14 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 752

Section 752's limitations period may be tolled by pertinent facts developed through discovery or other means.

Kasu Corp. v. Blake, Hall & Sprague, Inc. · filed 1988-04-21

We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Kasu a reasonable period of time within which to secure, through discovery or other means, pertinent facts, if available, to toll the statute of limitations and avoid the dismissal of its complaint.

Section 752 provides a six-year limitations period for personal injury actions, subject to exceptions where another law specially provides.

Nelson v. University of Maine System · filed 1996-01-29

The Court concludes that the six-year limitations period under Maine’s personal injury statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 752, is most fitting for Title IX claims.

Section 752 requires civil actions to be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues, unless otherwise specially provided.

Larochelle v. Hodsdon · filed 1997-03-21

The applicable statute of limitations in this case is six years. 14 M.R.S.A. § 753-A, 14 M.R.S.A. § 752. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Larochelle, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether each of his claims accrued within the six-year limitation period; therefore, the court erred in granting a summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.

Section 752 sets a six-year limitations period that begins when a wrongful act produces an injury, subject to limited discovery exceptions.

Cloutier v. Dalkon Shield Trust · filed 1993-02-26

The initial injury to Ms. Cloutier allegedly caused by the wrongful acts of A.H. Robins occurred in 1972. Thus, Maine’s six-year statute of limitations, 14 M.R.S.A. § 752, has already run, unless the “discovery” exception applies. ... I find no basis in Maine law to conclude that the Maine Law Court would delay the accrual of Ms. Cloutier’s cause of action under the discovery exception once she learned her injuries were connected with her use of A.H. Robins’ product — even though she was unaware of A.H. Robins’ actual misconduct.

Section 752’s six-year limit does not apply to child support arrearages because they are money judgments.

Cloutier v. Turner · filed 2012-01-19

Second, Cloutier argues that the limitations period on a claim of overdue child support is six years pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2011).2 ... Pursuant to both 19-A M.R.S. § 2602(2) (2011)3 and our precedent, see Carter v. Carter, 611 A.2d 86, 88 & n. 2 (Me.1992), child-support arrearages are considered money judgments. There is no statute of limitations for money judgments; rather, there is a statutory presumption of payment after the lapse of twenty years pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 864 (2011).

Section 752’s six-year limitations period is tolled under section 859 when the plaintiff adequately alleges fraudulent concealment.

Conroy v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland · filed 2013-11-21

The plaintiff alleges he learned in 2009 that he had five claims against this defendant. The six-year statute of limitations is tolled by section 859. 14 M.R.S. §§ 752; 859. The plaintiff will proceed with the five claims in his complaint.

Section 752’s six-year limitations period applies to a governmental entity’s construction-defect contract claim because nullum tempus does not exempt contract actions.

Regional School Unit 21 v. Manville · filed 2014-05-07

Because the court has found that Plaintiff's cause of action for defects in construction is a contract action, the court finds that nullum tempus does not apply. The statute of limitations applies and has run.

Section 752’s six-year period does not support dismissal when alleged fraud leaves unresolved when the plaintiff should have discovered the claim.

Pelletier v. Lewiston Auburn Water Pollution Control Authority · filed 2015-06-30

Mr. Pelletier has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for fraud and extend the statute of limitations on his other claims.

Section 752’s six-year period does not apply to an MHRA action because the MHRA provides its own limitations period.

Cutting v. Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A. · filed 2017-09-30

Therefore, by the plain language of the two statutes, read together, 14 M.R.S. § 752 does not apply to Ms. Cutting’s MHRA action.

Section 752's general six-year limitations period does not apply to residential mortgage foreclosure actions.

Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Kendall · filed 2019-10-04

Although Defendants argue that the general six-year statute of limitations applies, see 14 M.R.S. § 752, the statute of limitations applicable to residential foreclosure actions is 20 years from the expiration of the time for full performance of the conditions of the mortgage.

Section 752’s six-year period does not apply to an insured’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act claim arising from a fire insurance policy; the two-year period under the fire insurance statute and policy applies.

Insurcomm, Inc. v. Otis · filed 2021-05-05

The Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act claims are subject to the two-year limitations period provided in both section 3002(1) and the insurance contract.

Section 752 sets a six-year limitations period for civil actions unless a more specific statute applies; the limitations period for sealed instruments governs a breach of warranty claim on a sealed deed.

Kneizys v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation · filed 2022-03-21

In Maine, “[t]he statute of limitations for civil actions is six years, 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2006), unless another statute provides otherwise.” Dowling v. Salewski, 926 A.2d 193, 196 (Me. 2007). ... The more ... specific statute of limitation - 14 M.R.S. § 751 - therefore provides the applicable limitations period in this case, and plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim is timely regardless whether the cause of action arose in 2006 or in 2017.

Section 752’s six-year limitations period is not tolled by adverse domination when an informed, disinterested shareholder can bring a derivative action against the allegedly culpable directors.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2017-07-13

There is no reason that the limitations period should be stalled where a disinterested ... shareholder is both aware of the alleged wrongdoing and able to initiate an action on the corporation’s behalf against the allegedly culpable directors.

Section 752 bars recommencement of the civil action after its limitations period has expired.

Fleet Bank of Maine v. Dumont · filed 2000-06-22

First among these is that the statute of limitations has expired as to all of these causes of action. 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 752, 753.

Section 752 imposes a six-year limitations period, after which a trespass is treated as permanent and damages are barred.

Perkins v. Town of Searsport · filed 2000-08-23

However, once the six year period for seeking relief or for bringing an action against a taking had passed, the trespass would be considered a permanent one and the statute of limitations would apply thereby preventing the seeking of damages for what would be a permanent trespass.

Section 752 limits court actions for civil damages, but it is not an automatic bar to recovery in arbitration.

Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n, Local 785 v. City of Lewiston · filed 1976-03-01

We do not agree with the Justice’s conclusion that the six-year statute of limitations (14 M.R.S.A. § 752) must be applied to the Union’s claim to its right to back pay under the contractual parity pay provisions. Arbitration is not an action at law and the statute is not, therefore, an automatic bar to the Firefighters’ recovery.

Section 752's six-year limitations period for indemnification and contribution claims begins when the third-party plaintiff pays the judgment.

Cyr v. Michaud · filed 1983-01-11

Because Michaud’s claims for indemnification and contribution are unique to him, the statute of limitations for these claims is applicable and not the statute of limitations which applies to the underlying plaintiff’s claims of breach of warranty and strict liability. ... The claims for indemnification and contribution do not accrue for the purposes of the statute of limitations until a judgment has been paid by the third-party plaintiff. ... The third-party claim is maintainable even if the statute has run against the original plaintiff. ... Consequently, the judge improperly dismissed, as barred by the statute of limitations, the third-party plaintiff’s indemnification and contribution claims sounding in breach of implied warranty and strict liability.

Section 752 sets a maximum time limit for bringing all civil actions, while allowing laches to shorten that period.

Bowden v. Grindle · filed 1994-12-20

This statute imposes a maximum time limit within which all civil actions may be brought, but does not prevent the shortening of this period pursuant to the application of the equitable doctrine of laches.

Section 752 imposes a six-year limitations period on trespass and nuisance claims, subject to a new cause of action accruing each day a continuing nuisance or trespass remains.

Jacques v. Pioneer Plastics, Inc. · filed 1996-05-24

The statute of limitations for trespass and nuisance is six years. 14 M.R.S.A. § 752 (1980). Because it is undisputed that no dumping has occurred since 1978, the plaintiffs’ claim may be maintained only if the materials on lot B constitute a continuing nuisance or trespass. ... If the presence of the lagoon on lot B does constitute a continuing trespass or nuisance, a new cause of action accrues each day the hazardous materials remain and the plaintiffs’ action is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 752's six-year limit does not bar enforcement of child support arrearages because that enforcement is an action on a judgment.

Carter v. Carter · filed 1992-07-24

Thus an order of child support is essentially a “judgment in monthly installments,” ... and for the purposes of section 752 the enforcement of such an order is an action on a judgment. As Maine does not have a statute of limitations for such actions, ... plaintiff’s claim is not barred.

Section 752's six-year limitations period does not bar a continuing trespass claim while the offending waste remains on the land.

Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp. · filed 1994-08-17

Maine’s six-year statute of limitations, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 752, does not bar this claim. To the extent that the plaintiffs can show that wastes from the site continue to be present on their land, regardless of when they entered, they can maintain an action for a continuing trespass under Maine law, since that tort would be continually occurring for statute of limitations purposes.

The six-year limitations period does not bar a negligence claim alleging a continuing wrong that has not yet ended.

Frontier Communications Corp. v. Barrett Paving Materials, Inc. · filed 2009-07-07

Both sides agree that Maine law requires a claim for negligence be “commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 752. ... As alleged in the Complaint, the harm to Dunnett’s Cove from PAHs at the Rail Yard site readily falls into the category of a “continuing wrong” that has not yet terminated. ... Thus, the Court cannot conclude that there is a basis for dismissing Plaintiffs negligence claim on statute of limitations grounds.

Section 752’s six-year limitations period does not bar claims based on the continued maintenance of a wharf when each day of maintenance is a new violation.

Britton v. Department of Conservation · filed 2009-07-09

Based on the statutory language, every day that Varrell Wharf is maintained serves as a new and separate violation of the statute. Therefore, the court correctly concluded that any claims alleging a continued interference with the Brit-tons’ riparian rights, which includes the Wharves and Weirs Act, were not time-barred.

Section 752 requires a civil action to be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues; filing the complaint within that period satisfies the deadline.

Brett v. Lovejoy · filed 2011-02-16

The statute of limitations on civil actions requires that they be "commenced within [six] years after the cause of action accrues ...." 14 M.R.S.A. §752 (2010). An action is "commenced" by filing a complaint with the court. M.R. Civ. P. 3 (2010). Mr. Brett commenced this action on the defendants' alleged breach within six years of its occurrence.

Section 752 requires a civil action to be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues; filing the complaint with the court commences the action for that deadline.

Merrifield v. Dill · filed 2011-03-01

The suit had been initiated by filing a complaint four days before the statute of limitations expired. See 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2011) ("All civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues and not afterwards ... ."). The filing of the complaint with the court commenced the action for purposes of the statute of limitations. M.R. Civ. P. 3.

A court may deny a stay that would let a plaintiff circumvent section 752’s six-year limitations period.

Dyer v. Abbondanza · filed 2012-03-08

The claims asserted by the Plaintiff in her complaint are serious, but the merits cannot override the statute. Staying the proceeding would only allow the court ... and the Plaintiff the opportunity to inappropriately circumvent the statute of limitations.

Section 752’s six-year limitations period does not support dismissal when the complaint does not clearly show that the claims are time-barred.

Salvaggio v. Sagris · filed 2020-04-03

Taking that approach, it is not clear on the face of the Complaint that the action is barred by the six year statute of limitations, and dismissal on limitations grounds would be improper.

Section 752's six-year limitations period applies to permanent nuisances, but not to continuing nuisances.

Rodway v. Weber Way, LLC · filed 2020-09-28

The parties still dispute whether the alleged nuisance is a continuing or permanent nuisance because a permanent nuisance carries a six-year statute of limitations but a continuing nuisance does not. 14 M.R.S. § 752; Jacques v. Pioneer Plastics, Inc., 676 A.2d 504, 506 (Me. 1996) (holding that a continuing nuisance constitutes a new injury each day that the nuisance exists).

Section 752’s general six-year limitations period does not apply to an action enforcing a prior valid administrative order.

State of Maine v. Minervino · filed 2002-08-26

The court concludes that under these circumstances, the general statute of limitations set forth in 14 M.R.S.A. §752 simply does not apply.

Section 752’s six-year limitations period does not bar a town from enforcing its zoning regulations because a land use violation arose more than six years earlier.

Coffey v. Town of Windham · filed 2009-01-16

Plaintiffs, however, contend that the Town is barred from enforcing the 200 foot minimum because the 6 year statute of limitations in 14 M.R.S. § 752 has expired. This argument is misplaced. The court is not aware of any authority for the proposition that if a land use violation is created by a conveyance in 1994, a town is barred by the statute of limitations from enforcing its zoning regulations if it does not bring some kind of enforcement action within six years.

Section 752's reference to civil actions encompasses an administrative action to recover delinquent retirement contributions.

Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. 27 v. Maine Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. · filed 2009-02-19

The court does not accept the System's argument that, because this is an administrative appeal, section 752, which speaks of "civil actions," is inapplicable.

Section 752’s six-year limit applies to civil actions, not to administrative assessments or agency review of those assessments.

Maine School Administrative District No. 27 v. Maine Public Employees Retirement System · filed 2009-11-05

It was the District, and not the System, that commenced a civil action. The Legislature has not enacted a statute of limitations applicable to the type of administrative enforcement in this case.

Section 752’s six-year limit does not apply to administrative assessments or agency review because neither is a civil action.

Sch. Admin. Dist. 27 v. Employees Ret. Sys. · filed 2009-11-05

Neither the System's administrative assessment against the District, nor the Board's review of the same, were civil actions subject to the six-year statute of limitations.

Section 752 provides a general six-year limitations period for civil actions.

Curran v. Portland Superintending School Committee · filed 1977-07-18

Plaintiff asserts that the appropriate Maine statute of limitations is the general six-year statute of limitations for civil actions (14 M.R.S.A. § 752). Plainly, however, the analogous state statute of limitations is that contained in the Maine Human Rights Act (5 M.R.S.A. § 4552 et seq. (1973 Supp.)).

Section 752’s six-year period does not apply to a claim for unpaid goods governed by Article 2’s four-year period, even when the claim is characterized as an action on an account.

Cloutier v. Kennebec Tool & Die Co., Inc. · filed 2001-10-31

This attempt to characterize the debt as an action on an account is unavailing. ... In this court’s view, the sale of the grinding tool in the present case is a sale of goods and, as such, is governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The appropriate statute of limitations for an action alleging breach of contract under Article 2 is four years from time the action accrued.