149 Mass. Gen. Laws § 150

Section 150 mandates that a prevailing employee receive litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees; those fees are distinct from costs and are not automatically cut off by a rejected Rule 68 offer.

Mogilevsky v. Bally Total Fitness Corp. · filed 2004-03-31

Mogilevsky seeks to recover his attorney’s fees under the penalty provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action,” and under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150, which entitles prevailing plaintiffs to “an award of the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorney fees.” ... As the fee-shifting statutes in play here do not “define” costs to include such fees, Bally’s argument fails.

Section 150 requires a prevailing Wage Act plaintiff to receive reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, but fees and costs tied to unsuccessful claims are excluded unless those claims are sufficiently interconnected with the successful claims.

Trindade v. Grove Services, Inc. · filed 2023-10-03

A plaintiff who prevails on a Wage Act claim is entitled to a mandatory award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150. No fees, however, shall “be awarded for services [employed pursuing an] unsuccessful claim.” ... As such, except for the few instances in which the services cannot be separated, no fees or costs shall be awarded for services provided in pursuit of the 2013, 2014, and 2015 claims. ... In addition to reasonable attorneys’ fees, the Wage Act allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover the “costs of [] litigation.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150. ... As explained above, because expert discovery was limited exclusively to the 2015 Wage Act claim, Plaintiff is not entitled to costs associated with the expert fees, and the Court therefore awards $ 4,929.31 in costs.

Section 150 requires a prevailing Wage Act employee to receive the costs of litigation and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Santos v. Capital Power and Lighting, LLC · filed 2026-01-16

The Court also finds, upon review of the documentation submitted, that Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and costs is largely reasonable.3 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 (noting that employee who prevails in Wage Act action “shall . . . be awarded the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys’ fees”).

Section 150 allows reasonable attorneys fees for a successful wage claim, and the fee award may exceed the damages award.

Gifford v. Soma Group, Inc. · filed 2004-11-03

With regard to the matter of attorneys fees, §150 also provides for an award of “reasonable attorneys fees.” The law is settled that the attorneys fees awarded in such circumstances need not be a fraction of the damage award and may exceed the damage award.

Section 150 requires a reasonable attorney’s fee award to an employee who prevails in a covered action, even when the employee recovers only modest compensatory damages.

Killeen v. Westban Hotel Venture, LP · filed 2007-08-21

As noted earlier, the fee provision in G. L. c. 149, § 150, is mandatory and requires award of a reasonable fee to one who “prevails” in an action to which the statute applies. The award of compensatory damages to the plaintiff, though modest, altered the legal relationship between her and the defendant, made her the “prevailing party” in the litigation, and, therefore, required an award of legal fees.

Section 150 entitles a successful Wage Act plaintiff to an award of attorney fees.

Byrnes v. Lukes · filed 2012-09-27

The plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys fees pursuant to G.L.c. 149, § 150.

Section 150 entitles an employee who prevails on a claim for unpaid wages under § 148 to litigation costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Dixon v. City of Malden · filed 2013-03-04

The Wage Act provides that an employee aggrieved by a violation of G. L. c. 149, § 148, who prevails in a civil action for any damages incurred is entitled to an award of the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees. G. L. c. 149, § 150.

Section 150 allows a prevailing employee to recover litigation costs, but an interpreter’s canceled-work charge is not recoverable where the defendants were not solely responsible for the dispute that caused it.

Li v. Foolun, Inc. · filed 2017-08-10

In addition to reasonable attorney’s fees, the Wage Act allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover the “costs of litigation.” M.G.L. c. 149, § 150. ... The Court is unable to conclude that the Defendants were solely responsible for the dispute regarding the interpreter and, therefore, it is inappropriate to shift this cost to the Defendants. Thus, the Court disallows the $1,500 interpreter fee.

Section 150 entitles an employee who prevails on a section 148B claim to reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, including when the employee obtains damages in arbitration.

Awuah v. COVERALL NORTH AMERICA, INC. · filed 2011-06-15

The Court rules that Awuah and DaSilva are prevailing parties entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 149, section 150.

Section 150 entitles an employee who succeeds on a Wage Act claim to reasonable attorneys fees and litigation costs.

Parham-Johnson v. Pyramid Builders Assoc., Inc. · filed 2016-03-03

Plaintiffs success on her Wage Act claim entitles her to attorneys fees reasonably related to the enforcement of that statutory right. See G.L.c. 149, §148; see also G.L.c. 149, §150 (providing that any employee aggrieved by a violation of the Wage Act shall be awarded the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys fees).

Section 150 permits recovery of reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in bankruptcy proceedings to establish and collect Wage Act debts.

Chen v. Wen Jing Huang · filed 2016-09-07

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled under the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, §150, to recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred to participate in the bankruptcy proceedings initiated by Millennium and Ms. Huang and to litigate the issues summarized above.

Section 150 awards litigation costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing employee, rather than directly to the employee's attorney.

Doe v. Gonpo · filed 2023-09-07

This language clearly and unambiguously requires attorney's fees and costs to be awarded to the employee, rather than to the employee's attorney.

Section 150 awards attorney's fees to a plaintiff whose lawsuit was a necessary and important factor in obtaining a material portion of the relief sought.

Ferman v. Sturgis Cleaners, Inc. · filed 2019-02-19

For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff prevails for purposes of an award of attorney's fees under the Wage Act when his or her suit satisfies the catalyst test by acting as a necessary and important factor in causing the defendant to provide a material portion of the relief demanded in the plaintiff's complaint.

Section 150 entitles a successful wage claimant to reasonable attorney's fees on appeal.

Tisbert v. New England Mobile Crushing Services, Inc. · filed 2024-03-22

We agree that he is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under the Wage Act and overtime law. See G. L. c. 149, § 150.

Under § 150, a wage claimant qualifies for attorney's fees when the lawsuit was a necessary and important factor in obtaining a material portion of the requested relief; payment after filing alone does not establish that link.

JUSINO v. MASSACHUSETTS CHIROPRACTIC CENTER, LLC, & Another. · filed 2026-01-14

We are not persuaded, because temporal proximity alone does not prove that one event caused the other. ... We therefore remand to the trial court the question whether the Wage Act action was "a necessary and important factor in causing" the defendants to pay the plaintiff her outstanding wages and treble damages.

Section 150 requires an employee to wait 90 days after filing a complaint with the attorney general (unless the attorney general assents sooner) and to bring the civil action within three years after the violation.

DeBarros v. Areas USA Boston, LLC · filed 2018-04-20

However, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150, provides in relevant part: An employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of [Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § . . . 148A . . . or Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 19] may, 90 days after the filing of a complaint with the attorney general, or sooner if the attorney general assents in writing, and within 3 years after the violation, institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred, and for any lost wages and other benefits. ... The complaint alleges that plaintiff was wrongfully terminated in March 2013, nearly five years before filing the present suit. In addition, the complaint does not allege that plaintiff first brought his retaliation claim to the state attorney general as required by statute. Accordingly, the retaliation claim is time-barred and must be dismissed.

Section 150 requires a Wage Act plaintiff to file a complaint with the attorney general before bringing a private claim and to allege compliance with that requirement.

Byrnes v. Lukes · filed 2009-11-03

The defendants move to dismiss Count V because Byrnes fails to allege she followed the procedure outlined in G.L.c. 149, §150, whereby a plaintiff must file a complaint of a violation of G.L.c. 149, §148, with the attorney general before proceeding with a private claim against a defendant. Because the court finds Byrnes has sufficiently alleged the defendants violated G.L.c. 149, §148, by failing to pay her amounts owed to her on the date of her termination, it will give Byrnes leave to amend her complaint to allege under Count V that she followed the requirements of G.L.c. 149, §150 (see the court’s Order).

Section 150 generally requires an employee to file a complaint with the Attorney General and wait 90 days before bringing a private action, but noncompliance does not deprive the court of jurisdiction if the Attorney General is notified during the suit; the requirement also applies to related chapter 151 claims predicated on misclassification.

Hogan v. The InStore Group, LLC · filed 2021-01-11

The procedural requirements under § 150 apply to claims brought under ch. 151, § 1 as well because ch. 151 is “predicated on [the plaintiff’s] claim of misclassification under [ch.] 149, § 148B.” Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., 990 N.E.2d 1054, 1060 n.10 (Mass. 2013). The language of the statute seems to require that, before filing a civil action under the Massachusetts independent contractor statute, an individual must first submit the complaint to the Massachusetts Attorney General and then wait 90 days before commencing suit. However, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that failure to follow this requirement does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to consider claims under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §§ 148, 148B(a), and 150, so long as “the Attorney General is notified of the suit during its pendency.” Depianti, 990 N.E.2d at 1062. Mr. Hogan finally got around to submitting a complaint to the Attorney General on September 29, 2017, some 51 days before asking leave to substitute his First Amended Complaint. That filing with the Attorney General was sufficient to comply with the Supreme Judicial Court’s interpretation of this statutory predicate for a private action under Massachusetts wage and hour law. The belated submission of the Original Complaint to the Attorney General provides no reason to dismiss Mr. Hogan’s lawsuit at this point.

Section 150 requires a claimant alleging covered wage-law violations to first file a complaint with the Massachusetts Attorney General before bringing a private action, subject to the statute's timing rules.

de Souza v. American Used Auto Parts, Inc. · filed 2026-03-20

Section 150 requires an individual alleging a violation of the wage statutes alleged in Counts II, III, and V to first file a complaint with the Massachusetts AG.

Section 150 requires employees claiming unpaid compensation, including vacation pay, to file with the attorney general or obtain the attorney general’s written permission before suing.

Daly v. Norton Co. · filed 1999-11-15

Through this provision, Massachusetts law mandates that all compensation claims must be filed with the Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General before any court may adjudicate such claims. Daly, therefore, must either file a complaint with the attorney general or seek the attorney general’s written permission before filing a claim for unpaid compensation in this Court.

Section 150 does not require dismissal of a wage claim for failure to plead compliance with the Attorney General filing requirements when the plaintiffs actually complied.

Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2004-12-31

Because the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have, in fact, filed a complaint with the Attorney General and have received permission to sue from that office, the Court will not dismiss their complaint on the technical ground that they failed to allege this in their complaint.

Section 150 permits an employee to bring a private wage claim 90 days after filing a complaint with the Attorney General, or sooner with the Attorney General’s written assent.

Axton-Cross Co. v. Blanchette · filed 1994-10-17

Blanchette does not allege any facts which indicate that he has filed a complaint with the Attorney General or that he has received the Attorney General’s written approval to bring a private civil claim for violations of G.L.c. 149, §148. Thus, because Blanchette has failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites for bringing a private claim under G.L.c. 149, § 148, Count VI must be dismissed.

Section 150’s requirement to file with the Attorney General before bringing a private suit is not jurisdictional when the Attorney General receives notice during the suit and the delay does not prejudice the defendant.

Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. · filed 2013-06-17

Accordingly, we hold that failure to file a complaint with the Attorney General before initiating a private suit for alleged employment violations does not interfere with the accomplishment of the statutory purposes of § 150 to a substantial degree, at least where the Attorney General is notified of the suit during its pendency. ... For these reasons, we conclude that Depianti’s failure first to file a complaint with the Attorney General does not deprive the United States District Court of jurisdiction to consider his claims under G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 148B, and 150, and G. L. c. 151, §§ 1 and 1A.

Section 150 requires an employee to present the claims to the Massachusetts Attorney General before suing; a later complaint cannot cure a failure to do so.

Swanson v. Lord & Taylor LLC · filed 2011-12-20

Because Plaintiffs first complaint with the Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General did not mention the claims on which Plaintiff currently bases her putative class action lawsuit, Plaintiff cannot be found to have properly exhausted her administrative remedies as to those claims.

Section 150's pre-suit complaint requirement does not bar a private Wage Act action when the Attorney General receives notice during the suit and the defendant suffers no prejudice from the delay.

Owens v. City of Malden · filed 2023-10-30

Based on Depianti and the Attorney General's letter, we conclude that the purposes implicit in the statutory scheme have been satisfied. ... Hence, the district court was correct to allow this litigation to continue.

Section 150 permits an employee to file a Wage Act suit before the Attorney General assents, provided the Attorney General assents before judgment.

Lawless v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC · filed 2018-06-25

An employee who initiates such an action within the 90-day period and before the Attorney General has assented may still recover under the Wage Act as long as the Attorney General assents to the suit prior to the entry of judgment.

Section 150 permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over a pending Wage Act suit if the Attorney General is notified before judgment.

Owens v. City of Malden · filed 2021-10-04

In accordance with the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Depianti, this Court ruled at the June 2, 2021 hearing that it has subject-matter jurisdiction provided that the Massachusetts Attorney General is notified of the pending suit in accordance with Massachusetts General Laws chapter 149, section 150 before judgment in this matter enters.

The 2008 amendment to § 150 changes substantive rights by making treble damages mandatory, so it does not apply retroactively absent clear legislative intent.

DiFIORE v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2009-12-23

To sum up, the newly enacted amendment to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 149, section 150, is a law that changes the substantive rights of parties as they existed under the original version. The Legislature has not explicitly stated that this law is to be applied retroactively. Thus, the new version of the law will not be applied in this case. Therefore, the Skycaps’ motion to amend the judgment to treble the damages is DENIED.

Section 150’s 2008 amendment makes treble damages mandatory for Tip Statute violations but does not apply retroactively to earlier conduct.

Hernandez v. Hyatt Corp. · filed 2010-02-09

The Chapter 80 amendment, which eliminates any discretion in the imposition of treble damages, is more than an “essentially procedural” change that could be properly applied retroactively.

Under the pre-2008 version of § 150, treble damages are available when an employer’s conduct is outrageous because of evil motive or reckless indifference to the employee’s rights.

Pacheco v. H.N. Gorin, Inc. · filed 2011-05-10

Pursuant to G.L.C. 149, §150 prior to amendment, Pacheco is entitled to treble damages if the defendants’ conduct is “outrageous, because of [their] evil motive or [their] reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Wiedmann, 444 Mass. at 711, quoting Goodrow v. Lane Bryant Inc., 432 Mass. 165, 178-79 (2000). ... Pacheco is entitled to treble damages, resulting in an amount of $25,814.40.

Section 150 requires treble damages, litigation costs, and attorney fees for a prevailing Wage Act employee when the relevant facts occurred after Chapter 80 took effect.

Dow v. Casale · filed 2011-07-19

Because the relevant facts of this case occurred after Chapter 80 came into effect, the award of treble damages as well as attorneys fees and costs to a prevailing party is mandatory.

Section 150 requires treble damages for lost wages awarded for violations of §148.

Grady v. Cloherty · filed 2012-03-29

On review, we find that despite the dictum in Oliveira, §150 mandates the trebling of lost wages awarded as damages for violations of G.Lc. 149, §148.

Section 150 requires treble damages for unpaid commissions that are determined and due.

Weber v. Coast to Coast Medical, Inc. · filed 2013-04-10

As no significant legislative changes bearing on this interpretation have been made since that decision,7 we continue to view the trebling provision of § 150 as intended to be applied to commissions “determined and due.” G. L. c. 149, § 148.

Section 150’s mandatory treble damages are compensatory liquidated damages.

Feygina v. Hallmark Health System, Inc. · filed 2013-07-12

The addition of this provision makes clear that the mandatory award of treble damages under the revised statute is compensatory, not punitive, in nature.

Section 150 makes treble damages mandatory and nonwaivable; a term waiving them may be severed while the wage claim proceeds to arbitration.

Paradise v. Eagle Creek Software Services, Inc. · filed 2013-09-06

“[B]ecause the award of treble damages is mandatory under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 § 150, and cannot be waived,” an arbitration provision that compels an employee to forego that right must be invalidated. Machado v. System4 LLC, 465 Mass. 508, 517, 989 N.E.2d 464 (2013). ... The Court will accordingly sever the term in the ENCCA that purports to waive multiple damages, which term the Court finds to be invalid. Absent that waiver, the arbitration provision will be enforceable with respect to plaintiffs Massachusetts Wage Act claim.

Section 150 entitles an employee who proves wrongful withholding of wages to mandatory treble damages.

Mui v. Massachusetts Port Authority · filed 2015-04-01

More critically, as of 2008, a plaintiff who has proven the wrongful withholding of wages is entitled to the mandatory assessment of treble damages.

Section 150 requires treble damages for unpaid accrued vacation wages.

EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness · filed 2016-02-04

In his brief, however, Leness contends that the judge's calculation of damages for those days, in the amount of $4,732.10, trebled to $14,196.30 (as required by G. L. c. 149, § 150), is erroneous due to a mathematical error. We agree that based on a daily rate of $673.08, the damages for 8.4 days of accrued vacation pay should have been $5,653.87, trebled to $16,961.62.

Section 150 makes treble damages automatic for Wage Act violations, while prejudgment interest is assessed only on the single damages amount.

Segal v. Johnson · filed 2016-07-06

The 2008 Amendment modified M.G.L.c. 149, §150 to make treble damages automatic for any Wage Act violation. ... To reconcile the 2008 Amendment to the Wage Act and the prejudgment interest statute, while best serving the purpose of both statutes, I award prejudgment interest on the amount of single damages awarded by the jury for the period July 12, 2008 and thereafter.

Section 150’s 2008 amendment making treble damages mandatory applies only to claims arising on or after July 12, 2008.

Rosnov v. Molloy · filed 2011-08-31

We conclude that the amendment should be read to apply only prospectively, to claims arising on or after the amendment’s effective date of July 12, 2008.

Section 150 requires treble damages for a prevailing employee, and an arbitration agreement cannot waive them.

Machado v. System4 LLC · filed 2013-06-12

Accordingly, because the award of treble damages is mandatory under G. L. c. 149, § 150, and cannot be waived, that waiver must be invalidated.

Section 150 requires treble damages for a prevailing employee’s lost wages and benefits under §148, plus litigation costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Blake v. CRNC Operating, LLC · filed 2015-09-24

It is G.L.c. 149, §150 that actually provides punitive damage for a violation of §148. Id. at §150 (“An employee so aggrieved who prevails in [a §148] action shall be awarded treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost wages and other benefits and shall also be awarded the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys’ fees.”).

Section 150 requires treble damages for lost wages and other benefits, litigation costs, and reasonable attorney fees for a successful plaintiff.

Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc. · filed 2015-10-26

The provisions of G.L.c. 149, §150, require an award of treble damages for lost wages and other benefits, together with cost of litigation and reasonable attorneys fees to a successful plaintiff in a claim under the statute.

Section 150 requires an employee’s unpaid wages to be trebled before offsetting damages awarded to the employer on a fraudulent misrepresentation claim.

PETER M. ZILIOLI & Another v. PAUL ZILIOLI, JR., & Another. · filed 2023-06-30

The analysis in Ameripride Linen & Apparel Servs., Inc. v. Eat Well, Inc., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 63, 71 (2005), provides support for the judge's decision not to offset the plaintiffs' damages prior to trebling Paul's.

Section 150 permits treble damages for the untimely payment of overtime wages owed under federal law.

Lambirth v. Advanced Auto, Inc. · filed 2015-10-15

Accordingly, the disputed issue is whether the Wage Act can be 'used as a means of collecting treble damages for unpaid overtime wages due under federal law. ... The above-cited decisions, and a close reading of the Wage Act, lead to the conclusion that the statute applies to the untimely payment of all wages to which an employee is entitled under either state or federal law.

Section 150 requires treble damages for unpaid wages, plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, when an employer violates the Wage Act.

Guevara-Salgado v. Hayes-Meninno, LLC · filed 2015-08-31

Violation of the statute entitles the plaintiff to treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any loss of wages, and an award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Section 150 awards a prevailing aggrieved employee treble damages for lost wages and other benefits, plus litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Glynn v. Martin Sports & Entertainment, LLC · filed 2023-03-22

Under Section 150 of the Wage Act, “[a]n employee so aggrieved who prevails in such an action shall be awarded treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost wages and other benefits and shall also be awarded the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” M.G.L. c. 149, § 150.

Section 150 mandates treble damages for lost wages and other employment benefits, but emotional-distress damages are not an employment benefit eligible for trebling.

Travers v. Flight Services & Systems, Inc. · filed 2015-12-15

And that is because we find no basis for concluding that, under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 149, § 150, payment of damages for emotional distress is a "benefit[]" of employment.

Section 150 limits recovery to unpaid wages and benefits and excludes incidental damages such as lost job opportunities or emotional distress.

Somers v. Converged Access, Inc. · filed 2008-01-23

Furthermore, the Wage Act is limited to recovering for damages for failure of an employer to timely pay wages and benefits in full and does not allow recovery for other incidental damages such as lost job opportunities or emotional distress, as alleged by Somers.

Section 150 permits a misclassified employee to recover wages and benefits denied because of the misclassification, including holiday and vacation pay.

Somers v. Converged Access, Inc. · filed 2009-08-21

The defendants will bear the burden of proof on this issue, and if they are unsuccessful, the plaintiff will be entitled under G. L. c. 149, § 150, to “damages incurred,” including treble damages for “any lost wages and other benefits.” The “damages incurred” will include any wages and benefits the plaintiff proves he was denied because of his misclassification as an independent contractor, including the holiday pay, vacation pay, and other benefits that he would have been entitled to as a CAI employee.

Section 150 allows a misclassified employee to recover workers’ compensation insurance premiums the employee was required to pay as damages incurred.

Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc. · filed 2011-08-31

We therefore conclude that an employee such as Graffeo may recover, as “damages incurred,” any such insurance premiums that he was obliged to pay to Coverall under the terms of his contract.

Section 150 lets an employee who prevails on a misclassification claim recover lost wages and benefits attributable to the misclassification.

JONES v. MONTACHUSETTS REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & Others. · filed 2023-08-14

A plaintiff who prevails on a ... misclassification claim is entitled under G. L. c. 149, § 150, to recover "any damages incurred" (emphasis added), including any lost wages or benefits attributable to the misclassification.

Section 150 allows a misclassified worker to recover costs that a statute requires the employer to bear when misclassification shifts those costs to the worker.

Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc. · filed 2010-09-28

When an employer misclassifies an employee as an independent contractor and attempts to shift statutorily mandated costs to that employee, those costs are “damages incurred.”

The 2014 amendment to § 150’s limitations scheme does not revive claims already time-barred before the amendment; its new tolling provision therefore cannot save those claims.

Wang v. Palmisano · filed 2016-01-26

It is bears mentioning that, in 2014, Massachusetts amended its statute of limitations (i) to incorporate a provision into ch. 149, § 150 under which a plaintiffs claims for wage-payment violations under ch. 149, § 148 or for retaliatory discharge under ch. 149, § 148A are tolled from the date upon which the plaintiff files a complaint with the attorney general until the date upon which the plaintiff receives written authorization from the. attorney general that the plaintiff may sue, and (ii) to increase the statute of limitations under ch. 151, § 20A for overtime claims under ch. 151, § 1A from two to three years. ... These changes in the law cannot save Plaintiff's claims, however, because the statutes of limitations had already lapsed when Plaintiff brought his Complaint in 2013, and this Court will not assume that the legislature intended to revive Plaintiffs already time-barred claims.

Section 150 gives Wage Act claims a three-year limitations period that runs separately for each violation and may be equitably tolled when fraudulent concealment affirmatively misleads the plaintiff.

Ellicott v. American Capital Energy, Inc. · filed 2018-10-12

Wage Act claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations that attaches separately to each individual violation of the act. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 (2009); Crocker v. Townsend Oil Co., 979 N.E.2d 1077, 1085-86 (Mass. 2012). ... Equitable tolling based on fraudulent concealment is cognizable with respect to the Wage Act statute of limitations. See Crocker, 979 N.E.2d at 1083-84. It applies when a plaintiff is "affirmatively misled" by a defendant. Hall v. FMR Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 120, 126 (D. Mass. 2008) (citations omitted).

Section 150 provides a three-year limitations period for the wage claims and tolls that period during the Attorney General complaint and right-to-sue process; the court also applied class-action tolling to the putative class.

Mongue v. The Wheatleigh Corporation · filed 2021-09-29

The statute of limitations for each of Plaintiff’s state law claims is three years. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 20A. ... Accordingly, the court concludes that the statute of limitations was tolled by Plaintiff’s filing of the class action complaint on June 26, 2020, and the correct period for which class damages may be recovered is June 26, 2017, through March 1, 2020. That said, for each of Plaintiff’s claims, the statute of limitations is tolled “from the date that the employee or a similarly situated employee files a complaint with the attorney general alleging a violation … until the date that the attorney general issues a letter authorizing a private right of action ….”

Section 150 establishes a three-year limitations period for claims under the Massachusetts Wage Act.

Figueroa v. Cactus Mexican Grill, LLC · filed 2021-12-10

Count 2 asserts a claim for untimely payment of wages in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. The Massachusetts Wage Act imposes liability on employers who fail to timely pay wages earned by their employees. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. Among other things, the Act requires that an employer pay wages within six days of the period during which wages were earned if the employee is employed for five or six days in a calendar week. Id. The statutory limitations period is three years. Id. § 150. ... The complaint’s allegations are therefore insufficient to support equitable tolling based on fraudulent concealment under Massachusetts law. The three-year statutory limitations period thus applies, and the Court will grant the motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of that portion of Count 2 seeking recovery beyond the three years preceding the filing of this lawsuit.

Section 150 gives Wage Act claims a three-year limitations period that runs separately for each violation, and tolls that period while an employee's complaint is pending with the Attorney General's Office until authorization to sue is issued.

Trindade v. Grove Services, Inc. · filed 2024-01-22

"Wage Act claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations that attaches separately to each individual violation of the act." Ellicott, 906 F.3d at 170; see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150. The statute of limitations period is tolled from the date an employee files a complaint with the AGO alleging violations of the Wage Act until the date the AGO issues a letter authorizing the employee to bring suit on the employee's own behalf. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150.

Section 150 requires Wage Act claims to be brought within three years after the alleged violation.

Jiang v. Kobe Japanese Steakhouse, Inc. · filed 2024-11-22

Similarly, a person asserting violations of the Wage Act must do so “within 3 years after the [alleged] violation.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150. For the claims against Kobe to be timely, they would need to arise out of violations occurring on November 2, 2019, or later.

Section 150 provides a three-year limitations period for minimum-wage claims under § 148 and retaliatory-discharge claims under § 148A.

Wang v. Palmisano · filed 2014-09-30

Therefore, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202, the Court applies Massachusetts’ limitations periods of two and three years to Plaintiffs minimum-wage and overtime-wage claims, respectively, because they are shorter than New York’s six-year period for equivalent claims. ... Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 (three-year limitations period for minimum-wage claims alleged under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148); ... However, the Court applies New York’s two-year limitations period to Plaintiffs retaliatory-discharge claim because it is shorter than Massachusetts’ three-year period for equivalent claims.

Section 150 subjects claims for employment benefits under the state wage and hours statute to a three-year limitations period.

Miller v. Trinity Oil Co. · filed 1999-04-05

Assuming that Trinity had a legal obligation to provide these benefits, any claim for such benefits is subject to a three-year statute of limitations set forth in the state wages and hours statute.

Section 150 provides a three-year limitations period for wholly unpaid wages; it does not extend the two-year period for claims seeking the difference between regular and overtime pay.

Mogilevsky v. Bally Total Fitness Corp. · filed 2003-05-13

... would essentially eviscerate the distinction between the two-year statute of limitations for the failure to pay overtime hours at the overtime rate, Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151, § 20A, and the three-year statute of limitations for the failure to pay wages altogether, Mass. Gen. Laws c. 149, § 150.

Section 150 requires an employee to file a civil suit within three years of the violation.

Beaupre v. Town of Douglas · filed 2006-04-04

Pursuant to G.L.c. 149, §150, a civil suit must be filed by an employee within three (3) years of a violation.

A private complaint under Section 150 must be brought within three years.

Montello v. Smith · filed 1998-02-25

A *47private complaint under G.L.c. 149, §150 would have had to have been brought within three years.

Section 150 permits an employee to recover unpaid wages for overtime hours at the regular rate within three years, even after the two-year deadline for premium overtime has passed.

Crocker v. Townsend Oil Co. · filed 2012-12-17

As it pertains to the present dispute, although the plaintiffs’ overtime claims brought under G. L. c. 151, § 1A, are barred by the two-year statute of limitations, the plaintiffs may still recover for unpaid overtime work at the regular rate under the Wage Act, subject to the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 150 limits Wage Act claims to the three years before the action is filed.

George v. Synkinetics, Inc. · filed 2013-03-20

Given that George’s responsibilities were gradually reduced over time, and that the relevant time period for the Wage Act claim looks back three years from the date of filing the case, G.L.c. 149, §150; Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 375 (2008), i.e., during the period when George had been demoted to vice president and had his stated compensation slashed, I find that George has alleged sufficient facts to support his claim that he should be considered an employee under the Wage Act, if not for all, at least for some, of the relevant period.

Section 150’s three-year limitations period may be shortened by agreement when the shorter period is reasonable and consistent with statutory provisions and public policy.

Machado v. System4 LLC · filed 2015-04-13

The agreement additionally provides for a one year or eighteen-month statute of limitations, which is shorter than the three-year period provided by G. L. c. 149 § 150. Massachusetts law permits contractually shortened limitations periods so long as they are "reasonable" and "not contrary to other statutory provisions or to public policy." ... The plaintiffs have presented no evidence to suggest that the shortened statute of limitations at issue is unreasonable or contrary to public policy. Accordingly, it remains enforceable.

Section 150’s three-year limitations period permits a claim for commissions that became due within three years before suit, even if the employer changed the commission rate earlier.

Daly v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. · filed 2018-08-22

Accordingly, Daly's Wage Act claim is not barred by the statute of limitations in so far as it concerns disputed commissions from July 23, 2012 (three years before he filed the present action) through the end of his employment at T-Mobile.

Section 150 permits an employer to offset earned wages only through a valid set-off, which requires a clear and established debt owed by the employee rather than a unilateral withholding.

Selfridge v. Jama · filed 2016-03-24

Section 150 of the Wage Act recognizes several exceptions to this general rule, including “the ■ attachment of such wages by trustee process or a valid assignment thereof or a valid set-off against the same.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has defined “valid set-off’ consistent with “the common, ordinary sense to refer to circumstances where there exists a clear and established debt owed to the employer by the employee.”

Section 150 permits an employer to avoid liability for failing to pay commissions only when the wages are subject to a valid set-off, which requires a clear and established debt owed by the employee; an unresolved debt is not a valid set-off.

Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. v. Powers · filed 2023-03-31

Under the Wage Act, an employer may not excuse failure to pay commissions as required “other than the attachment of such wages by . . . a valid set-off against the same,” among other expressly delineated reasons that are not at issue here. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150. While the term “set-off” is not defined in the Wage Act, “[a] setoff is generally defined as ‘something that is set off against another thing [;] ... the discharge of a debt by setting against it a distinct claim in favor of the debtor.’” Camara v. Att’y Gen., 941 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 n. 7 (Mass. 2011) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2078 (1993)). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a “valid set-off” “refer[s] to circumstances where there exists a clear and established debt owed to the employer by the employee.” Somers v. Converged Access, Inc., 911 N.E.2d 739, 750 (Mass. 2009). ... Accordingly, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that the Note was an “undisputed loan” or that Powers owed to JLL “a clear and established debt” thereunder, Somers, 911 N.E.2d at 750, and so need not decide whether “due process” was owed. If Powers was not obligated to repay the outstanding balance on the Note, then JLL’s application of a portion of Powers’ Quanterix Lease Deal commission against the balance of the Note would not constitute a “valid set-off” under the Wage Act. Summary judgment is denied in this limited respect.

Section 150 permits wage deductions or withheld payments only when supported by a valid attachment, assignment, or set-off.

Pineda v. Skinner Services, Inc. · filed 2019-08-08

The SJC further noted that Section 150 of the Wage Act prohibits employers from making deductions or withholding payments unless there is a valid attachment, assignment, or set-off. Id. at 759-60 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150). ... There are common questions of law and fact as to the Uniform Class. Whether Skinner violated the Massachusetts Wage Act depends on whether it forced plaintiffs, through coercion or intimidation, into signing up for the Cintas uniform cleaning program, and whether the deductions were valid attachments, assignments, or set-offs. These questions may be answered through common evidence, and there is no reason to think that the answers will vary between class members.

Section 150 permits a wage setoff for a clear and established debt, but an employer’s unilateral assessment of an employee’s fault and damages does not establish one.

Camara v. Attorney General · filed 2011-01-25

The statutory language and the interplay of §§ 148 and 150 of the Wage Act reflect that employee deduction agreements of the type at issue in this case constitute special contracts that § 148 prohibits unless the deductions are valid setoffs for clear and established debts within the meaning of § 150. For the reasons we have discussed, we do not find the deductions prescribed by the plaintiff’s policy to be setoffs for clear and established debts.

Section 150’s valid set-off defense may apply at the pleading stage when an employer plausibly alleges that an agreed training repayment is a clear and established debt.

McClain v. Cape Air · filed 2023-12-12

Even assuming that the training repayment provision could be treated as analogous to a deduction or withholding from Plaintiffs’ paycheck, Cape Air has at least plausibly alleged that the $30,000 falls within the Wage Act’s exception for a “valid set-off” for a “clear and established debt.”

Section 150 allows an employer to raise a valid setoff defense, but the employee’s debt must be established through a neutral process.

Muniz v. RXO Last Mile, Inc. · filed 2023-12-21

Furthermore, under M.G.L. c. 149, § 150 an employer may raise a “valid setoff” affirmative defense. ... In a perverse sense, always assigning fault to the employee is “clear,” but fails to “establish” the debt within the meaning of Camara: the debt must be proven through some kind of neutral process.

Section 150 permits an aggrieved employee to bring a Wage Act civil action for himself and similarly situated employees, but that class-action mechanism cannot be used here to pursue overtime wages owed only under federal law with different procedural requirements.

Brayak v. New Bos. Pie, Inc. · filed 2017-11-14

I recognize that the Wage Act provides for class proceedings, but I am not convinced that plaintiffs may avail themselves of such proceedings to collect overtime wages to which they are only entitled under a federal law with different requirements.

Section 150 allows an employee aggrieved by a Wage Act violation to bring a civil action individually or on behalf of the employee and other similarly situated employees.

Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc. · filed 2019-08-20

see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 (“An employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of [the Wage Act] may . . . institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and others similarly situated, a civil action.”). ... The Wage Act itself evidences an intent to permit plaintiffs to proceed as a class. ... Because the FAA does not apply, these public policy rationales are is sufficient to invalidate the agreement.

Section 150 generally permits Wage Act claims to proceed as Rule 23 class actions, but a class claim dependent solely on FLSA wages may not be maintained because it would circumvent the FLSA's opt-in requirements.

Chavira v. OS Restaurant Services, LLC · filed 2019-02-25

Consistent with this, there is no dispute that Wage Act claims may generally be brought as Rule 23 class actions. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150. ... Plaintiff’s ability to proceed under Rule 23 is not foreclosed by the fact that FLSA remedies may be available to Plaintiff, but rather because his Wage Act claim is wholly dependent on his FLSA claim. ... A Rule 23 action for a claim seeking to recover wages due exclusively under the FLSA circumvents the FLSA’s opt-in requirements, even when it is not wholly duplicative of the FLSA claim, and may not be maintained.

Section 150 permits class actions for similarly situated workers, but plaintiffs must still satisfy Rule 23 to obtain class certification.

Williamson v. DT Management, Inc. · filed 2004-03-10

The plaintiffs here argue that in light of the language in Chapter 149, Section 150 permitting class actions, they are exempt from the requirements of Rule 23 and are automatically entitled to class action status. This Court, however, disagrees with this entitlement argument that is notably lacking in legal support and because the plaintiffs do not make any assertions with regard to Rule 23 compliance, the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification must be denied.

Section 150 permits claims on behalf of similarly situated employees, but class certification must satisfy Mass.R.Civ.P. 23.

Shea v. Weston Golf Club · filed 2007-05-18

Pursuant to G.L.c. 149, §150, plaintiffs have claimed, for themselves and for others similarly situated, a violation of G.L.c. 149, §152A; however, this Court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because plaintiffs have not addressed the requirements of Mass.R.Civ.P. 23, which governs class certification.

Class certification for §150 claims is subject to all requirements of Mass.R.Civ.P. 23, including predominance and superiority.

Sagar v. Fiorenza · filed 2014-01-18

In the absence of appellate authority explicitly stating that the predominance and superiority requirements do not apply to motions for class certification regarding claims brought under G.L.c. 149, §150, this Court will apply Mass.R.Civ.P. 23 to such claims in full.

Section 150 permits employees to bring Wage Act claims on behalf of similarly situated employees.

Clark v. Legal Sea Foods, LLC · filed 2014-11-06

The second relevant factor is that Plaintiffs bring their claim under the Tips Statute, which is found in the Wage Act. That statute specifically provides that employees such as Plaintiffs may bring claims on behalf of other similarly situated employees. M.G.L.c. 149, §150; c. 151, §20.

Section 150 permits a plaintiff to sue for others similarly situated; in federal court, class certification for those wage claims follows Rule 23.

Garcia v. E.J. Amusements of New Hampshire, Inc. · filed 2015-04-13

The Massachusetts wage and hour statute states that a plaintiff may bring a lawsuit on behalf of “himself and for others similarly situated.” Mass. Gen. Laws c. 149, § 150, c. 151, §§ 1B, 20. ... Instead, the Court will proceed with a conventional class certification analysis under Fed. R.Civ.P. 23.

Section 150 permits employees to sue on behalf of similarly situated workers, with class certification governed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 23.

Gammella v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc. · filed 2019-04-12

We agree with the defendant, and accordingly we hold that rule 23 provides the correct framework for analyzing a certification claim brought under the Wage Act or the minimum fair wage law.

Section 150’s policy favoring class proceedings for Wage Act claims makes a class action waiver unenforceable under Massachusetts law when the FAA does not apply.

Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc. · filed 2020-03-27

However, while the rule in Feeney 1 prohibiting class action waivers based on public policy is preempted when the FAA applies to a contract, see Feeney v. Dell Inc., 465 Mass. 470, 471-72 (2013) (“Feeney II”) and Machado, 465 Mass. at 516, the court finds no basis for concluding that Feeney I’s rule against class action waivers is abrogated where the FAA does not apply. ... The court finds that Plaintiffs’ arbitration agreements are not subject to the FAA as Plaintiffs fall within the Section 1 exemption, and that the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement between the parties is not enforceable under Massachusetts law as it contravenes Massachusetts’ public policy against class action waivers of Wage Act claims.

Section 150 provides a private cause of action for misclassification but requires the misclassified employee to suffer damages to recover.

Waithaka v. Amazon.com Inc · filed 2024-12-31

But even if Plaintiff could show that prong B is absent, that showing alone would not establish liability. Massachusetts General Law § 150—which provides a private cause of action for misclassification—also requires the misclassified employee to suffer a harm (“damages”) to recover.

Section 150 gives an employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of §§ 148 or 148A a private right of action and provides treble damages, litigation costs, and reasonable attorney fees, with fee entitlement requiring prevailing-party status under the catalyst test.

Despins · filed 2026-03-12

The correct statutory section is Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150, which applies to all “employee[s] claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of [Mass. Gen. Laws ch.] 149, § 148 or 148A,” Fernandes v. Attleboro Housing Auth., 20 N.E.3d 229, 237 (Mass. 2014), grants a private right of action, and provides for treble damages and attorney fees. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150. ... Where damages are resolved by payment of lost wages prior to judgment, the test for whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees is whether the suit “act[ed] as a necessary and important factor in causing the defendant to provide a material portion of the relief demanded in the plaintiff’s complaint.” ... Accordingly, Despins’s claim under § 148 survives summary judgment as to costs and fees and is otherwise mooted by the past payment. The Court notes that an attorney fee award must be “reasonable,” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150, and that Despins’s failure to seek attorney fees when Defendants paid him for his damages under § 148 may impact the reasonableness of any further fees incurred after that payment, at least as to his § 148 claim.

Section 150 provides a private right of action for § 148 violations, allows an unpaid-overtime claim under the Wage Act instead of § 151’s overtime provision, and limits recovery to the regular rate.

Scarpaci v. Lowe's Home Center, LLC · filed 2016-07-22

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 provides a private right of action for violations of Section 148 of that chapter, which is directed at the timing of when an employee must be paid. An employee may choose to bring a claim for unpaid overtime under the Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §§ 148, 150, rather than Mass. Gen. Laws ch. § 151, § 1A, which specifically grants employees the right to receive one and one-half their regular pay rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. ... “However, in such instance, recovery is limited to uncompensated time worked at the regular rate.”

Section 150 requires a wage claimant to file a complaint with the Attorney General and wait 90 days, unless the Attorney General assents sooner, before bringing a private action.

Jiang v. Shogun Japanese Steak House, Inc. · filed 2022-07-22

Pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150, an individual alleging a violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, or other wage-law violations under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, may bring a private right of action “ninety days after filing a complaint with the Attorney General, or sooner if the Attorney General assents to such suit.” Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., 465 Mass. 607, 611 (2013). “Failure to satisfy this statutory precondition is grounds for dismissal.” Joyce v. Upper Crust, LLC, 2012 WL 3028459, at *6 (D. Mass. July 25, 2012).

Section 150 gives an aggrieved employee a private right of action and provides treble damages, litigation costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees when the employee prevails on a covered wage violation.

De Sousa v. Amazon Siding Application Inc. · filed 2026-05-22

Mass. Gen Laws ch. 149, §§ 148 and 150 and Mass. Gen Laws 151, §§ 1A and 1B, confer a private right of action for an employee “aggrieved” by an employer’s violations of these provisions. Under these chapters, if an employee prevails against their employer, they “shall be awarded treble damages . . . and shall also be awarded the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees.” See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §150; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1B.

Section 150 entitles an employee aggrieved by a § 148 violation to damages incurred, including lost wages and other benefits, and mandates trebling of the awarded Wage Act damages.

Trindade v. Grove Services, Inc. · filed 2023-02-22

The Wage Act states that employees claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of § 148 of the Act are entitled to “damages incurred,and for any lost wages and other benefits.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150. ... This number is subject to mandatory trebling under the Wage Act, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150; McGrath v. City of Somerville, 419 F. Supp. 3d 233, 262 (D. Mass. 2019), bringing the total to $323,556.00, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 150 gives an employee aggrieved by a wage payment violation a private civil action for injunctive relief and damages, including treble damages, litigation costs, and attorney fees.

Scott v. Granada Computer Services, Inc. · filed 1996-05-02

In particular, an employee aggrieved by the violation of the statute has a private civil right of action for injunctive relief and damages, including treble damages for loss of wages and other benefits, attorneys fees, and litigation costs.

Section 150 permits an employee, with the Attorney General’s approval, to bring a private action for retaliation under §148A.

Lohnes v. Darwin Partners, Inc. · filed 2002-07-22

Here, the Legislature has prescribed a statutory remedy for such retaliation — G.L.c. 149, §150 specifically permits an employee to bring a private cause of action alleging a violation of §148A with the approval of the Attorney General.

Section 150 permits aggrieved employees to bring a private action for violations of § 148A.

Smith v. Winter Place LLC · filed 2006-08-01

In 1999, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 149, § 150, adding § 148A to the list of sections that permit a private right of action for aggrieved employees. The present action is brought under G. L. c. 149, § 150.

Section 150 authorizes private civil actions for violations of specified wage provisions but does not include meal-period violations under § 100.

Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2008-09-23

Thus G. L. c. 149, § 150, authorizes employees claiming to be aggrieved by violations of certain sections — specifically §§ 148, 148B, 150C, 152, and 152A (relating to wages) — to “institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action for injunctive relief and any damages incurred, including treble damages for any loss of wages and other benefits.” This provision does not, however, mention § 100.

Section 150 allows an employee to sue for misclassification under section 148B without alleging a violation of another Wage Act provision.

Amero v. Townsend Oil Co. · filed 2009-04-15

This court agrees. The two sections must be read in light of one another. If subsection (d) of section 148B provided the exclusive remedy for violations of section 148B, then section 150 is superfluous to the extent it includes section 148B among the sections the violation of which gives rise to a private cause of action for employees.

Section 150 permits the department to file a wage complaint but does not prevent an employee from seeking a complaint.

Commonwealth v. Northern Telecom, Inc. · filed 1988-01-11

The language in § 150, that “[t]he department may make complaint against any person for a violation of [G. L. c. 149, § 148] . . . ,” is permissive only, and does not foreclose an employee from seeking a complaint.

Section 150 gives an employee a right of action for unpaid wages; an independent contractor has no such right.

Molloy v. Massachusetts Mortgage Corp. · filed 1998-01-12

There was ample evidence at trial to support the court’s implicit finding that the plaintiff was an independent contractor rather than an employee with a G.L.c. 148, §150 right of action.

Section 150 gives individual workers a judicial remedy for unpaid wages, including treble damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs, even when a collective bargaining agreement addresses their compensation.

Newton v. Commissioner of the Department of Youth Services · filed 2004-10-27

As such, it bestows upon individual workers the right to recover not only their lost wages, but also treble damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs. G. L. c. 149, § 150.

Section 150 gives an employee a private right of action but does not give the employee the Attorney General’s enforcement standing.

Melia v. Zenhire, Inc. · filed 2012-05-08

General Laws c. 149, § 150, merely grants an employee a private right of action. See Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 373 (2008); Smith v. Winter Place LLC, 447 Mass. 363, 368 n.12 (2006). It in no way vests an employee with the standing of the Attorney General.

Section 150 permits a nonresident employee to seek its remedy when Massachusetts has a close connection to the parties and their employment relationship.

Dow v. Casale · filed 2013-06-19

In short, in the circumstances presented, where the Commonwealth has such a close connection to the parties and their employment relationship, it is entirely reasonable to apply local law to Dow’s claim and to afford him the remedy provided by § 150.

Section 150 authorizes a private civil action for retaliation prohibited by § 148A.

Wessell v. Mink Brook Associates, Inc. · filed 2015-08-05

In so arguing, the defendants ignore the authorization in § 150 for a private cause of action for retaliation prohibited by the first paragraph of § 148A.

Section 150 allows employees to bring private actions for injunctive relief or damages for violations of section 148.

Hamilton v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc. · filed 2016-07-21

The opportunity for private actions by employees to seek injunctive relief or damages in connection with violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 § 148 is provided by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 § 150.

Section 150 lets employees sue to recover unpaid Sunday premium wages.

Bassett v. Triton Technologies, Inc. · filed 2017-03-06

They are seeking payment of wages earned by working on a Sunday. Plaintiffs may do so by asserting a cause of action under G.L.c. 149, §150.

Section 150 does not separately define who may be held civilly liable for violations of section 148.

Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC · filed 2013-06-13

General Laws c. 149, § 150, does not separately define the class of people who may be subject to civil liability under G. L. c. 149, § 148.

Section 150 provides a private cause of action when the Commonwealth misclassifies a worker covered by Section 148 and consequently fails to pay wages required by that section.

Jergensen v. Massachusetts Historical Commission · filed 2015-05-14

So, for example, if the Commonwealth misclassifies one of its workers covered by Section 148 (e.g. a “mechanic, workman [or] laborer” or a person who works “in a penal or charitable institution”) as an independent contractor in violation of Section 148B(a), and as a result fails to pay the worker as required under Section 148, a private cause of action will lie under G.L.c. 149, §§148 and 150.

Section 150's private right of action does not cover violations of section 30B.

Tortolano v. Lemuel Shattuck Hosp. · filed 2018-08-20

The express private right of action under G. L. c. 149, § 150, does not apply to violations of § 30B, and because Tortolano is an employee of a State hospital, she falls outside the protection of other provisions of the statutes.

Section 150 does not permit an employee to recover prevailing wage underpayments under the Wage Act when the only alleged violation is of the Prevailing Wage Act.

Donis v. American Waste Services, LLC · filed 2020-07-21

Following Crocker, we hold that the plaintiffs may not recover under the Wage Act, where their only contention is that the defendants failed to pay the wage rates mandated by the Prevailing Wage Act.

Section 150 permits employees to sue for unpaid Sunday pay through a claim for wages earned under § 148.

Sutton v. Jordan's Furniture, Inc. · filed 2024-03-28

We also conclude that the Sunday pay statute is enforceable under the Wage Act's private right of action, G. L. c. 149, § 150.

Section 150 permits class-wide injunctive relief but does not authorize injunctions for the public benefit.

Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc. · filed 2020-03-20

The statute explicitly contemplates class-wide relief but includes no provisions that allow for injunction for the public benefit.

Section 150 allows injunctive relief for similarly situated plaintiffs but does not authorize injunctions for the public benefit.

Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc. · filed 2020-03-20

The statute explicitly contemplates class-wide relief but includes no provisions that allow for injunction for the public benefit.

A settlement between an employer and the Massachusetts Attorney General does not bar employees from pursuing additional remedies under the Wage Act.

Delgado v. Arbor Homecare Services, LLC · filed 2016-05-10

By its express terms, however, the agreement is between the defendants and the OAG only, and it does not bind the employees, nor release the defendants from liability, even as to the OAG, for any conduct beyond that described in the agreement. The agreement further states that the OAG cannot waive any statutory rights provided to individuals to pursue additional remedies (although the agreement does note that the defendants may be entitled to set-off for amounts paid under the agreement). It is thus clear that, even if the putative class members were beneficiaries of the settlement agreement and accepted payment thereunder of overtime wages due and owing them, they are not barred from proceeding with a Wage Act claim against the defendants.

Section 150 permits an employee to seek money damages in District Court without also seeking injunctive relief.

Rogers v. Town of Plainville · filed 1999-08-31

In that there is no designation to the contrary in §150, we find that, under G.L.c. 149, §150, the District Court is a proper venue in which to seek money damages.

Section 150 treats the bringing of a complaint as commencing a civil action, not filing a complaint form with the Attorney General.

Littlefield v. Adcole Corp. · filed 2015-06-18

This Court finds that the “bringing of the complaint” refers to the commencement of a civil action.

Section 150 does not categorically bar arbitration of Wage Act claims; whether a particular claim can be arbitrated requires a case-by-case analysis.

Dixon v. Perry & Slesnick, P.C. · filed 2009-09-28

Although we conclude that the language of G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, does not operate as a per se bar to the arbitration of a Wage Act claim for many of the reasons set forth in Gilmer, whether a particular claim can be arbitrated is subject to a case-by-case analysis.

Section 150 does not provide a wage claim for prospective unpaid furlough days because wages for those days have not been earned.

Massachusetts State Police Commissioned Officers Ass'n v. Commonwealth · filed 2012-05-11

Accordingly, we conclude that a prospective reduction in the number of days to be worked does not deprive the plaintiffs of any wages “earned.” In these circumstances, the plaintiffs do not fall within the “ ‘zone of interests’ arguably protected by” G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150.

A collective bargaining agreement that lacks a clear and unmistakable waiver does not bar employees from pursuing § 150 judicial remedies for late wages.

Parris v. Sheriff of Suffolk County · filed 2018-09-05

The CBAs here do not include sufficiently clear and unmistakable language to waive the employees' individual judicial remedies contained in G. L. c. 149, § 150.

Section 150 requires an employee claiming unpaid wages to file a complaint with the Attorney General within three years of the alleged violation.

Yelle v. UNITED WATER SPRINGFIELD LLC · filed 2011-07-07

Plaintiff has presented no opposition, nor can the court conceive of one, to Defendant’s argument that his claim is time-barred pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150, which provides that an employee’s exclusive remedy for alleged failure to pay wages is to file a complaint with the Attorney General’s of *177 fice within three years of the alleged violation. Given that Plaintiff filed no such complaint within the allotted time period, the court will allow Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Count VI.

A § 150 wage claim falls within an employee’s agreement to arbitrate statutory employment disputes when the employee knowingly waived a judicial forum.

Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp. v. Grant · filed 2005-12-06

Grant made an explicit and voluntary waiver of his right to pursue his statutory claim in a judicial forum when he signed the Agreement, which clearly provides that “all disputes, claims (where in tort, contract, statutory, or otherwise)” are to be submitted to final and binding arbitration. Agreement Art. V, §5.1 (emphasis added). Grant’s counterclaim and thirdparly claim, thus, come within the scope of the arbitration agreement and are proper subjects for arbitration.

Section 150 requires a plaintiff to file a complaint with the attorney general before suing and permits injunctive relief; those provisions do not indicate that the Wage Act applies to work outside Massachusetts.

Hadfield v. A.W. Chesterton Co. · filed 2009-09-15

Further, that G.L.c. 149, §150, requires a plaintiff to first file a complaint with the attorney general’s office and provides that a plaintiff may seek injunctive relief strongly suggest that extraterritorial application of the Wage Act is impracticable, indicating a lack of legislative intent for such application.

Section 150 does not preempt existing breach of contract or quantum meruit claims for unpaid wages.

Lipsitt v. Plaud · filed 2013-08-12

In this case, we are asked to decide whether G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150 (Wage Act), are intended to be the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages under Massachusetts law, preempting common-law breach of contract and related quasi-contract claims. We conclude that they are not.

Section 150 does not authorize a court to order reinstatement for a Wage Act violation.

Fernandes v. Attleboro Housing Authority · filed 2014-11-19

Here, nothing in the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 150, permits a court to order the reinstatement of an employee who has been aggrieved by an employer's unlawful conduct in violation of G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 or 148A.

Section 150 protects participation in a wage suit from retaliatory termination; the claim requires protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them.

Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co. · filed 2016-06-04

In order to prevail on a claim for retaliatory termination in violation of G.L.c. 151, §19 and G.L.c. 149, §150, Mr. Telfort must demonstrate that “(1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse employment action was causally related to the protected activity.” Karatihy v. Com. Flats Dev. Corp., 84 Mass.App.Ct. 253, 255 (2013), citing Mole v. Univ. of Mass., 442 Mass. 582, 591-92 (2004). It is undisputed that Mr. Telfort’s participation in this suit is protected activity, and that his employment at Eastern Bus was terminated after the suit was filed.

Section 150 permits prejudgment interest on lost wages and benefits, but not on the additional amount awarded when those damages are trebled.

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Co. · filed 2017-06-26

For the reasons stated, in answer to the certified question, we declare that, under Massachusetts law, statutory prejudgment interest shall be added by the clerk of court to the amount of lost wages and other benefits awarded as damages pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, but shall not be added to the additional amount of the award arising from the trebling of those damages as "liquidated damages."