188 Mass. Gen. Laws § 1

Section 1 allows a $100,000 homestead exemption against the debtor’s interest in a residence held as a tenancy by the entirety once that interest is valued.

In Re Conroy · filed 1998-09-02

The Debtor’s claim of the Massachusetts homestead exemption therefore turns upon the determination of what portion of the Residence is property of the estate. ... the Debtor will be entitled to claim the Massachusetts homestead exemption in the amount of $100,000.

Section 1 applies the homestead exemption to the equity remaining after subtracting the mortgage from the home’s fair market value when one spouse declares homestead in property held as tenants by the entirety.

In Re Ballirano · filed 1999-05-06

Because the language in the homestead statute and the aforementioned cases stress the importance of a homestead in protecting and benefitting both the declarant and the declarant’s family, I conclude that the proper application of the homestead exemption is to the equity which remains after deducting the mortgage from the fair market value of the Property.

Section 1 limits a homestead exemption to the amount applicable when the debtor files for bankruptcy, even if the statutory limit later increases.

In Re DeNadai · filed 2001-03-23

Although the Massachusetts homestead was increased to $300,000. in 2001, the Debtor's exemption was properly taken in the amount applicable at the time of the filing, $100,000.

Section 1 permits a $300,000 homestead exemption for an earlier recorded declaration against liens recorded after the increase took effect.

In Re Heretakis · filed 2003-05-06

Because the writs of attachment were obtained by Haffey and Natick Crossing in March and September of 2002, respectively, after the effective date of the act, the Debtor is entitled to an estate of homestead to the extent of $300,000.

Section 1 protects an interest in land and buildings, but not a personal claim to proceeds from a future sale of the home.

Gourdin v. Agin (In Re Gourdin) · filed 2010-06-17

Being personal property and not an interest in “land and buildings,” that claim is not protected under the Massachusetts homestead law.

The 2000 increase in the § 1 homestead exemption from $100,000 to $300,000 applies prospectively; a debtor whose bankruptcy petition predates the increase is limited to the earlier amount.

In Re Tardugno · filed 2001-05-09

In the absence of any clear directive from the Massachusetts legislature to the contrary, this Court holds the Act is prospective in application only and, therefore, was not the applicable law in effect on the date of the Debtors’ petition. The Court therefore allows the Debtors an exemption in the Property in the amount of $100,000.00 as provided for by the Massachusetts homestead statute in effect on the Petition Date.

A homestead under § 1 on property held by spouses as tenants by the entirety is not apportioned to one spouse’s supposed one-half interest in the equity.

Desmond v. Chiang (In re Chiang) · filed 2016-12-21

The estate of homestead created by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1 is not apportioned, as the Defendants contend, to the Debtor’s “one-half interest in the equity” which they maintain equals $297,500.00, particularly as a declaration of homestead under § 1 is an acquisition of a homestead “for the benefit of [the] family.”

Section 1 keeps the homestead exemption whole and unallocated for property held by the entirety even when the debtor’s interest is valued at no more than half the property’s value for lien avoidance.

Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz, LLP v. Minkina · filed 2023-08-24

RPS also urges us to cap Minkina's homestead exemption for the purposes of the § 522(f) formula at 50 percent if we affirm the bankruptcy court's order (as we have done). The firm claims that, because Massachusetts law provides that a homestead exemption "shall remain whole and unallocated" in the case of a tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy, but the bankruptcy court's valuation approach ostensibly constitutes "treating each individual as a tenant in common," we should treat the homestead exemption in line with provisions for the latter, as well. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1. However, as explained above, abiding by the no more than $525,000 valuation does not negate the nature of Minkina and her husband's tenancy by the entirety. RPS's argument is therefore unavailing.

Section 1 permits a homestead declaration by an owner who intends to occupy the home as a principal residence, even if the owner does not occupy it when making the declaration.

In Re Sebio · filed 1999-08-05

Thus, to the extent that ... requires the declarant of a homestead to occupy the premises at the time of the declaration, that case has been superceded by statute. ... The question, then, is whether the Debtor and her husband, at the time of the declaration, did in fact intend to occupy the Chatham Property as their principal residence.

Section 1 requires a homestead declarant who does not occupy the home to show an intent to occupy it in the near future, with the timing capable of measurement; a declaration of interest alone is insufficient.

In Re Roberts · filed 2001-11-21

Therefore, I conclude that in order to establish the requisite intent, a debtor must demonstrate that the future occupancy is in the near future and is capable of measurement given whatever steps a debt- or must take to achieve occupancy. A declaration of interest alone is insufficient.

Section 1 requires the declarant to occupy or intend to occupy the property as a principal residence when the homestead is recorded; a spouse’s occupancy cannot cure a declaration that failed this requirement.

In Re Genzler · filed 2010-03-31

Here, the Debtor did not satisfy the occupancy requirement of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1 on the recording date, and, thus there can be no “continuing validity” of the Homestead through Mrs. Genzler’s occupation.

Section 1 requires an owner to occupy or intend to occupy the property when filing a homestead declaration, but does not impose that requirement throughout the declaration’s duration.

In Re Marrama · filed 2004-04-01

The statutory requirement of occupy or intend to occupy, however, is only applicable at the time of the filing of the declaration and does not apply during the duration of the declaration.

Section 1 includes a tenant by the entirety in its definition of owner and defines principal residence as the home used or intended as the owner’s primary dwelling.

In re Zakarian · filed 2017-08-03

As to the first inquiry, to be eligible for homestead protection in Massachusetts a person must be an owner of the property and the property must be his principal residence, M. G. L. c. 188, § 1 defines owner as “a natural person who is a sole owner, joint tenant, tenant by the entirety, tenant in common, life estate holder or holder of a beneficial interest in a trust.” It defines principal residence as “the home where an owner, and the owner’s family if applicable, resides or intends to reside as the primary dwelling.” Mr. Zakarian owns the Braintree property as a tenant by the entirety and shares it with Ms. Zakarian as their principal residence. He is thus eligible to declare a homestead in the Braintree property.

Section 1 allows a homestead estate to remain valid when its holder no longer occupies or intends to occupy the home, if the holder’s spouse and minor children continue to occupy it as their principal residence.

In Re Webber · filed 2002-05-20

For these reasons, I conclude that either (1) the continuing validity of a Massachusetts estate of homestead is not contingent on the holder’s continued occupancy or intent to occupy or (2) if the validity of such an estate requires continuing occupancy or intent to occupy as a principal residence, the requirement is satisfied if the holder’s spouse and minor children continue to occupy the premises as their principal residence. I need not decide which of these two constructions the statute requires; it is enough to hold that the premise of the Trustee’s argument is invalid.

Section 1 permits a homestead to include a separate, contiguous parcel used and occupied with the principal residence, even if the parcel is vacant and held by a separate deed.

In Re Edwards · filed 2002-08-05

Massachusetts law does not proscribe a homestead exemption simply because the homestead consists of two separately-deeded parcels, and it does not require a partition of the property of the individual claiming a homestead simply because a part of the claimed homestead is vacant land.

Section 1 includes contiguous land in a homestead when it is materially used in connection with the principal residence, but excludes contiguous land that is not so used.

In Re Fiffy · filed 2002-08-06

Accordingly, this Court finds that the relevant inquiry in determining if Lot A is part of the homestead is its “use” in connection to the Debtor’s principal residence. That “use” must be material in connection to the principal residence and not superflous. Lot A is not used in any fashion whatsoever in connection with the Debtor’s residence; it is simply a large wooded area that may or may not be sub-dividable.

Section 1 permits a homestead declaration to include a separately deeded parcel contiguous to the residence; the parcel is not excluded solely because it lacks a dwelling.

In re Vaghini · filed 2016-04-14

The Homestead Statute does not limit the size of the property that may be covered by a declaration, nor does it prohibit a declar-ant from including separately-deeded but contiguous parcels within a homestead declaration.

A homestead declaration covering one lot does not exempt a separate lot omitted from the declaration.

In Re Govoni · filed 2002-12-19

In this case, the homestead was timely filed but specifically only covered Lot 1.

Section 1 covers the whole of a three-unit home when the owner lives in one unit and rents the others, subject to the exemption’s dollar limit.

In Re Carey · filed 2002-08-21

The statute does not attempt to limit the manner in which homeowners might profit from their homes: some will choose extra bedroom space for their own families and the benefits of having no in-house neighbors, others will forsake such luxuries for rent that helps pay the mortgage, the rent being no less necessary for enjoyment of the homestead than the furnace.

A mixed-use building may qualify as a single-family dwelling under section 1 when its predominant purpose is residential.

Nickless v. Catton · filed 2015-11-17

Nothing in the statute’s language precludes a mixed-use building from being a single-family dwelling, a category clearly on the statutory list. ... the Court holds that the mere use of a residence for nonresidential purposes, at least when the predominant purpose is residential, does not, by itself, preclude an exemption for the Property.

Section 1 allows a homestead on only one principal residence per family; spouses who live apart but remain legally married count as one family.

In Re Gunnison · filed 2008-11-07

While the Debtors may be separated in fact, they remain legally married and thus are a single “family” for purposes of the Homestead Statute.

A section 1 homestead protects the declarant's family, but it cannot be stacked with a disabled spouse's earlier section 1A homestead.

Garran v. SMS Financial V, LLC (In Re Garran) · filed 2003-07-28

Having predicted that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would conclude that the plain language of the Massachusetts homestead statutes prohibits the stacking of the exemption available to disabled debtors on top of the exemption available to all other residents of Massachusetts, and that Garran is entitled only to a maximum of $300,000 provided by his non-debtor spouse's declaration of homestead under § 1, we now must return to the formula laid out in 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) to determine whether Citizens' lien impairs Garran's homestead exemption of $300,000.

Under the former § 1, a spouse may claim a homestead exemption through the other spouse’s declaration even if the claiming spouse did not live in the home when the declaration was filed.

In Re Goulakos · filed 2011-09-28

As the spouse of Mr. Goulakos, the debtor is a qualified family member under ch. 188, § 1 and it is of no consequence that she did not reside in the Dracut Property when the homestead declaration was filed.

Under the pre-2011 version of § 1, spouses who are separated but remain married are still a family for homestead purposes.

In re Andris · filed 2012-04-10

It is well-established in this district that separated spouses who have not yet divorced are still a family.

The homestead benefits a declarant’s nonowning family members, but it does not give them a separate bankruptcy exemption without a property interest.

In Re Ellis · filed 2011-03-25

Put simply, the benefit an estate of homestead affords to non-owning family members of a declarant does not amount to a cognizable claim of exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) without an underlying property interest.

Section 1 permits divorced co-owners to file separate homestead declarations for their respective families; one ex-spouse’s declaration does not give the other an exemption.

In Re Cassese · filed 2002-12-13

Both the Debtor and Mr. Kittleson are eligible to file an estate of homestead for the benefit of their respective families. ... For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that the Debtor is not entitled to a Massachusetts homestead exemption based on the filing made by the Debtor’s ex-husband after they were divorced.

Section 1 allows a spouse to claim a homestead exemption based on the other spouse’s valid declaration of homestead.

In Re Farrenkopf · filed 2004-02-13

The validity of the non-Debtor spouse’s Declaration under Section 1 of the Massachusetts Homestead Act is undisputed; it is uncontested that the Debtor and her non-Debtor spouse were, at all relevant times, “husband and wife” residing in the Property. Therefore, I conclude that the Debtor may rely on her non-Debtor spouse’s Declaration to claim an exemption in the Property.

Section 1 includes an adult child living with a declarant parent as a family member protected by the parent's homestead, even when the child co-owns the home.

In Re Vasques · filed 2006-01-17

In summary, I find that, as of the Petition Date, the Debtor is a co-owning family member of the Declarant, barred from acquiring her own separate homestead estate but entitled to the benefits of the homestead estate of her mother.

Section 1 defines a minor child as a person aged 21 or under; an unemancipated adult child does not meet that definition.

Merrill v. Ewen · filed 2023-07-25

A minor child, for purposes of the act, is defined as "a person aged 21 and under, who is the natural or adopted child of an owner or owner's spouse entitled to the benefits of this chapter." G. L. c. 188, § 1. ... But the attachment instead was based on the 2018 contempt judgment, which entered when the daughter, although still unemancipated due to disability, was no longer a minor child as defined by the act.

Section 1 does not extend the homestead exemption to manufactured homes.

In Re Kelly · filed 2005-11-28

Having twice amended § 1A to address the issue of manufactured home without making a corresponding amendment to § 1, I conclude that the omission was intentional and hold that the Supreme Judicial Court would rule that I am without authority to expand the phrases “land and buildings”, “home”, and “premises” to include manufactured home.

Section 1 permits a homestead exemption in a manufactured home even when the owner leases the land beneath it.

In Re Gray · filed 2007-12-07

Given the fact that § 1 of the Homestead Exemption Statute may be interpreted in more than one reasonable manner; there is a lack of statutory definition; the statute makes the exemption available to a leaseholder; and the highest court in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts counsels a liberal interpretation in favor of debtors, this Court concludes that manufactured homes are included within § 1 of the Homestead Exemption Statute.

Section 1 permits a person who holds all legal and equitable title to a principal residence after a nominee trust ends by merger to qualify as an owner in rightful possession for a homestead.

Houghton v. Szwyd (Szwyd) · filed 2007-07-06

At that point all legal and equitable title vested in the debtor and he became an owner in rightful possession of his principal residence within the meaning of§ 1.

Section 1 includes holders of life estates and beneficial interests in trusts among owners eligible for homestead protection.

In Re Peirce · filed 2012-03-14

That result was changed with the revised Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1, by including holders of life estates and beneficial interests in trusts within the definition of “owners” eligible for homestead protection under either the general or elderly or disabled persons provisions of the statute.

Section 1’s definition of “owner” excludes a person whose only interest is a remainder interest created by deed.

In re Bertone · filed 2013-01-30

For the same reason, I agree with In re Gordon, and I find that an individual holding a remainder interest in property created by deed does not qualify as an “owner” under the Massachusetts Homestead Statute.

Section 1 excludes a mere remainderman from its definition of an owner eligible to claim a homestead exemption.

In re Freeman · filed 2014-10-27

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Debtor does not hold a mere remainder interest and is entitled to claim a homestead exemption as an “owner” within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, §§ 1 and 3(a).

Section 1 excludes holders of remainder interests from its definition of eligible owners, so a remainder interest cannot support a homestead exemption.

In re Gordon · filed 2012-08-28

The Massachusetts Homestead Statute enumerates six types of “owners” who may claim an exemption under the statute—and the holder of a remainder interest is not among them.

A resident of a residential cooperative housing unit may qualify as an owner for a homestead exemption even when the cooperative corporation holds title to the home.

In re Dougan · filed 2013-01-08

Upon reconsideration, I find that my initial application of the Homestead Statute was overly technical and predict that if presented with the issue, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would find that the Debtors qualify as “owners” and are entitled to the benefit of a homestead with respect to the Property.

A trust beneficiary is an owner for homestead purposes, but a trustee who holds only legal title and no beneficial interest is not.

In re Ricciardi · filed 2013-01-15

However, for purposes of establishing a right to a homestead exemption under Massachusetts law, one who is the beneficiary of the trust that owns certain real property is deemed an “owner” of that property within the meaning of §§ 3 and 4 of ch. 188, which permit an estate of homestead to exist automatically for, or be acquired by, an “owner” of the property. ... I conclude that, at best, her only interest in the Property was as a trustee of the Trust, and that, when she filed the declaration of homestead and later filed her bankruptcy petition, she held no beneficial interest in the trust or its property. Therefore, she was not an owner within the meaning of ch. 188.

Section 1 includes life estate holders in its definition of owner but excludes holders of remainder interests from the homestead exemption.

Gordon v. Pappalardo (In re Gordon) · filed 2013-03-13

The statute acknowledges life estates, and expressly provides that a life tenant may claim the exemption. But it does not extend its benefits to remaindermen.

Section 1 allows a beneficiary of a trust that holds an interest through another trust to claim the automatic homestead, but allocates the exemption by ownership share even when other owners do not occupy the home.

In re VanBuskirk · filed 2014-05-20

Mindful of the public policy considerations which pervade the homestead statute, I conclude that being the trust beneficiary of a downstream trust as the VanBuskirks are here does not disqualify them from claiming the automatic homestead exemption in the trust property, namely unit 1 at 11 Moffa Lane in Marlborough. ... Allocation is based on ownership not occupancy. ... The allocated automatic homestead amount available to beneficial owners of a home who do not occupy or intend to occupy it does not spill over to those beneficiaries who do.

A trust beneficiary’s declared homestead exemption under § 1 is $500,000 multiplied by the beneficiary’s percentage ownership interest.

Madoff v. Nardo (In re Nardo) · filed 2016-06-29

As Mr. Nardo is a 1% beneficiary of the Trust that owns the Samoset Street Property, he is entitled to a $5,000 exemption under the Massachusetts homestead statute.

Section 1 treats a natural person with a beneficial interest in a trust as an owner eligible for homestead protection even when that trust is the beneficiary of the trust holding title to the home.

In re Newcomb · filed 2014-07-10

Therefore, I agree with In re Vanbuskirk and similarly predict that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts would hold that the beneficiary of a trust which is the beneficiary of a title holding trust can be an “owner” qualifying for protection under the Massachusetts Homestead Statute.

Section 1 includes a holder of a beneficial interest in a trust within its definition of an owner eligible to claim a homestead exemption.

In re Dickey · filed 2014-08-28

This, however, is easily dismissed because the Massachusetts Homestead Statute defines "owner” to include "a natural person who is a sole owner ... or holder of a beneficial interest in a trust.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1. Thus, even if the Ridgewood Judgment did not reconvey the Property back to the Debtor as I have determined, she remains an "owner” by virtue of her beneficial interest in the Lanac Trust.

A joint tenant may claim a homestead exemption under § 1 only in that tenant’s ownership interest.

Premier Capital, Inc. v. Pagnini (In Re Pagnini) · filed 2010-07-23

Here, the Debtor filed the 2009 Homestead pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1, and elected the Massachusetts state exemption scheme in her bankruptcy case. As a joint tenant owner of the Property, the Debtor may claim a homestead exemption only in her one-half interest in the Property.

Section 1 allows one owner of a jointly owned home to acquire a homestead exemption without the other owner’s signature.

In Re Leigh · filed 2004-03-31

The authority for the acquisition of a homestead exemption is clearly stated in Chapter 188, § 1: “an owner or owners of a home.” M.G.L. ch. 188, § 1 (2003). While the affirmative termination of a homestead exemption under M.G.L. ch. 188, § 7 may require the manifest assent of all property owners, the acquisition of an exemption under §§ 1 and 2, and the consequential termination of a previous estate under § 2, do not.

Section 1 allows a person to claim a homestead exemption when legal and equitable ownership of the residence merge in that person after a trust terminates.

In Re Szwyd · filed 2006-08-07

By that time, the legal and equitable interests in the Residence had merged and vested solely in the Debtor. As such, the Massachusetts Homestead Exemption was his to claim. G.L. c. 188, §§ 1, 2.

Section 1’s definition of an owner includes a person who holds a beneficial interest in a resulting trust.

In re Sullivan · filed 2016-05-02

The Court finds that, under the circumstances currently presented, and construing the current statute liberally in favor of the debtor, the Debtor’s equitable interest by way of resulting trust qualifies her as an “owner” under the Massachusetts Homestead Statute.

Section 1 homesteads have the same effect on creditors’ rights as Section 1A homesteads.

Antognoni Ex Rel. Estate of Antognoni v. Basso (Basso) · filed 2008-12-09

Section 1A differs from § 1 only with respect to the requirements for obtaining a valid election; the effect of a homestead on creditors’ rights is the same under each section.

Section 1 permits an owner to acquire a homestead exemption after a creditor levies on the home if the creditor has not completed the levy and acquired title.

In Re Mariano · filed 2004-06-18

Here, Fleet has not completed the levy on the Residence and thus title had not yet vested in Fleet. ... As the owner then, Debtor was a proper party to acquire an estate of homestead. ... Moreover, because Debtor has satisfied the requirements of the Massachusetts homestead statute, the Court finds that Debtor holds a valid homestead exemption pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 188, § 1, and thus Fleet’s Objection is overruled.

Section 1 does not exempt a homestead from sale for taxes.

Houghton v. United States (In Re Szwyd) · filed 2008-04-14(1)

First, while, federal courts have ruled that they should consider state homestead exemption statutes when determining whether to apply the marshaling doctrine, Meyer, 375 U.S. at 237-38, 84 S.Ct. 318, here, state law provides no such exemption in the face of tax claims.

Section 1 does not protect a homestead from a sale for taxes.

Lay v. Shaughnessy · filed 2010-01-22(1)

Shaughnessy claims that he was protected by a declaration of homestead on the Premises. However, an estate of homestead is “exempt from the laws of conveyance, descent, devise, attachment, levy on execution and sale for payment of debts or legacies except in the following cases: (1) sale for taxes'1 (emphasis added). G.L.c. 188, §1.

Section 1(6) does not remove homestead protection for a judgment based on misappropriation and theft of trade secrets.

CLEARONE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. Chiang · filed 2010-05-24(6)

Whatever the ambiguous terms of M.G.L. c. 188, § 1(6) mean, the Court declines ClearOne’s invitation to read them as broadly as it proposes. Because plaintiff has been unable to cite any Massachusetts authority to the contrary, the Court finds that the provision does not apply to a judgment based upon misappropriation and theft of trade secrets.

Former § 1 exempted a homestead from creditors’ claims while the homestead remained in effect; termination removed that protection.

Utica Mutual Insurance v. Cohen · filed 2014-04-04

Upon the termination of homestead, the Properly would no longer be exempt from “the laws of conveyance, devise, attachment, levy on execution and sale for payment of debts or legacies,” thus rendering the Properly susceptible to the plaintiffs claims of fraudulent transfer.

Section 1 defines a home to include sale proceeds covered by section 11(a)(1), allowing an estate of homestead to continue in those proceeds after the property is sold.

In re Williams · filed 2014-08-06

Although the Property has been sold, an “estate of homestead” still exists in a “home,” which is defined to include “the sale proceeds as provided in clause (1) of subsection (a) of section 11.”

Section 1 permits a debtor to claim casualty insurance proceeds as part of the homestead even if the debtor lacks personal possession of the proceeds on the bankruptcy petition date.

Mateer v. Ostrander (In re Mateer) · filed 2015-02-13

For these reasons, the fact that in this case Mr. Mateer did not have personal possession of the insurance proceeds on the date he filed his bankruptcy petition is not a basis upon which to deny his right to claim an exemption in those proceeds under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1.

Section 1 defines recording of a declared homestead in the registry for the county or district where the home lies; a declaration for a home in another state cannot be recorded in a Massachusetts registry.

In re James · filed 2016-10-21

Section 1 of Chapter 188 requires that a "declared homestead exemption” be recorded, which is defined as "the act of recording in the registry of deeds or the registry district of the land court for the county or district wherein the home lies .... ” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1. A declaration cannot be recorded in the registry of deeds or registry district of a Massachusetts land court when the home "lies” in another state.

Section 1 preserves a valid homestead claim by one owner when another owner also signs the declaration; the additional declaration is a legal nullity.

In Re Cempellin · filed 1994-12-06

There is no doubt that, had Mrs.’ Cempellin not joined in the declaration, a vahd declaration of homestead would have been made by Mr. Cempelhn. That election should be preserved and the addition of Mrs. Cempellin’s name and declaration regarded as what it is fact is, a legal nulhty.

Under the 1979 version of § 1, a homestead declaration signed by two owners is valid only for the owner who signed first; the second owner cannot acquire the exemption without a release of the first claim.

Dwyer v. Cempellin · filed 1996-12-23

The homestead statute does not state that a second signature on the declaration renders the homestead claim invalid. In construing the homestead exemption, we think that we should apply the rule of liberal construction. We conclude that the debtors’ declaration of homestead is valid under the 1979 version of G. L. c. 188, § 1, in effect in 1981, but only as to the person whose signature comes first, in this case, Joseph Cempellin. As the second declarant, Adele Cempellin could not acquire the exemption without a release of the first recorded declaration, and her signature is simply a legal nullity.

A spouse’s later Section 1 homestead declaration terminates an earlier Section 1A homestead; the debtor may claim the spouse’s Section 1 exemption but cannot combine the two.

In Re Garran · filed 2002-03-15

In the present case, the declaration of homestead by the Debtor’s non-debtor spouse under Section 1 terminated and extinguished the Debtor’s Section 1A homestead. Therefore, the Debtor is not entitled to stack both his and his spouse’s homestead declarations. Because the Debtor is entitled to claim the benefit of his spouse’s declaration, however, he is entitled to a homestead exemption in this case in the sum of $300,000.

A homestead declaration filed under § 1A can qualify for the $100,000 exemption under § 1 if it meets § 1’s requirements; § 1 requires no additional documentation.

Shamban v. Masidlover · filed 1999-02-19

Turning to the second question, we agree that the declaration of estate of homestead should be considered valid under § 1, even though the debtor expressly filed under § 1A. Although the debtor filed her declaration of homestead under § 1A, nothing precludes her declaration from being valid under § 1. The debtor meets the statutory requirements of § 1 because that statute does not require additional documentation for a legitimately acquired homestead.

Section 1 does not extend a homestead exemption to an adjacent parcel that the declaration does not identify.

In RE McCOMBER · filed 2010-01-12

In this situation the title searcher would still be faced with the underlying problem that the Declaration of Homestead does not refer to the Oak Street property, as required by M.G.L. ch. 188, § 1, and therefore does not place the world on notice that an estate of homestead applies to that parcel as well as the Water Street parcel.

A tenant in common’s homestead declaration cannot prevent other cotenants from partitioning the property.

Ladd v. Swanson · filed 1987-08-28

We think that, on the basis of the traditional purpose of an estate of homestead and the express language of c. 188, § 1, the defendant cannot rely upon the declaration of homestead to defeat or frustrate the right of her tenants in common to partition the tenancy.