223A Mass. Gen. Laws § 3

Section 3(a) does not give Massachusetts personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent based on brief stays in the Commonwealth years before a child support action.

Morrill v. Tong · filed 1983-09-13(a)

The defendant’s two brief stays in Massachusetts, consisting of four months in 1962 and one month in 1970, do not bring him within the reach of G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation that solicits Massachusetts retailers and makes regular sales in the state.

Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc. · filed 1983-11-10(a)

In our view, Wool Masters’ solicitation letter and its sales totalling approximately $8800 to Massachusetts retailers authorize jurisdiction over the corporation.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a business with regular, continuing dealings with Massachusetts retailers, even when it conducts those dealings by mail and telephone.

Balloon Bouquets, Inc. v. Balloon Telegram Delivery, Inc. · filed 1984-07-24(a)

Because we find that the defendant is susceptible to personal jurisdiction under § 3(a) of G. L. c. 223A, we need not consider the plaintiff’s additional argument that jurisdiction is also conferred by section 3(c), which applies to persons “causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth.”

Section 3(a) does not permit personal jurisdiction based on proposed contract modifications sent to Massachusetts when the modifications never became part of the agreement and the claim did not arise from those contacts.

Cadman v. Bond · filed 1985-03-13(a)

The contract modifications proposed by the Bonds are similarly insufficient to provide a basis for jurisdiction. To begin with, none of the modifications proposed in Florida and received in Massachusetts ever became a part of the agreement. Therefore, it is impossible for the cause of action to have arisen out of these contacts as required by the statute.

Section 3(a)'s transacting business requirement can be satisfied by a single guaranty communicated to a Massachusetts party, even without other business in the state.

Bond Leather Co., Inc. v. Q.T. Shoe Mfg. Co., Inc. And Martin S. Nadler, Bond Leather Co., Inc. v. Q.T. Shoe Mfg. Co., I · filed 1985-06-18(a)

We thus reject the argument that the assertion of jurisdiction under § 3(a) is unauthorized here simply because M.N., Inc. has transacted no business other than the execution of the-guaranty in question.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim arises from that business; mailing admission materials and an acceptance letter can satisfy the business requirement.

Hahn v. Vermont Law School · filed 1983-01-21(a)

The purposeful actions of VLS in mailing to Hahn in Massachusetts application information and an acceptance letter were sufficient, without more, to constitute transacting business under the broadly construed Massachusetts long-arm statute. ... Although the Massachusetts courts have not defined the scope of the “arising from” requirement of the long-arm statute, we have no doubt that it has been satisfied when the cause of action is for an alleged breach of contract and the business transacted was instrumental in the formation of the contract.

Section 3 permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s Massachusetts business activities are sufficiently connected to the plaintiff’s injury claim.

Lavoie v. General Aerospace Materials Co., Inc. · filed 1984-02-14

Based on the undisputed facts discussed above, I rule that defendant’s contacts with Massachusetts are sufficient to meet the requirements of the state’s long-arm statute. ... By these facts, plaintiff has made a sufficient showing that his cause of action arose from defendant’s activities relative to Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) and (b) do not support personal jurisdiction based on a single alleged warranty agreement when the defendant’s contacts with Massachusetts are negligible.

Hood v. American M.A.N. Corp. · filed 1985-06-21(a), (b)

We do not enter upon general theory, ... as it is fairly clear by previous decision that in the circumstances the single agreement of warranty (whether conceived to have been “made” in the Commonwealth or elsewhere) did not satisfy the provision dealing with the transaction of business, subsection (a) of c. 223A, § 3, or that covering the contracting to supply services or things, subsection (b),... each with the constitutional overlay.

Section 3(a) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s business activity in Massachusetts; a tenuous connection is insufficient.

V & V Corp. v. American Policyholders' Insurance · filed 1985-10-30(a)

We decline to read the statute’s “arising from” language as API does, to the effect that the tenuousness of the connection matters not at all.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction based on transacting business in Massachusetts only when the claim arises from that business.

Gray v. Michael T. O'Brien and the Sugarloaf Mountain Corporation · filed 1985-12-03(a)

The phrase “transacting any business in the commonwealth” must be read together with the prior phrase “cause of action in law or equity arising from.”

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantors when a claim arises from their negotiation of guarantees and the underlying contract in Massachusetts.

Beaver Builders v. Schnip Building · filed 1985-12-05(a)

In this case, the negotiation of the guarantee and the underlying contract in Massachusetts, along with the execution of the guarantee itself, satisfies the literal requirement of § 3(a) that the cause of action arise out of the defendants transacting business in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from a defendant’s business activities in Massachusetts.

Eatable Greetable Products, Inc. v. Sweet Stop Inc. · filed 1986-02-13(a)

For the reasons discussed below, I rule that this action “arises from” the defendants’ “transacting any business” in Massachusetts within the meaning of Mass. Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 223A, § 3.

Section 3(a) covers an out-of-state buyer’s repeated telephone orders from a Massachusetts seller as transacting business in the Commonwealth.

L & P Converters, Inc. v. H.M.S. Direct Mail Service, Inc. · filed 1986-05-09(a)

Converters argues that through the course of transactions outlined above Direct Mail “transacted” business in the Commonwealth within the meaning of the Massachusetts Long Arm statute, Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 223A, § 3(a). The Court agrees. Direct Mail’s course of conduct here constitutes transacting business under the broad construction given that term by our Court of Appeals in its interpretation of Massachusetts law.

Section 3(c) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose alleged fraudulent communication causes tortious injury in Massachusetts; under § 3(a), sending a telex to Massachusetts from which the claim arises can constitute transacting business there.

The Ealing Corporation v. Harrods Limited · filed 1986-05-16(a), (c)

Ealing’s affidavits and exhibits are sufficiently specific to sustain jurisdiction under 223A § 3(c) and withstand a motion to dismiss on the pleadings. ... Here, the cause of action arose from the sending of a telex to plaintiff in Massachusetts. We hold that the “transacting any business” requirement of § 3(a) has been met.

Section 3(a) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s Massachusetts business transaction; a Massachusetts hotel reservation does not satisfy that requirement for an injury at the Hawaii hotel.

Mary Marino and Thomas Marino v. Hyatt Corporation · filed 1986-06-16(a)

But it is not enough for the purposes of section 3(a) that a defendant transact business in Massachusetts. The cause of action itself must “aris[e] from” the defendant’s transacting of business in Massachusetts. ... We conclude that it would be a case of the tail wagging the dog to hold that plaintiffs’ claims for personal injuries suffered in a Hawaii hotel “aris[e] from” their alleged Massachusetts contract with Hyatt making a hotel reservation.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction based on transacting business in Massachusetts only when the claim arises from that business.

Catrone v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc. · filed 1986-11-12(a)

Exercise of jurisdiction under § 3(a) will fail if the cause of action did not arise from defendant’s transaction of business in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from substantial business with a Massachusetts resident, even if the work was performed outside Massachusetts.

Kehoe v. Boat Sara T., Inc. · filed 1987-02-17(a)

Even considering the business transacted with Whipple alone, the substantial amount of money ($39,855.78 for repairs and store purchases) involved in the repairs of a boat known to belong to a Massachusetts-based person or corporation indicates a significant business transaction with Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) requires a plaintiff facing a personal jurisdiction challenge to establish facts showing that its claim arose from business the defendant transacted in Massachusetts.

Raleigh Rug Co. v. R.A. Civitello Co. · filed 1987-03-31(a)

In our view, the only facts which have been established for the purposes of the motion to dismiss are insufficient to warrant a finding that the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of whatever business the defendant may have “transact[ed]” in Massachusetts within the meaning of G. L. c. 223A, § 3(a).

Persistent advertising aimed at cultivating a Massachusetts market constitutes transacting business under § 3(a), even without other contacts in the Commonwealth.

Gunner v. Elmwood Dodge, Inc. · filed 1987-04-17(a)

More precisely put, then, the issue in the case is: Does the dissemination, on a persistent basis, of advertising, print and electronic, aimed at cultivating a market area in Massachusetts, without any other contact in Massachusetts, constitute transacting business for purposes of G. L. c. 223A, § 3(a)? ... We think it does.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction based on a person's Massachusetts business activities undertaken for a corporation, even if the person is not the corporation's alter ego.

Yankee Group, Inc. v. Yamashita · filed 1988-01-20(a)

In the absence of any authority indicating that Massachusetts recognizes the fiduciary shield doctrine, the Court rules that jurisdiction under the Massachusetts long-arm statute may be predicated on activities undertaken in a corporate capacity without regard to whether the individual defendant is an “alter ego” for the corporation.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state parent corporation that runs its subsidiary’s operations in Massachusetts.

Kleinerman v. Morse · filed 1989-01-26(a)

Running the operations of a subsidiary in Massachusetts constitutes a breadth of business activity that necessarily involves exercise of the privilege of conducting business here.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a person transacts business in Massachusetts directly or through an agent and the claim arises from that transaction.

Jet American Companies v. Dangerous Co. · filed 1989-03-07(a)

There is no question, and we so conclude, that the defendant(s) either directly or bv an agent transacted and that the alleged cause of action arose from such transaction.

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state hotel based on an advertisement in Massachusetts and later settlement negotiations.

Rye v. Atlas Hotels, Inc. · filed 1989-03-07(a)

From the facts of the case, the only activity of the defendant in the Commonwealth was the advertisement in the Bulletin. Our courts have already decided that such activity, alone, can not sustain application of the statute. ... The plaintiff attempts to add the settlement negotiations as a form of doing business by the defendant within the Commonwealth. This court rejects this position.

Section 3 requires a nexus between the claim and conduct affecting Massachusetts.

Debreceni v. Bru-Jell Leasing Corp. · filed 1989-03-21

But all the bases for the assertion of personal jurisdiction contained in section 3 require some nexus between the claim asserted and conduct affecting the Commonwealth.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim arises from that activity.

Shipley Co., Inc. v. Clark · filed 1990-01-16(a)

Here, the cause of action arose from the business transacted, and the jurisdictional requirements of § 3(a) are satisfied.

Section 3(a) treats a nonresident seller’s vehicle demonstration in Massachusetts as transacting business when the buyer’s claim arises from the resulting sale.

A-Connoisseur Transportation Corp. v. Celebrity Coach, Inc. · filed 1990-08-16(a)

Applying that generous standard to the instant case reveals that Celebrity indeed transacted business. Specifically, it drove a van to Massachusetts and showed it to plaintiff. According to plaintiff, it also signed a sales agreement while here. Moreover, plaintiffs cause of action arises from the purchase of this van. In my judgment, this activity is sufficient to satisfy c. 223A, § 3.

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on advertising in national trade magazines that is not aimed specifically at Massachusetts customers.

Rhodes v. Tallarico · filed 1990-10-30(a)

PNG’s trade magazines do not appear to be aimed specifically at Massachusetts customers. PNG’s advertising, therefore, does not subject it to jurisdiction under Massachusetts’s long-arm statute.

Section 3(a)’s transacting business requirement is not satisfied by a single shipment to a company in Massachusetts.

P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc. v. New England Tech Air, Inc. · filed 1990-11-29(a)

In this case there is even less reason to find personal jurisdiction under § 3(a). The plaintiff in this case is a Florida corporation. The record shows only a single shipment by the defendant to a company in Massachusetts. Under Droukas, this contact does not satisfy § 3(a).

Section 3(a) covers purposeful acts performed in Massachusetts, including signing a trust amendment that creates an ongoing fiduciary relationship when the claim arises from that relationship.

Johnson v. Witkowski · filed 1991-06-19(a)

The motion judge was correct in concluding the defendants were “transacting business” in Massachusetts within the meaning of G. L. c. 223A, § 3(a), the so-called “long-arm” statute. As used in the statute the term “transacting business” does not require purely commercial activity but is used to embrace any purposeful acts performed in Massachusetts, whether personal, private, or commercial.

Section 3(a) requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant transacted business in Massachusetts to obtain personal jurisdiction on that basis.

Welford v. Nobrega · filed 1992-02-18(a)

Our review of the record satisfies us that Welford did not establish in the Superior Court that the bank, which has no office, mailing address, telephone listing, or employees in Massachusetts, had transacted business in Massachusetts within the meaning of the Massachusetts long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a) (1990 ed.).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from a nonresident’s telephone and mail negotiations for the sale of Massachusetts land.

Haddad v. Taylor · filed 1992-03-30(a)

In the case at bar, the defendant negotiated with the plaintiff for the sale of land located in Massachusetts. He spoke on the telephone with the plaintiff (who was in the Commonwealth) as well as with his Massachusetts attorney, and wrote to that attorney in Massachusetts. The cause of action arose out of those negotiations and negotiations with a Massachusetts real estate broker hired by the defendant.

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a resort operator for injuries at an out-of-state resort when the claims do not arise from its Massachusetts contacts.

Fournier v. Best Western Treasure Island Resort · filed 1992-04-24(a)

We think it follows, ineluctably that here, as in Marino, id. at 431, plaintiff’s claims for personal injuries suffered at the out-of-state situs, regardless of how creatively her cause of action is la-belled, did not “aris[e] from” the affected defendant’s contacts with Massachusetts. Consequently, applying our earlier precedent, jurisdiction cannot be premised on Mass.Gen.Laws. ch. 223A, § 3.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a partner when another partner’s business contacts with Massachusetts are attributable to the partnership and the claim arises from that business.

Maker v. Bermingham · filed 1992-06-02(a)

Thus, the jurisdictional issue turns on whether Ted was Norma’s agent for the purpose of applying G. L. c. 223A, § 3. ... On the basis of the materials before the judge, which we accept as true, the motion was correctly denied. The plaintiff made an adequate showing that the defendants were in partnership, that the partnership entered into the agreement sued upon, and that the partnership was in default of its obligations under the agreement, causing damages to the plaintiff.

Section 3(a) reaches a defendant that negotiates a collective bargaining agreement in Massachusetts when the claim arises from that transaction of business.

United Electrical Radio and MacHine Workers of America (Ue). v. 163 Pleasant Street Corporation · filed 1993-03-03(a)

Without question, ITDH’s and ITD’s activities during the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, ... must, even under the narrowest possible construction of the term, be construed as a “transaction of business” within Massachusetts. Moreover, plaintiffs’ cause of action clearly arose from this transaction of business. Thus, ITDH and ITD fall within the reach of the Commonwealth’s long-arm statute.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a declaratory judgment action arises from a defendant’s Massachusetts business contacts, including sales and calls about alleged patent infringement.

Der-Tex Corp. v. Thatcher · filed 1993-03-09(a)

Adopting the logic of the Medtronic court, and the interpretation left open to it by the Nova Biomedical court, this Court holds that Plaintiff Der-Tex’s cause of action “arose from” Defendant Thatcher’s business contacts with Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) can support personal jurisdiction based on a guaranty of a Massachusetts corporation’s obligations even without proof that the guaranty was signed in Massachusetts.

A.I. Credit Corp. v. Barmack, Inc. · filed 1993-04-23(a)

Contrary to Jackson’s contentions, however, the absence of evidence of his in-state execution of the guaranty is not fatal to the plaintiff s successful invocation of Section 3 (a).

Section 3(a) requires the defendant to transact business in Massachusetts and the claim to have a rational nexus to that business; unrelated Massachusetts sales do not support jurisdiction over a separate contract dispute.

Irma S. Mann Strategic Marketing, Inc. v. Innovatex Research & Development, Inc. · filed 1993-12-31(a)

The plaintiff asserting jurisdiction must show a rational nexus between his cause of action and the transaction of business in Massachusetts by the defendant within the literal meaning of G.L.c. 223A, §3 (a). ... Because defendant’s only other Massachusetts business was with a distributorship in Lynn and was entirely independent from the transaction that is the subject of the case before the court, it does not add any weight to the plaintiffs position that the defendant’s activity satisfied the literal requirements of the long-arm statute as to “transacting business in this Commonwealth.”

Section 3(a) permits jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim would not have arisen but for that business, including a hotel injury following a Massachusetts reservation.

Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc. · filed 1994-01-13(a)

For jurisdiction to exist under § 3 (a), the facts must satisfy two requirements — the defendant must have transacted business in Massachusetts, and the plaintiff’s claim must have arisen from the transaction of business by the defendant. ... There is no readily apparent basis in the statutory language (“arising from”) for the restrictive proximate cause approach adopted by the First Circuit.

Section 3(a) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s business transacted in Massachusetts; the court applies a “but for” or “train of events” test to that connection.

Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada · filed 1994-02-25(a)

However, even applying the more generous Massachusetts standard, I cannot find that Foster-Miller has established the probability that “but for” BWC’s presence at the May 11, 1990, meeting in Waltham, its injury (if any) would not have occurred or that a sequence of'events was set into motion that ultimately caused harm to Foster-Miller.

Section 3(a) permits jurisdiction over a defendant whose substantial business in Massachusetts made the plaintiff’s claim possible, even when the plaintiff was not a party to that business.

Connecticut National Bank v. Hoover Treated Wood Products, Inc. · filed 1994-08-31(a)

Here, the return of the lumber by O’Connor, and the subsequent alleged conversion by Hoover, would not have occurred but for Hoover’s substantial volume of sales of lumber to O’Connor in Massachusetts. Thus, it can fairly be said that the bank’s claim against Hoover for conversion was “made possible by, or lies in the wake of,” Hoover’s transacting business in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident’s business dealings in Massachusetts give rise to the claim, even if its agents never enter the state.

Nelmor Co. v. Plastic Injectors, Inc. · filed 1994-09-12(a)

The subject matter of this action arises from Plastic’s transacting business in Massachusetts (viz, ordering and taking delivery of the 2036 machines). ... Applying the broad reading customarily employed in the construction of c. 223A, §3(a), this court finds jurisdiction under the Massachusetts longarm statute.

Section 3(a) reaches an employee’s purposeful business contacts with Massachusetts even when those contacts are part of the employee’s job.

Principal Mutual Life Insurance v. Glick · filed 1994-12-14(a)

Even though Stephany’s actions which brought her into contact with Massachusetts were part of her employment duties, they constitute the purposeful conduct that satisfies §3(a).

Section 3(a) and (b) permit personal jurisdiction over a nonresident company when its agent transacts business and contracts to supply products in Massachusetts.

Ottowitz v. Letourneau · filed 1995-01-09(a), (b)

The contacts are, therefore, sufficient to satisfy personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to G.L.c. 223A, §3(a). ... Accordingly, S.H. Frank & Company has the necessary contacts to satisfy section 3(b) of the longarm statute.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim arises from that business.

Phillips v. State of Rhode Island & Providence Plantations · filed 1995-03-27(a)

The court concludes that, under the circumstances of this case, Rhode Island’s actions constitute “transacting business” in Massachusetts as that term has been broadly construed. Further, FH&E’s claim for unpaid legal fees clearly arises out of Rhode Island’s “transacting business” in Massachusetts within the meaning of G.L.c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) requires a plaintiff’s injuries to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in Massachusetts; the court applies a “but for” test to that connection.

Johansen v. Budget Rent A Car Systems, Inc. · filed 1995-05-31(a)

General Laws c. 223A, §3(a), also requires that it be shown that plaintiffs’ injuries “arise from” Budget Corporation’s and Budget International’s transaction of business in Massachusetts. ... Here, this court concludes that plaintiffs’ injuries “arise from” Budget Corporation’s and Budget International’s transaction of business in Massachusetts. But for defendants’ advertising, marketing, and involvement in the management of Budget Systems in Massachusetts, plaintiffs may not have rented a car from Munro.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a manufacturer that transacts business in Massachusetts through the marketing, distribution, and sale of its products there.

Parmenter v. Hyundai Motor Co. · filed 1995-06-19(a)

Because I am satisfied that HMC “transacts business” in Massachusetts, I need not address the plaintiffs other arguments made pursuant to G.L.c. 223A, §3(b), (c) and (d).

Section 3 does not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state manufacturer merely because its product reaches Massachusetts through third parties and causes harm there.

National Gypsum Co. v. Continental Brands Corp. · filed 1995-07-14

The mere fact that the chemicals that Schenectady produced somehow found their way into Massachusetts through the actions of third parties and caused harm there is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Schenectady.

Section 3(a) covers an employee who purposefully seeks and accepts work for a Massachusetts company and maintains an ongoing business relationship with the Commonwealth.

EMC Corp. v. Smith · filed 1995-08-16(a)

Here, defendant Smith’s purposeful action in actively seeking and accepting employment as a district sales manager in a satellite San Francisco office of EMC’s central sales division is sufficient to constitute “transacting business” within the meaning of G.L.c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully and successfully solicits business from Massachusetts residents and the claim arises from that solicitation.

Light v. Roney · filed 1995-08-30(a)

Thus, the plaintiffs have established that the defendant purposefully and successfully solicited business from them in Massachusetts. That being so, and since their cause of action arises from such solicitation, the longarm statute gives this court jurisdiction over defendant.

Section 3(a) treats telephone communications and purposeful advertising in Massachusetts as transacting business when a contract claim arises from those contacts.

Salpoglou v. SHLOMO WIDDER, MD, PA · filed 1995-09-26(a)

The determinative issue as to personal jurisdiction over the defendant is whether the defendant’s forum-state contacts satisfy the requirements of the Massachusetts long-arm statute. Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 223A, § 3(a) (West 1988). In the case at hand, the series of telephone communications between Salpoglou and Widder or his agents and Wid-der’s purposeful advertisements in Massachusetts constitute transacting business in this Commonwealth.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from business transacted in Massachusetts, including related calls, meetings, and negotiations there.

Eastern Enterprises v. Shalala · filed 1996-03-30(a)

Plaintiffs affidavits indicate that the sale of EACC to Peabody involved telephone calls to individuals in Boston, as well as meetings and negotiations held in Boston. This activity is sufficient to satisfy the Massachusetts Long Arm Statute’s requirement that the cause of action arise out of the transacting of business in the Commonwealth.

Section 3(a) requires a defendant to have purposefully availed himself of conducting business in Massachusetts; whether an isolated transaction qualifies depends on the facts.

Mullen Bros. v. Jacobson · filed 1996-05-15(a)

To come within the reach of section (a), transacting any business in Massachusetts, it must be shown that the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) requires a plaintiff’s claim to arise from the defendant’s business activity in Massachusetts; an injury at an out-of-state resort does not qualify without evidence connecting the visit to that activity.

Sheridan v. Ascutney Mountain Resort Services, Inc. · filed 1996-05-16(a)

While Tatro certainly extended the jurisdictional reach of the Massachusetts long-arm statute beyond what the federal courts had previously allowed, it is not limitless in its application. Here, unlike Tatro, where the defendant not only accepted plaintiffs room reservation, but accepted it as part of a purposeful solicitation, Plaintiff has provided no competent evidence that she would not have been present at the resort on the day of her injury but for Defendant’s solicitation of business in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) requires specific facts showing that a defendant transacted business in Massachusetts and that the claim arose from that activity.

Harvard University v. Pretsch · filed 1996-06-10(a)

The plaintiff argues that long-arm jurisdiction may be based herein on the defendant’s G.L.c. 223A §3 (a) transaction of business in this Commonwealth. The plaintiff’s complaint alleges, however, only that unspecified goods and services were rendered to a non-resident defendant at an undisclosed place and time; the complaint is devoid of any indication that the plaintiff’s contract claim arose from any business or other “purposeful” activities by the defendant in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a hotel solicits business and accepts reservations in Massachusetts and the resulting stay gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim.

Ralph M. Nowak, Administrator of the Estate of Sally Ann Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd., D/B/A Holiday Inn Crowne Pl · filed 1996-09-20(a)

To satisfy the requirements of the long-arm statute, Section 3(a), the defendant must have transacted business in Massachusetts and the plaintiffs’ claim must have arisen from the transaction of business by the defendant. ... The factual scenario in the present case is analogous in all essential respects, and we therefore have little difficulty concluding that sufficient contacts exist to satisfy Section 3(a)’s requirements.

Section 3(a) permits jurisdiction over a declaratory action triggered by cease and desist letters when the defendant also solicited Massachusetts businesses.

Fabiano v. Starnet Development, Inc. · filed 1996-10-10(a)

The cease and desist letters, coupled with SDI’s prior solicitation of Massachusetts businesses is a sufficient basis for asserting personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.

Section 3(a) broadly covers claims arising from a nonresident’s transaction of business in Massachusetts; entering a purchase contract can qualify.

Larchmont Engineering & Irrigation, Inc. v. Jade Realty Corp. · filed 1996-11-08(a)

On the basis of its having entered into the purchase contract from which this action arises, Jade may be deemed literally to have transacted business in this Commonwealth within the meaning of G.L.c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a)’s transacting-business requirement is satisfied when a defendant orders goods through a Massachusetts business and pays it a commission.

Aerogroup International, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd. · filed 1996-12-24(a)

It is undisputed that Town Shoes and Gredico each ordered the allegedly infringing shoes through Marlboro in Massachusetts. In addition, each paid Marlboro a commission for its services. This is sufficient to constitute “transacting business” within the meaning of the Massachusetts long-arm statute.

Section 3(a) requires a defendant to transact business in Massachusetts and the claim to arise from that business.

Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n · filed 1997-02-13(a)

To establish jurisdiction under 3(a), it must be demonstrated that the defendant transacted business within the Commonwealth, and that the cause of action arises from such business.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction in this insurance dispute if the policy was contracted for in Massachusetts or the insured activity occurred there.

New Hampshire Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Markem Corp. · filed 1997-03-04(a)

To meet the requirements of § 3 (a) in this context, NHIGA must show that Markem either contracted for the policy in question in this State or that the activity the policy insured occurred here.

Section 3(a)’s transacting-business requirement is met when a contract with a Massachusetts resident is associated with other activities in the state.

Digital Equipment Corp. v. Altavista Technology, Inc. · filed 1997-03-12(a)

Where, as here, such a contract is “associated with other forum-related activities,” the transacting business requirement of section 3(a) is met.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the plaintiff’s claim arises from that business.

Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada · filed 1997-08-01(a)

The grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction over BWC under the first requirement of the transacting business test are St. Louis’s attendance at the May 11, 1990 meeting in Waltham, Massachusetts, and BWC’s faxing of the signed confidentiality agreement to FMI in Waltham. ... If, as alleged, BWC used this information in the development of its own hose, the “arising from” requirement of the test is met.

Section 3(d) permits personal jurisdiction for tortious injury in Massachusetts caused by conduct elsewhere when the defendant regularly solicits business in Massachusetts; an accessible advertising website, together with other business contacts, can satisfy that requirement.

Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc. · filed 1997-09-30(d)

By maintaining a Web site which can be continuously accessed by Massachusetts residents, combined with the actions discussed above, Clue Computing does regularly solicit business in Massachusetts through its Web site, and therefore satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of § 3(d).

Section 3(a) does not confer jurisdiction over a manufacturer based on an independent distributor’s Massachusetts business, and section 3(d) requires qualifying conduct by the manufacturer or its agent.

Greineder v. Drs. Foster & Smith, Inc. · filed 1997-11-25(a), (d)

Given the above standards, the court cannot conclude that BT transacted business in the Commonwealth within the meaning of Section 3 (a). ... Since the court has already determined that no agency relationship existed between the parties and the record reveals no facts to satisfy the standard articulated in Section 3(d), the court must conclude that jurisdiction is not authorized by Section 3(d).

Section 3(a) requires a nonresident guarantor’s own conduct to support jurisdiction; guaranteeing a single transaction with no commercial consequences in Massachusetts did not establish transacting business there.

Leasecomm Corp. v. Crockett · filed 1998-01-13(a)

Leasecomm argued only that the parties’ agreement was a Massachusetts contract because Leasecomm approved and signed the lease and guaranty in Massachusetts; that Crockett thus guaranteed a Massachusetts contract which provided for lease financing by a Massachusetts lender; and that such activities by Crockett constituted “transacting business” under G.L.c. 223A, §3(a). Leasecomm’s argument ignores the obvious and constitutionally dispositive consideration that Crockett’s activities were confined to this one contract and thus to participation in an “isolated transaction without commercial consequences in Massachusetts.”

Section 3 permits personal jurisdiction over a corporate successor that assumed the manufacturer’s liability for a product allegedly causing injury in Massachusetts.

Badonnel v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 1998-02-03

The Rule 12(b)(2) materials offered at bar are persuasive that Badonnel’s injury, allegedly resulting from the defective silicone breast implants, did occur in Massachusetts, that the manufacturer of the implants is liable for injuries resulting from a product defect, if any, and that defendant Baxter International, through its absorption of Baxter Travenol which had assumed the manufacturer’s liability when it merged with American Heyer-Schulte, has itself assumed manufacturer’s liability. Therefore, this complaint is properly within the reach of G.L.c. 223A, §3.

Section 3(a) permits jurisdiction over a claim arising from transacting business in Massachusetts, but a single purchase from a Massachusetts supplier is insufficient by itself.

Stanton v. AM General Corp. · filed 1998-02-23(a)

Section 3(a) of G.L.c. 223A authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a person in an action “arising from the person’s (a) transacting any business in the Commonwealth.” ... General’s single purchase of parts, however, from a Massachusetts supplier is insufficient, without more, to constitute transacting business under G.L.c. 223A, §3 (a).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s agents repeatedly solicit people in Massachusetts by telephone and in person.

American Management Services, Inc. v. Frye & Associates, Inc. · filed 1998-02-24(a)

Such solicitations involved telephone conversations as well as face to face meetings in Massachusetts, and satisfy the requirements set forth in c. 223A, §3.

Section 3 permits personal jurisdiction when a call into Massachusetts transacts business or causes tortious injury there, and the claims arise from that call.

Abbott v. Interactive Computing Devices, Inc. · filed 1998-02-27(a), (c)

The question is whether this telephone call, whatever its precise content, is sufficient to establish that Cho either transacted business in Massachusetts or caused tortious injury by an act occurring in the Commonwealth, and that the causes of action against him arose from this Massachusetts-connected conduct. I conclude that it is.

Section 3(a) permits jurisdiction when a nonresident’s business in Massachusetts gives rise to an insurer’s claim, even if the insurer was not a party to the local transactions.

Home Indemnity Co. v. KMG Minerals, Inc. · filed 1998-03-17(a)

Therefore, because KMG’s transactions within the Commonwealth caused the underlying action, and because the Home’s potential liability arises out of the underlying action, the court concludes that the Home’s injury arises out of KMG’s transacting business within the Commonwealth. The fact that the Home was not a party to the transactions between KMG and Consolidated is of no consequence. ... Accordingly, KMG is subject to personal jurisdiction under §3(a).

Section 3 permits personal jurisdiction based on specified acts, none of which applies when the defendant is not alleged to have acted in Massachusetts.

Depew v. Hawk · filed 1998-03-25

Massachusetts' long-arm statute, M.G.L. c. 223A, § 3, specifies certain acts which subject a person to long-arm jurisdiction. None of the acts specified applies here.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from a nonresident’s sufficiently substantial business transactions in Massachusetts.

Armron Corp. v. Kennedy · filed 1998-05-12(a)

The aggregate of Kennedy’s contacts with Armron in Massachusetts, see “Background,” supra, is sufficiently substantial to satisfy the “long-arm” prong of the jurisdictional analysis. See G.L.c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) covers claims arising from a nonresident’s Massachusetts business activity; § 3(c) requires tortious conduct in Massachusetts; and § 3(d) covers an out-of-state tort causing in-state injury when the defendant has qualifying Massachusetts business ties.

Better Boating Ass'n v. BMG Chart Products, Inc. · filed 1998-07-10(a), (c), (d)

The court concludes that jurisdiction over defendant BMG II, as corporate successor to BMG I, is appropriate under G.L.c. 223A, §3(a). ... Accordingly, this court concludes that the alleged tortious conduct of defendants occurred outside of Massachusetts and G.L.c. 223A, §3(c) does not apply. ... Accordingly, the court concludes that defendants did derive substantial revenues from BMG I’s products sold in Massachusetts, thereby satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of G.L.c. 223A, §3(d).

Section 3(a) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s Massachusetts business transactions; unrelated business contacts do not establish personal jurisdiction.

TX Media, Inc. v. Spice Entertainment Companies, Inc. · filed 1998-11-12(a)

Therefore, TXM has failed to establish that its claims arise from Graffs “transacting . . . business” in Massachusetts and, thus, that Graff is subject to in personam jurisdiction in Massachusetts under c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) is construed liberally: purposeful solicitation may satisfy its transacting-business requirement even when the resulting transaction is isolated.

Mega Industries v. Raynham Tire Recycling, Inc. · filed 1999-01-06(a)

The “transaction of any business” clause in §3 (a) of G.Lc. 223A has enjoyed a liberal construction in the courts of the Commonwealth. Solicitation of business in a purposeful manner may suffice to render what might otherwise be deemed an isolated and insignificant transaction permissible for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over defendants whose business transaction in Massachusetts gives rise to the claim, including defendants who hire a Boston law firm to perform substantial work there.

Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP v. Driggs Corp. · filed 1999-01-22(a)

Defendants also knew that the case was to be primarily staffed by attorneys in plaintiffs Boston office, and could reasonably expect that their nonpayment of legal fees would result in their being “hailed into a Massachusetts court.” Thus, the requirements of due process, as well as those of the long-arm statute, are met.

Section 3(a) reaches a defendant that initiates an ongoing business relationship with a Massachusetts company and maintains repeated contacts with it in the Commonwealth.

Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Central Florida Investments, Inc. · filed 1999-06-23(a)

The judge held, and we agree, that the contacts mentioned fell within the broad reach of the clause “transacting any business in this commonwealth” found in the long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3(a), as inserted by St. 1968, c 760.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction for claims arising from a defendant’s business transactions in Massachusetts, including visits and substantial correspondence connected to a contract.

Fairview MacHine & Tool Co. v. Oakbrook International, Inc. · filed 1999-07-21(a)

In this case, where two of the defendants’ employees, including Nuway’s plant manager, visited plaintiffs facility in Massachusetts and where the defendants sent substantial correspondence, including approximately $1,500,000, into the Commonwealth, the defendants transacted business within the meaning of the broadly construed Massachusetts long-arm statute.

Section 3 does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on a misrepresentation made in New York without a showing that the statute reaches that conduct.

Gordon & Co. v. Ross · filed 1999-09-03

Indeed, there has been no showing that the Massachusetts long-arm statute reaches Ross’s misrepresentation in New York.

Section 3(a) does not treat a single meeting at a prospective employer’s Massachusetts office as transacting business in the Commonwealth.

Unitrode Corp. v. Linear Technology Corp. · filed 2000-02-17(a)

Attendance at a single meeting, even if the meeting’s purpose were to discuss aspects of the job that each defendant was in the process of applying for, does not rise to the level of transacting business in the Commonwealth.

Section 3(a) requires facts showing that the defendant transacted business in Massachusetts and that the plaintiff’s claim arose from that transaction; working in Massachusetts alone does not establish the required connection.

Renaissance Worldwide Strategy, Inc. v. Bridge Strategy Group, LLC. · filed 2000-03-01(a)

The flaw with this affidavit, which also constitutes the only evidence submitted on this issue, is that working in Massachusetts as an employee of Renaissance, by itself, does not identify a business transaction which could give rise to Renaissance’s claims. It appears that Renaissance’s claims arise regardless of the Massachusetts contacts set forth in Hughes’ affidavit. As the plaintiffs have failed to offer affirmative facts on which this court can find personal jurisdiction under subsection (a), this Court finds that it cannot assert personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Section 3 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose regular business contacts with a Massachusetts plaintiff bring the complaint within its reach.

Nation One Mortgage Co. v. Barnett · filed 2000-03-28

The Rule 12(b)(2) materials offered are persuasive that Rehm, Frost, Voss, and Reed maintained an ongoing and regular pattern of contacts with plaintiff in Massachusetts and that each derived substantial benefits from such contacts. Therefore, this complaint is properly within the reach of G.L.c. 223A, §3.

Section 3(a) requires business transacted in Massachusetts, while §§ 3(c) and 3(d) can support jurisdiction over a website that sends allegedly infringing material into the state and regularly solicits business there.

Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club · filed 2000-03-31(a), (c), (d)

In the present case, the Plaintiff has not shown that any of the Defendants has attempted to solicit business and succeeded. ... Given entrance of the allegedly infringing material into Massachusetts, the Defendants’ knowledge of its potentially infringing nature, and their goal of doing business with Massachusetts residents, § 3(c) is satisfied. ... I find that the Defendants have regularly solicited business in Massachusetts.

Section 3 does not extend personal jurisdiction to a project performed in another state based only on incidental activities in Massachusetts.

Information Mapping Inc. v. Access Health Systems Inc. · filed 2000-05-10(a)

Ancillary activities which are only incidental to the performance of a project located within another state do not fall within the meaning of the Massachusetts long-arm statute.

Section 3(a) does not support personal jurisdiction when the defendant’s Massachusetts activities are too attenuated and the claim does not arise from its business in the Commonwealth.

MCL Associates, Inc. v. Heidelberg Web Systems, Inc. · filed 2000-06-12(a)

We conclude that the facts presented are insufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under G.L.c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a buyer whose substantial, sustained transactions with a Massachusetts supplier give rise to the claim, even if the buyer was never physically present in Massachusetts.

U.S. Plastics, Inc. v. Video Update, Inc. · filed 2000-07-15(a)

Given these facts, it is fair to say that Video Update “conducted business” in Massachusetts within the meaning of the statute.

Section 3(a) can reach a person who transacts business through an agent, even when the agent enters the agreements in its own name.

GSI Lumonics, Inc. v. Biodiscovery, Inc. · filed 2000-08-25(a)

An agency relationship is evident, and Shams is not immune from jurisdictional reach merely by virtue of his use of agents.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over directors who actively manage a transaction that constitutes transacting business in Massachusetts and gives rise to the claim.

Harbourvest International Private Equity Partners II-Direct Fund, L.P. v. Axent Technologies, Inc. · filed 2000-08-31(a)

The Defendant Directors were “transacting business” in this Commonwealth under §3(a) of the long-arm statute.

Under § 3(a), an injury at an out-of-state hotel arises from a Massachusetts business transaction when the injury would not have occurred but for a resident’s reservation.

Sigros v. Walt Disney World Co. · filed 2001-01-08(a)

Applying Tatro to the instant case, Johanna’s injury clearly “arose from” Sophie’s act of reserving a room at Caribbean Beach because “but for” that contact she would not have been injured.

Section 3(a) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in Massachusetts; the plaintiff must allege and support facts showing that business activity.

Barrett v. Veritas Offshore · filed 2001-01-17(a)

Compliance with the state standard for personal jurisdiction necessitates a showing that the cause of action arises from the defendant's "transacting any business" in Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(a), or from a tortious in-state "act or omission," id. § 3(c). ... The appellant failed even to allege — let alone offer competent proof — that Veritas had conducted any business in Massachusetts or that it had any significant ties to the state.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a guarantor whose contract negotiations by letter and telephone amount to transacting business in Massachusetts.

Papa Gino's, Inc. v. Baystate Bagel's, Inc. · filed 2001-05-11(a)

The evidence is sufficient to establish that he “transacted business” in the Commonwealth and therefore, the plaintiff has satisfied its burden under G.L.c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign employer that recruits a Massachusetts resident when the employee’s injury arises from that employment, even if the injury occurs elsewhere.

Pike v. Clinton Fishpacking, Inc. · filed 2001-05-31(a)

It simply strains the literal requirements of the long-arm statute to suggest that a foreign corporation can continuously and substantially contract with Massachusetts residents for employment in Alaska and then seek to avoid personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts when those employees suffer injuries that arise from their employment.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from a defendant’s business dealings in Massachusetts; physical presence in the state is unnecessary.

Lycos, Inc. v. TJ Motorsports, Inc. · filed 2001-07-16(a)

Thus, actual physical presence of defendants in this jurisdiction is not required to acquire personal jurisdiction under “transacting business” clause. Accordingly, defendants’ contacts with the Commonwealth are sufficient to establish jurisdiction under G.L.c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident transacts business in Massachusetts and the plaintiff’s claim arises from that business.

Edwards v. Radventures, Inc. · filed 2001-09-13(a)

In order for jurisdiction to exist pursuant to § 3(a), the facts must satisfy two requirements: (1) the defendant must have transacted business in Massachusetts and (2) the plaintiffs claim must have arisen from the defendant’s transaction of such business. ... In this case, the Court finds that Radventures transacts business in Massachusetts for purposes of § 3(a). ... Because this Court has already determined that personal jurisdiction exists over Radventures pursuant to § 3(a), this Court will not address the parties’ arguments with respect to jurisdiction under § 3(b).

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on an isolated contract with a Massachusetts resident and an unrelated delivery into the state.

Mazur v. S&A Construction, LLC · filed 2001-09-28(a)

A single contract with a Massachusetts resident arising from a national advertisement coupled with a single delivery of a steel structure to Massachusetts for a customer in Connecticut does not demonstrate the purposeful and successful solicitation of business from residents in Massachusetts and, therefore, does not satisfy the requirements of the longarm statute.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the plaintiff’s claim arises from those transactions.

Advanced Cell Technology, Inc. v. Infigen, Inc. · filed 2001-11-21(a)

Under G.L.c. 223A, §3(a), a plaintiff is also required to demonstrate that its claims against the defendant “arise from” the defendant’s transaction of business in Massachusetts. ... Here this court finds that the above mentioned contacts that Infigen had with Advanced Cell and its employees is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of G.L.c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim arises from that business.

Micro Networks Corp. v. HIG Hightec, Inc. · filed 2001-12-17(a)

In order for jurisdiction to exist pursuant to § 3(a), the plaintiff must satisfy two baseline requirements: (1) the defendant must have transacted business in Massachusetts, and (2) the plaintiffs claim must have arisen from the defendant’s transaction of such business.

Section 3(a) uses a broad but-for test to determine whether a claim arises from a defendant’s business transaction in Massachusetts.

Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A. · filed 2001-12-21(a)

The long-arm statute requires that the cause of action “arise from” a specific transaction of business in the forum. Massachusetts employs a very broad “but for” test which is easily met.

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based on isolated payments and a credit application sent to a Massachusetts seller without a prior or continuing business relationship.

Raid, Inc. v. Andrew, No. Cv 00 0178828 S (Feb. 8, 2002) · filed 2002-02-08(a)

This court finds that the ATR was correct in concluding that Janet V. Andrew did not transact business in Massachusetts and that consequently, Massachusetts did not have personal jurisdiction over Janet V. Andrew. Here, the three SSI checks that Janet V. Andrew signed in July, 1997, and sent to the plaintiff and the credit application she faxed to the plaintiff were isolated transactions in that there was no showing in the record of any previous or continuing relationship between the parties.

Section 3(c) permits jurisdiction over a corporation for its agent’s fraudulent communications into Massachusetts, but the agent’s conduct solely on the corporation’s behalf did not establish jurisdiction over him individually.

LaVallee v. Parrot-Ice Drink Products of America, Inc. · filed 2002-02-13(c)

Although this may a close call, the Court concludes that Malik did not act in the forum to serve his personal interests, but rather acted solely as an agent of ParroG-Ice. With respect to the corporate defendants, the plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of section 3(c) because Malik, via mail and electronic means, made an allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation in the Commonwealth upon which the plaintiffs relied when they acted on Parrot-Ice’s behalf in the Middle East.

Section 3(a) permits jurisdiction over a person whose Massachusetts business transactions gave rise to the claim, even if the property allegedly converted was elsewhere.

National Medical Care, Inc. v. Home Medical of America, Inc. · filed 2002-04-23(a)

Because plaintiff asserts jurisdiction over Porter under §3(a), plaintiff has to show that the alleged conversion of IDPN funds by Porter would not have occurred but for his business transactions in Massachusetts. ... Here, plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to conclude that the claim for conversion and the related c. 93A claim arise from Porter’s meetings, telephone calls, correspondence, and other continuous and purposeful contacts with plaintiff in Massachusetts, all of which relate to the treatment of the IDPN payments.

Section 3(a) requires a defendant to transact business in Massachusetts; ownership of a Massachusetts subsidiary and approval of its sale do not establish that conduct.

National Medical Care, Inc. v. Home Medical of America, Inc. · filed 2002-08-09(a)

The court concludes that HMA has not met its burden in establishing that FMC AG conducts business in Massachusetts required to support the assertion of jurisdiction under the Massachusetts long-arm statute.

Section 3 does not permit personal jurisdiction based on local advertisements that incidentally reach Massachusetts when the defendant neither commits the alleged tort there nor regularly solicits business there.

High Country Investor, Inc. v. McAdams, Inc. · filed 2002-08-13(a), (c), (d)

The advertising contacts are insufficient to satisfy any of the cited long-arm provisions. Advertisements which happen to circulate in Massachusetts are not contact enough to amount to “transacting any business in this commonwealth” under § 3(a). ... McAdams also did not “caus[e] tor-tious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth” as required under § 3(c). ... With respect to § 3(d) of the long-arm statute, a Massachusetts court has jurisdiction over a defendant whose tor-tious acts occur outside of Massachusetts and cause harm within the commonwealth only if the defendant engages in a regular pattern of business in Massachusetts. There is no evidence here of “regular” solicitation of business in Massachusetts or of “any other persistent course of conduct” aimed at Massachusetts residents.

Section 3(a) requires a sufficient connection between the defendant’s Massachusetts contacts and the claim for those contacts to support personal jurisdiction.

Fern v. Immergut · filed 2002-08-15(a)

Because there is no showing of a sufficient nexus between Milbank’s contacts with Massachusetts and the claim that it negligently represented Kansallis, we conclude that jurisdiction is lacking under § 3(a).

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction when a nonresident’s Massachusetts contacts are fortuitous and incidental to the business relationship.

Aub v. Technicolor Entertainment Services · filed 2002-10-10(a)

Technicolor’s contacts with Massachusetts are too fortuitous and incidental to fall within the reach of the Massachusetts long-arm statute. The business relationship grew out of the contact originally made in California when Aub was a resident of that state.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident company officers when their involvement in Massachusetts business operations makes the plaintiff’s claim possible.

Barthel v. One Community, Inc. · filed 2002-10-25(a)

As the record stands, it appears that this court has personal jurisdiction over Reich and Horn under the Massachusetts Long Arm statute, due to their involvement in conducting One’s business affairs at the Massachusetts office. Both defendants’ role in the operations at One satisfy the “but for” analysis: the alleged decision by defendants to deny Barthel wages was “made possible by, or lies in the wake of, the transaction of business in the forum state.”

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on isolated sales completed outside Massachusetts without purposeful business activity in the Commonwealth.

Intech, Inc. v. Triple "C" Marine Salvage, Inc. · filed 2003-01-24(a)

The first transaction at issue herein was identical in all significant respects to the transaction in Droukas and plainly did not constitute “transacting any business in this commonwealth.”

Section 3(a) permits jurisdiction over a claim arising from business transacted in Massachusetts, including sales through a distributor when the manufacturer knew its products would be sold there.

Ross v. Beldare Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2003-05-21(a)

The Massachusetts long-arm statute, G.L.c. 223A, §3(a), “gives rise to jurisdiction if the defendant either directly or through an agent transacted any business in Massachusetts, and the alleged [cause of action] arose from such transaction of business.” ... Upon examining the alleged nature of Pelita’s activities in this case and the alleged legal injury claimed to have arisen therefrom, this court finds that jurisdiction does lie under the so-called transaction of business clause of the long-arm statute.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim arises from that business, including contacts instrumental in forming the contract in dispute.

Champion Exposition Services, Inc. v. Hi-Tech Electric, LLC · filed 2003-07-30(a)

The Massachusetts long-arm statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(a), made applicable by virtue of Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e), establishes jurisdiction when the claim arises from a natural or legal person’s “transacting any business in this commonwealth.” ... I hold that Champion has asserted contacts by Hi-Tech with this forum that were “instrumental (not incidental) in the formation of the contract in dispute.”

Section 3(a) covers any purposeful act directed toward Massachusetts, subject to due process limits.

Levin v. Harned · filed 2003-09-17(a)

Section § 3(a) has been construed broadly: “transacting any business” means any purposeful act directed to the forum state.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s business transactions in Massachusetts are connected to the cause of action.

Soitec, S.A. v. Silicon Genesis Corp. · filed 2003-11-26(a)

These activities, purchases and business transactions within the forum are intertwined with the accused infringing processes. In the aggregate, SiGen’s contacts with the forum were sufficient to meet both the “transacting any business” requirement of the Massachusetts long-arm statute and due process requirements for personal jurisdiction.

Section 3(a)’s transacting-business requirement can be satisfied by purposeful communications with a Massachusetts company about alleged patent infringement.

Measurement Computing Corp. v. GENERAL PATENT CORP. INTERNATIONAL · filed 2004-02-10(a)

With regard to the first inquiry, the Court concludes that under the circumstances, General Patent’s purposeful communications with Measurement meet the literal requirement of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A § 3(a) that the defendant have “transact[ed] any business in this commonwealth.”

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a manufacturer solely because its products reach Massachusetts through independent distributors.

Commonwealth v. Sekap S.A. Greek Cooperative Cigarette Manufacturing Co. · filed 2004-04-13(a)

In short, SeKap was too far removed from the transaction that ultimately brought its cigarettes to Massachusetts to be considered to have transacted any business in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth has not established that jurisdiction of SeKap is authorized by Mass. Gen. Laws c. 223A §3(a).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant deliberately solicits a Massachusetts resident for the transaction giving rise to the claim, even if the resident previously expressed interest in doing business.

Intech, Inc. v. Triple" C" Marine Salvage, Inc. · filed 2004-07-22(a)

In the circumstances, however, where the defendant directed a specific solicitation to the plaintiff in Massachusetts approximately two ... months after a general expression of interest by the plaintiff in transacting more business together, we conclude that the defendant’s affirmative act was sufficiently deliberate to support the exertion of in personam jurisdiction over it.

Section 3(a) and (c) allow personal jurisdiction based on business transacted in Massachusetts or tortious injury caused by an act or omission there.

Lawson v. Affirmative Equities Co., LP · filed 2004-10-27(a), (c)

As this court (as will be seen) has personal jurisdiction over Bishop under sections 3(a) and 3(c) of the Massachusetts long-arm statute, there is no reason to explore this more demanding (and doubtfully applying) doctrine.

Section 3(a) requires an injury to arise from the defendant’s Massachusetts business, applying a generously construed “but for” test.

Corcoran v. United Natural Foods, Inc. · filed 2004-11-18(a)

The long-arm statute also requires that the injuries to the plaintiffs arise from the defendant’s transaction of business within Massachusetts. M.G.L.c. 223A, §3. This state adopts the “but for” test to determine if the plaintiff s injuries arose from the defendant’s transaction of business in Massachusetts. ... Accordingly, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, pursuant to §3(a) of the Massachusetts long-arm statute, is improper.

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because a nonresident contracts with a Massachusetts business and sends payments there when the transaction concerns assets outside Massachusetts.

Clear Creek Environmental, LLC v. Mansfield · filed 2005-01-27(a)

The “transacting any business” requirement of G.L.c. 223A, §3, should be read broadly in accordance with the view that the Massachusetts long-arm statute is an “assertion of jurisdiction to the limits allowed by the Constitution of the United States.” ... Clear Creek has not sustained its burden of establishing a factual basis for the assertion that Mansfield transacted business in the Commonwealth with respect to the promissory note at issue. Consequently, this Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Mansfield.

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident seller based on two isolated sales and an exploratory telephone call to a Massachusetts buyer.

Intech, Inc. v. Triple "C" Marine Salvage, Inc. · filed 2005-04-25(a)

We conclude that the plaintiff did not satisfy its burden of demonstrating that the defendant “transacted business” in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because a nonresident accepts services outside Massachusetts from a Massachusetts company and fails to pay.

Trans National Communications International, Inc. v. Publishers Marketing Outlet, Inc. · filed 2005-05-11(a)

While the longarm statute’s “transacting any business in this commonwealth” language is construed broadly, accepting services outside the Commonwealth from a Massachusetts company and failing to make payments is insufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the longarm statute.

Section 3(a) does not treat a single eBay listing that is not targeted to Massachusetts residents as transacting business in the Commonwealth.

Kolberg v. Channell · filed 2006-01-30(a)

Rather, he placed the item for sale to the highest bidder on eBay. Channell did not maintain eBay’s website, he only maintained a minimally interactive listing, very similar to other eBay listings, nor does the record indicate that he maintained multiple listings or listings targeted to Massachusetts residents. Channell’s act did not constitute the transaction of business in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose purposeful transaction of business in Massachusetts gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim.

Deutsch Williams Brooks DeRensis & Holland, P.C. v. Naturopathic Laboratories International, Inc. · filed 2006-07-10(a)

Therefore, I conclude that the defendant’s initial contact with the plaintiff to provide legal services led to a broader range of legal activities and research which amounted to the transaction of business in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident employee based on a single, isolated consultation with a Massachusetts physician about an insurance claim.

Morris v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2006-07-14(a)

Notwithstanding the limited amount of this “back and forth” correspondence, the record shows that Pringle’s in-forum contacts amounted to a single, isolated consultation with a Massachusetts physician, McIlvaine, in the course of evaluating an individual’s claim for benefits. As such, those contacts were not sufficiently substantial or continuous to confer personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts over Pringle under G. L. c. 223A, § 3(a).

Section 3(a) does not authorize personal jurisdiction over a component supplier whose product reaches Massachusetts through other companies when the supplier conducts no business in the Commonwealth.

Normandy v. Royal Industries, Inc. · filed 2006-08-15(a)

Even though this court must broadly construe section 3(a), Royal cannot establish the necessary contacts for jurisdiction. ... In sum, Royal cannot demonstrate any business acts by Intradin in the Commonwealth.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident purposefully solicits a Massachusetts expert and directs work there through calls, documents, and supervision, and the claim arises from that business.

Robillard v. Berends · filed 2007-01-16(a)

These contacts were not "incidental" and were clearly sufficient to satisfy the "transacting business" section of the Massachusetts long-arm statute.

Section 3(a) does not permit personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent based solely on financial support for a child attending college in Massachusetts.

Bash v. Clark University · filed 2007-04-05(a)

Mr. Book has not cited any authority that justifies this court exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident parent whose sole contact with Massachusetts was to provide monetary support for her daughter while she was at college in Massachusetts. While the longarm statute’s “transacting any business in the commonwealth” language is construed broadly, such contacts by an individual are not sufficient to trigger jurisdiction.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a person transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim arises from that business, including when the person acts on a corporation’s behalf.

Farazi v. Caffey · filed 2007-05-02(a)

In light of the prevailing case law, this court finds that the activities Caffey conducted on behalf of TCN fall within in the ambit of transacting business as contemplated by G.L.c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on an isolated transaction with limited Massachusetts contacts when the defendant performed outside the state.

Pale Horse Designs, Inc. v. Stanfab Apparels · filed 2007-08-21(a)

The isolated transaction here was not sufficient to constitute transacting business in Massachusetts for purposes of jurisdiction under c. 223, §3(a).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim arises from that business.

Heffernan v. Robeco Investment Management, Inc. · filed 2007-10-25(a)

Under G.L.c. 223A, §3(a), personal jurisdiction attaches to a defendant if (1) it has transacted any business in Massachusetts, and (2) the cause of action arose from that business. ... The record thus establishes a prima facie case of jurisdiction under G.L.c. 233A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant transacted business in Massachusetts and that the claim arose from that business.

White v. Alpine Adventures, Inc. · filed 2007-11-09(a)

As a threshold matter, in order to satisfy an assertion of personal jurisdiction under the Massachusetts longarm statute, G.L.c. 223A, §3(a), the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant transacted business in Massachusetts, and (2) the plaintiffs claim arose out of the transaction of business in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when repeated communications into Massachusetts during contract performance constitute transacting business and the claim arises from that business.

M-R Logistics, LLC v. Riverside Rail, LLC · filed 2008-02-08(a)

Those repeated contacts with Massachusetts plainly constitute “transacting business” in the commonwealth within the meaning of ch. 223A, § 3(a). Furthermore, as in Little and Good Hope, this cause of action can be fairly said to arise from that transaction of business and the contacts at issue were neither “isolated” or “fortuitous.” The statutory personal jurisdiction requirements of ch. 223A, § 3(a) have thus been met.

Section 3(a) covers purposeful contacts arranging a prisoner’s transfer to Massachusetts, but not incidental replies to the prisoner’s requests from Massachusetts.

Hannon v. Beard · filed 2008-04-28(a)

Under these circumstances, though, we hold that Beard “transacted business” in Massachusetts for purposes of the state’s long-arm statute, particularly because the contacts Hannon alleges form the basis for Hannon’s claim against Beard. ... We therefore hold that the district court did not err when it dismissed Hannon’s claim against Hesse for lack of personal jurisdiction because the Massachusetts long-arm statute does not authorize personal jurisdiction over Hesse.

Section 3(a) permits jurisdiction over claims arising from a person’s transaction of business in Massachusetts, to the limits allowed by the United States Constitution.

Diomed, Inc. v. Total Vein Solutions · filed 2008-06-09(a)

The Massachusetts longarm statute grants jurisdiction “over a person ... as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person’s ... transacting any business in this commonwealth”. M.G.L. c. 223A, § 3(a). That provision extends jurisdiction to the limits allowed by the United States Constitution.

Section 3(a) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s business transactions in Massachusetts; correspondence unrelated to the plaintiff’s injuries does not satisfy that requirement.

Pettengill v. Curtis · filed 2008-09-30(a)

For § 3(a) to apply, “the defendant must have transacted business in Massachusetts, and the plaintiffs claim must have arisen from the transaction of business by the defendant.” ... It cannot be said that the correspondence is, as required, a “but for” cause of Pettengill’s injuries because whether the Individual Defendants knew about other abuse is not causally linked to any alleged negligence regarding Curtis.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s sustained direction and supervision of work in Massachusetts constitutes transacting business and the claim arises from those contacts.

Mass Web Printing Co. v. Nuffield Publishing, LLC · filed 2008-11-06(a)

I thus find Defendant was transacting business in Massachusetts for purposes of both the constitutional and statutory standards, and personal jurisdiction attaches.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction based on an entity’s transaction of business in Massachusetts, directly or through an agent.

Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc. · filed 2008-11-25(a)

Under the Long-Arm statute, a Massachusetts court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an entity if the entity has transacted business in Massachusetts, directly or through its agent, or if the cause of action arises from the entity’s transaction of business in Massachusetts.

Section 3(a) does not treat an employee’s work from a Massachusetts home as the employer state’s transaction of business there without evidence that the state authorized the work or operated an office there.

Wieder Psychiatric Services v. New Hampshire Chief Medical Examiner's Office · filed 2009-02-12(a)

The complaint does allege that plaintiff Katherine Wieder conducted some sort of business in her capacity as Chief Forensic Investigator or Assistant Deputy Medical Examiner from her “home office” in Newburyport, Massachusetts. This allegation, by itself, is not sufficient to constitute a state “transacting any business in the Commonwealth” for purposes of §3(a).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction based on a single letter sent into Massachusetts when the claim arises directly from that contact.

Kim v. Veglas · filed 2009-04-16(a)

On balance, Km’s allegations are sufficient to satisfy the long-arm statute. The First Circuit already has held that a single letter sent into Massachusetts can constitute “transacting business.” ... Thus, this Court holds that Km’s complaint satisfies Massachusetts’ long-arm statute.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s contracts, payments, and related dealings amount to transacting business in Massachusetts.

Scottsdale Insurance v. Passports, Inc. · filed 2009-07-23(a)

These contacts exceed the minimum required to meet the “transacting any business in the commonwealth” test of G.L.c. 223A, §3(a).

Section 3(a) reaches business transacted in Massachusetts through an agent when the claim arises from a contract formed through that business.

BCCTC Associates, Inc. v. Summerdale/AAHFI, L.P. · filed 2009-09-12(a)

Since the Court construes facts alleged by the Plaintiffs in the light most congenial to them, all the Defendants are held to be transacting business in Massachusetts though their agent Dressel. ... The Plaintiffs’ claim here is based on breach of the contract that was created through negotiations that involved the out of state parties transacting business in Massachusetts, and therefore this element is satisfied.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant when a claim arises from its business transactions in Massachusetts, including a manufacturing contract that gives rise to breach of contract claims.

Hadley Pollett, LLC v. Zhu · filed 2009-12-10(a)

Personal jurisdiction over Zhaoheng lies pursuant to G.L.c. 223A, §3(a), which applies to “a cause of action . . . arising from” the defendant’s “transacting any business in this commonwealth . . .” The notion of “transacting business” under this section is interpreted broadly.

Section 3(a)'s transacting business clause supports personal jurisdiction when a defendant's contract-related contacts with Massachusetts establish a statutory basis and jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible.

Pesmel North America, LLC v. Caraustar Industries, Inc. · filed 2010-11-24(a)

Although the long-arm statute “asserts jurisdiction over the person to the constitutional limit only when some basis for jurisdiction enumerated in the statute has been established,” ... the transacting business clause (which the defendant assumes the plaintiff would assert) is satisfied here.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim arises from that business.

SATURN MANAGEMENT LLC v. Gem-Atreus Advisors, LLC · filed 2010-12-09(a)

These facts suffice to establish Ganguly Trust and Ventures’ attempt to participate in Massachusetts’s economic life; their contacts thus constitute “transacting business” under the Massachusetts long-arm statute.

Section 3 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident transacting business in Massachusetts when the defendant purposefully avails itself of conducting activities there.

Worcester Envelope Co. v. Universal Printing, Inc. · filed 2011-06-03

This Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant transacting business in the Commonwealth, pursuant to the longarm statute, G.L.c. 223A, §3, if that defendant has taken some act “by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, Inc., 375 Mass. 149, 152-53 (1978). ... On this record, there are insufficient facts to find personal jurisdiction over Universal.

Section 3(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an insurer based on out-of-state policies naming a Massachusetts loss payee when the insurer has not purposefully conducted business in Massachusetts.

Source One Financial Corp. v. Omni Insurance Group · filed 2011-06-17(a)

Source One appears to rely on G.L.c. 223A, §3(a), which provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a person arising from the person’s “transacting any business in this commonwealth.” ... The 184 policies had marginal, if any, economic effect on Massachusetts and did not entail any “minimum contact with the Commonwealth which resulted firom an affirmative, intentional act of the defendant.”

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who transacts business in Massachusetts when the claim arises from that business, up to constitutional limits.

Adelson v. Hananel · filed 2011-07-13(a)

We have construed the Massachusetts long-arm statute1 as being coextensive with the limits permitted by the Constitution.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident transacts business in Massachusetts and the plaintiff’s claims arise from that business.

Berry v. Cook · filed 2011-09-08(a)

The contacts present in this case demonstrate that Cook was transacting business in Massachusetts for §3(a) purposes. ... As such, the Berrys have met their burden of demonstrating both requirements of §3(a) of the Massachusetts Long Arm Statute.

Section 3(a) does not establish personal jurisdiction over reinsurers based on a broker’s contact with a Massachusetts insurer without facts showing that the reinsurers initiated or authorized the contact.

OneBeacon America Insurance v. Argonaut Insurance · filed 2011-11-10(a)

Even under the broad sweep of c. 223A, §3(a), the court concludes that the above facts do not constitute transacting business. ... Nor has OneB-eacon provided any facts from which the court can infer that Willis was acting as the agent of or on behalf of the Moving Party Reinsurers, or that they at any time requested Willis to contact ELAC.

Section 3(a) permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction based on business conducted in Massachusetts.

Anjomi v. Kalai · filed 2011-12-12(a)

The Court asserts personal jurisdiction over Ralai consistent with both the Massachusetts long-arm statute and the United States Constitution’s Due Process clause due to his role as President of URS Tax, Inc. (“URS Tax”).

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a person transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim arises from those contacts.

Askenazy v. Tremont Group Holdings, Inc. · filed 2012-01-26(a)

The plaintiffs rely on the Massachusetts longarm statute, G.L.c. 223A, §3(a), which permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over any person who transacts business in this Commonwealth, provided that the plaintiffs claim arose from those forum-based contacts.

Section 3(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in Massachusetts and the claim arises from that business.

Cannonball Fund, Ltd. v. Dutchess Capital Management, LLC · filed 2013-08-02(a)

The claim must arise from business that the defendant transacted in the Commonwealth. ... We are not required to imagine that Dundee Leeds performed its duties without regular contact with its two clients, who were located in Massachusetts.