La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892

Section 22:1892 provides bad-faith penalties, fees, and damages, and a claim under it must be expressly assigned to be transferred.

Witten Roofing L L C v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 2024-02-23

The assignment of rights under penalty statutes must be expressly provided for in the act of assignment. Disaster Relief Services of North Carolina, LLC v. Employers Mutual Cas. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 935963 (W.D. La. April 6, 2009); and Franks v. Liberty Personal Insurance Company, 2023 WL 2309819 (W.D. La., March 1, 2023). Because bad faith claims were not expressly assigned in the assignment, Witten cannot recover bad faith claims.

Section 22:1892 provides for attorney’s fees and court costs as rights under a bad faith claim, and those rights may be assigned before the claim becomes ripe; an assignment that says nothing about penalties or damages does not assign penalty damages.

Cat 5 Global, LLC v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2024-05-01

The assignment expressly confers the right to seek attorney’s fees and court costs, which is a right not conferred by State Farm’s policy but rather by La. R.S. § 1892. ... The assignment says nothing about assigning a claim for penalties or damages. But the Court is persuaded that Cat 5 can recover, if it prevails against State Farm, its attorney’s fees and court costs, in accordance with the bad faith statutes.

A post-loss assignee may pursue the assignor’s bad-faith claim under La. R.S. 22:1892 because the claim is assignable and is not a strictly personal obligation.

I Say I Say I Say, LLC v. The Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut · filed 2024-08-02

The Court likewise finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible bad faith claim against Defendant under La. R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973. ... Louisiana Civil Code article 2642 allowed Blackburn to assign any causes of action she had under La. R.S. 22: 1892 and 22:1973 to Plaintiff, and the Assignment of Rights allowed Plaintiff to step into the shoes of Blackburn and assert those claims against Defendant.

Section 22:1892 requires payment within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss, and an assignment must expressly include the statute’s extra-contractual bad-faith claim to transfer it.

Allstate Construction, Inc. v. Ohio Security Insurance Company · filed 2024-08-13

Thus, an assignment of rights provision does not unambiguously include bad faith claims pursuant to La. R.S. § 22:1892 or La. B.S. § 22:1978 (A).

Section 22:1892 requires a claimant alleging insurer bad faith to plead facts showing a plausible violation, including enough timing detail to determine when the statute's 30-day and 60-day periods began to run.

C & S Properties - I, LLC v. Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan · filed 2025-01-10

Further, to state a claim for breach of Louisiana’s bad faith statutes, the plaintiff must adequately allege a breach of contract claim and include factual allegations sufficient “to plausibly conclude” that the defendant violated La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973. ... Information regarding the timing of these events is necessary “to determine if and when the 30-day and 60-day statutory periods began to run.”

Section 22:1892 authorizes attorney's fees and costs when an insurer's bad-faith failure to pay follows the statutory prerequisites, and its penalty provisions are strictly construed.

Doucet-Speer, APLC v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2025-05-29

A plaintiff that proves an insurer's breach of its duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly—i.e., an insurer's bad faith—may recover statutory penalties, including double damages,293 and attorneys’ fees and costs.294 Louisiana's statutes assigning penalties for an insurer's bad faith “are penal in nature and must be strictly construed.” A plaintiff asserting bad faith against an insurer must show that his insurer: “(1) received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) failed to pay within the required time, and (3) acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”

Section 22:1892 imposes liability for an insurer’s arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause failure to pay a covered claim, and whether that standard is met is generally a fact-intensive inquiry.

MacNair v. Chubb European Group SE · filed 2025-09-30

But, as Plaintiff points out, assessing whether an insurer acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause is a highly fact intensive inquiry. ... In sum, the Court finds summary judgment on the issue of bad faith is not warranted at this time.

Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, while penalty liability requires a failure to pay that is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Rayne Memorial United Methodist Church v. Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. · filed 2025-06-02(A)(1)

“A party seeking statutory penalties under [§ 1892] is required to establish that: (1) the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to pay the claim within thirty days of receipt of the proof of loss, and (3) the insurer's failure to pay the claim was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” ... “The Court finds there are genuine disputes of material fact as to (1) when Defendant received satisfactory proof of loss from the hurricane, and (2) whether Defendant’s payment and handling of the claim under the Policy was arbitrary or capricious.”

For § 22:1892(B)(1), whether a communication is a payment demand depends on the facts and circumstances of the individual case; the statute does not require a demand for a specific dollar amount.

Ramos v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company · filed 2025-06-25(B)(1)

As the Court noted in its more recent order denying summary judgment, “[w]hat constitutes demand . . . is to be determined in the light of the facts and circumstances of each individual case.” Wilkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 173 So. 2d 199, 202 (La. Ct. App. 1965). So Hartford can dispute whether Ramos’s demands really counted as demands under section 22:1892(B)(1).

Section 22:1892(B)(1)(a) allows penalties when, after satisfactory proof of loss, an insurer fails to pay within thirty days and the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Gentilly, LLC v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2024-12-30(B)(1)(a)

Under Section 22:1892, a claimant is entitled to penalties if, after satisfactory proof of loss, the insurer fails to pay a claim within thirty days, and the failure is deemed “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.”

Section 22:1892 requires a claimant seeking penalties or attorney fees to prove satisfactory proof of loss, failure to tender payment within thirty days, and an arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause failure to pay.

Michael Hingle & Associates, LLC v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company · filed 2024-02-29

“In order to establish a cause of action for penalties and/or attorney fees and costs under [La. R.S. 22:1892, formerly] La. R.S. 22:658, a claimant must show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.”

Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires a claimant to prove satisfactory proof of loss, failure to pay within the applicable statutory period, and an arbitrary and capricious failure to timely tender a reasonable amount.

Felty v. Chubb & Son Inc · filed 2023-08-17(B)(1)

To prevail under La. R.S. § 22:1892(B)(1), the claimant must establish that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss, failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period, and that the failure to timely tender a reasonable amount was arbitrary and capricious.

A claimant must prove satisfactory proof of loss, failure to pay within thirty days, and an arbitrary, capricious, or baseless refusal to pay; a reasonable dispute about coverage or the amount of loss defeats bad-faith penalties.

Daniels v. Risk Placement Services · filed 2020-12-07

“In order to establish a cause of action for penalties and/or attorney fees and costs under [La. R.S. 22:1892, formerly] La. R.S. 22:658, a claimant must show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.” ... “Considering what Scottsdale indisputably knew at the time of its adjustment of Plaintiffs’ claim, there can be no bad faith on its part.” ... “Under these circumstances, Scottsdale reasonably questioned the extent of its liability for the claimed loss.” ... “Therefore, Scottsdale’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ bad faith claims, which are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”

Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within the applicable statutory period after satisfactory proof of loss and permits a penalty when the failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Pvca, Inc., and Renola Equity Fund II, LLC v. Pacific West Td Fund Lp, and Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company Fair Plan and Maf, Inc. Dba Worldclaim Global Cliams Management · filed 2021-01-20

In order to obtain penalties for bad faith handling of a claim, a party must establish that: (1) the insured received satisfactory proof of loss; (2) the insurer failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period; and (3) the failure to pay was arbitrary, capricious and without probable cause. Aghighi v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2012-1096, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/19/13), 119 So.3d 930, 933. ... It is undisputed that Louisiana Citizens did not pay the claim within the applicable statutory period. ... The jury assessed a 50% penalty against Louisiana Citizens. We find a reasonable factual basis exists for the jury to find that Louisiana Citizens’ failure to pay the claim, within the applicable statutory period, was arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.

Section 22:1892 imposes a bad-faith penalty when an insurer fails to pay the amount due within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss and the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Eaux Holdings L L C v. Scottsdale Insurance Co · filed 2022-07-01(A) and (B)

Eaux sued Scottsdale for violations of La. R.S. 22:1892, which provides for a bad faith penalty when an insurer fails to pay the amount due within 30 days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss, and when that failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. La. R.S. 22:1892(A) and (B). ... The Court agrees and finds no basis in law to reverse its earlier ruling as to this issue.

Section 22:1892 permits policyholders to seek bad-faith penalties under specified circumstances, but the mere speculative possibility that those penalties may be available does not establish a conflict with an arbitration agreement.

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Belmont Commons LLC · filed 2023-01-04

La. R.S. § 22:1892 allows policyholders to recover bad faith penalties under certain circumstances, and § 22:1973 allows for the recovery of both bad faith penalties and consequential losses under certain circumstances. ... It is unclear that La. R.S. § 22:1892 and § 22:1973 are even implicated in this case because it is unclear whether any of the conditions which trigger bad faith or consequential loss damages, such as arbitrary and capricious failure to offer to settle a claim within thirty days, are present. If La. R.S. § 22:1892 and § 22:1973 are not implicated, the instant arbitration agreement cannot conflict with them. The Court declines to hold that the speculative possibility of the availability of bad faith or consequential loss damages under Louisiana law creates such a conflict.

Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires insurers to pay claims due within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, while penalties under § 22:1892 require proof of satisfactory proof, late payment, and arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause conduct.

McDonnel Group, LLC v. Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Company · filed 2023-03-31(A)(1)

Under Louisiana Revised Statute § 22:1892(A)(1), “All insurers issuing any type of contract…shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or any party in interest.” ... Thus, in order to establish a cause of action for penalties under § 22:1892, a claimant must show that “(1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer's failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.”

Section 22:1892 permits statutory penalties, including attorney fees and costs, when an insurer’s failure to timely adjust and pay a claim is arbitrary and capricious or vexatious, but not when supported by a reasonable good-faith defense.

Doucet-Speer, APLC v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2025-06-12

A plaintiff asserting bad faith against an insurer must show that his insurer: “(1) received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) failed to pay within the required time, and (3) acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”

Section 22:1892 imposes bad-faith penalties when an insurer fails to timely pay a claim after satisfactory proof of loss and acts arbitrarily or without probable cause, and it requires good faith and fair dealing while prohibiting knowing misrepresentation of pertinent policy facts or provisions.

Sentilles · filed 2025-10-24(B)(1)(a)

Section 22:1892(A)(1) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes provides that an insurer “shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured ….” ... An insurer breaches its duties if it (or its representative) knowingly misrepresents “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to any coverages at issue.”

Section 22:1892 requires an insured seeking bad-faith penalties to show satisfactory proof of loss, failure to pay within thirty days, and an arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause failure to pay; whether satisfactory proof was provided is a fact question.

Osteen · filed 2025-11-20

A claim for statutory bad-faith penalties under Louisiana Revised Statutes §§22:1892 and 1973 requires the insured to make a showing that “(1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer fails to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer's failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.” ... A satisfactory proof of loss under the statute is one “that which is sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured's claim.” ... Whether the insured has provided satisfactory proof of loss is a question of fact. ... There exists a genuine issue of material fact as to when satisfactory proof of loss was provided. Without determining when the satisfactory proof of loss was provided by the insured to the insurer, the 30-day statutory timeframe cannot be calculated under the statute.

Section 22:1892 requires satisfactory proof of loss, failure to tender payment within thirty days, and arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause nonpayment for a bad-faith claim; the claim fails when the insured lacks a valid underlying breach-of-contract claim.

Penn · filed 2026-02-19

To establish a bad faith claim, the petitioner “must show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.” ... Here, as ruled above, Penn does not have a valid breach of contract claim so State Farm did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it denied payment for an alleged hail event on February 26, 2023. Therefore, Penn’s bad faith claim also fails and summary judgment is required.

Section 22:1892 authorizes bad-faith damages for policies other than life insurance policies.

Brown v. New York Life Insurance Co · filed 2019-05-28(B)(1)

However, even these statutes are inapposite. Section 1892 provides for bad faith damages for “policies other than life.”

Section 22:1892 does not apply to claims under life or health and accident policies, including a long-term disability policy.

Dukes · filed 2025-12-10

Defendant is also correct, as noted above, that La. R.S. 22:1892 by its own terms does not apply to life and health and accident policies such as Plaintiff’s long-term disability policy at issue in this case, and that 22:1973 was repealed effective July 1, 2024, before Plaintiff filed his Petition.

Section 22:1892(B)(1) imposes a penalty when an insurer fails to pay within 30 days after receiving satisfactory written proof of loss and demand, if the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Jackson v. Berkshire Hathaway Global Insurance Services L L C · filed 2019-08-14(B)(1)

Section 1892(B)(1) provides that failure to make such payment within 30 days “after receipt of such satisfactory written proofs and demand therefor. . . when such failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, shall subject the insurer to a penalty, in addition to the amount of the loss of fifty percent damages on the amount found to be due from the insurer to the insured or one thousand dollars, whichever is greater. . . .”

Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss and permits penalties, attorney fees, and costs when delayed payment is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Freeman v. Ocean Harbor Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2025-03-28

Additionally, Louisiana Revised Statute § 22:1892 requires insurers to “pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss from the insured or any party in interest.” ... Penalties for failure to pay a legitimate claim in a timely manner include the amount loss, “fifty percent damages on the amount found to be due . . . as well as reasonable attorney fees and costs.”

Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a covered claim or make a written offer to settle a property-damage claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss; there is no bad-faith violation for failing to pay or settle damages that did not exist.

Morris v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co · filed 2024-06-24(A)(1)(a), (A)(1)(b)

La. R.S. § 22:1892 provides that “insurers shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or any party in interest” or “shall make a written offer to settle any property damage claim … within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss of that claim.” ... The Court agrees any Hurricane Delta claims based on La. R.S. § 22:1892 must be dismissed. Skluzacek conceded Hurricane Delta did not damage the property. State Farm cannot be said to have acted in bad faith by failing to pay or settle a claim for damages when such damages did not exist. No genuine factual dispute exists as to whether State Farm violated this statute for any Hurricane Delta claims, so summary dismissal is warranted.

Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires an insurer to pay a claim within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss, while § 22:1892(A)(4) requires a written offer to settle a property-damage claim within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss, with penalties potentially available for an unjustified and vexatious refusal.

Mathews v. Foremost Insurance Co · filed 2024-09-06(A)(1), (A)(4)

Louisiana Revised Statute §22:1982(A)(1) requires insurers to pay the amount of any claim due to any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss. And §22:1982(A)(4) requires insurers to make a written offer to settle any property damage claim within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss of that claim. These statutes must be strictly construed. ... The only remaining question for the jury is to determine whether Foremost acted with vexatiousness when it failed to investigate the interior damage claims after receiving the Matthews’ expert report. ... Therefore, Foremost’s Motion is DENIED IN PART to the extent it seeks to limit the Matthews from seeking penalties under §22:1982(A)(4) for Foremost’s failure to make a timely written offer to settle the interior damage claims after receiving notice from the Matthews’ expert report. However, Foremost’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART to the extent it seeks to limit the Matthews from seeking penalties under §22:1982(A)(4) for any other claims.

Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim or make a written offer to settle within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss, and permits one statutory penalty for arbitrary, capricious, or unjustified failure to comply with any or all of those duties.

Lamar Advertising Company v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2020-07-20(A)(1), (A)(4), and (B)(1)

The Court concludes that the plain language of subsection (A) provides separate affirmative duties on the insurer when paying claims to its insured and/or third parties. ... Because the subsections provide separate affirmative duties, an insured can bring a claim for violation of any of the subsections. ... As such, the Court concludes that for any given property damage claim by an insured, an insurer has multiple affirmative duties to promptly pay or settle that claim. The failure to comply with one or more of those duties can subject that insurer to a penalty, if the insurer’s failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause. ... Instead, the statute provides a penalty for any and all of an insurer’s failures when handling a property damage claim.

Section 22:1892(A)(3) requires an insurer to investigate an insurance claim promptly as part of its duty of good faith, but does not categorically require a physical inspection of the property.

Guillory v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co · filed 2024-08-29(A)(3)

State Farm’s duty of good faith required it to investigate Guillory’s claim promptly.

Section 22:1892 permits an insurer bad-faith claim based on post-litigation conduct, making related post-litigation claims-handling information discoverable.

Joey Stone v. Amador · filed 2020-10-27

Federal courts have more recently recognized that post-litigation conduct applies to La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973 in light of these Louisiana state court decisions. ... In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that USAA’s post litigation conduct is within the scope of discovery.

Section 22:1892 applies to an insurer’s post-litigation conduct; its duties and penalties are not limited to conduct before suit.

Lamar Advertising Company v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2021-04-12

“Federal courts have more recently recognized that post-litigation conduct applies to La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973 in light of these Louisiana state court decisions.” ... Thus, the Court agrees with Lamar and this part of Lamar’s motion is granted.

Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires an insurer to tender undisputed amounts due within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss, and later information establishing additional undisputed amounts triggers the same duty.

Pursley v. Lawrence · filed 2022-06-23(A)(1)

Louisiana law requires insurers to "pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or any party in interest." La. R. S. 22:1892(A)(1). ... Thus, GEICO was obliged to tender to plaintiff any undisputed damages amount above $50,000.00 thirty days from then pursuant to La. R. S. 22:1892(A)(1), or sixty days from then, pursuant to 22:1973(B)(5). ... However, this duty is a continuing one, extending through the litigation period. See Kimble, supra. ... Thus, even though GEICO first received proof of loss in December 2020, subsequent information apprising it of additional undisputed amounts due also triggered a duty to tender payment.

Section 22:1892(A)(3) defines bad faith as an insurer’s arbitrary, capricious, or probable-cause-free failure to pay the amount of a valid claim due within thirty days.

Tommy M. Ardoin, Jr. as (In His Capacity as the of the Succession of Tommy M. Ardoin, Sr.) v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (Subscribing to Certificate Number Ld606857-01) · filed 2024-04-03(A)(3)

Bad faith is defined by statute as the failure to pay “the amount of any claim due” within thirty days, pursuant to La.R.S. 22:1892, or sixty days, pursuant to La.R.S. 22:1973, when that failure to pay is “arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.” La.R.S. 22:1892(A)(3); La.R.S. 22:1973(B)(5). Thus, a prerequisite for finding that a party acted in bad faith is a finding that there is a valid claim, and “an amount due” to the insured.

Section 22:1892 does not permit a bad-faith claim absent a valid, cognizable underlying insurance-coverage claim.

Randle v. American Security Insurance Co · filed 2024-04-15

Under both La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973, a party asserting a breach of contract claim must have a valid, cognizable claim upon which the insurance coverage is based. For the reasons stated above, Randle does not have a claim for insurance coverage under the contract because she is not a named insured, additional insured, or third-party beneficiary. Because the Court finds that Randle has no standing to assert a breach of contract claim, she is not entitled to assert a bad faith claim.

Section 22:1892 permits recovery of penalties only when the claimant has a valid underlying substantive insurance claim and does not create a standalone cause of action against an insurer.

Q Clothier New Orleans, LLC v. Twin City Fire Insurance Company · filed 2021-04-23

“In order to recover under La. R.S. 22:1973 and La. R.S. 22:1892, a plaintiff must first have a valid, underlying, substantive claim upon which insurance coverage is based.” ... “The penalties authorized by these statutes do not stand alone; they do not provide a cause of action against an insurer absent a valid, underlying insurance claim.”

Section 22:1892 does not provide a standalone cause of action against an insurer; a claim under it requires a valid underlying insurance claim.

Ford of Slidell, LLC v. Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Company · filed 2021-11-19

Specifically, Plaintiffs’ claim for a breach of statutory duties under La. R.S. 22:1973 and La. R.S. 22:1892 is not cognizable without a valid underlying insurance claim.

Section 22:1892 does not create a standalone bad-faith claim; the claim fails when the underlying insurance-coverage claim fails.

St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2 v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2022-03-23

Plaintiff’s claim for insurer’s breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing under Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 22:1973 and 22:1892 necessarily fails because its claims for coverage have failed.

A § 22:1892 bad-faith claim requires a valid underlying insurance claim; when the insurer is not liable for breach of contract, the statutory claim fails.

Fields v. QBE Speciality Insurance Company · filed 2021-05-25

As discussed above, the Court finds that QBE has demonstrated that it is not liable for breach of contract; consequently, Fields has no valid underlying claim on which to base a bad faith claim.

A § 22:1892 bad-faith claim is derivative of the underlying breach-of-insurance-contract claim and fails when that underlying claim is dismissed.

Johnson v. American Security Insurance Company · filed 2023-01-10

if Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract is dismissed, so too must the bad faith claim be dismissed.

Section 22:1892 requires a valid, underlying, substantive claim for breach of the insurance contract before a plaintiff may recover under the statute.

Dehart v. Integon National Insurance Company · filed 2023-07-28

And, since that claim fails, so do the La. R.S. 22:1973 and 22:1892 claims, which must be based on “a valid, underlying, substantive claim” for breach of the insurance contract.

A claim for penalties under La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 depends on the existence of a valid underlying insurance claim; a plaintiff who is not covered by the policy cannot state a plausible claim under the statute.

Moore v. Integon National Insurance Company · filed 2023-12-07

Plaintiff additionally claims that defendant is liable for violating statutory duties pursuant to La. R.S. §§ 22:1973 and 22:1892.15 “These claims rely on the existence of a valid, underlying insurance claim.” See Fontenot, 2023 WL 6065152, at *4 (citing Gisclair, 2023 WL 1765922, at *7); see also Riley, 2008 WL 4286631, at *3. “Because plaintiff is not covered by the Policy, these claims also lack a plausible basis.” Fontenot, 2023 WL 6065152, at *4.

Section 22:1892 does not support a stand-alone bad-faith claim; the insured must have an underlying insurance claim.

Allstate Construction, Inc. v. Nautilus Insurance Company · filed 2025-04-15

Although the Court finds that any bad faith claims were not part of the Assignment, Sawdust cannot maintain a bad faith claim without an underlying insurance claim against the insurer. ... Because Sawdust assigned all its contractual claims to Allstate before any alleged bad faith adjusting occurred, Sawdust cannot maintain bad faith statutory claims against Defendant. For these reasons, the Court finds that Sawdust cannot maintain bad faith claims against Defendant absent an underlying insurance claim. As such, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment in its favor as to Sawdust’s claims for bad faith penalties pursuant to La. R.S. §§ 22:1892 and 1973.

Section 22:1892 requires an underlying breach of the insurance contract before an insured can recover for an insurer’s bad-faith conduct.

Calais v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Co · filed 2025-02-20(I)(2)(a)

Here, in finding that Vandevere completed a valid UM rejection under Louisiana law, Plaintiff has no underlying claim for breach of contract against Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant did not act in bad faith as a matter of law.

A claim under § 22:1892 for insurer bad faith depends on a valid, underlying substantive insurance-coverage claim and cannot stand alone.

Spinosa v. Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan · filed 2025-04-15

recovery under Section 1973 or Section 1892 does not stand alone but is based on ‘a valid, underlying, substantive claim’ of insurance coverage.

Section 22:1892 does not support a bad-faith penalty claim when the plaintiff has no cognizable underlying insurance-coverage claim.

Robinson · filed 2025-12-18

Defendant is correct. Because Plaintiffs do not have a cognizable claim for coverage under the policy, their claim for bad faith penalties under the Louisiana Insurance Code necessarily fails.

Section 22:1892 requires payment or a settlement offer within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss, and a bad-faith claim fails when the plaintiff lacks a valid underlying insurance-contract claim.

3601 Coliseum, LLC, et al. v. Great American Risk Solutions Surplus Lines Insurance Company · filed 2026-03-09

Section 1892 requires insurers to pay claims or tender offers of settlement within thirty days of receiving a satisfactory proof of loss. ... Thus, the Court finds that because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for breach of insurance contracts, they have also failed to state a claim for bad-faith under § 1892.

Section 22:1892 applies only to insurers, and the statutory definition of insurer does not include an insurance broker.

I F G Port Holdings L L C v. Underwriters at Lloyds London · filed 2021-06-24

Neither of these apply against RKH. R.S. 22:1892 and R.S. 22:1973 only apply to “insurers”. The general definition of “insurer” in R.S. 22:46(10) does not include an insurance broker.

A claim for penalties and attorney fees under § 22:1892 requires factual allegations supporting the insurer’s bad faith and statutory violation; conclusory assertions are insufficient.

Joseph Henderson, Jr. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Michael Richard, Steadfast Insurance Company, Lyft, Inc., and Damon Reynolds · filed 2021-12-17

Turning to the case sub judice, after review of the record, particularly Mr. Henderson’s supplemental and amending petition, we conclude the supplemental and amending petition does not provide any factual basis for his conclusions that Steadfast is liable for statutory penalties, attorney’s fees and costs under La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973; instead, the supporting petition for damages makes conclusory statements regarding Steadfast’s alleged bad faith dealings. ... Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment overruling the exception of no cause of action and find that Mr. Henderson failed to state a cause of action for statutory penalties, attorney fees and costs under La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973.

Section 22:1892's bad-faith claim requires facts showing when the insurer received notice, responded, inspected, and paid, so the statutory timing period and whether unpaid amounts were undisputed can be assessed.

Con El, Inc. v. Burlington Insurance Company · filed 2025-07-11

Information regarding the timing of these events is necessary ‘to determine if and when the 30-day and 60-day statutory periods began to run.’

Section 22:1892(I)(1)(a) fixes and caps the penalty for an insurer's arbitrary and capricious conduct; the jury decides whether the insurer acted that way, but does not set the penalty amount.

Franks v. State National Insurance Company · filed 2025-08-05(I)(1)(a)

The jury will be asked only to deliberate and return a verdict on whether SNIC was arbitrary and capricious. If answered in the affirmative, the penalty amount is set by statute. The jury has no role in determining the penalty amount. Accordingly, to allow the Plaintiff to argue for punishment is more prejudicial than probative. The Plaintiff frankly discloses that counsel will make “arguments asking the jury to send a message to SNIC with respect to a punitive damages verdict”. Where, as here, the penalty is fixed by statute, argument asking the jury to punish the defendant insurer is more prejudicial than probative.

Section 22:1892(B)(1)(a) limits a bad-faith penalty after a partial payment or tender to 50% of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount found due, and permits reasonable attorney’s fees without prescribing a calculation formula.

Attamari v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2024-10-04(B)(1)(a)

However, La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1)(a) calculates bad faith penalties in the event a tender has been made based on “fifty percent of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount found to be due . . . .” In this case, fifty percent of the difference between the amount due of $15,000.00 and the $7,500.00 tender equals $3,750.00. Accordingly, we reduce the bad faith penalty award from $15,000.00 to $3,750.00.

Section 22:1892 does not support penalties based on amounts the insurer timely paid to the insured.

Defrancesch Family Partnership, LLC v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2023-04-17(A)

Nationwide’s argument grounding a potential penalty/damage calculation on the proceeds already paid out is fatally flawed in that it ignores that any penalties/damages recoverable under the Insurance Code cannot be based on amounts that were timely paid to the insured.

When an insurer arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause fails to timely pay a claim, Subsection (B)(1)(a) imposes a 50% penalty on the amount found due under the insurance contract, or $1,000, whichever is greater; after a partial payment or tender, the penalty is 50% of the difference.

Durkheimer v. Landry · filed 2023-05-10(B)(1)(a)

Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s award of $162,500.00 in penalties to Plaintiff pursuant to La.R.S. 22:1892(B)(1)(a). The jury specifically ... found that the amount Defendant arbitrarily, capriciously, or without prebable cause failed to pay Plaintiff was $325,000.00, which amount, we note, corresponds to the amount of medical expenses awarded to her. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in calculating Plaintiff's penalty award based on the amount due to her under the terms of her insurance contract with Defendant. Based on the foregoing, this assignment is dismissed as being without merit.

Section 22:1892's insurance bad-faith penalty provisions do not apply to a statutory surety issuing a bond under the Louisiana Public Works Act.

Southern Environmental Management and Specialties, Inc. v. City of New Orleans and Honorable Latoya Cantrell, in Her Official Capacity as the Mayor of the City of New Orleans and Command Construction Industries, LLC and Arch Specialty Insurance, Inc. · filed 2022-05-11

The Immunity Provision cabins a surety’s liability to the parameters of the LPWA. Given the Insurance Penalties Provisions are located outside the LPWA—in the Louisiana Insurance Code—the Insurance Penalties Provisions, as we held in Metro, are not applicable to the statutory surety, Arch.

Section 22:1892(B)(1) provides penalties and reasonable attorney fees and costs to insureds when an insurer arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause delays payment of a covered claim, rather than to a mortgagee.

Pvca, Inc. and Renola Equity Fund II, LLC v. Pacific West Td Fund, Lp, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company Fair Plan, and Maf, Inc. D/B/A Worldclaim Global Claims Management · filed 2022-07-13(B)(1)

Pacific West relies on La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1) for its assertion that it is entitled to attorney’s fees because Louisiana Citizens was found to have acted in bad faith in failing to timely pay Plaintiffs’ insurance claim. The purpose of La. R.S. 22:1892 is to “provide remedies to insureds whose insurance claims are improperly handled or to whom payment is unreasonably delayed.” ... Thus, the purpose of a penalty statute is the bad faith conduct of the insurer relative to its relationship with the policy holder. The core justification of a penalty statute is to discourage the bad faith conduct of the insurer towards the policy holder not the mortgagee.

Section 22:1892(B) gives a mortgagee with a standard mortgage clause, as an additional insured with an independent claim, the right to recover attorney’s fees and costs when the insurer’s bad-faith failure to pay is adjudicated.

Pvca, Inc. and Renola Equity Fund, II, LLC v. Pacific West Td Fund, Lp · filed 2023-06-26(B)

Thus, as in May, Pacific West has an independent claim from Renola, making it an insured under the contract, and giving it a right to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892.

Section 22:1892’s statutory-penalty claim is unavailable to a plaintiff who cannot bring the underlying breach-of-contract claim under the insurance policy.

Cadaro v. American National Property and Casualty Company · filed 2024-03-14

Further, because Cadaro does not have standing to bring a breach-of-contract claim, he similarly cannot assert claims for statutory penalties under La. R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973.

Section 22:1892(B)(5) permits total-loss actual-cash-value determinations through specified methods, including a fair-market survey using qualified local retail dealers or a generally recognized used-motor-vehicle industry source; an insurer's valuation system must satisfy those requirements.

Gautreaux v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. · filed 2022-12-29(B)(5)(a), (B)(5)(b)

The first method at issue, under La.R.S.22:1892(B)(5)(a), provides for the use of a fair market value survey using qualified retail automobile dealers in the local market area. Based on the undisputed facts and evidence provided in the record, we find that the Mitchell WCTL system fails to comply with the clear and unambiguous language of La.R.S. 22:1892(B)(5)(a) because it fails to conduct a fair market value survey using qualified retail auto dealers in the local area as resources. The second method under La.R.S. 22:189(B)(5)(b) provides for the determination of retail cost from a generally recognized used motor vehicle industry source. Based on the facts and evidence in the record, we find that the Mitchell WCTL system fails to comply with La.R.S. 22:189(B)(5)(b) because retail costs was not determined from a generally recognized used motor vehicle industry source.

Section 22:1892(B)(1) permits an award of the statutory penalty even when the insured has not proved actual damages.

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. The Shaw Group, Inc. · filed 2023-02-09(B)(1)

But the failure to prove actual damages is not reason alone for dismissing Shaw’s bad faith claim since a penalty may be awarded for the breach of these statutes, even in the absence of actual damages. See, e.g., La. R.S. 22:1973(C); La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1).

Section 22:1892(B)(1)(a) permits a successful plaintiff to recover all costs incurred, not just ordinary taxable litigation costs, as part of the statutory award.

Charles Guillory and Tammy Guillory v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. · filed 2023-10-04(B)(1)(a)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1892(B)(1)(a) provides for a penalty, attorney fees, and costs. Plaintiffs argue that this allows the recovery of all costs incurred by a plaintiff, without restriction to the ordinary taxable costs, as a penalty and that to interpret the use of the term “costs” in La.R.S. 22:1892 as limited to those allowable in any suit would render its use meaningless and superfluous. We agree and affirm the entirety of the trial court’s award of costs in this matter.

Section 22:1892(B)(6)(e) is a rule intended to protect individual insureds, rather than a public-order rule protecting a broad class or broader societal concerns.

Burke v. GeoVera Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2023-10-27(B)(6)(e)

The Court is persuaded that La. R.S. § 22:1892(B)(6)(e) is not a rule of public order of the nature encompassed within the reach of Civil Code article 2030, “as when the object of a contract is illicit or immoral.” ... Rather than constituting a rule of public order “intended to protect a large class of persons,” Crute, 226 So. 3d at 1173, the Court is persuaded that La. R.S. § 22:1892(B)(6)(e) is “a rule intended for the protection of private parties,” because it is intended to protect the individual insured. See La. Civ. Code art. 2031.

Section 22:1892(G) requires residential insurance policies to include an appraisal clause when the insurer and insured disagree about the amount of loss; as a substantive provision, it applies prospectively only, and equitable estoppel may preempt its application when the Convention governs.

Stonelake Condominium Association, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters Lloyds, London · filed 2024-03-27(G)

The Court finds the 2022 amendment to § La. R.S. § 22:1892(G) to be substantive. By enacting Subsection G during the 2021 legislature and mandating that residential insurance policies have an appraisal clause, the legislature established a new rule and duty, thus making it a substantive law. The 2022 legislature amending Subsection G to remove the language “on or after January 1, 2022” did not transform Subsection G into a procedural or interpretive law. Removing this phrase “on or after January 1, 2022” did not “prescribe a method for enforcing a substantive right and relate to the form of the proceeding or the operation of the laws” or “merely establish the meaning the interpreted statute had from the time of its enactment.” Segura, 630 So. 2d at 723. As such, § La. R.S. § 22:1892(G) (2022) is a substantive amendment, and the Court cannot give it a retroactive application. ... However, the Court holds, regardless of whether La. R.S. § 22:1892(G) can be applied retroactively to this case, principles of equitable estoppel apply equally to this issue so as to preempt the application of Louisiana’s appraisal requirement.

A claim for penalties under § 22:1892 is barred by a valid two-year contractual suit limitation when the insured files suit after that period.

Nautilus Insurance Co v. Cavazos · filed 2024-06-24

Here, the time provision in the Policy makes it clear that Cavazos was to bring the claim within two (2) years of the Incident in order to recover for the loss. The Incident occurred on or about April 15, 2020, but Cavazos did not bring legal action against Nautilus to recover for the loss under the Policy until February 20, 2024. Therefore, Cavazos’s claim is time-limited because she failed to bring legal action within the two-year time period. Thus, even if there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Cavazos’ motive, Cavazos cannot recover under the policy because the claim is time limited. Therefore, Nautilus can have no liability under La.R.S. 22:1892, and/or La.R.S. 22:1973, and there is no coverage under the Policy.

For a catastrophic loss arising from a qualifying declared natural disaster or weather event, § 22:1892(B)(1)(b) makes penalty claims subject to § 22:1892.2 and provides that the ordinary § 22:1892 provisions do not apply.

3612 Edenborn, LLC v. Chaucer Insurance Company DAC · filed 2026-03-25(B)(1)(c)(i), (B)(1)(b)

Section 22:1892(B)(1)(c)(i) defines a catastrophic loss as “a loss that arose from a natural disaster, windstorm, or significant weather-related event that was a presidentially declared emergency or disaster or a gubernatorially declared emergency or disaster.” ... Section 22:1892(B)(1)(b) of that section provides: ... In the case of a catastrophic loss, any penalty for payment and adjustment of a first party claim arising under an insurance policy for immovable property shall be subject to penalty pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 22:1892.2, and the provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply. ... Accordingly, the provisions of § 22:1892 do not apply, and § 22:1892.2 governs Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 22:1892(B)(1)(c)(i) defines a catastrophic loss as a loss arising from a natural disaster, windstorm, or significant weather-related event that was declared an emergency or disaster by the President or the Governor; the court concluded that this definition covered losses from Hurricane Francine.

Lumar v. Allied Trust Insurance Company · filed 2025-10-01(B)(1)(c)(i)

A “catastrophic loss” is defined in La. R.S. § 22:1892(B)(1)(c)(i) to mean “a loss that arose from a natural disaster, windstorm, or significant weather-related event that was a presidentially declared emergency or disaster or a gubernatorially declared emergency or disaster.” ... Therefore, if a claimant sues their insurer and seeks statutory penalties for damages sustained as a result of Hurricane Francine, the provisions of La. R.S. § 22:1892.2 appear applicable.

Section 22:1892(B)(1)(c) treats the windstorm loss as a catastrophic loss when the governor’s declaration sufficiently covers the affected location, including through a catch-all provision.

Sicilian Foods, LLC d/b/a Frank’s Restaurant v. Atain Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2026-06-11(B)(1)(c)

The Court finds this sufficient to meet the requirement for the event to qualify as “catastrophic loss” under La. R.S. § 22:1892(B)(1)(c) for all affected locations.

Section 22:1892 treats knowingly committed acts by an insured's representative as a breach of the insured's duties, but creates no separate cause of action and instead directs the trier of fact to consider the conduct when deciding penalties or attorney fees.

O'Connor · filed 2025-12-19(J)(2)-(4)

In response, Allied Trust cites La. R.S. § 22:1892, which establishes that certain acts, “if knowingly committed or performed by an insured, claimant, or representative of the insured or claimant, constitutes a breach of insured’s duties.” Id. § 22:1892(J)(2) (emphasis added). In other words, under the statute, a violative act committed by Irwin as a representative of the O’Connors would constitute a breach of the O’Connors’ duties under the contract they hold with Allied Trust. Indeed, the statute specifies that the “duty imposed by this Subsection does not create a separate cause of action . . .” Id. at § 22:1892(J)(3). Rather, if the insured’s representative breached a duty under the statute, “the trier of fact shall consider that conduct in determining whether or not the insured is to be awarded penalties or attorney fees[.]” Id. at § 22:1892(J)(4). It does not, however, create contractual privity between the insurer and the insured’s representative such that the insured’s representative could be held liable for breach of contract.

For a declared disaster, the partial-payment penalty provision applies only when the insurer's partial payment is tendered within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss, while untimely payments remain subject to the mandatory penalty.

Rayne Memorial United Methodist Church v. Church Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2026-05-08(B)(1)(b)

The Fifth Circuit has made clear that the partial payment language in La. R.S. 22:1892 “applies if (and only if) the insured’s partial payment complies with the statutory requirements—namely, it is tendered “within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured.”77 As a result, because Defendant’s payments were not made within 30 days, the language concerning partial payment was not applicable in this case and would have had no impact on the Jury’s verdict. ... La. R.S. 22:1892 requires the Court to assess a mandatory penalty on all amounts the insurer failed to pay within 30 days, regardless of whether the insured eventually makes the payment,83 which this Court did.