasonably should have discovered the factual bases underlying its claims before August 18, 2006, i.e., three years before the Complaint was filed. Because genuine issues of material fact remain concerning the commencement of the statutory period, that question must be answered in the negative.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring an invasion of privacy tort claim, measured from when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the alleged injury.

Ortiz v. Mass Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2013-02-19

Ortiz’s claim for invasion of privacy is governed by the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions set forth in G.L.c. 260, §2A. ... Because Ortiz was aware of any putative injury suffered as a result of being examined by a doctor of physical therapy by at the latest by August 16, 2009, Count I is time-barred.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period for common-law claims may be tolled when the plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered the alleged misconduct earlier.

Genovesi v. Nelson · filed 2014-03-05

The pleadings allege with sufficient detail that Genovesi was misled by Nelson, assisted by Ricciardi and McCaffery, into believing he had placed his funds in a liquid low-risk investment, and that the truth was inherently unknowable, thus setting forth a legal basis to toll the statute of limitations.

A claim for a later discovered disease accrues when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the disease and its cause, and is subject to Section 2A’s three-year limit.

Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. · filed 2013-06-11

Thus, Marie’s cause of action for injuries resulting from her lung cancer accrued when she knew or reasonably should have known that she had developed lung cancer from smoking Lorillard’s Newport cigarettes. ... The plaintiff’s claims in this case are not time barred by the three-year statute of limitations in G. L. c. 260, § 2A, because his complaint was filed on June 28, 2004.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years after a tort claim accrues to sue; disputed facts about when the plaintiff discovered the harm and its cause can preclude summary judgment on that deadline.

Hammerberg v. Boy Scouts of America Corp. · filed 2015-08-13

The applicable statute of limitations, G.L.c. 260, §2A, states, in pertinent part, that: “actions of tort. . . to recover for injuries . . . shall be commenced only three years next after the cause of action accrues.” ... Given these material facts in dispute, summary judgment cannot be granted on this basis.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tort claim; under the discovery rule, the period begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the harm and its cause.

Commonwealth v. Tradition (North America) Inc. / Jampel · filed 2017-02-21

The tort8 and G. L. c. 93A claims against Jampel, Goldberg, Trinity, and FSA are subject, respectively, to three and four year statutes of limitation that typically accrue from the date of injury. See G. L. c. 260, §§ 2A (torts), 5A (c. 93A); Stark ... v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 232 (2000).9 ... Applying these principles here, we conclude it was error to dismiss the noncontribution claims based on the statutes of limitation.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a fraud claim; the period begins when the plaintiff has notice of the injury and its cause.

Kelly v. Waters Corp. · filed 2019-02-15

Even if we were to assume that Kelly did not have actual knowledge of fraud, he certainly had the means of detecting it. Accordingly, the discovery rule does not operate to toll the statute of limitations beyond February 17, 2007, with regard to the claims of fraudulent inducement, or beyond February 17, 2008, with regard to the alleged c. 93A violations.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a tort claim; a factual dispute over when the plaintiff should have discovered the harm can prevent summary judgment on timeliness.

Stanley v. Black · filed 2019-03-28

Under Massachusetts law, a tort claim must be brought within three years of the date when the cause of action accrues. M.G.L. c. 260 § 2A. ... As with the ’34 Act claim, there are sufficient facts in the record from which a reasonable jury could find that a reasonable Plaintiff should have known that they had a negligence cause of action no earlier than December 2014. I will not, therefore, grant summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are time-barred.

Section 2A gives tort and personal injury claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of both the injury and the defendant’s role in causing it.

In re Fresenius Granuflo/Naturalyte Dialysate Products Liability Litigation · filed 2015-01-02

The three-year statute of limitations period for tort-based claims does not begin to run until a plaintiff is aware or should have been aware both of the injury and that the defendant caused the injury.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims begins when the claimant discovers, or reasonably should discover, the harm if the discovery rule applies.

Moore v. Valle Auto Mall, Inc. · filed 2017-12-05

Such claims typically accrue on the date of injury unless, as here, the discovery rule applies. ... Thus, the claims did not accrue until October of 2005. ... The plaintiff filed her complaint within three years of that date, on January 9, 2008.

Section 2A gives plaintiffs three years to bring a tort claim; under the discovery rule, some claims accrue when the plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of the harm.

Stanley v. Schmidt · filed 2019-03-28

As with the '34 Act claim, there are sufficient facts in the record from which a reasonable jury could find that a reasonable Plaintiff should have known that they had a negligence cause of action no earlier than December 2014. I will not, therefore, grant summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs' negligence claims are time-barred.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring an unjust enrichment claim, measured from when the plaintiff confers a benefit on the defendant.

Clark v. First Resolution Investment Corp. · filed 2016-02-22

A three-year statute of limitations applies to claims for unjust enrichment. See G.L.c. 260, §2A. ... Any benefit that FRIC received from Clark did not occur until she made the first payment to FRIC as a consequence of actions that FRIC took after obtaining that judgment. Clark did not make any payment to FRIC until after April 2012, when the supplementary process action was instituted. This lawsuit was commenced within three years of that date, within the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 2A gives emotional distress tort claims a three-year limitations period, with the discovery rule affecting when that period begins if the plaintiff could not reasonably have known of the harm.

Arias v. City of Everett · filed 2019-12-04

It is undisputed that these tort claims are governed by the three-year statute of limitations found in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A. At issue in the instant case is when the causes of action accrued. The general rule is that a tort action accrues when the plaintiff is injured. Koe v. Mercer, 450 Mass. 97, 101, 876 N.E.2d 831, 836 (2007) (citations omitted). However, the “discovery rule” applies “to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run in circumstances where the plaintiff did not know or could not reasonably have known that he or she may have been harmed by the conduct of another.”

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period begins when a reasonably prudent plaintiff should have discovered the facts giving rise to the claim.

Birkenfeld v. Pamela Birkenfeld. · filed 2023-04-28

Whether Bradley's claims are timely under G. L. c. 260, § 2A, turns on when they accrued. ... We agree with the first judge that a reasonably prudent plaintiff would have made inquiry well before 2017 and that Bradley's claims are therefore time-barred.

Section 2A gives tort claims a three-year limitations period; when an injury is inherently unknowable, the discovery rule may delay accrual.

Ostrowski v. Ostrowski · filed 2023-11-20

Pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260 § 2A, tort actions have a three-year statute of limitations. ... Taking the allegations in Michael’s complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, he has plausibly alleged that he did not know in 2015 that William had harmed him and that a reasonable person in his position would not have suspected his injury at the time. ... Accordingly, Michael’s claims are not subject to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.

Section 2A gives plaintiffs three years to bring tort claims after they accrue; claims based on publicly posted images accrued when the images were published, and the discovery rule did not extend the deadline where plaintiffs failed to show their lack of knowledge was objectively reasonable.

Davalos v. Baywatch, Inc. · filed 2023-12-08

Accordingly, the statute of limitations was not tolled beyond the date of publication and Counts III-XII, inclusive, are time-barred.

Section 2A gives tort claims a three-year filing period; for claims arising from social media posts, accrual under the discovery rule depends on when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the harm.

CAMILA DAVALOS & Others v. BAY WATCH, INC. · filed 2024-09-04

General Laws c. 260, § 2A, establishes the default statute of limitations for tort claims, which must be "commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues." ... Claims for defamation, violation of the right to privacy, violation of the right of publicity, and related claims that arise from material posted to social media platforms accrue when a plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, that he or she has been harmed by the defendant's publication of that material.

Section 2A bars a negligence claim filed more than three years after the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the harm.

Kissi v. Santander Bank, N.A. · filed 2025-02-19

Where the appellant did not file his complaint until more than six years after he discovered that his safe deposit box was empty, the complaint was outside the statute of limitations.

A breach of fiduciary duty claim has a three-year limitations period that may be tolled until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury.

Maffeo v. White Pines Investments · filed 2021-04-28

In Massachusetts, claims for breach of fiduciary duty are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See M.G.L. c. 260, § 2A. ... That describes a factual predicate which, if proved, would warrant the tolling of the statute of limitations until that alleged discovery date. If the limitation period was tolled, plaintiff filed his complaint within it.

Section 2A’s three-year period for personal injury claims began when Smith knew he was harmed and believed McKesson’s bandages were partly responsible.

SAMUEL SMITH v. MCKESSON MEDICAL-SURGICAL INC. & Others. · filed 2024-09-18

Here, the allegations of Smith's complaint showed that by October 2018, more than three years before he filed the complaint, he knew he had suffered harm and he believed McKesson's bandages to be partly responsible.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, measured from when the plaintiff discovers or should discover actionable harm.

JEFFREY T. SCUTERI, JR. v. MARIA-PIA SHUMAN & Another. · filed 2025-02-28

They assert that the claim accrued when Shuman told Scuteri he was the father of her child in June 2015, yet the complaint was not filed until July 2018, more than three years later, and thus outside the limitations period established by G. L. c. 260, § 2A. For three reasons, we reject this argument. ... Finally, the defense fails on the merits. ... It was only when Scuteri learned that the defendants' claim of his paternity was knowingly false, and when they threatened him with a video of him having sex with Shuman, that he suffered harm of the type sufficient to support an IIED claim. The complaint alleged that those events occurred in or after April 2016, which was less than three years before the complaint was filed. The IIED claim was therefore timely.

Section 2A gives tort claims a three-year filing period, with the discovery rule potentially delaying accrual until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the harm.

Ryan v. Quinlan · filed 2025-09-19

Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A, “actions of tort . . . shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues.” ... “Accordingly, at this early stage of litigation, it is premature to determine whether the discovery rule applies or plaintiff’s claim is time-barred.”

Section 2A applies a three-year limitations period to negligence claims.

Szulik v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2013-03-25

It is undisputed that claims for negligence are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under both Massachusetts and New York law. ... This court finds that the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to avoid dismissal at this juncture in the case.

Section 2A's former two-year limit for tort claims is not tolled merely because a plaintiff is unwilling to sue creditors who are forbearing on a default.

Babco Industries, Inc. v. New England Merchants National Bank · filed 1978-10-04

It is possible to imagine circumstances in which duress might toll the statute (see Annot., 121 A.L.R. 1294 [1939]), but the most that appears on the allegations in the present complaint is an unwillingness to initiate legal proceedings against creditors who are forbearing to exercise their rights on default. ... As the then applicable two year tort statute of limitations (G. L. c. 260, § 2A) was not tolled, the limitations period expired well before July 15,1975, when the four year statute of limitations (G. L. c. 260, § 5A) became effective.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period is not tolled because a plaintiff did not know the legal basis for a claim.

Zampell v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. · filed 1983-03-01

Although three years had run since William Zampell, the husband of the plaintiff, suffered an injury which she attributes to the negligence of William’s employer, the plaintiff asks that the bar of the statute of limitations (G.L. c. 260, § 2A) be lifted for the reason that her action for emotional distress and loss of consortium was inherently unknowable until the court articulated such a cause of action in Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, 381 Mass. 507 (1980). The same argument was advanced and rejected in Armstrong v. Carlyle Constr. Co., 532 F.Supp. 939, 940-941 (D. Mass. 1982), which we follow.

Section 2A gives plaintiffs three years from accrual to bring a tort action, and a pending worker's compensation claim does not toll that period.

Hemric v. Reed and Prince Manufacturing Company · filed 1984-07-05

Finally, Hemric contends that the three year statute of limitations provided by Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 260, Sec. 2A was tolled during the pendency of his worker's compensation claim. ... Though these may be good arguments, we must reject Hemric's appeal because we do not believe that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts would find that the statute was tolled by the pendency of his compensation claim.

Section 2A’s three-year tort limitation period is not tolled merely because a defendant leaves Massachusetts without a forwarding address when the plaintiff can file suit and seek alternative service.

Fahey v. Ingram · filed 1987-03-23

The question presented to the appellate division centers on whether the three year statute of limitations for tort actions, G. L. c. 260, §2A, bars the claim of plaintiff against defendant. ... To adopt plaintiffs stance would allow suit to be postponed indefinitely. This result was clearly not intended by the legislature.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period for a tort action is not tolled while the plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings are pending.

Zirpolo-D'Orlando v. Hazel · filed 1990-04-20

We conclude, therefore, that the Statute of Limitations was not tolled during the period incident to the plaintiffs bankruptcy proceedings; and, that, the trial judge was correct in his allowance of the defendant's motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment.

Section 2A’s limitations defense cannot support summary judgment when an affidavit raises a factual issue about reliance on an insurer’s statements in delaying suit.

Drumheller v. Kirby · filed 1995-01-06

In opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment asserting that the plaintiff’s action is time barred by the application of G.L.c. 260, §2A, the plaintiff’s counsel filed an affidavit stating that he relied upon statements made by an agent of the defendant’s insurer for failing to commence an action prior to the running of the statute of limitations. ... In this case, the affidavit of counsel in opposition to the motion relates to a material fact and precludes allowance of the motion. The denial of the motion was correct.

Section 2A’s three-year limit for tort actions is tolled under § 7 while the person entitled to sue is incapacitated by mental illness.

Howe v. Johnston · filed 1996-01-23

If it is shown that Adeline was incapacitated and the incapacity continued until her death, the action, filed on July 18, 1991, was timely since it was brought within three years of her death.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period is not equitably tolled by filing an arbitration claim.

Shafnacker v. Raymond James & Associates, Inc. · filed 1997-08-14

The statute of limitations is not tolled by the plaintiff’s filing of her arbitration claim.

Section 2A’s three-year limit for negligence actions may be equitably tolled when a plaintiff timely files a defective pleading and diligently continues pursuing the claim.

Lamboy v. Wellpath LLC · filed 2025-09-30

Equitable tolling is to be used sparingly. The court finds that this unique procedural background merits equitable tolling of the statute of limitations as to Plaintiff’s negligent training claim.

Section 2A sets a three-year limitations period for tort claims, with accrual governed by the discovery rule and the period subject to applicable tolling.

Vuksanovich · filed 2025-09-30

Under the applicable provisions of Massachusetts law, any tort, breach of warranty, or consortium claims that accrued in the three years preceding the filing of the Complaint—that is, on or after October 14, 2017—would be timely. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 260, §§ 2A, 2-318 (West); Olsen, 388 Mass. at 176-77. ... For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred under Massachusetts law because they accrued before June 30, 2017, beginning on or around June 16, 2017.

Section 2A gives a plaintiff three years to bring a loss of consortium claim after it accrues.

DEVINE v. PHILIP MORRIS USA INC. & Others. · filed 2026-04-09

Because the cause of action accrued years before Catherine's death and the present action was filed nearly three years after her death, the claim for loss of consortium was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. G. L. c. 260, § 2A.

Section 2A imposes a three-year limitations period on tort claims, including unjust enrichment claims whose gist sounds in tort.

Schoonover v. Burnell Controls, Inc. · filed 2026-02-26

The three-year limitations period under G.L. c. 260, § 2A, applies to Burnell’s proposed counterclaims for fraud, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty by diverting corporate opportunity, and civil conspiracy. The proposed counterclaim for unjust enrichment is based on allegations that Schoonover breached his fiduciary duties by working for Burnell and Edge at the same time. Since the “gist of the action” sounds in tort, the three-year limitations period applies.

Section 2A’s three-year tort limitations period applies when the gist of a claim is tortious conduct, even if the claim is framed as a breach of contract.

CRANBERRY COMMONS CONDOMINIUM, LLC, & Others v. PETER R. BARBAGALLO & Another. · filed 2025-07-21

In the present case, the plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proving that the facts take their claims in counts I and II outside of the three-year statute of limitations period applicable to torts.

Section 2A’s then two-year limit for tort actions applies to § 1981 employment-discrimination claims because those claims sound in tort.

Ware v. Colonial Provision Co., Inc. · filed 1978-10-27

Inasmuch as the complaint was not filed within the then applicable period prescribed by Mass.G.L. c. 260 § 2A for a tort action, it must be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2A’s limitations period applies to malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims.

Cuddy v. Sweeney · filed 1979-03-14

Both claims are also barred by the statute of limitations governing malicious prosecution and abuse of process actions, G. L. c. 260, § 2A, as amended by St. 1973, c. 777, § 1, a fact that is manifest on the face of the pleading.

Section 2A generally treats a tort claim as accruing when the plaintiff is injured; an inherently unknowable claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know the facts giving rise to it.

Dinsky v. Town of Framingham · filed 1982-07-20

It is a well-settled rule that causes of action in tort generally accrue under G. L. c. 260, § 2A, at the time that the plaintiff is injured. ... We have also held on numerous occasions that when a cause of action in either contract or tort is based on an inherently unknowable wrong, it accrues when the injured person knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.

Section 2A gives plaintiffs three years to bring a tort action, beginning when they suffer injury.

Joseph A. Fortin Construction, Inc. v. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency · filed 1984-07-11

While the point at which negligence actions accrue is not provided in the statute, it is a well-settled rule that causes of action in tort generally accrue under G. L. c. 260, § 2A, at the time the plaintiff is injured.

Section 2A provides a two-year limitations period for tort claims arising before January 1, 1974, and a three-year period for claims arising on or after that date.

Palandjian v. Pahlavi · filed 1985-08-16

For claims arising in tort, the Massachusetts statute provides a two-year limitations period for claims arising before January 1, 1974, and a three-year limitations period for claims arising on or after that date. ... Because these events took place in 1970 and 1971, the limitations period for the conversion claim ordinarily would have expired no later than 1973.

Section 2A requires tort claims to be filed within three years after they accrue; a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the harm.

Whitcomb v. Pension Development Co., Inc. · filed 1986-12-31

Plaintiffs’ tort claims are governed by Mass. Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2A, which provides that tort claims must be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. ... At that point, plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known of the harm caused by defendants’ conduct, and the facts giving rise to their cause of action.

Section 2A gives plaintiffs three years from an alleged tortious act to bring a fraud claim.

Brodeur v. American Rexoil Heating Fuel Co. · filed 1982-02-10

Assuming, without deciding, that there is evidence of fraud by the defendants in obtaining the releases and the stock owned by the various plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were bound by the applicable statute of limitations to commence legal action within three years of the alleged tortious act. G. L. c. 260, § 2A. Since the stock transfer is alleged to have occurred sometime in 1968 and the releases were executed on April 8,1970, the time for bringing suit had expired long before this action was commenced on May 28, 1980.

Section 2A’s three-year limitations period does not apply to adjudications of paternity in criminal nonsupport proceedings.

Commonwealth v. Gruttner · filed 1982-03-02

We conclude the case law and the analogous statutory provisions demonstrate that no statute of limitations should apply to an action for the adjudication of paternity.

Section 2A gives three years from accrual to bring a third-party tort action under the workers’ compensation statute; that period does not require an insurer to sue to preserve its reimbursement right.

Pina v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1983-02-14

General Laws c. 260, § 2A, is a general statute of limitations, requiring a party to commence a tort action within three years of the time the cause of action accrues. General Laws c. 152, § 15, has no limitation of time expressed therein, but a third-party action under G. L. c. 152, § 15, must be commenced within the time constraints of G. L. c. 260, § 2A. ... Section 15 does not impose any obligation on the insurer to institute a suit within the time prescribed by G. L. c. 260, § 2A, in order to preserve its right to reimbursement.

Section 2A’s three-year limitation does not displace the special two-year limitation for claims against the MBTA.

Hearn v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 1983-06-10

We read the plaintiff s brief as arguing that the Legislature impliedly repealed the two-year statute of limitations created in 1964 in G. L. c. 161 A, § 21, when, in 1973, it extended from two years to three years the time constraints in §§ 2A and 4 which limit the commencement of personal injury and property damage actions similar to those encompassed by § 21. ... Furthermore, the Legislature has specifically recognized the viability of special statutes of limitation such as that contained in § 21. General Laws c. 260, § 19, provides: “If a special provision is otherwise made relative to the limitation of any action, any provision of this chapter inconsistent therewith shall not apply.” Section 21 is such a special provision.

Section 2A's three-year limit applies to a damages claim whose essential nature is deceit, even when the plaintiff frames it as a claim under a sealed contract.

Solomon v. Birger · filed 1985-04-22

In choosing the correct limitations period we look to the essential nature of the action, not its form. Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 85 (1974). Here the essential nature is deceit.

Section 2A’s three-year tort limitations period governs Title I LMRDA claims in Massachusetts.

Doty v. Sewall · filed 1986-02-10

Thus, we hold that Massachusetts’ three year statute of limitations for tort actions, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2A, governs appellant’s claims under the LMRDA.