Statute Annotations › Louisiana › La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892

La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892

Payment of claims under property and casualty insurance policies: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Louisiana
Case notes
219
Cited in passing
186
Citing cases indexed
532
Case dates
2009–2026
Screened through
2026-06-11
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-06
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

405 citing cases reviewed of 532 in the citation index: 219 interpreted the section (annotated below), 186 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-11 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 2009-08-15 Act 488 amended § 22:1892(A)(3) to allow extra loss-adjustment time after a declared emergency or disaster. Source
  • 2010-08-15 Act 1032 added § 22:1892(B)(5), specifying motor-vehicle total-loss valuation methods. Source
  • 2012 Act 271 made technical corrections to Title 22; no note rule was found changed. Source
  • 2018 Act 27 allowed electronic transfer of claim payments at the claimant's request under § 22:1892(C)(1). Source
  • 2019 Act 317 revised the motor-vehicle repair anti-steering rules in § 22:1892(D). Source
  • 2021 Acts 344 and 345 added field-adjuster-report, catastrophe-penalty, depreciation, vendor-choice, and appraisal rules. source Source
  • 2022 Acts 559 and 735 amended the residential appraisal clause and added itemized statements for joint claim-payment checks. source Source
  • 2023 Act 290 added § 22:1892(H), restricting class actions and certain penalties against the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association and Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. Source
  • 2024 Acts 625 and 757 revised the appraisal process and the limits on penalties against guaranty and Citizens entities. source Source
  • 2024-07-01 Act 3 repealed § 22:1973, moved good-faith duties into § 22:1892(I), set a two-year period for subsection (B) penalty and fee claims, and created separate catastrophic-loss rules in § 22:1892.2. Source
  • 2025 Act 500 revised replacement-cost holdback, vehicle-rental, total-loss-valuation, and surety-bond provisions. Source

Who may be sued for bad faith

Section 22:1892 provides a bad-faith claim against insurance companies, not insurance brokers.

GeoVera Specialty Insurance Company v. Joachin · filed 2019-07-18

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 22:1892 and 22:1973 only provide for bad faith claims against insurance companies.
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Section 22:1892 imposes its bad-faith claim-handling duties and penalties on insurers, not third-party claims administrators.

Jackson v. Gray · filed 2023-07-19(B)(1)(a)

Sections 22:1892 and 22:1973 clearly apply to insurers, not to third-party claims administrators, as they are the only party the statutes refer to as owing a duty to the insureds and claimants.
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Section 22:1892 permits bad-faith penalties to be imposed only on an insurer.

NOLA Rugby Enterprises, LLC v. K&K Insurance Group, Inc. · filed 2022-12-08

Further, only an insurer can be held liable under Louisiana’s bad faith statutes. See La. R.S. 22:1892, :1973.
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An entity must be a named insured, additional insured, or third-party beneficiary to pursue Louisiana bad-faith insurance penalties.

Jimmy D Enterprises L L C v. Janus Hotel Management Services L L C · filed 2023-10-11

Louisiana law is abundantly clear that in order to enforce an insurance policy and receive bad faith penalties, an entity must be either a: 1) named insured; 2) additional insured; or 3) third-party beneficiary to an insurance policy.
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Section 22:1892(I) permits a bad-faith claim against an insurer only by an insured in contractual privity with the insurer, meaning a named insured, not someone covered solely under La. R.S. § 32:900.

Sikes v. Prime Holdings Insurance Services, Inc. · filed 2025-06-26(I)

Mr. Thompson was not a named insured and was not in contractual privity with Prime. Accordingly, under the applicable statutes, as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, he could not have brought a bad faith claim against Prime under La. R.S. §§ 22:1973 or 22:1892.
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Section 22:1892 subjects insurers—not insurance adjusters—to penalties when they fail to pay a claim due within the applicable period after receiving satisfactory proof of loss.

Lambert · filed 2026-04-03

That duty is breached when an insurer fails to pay the amount of any claim due within the applicable time period after receiving satisfactory proof of loss. A breach of that duty subjects an “insurer” to penalties under La. R.S. § 22:1892 and La. R.S. § 22:1973. ... Because SageSure is not an insurer, it cannot be held liable for penalties under these statutes.
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Prescription — interruption by unconditional UM payment

Section 22:1892 requires an insurer’s unconditional tender of the undisputed claim amount, and that tender may constitute an acknowledgment interrupting prescription for property-insurance claims.

Caldwell v. GeoVera Specialty Insurance Co · filed 2024-11-07

In the former, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the unconditional tender of the undisputed amount of a claim by a UM insurer, as required under McDill v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company, 475 So.2d 1085 (La. 1985), and Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658, “was a tacit acknowledgment that interrupted prescription.” ... But the court made no mention of such considerations in Demma and instead spoke broadly of the insurer’s unconditional tender obligations under La. R.S. 22:658 (redesignated under La. R.S. 22:1892), which applies in equal force to property insurers.
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An insurer's unconditional payment of UM benefits under § 22:1892 acknowledges the insured's claim and interrupts prescription.

Alkasaji v. James River Insurance Company · filed 2020-02-27

“An uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier’s unconditional payment of monies to its insured pursuant to [La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892] and McDill, constitutes an acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription.”
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Statutory penalties and attorney fees for insurer bad faith

Section 22:1892(B) permits statutory penalties and reasonable attorney fees and costs when an insurer fails within thirty days of satisfactory proof of loss to pay what is due or make a written settlement offer, but recovery requires an arbitrary, capricious, or probable-cause-lacking refusal to pay.

Roy v. Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company · filed 2020-05-01(B)

Under La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892(B), an insurer is subject to a statutory penalty and reasonable attorney fees and costs payable to the insured if it fails to pay the amount due or make a written offer to settle the claim within thirty days of receiving a satisfactory proof of loss. The statutory penalty is fifty percent of the amount found to be due, or one thousand dollars, whichever is greater. La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892(B)(1). However, an insured may only recover the statutory penalty and attorney fees and costs when the insurer is found to have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause.
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Section 22:1892 imposes penalties when an insurer's failure to make timely payment is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, and reasonableness under the totality of the facts may present a genuine issue of material fact.

Merwin v. Spears · filed 2012-06-22

With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent the Farmers’ policy provided coverage for at least part of plaintiffs’ damages. However, for purposes of plaintiffs’ penalty claim, the issue is whether Farmers’ failure to make timely payment was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. La. R.S. 22:1892. We conclude there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Farmers’ initial decision to deny the claim, based on its investigation and consultation with plaintiffs’ expert, was reasonable under the totality of the facts. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires satisfactory proof of loss and demand, timely payment or a written settlement offer within thirty days, and arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause conduct before imposing its penalty.

Iteld v. Four Corners Construction, L.P. · filed 2014-01-30(B)(1)

The claimant seeking to recover under these two statutes has the burden of establishing three things: 1) that the insurer received a satisfactory proof of loss, 2) that the insurer failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period, and 3) that the insurer’s failure to pay was arbitrary and capricious. ... Accordingly, no claimant is entitled to statutory penalties under La. R.S. 22:1973 and 22:1892 absent a satisfactory proof of loss.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) permits penalties and attorney’s fees when an insurer, after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, fails to timely pay a reasonable amount and that failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Cooper v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2016-11-23(B)(1)

Both La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1) and La. R.S. 22.1973(B)(5) and (C) provide for penalties, including attorney’s fees, against an insurer whose failure to pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. Both statutes are penal in nature and must be strictly construed. Jones v. Johnson, 45,847 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/15/10), 56 So.3d 1016, 1021. ... To prevail under 221892(B)(1), the claimant must establish that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss, failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period, and that the failure to timely tender a reasonable amount was arbitrary and capricious. Jones, supra; See Block v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 32,306 (La.App. 2d Cir. 09/22/99), 742 So.2d 746. Satisfactory proof of loss within the meaning of the statute is that which is sufficient to “fully apprise the insurer of the insured’s claim.” McDill v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 475 So.2d 1085 (La. 1985); Jones, supra; Block, supra.
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Section 22:1892(A)(4) requires an insurer to make a written settlement offer within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, and a claimant seeking the statute’s penalties must specifically allege the facts establishing that violation.

Fie, LLC v. New Jax Condo Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2018-02-21(A)(4)

However, statutory penalties, such as those provided within La. R.S. 22:1892, are considered items of special damage, which must be specifically alleged. ... While the allegations in the petition need not cite the precise section of the statute under which relief is sought, the facts alleged must establish the necessary elements of the claim asserted under the statute. ... Upon review of the pleadings, we note that plaintiffs' third supplemental and amended petition does not specifically allege that Lafayette failed to make a written offer to settle the interior property damage claim within thirty days of receiving satisfactory proof of loss, pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892(A)(4). Therefore, in consideration of the pleadings, the applicable law, and the trial court's prior relevant judgment, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Lafayette's motion in limine to exclude evidence of a bad faith claim pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892(A)(4).
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss and permits penalties and attorney fees for an arbitrary, capricious, or baseless failure to do so; a reasonable good-faith coverage defense defeats the penalty claim.

Estate of John. F. Munsterman v. Unitrin Auto & Home Insurance Co. · filed 2020-11-18(A)(1), (B)(1)

Louisiana jurisprudence provides that La.R.S. 22:18921 and La.R.S. 22:19732 are “penal in nature and must be strictly construed.” Reed v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 03-107, p. 13 (La. 10/21/03), 857 So.2d 1012, 1020. ... Both [La.R.S. 22:1973] and [La.R.S. 22:1892] require proof that the insurer was “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause,” a phrase that is synonymous with “vexatious.” This court has noted that “vexatious refusal to pay” means unjustified, without reasonable or probable cause or excuse. Both phrases describe an insurer whose willful refusal of a claim is not based on a good-faith defense. ... We find that the evidence in the record shows that Unitrin had legitimate and reasonable doubts about coverage based upon the applicable notice provision and exclusion. Thus, Unitrin had a reasonable basis to defend the claim and acted in good-faith reliance on that defense. Although the trial court disagreed with the interpretation that Unitrin placed on its policy with respect to the exclusion, its actions in refusing to pay should not necessarily subject it to the penalty provisions of the statutes. See Hayes, 634 So.2d 1384. ... As such, the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in declining to award bad faith penalties and attorney fees.
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Law changed since Act 3 (effective July 1, 2024) repealed § 22:1973 and folded its good-faith duties into § 22:1892(I), ending the two-statute penalty comparison.

Section 22:1892 requires satisfactory proof of loss, nonpayment within 30 days, and an arbitrary or capricious failure to pay, and it permits attorney’s fees even when greater penalties are recovered under § 22:1973, though penalties may not be recovered under both statutes.

Zydeco's II, LLC, Zydeco's Corp, Dustin Gainey and Rosemarie Gainey Versus Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London Subscribing to certificate/policy No. D1180d150152-59633, David Brennan, Dave Brennan Insurance Inc., and Braishfield Associates, Inc. · filed 2021-05-28(A)(1), (B)(1)

Where La. R.S. 22:1973 provides the greater penalty, it supersedes La. R.S. 22:1892, such that the insured cannot recover penalties under both statutes.
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Section 22:1892 requires satisfactory proof of loss, nonpayment within 30 days, and an insurer’s arbitrary, capricious, or baseless failure to pay before penalties and attorney’s fees may be awarded.

Allied Shipyard, Inc. v. Chubb European Group, SE · filed 2022-01-07

“In order to establish a cause of action for penalties and/or attorney fees and costs under [La. R.S. 22:1892, formerly] La. R.S. 22:658, a claimant must show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.”
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Section 22:1892 requires an insured seeking penalties and attorney fees to show satisfactory proof of loss, failure to timely pay or make a written settlement offer, and arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause conduct.

Leblanc v. Allied Trust Insurance Co · filed 2022-09-29

La. R.S. 22:1892 subjects an insurer to the mandatory imposition of penalties and attorney fees when it is arbitrary and capricious in failing to tender the undisputed amount or make a written offer to settle a claim within thirty days of satisfactory proof of loss, for the collection of such amount. Thus, to prevail under La. R.S. 22:1892, a claimant must establish (1) that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss; (2) failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period or failed to make a written offer to settle the claim, and (3) that the failure to timely tender a reasonably amount was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. Bourg v. Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, 2019-0270, (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/5/20), 300 So. 3d 881, 891.
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Section 22:1892 makes an insurer’s arbitrary, capricious, or unjustified failure to make timely payment the basis for a penalty, and whether that standard is met can be a jury question.

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. The Shaw Group, Inc. · filed 2023-03-16

Here, the Court agrees with Shaw. Whether or not Liberty’s denial of coverage was, under the facts alleged in the First through Fifth Amended Complaints, and as known to Liberty, arbitrary and capricious is a question of fact for the jury to decide. ... for purposes of plaintiffs’ penalty claim, the issue is whether Farmers’ failure to make timely payment was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. La. R.S. 22:1892. We conclude there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Farmers’ initial decision to deny the claim, based on its investigation and consultation with plaintiffs’ expert, was reasonable under the totality of the facts. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue. ... Here, like in Paternostro, and unlike Bollinger Shipyards, Liberty had a duty to defend not dependent on exhaustion. Whether or not Liberty’s refusal to defend was arbitrary and capricious under the facts and circumstances of this case is a question of fact. Summary judgment on this issue is therefore denied.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires an insurer to pay an undisputed covered loss within 30 days after satisfactory proof and permits penalties only when the insurer's nonpayment is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Lightfoot v. Dover Bay Specialty Insurance Co · filed 2025-07-03(B)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1892 requires insurers to pay undisputed sums owed to their insured within 30 days of the insured presenting satisfactory proof of a loss covered by the insurance policy. ... For an insured to prevail on a claim for statutory penalties, the insured must prove: (1) the insured presented satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer did not timely pay the loss proven and (3) the insurer’s conduct is “arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.”
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Section 22:1892 does not impose bad-faith penalties when an insurer reasonably and substantiatedly denies a claim that is excluded by the policy.

Mims Recycling of Ruston L L C v. Arch Insurance Co · filed 2025-09-30

Mims seemingly argues that they have a valid underlying claim for the damage to the rented Crane, but that claim fails because the cause of damage to the Crane was excluded under the Arch policy. Since there was no policy covering this type of damage subsequently there is not a valid underlying claim. Furthermore, Arch’s denial of the claim was not arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause as it was based on Brewer’s expert report which concluded the loss was due to a policy exclusion. An insurer who denies a claim based on a reasonable and substantiated investigation is not liable for bad faith penalties under La. R.S. 22:1973 or La. R.S. 22:1892. See Jacobs v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 18-11126, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92272 at *5 (E.D. La. June 3, 2019). Mims does not have a valid underlying substantive claim, so their bad faith claims also fail and will be dismissed.
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Satisfactory proof of loss triggering the payment deadline

Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proofs of loss, and penalties require arbitrary, capricious, or probable-cause-lacking nonpayment.

Rosenthal v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. · filed 2017-11-14(A)(1)

An insurer who fails to pay the claim within thirty days after receipt of such satisfactory written proofs is subject to penalties if the failure is “found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.”
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Section 22:1892(B) permits penalties when an insurer arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause fails to pay within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proofs of loss.

Omkar, L.L.C. v. AmGuard Insurance Company · filed 2022-08-31(B)

For example, Omkar does not state what materials were included in its allegedly sufficient proof of loss which allegedly triggered the timelines established in the bad-faith statutes.
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Section 22:1892 imposes a penalty when an insurer arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause fails to pay within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, which may arise when the insurer has adequate knowledge of the loss, including through its adjuster's inspection.

First United Methodist Church of Houma v. Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. · filed 2023-02-27

La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 provides a penalty for an insurer’s failure to pay a claim within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss if the failure was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. ... “A satisfactory proof of loss is one that is sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured’s claim.” ... In other words, “satisfactory proof of loss occurs when the insurer has adequate knowledge of the loss.” ... Louisiana law provides that “satisfactory proof of loss can also be established through the insurer’s inspection of the site through its own adjuster.” ... neither statement indicates that Church Mutual lacked sufficient proof of loss to prevent La. Stat. Ann. §§ 22:1892 and 22:1973’s statutory time periods from beginning to run. ... This Court agrees; as a reasonable jury could find that Church Mutual had adequate knowledge of First United’s loss, or at least partial loss, a genuine issue of material fact exists.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss, which may be supplied by a party other than the insured, and permits penalties for arbitrary, capricious, or unjustified nonpayment.

Untd v. Church Mtl Ins · filed 2024-01-05(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)

To assess such penalties, a plaintiff must prove “(1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer fails to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.” ... Satisfactory “proof of loss is a flexible requirement to advise an insurer of the facts of the claim, and . . . need not be in any formal style.” ... First, CM points to no authority that § 22:1892 requires written proof of loss from the insured alone. ... Moreover, the district court’s jury instruction on this point—to which CM offered no objection—was identical to the one approved by the Louisiana Supreme Court. ... The jury heard evidence that Montano’s initial written estimate on September 20, 2020 constituted a satisfactory proof of loss under this standard. Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably found that CM’s payment of November 16, 2020 was untimely under the 30-day period.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires an insurer to pay a claim within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss and authorizes a 50% penalty plus reasonable attorney fees when nonpayment is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Jones v. Johnson · filed 2010-12-15(B)(1)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892, an insurer “shall pay” the amount of a claim due within 30 days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss. This is what the law requires of an insurer. Markel did not comply, and its failure to do so, which the record shows was primarily attributable to concerns about the lienholders, was arbitrary, capricious, and without probable cause.
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The statute requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss and authorizes a 25% penalty for an arbitrary, capricious, or baseless failure to do so.

Maloney Cinque, L.L.C. v. Pacific Insurance Co. · filed 2012-01-25(A)(1), (B)(1)

The question then is what constitutes a “satisfactory proof of loss from the claimant.” Courts have defined it as follows: “Satisfactory proof of loss ... is that which is sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured’s claim. [Emphasis supplied.]” Maurice v. Prudential Ins. Co., 02-0993, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/23/02), 831 So.2d 381, 388; Cherry v. Audubon Ins. Co., 09-1646, p. 16 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/20/10), 51 So.3d 109, 119. ... We find that the 30-day period began to run no later than 1 March 2006, the date that Pacific received the Large Loss Notice. Pacific had, or should have had, all the information it needed to determine the plaintiffs’ loss at that time. In any event, as determined by the trial court, the final payments of $190,348 for the Mardi Gras and $415,974 for the Big Easy made by Pacific on 9-10 May 2006 were untimely. ... Pursuant to La. R.S. 22:658, we apply a 25% penalty to these late payments ($606,-322); the total amount of the penalty is *24$151,580.50.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay an undisputed claim amount within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss and imposes penalties and attorney fees when it arbitrarily fails to do so.

Aghighi v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp. · filed 2013-06-19(A)(1), (B)(1)

The insurer’s duty under La. R.S. 22:1892 mandates more than merely sending an adjuster to the insured’s property to take pictures and calculate numbers on less than all the damage. It would defeat the purpose of the statute to allow an inadequate and unreasonably low adjustment, done within the requisite time delays, to satisfy the insurer’s obligation to the insured. Likewise, allowing a “readjustment” done approximately six months later to cure the original bad conduct without any penalty would be condoning the insurer’s actions.
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Section 22:1892 penalties require the insured to provide satisfactory proof of loss, meaning information sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the claim and its extent of damages.

Advanced Sleep Center, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's · filed 2017-02-08

It is well settled that a “satisfactory proof of loss” is only that which is “sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured’s claims.” Louisiana Bag Co., Inc. v. Audubon Indem. Co., 08-453 (La. 12/2/08), 999 So.2d 1104, 1119. ... Based on the lack of evidence presented by plaintiffs at trial and the testimony of Mr. McClary regarding his inspection of the building, plaintiffs failed to prove that they provided defendant with satisfactory proof of loss. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that plaintiffs are precluded from obtaining statutory penalties for defendant’s alleged failure to pay their claim.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss and permits penalties when the failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Lamar Advertising Company v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2021-03-22(A)(1), (B)(1)

Having carefully considered the law and facts in the record, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment. Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Defendant and drawing reasonable inferences in its favor (as required), the Court concludes that there are fact questions as to when Zurich received satisfactory proof of loss. ... Based on the above, a reasonable juror could conclude that Zurich did not receive satisfactory proof of loss until it received the report and recommendation of Menke on March 27, 2018. Therefore, at present, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Lamar’s bad faith claims related to Zurich’s April 10, 2018 payment.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss and authorizes penalties when a late payment is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Lamar Advertising Company v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2021-03-22(A)(1), (B)(1)

Courts in Louisiana have set forth that an insured seeking to recover the statutory penalties under this statute must establish three elements: “(i) that the insurer received a satisfactory proof of loss, (ii) that the insurer failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period, and (iii) that the insurer's failure to pay was arbitrary and capricious.” ... With regard to the first factor, Louisiana has adopted “liberal rules concerning the lack of formality relative to proof of loss.” ... Satisfactory proof of loss, as required for an insured to obtain penalties from an insurer, is that which is sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the claim and extent of the damage. ... So long “as the insurer obtains sufficient information to act on the claim, ‘the manner in which it obtains the information is immaterial.’ ” ... Thus, a “satisfactory proof of loss occurs when the insurer has adequate knowledge of the loss.” ... Whether and when the insurer received “satisfactory proof of loss” sufficient to trigger the payment periods is a question of fact.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss and penalizes an arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause failure to do so.

Lemons v. St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co · filed 2021-04-21(A)(1)

St. Paul did not receive satisfactory proof of loss from Lemons until June 11, 2020 and sent payment immediately after obtaining this information. Therefore, no violation of La. R.S. 22:1892 or 22:1973 was present at the time this case was filed in January 2020.
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Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires an insurer to pay a claim due an insured within 30 days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, which for a UM claim must include facts showing underinsured status, fault, causation, and damages.

Pursley v. Lawrence · filed 2022-04-29(A)(1)

Louisiana law requires insurers to "pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or any party in interest." La. R. S. 22:1892(A)(1). ... To establish a satisfactory proof of loss with regard to a UM claim, the insured must establish that the insurer received sufficient facts to fully apprise it that (1) the owner or operator of the other vehicle in the accident was uninsured or underinsured; (2) that he was at fault; (3) that the fault gave rise to damages; and (4) establish the extent of the damages.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay the undisputed amount or make a written settlement offer within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss, and permits penalties and attorney fees when the failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Lee v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co · filed 2022-10-24

Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:1892 subjects an insurer to the mandatory imposition of penalties and attorney fees when it is arbitrary and capricious in failing to tender the undisputed amount or make a written offer to settle a claim within thirty days of satisfactory proof of loss. Specifically, Section 22:1892 provides for penalties in an amount up to fifty percent of “the amount found to be due from the insurer to the insured[.]” To prevail under Section 22:1892, a claimant must establish the following: (1) that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss; (2) failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period or failed to make a written offer to settle the claim; and (3) that the failure to timely tender a reasonable amount was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. Bourg v. Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, 300 So. 3d 881, 891, (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2020).
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a covered claim or make a written settlement offer within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proofs of loss.

Sampson v. Allstate Insurance Co · filed 2024-03-19

The Court finds these facts do not indicate a breach of La. R.S. § 22:1892. Without evidence of Allstate receiving any proof of loss, there is no evidence of a violation of this statute. Allstate cannot be said to have failed to pay or offer to settle Sampson’s claim after receiving a satisfactory proof of loss where there is no evidence of such proof of loss having even existed.
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Section 22:1892 requires a claimant seeking penalties, attorney fees, and costs to prove satisfactory proof of loss, nonpayment within thirty days, and an arbitrary, capricious, or baseless failure to pay.

Talluri v. AIG Property Casualty Company · filed 2024-04-30

“In order to establish a cause of action for penalties and/or attorney fees and costs under [La. R.S. 22:1892, formerly] La. R.S. 22:658, a claimant must show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.”
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Section 22:1892 requires an insured seeking penalties and attorney fees to prove satisfactory proof of loss, failure to pay or make a written settlement offer within the statutory period, and arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause conduct.

Ricky Leboeuf and Kimberly Leboeuf v. Bankers Specialty Insurance · filed 2024-06-20(A)(1), (B)(1)

A “satisfactory proof of loss” is that which is “sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured’s claim.” Louisiana Bag Co., Inc. v. Audubon Indem. Co., 08-453, p. 23 (La. 12/2/08), 999 So.2d 1104, 1119. A satisfactory proof of loss occurs when the insurer has adequate knowledge of the loss. Id. “Thus, in order to prevail under La.R.S. 22:1892, a claimant must establish (1) that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss; (2) failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period, or failed to make a written offer to settle the claim, and (3) that the failure to timely tender a reasonable amount was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.”
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss and subjects arbitrary, capricious, or baseless nonpayment to a penalty; whether the proof is satisfactory is a question of fact.

Peiffer Wolf Carr Kane Conway & Wise, LLP v. Valley Forge Insurance Company · filed 2024-11-21(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)

§ 22:1892A.(1) mandates that “All insurers issuing any type of contract . . . shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured.” ... To prevail on its claim for statutory damages, Plaintiff must show “that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer fails to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.” ... Whether Plaintiff provided satisfactory proof of loss is a question of fact. ... Thus, the Court will not grant summary judgment on the satisfactory proof of loss issue.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim or make a written offer to settle a property-damage claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss.

Armond v. Foremost Insurance Co Grand Rapids Michigan · filed 2024-12-09

Section 22:1892 provides that “insurers shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or any party in interest” or “shall make a written offer to settle any property damage claim . . . within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss of that claim.” La. R.S. 22:1892. Foremost never received notice of the alleged damage caused by Hurricane Delta prior to the lawsuit, and Foremost’s first notice of the claimed loss caused by Hurricane Laura was one week prior to the filing of this lawsuit. See Record Document 33-3 at 2. No genuine dispute exists as to whether Foremost violated this statute, and summary dismissal of these claims are warranted.
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An insurer’s initial inspection of the insured’s property can constitute satisfactory proof of loss, and whether it was adequate and triggered the statutory payment periods is generally a fact question.

Glascock v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company · filed 2025-05-30

The initial inspection can constitute a satisfactory proof of loss. Whether the original inspection was adequate is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. ... Whether and when the insurer received “satisfactory proof of loss” sufficient to trigger the payment periods is a question of fact.
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Section 22:1892(A) requires an insurer to pay the amount of a claim due within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss.

Ley v. Geico Casualty Company · filed 2025-09-08(A)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1892(A) provides that an insurer must pay the amount of a claim due under an insurance contract within thirty days of receipt of satisfactory proof of loss from the insured. ... All of these were issued well-within the thirty-day period imposed by La. R.S. 22:1892(A).
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Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, and nonpayment that is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause can trigger statutory damages and penalties.

Roger Williams, et al. v. North Light Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2026-06-02(A)(1)

Plaintiffs’ first argument relies on the assumption that the Fuselier report constituted satisfactory proof of loss, sufficient to trigger the applicable statutory time limits for payment under §§ 22:1892 and 22:1973, respectively. A “satisfactory proof of loss” is that which is sufficient to fully apprise an insurer of an insured’s claim; in other words, when the insurer has adequate knowledge of loss. ... The Court therefore finds that it cannot be considered a “satisfactory proof of loss” for purposes of triggering a duty to pay undisputed amounts under either §§ 22:1892 or 22:1973.
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Section 22:1892’s thirty-day payment period does not begin when a policy excludes losses covered by other insurance until the insurer receives information about whether other insurance exists.

Microfilm Systems Inc v. Gotham Insurance Co · filed 2024-08-13(A)(1)

However, when an insurance policy expressly excludes claims for losses covered by other insurance and predicates payment on being assured that other insurance does not exist, we hold that the insurance company does not have satisfactory proof of loss—nor is the claim really “undisputed”—until it receives information regarding other insurance or the lack thereof.
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Arbitration of claims for penalties and attorney’s fees

Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to make a written offer on a property-damage claim within thirty days after satisfactory proofs of loss and, when the applicable version provides for it, permits penalties and attorney fees for an arbitrary, capricious, or baseless failure to comply.

Leland v. Lafayette Insurance Co. · filed 2011-11-09(A)(4), (B)(1)

At the time of Hurricane Rita, in September 2005, La.R.S. 22:658(B)(1)3 permitted recovery of a 25% penalty and did not provide for the recovery of attorney fees. Effective August 15, 2006, however, the legislature amended La.R.S. 22:658(B)(1)4 to permit recovery of a 50% penalty and attorney fees. This amendment does not apply retroactively. Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 07-2441 (La.4/8/08), 988 So.2d 186; Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 11-84 (La.10/25/11), 74 So.3d 1159. ... Given the timeline of this ease, we find no error in the judgment’s inclusion of attorney fees based upon application of the amendment to La.R.S. 22:658.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss and permits penalties and attorney fees for an arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause failure to do so.

Galyn and James Montgomery v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2012-11-14

Moreover, the fact that State Farm timely paid Plaintiffs‟ original Hurricane Rita claim and a portion of supplemental claim in March 2007 does not insulate it from being held liable for violating the mandatory obligations found in La.R.S. 22:1892 with regard to its overall handling of Plaintiffs‟ supplemental claim. The trial court did not manifestly err in finding that State Farm was liable for penalties and attorney fees pursuant to La.R.S. 22:1892.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within the statutory period after satisfactory proof of loss and permits penalties and attorney fees only for an arbitrary, capricious, or probable-cause-free refusal to pay, with the statute strictly construed.

Melba Terry Shelton Succession v. Encompass Indemnity Co. · filed 2014-11-13

The conduct prohibited by La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973 is “virtually identical,” with the primary difference being “the time periods allowed for payment.” 13 Reed at 1020. Both statutes are penal in nature and must be strictly construed.
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Section 22:1892 permits penalties and attorney’s fees on a UM claim when the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss, failed to pay within the statutory period, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously or without probable cause; satisfactory proof requires facts showing the other vehicle’s uninsured or underinsured status, fault, resulting damages, and the extent of those damages.

Dey v. Eddie Williams and Lyndon Southern Insurance Company and First Chicago Insurance Company · filed 2022-12-29

In order to recover penalties and attorney’s fees pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 22:1892 for a UM claim, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing: that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss; that the insurer failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period; and that the insurer’s failure to pay was arbitrary and capricious or without probable cause. Boudreaux v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 04-1339, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/2/05), 896 So.2d 230, 233. A claimant provides satisfactory proof of loss for a UM claim when the insurer receives sufficient facts to fully apprise it that: (1) the uninsured or underinsured status of the owner or operator of the other vehicle involved in the accident; (2) the fault of the owner or operator of the other vehicle; (3) the damages resulting from such fault; and (4) the extent of those damages. McDill v. Utica, 475 So.2d 1085, 1090 (La. 1985) (citing Hart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 437 So.2d 823 (La. 1983)). “Once the four criteria are met, the insurer cannot refuse to pay the claim on the basis that the insured is unable to prove the exact extent of the general damages, which are by their nature subjective.” Jones v. Johnson, 45,877, p. 10 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/10), 56 So.3d 1016, 1022.
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Thirty-day payment deadline and penalties

Section 22:1892(B)(1)(a) permits a third-party claimant to seek penalties when an insurer fails to pay within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss and the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Jackson v. Gray · filed 2024-01-26(B)(1)(a)

Under section 22:1892, a third-party claimant is entitled to penalties if, after satisfactory proof of loss, the insurer fails to pay a claim within thirty days and the failure is deemed “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.”
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Section 22:1892(B) gives an insured a cause of action for penalties when the insurer fails to pay within 30 days after receiving satisfactory proofs of loss and the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

JMC - Tran Properties v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company · filed 2023-03-15(B)

An insured party also has a cause of action for penalties against their insurer if the insurer fails to pay a claim within thirty days of “receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss” and that failure is “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” Id. § 1892(B). ... For example, JMC’s complaint does not state when Westchester received satisfactory proof of loss, when inspections of the property took place, or other factual allegations regarding timing which are necessary to determine if and when the 30-day and 60-day statutory periods began to run.
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Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss; penalties and attorney fees require proof that the nonpayment was arbitrary, capricious, and without probable cause.

Lacoste Aviation, LLC v. StarStone National Insurance Company · filed 2024-02-28(A)(1)

To prove that it is entitled to penalties, the insured must establish the following: (1) the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss;17 (2) the insurer failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period (thirty or sixty days); and (3) the insurer’s failure was arbitrary and capricious and without probable cause.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires payment within thirty days after satisfactory written proof of loss and a demand, and provides penalties and attorney fees for an arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause failure to pay.

Ramos v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company · filed 2025-06-11(B)(1)

The other statute—section 22:1892—provides penalties, including attorney fees, for the “failure to make payment within thirty days after receipt of such satisfactory written proofs and demand therefor . . . when the failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” ... Notably, the statute also addresses partial payments by insurers, stating that if “a partial payment or tender has been made,” the penalty is “fifty percent of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount found to be due as well as reasonable attorney fees and costs.” ... Another difference, which will be explored below, is that section 22:1973 requires only “satisfactory proof of loss” while section 22:1892 specifies that the insured must also make a demand on the insurer.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires an insured seeking statutory bad-faith penalties to show satisfactory proof of loss, failure to tender payment within thirty days, and arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause nonpayment.

Romious · filed 2026-01-02(B)(1)

In regards to the claims for bad faith, a claim for statutory bad-faith penalties under Louisiana Revised Statutes §§22:1892 and 1973 requires the insured to make a showing that “(1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer fails to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer's failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.” A satisfactory proof of loss under the statute is one “that which is sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured's claim.”
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Section 22:1892(A)(2) requires an insurer to pay a third-party property damage claim within thirty days after a written settlement agreement, but the payment deadline begins when the parties agree on settlement terms, including release language.

Frank J. Culotta, M.D. v. Acadiana Pest Control, Inc. · filed 2026-03-04(A)(2)

We agree that the correspondence between counsel for all parties extended the date when the settlement funds would be due. After review, we find the parties’ agreement on the terms of the Release, following communication between counsel regarding the language of the release, was February 18, 2025. Thus, thirty days from February 18, 2025, was March 20, 2025, with the settlement payment received from AIX on March 7, 2025, and the settlement payment received from Lexington on March 14, 2025. As such, we find that payment of the settlement funds by defendants was timely.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1)(a) authorizes a penalty and attorney fees when an insurer fails to make a settlement payment within thirty days after written agreement or settlement and the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause; payment within eleven days was timely here.

Robertson · filed 2025-12-29(B)(1)(a)

The statute provides that an insurer’s “failure to make [a settlement] payment within thirty days after written agreement or settlement when the failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, shall subject the insurer to a penalty . . . as well as . . . reasonable attorney fees and costs.” ... Defendant timely tendered payment within eleven days of execution, rendering the payment timely under both the settlement agreement and La. R.S. 2:1892.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1)(a) permits penalties and attorney fees when an insurer fails to timely pay a settlement amount and the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause; the insured bears the burden to prove both elements.

O'Shea · filed 2026-02-27(B)(1)(a)

La. R.S. § 22:1892 provides for penalties and attorneys’ fees when an insurer fails to timely pay a settlement amount and the failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, and without probable cause. ... To recover penalties under the statute, the insured bears the burden of proving that (1) the insurer failed to timely pay the settlement amount, and (2) that the failure was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.
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Insurer's failure to pay claims; bad-faith penalties

Section 22:1892(B)(1)(a) permits penalties when an insurer, after satisfactory proof of loss, fails to pay within thirty days and the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Memorial Baptist Church of Metairie Louisiana v. Church Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2025-11-14(B)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973 establish the standards for bad-faith insurance claims under Louisiana law. La. R.S. 22:1892 provides that an insurer may be subject to penalties if, after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, it fails to pay a claim within thirty days and that failure is “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” To establish a claim under this statute, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer's failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.”
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss, but penalties and attorney fees apply only when the failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, and reasonable doubts about the extent of liability defeat bad faith.

First United v. Church Mutual Ins · filed 2024-10-17(A)(1), (B)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statute § 22:1892 requires that insurers “shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss from the insured or any party in interest.” If the insurer fails to do so and “such failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause,” the insurer is subject “to a penalty, in addition to the amount of the loss, of fifty percent damages on the amount found to be due . . . as well as reasonable attorney fees and costs.” ... “[W]hen there are substantial, reasonable and legitimate questions as to the extent of an insurer’s liability or an insured’s loss, failure to pay within the statutory time period is not arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.” ... Further, the statute is “penal in nature and should be strictly construed,” ... Accordingly, we hold that the district court clearly erred in awarding statutory penalties and attorney fees and costs.
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Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, and subsection (B)(1) imposes a fifty-percent penalty and attorney fees when a failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Manas Hotel L L C v. AmGuard Insurance Co · filed 2025-03-10(A)(1), (B)(1)

Under Louisiana Revised Statute § 22:1892, insurers “shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss from the insured or any party in interest.” La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892(A)(1). If an insurer fails to make such a payment and the failure “is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause,” the insurer is subject “to a penalty, in addition to the amount of the loss, of fifty percent damages on the amount found to be due ... as well as reasonable attorney fees and costs.” La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892(B)(1). ... In short, AmGUARD has not shown that no reasonable jury could find in favor of Manas Hotel on the question of bad faith failure to pay.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insured seeking bad-faith relief to show satisfactory proof of loss, failure to tender payment within thirty days, and that the insurer’s failure to pay was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Taylor · filed 2026-05-07

Louisiana imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing on insurers. La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 (“An Insurer…owes its insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing.”). To establish a bad faith claim, the insured “must show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.”
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss and permits penalties and attorney fees when a failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Guillory v. Lee · filed 2009-06-26(A)(1), (B)(1)

In order to establish a cause of action for penalties and/or attorney fees and costs under La. R.S. 22:658, a claimant must show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause. La. R.S. 22:658.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires an insurer that has satisfactory proof of a claim to pay the amount due within thirty days, or face penalties if its nonpayment is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Citadel Broadcasting Corp. v. Axis U.S. Insurance Co. · filed 2015-02-11(B)(1)

The insurer becomes subject to penalties when the failure to pay within the thirty day time frame is found to be arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause. La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1); see also Aghighi v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2012-1096, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/19/13), 119 So.3d 930, 933. “Arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, as used in statutes allowing for penalties and attorney fees when an insurer fails to timely pay a claim is synonymous with vexatious, and a vexatious refusal to pay means unjustified, without reasonable or probable cause or excuse.” Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 07-2441, p. 27 (La.4/8/08), 988 So.2d 186, 206 quoting Reed v. State Farm Ins. Co., 03-0107, p. 13 (La.10/21/03), 857 So.2d 1012, 1020-21. Louisiana law requires insurers who dispute the extent of the loss to “tender the reasonable amount which is due,” that is “a figure over which reasonable minds could not differ.” McDill v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 475 So.2d 1085, 1091-92 (La.1985). An insurer who fails to tender any amount within the statutory period must have relied on a reasonable defense that would preclude recovery in order to avoid a bad faith finding. Id.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) permits penalties and attorney fees when, after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, an insurer fails within the applicable statutory period to pay or timely tender a reasonable amount and acts arbitrarily or capriciously.

Jacobs v. Geico Indem. Co. · filed 2018-09-26(B)(1)

Both La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1) and La. R.S. 22:1973(B)(5) and (C) are penal in nature and must be strictly construed. Cooper v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 50,978 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/23/16), 210 So.3d 829 ; Jones v. Johnson , 45,847 (La. App. 2d Cir. 12/15/10), 56 So.3d 1016. To prevail under 22:1892(B)(1), the claimant must establish that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss, failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period, and that the failure to timely tender a reasonable amount was arbitrary and capricious. Id. Satisfactory proof of loss within the meaning of the statute is that which is sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured's claim. McDill v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co. , 475 So.2d 1085 (La. 1985) ; Cooper , supra ; Jones , supra .
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, and imposes a penalty only when the failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Ammar Invs., LLC v. Certain Underwriters Lloyd's · filed 2018-12-12(B)(1)

La. R.S. 22:1892 requires an insurer to "pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or any party in interest." See La. R.S. 22:1892. But even when an insurer fails to make a timely payment within the terms of Section 22:1892, "such failure [must be] found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause" before an insurer will be subjected to a penalty. Id.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss and permits penalties when the failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Feingerts v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. · filed 2019-02-13(A)(1) and (B)(1)

Both La. R.S. 22:1892 (formerly La. R.S. 22:658 ) and La. R.S. 22:1973 (formerly La. R.S. 22:1220 ) set forth affirmative duties for insurers and prescribe penalties for their breach.1 La. R.S. 22:1892 requires insurers to pay "the amount of any claim due any insured" and imposes penalties if the insurer arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause fails to make such payment "within thirty days ... after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss of that claim." See La. R.S. 22:1892(A)(1) and (B)(1).
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Section 22:1892 permits an insured to recover statutory penalties and attorney fees when an insurer's failure to pay a claim is arbitrary and capricious.

BJD Props., LLC v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. · filed 2019-03-29(B)(1)

Finally, BJD claims it has suffered expert, court, and deposition costs in this litigation. As STG notes, these costs are recoverable only if the insured can show that the insurer operated in bad faith in handling a claim on the policy. See La. R.S. §§ 22:1892, 22:1973. In its complaint, BJD summarily alleges that STG acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in handling its claim; this constitutes bad faith in Louisiana. See La. R.S. §§ 22:1892, 1973. An insurer does not act arbitrarily or capriciously if it refuses to pay a claim because of a genuine dispute over coverage or the amount of the loss. In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litig. , 759 F. Supp. 2d 822, 853 (E.D. La. 2010) (citing Reed v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 857 So.2d 1012, 1021 (La. 2003) ). Given that the Court has found that the Plaintiff's asserted losses are not within the scope of coverage of the Policy, STG did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying BJD's claim. In any case, BJD has failed to point to any evidence in the record of STG's alleged bad faith.
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Section 22:1892(B) requires an insurer to pay a penalty and attorney fees when it fails to pay or make a written settlement offer within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss and acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause.

Vincent v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2020-05-14(B)

Under La.R.S. § 22:1892(B), an insurer must pay a statutory penalty and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the insured if it fails to pay the amount due or make a written offer to settle the claim within 30 days of receiving satisfactory proof of loss. An insured may recover the statutory penalty (50 percent of the amount determined to be due, or $1,000, whichever is greater) and attorney fees and costs only if it is determined that the insurer has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause. Id. at § 22:1892(B)(1).
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Section 22:1892 requires an insured seeking penalties to prove satisfactory proof of loss, untimely payment, and an arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause failure to pay.

Lamar Advertising Company v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2021-03-29

Courts in Louisiana have set forth that an insured seeking to recover the statutory penalties under La. R.S. 22:1892 must establish three elements: “(i) that the insurer received a satisfactory proof of loss, (ii) that the insurer failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period, and (iii) that the insurer's failure to pay was arbitrary and capricious.” Grilletta v. Lexington Ins. Co., 558 F.3d 359, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2009). ... Thus, while Lamar argues that, based on Stephens’ report, it has provided satisfactory proof of loss that at least $663,000 is owed under the Policy, Zurich has produced evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Zurich has not received satisfactory proof of loss for Lamar’s business interruption claim.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires a claimant seeking penalties and attorney fees to show satisfactory proof of loss, a failure to timely pay or make a written settlement offer, and an arbitrary, capricious, or baseless failure to tender a reasonable amount.

Carrier v. Q B E Specialty Insurance Co · filed 2022-01-24(B)(1)

La. R.S. 22:1892 subjects an insurer, when it is arbitrary and capricious in failing to tender the undisputed amount or make a written offer to settle a claim within thirty days of satisfactory proof of loss, to the mandatory imposition of penalties and attorney fees for the collection of such amount. Thus, to prevail under La. R.S. 22:1892, a claimant must establish (1) that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss; (2) failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period or failed to make a written offer to settle the claim; and (3) that the failure to timely tender a reasonably amount was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. Bourg v. Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, 2019-0270, (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/5/20), 300 So. 3d 881, 891. ... The Court has reviewed the evidence submitted by both parties and finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
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Section 22:1892 requires a claimant seeking penalties or attorney fees to show satisfactory proof of loss, nonpayment within thirty days, and that the insurer’s failure to pay was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

2715 Marietta, LLC v. Axis Surplus Insurance Company · filed 2023-12-19

“In order to establish a cause of action for penalties and/or attorney fees and costs under [La. R.S. 22:1892, formerly] La. R.S. 22:658, a claimant must show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.”
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Section 22:1892 permits penalties against an insurer that fails to pay a claim after satisfactory proof of loss only when the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Creamer Brothers Inc v. General Casualty Co of Wisconsin · filed 2025-03-13

La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973 (the “bad-faith statutes”) penalize insurers for failing to pay claims after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, but only if such failure is “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” ... However, an insurer’s refusal to pay a claim or withholding of funds is not in bad faith when based on a genuine dispute over coverage. ... However, the fact that the parties’ experts reached different conclusions in their respective assessments gives rise to a dispute in the extent of Plaintiffs’ coverage, but does not illustrate a genuine issue of fact as to General Casualty’s “bad faith.”
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Section 22:1892 permits penalties and attorney fees only when the insured proves satisfactory proof of loss, nonpayment within thirty days, and an arbitrary, capricious, or probable-cause-free failure to pay.

Concepcion v. Underwriters At Lloyds London · filed 2025-05-22

“In order to establish a cause of action for penalties and/or attorney fees and costs under [La. R.S. 22:1892, formerly] La. R.S. 22:658, a claimant must show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.” ... Here, Concepcion has presented no evidence that Certain Underwriters acted in bad faith, and thus, Certain Underwriters are entitled to summary judgment dismissing those claims.
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Insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing

Section 22:1892(I)(1)(a) requires insurers to adjust claims fairly and promptly and permits penalties, attorney fees, and costs for untimely payment only when the breach is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Stoetzel · filed 2026-01-16(I)(1)(a)

Generally, this statute imposes “a duty of good faith and fair dealing” between an insurer and its insured, which requires “an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the insured . . . .” La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892(I)(1)(a). More specifically, the statute provides that an insurer must pay an insured’s claim “within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or any party in interest.” La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892(A)(1). Furthermore, the statute enables an insured to recover penalties, attorney fees, and costs when an insurer breaches the duty to timely pay a claim, but “only if the breach is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892(I)(1)(a).
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Subsection (I)(1)(A) requires an insurer to act in good faith, adjust claims fairly and promptly, and permits penalties for a breach involving a knowing misrepresentation of pertinent facts.

Troung v. Marcus Dewayne Sanders and Old American Indemnity Company · filed 2024-12-18(I)(1)(A)

By forcing Troung to pay for the betterment credit, a credit Old American calculated itself without any input from Troung, while previously approving all damage repair estimates, amounts to a knowing misrepresentation of pertinent facts. ... Accordingly, we find these assignments of error have merit. Old American did act in bad faith in failing to repair the damage caused by its insured and is therefore liable for the damages sustained as a result of the breach of his duty of good faith, which include the $313.79 paid on behalf of Troung, as well as the penalty of $5000, as provided in La. R.S. 22:1892(I)(1)(A).
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Section 22:1892(I)(1) requires an insurer to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured, and permits liability for an excess judgment when the insurer's refusal to settle within policy limits is arbitrary or in bad faith.

Franks v. State National Insurance Company · filed 2025-06-24(I)(1)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892, “[a]n insurer … owes to its insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing.” An “insurer may be liable for an excess judgment rendered against the insured if its refusal to settle within policy limits is found to be arbitrary or in bad faith.”
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Maritime-law exclusion of Louisiana penalties

Section 22:1892 penalties for bad-faith claims handling are unavailable when general maritime law exclusively governs and Louisiana law does not apply.

In the Matter of Gulf Inland Contractors, Inc. · filed 2024-09-17

Regarding non-pecuniary damages, the Court finds that the damages for penalties for “bad faith” claims handling pursuant to La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1973 and La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 that TPCG seek to recover from Gulf Inland’s insurer, Clear Spring, are not available. As this case is exclusively governed under general maritime law, Louisiana’s state law is not applicable in the instant case to either Gulf Inland or Clear Spring.
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Statutory application and penalties

Whether an insurer acted in bad faith in violation of § 22:1892 can be a fact question that cannot be resolved on summary judgment when the evidence leaves material factual issues.

CF Industries, Inc. v. TURNER INDUSTRIES SERVICES, INC. · filed 2009-06-12

Nothing in our reversal of the summary judgment precludes a factfinder, after hearing the evidence and making its credibility determinations, from finding that LMC's actions contravened the good faith requirements of former La. R.S. 22:658 and former La. R.S. 22:1220.
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Section 22:1892(A)(2) requires an insurer to pay a bona fide third-party claimant's reasonable medical-expense claim within thirty days after a written settlement agreement; under Subsection (B)(1), an arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause failure to do so subjects the insurer to a statutory penalty.

Betty Jean Pharis Morrison v. Alexandria Commons, LLC · filed 2009-12-09(A)(2), (B)(1)

Finally, the defendants argue that La.R.S. 22:658 “is simply not applicable to this case. Plaintiff cannot ‘piggy back’ her obligation to reimburse the worker’s [sic] compensation intervenor into a failure to timely pay medical expenses to a third party.” We disagree. The law is clear: “All insurers issuing any type of contract, . . . , shall pay the amount of any third party property damage claim and of any reasonable medical expenses claim due any bona fide third party claimant within thirty days after written agreement of settlement of the claim from any third party claimant.” La.R.S. 22:658(A)(2).
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Section 22:1892 permits penalties and attorney fees only when, after satisfactory proof of loss, an insurer's failure to timely tender a reasonable amount was arbitrary, capricious, and without probable cause; reasonable disputes about the claim do not support bad-faith penalties.

Delores M. v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. · filed 2010-01-06(B)(1)

La. R.S. 22:1892 is penal in nature, and as such, must be strictly and narrowly construed. Hart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 437 So.2d 823 (La.1983). In order to assess penalties and attorney fees, it must be clearly shown that the insurer was in fact arbitrary, capricious, and without probable cause in refusing to pay. ... La. R.S. 22:1892 has been held to apply to uninsured or underinsured motorist’s claims. Hart, supra. To prevail under La. R.S. 22:1892 B(l), the claimant must establish that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss and that failure to timely tender a reasonable amount was arbitrary and capricious. Block, supra. Satisfactory proof of loss within the meaning of the statute is that which is sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured’s claim. Hart, supra; McDill v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 475 So.2d 1085 (La.1985).
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Section 22:1892(A)(1) permits penalties and attorney fees when an insurer fails to timely pay a claim after satisfactory proof of loss in an arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause manner.

Long v. American Security Insurance Co. · filed 2010-11-17(A)(1)

However, complying with a contracted and self-invoked appraisal process fails to provide evidence or factual proof of vexatious, arbitrary, capricious, or conduct without probable cause. Therefore, ASIC proved that Mr. Long would not be able to satisfy his burden of proof at trial by producing factual support sufficient to establish that ASIC’s behavior was arbitrary and capricious.
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Section 22:1892 does not require an insurer to make an unconditional tender to a third-party claimant in order to avoid penalties and attorney fees.

Richard Duran Armstrong, Et Ux. v. Safeway Ins. Co. · filed 2010-10-06(A)

The undisputed facts in the case herein demonstrate that the defendants fully complied with the duties imposed by La.R.S. 22:1892 and La.R.S. 22:1973 with regard to the handling of Armstrong’s property damage claim. Similar to the plaintiff in Ledet, Armstrong has not alleged that the defendant violated any of the specific duties imposed by those statutes. Instead, he claims that the defendants’ failure to unconditionally tender the amount of the Safeway estimate was arbitrary and capricious, subjecting the defendants to a judgment against them for penalties and reasonable attorney fees. The law simply does not require an insurer to offer a third party claimant an unconditional tender. Accordingly, the portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding Armstrong penalties and attorney fees is reversed.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss and imposes penalties when a failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Cherry v. Audubon Insurance Co. · filed 2010-10-20(B)(1)

The prohibited conduct under these two statutes is virtually identical: ‘the failure to timely pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss when that failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.’ ... The difference between the statutes is the time period permitted for payment. La. R.S. 22:658 requires payment within thirty days of receiving satisfactory proof of loss and La. R.S. 22:1220 requires payment within sixty days. Both statutes impose a penalty when the failure to pay is “arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.” ... Ms. Reilly was required to prove: (i) that the insurer received a satisfactory proof of loss, (ii) that the insurer failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period, and (iii) that the insurer’s failure to pay was arbitrary and capricious.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, but penalties apply only when the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

J.R.A. Inc. v. Essex Insurance Co. · filed 2011-05-27(A)(1), (B)(1)

One who claims entitlement to penalties and attorney fees has the burden of proving the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss as a predicate to a showing that the insurer was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. It logically follows from this burden that a plaintiff who possesses information that would suffice as satisfactory proof of loss, but does not relay that information to the insurer is not entitled to a finding that the insurer was arbitrary or capricious. The sanctions of penalties and attorney fees are not assessed unless a plaintiffs proof is clear that the insurer was in fact arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause in refusing to pay. ... Our review of the record suggests that we cannot say that Essex failed to fairly and expeditiously process the claim of J.R.A.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) penalties for an insurer's failure to participate in an insured's defense require proof that the insured suffered actual damages.

ANCO Insulations, Incorporated v. AIG Premium Insurance Company · filed 2015-02-25(B)(1)

as we hold that the district court properly concluded that, to recover statutory penalties, Anco was required to show it suffered actual damages – as we explain below – we decline to remand the case for the trial court to determine whether Anco bore its burden of satisfactory proof of loss.
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Section 22:1892 does not define satisfactory proof of loss; the proof must sufficiently apprise the insurer of the insured's claims, and whether that burden is met is a fact question.

Anco Insulations, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company · filed 2015-02-25(A)(1)

Section 22:1892 does not define what constitutes a “satisfactory proof of loss.” As the Louisiana Supreme Court recently stated, though, “[i]t is well settled that a ‘satisfactory proof of loss’ is only that which is ‘sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured’s claims.’”
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) imposes a mandatory penalty in addition to the actual loss when its payment duty is violated.

ANCO Insulations, Incorporated v. AIG Premium Insurance Company · filed 2015-04-24(B)(1)

Although we recognize that both Section 22:1892 and Section 22:1973 cover an insurer’s duty to timely pay claims if required under the terms of a policy, their penalty provisions are distinguishable. The plain language of Section 22:1892(B)(1) contemplates the award of a penalty “in addition” to the amount of the actual loss.
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Section 22:1892(B) subjects an insurer to a penalty of 50% of the amount due or $1,000, whichever is greater, when its arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause failure violates the section's payment or settlement deadlines.

Williams v. Security Plan Fire Insurance Co. · filed 2017-05-31(B)

Rather, the greatest penalty to which plaintiff is entitled is the mandatory statutory penalty under La. R.S. 22:1892, which is fifty-percent of the entire amount found due from the insurer to the insured, or $8,040.61. Accordingly, we amend the trial court judgment to grant penalties in the amount of $8,040.61.
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A prompt reissued payment of an undisputed UM claim does not support § 22:1892 penalties when the insurer's conduct was not arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Bertrand v. Progressive Security Insurance Company · filed 2018-10-03(B)(1)

Progressive’s actions do not rise to the level of arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause required for the imposition of penalties and attorney fees.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) authorizes penalties and attorney fees when an insurer fails to timely pay after satisfactory proof of loss and the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, but only when the claimant has a valid underlying insurance claim.

Nucor Steel Louisiana, LLC v. HDI Global Insurance Company · filed 2022-06-01(B)(1)

“The prohibited conduct under La. R.S. 22:1973 and La. R.S. 22:1892 is virtually identical: the failure to timely pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss when that failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. ... In order to recover under La. R.S. 22:1973 and La. R.S. 22:1892, a plaintiff must first have a valid, underlying, substantive claim upon which insurance coverage is based. ... The penalties authorized by these statutes do not stand alone; they do not provide a cause of action against an insurer absent a valid, underlying insurance claim.”
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Section 22:1892 does not permit a claimant to pursue statutory penalties when the claimant lacks standing to bring the underlying breach-of-contract claim against the insurer.

Hills v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company · filed 2024-03-14

Further, because Hills does not have standing to bring a breach-of-contract claim, he similarly cannot assert claims for statutory penalties under La. R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1)(a) imposes a penalty when an insurer arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause fails to pay within thirty days after satisfactory written proof and demand, with the penalty calculated by the statutory formula rather than by the jury.

Rayne Memorial United Methodist Church v. Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. · filed 2025-05-29(B)(1)(a)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892, “failure to make [a] payment within thirty days after receipt of . . . satisfactory written proofs and demand therefor . . . when such failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause” triggers a statutory penalty. ... Both statutes include a penalty calculated by the court rather than the jury according to a mathematical formula. As a result, the Defendant’s financial condition, net worth wealth, overall profit, and income have no relevance to the Court’s calculation of statutory penalties.
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Penalties for failure to initiate loss adjustment

Section 22:1892(A)(3) requires an insurer to initiate property-loss adjustment within the statutory period, and penalties for noncompliance require a fact-based finding that the insurer breached its good-faith duty.

Oubre v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan · filed 2010-11-09(A)(3)

A reasonable interpretation of these two statutes indicates that in order to subject an insurer to penalties for failing to initiate loss adjustment in a timely manner, the insurer must be found to have breached the duty of good faith.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) permits an attorney-fee award under the amended provision when the insurer’s payment obligation arises from a proof of loss received after the amendment’s effective date.

Ginger Hinch Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co. · filed 2010-12-08(B)(1)

The trial court awarded attorney fees of one-third of the total award, or $379,905.56 under La.R.S. 22:658, renumbered and now found at La.R.S. 22:1892. Horace Mann objects to the amount of the award and contends the statute authorizing such an award was not in effect at the time Durio’s proof of claim was received by Horace Mann. An amendment to Section 658 to provide for an attorney fee award became effective on August 15, 2006, and cannot be applied retroactively. Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 07-2441 (La. 4/8/08), 988 So.2d 186. Nevertheless, “an insurer has a continuing duty of good faith and fair dealing which extends throughout the litigation period,” Id. at 199. ... In the present case, the trial court found Durio’s final proof of loss was received by Horace Mann in 2008, long after the applicable provision for attorney fees became effective; therefore, the 2006 amendment applied. We find no error in this conclusion.
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Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires satisfactory proof of loss and a failure to pay the undisputed or reasonable amount within the statutory period that is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause before penalties and attorney's fees may be awarded.

Ullah, Inc. v. Lafayette Insurance Co. · filed 2010-12-17(A)(1)

The conduct prohibited by La. R.S. 22:658 A(l) is “virtually identical to the conduct prohibited in La. R.S. 22:1220 B(5): the failure to pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss when that failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” ... “One who claims entitlement to penalties and attorney fees has the burden of proving the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss as a predicate to a showing that the insurer was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” ... Where the exact extent of the damages is unclear, an insurer must tender the reasonable amount which is due. ... After reviewing the record, we find no basis for assessing penalties against Lafayette under either La. R.S. 22:658 or La. R.S. 22:1220 for its initial payment of $40,000 for Ullah’s looting losses. ... Although Lafayette’s initial calculation of the amount it owed Ullah for its looting losses was wrong or incorrect in light of the jury’s ultimate reasonable factual determination, we do not find Lafayette’s actions to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires satisfactory proof of loss, payment within 30 days, and an arbitrary, capricious, or baseless failure to pay before penalties or attorney fees may be awarded.

Hoagboon v. Cannon · filed 2010-12-29(B)(1)

In order to establish a cause of action for penalties and/or attorney fees and costs under La. R.S. 22:1892,4 a claimant must show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. See La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1); Guillory v. Lee, 09-0075, p. 30 (La.6/26/09), 16 So.3d 1104, 1126.
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Section 22:1892 permits penalties and attorney fees when an insurer receives satisfactory proof of loss, fails to pay within thirty days, and the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Jouve v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2011-08-17(B)(1)

Both La. R.S. 22:658 and La. R.S. 22:1220 provided for penalties and attorney fees for the insurer’s failure to timely pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss when that failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. ... The primary difference is the time periods allowed for payment; La. R.S. 22:658(B)(1) requires payment to be made within thirty (30) days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss while La. R.S. 22:1220(B)(5) requires payment to be made within sixty (60) days. ... La. R.S. 22:658 was renumbered as La. R.S. 22:1892 by Acts 2008, No. 415, § 1, effective January 1, 2009.
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Section 22:1892 permits attorney fees only for work prosecuting and collecting the loss that was paid late.

Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp. · filed 2011-07-01

The attorney fees for the “prosecution and collection of such loss” are only those fees expended in prosecuting and collecting the late payment of defense costs.
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Retroactivity of attorney fees and penalties

Section 22:1892(B)(1) does not apply retroactively, but its attorney-fee provision can apply when a claim first arises after the amendment, including when satisfactory proof of loss is first made after the amendment.

Clarence M. Leland, Et Ux. v. Lafayette Insurance Company · filed 2011-11-09(B)(1)

Although the supreme court recognized, in Sher, that an insurer “has a continuing duty of good faith and fair dealing which extends throughout the litigation period,” it observed that the plaintiff‟s claim “first arose prior to the amendment of R.S. 22:658.” Id. at 199. Therefore, the supreme court rejected the plaintiff‟s argument that the continuing breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing subjected the insurer to post-amendment penalties and attorney fees. ... Given the timeline of this case, we find no error in the judgment‟s inclusion of attorney fees based upon application of the amendment to La.R.S. 22:658.
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Section 22:1892's amended attorney-fee provision does not apply retroactively when the insured's cause of action arose before the amendment's effective date.

Durio v. Horace Mann Insurance Co. · filed 2011-10-25(B)(1)

Based on our decision in Sher, the amended version of La. R.S. 22:658 cannot be applied in this case. Thus, we reverse the lower courts’ rulings applying the amended version of the statute, and vacate the award of attorney fees.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When the same insurer misconduct implicates §§ 22:1892 and 22:1973, the statute authorizing the greater penalty supersedes the other; under § 22:1892(B)(1), the penalty is calculated as fifty percent of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount due when there has been a partial payment or tender, together with reasonable attorney fees and costs.

Mason v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2016-12-28(B)(1)

As these statutory provisions relate to the same misconduct by the insurer, the statute that permits the greater penalty supersedes the other. ... If the formula of La.R.S. 22:1892(B)(l)(“fifty percent of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount found to be due”) were used to calculate the penalty as urged by Ms. Mason, it would not exceed the $10,000.00 awarded pursuant to La.R.S. 22:1973. Thus, we will leave that award intact.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 22:1892 imposes a penalty of 50% of the amount due under the policy or $1,000, whichever is greater, and permits attorney-fee recovery even when penalties are awarded under § 22:1973.

Project Build A Future L L C v. Great Lakes Insurance S E · filed 2021-12-28

Under Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1892, the penalty is an additional fifty percent of the amount due under the policy or $1,000, whichever is greater. ... A plaintiff can only recover penalties under one of these statutes but may recover attorney fees under § 22:1892 even if he receives punitive damages under § 22:1973. Kodrin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., F.App’x 671, 678–79 (5th Cir. 2009).
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires proof that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss, failed timely to pay or make a written settlement offer, and acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause before penalties and attorney fees may be imposed.

Babineaux v. United National Insurance Co · filed 2022-07-21(B)(1)

La. R.S. 22:1892 subjects an insurer to the mandatory imposition of penalties and attorney fees when it is arbitrary and capricious in failing to tender the undisputed amount or make a written offer to settle a claim within thirty days of satisfactory proof of loss, for the collection of such amount. Thus, to prevail under La. R.S. 22:1892, a claimant must establish (1) that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss; (2) failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period or failed to make a written offer to settle the claim, and (3) that the failure to timely tender a reasonably amount was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. Bourg v. Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, 2019-0270, (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/5/20), 300 So. 3d 881, 891.
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Penalties for failure to settle third-party property damage claims

Section 22:1892(B)(1) permits a third-party claimant to recover penalties and attorney fees from an insurer that arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause fails to make the written settlement offer required by § 22:1892(A)(4).

State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Norcold, Inc. · filed 2012-04-04(A)(4) and (B)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that La.R.S. 22:1892(B)(1) provides for an award of penalties in favor of a third-party claimant against an insurer for a violation of L.R.S. 22:1892(A)(4).
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Section 22:1892(A)(4) requires an insurer to make a written offer to settle a third-party property-damage claim within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss, while § 22:1892(B)(1) authorizes penalties and attorney fees for an arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause failure to comply.

Cochran v. Safeway Insurance Co. · filed 2013-12-11(A)(4) and (B)(1)

This court in Armstrong v. Safeway Insurance Co., 10-183, p. 13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/10), 47 So.3d 63, 71, considered this same issue and concluded: “The law simply does not require an insurer to offer a third party claimant an unconditional tender.” In addition, Safewa/s offer of half the amount of Ms. Cochran’s property damage claim was not arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. ... Therefore, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding a $1,000.00 penalty and $1,000.00 for attorney fees to Ms. Cochran.
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Section 22:1892 imposes affirmative claim-adjustment and written-settlement-offer duties on insurers, including for third-party claims, but does not require an unconditional payment to a third-party claimant.

Bosley v. Oliphint Enters., LLC · filed 2017-09-27A(3), A(4), B(1)

In short, § 1892 sets forth affirmative duties for insurers and prescribes penalties for their breach. ... The statute explicitly applies to third-party claims, but requires only a written offer to settle; an insurer "has no duty to make an unconditional payment to a third party" under the statute.
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Section 22:1892(A)(4) requires an insurer to make a written offer to settle a property-damage claim within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss; failure to do so, alongside untimely payment, supported penalties here.

Gibsland Bank and Trust Company v. The Security Guarantee Corporation of Baltimore · filed 2026-01-21(A)(4)

Clearly, Security failed to make a payment within 60 days, as required by the former R.S. 22:1973, or to make a written offer to settle within 30 days, as required by R.S. 22:1892.
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Third-party claims—settlement offers and penalties

Section 22:1892(A)(4) requires insurers to make written settlement offers on third-party property-damage claims within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss, and § 22:1892(B)(1) authorizes penalties and attorney fees for arbitrary, capricious, or unjustified failures.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Norcold, Inc. · filed 2012-04-04(A)(4) and (B)(1)

We conclude, | (¡based upon the statutory language, the historical amendments, the legislative intent, and the jurisprudence that La.R.S. 22:1892(B)(1) does provide for an award of penalties and attorney fees in favor of third-party claimants against an insurer who fails to make an offer of settlement after receiving satis*1251factory proof of loss, if the insurer’s failure to pay is “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.”
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Section 22:1892(A)(4) requires an insurer to make a written offer to settle a property-damage claim, including a third-party claim, within thirty days after satisfactory proofs of loss, while subsection (B)(1) permits penalties for an arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause failure to do so.

Cochran v. Safeway Ins. Co. · filed 2013-12-11(A)(4) and (B)(1)

This court in Armstrong v. Safeway Insurance Co., 10-183, p. 13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/10), 47 So.3d 63, 71, considered this same issue and concluded: “The law simply does not require an insurer to offer a third party claimant an unconditional tender.” In addition, Safeway‟s offer of half the amount of Ms. Cochran‟s property damage claim was not arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.
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Timely Payment of Claims and Penalties

Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a claim within 30 days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, and permits penalties when nonpayment is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Daniels v. Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. · filed 2013-01-16(A)(1), (B)(1)

The plaintiffs claim penalties and attorney’s fee under La. R.S. 22:1892(A)(1), which requires an insurer to pay the amount of any claim due an insured within 30 days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss and that failure to do so, if arbitrary, capricious, and without probable cause subjects the insurer to a penalty as well as attorney’s fees and costs. ... Both La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1) and La. R.S. 22:1973(B)(5) and (C) provide for penalties against an insurer whose failure to pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. ... Upon receipt of satisfactory proof of loss, La. R.S. 22:1892 requires payment within 30 days, whereas R.S. 22:1973(B)(5) requires payment within 60 days. Both statutes are penal in nature and must be strictly construed.
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Section 22:1892(A)(1) requires an insurer to pay within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss, and § 22:1892(B)(1) imposes penalties for an arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause failure, including failure to timely pay the undisputed amount.

Odstrcil v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. · filed 2017-05-03(A)(1), (B)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1892, renumbered from La.R.S. 22:658 by La. Acts 2008, No. 415, § 1, effective on January 1, 2009, provides that insurers “shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or any party in interest.” La.R.S. 22:1892(A)(1). Further: ... La.R.S. 22:1892(B)(1). ... Since State Farm- paid the full amount of its policy limits, $50,000,00, on April 4, 2015, within fifteen days of being fully apprised of causation, its payment was well within the thirty-day- requirement of the penalty statute. ... State Farm tendered the undisputed amount on May 5, 2015, within twelve days of being fully apprised of the undisputed amount. Therefore, State Farm cannot be seen as arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause under the penalty statute.
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Section 22:1892 subjects an insurer to a penalty when, after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, it fails to pay within thirty days and the failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Hebert v. QBE Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2024-06-25

La. R.S. § 1892 states that, where an insurer receives satisfactory proof of loss of a claim and does not issue a payment for that loss within thirty days, it is subject to a penalty if such failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. ... This is a genuine dispute of material fact—when QBE received proof of loss determines when the statutory timer begins. Accordingly, summary judgment cannot be granted on timeliness grounds because it is possible that some payments were issued after the statutory time had run. ... The Court declines to find that QBE acted reasonably as a matter of law. ... Accordingly, having considered the disparity in estimates and the long history of supplemental claims and eventual payments by QBE, the Court finds that there exists an issue of fact as to whether QBE acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause in failing to issue payments within the statutory time period.
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Penalties for arbitrary and capricious failure to pay claims

Section 22:1892(B)(1) imposes damages and statutory penalties when an insurer's failure to pay a claim is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Marcelle v. Southern Fidelity Insurance · filed 2013-06-19(B)(1)

An insurer is liable for damages and for statutory penalties, attorney’s fees, and costs if its failure to pay is “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” La. R.S. § 22:1892(B)(1). ... The plaintiff submits no evidence to support his claim for statutory penalties, an issue on which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. ... Because he has failed to do so, SFIC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of statutory penalties.
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Subsection (B)(1) authorizes a penalty, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs, for an insurer’s arbitrary, capricious, or baseless failure to timely pay or offer to settle a claim, with the penalty calculated under the alternatives stated there.

Alfrieda Onezime Mason v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2016-12-28(B)(1)

As these statutory provisions relate to the same misconduct by the insurer, the statute that permits the greater penalty supersedes the other. ... After considering both parties’ respective arguments, we maintain the trial court’s award of $10,000.00 in penalties. ... If the formula of La.R.S. 22:1892(B)(1)(“fifty percent of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount found to be due”) were used to calculate the penalty as urged by Ms. Mason, it would not exceed the $10,000.00 awarded pursuant to La.R.S. 22:1937. Thus, we will leave that award intact.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires a claimant to show satisfactory proof of loss, nonpayment within the statutory period, and an arbitrary and capricious failure to timely tender a reasonable amount.

Henderson v. State Farm Mut. · filed 2017-08-09(B)(1)

To prevail under 22:1892(B)(1), the claimant must establish that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss, failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period, and that the failure to timely tender a reasonable amount was arbitrary and capricious.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) requires an insurer to tender payment within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss and authorizes a 50% penalty and attorney's fees when the failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Lind v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n · filed 2018-01-30(B)(1)

Both La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1) and La. R.S. 22:1973(B)(5) and (C) provide for penalties, including attorney's fees, against an insurer whose failure to pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. ... In order to establish a cause of action for penalties and attorney fees, the Linds were required to show that: (1) USAA received satisfactory proof of loss; (2) USAA failed to tender payment within thirty days ( La. R.S. 22:1892 ) or sixty days ( La. R.S. 22:1973 ) of receipt thereof, and (3) USAA's failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. ... While USAA was justified in refusing to compensate the Linds for the value of a Hagerty Guide Condition # 2 vehicle on the date of the loss, we find that USAA did act arbitrarily, capriciously, and without probable cause in refusing to compensate the Linds for the loss of the component parts of the vehicle. USAA was aware that the vehicle was missing component parts and never made an offer of any type to compensate the Linds for the loss thereof, although USAA candidly admitted that the policy provided coverage for the theft of the component parts. Under these circumstances, we award the Linds damages under La. R.S. 22:1892 in the amount of 50% of the damages owed to the Linds for the loss of the vehicle's component parts, for a total award of $25,250.00.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) permits penalties, including attorney fees, when an insurer arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause fails to pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, and the provision is strictly construed.

Shreve v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. · filed 2018-05-23(B)(1)

Both La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1) and La. R.S. 22:1973(B)(5) and (C) provide for penalties, including attorney fees, against an insurer whose failure to pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. Both statutes are penal in nature and must be strictly construed.
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Section 22:1892 provides penalties, including attorney fees, for an insurer's arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause failure to pay a claim after satisfactory proof of loss, but the penal remedy is strictly construed and is unavailable when the insurer had a reasonable, good-faith basis to defend the claim.

Courtney Handy, on behalf of Courtlandra Armstead, Jametrice Handy and Aiden Handy v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2019-09-25

La. R.S. 22:1973 and 22:1892 provide for penalties, including attorney fees, against an insurer whose failure to pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. These statutes are penal in nature and must be strictly construed. Shreve v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 52,032 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18), 247 So. 3d 1175, 1185, writ denied, 2018-1058 (La. 10/29/18), 255 So. 3d 574. Penalties and attorney fees are inappropriate when the insurer has a reasonable basis to defend the claim and was acting in good-faith reliance on that defense. Id.
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Section 22:1892(A)(1) permits an insured to recover penalties only by showing satisfactory proof of loss, failure to tender payment within thirty days, and an arbitrary, capricious, or probable-cause-free failure to pay; a valid underlying insurance claim and supporting factual allegations are also required.

Naz, LLC v. Mt Hawley Insurance Company · filed 2022-05-27(A)(1)

Moreover, “under Revised Statute § 22:1892, an insured has a cause of action for penalties if it can ‘show that (1) an insurer has received satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof, and (3) the insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.’” NAZ, L.L.C. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 779 F. App’x 200, 204 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Guillory v. Lee, 2009-0075, p. 30 (La. 6/26/09); 16 So. 3d 1104, 1126); ... Furthermore, “to recover under La. R.S. 22:1973 and La. R.S. 22:1892, a plaintiff must first have a valid, underlying, substantive claim upon which insurance coverage is based.” Q Clothier New Orleans, L.L.C. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 535 F. Supp. 3d 574, 588 (E.D. La. 2021) (quoting Pelle v. Munos, 2019-0549, p. 16 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/20); 296 So. 3d 14, 25). “The penalties authorized by these statutes do not stand alone; they do not provide a cause of action against an insurer absent a valid, underlying insurance claim.” Id.
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Section 22:1892 supports penalties for an insurer's failure to timely pay an undisputed amount due on an insurance claim, but it does not apply where the claimed amount is disputed.

Ryan Fremin Husband of/and Rebecca Fremin Versus Anpac Louisiana Insurance Company · filed 2022-10-05

Plaintiffs argue that this amount was “undisputed” and therefore under La. R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973, ANPAC was obligated to pay this amount to plaintiffs within the respective delays of each statute. ... The record reveals, however, that the amount of this estimate was in fact disputed, as plaintiffs rejected it three days after receiving the estimate. Further, the record shows that the payment of the BELFOR estimate was contingent upon having BELFOR perform the restoration work, which plaintiffs rejected. This assignment of error is likewise without merit.
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For a disaster-related arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause coverage denial resulting in nonpayment or underpayment, the penalty is the greater of 50% of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount due, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs, or $2,500.

Rodriguez v. Occidental Fire & Casualty Company of North Carolina · filed 2023-10-31(B)(1)(b)

Section 22:1892 provides a separate additional means of recovery for the insured. Under that statute, the insurer is liable for a coverage denial that is “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause” and results in a non-payment or underpayment “thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss of that claim.” La. R.S. § 22:1892(B). When the loss occurs due to a “presidentially or gubernatorially declared disaster,” penalties consist of “fifty percent of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount found to be due as well as reasonable attorney fees and costs or two thousand five hundred dollars, whichever is greater.”
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Section 22:1892(B)(1)(a) imposes a penalty for an insurer’s failure to pay within thirty days after receiving satisfactory written proof and demand when that failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Lewis v. State National Insurance Company, Inc., D/B/A Qeo Insurance Group, David Degruy, Richard's Disposal, Inc. and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (In Its Capacity as un-insured/under-insured Motorist Carrier) · filed 2025-11-12(B)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “failure to make a payment within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory written proofs and demand…when the failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, shall subject the insurer to a penalty… .” Therefore, the application of La. R.S. 22:1892 is contingent upon a finding that the insurer was arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.
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Satisfactory proof of loss; penalties and attorney fees

Section 22:1892B(1) requires an insurer to pay within 30 days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss, with penalties and attorney fees available when nonpayment is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

Mason v. Bankers Insurance Group · filed 2014-01-31B(1)

Both La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1978 provide for penalties and attorney fees for the insurer’s failure to timely pay a claim after receiving satisfactory proof of loss when that failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. ... La. R.S. 22:1892B(1) requires payment to be made within 30 days after satisfactory proof of loss while La. R.S. 22:1973B(5) requires payment to be made within 60 days after satisfactory proof of loss. ... The question then is what constitutes a “satisfactory proof of loss.” Satisfactory proof of loss is only that which is sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured’s claims. ... Considering the evidence, we find that the district court did not err in denying the Masons’ claim pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1)(a) permits penalties and attorney fees when an insurer’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause; the insured must prove the statutory prerequisites.

Arnaud · filed 2026-04-21(A)(1)

Insurers may be subject to statutory penalties, attorney’s fees, and costs if they act in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.
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Third-party claimants

Section 22:1892's bad-faith penalties and attorney-fee remedy does not apply to a third-party claimant suing the tortfeasor's insurer, and the statute is strictly construed.

Howard v. United Services Automobile Ass'n · filed 2015-07-22

As correctly argued by the defendants, claims for penalties and attorneys’ fees for the failure, to tender policy limits under La. R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973 are commonly referred to as “bad faith” claims, - which apply only to first party medical pay issues. USAA insured Ms. Greenup, the tortfeasor in this matter; it did nqt insure plaintiffs. Thus, plaintiffs are third party claimants vis-d-vis USAA and the “bad faith” statutes are simply inapplicable. Plaintiffs do not fall within the category of individuals who can bring a “bad faith handling of a claim” cause of action against USAA, with whom plaintiffs have no contractual relationship. As stated by the supreme court in Langsford v. Flattman, 2003-0189 (La.1/21/04), 864 So.2d 149, “[t]he relationship between the insurer and the third party claimant is neither fiduciary nor contractual; it is fundamentally adversarial. For that reason,' a cause of action directly in favor of a third party claimant is generally not recognized absent statutory creation.” Id. at 151; see also Mathies v. Blanchard, 2006-0559 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/21/07), 959 So.2d 986, 988-989. Additionally, La. R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973 are penal in nature and strictly construed. Guillory v. Lee, 2009-0075 (La.6/26/09), 16 So.3d 1104, 1130. There is no. construction of these statutes that would render them applicable to plaintiffs’ claims against the tortfeasor’s insurer.
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A nonparty to the insurance contract who is not a third-party beneficiary cannot enforce § 22:1892 or recover its extra-contractual damages.

Ledet v. Fabianmartins Constr. LLC · filed 2018-10-17

Because we have determined that Mr. Ledet, a non-party to the insurance contract, has no right to enforce the Policy as either a third party beneficiary thereto or as a beneficiary of an express contractual insurance trust, we find his claims against the Insurers for extra-contractual damages under La. R.S. 22:1892, La. R.S. 9:1973, and La. C.C. art. 1997, likewise fail.
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Section 22:1892 applies only to insurers and does not provide a bad-faith cause of action absent a potentially viable underlying insurance claim.

Walker v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Safety National Casualty Corporation, and Joseph Rashaun Wimberly · filed 2021-04-14

The statutes do not provide a cause of action against an insurer for bad faith absent a valid underlying insurance claim. ... As a third-party claimant, plaintiff failed to assert any qualifying claims under Section 1973(B) and did not state a cause of action under the statutes. Thus, the trial court, as to all allegations in the petition, did not err in granting the peremptory exception of no cause of action.
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Anti-steering provision—who may sue

Section 22:1892(D)(1) gives insureds and third-party insurance claimants, but not body shops without a contractual relationship to the insurer, the right to pursue the anti-steering remedy.

Medine's Collision Center, LLC v. Progressive Direct Insurance Co. · filed 2016-07-12(D)(1)

Although Subsection D of La. R.S, 22:1892 does not specify to whom the cause of action belongs, a full reading of the statute shows that the right of action for “steering” is exclusive to insureds or third-party claimants who claim their insurer, or the insurer of a tortfeasor, steered them to a particular body shop.
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Penalties and attorney fees for untimely insurance payments

Section 22:1892 requires an insurer to pay a 50% penalty, attorney’s fees, and reasonable costs when its initial payment is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, and satisfactory proof of loss triggers those obligations.

Nevills v. Liberty Personal Insurance Co · filed 2025-07-30(B)(1)(c)

When Plaintiff suffered his losses in April 2024, La. R.S. 22:1892 was in effect and provided plaintiffs the right to recover a 50% penalty plus attorney’s fees and reasonable costs if an insurer’s initial payment was proven to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, and this right could not be cured and reduced by later actions. ... As in French, the Court finds that Defendant received satisfactory proof of loss to trigger their obligations under La. R.S. 22:1892, and this proof was received prior to the enactment of La. R.S. 22:1892.2 on July 1, 2024.
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Section 22:1892(B)(1) penalizes an insurer that arbitrarily, capriciously, or without probable cause fails to pay a claim within thirty days after satisfactory written proof and demand, allowing fifty-percent damages or one thousand dollars, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs.

Naddia Melder, Et Ux. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. · filed 2016-12-14(B)(1)

Farm Bureau paid the med-pay limit of $5,000.00 on September 25, 2007, one day late. Farm Bureau provided no compelling reason for its failure to timely distribute med-pay benefits to Melder, and the validity of the claim was not disputed. Therefore, it was arbitrary, capricious, and without probable cause on Farm Bureau’s part to delay beyond thirty days in making payment to Melder. ... Pursuant to the statute, Farm Bureau is responsible for penalty damages in the amount of $2,500.00 which is half of the undisputed amount it failed to pay, i.e., $5,000.00. Additionally, pursuant to La.R.S. 22:1892(B)(1), we award $3,500.00 in attorney fees.
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Section 22:1892(A) requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proof of loss; failure to do so when arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause can subject the insurer to penalties and attorney fees.

Martin Baack and Brenda Baack v. McIntosh · filed 2020-07-29(A)

The Insurance Code requires an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss, and the failure to pay within that time period, if found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, subjects the insurer to penalties and reasonable attorney fees. La.R.S. 22:1892(A), (B)(1).
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Penalties and attorney fees—relationship between §§ 22:1892 and 22:1973

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 22:1892 remains available for attorney fees when § 22:1973 supplies the greater penalty, but penalties cannot be recovered under both statutes.

Ewell J. Gaspard, Et Ux. v. Usaa Casualty Ins. Co. · filed 2017-05-24(B)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1973, providing that an insurer must pay a claim within sixty days, supersedes La.R.S. 22:1892, providing that an insurer must pay a claim within thirty days, because it provides the greater penalty, and a plaintiff cannot recover penalties under both statutes. Leland v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 11-475 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/9/11), 77 So.3d 1078, writ denied, 11-2714 (La. 2/17/12), 82 So.3d 285.2 However, since La.R.S. 22:1973 does not provide for attorney fees, a plaintiff who establishes entitlement to recovery under La.R.S. 22:1892 can recover an attorney fee thereunder. Id.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When § 22:1973 provides the greater penalty, it supersedes § 22:1892 and bars double recovery, but the insured may recover attorney fees under § 22:1892 because § 22:1973 does not provide them.

Jackson v. Berkshire Hathaway Global Insurance Services L L C · filed 2020-05-28(B)(1)

When Section 1973 provides the greater penalty, it supersedes Section 1892; the insured cannot recover penalties under both statutes. However, because Section 1973 does not provide for attorney fees, the insured is entitled to recover the greater penalties under its provisions and attorney fees under Section 1892.
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Section 22:1892 permits recovery of attorney fees even when penalties are awarded under § 22:1973, but a plaintiff may recover penalties under only the statute providing the greater penalty.

Simmons v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2025-03-03

A plaintiff is limited to recovery under the statute that provides for the greater penalty.
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Bad-faith penalties—reasonable basis to defend claim

Section 22:1892 requires satisfactory proof of loss, nonpayment within thirty days, and arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause conduct; an insurer with a reasonable coverage defense may obtain judicial determination before tendering payment without incurring bad-faith penalties.

Jones v. Government Employees Insurance Co. · filed 2017-06-14(A)(1) and (B)(1)

To establish a cause of action for penalties and attorney fees under La. R.S. 22:1892, Mr. Jones must show that: (1) GEICO received satisfactory proof of loss; (2) GEICO failed to tender payment within thirty days of receipt thereof; and (3) GEICO’s failure to pay is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. ... GEICO was entitled to a judicial determination of its coverage defense before it was obligated to make a tender pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1) and 22:1973(B)(5). ... Therefore, insofar as GEICO sought judicial determination of the choice of law issue, we find as matter of law that GEICO is entitled to summary judgment as to the alleged violations of La. R.S. 22:1892(B)(1) and 22:1973(B)(5).
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Whether an insurer's coverage dispute was arbitrary and capricious under § 22:1892 is a fact-intensive inquiry requiring findings about the reasonableness of the defense and the insurer's good-faith reliance on it.

Thibodeaux v. Steven Arvie, Jr. · filed 2017-08-31(B)(1)

But the arbitrary and capricious aspect of the bad-faith penalty inquiry requires a factual finding of the reasonableness of the dispute, i.e., a reasonable defense, as well as a finding that the insurer acted in good faith in its reliance upon that reasonable defense.
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An insurer's good-faith coverage dispute defeats a claim for § 22:1892 penalties when the insured offers only conclusory allegations of arbitrary and capricious denial.

Kent & Smith Holdings, L.L.C. v. HDI Global Ins. Co. · filed 2018-09-25(B)(1)

Because the Court finds that Defendant had a legitimate basis for its denial of coverage and a right to litigate over coverage in any event, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's claim for damages under La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973 is granted, and Plaintiff's Motion is denied.
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Section 22:1892 does not impose bad-faith penalties when an insurer timely tenders the amount it reasonably believes is undisputedly owed and has a good-faith basis to dispute the remainder.

Meador v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Insurance Company · filed 2020-12-10(A)(1), (B)(1)

“An insurer does not act arbitrarily or capriciously when its refusal to pay a claim is based on a genuine dispute over coverage or the amount of loss.” ... Even with all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor, Plaintiff is not entitled to penalties against Starr Indemnity. A reasonable trier of fact could not find Starr Indemnity’s actions were arbitrary and capricious or without probable cause as a matter of law. ... Starr Indemnity had reasonable grounds to investigate the accident and dispute fault before tendering 100 percent of Plaintiff’s claimed damages; Starr Indemnity has a good faith defense to a demand for payment of 100 percent of Plaintiff’s damages. When there is a genuine dispute over fault causing the accident there cannot be satisfactory proof of loss on an underinsured/uninsured motorist claim. Starr Indemnity has a reasonable basis for its actions.
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Whether an insurer handled a claim arbitrarily or capriciously under § 22:1892 is ordinarily a fact-specific inquiry based on the facts known to the insurer, and genuine factual disputes can preclude summary judgment.

Melendez v. Southern Fidelity Insurance Company · filed 2020-11-25(B)(1)

When the insured claims penalties for refusal to pay a claim timely, the inquiry usually focuses on whether the insurer acted reasonably in its adjustment of the claim based on the facts known or that should have been known by the insurer. Normally, the reasonableness of the insurer’s claims handling will be a factual issue, and cases involving this issue will be fact specific. ... Therefore, at present, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Melendez’s bad faith claims related to the 2019 loss.
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Section 22:1892 authorizes attorney fees and costs for an insurer’s bad-faith failure to adjust claims fairly and promptly, but its penalties do not apply when the insurer has a reasonable basis for its position.

The Estate of Louise Christman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2022-02-16

A plaintiff that proves an insurer’s breach of its duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly—i.e., an insurer’s bad faith—may recover statutory penalties, including double damages, La. R.S. § 22:1973(C), and attorneys’ fees and costs, La. R.S. § 22:1892. Louisiana’s statutes assigning penalties for an insurer’s bad faith “are penal in nature and must be strictly construed.” ... By contrast, The statutory penalties are inappropriate when the insurer has a reasonable basis to defend the claim and acts in good-faith reliance on that defense. Especially when there is a reasonable and legitimate question as to the extent and causation of a claim, bad faith should not be inferred from an insurer's failure to pay within the statutory time limits when such reasonable doubts exist. ... Applying these principles to the instant dispute, the Court determines that the Estate has failed to establish a genuine dispute that Liberty’s refusal to pay its initial claim for roof damage was arbitrary and capricious, and will dismiss the Estate’s bad faith claim on this basis alone. ... On this record, there is simply no basis to conclude that Liberty acted in bad faith.
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Law changed since Act 3 (effective July 1, 2024) repealed § 22:1973 and folded its good-faith duties into § 22:1892(I), ending the two-statute comparison.

Section 22:1892 permits extracontractual penalties when an insurer's denial of coverage is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, and the court treated it as proscribing virtually identical conduct to § 22:1973, differing primarily in payment periods.

Hodge v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, XYZ Insurance Company, Nicolas Hopkins · filed 2024-06-26

Hodge also seeks extracontractual damages under La. R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that these two statutes proscribe “virtually identical” conduct and that “the primary difference is the time periods allowed for payment.” ... To succeed under either statute, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the denial of coverage was “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” ... Here, there is no evidence that Farm Bureau’s conduct in denying coverage was arbitrary and capricious. ... Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s determination that Hodge is not entitled to bad-faith penalties pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973.
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Section 22:1892 requires payment of a claim due within thirty days after satisfactory proof of loss and permits bad-faith penalties and attorney fees only on amounts actually due, with mitigation costs included in covered building damages rather than treated as a separate claim.

Commercial Restoration, LLC v. Nanaki, LLC · filed 2024-12-30(A)(1), (B)(1)

As a matter of law, penalties and fees cannot be assessed on amounts not owed. Penalties only arise when an insurer fails to pay “the amount of any claim due” and are calculated as fifty percent of “the amount found to be due from the insurer to the insured.” La.R.S. 22:1892 (2019). ... Here, mitigation costs are part of, not in addition to, the coverage for building damages under the policy. ... In sum, the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding $569,688.38 in penalties and $569,688.38 in attorney fees for “bad faith under La. R.S. 22:1892 for arbitrary failure to timely pay Mitigation damages[.]” The amounts should have been considered in its award of penalties and attorney fees for AmGuard’s untimely payment of structural damages.
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Section 22:1892 requires an insured to show satisfactory proof of loss, failure to pay within 30 days, and arbitrary, capricious, or without-probable-cause nonpayment to recover penalties and attorney fees.

Belmere, L.P. v. Steadfast Insurance Company · filed 2025-07-01

To prevail under this statute, the insured must show that (1) the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss; (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within 30 days of receiving this proof; and (3) the insurer's failure to pay was “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” Guillory v. Lee, 16 So.3d 1104, 1126 (La. 2009). ... Thus, in drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Belmere as the nonmovant, it has set forth facts establishing the first two elements of La. R.S. 22:1892, i.e., that Steadfast (1) received satisfactory proof of loss and (2) failed to tender payment within 30 days of receiving proof of loss.
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Prescription of bad-faith claims

Law changed since Act 3 (effective July 1, 2024) added a two-year prescriptive period for § 22:1892(B) penalties and attorney fees; this ten-year rule describes earlier claims.

A claim for penalties and attorney’s fees under § 22:1892 is subject to a ten-year prescriptive period under La. C.C. art. 3499.

Goodly v. Allstate Insurance Co · filed 2023-10-04

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 22:1892 and 22:1973 claims for penalties and attorney’s fees that arise out of Allstate’s handling of its Hurricane Laura and Delta claims are subject to the ten-year prescriptive period set forth in La. C.C. art. 3499 and thus have not yet prescribed.
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Law changed since Act 3 (effective July 1, 2024) added a two-year prescriptive period for § 22:1892(B) penalties and attorney fees; this one-year rule describes earlier claims.

A claim for penalties under § 22:1892 is a statutory bad-faith claim subject to a one-year prescriptive period.

Fils v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Insurance Co. · filed 2018-05-09

There are two statutes available to an insured to file suit against an insurer for bad faith damages; La.R.S. 22:1892 (penalties) and La.R.S. 22:1973 (attorney fees). ... Therefore, we find the trial court did not err in finding a one-year prescriptive period applied to Plaintiff’s bad faith claims against Starr.
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Law changed since Act 3 (effective July 1, 2024) added a two-year prescriptive period for § 22:1892(B) penalties and attorney fees; this ten-year rule describes earlier claims.

For an insured's bad-faith claim against its insurer, Section 22:1892 is subject to a ten-year prescriptive period.

Fils v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. · filed 2018-05-09

Second, at least two Louisiana appellate court decisions have applied a ten-year prescriptive period to Section 1892 claims, one of which came out of the same circuit that decided the Zidan case. ... We agree with the reasoning of the court in Aspen Specialty Insurance Co. , that the facts in Zidan are distinguishable, as the plaintiff in that case was a third-party claimant and not a party to the contract of insurance at issue. ... For the foregoing reasons, on rehearing we reverse our earlier ruling, affirming the trial court's judgment holding the one-year prescriptive set forth in La.Civ.Code art. 3492 is applicable to Plaintiff's bad faith claims. We find the UM insurer's duty of good faith arises out of the contract of insurance between the two parties; and, thus, is subject to the ten-year prescriptive period of La.Civ.Code art. 3499. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment finding Plaintiff's bad faith claims have prescribed is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A first-party insured's bad-faith claim under La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 arises from the insurance contract and is subject to the ten-year prescriptive period for personal actions under La. Civ. Code art. 3499.

Fils v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Insurance Co. · filed 2019-02-04

Second, at least two Louisiana appellate court decisions have applied a ten-year prescriptive period to Section 1892 claims, one of which came out of the same circuit that decided the Zidan case. ... We agree with the reasoning of the court in Aspen Specialty Insurance Co., that the facts in Zidan are distinguishable, as the plaintiff in that case was a third-party claimant and not a party to the contract of insurance at issue. Thus, it was appropriate in Zidan to apply the one-year prescriptive period.
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A plaintiff may not pursue bad-faith claims-handling penalties under § 22:1892 without stating a breach-of-contract claim against the insurer.

Barbe v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2019-05-22

And because the plaintiff has not stated a breach of contract claim against American Modern, he likewise may not bring a claim for bad faith claims handling practices under La. R.S. §§ 22:1892 or 22:1973. See Guthrie Brown I, 2017 WL 2290268, at *, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80057, at *16 n.2 (citing Bradley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 620 F.3d 509, 529 (5th Cir. 2010) ).
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Section 22:1892 supports a bad-faith claim when an insurer’s handling and payment of a claim may have been arbitrary and capricious, and factual disputes about that conduct can require a trial.

Rutledge Investments L L C v. Scottsdale Insurance Co · filed 2022-08-26

Thus, Rutledge maintains that there 1s a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to whether Scottsdale was arbitrary and capricious in how it handled this claim. The Court agrees with Rutledge. ... For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact for trial as to Scottsdale’s handling of the claims. As such, the Court will deny Scottsdale’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Dismiss La. R.S. 22:1892 Bad Faith Claim Related to Hurricane Laura (Doc. 33).
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Section 22:1892 requires a claimant to have a valid underlying substantive insurance-coverage claim to pursue a bad-faith claim.

Gisclair v. Great American Assurance Company · filed 2023-02-03

To state a claim under either of these statutes, however, the Succession must possess “a valid, underlying, substantive claim upon which insurance coverage is based.” Because the Succession has no underlying claim for damages under the contract, the Succession’s claim under La. R.S. 22:1927 and La. R.S. 22:1892 must be dismissed.
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Claims for bad-faith damages under § 22:1892 may be subject to arbitration when the insurance policy broadly requires arbitration of disputes arising from the policy.

Evergreen Associates, Inc. Evergreen Lions Club v. Independent Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2023-08-18

Plaintiff argues the last line—that the Arbitration Tribunal may not award exemplary, punitive, multiple, or other damages of a similar nature—prevents the Arbitration Tribunal from considering Plaintiff’s claims for bad faith damages under Louisiana R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s bad faith claims against Defendants are subject to arbitration.
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Section 22:1892's statutory bad-faith penalty claim is not included in an assignment of contractual insurance rights unless the assignment expressly transfers the right to bring it.

Cat 5 Global, LLC v. Occidental Fire and Casualty Company of North Carolina · filed 2024-01-16

Thus, Parretto did not assign her right to seek statutory bad faith penalties under §§ 22:1892 and 22:1973 to Cat 5, and those claims must be dismissed.
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Section 22:1892 does not impose liability for an insurer’s coverage denial when the insurer’s interpretation of the policy was reasonable.

Hargiss v. Princeton Excess & Surplus Lines Insurance Co · filed 2024-01-22

Further, because Defendant’s interpretation was also reasonable, the Court finds that PESLIC’s denial of coverage did not violate La. R.S. 22:1973 and La. R.S. 22:1892. Adopting and arguing this interpretation was not a violation of good faith and fair dealing. Nor was this interpretation arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.
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Notes 1–150 of 219, oldest cases first.

186 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Zahid Hotel Group, LLC v. AmGuard Insurance Company, the court only references § 22:1892 to describe the statutory-timeline issue underlying Zahid’s substantive claims and to explain that the requested declaratory relief would be redundant; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company v. Smitty's Supply, Inc., section 22:1892 is mentioned only as an alternative statutory basis in Smitty’s counterclaim. The court did not construe or apply the statute’s requirements; its denial of summary judgment on Count III was a procedural ruling based on disputed facts. opinion →
Burk Holding Co., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only to identify the statutory bad-faith claims included within the dispute; the court decided the scope and enforceability of the forum-selection clause, not what § 22:1892 means or requires. opinion →
Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company v. Smitty's Supply, Inc., the opinion only identifies § 22:1892 as an unresolved claim to be decided on remand and reports an earlier motion-to-dismiss ruling that statutory penalties and attorney’s fees were properly pleaded. It does not construe, explain, or decide the statute’s requirements or application. opinion →
Tymon v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, the statute appears only in the procedural background as a basis for relief sought by the plaintiff. The court dismissed the claims because Tymon was not an insured or third-party beneficiary under the policy and did not interpret or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Tymon v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, the court mentions § 22:1892 only in describing the damages and penalties Tymon requested in her petition. The court dismissed the action for failure to amend and did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 22:1892. opinion →
Tymon v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, the statute is mentioned only in the background as a basis for the plaintiff’s requested damages, penalties, and attorneys’ fees. The court did not interpret or apply § 22:1892; it ruled only on the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. opinion →
Ram Krishana Inc v. Mt Hawley Insurance Co, the opinion mentions La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 only in describing Plaintiff's claims and allegations in the procedural history. The court decided the choice-of-law issue and applied New York substantive law; it did not interpret, construe, or otherwise decide what § 22:1892 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Jack, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only in a footnote identifying it as the current codification of the good-faith duty. The court's actual ruling concerns § 22:1973 and whether its duties and penalties apply to an insurance adjuster; it does not construe or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Erdey v. Progressive Security Insurance Co., the opinion only notes that former La. R.S. 22:658 was renumbered as § 22:1892 and reports that the trial court awarded attorney’s fees under the former provision. The appellate court decided the insured’s verbal cancellation under § 22:885, not the meaning or application of § 22:1892. opinion →
Hudson v. Aig National Insurance Company, section 22:1892 appears only in AIG's description of its first assignment of error. The court resolves that assignment under the involuntary-dismissal standard in La. Code Civ. P. art. 1672(B) and does not interpret or apply § 22:1892; the substantive penalty rulings concern § 22:1973. opinion →
Hudson v. AIG National Insurance, section 22:1892 is mentioned only as part of AIG's assignment of error and is not construed or applied by the appellate court; the court's substantive analysis and ruling concern La.R.S. 22:1973, while the § 22:1892 reference is merely procedural/incidental. opinion →
Good Hope Baptist Church v. Ict Insurance Agency, Inc., the court mentions La.R.S. 22:1892 when describing Good Hope’s attorney-fee and penalty claim, but expressly declines to determine whether that claim was prescribed; it therefore does not decide an issue about the statute. opinion →
Good Hope Baptist Church v. ICT Insurance Agency, Inc., the opinion only recites the statute while summarizing Good Hope’s claim for attorney fees and penalties; it expressly states that the court need not determine whether the claims under La.R.S. 22:1892 had prescribed. opinion →
Defraites v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the court quoted and discussed La. R.S. 22:1892(A)(3) and (A)(4) only to evaluate whether the proposed claims could be maintained as a class action. It expressly did not decide the substantive statutory claims or what the statute requires in an individual claim. opinion →
La Louisiane Bakery Co. v. Lafayette Insurance Co., the court did not construe or apply § 22:1892. It only noted in a footnote that former § 22:658 had been renumbered as § 22:1892; the court's bad-faith analysis and ruling applied La.R.S. 22:1220, and the § 22:658 reference was part of the appellee's request that the court rejected. opinion →
Wegener v. Lafayette Insurance Co., La. R.S. 22:1892 is mentioned only to explain that it is the renumbered version of former La. R.S. 22:658. The court does not interpret or apply § 22:1892; its substantive analysis concerns former La. R.S. 22:1220, now § 22:1973. opinion →
Safeguard Storage Properties, L.L.C. v. Donahue Favret Contractors, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote explaining the renumbering of provisions cited in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Morvan v. Moore, the court mentions § 22:1892 only to note that the plaintiffs alleged no violation of the statute; it decides the insurer's policy-limit direct-action liability without construing or applying the statute's requirements. opinion →
Scott v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America, the court mentioned La. R.S. 22:1892 only in a footnote while comparing penalty language; the holding construed and applied La. R.S. 22:1821, not § 22:1892. opinion →
Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the statute appears only in the plaintiff’s allegations and request for damages and attorney fees. The court did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 22:1892; it resolved the appeal on summary judgment under the facts and discussed the insurer’s duties under La. R.S. 22:1973. opinion →
Peoples State Bank v. Progressive Casualty Insurance, the statute is mentioned only in describing Peoples’ cross-appeal seeking statutory penalties and the district court’s refusal to consider the issue for the first time post-judgment. The court affirmed that procedural ruling without interpreting or applying § 22:1892. opinion →
United States Fire Insurance v. Housing Authority, the statute appears only in the opinion’s procedural history as part of HANO’s asserted state-court claims; the court did not interpret or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Ansardi v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp., the opinion merely reports the plaintiffs’ allegations and requested penalties under § 22:1892 in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under that statute. opinion →
Orleans Parish School Board v. Lexington Insurance Co., the statute appears only as part of the OPSB's argument that the insurers acted in bad faith and caused delay. The court did not construe or apply § 22:1892; it rejected the reliance on bad-faith jurisprudence and resolved the appeal under the insurance policy and Civil Code provisions. opinion →
Wagner v. Tammany Holding Co., LLC, the court expressly declined to address the claim for penalties and attorneys’ fees under La. R.S. 22:1892 after resolving the insurance coverage and duty-to-defend issues; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Elberson v. Geico General Insurance Company, the statute is cited only to identify one of Elberson’s claims for penalties and attorney’s fees. The court reversed on summary-judgment grounds because the trial court improperly weighed disputed evidence; it did not interpret or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Spears v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the statutes under which Dr. Houston sought penalties; the appellate court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Spears v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as a basis for penalties sought by Dr. Houston; the appellate court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Brown v. AM Logging & Alternative Service Concepts, LLC, section 22:1892(C) appears only in a footnote quoting a cross-reference contained in La. R.S. 23:1201(I). The court did not construe or apply § 22:1892(C); its decision addressed other workers’ compensation provisions and issues. opinion →
Burley v. New York Life Insurance Company, the opinion expressly declines to consider the La.R.S. 22:1892 award because the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that claim; the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history and a footnote, not construed or applied by the appellate court. opinion →
Burley v. New York Life Insurance Co., the statute is mentioned as the basis for claims made below, but those claims were voluntarily dismissed; the appellate court did not decide the statute’s meaning or application. opinion →
Celebration Church, Inc. v. United National Insurance, section 22:1892 appears only in UNIC's argument that insurers must begin adjusting property-damage claims within fourteen days; the court did not decide that issue and expressly declined to reach the bad-faith claims after resolving coverage. opinion →
Johno v. Doe, the statute appears only in a quoted definition of “CLAIM” in the settlement Release. The court construed the assignment of a La. R.S. 22:1973 bad-faith claim, not La. R.S. 22:1892, and made no ruling about § 22:1892. opinion →
Dupuy Storage & Forwarding, LLC v. Max Speciality Insurance Co., the statute is mentioned only in the court’s description of claims adjudicated below and a previously denied writ application; this appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and the court did not decide what La. R.S. 22:1892 means or requires. opinion →
Breland v. Arena Football One, LLC., section 22:1892 is mentioned only in the background as part of the plaintiff’s requested bad-faith relief. The court did not construe or specifically apply the statute; its dismissal of the bad-faith claim was a general ruling that the complaint lacked support under Louisiana law. opinion →
Smith v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., the statute appears only in the opinion's account of the state trial court's disposition of Babin's claims; the Fifth Circuit did not interpret or apply § 22:1892 and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. opinion →
Jackson v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., L.L.C., the statute appears only in Lowe's argument and in the procedural history of an exception that was not at issue on appeal; the court did not decide what § 22:1892 means or how it applies. opinion →
Gaspard v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., the opinion mentions § 22:1892 in connection with the plaintiff's bad-faith claim, but the court expressly declined to address that assignment after finding the damages did not exceed $50,000; it therefore did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Barnett v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., the statute is mentioned only to identify the statutory basis of plaintiffs' dismissed claims; the court resolves the appeal under res judicata and does not decide what La. R.S. 22:1892 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Williams v. United Statesgencies Cas. Ins. Co., the statute is mentioned only as one of the grounds asserted in the plaintiff's lawsuit. The court's decision construes and applies La. R.S. 22:2062, not § 22:1892. opinion →
Bosse v. Access Home Ins. Co., the statute appears only in a footnote listing the statutory bases for the plaintiffs' penalties claims; the court did not construe or decide what La. R.S. 22:1892 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Bosse v. Access Home Ins. Co., the statute appears only in a footnote listing related Louisiana Insurance Code penalty provisions; the court did not construe § 22:1892 or decide its requirements or application. opinion →
Nathan Lopez and Olivia Lopez v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as a basis for penalties sought by the plaintiffs. The appellate court does not discuss, interpret, or rule on La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892; its holding concerns insurance-policy coverage for theft. opinion →
Lopez v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as a basis for the plaintiffs' requested penalties. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Lopez v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., the statute appears only in the procedural history as a basis for penalties sought by the plaintiffs; the court did not construe, apply, or rule on La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Smith v. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co., the statute is mentioned only in reporting the state court’s prior dismissal of Babin’s bad-faith claims. The Fifth Circuit decided the appeal under issue-preclusion principles and did not interpret or independently apply La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Apollo Energy, LLC v. Lloyd'S, the statute appears only in the description of Plaintiff's claims. The court decided the insurance-coverage issue and did not construe or apply § 22:1892(A)(3)'s loss-adjustment or payment requirements. opinion →
Ortiz v. Meadwestvaco Corporation, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only as the potential source of statutory penalties for a bad-faith breach and does not decide whether the statute applies, whether bad faith occurred, or what the statute requires. The court instead resolved the appeal on the insured's breach of notice-and-consent conditions and pretermitted the remaining issues. opinion →
Ortiz v. Meadwestvaco Corp., the court mentioned La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 only in recounting that statutory penalties may apply for a bad-faith breach of the duty to defend. It did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under that statute; the holding concerned waiver of insurance-policy defenses and prejudice from untimely notice and unilateral settlement. opinion →
Ortiz v. Meadwestvaco Corp., the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only in a parenthetical reference to statutory penalties while discussing another case; it does not interpret or apply this statute. opinion →
Gautreaux v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., the court affirmed class certification and held only that the alleged statutory violation presented a common question suitable for class treatment; it did not decide whether Farm Bureau’s WCTL system actually violated La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 or construe the statute’s requirements. opinion →
Ruckman v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company, the opinion dismissed the Louisiana-law claim based on the parties’ stipulated choice of Florida law, without construing or deciding the requirements or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Calogero v. USA Agencies Casualty Insurance Company, Inc., the dissent mentions § 22:1892 to characterize the source of Calogero’s bad-faith claim, but the issue it decides is whether LIGA is liable under the separate LIGA statutes; it does not interpret or apply § 22:1892 itself. opinion →
Wells v. Allstate Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only to estimate potential penalties while the court evaluates diversity jurisdiction and the amount in controversy; the court does not decide what § 22:1892 requires or apply it to the insurance claim. opinion →
Lamar Advertising Company v. Zurich American Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the background as one of Lamar’s asserted claims. The order decides discovery motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Lamar Advertising Company v. Zurich American Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the background as part of Lamar’s asserted claims. This discovery order does not construe, explain, or decide anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Lamar Advertising Company v. Zurich American Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the background description of Lamar's claims; the order decides a motion to compel discovery and does not interpret or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Shepherd v. Security National Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the procedural and factual background as part of Plaintiff’s allegation. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under La. R.S. 22:1892; it denied summary judgment based on disputed facts concerning insurance coverage and policy exclusions. opinion →
Baugh v. Voyager Indemnity Insurance Company, the court recited the statute's requirements in summarizing the parties' bad-faith dispute, but the ruling only granted plaintiff leave to amend and did not decide or construe the application of La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Wright v. U S A A Casualty Insurance Co, the court mentions § 22:1892 and its penalty while deciding whether the jurisdictional amount in controversy is satisfied. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any dispute about what § 22:1892 requires. opinion →
The Country Club of Louisiana, Inc. v. International Insurance Company of Hannover SE, the court merely recounts the plaintiff’s asserted statutory claims while addressing whether removal jurisdiction was adequately pleaded. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Dozier v. GoAuto Insurance Co, the court mentions § 22:1892(B)(5) in a footnote while summarizing the plaintiff’s allegations and the applicable insurance regulations. The case decides jurisdiction, removal, and jurisdictional discovery, not the meaning or application of this statute. opinion →
Evans v. Thomas, the statute is mentioned only in the court’s summary of the allegations in the original petition; the court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Georgetown Home Owners Association, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London Severally Subscribing to Policy Number AMR-60507, the statute appears only in the procedural history as part of Plaintiff's pleaded claim for penalties and fees. The court did not interpret or apply § 22:1892; its analysis concerned arbitration, the Convention, and § 22:868. opinion →
Amoroso v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned in the plaintiffs’ allegations and in the procedural history of their voluntary dismissal; the court did not construe or decide anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, LLP v. Louisiana Worker's Comp. Corp., the court cites § 22:1892 only as a comparison to support its interpretation of La.R.S. 22:1973; it does not decide a claim under § 22:1892 or make it the basis of the judgment. opinion →
The Estate of Louise Christman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify a claim in the amended complaint. The court's discovery rulings do not construe or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
The Estate of Louise Christman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the procedural background identifying a claim pleaded in the amended complaint; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning § 22:1892. opinion →
Hebert v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, the statute is mentioned only to describe the plaintiff’s dismissed bad-faith claim in the procedural history; the court did not construe or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Lafontaine v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., the court’s only reference to La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 is in a string citation in footnote 114 to support a general statement about similar penalty statutes. The court decided claims under §§ 22:1964, 22:1821, and 22:1973, and did not construe or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Eaux Holdings L L C v. Scottsdale Insurance Co, the opinion only reports the plaintiff's requested advisory ruling involving § 22:1892 and expressly defers the premature motion; it does not decide what the statute means or how it applies. opinion →
Heberts Holdings, LLC v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., the opinion only reports that the plaintiff pleaded a claim under La.R.S. 22:1892. The court limited the appeal to prescription and expressly declined to address the trial court’s dismissal of the penalties and attorney-fees claim, so it did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Zydeco's II, LLC, Zydeco's Corp, Dustin Gainey and Rosemarie Gainey Versus Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London Subscribing to certificate/policy No. D1180d150152-59633, David Brennan, Dave Brennan Insurance Inc., and Braishfield Associates, Inc., the opinion is a rehearing decision about whether a divided panel had to reargue the case before five judges. Its references to La. R.S. 22:1892 merely recount findings from the prior appeal and do not construe or independently decide what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Zydeco's II, LLC, Zydeco's Corp, Dustin Gainey and Rosemarie Gainey Versus Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London Subscribing to certificate/policy No. D1180d150152-59633, David Brennan, Dave Brennan Insurance Inc., and Braishfield Associates, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the opinion’s account of what the court affirmed in the earlier appeal. This rehearing decision addresses whether a five-judge panel was required under La. Const. art. 5, § 8(B) and U.R.C.A. Rule 1-5; it does not interpret or independently apply La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Peairs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the procedural background to identify claims asserted in the amended complaint. The court decided a motion to quash discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and did not interpret, apply, or rule on the requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Anthony Cemo Versus State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only as a statute under which the relator sought damages, penalties, and attorney fees. The court decided whether leave to amend should be granted and did not interpret, apply, or otherwise rule on the statute. opinion →
Hermes Health Alliance, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, the statute appears only in a settlement-demand email referenced while evaluating whether the contingency-fee agreement was collusive or established a 40% fee. The court did not interpret or apply § 22:1892; its ruling concerned Lape’s contractual attorney-fee privilege and summary judgment. opinion →
Dozier v. GoAuto Insurance Co, the statute appears only in a footnote in the background section to describe the regulations underlying the plaintiff's allegations. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 22:1892. opinion →
Lake Charles Instruments Inc v. Scottsdale Insurance Co, the statute appears only in the plaintiff's itemized damages allegations. The court's substantive analysis and ruling concern La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1973, not § 22:1892. opinion →
Nederland Jewelers L L C v. Great American Insurance Co of New York, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one basis for Nederland’s filed claims. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Bouillion v. Geico Marine Insurance Co., the statute appears in the plaintiff’s request and in the trial court’s award of attorney fees, but the appellate court did not interpret or apply § 22:1892; it vacated the judgment based on inadmissible hearsay and expressly declined to discuss the remaining assignments of error. opinion →
Fahimipour v. United Property & Casualty Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the description of Plaintiffs’ requested relief. The court did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 22:1892; it ruled for Defendant based on the material misrepresentation that voided the insurance policy. opinion →
Mansfield Road L L C v. Great American Insurance Co of New York, the statute is mentioned only to identify a claim Plaintiffs pleaded in the procedural history. The court did not construe or apply § 22:1892; it dismissed all claims as prescribed under the policy's contractual two-year limitations period. opinion →
Ross v. State of Louisiana Through the University of Louisiana System, University of New Orleans and Senator Nat G. Kiefer University of New Orleans Lakefront Arena, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as part of UNO's allegation. The appellate court did not decide what § 22:1892 means, requires, or how it applies; it resolved the no-cause-of-action issue on the sufficiency of the pleadings and potential insurance coverage. opinion →
Mercato Elisio, L.L.C. v. City of New Orleans, New Orleans Historic District Landmarks Commission and John Deveney, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only in a footnote identifying its current number after discussing the predecessor statute in Safeguard Storage; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 22:1892. opinion →
Academy of the Sacred Heart of New Orleans v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 while discussing and rejecting a speculative objection to arbitration. It does not construe the statute, identify its requirements, or decide whether statutory damages are available; the ruling is instead that equitable estoppel requires arbitration. opinion →
Upper Room Bible Church, Inc. v. Sedgwick Delegated Authority, the statute appears only in the complaint's allegations described in the background; the court decided a Rule 59(e) motion about the location of arbitration and did not interpret or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Jackson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, the statute is mentioned only while recounting plaintiffs’ allegations in the procedural history. The court’s memorandum ruling addresses motions in limine and summary judgment without construing or deciding anything about § 22:1892. opinion →
Talley v. MasTec, Inc., the order merely reports that the plaintiff purported to seek relief under the statute while addressing removal and diversity jurisdiction; it does not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
City of Westlake v. Republic Fire & Casualty Insurance Co, the court mentions § 22:1892 only to describe the claims asserted in a different case, Mt. Hawley. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning this statute. opinion →
Buddington v. United Services Automobile Association, the court did not interpret or apply a specific requirement of § 22:1892. It only held at the pleading stage that plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to pursue bad-faith claims; the statute was otherwise mentioned in party arguments and in the court’s discussion of another case. opinion →
Ishwar Krupa LLC v. Independent Specialty Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the background as one of Plaintiff's asserted causes of action; the court decided whether to compel arbitration and did not interpret or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Washington v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the court cites § 22:1892(A) for the general 30-day payment rule and states that the insurer paid promptly and timely, but it does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of that statute. The judgment turns on the validity of the UM-limit selection under La. R.S. 22:1295 and exhaustion of the policy limits. opinion →
Talley v. AG Quality Construction LLC, the opinion only reports that Plaintiff purported to seek relief under the statute and later counts the requested penalties among the amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction. It does not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Talley v. MasTec, Inc., the opinion merely reports that Plaintiff purported to seek relief under the statute and refers to the claimed penalties in assessing the amount in controversy; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the procedural background as part of Mercy Manor’s underlying state-court claim. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning § 22:1892. opinion →
Korbel v. Republic Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the background as one of Plaintiff’s asserted causes of action. The court resolved the case on policy coverage and did not interpret or apply § 22:1892; its ruling on the bad-faith motion was only that the motion was moot. opinion →
Eriksen v. American Security Insurance Company, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the legal authorities cited for ASIC's unadopted argument about standing to bring a bad-faith claim. The court granted summary judgment because Plaintiff was not an insured or intended third-party beneficiary and lacked standing to enforce the insurance contract; it did not decide what La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 means or requires. opinion →
Zahid Hotel Group, LLC v. AmGuard Insurance Company, the court mentioned § 22:1892 only to describe Zahid’s statutory-penalty claim and the relevance of the Claremont Bid in resolving a discovery motion. It did not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Khan v. Geovera Advantage Insurance Services, Inc., the court mentions § 22:1892 only to describe the claims asserted and to compare the case with Lacy; it decides relation back and prescription under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, not the meaning or application of § 22:1892. opinion →
Ten G, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, the court decided the scope of an arbitration clause and stayed the case; it did not construe, apply, or decide the requirements or entitlement to penalties under La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. The statute was only part of the bad-faith claims being sent to arbitration. opinion →
Anderson v. Vault Reciprocal Exchange, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background as one of plaintiffs’ asserted claims. The court decided the motion to remand based on diversity jurisdiction and did not construe or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Gabriel v. Assurant American Security Insurance Company, the court did not construe or independently apply La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892; it merely stated that plaintiffs could not pursue statutory-penalty claims as a consequence of lacking standing to bring the underlying breach-of-contract claim. opinion →
Dos Santos v. Usaa Casualty Insurance Company, Government Employees Insurance Company and Carrie Ann Rainey, the statute is mentioned in the procedural history as part of Respondent’s asserted penalty claim. The appellate court did not construe or independently apply § 22:1892; it resolved the case by enforcing the policy’s North Carolina choice-of-law provision. opinion →
Gabriel v. Assurant American Security Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the opinion's procedural-history recap of the earlier summary-judgment ruling. This order addresses the motion to vacate under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) and does not independently decide what § 22:1892 means or requires. opinion →
Southland Circle, LLC v. Independent Specialty Insurance Company, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only as a basis for Plaintiff’s extra-contractual penalty claim in the procedural background; the court’s holding concerns La. R.S. 22:868(D), not § 22:1892. opinion →
Cornerstone Association v. Independent Specialty Insurance Company, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only in recounting Plaintiff's allegations. The court decides the motion based on La. R.S. 22:868 and arbitration, without construing or applying § 22:1892. opinion →
Zahid Hotel Group, LLC v. AmGuard Insurance Company, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only in describing Zahid's claims and requested declaratory relief. The court does not construe or apply the statute, identify its governing requirements, or decide entitlement under it; it denies summary judgment on fact questions concerning bad faith generally. opinion →
Zahid Hotel Group, LLC v. AmGuard Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the procedural background as a claim Zahid asserted; the court decided a motion to exclude expert testimony and did not construe or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Zahid Hotel Group, LLC v. AmGuard Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the background as a description of Zahid’s pleaded claim and requested relief. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 22:1892; it resolves the motion on insurance-policy coverage issues. opinion →
Zahid Hotel Group, LLC v. AmGuard Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only as one of Zahid's asserted claims in the background and as requested declaratory relief; the court's order addresses summary judgment on AmGUARD's counterclaim and does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 22:1892. opinion →
Burregi v. QBE Specialty Insurance Company, the opinion only mentions La. R.S. § 22:1892 as one of the statutes underlying plaintiff's allegations. The court decided summary-judgment issues under the insurance policy and did not construe, explain, or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
AQA of Louisiana, LLC v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, the court cited § 22:1892 only to identify one of AQA’s claims; it dismissed that claim because the assignment named a different legal entity and AQA failed to oppose the motion, without interpreting or applying any requirement of the statute. opinion →
Daniels v. Progressive Property Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the background as one of the causes of action Plaintiff asserted. The Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the parties' lack of diversity and did not interpret, apply, or rule on the requirements of § 22:1892. opinion →
Flint v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only to describe Plaintiffs' asserted cause of action and allegations; the court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892, deciding the motion based on the identity of the proper insurer. opinion →
McMillan v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company, the statute appears only in a footnote describing plaintiffs’ claims; the court did not interpret, apply, or rule on § 22:1892. opinion →
Williamson v. Underwriters at Lloyds London, the court mentions potential damages under § 22:1892 only as part of calculating whether the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction could be met; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what the statute requires. opinion →
Jackson v. Great American Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the background to identify the bad-faith claims Plaintiff asserted. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide what La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 requires; it dismissed the claims because Plaintiff lacked standing as a non-insured and non-beneficiary. opinion →
Sylve v. American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, the opinion merely identifies § 22:1892 as one basis for the plaintiff’s requested statutory penalties. The court dismissed those extra-contractual claims as preempted and did not interpret, explain, or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Chicken Mart, Inc. v. Independent Specialty Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the background as one of the plaintiff's alleged causes of action. The court decided a motion to compel arbitration and did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Sorapuru v. American National Property and Casualty Company, the statute appears only in the description of Sorapuru's pleaded causes of action. The Court did not interpret or apply § 22:1892; it dismissed because Sorapuru failed to plausibly allege that Defendant insured the property. opinion →
Duncan v. Agent Alliance Insurance Company, the court merely summarized Joy Fellowship’s bad-faith claim and did not decide what § 22:1892 means or require, nor apply it to the facts. The motion was denied based on standing and third-party-beneficiary pleading issues. opinion →
OnePack Hospitality Group v. Independent Specialty Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the description of OnePack's pleaded causes of action. The court decided a motion to compel arbitration and did not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Rhodes v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the background as part of Rhodes's asserted bad-faith claims and argument. The Court did not adopt that description, construe the statute, or decide how it applies; the dismissal rested on the policy's wind-and-hail exclusion. opinion →
6101 Tullis Drive, LLC v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background as a basis for the plaintiff's extra-contractual penalty claims. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Spanish Villa, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, the court mentioned § 22:1892 only while rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the speculative availability of statutory penalties and attorney’s fees made the arbitration clause unconscionable. It did not construe the statute or decide whether its requirements were satisfied. opinion →
Catalanotto v. GeoVera Specialty Insurance Company, the statute appears only in plaintiffs’ reservation of the right to amend their petition to assert a future bad-faith claim. The court did not construe or apply § 22:1892; it decided the motion based on other insurance statutes governing proof of loss and suit limitations. opinion →
Clark v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the description of Defendant’s motion seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s bad-faith claims. The court decided the motion was moot after the amended complaint and did not interpret or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Lotten v. Allstate Indemnity Company, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as part of the penalties Plaintiff sought. The Court decided the motion based on the untimely amendment and federal relation-back rules, without interpreting or applying La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Klein v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, the court mentioned § 22:1892 only as one component of the damages and fees claimed for purposes of calculating the federal diversity-jurisdiction amount in controversy. It did not construe or decide any issue about what the statute means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Richards Clearview City Center, LLC and Richard's Canal Street Property, LLC Versus Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the concurrence’s discussion of the potential effect of applying New York law to the pleaded bad-faith claims. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892; the actual holding concerns forum selection and venue under §§ 22:868 and 22:442. opinion →
Richard's Clearview, LLC Versus Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Company, the opinion mentions La. R.S. 22:1892 only to describe the statutory basis of Clearview’s claims in the procedural history. The court’s actual analysis and holding concern venue and forum-selection clauses under La. R.S. 22:442 and La. R.S. 22:868, not the meaning or application of § 22:1892. opinion →
Morris v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, the statute appears only in the procedural history as part of the plaintiff’s alleged causes of action. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892; it granted summary judgment on mental-anguish claims based on the evidentiary record. opinion →
Burton v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company, the court mentions § 22:1892 only to explain that the plaintiff's statutory-penalty claims fail derivatively from the court's standing ruling on the breach-of-contract claim; it does not interpret or apply any requirement of § 22:1892. opinion →
Clement v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in describing Plaintiff's alleged bad-faith cause of action. The court decided the motion on insufficient service of process and did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Alexander v. American Security Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the background as the legal basis Plaintiff asserted for a bad-faith claim. The court decided the motion on insufficient service of process and did not interpret, apply, or rule on the requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Credit Consultative, Inc. v. XL Insurance America, Inc., the statute appears only in the opinion's summary of Plaintiff's pleaded causes of action; the Court decided a forum-selection transfer motion and did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Allen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, the statute appears only in the background as part of Plaintiff's allegation. The court did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 22:1892; it dismissed the bad faith claim because Plaintiff could not show that an insurance contract existed. opinion →
R D K L L C v. Federated Service Insurance Co, the statute appears only in the background as part of RDK's asserted claims. The recommendation does not interpret or apply La. R.S. 22:1892; it resolves the motions based on lack of coverage, failure to state a contract claim, and prescription/relate-back issues. opinion →
Allison v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company, the statute appears only in a footnote summarizing the plaintiff’s claims. The court decided the motion based on the policy’s windstorm exclusion and did not interpret or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Jarrell E. Godfrey, Jr. v. GoAuto Insurance Company and Craig Dewayne Jones, the opinion mentions La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 in a footnote as one source of the plaintiff’s requested penalties, but does not construe or independently apply the statute; it rejects the penalties claim based on the absence of insurance coverage. opinion →
Williams v. Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company, the opinion merely notes that the plaintiff did not seek attorney’s fees or statutory bad-faith penalties under § 22:1892 while addressing the amount in controversy and federal jurisdiction; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
Washington Gardens, LLC v. General Star Indemnity Company, the statute appears only in the background as a description of the penalties sought in the plaintiff’s state-court complaint. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Simmons v. G E I C O Insurance Co, the statute is mentioned only as identifying bad-faith claims that plaintiffs previously sought leave to add. The report does not interpret, explain, or apply La. R.S. 22:1892; it recommends denying reconsideration on procedural grounds. opinion →
Chaisson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, the statute is mentioned only to describe the plaintiff’s claims; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Triay v. National General Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the background as one of the provisions plaintiff alleged was violated. The court's dismissal analyzes prescription under La. R.S. 22:868(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), without deciding what § 22:1892 means or requires. opinion →
Thakore v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the plaintiffs’ bad-faith claims; the court decides a discovery motion and does not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Brothers Petroleum, L.L.C. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, the statute appears only in the background description of Plaintiff's pleaded claims. The Court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Stewart v. USAA General Indemnity Company, the statute is mentioned only in the background to identify Plaintiff's bad-faith claim. The Court dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction and did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 22:1892. opinion →
Rapides Station Land Co L L C v. Markel American Insurance Co, the court merely identified § 22:1892 as a possible basis for the plaintiff’s bad-faith claims while denying summary judgment; it did not construe the statute or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., the statute is mentioned only in the recitation of Calcasieu’s allegations; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 22:1892. opinion →
Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College v. Bickham, the opinion mentions La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 only in a footnote recounting the prior Clark decision under the statute’s former numbering; the court did not construe or apply § 22:1892. Its holding concerns abandonment under La. C.C.P. art. 561 and the COVID-related suspension in La. R.S. 9:5829. opinion →
Hannah Keiger Versus Ngm Insurance Company, the court merely recounts that the plaintiff asserted claims under § 22:1892. It does not construe the statute or decide what it requires or how it applies; the prescription ruling rests on La. R.S. 9:5629 and procedural deficiencies in the record. opinion →
Thibodeaux v. Allstate Vehicle & Property Insurance Co, the statute appears only in the background as part of the plaintiff’s alleged bad-faith claims. The court did not interpret or apply § 22:1892; it granted summary judgment because no insurance contract existed between the plaintiff and Allstate V&P. opinion →
Bowman v. Agent Alliance Insurance Company, the court merely reports the defendant's argument and the plaintiff's pleaded claim; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what La. R.S. 22:1892 requires. The ruling instead concerns contractual standing and leave to amend. opinion →
Peiffer Wolf Carr Kane Conway & Wise, LLP v. Valley Forge Insurance Company, section 22:1892 is mentioned only as one of Plaintiff’s asserted claims. The Court expressly limits its analysis and ruling to § 22:1973, so it does not decide what § 22:1892 means or how it applies. opinion →
McNamara v. American Security Insurance Company, the court did not construe or independently apply La. R.S. 22:1892; it mentioned the statute only as a consequence of its policy-based holding that McNamara lacked standing to enforce the insurance policy. opinion →
Marcello v. Allied Trust Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the background to describe plaintiffs’ claims for penalties and attorney’s fees. The court’s ruling concerns reconsideration and relief from judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b), and it does not decide what § 22:1892 means or requires. opinion →
Austin v. GeoVera Specialty Insurance Co, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only to identify one of Austin’s asserted claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Esplanade 2018 Partners, LLC v. Mt Hawley Ins Co, the court did not construe or apply § 22:1892’s substantive requirements; it merely listed the statute among Louisiana-law claims dismissed as a consequence of applying New York law under the policy’s choice-of-law provision. opinion →
Charles House Condominium Association, Inc. v. Old Republic Union Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background as a basis for the plaintiff’s claims. The court decided the motion to reconsider an order compelling arbitration under the Convention and discussed La. R.S. 22:868, but did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Yokubaitis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, the statute is mentioned only in the factual background to identify claims asserted in the complaint; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 22:1892. opinion →
Cat 5 Global, LLC v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, the statute is mentioned only as a claim Cat 5 initially sought and then expressly disclaimed. The court decided the summary-judgment motion under Louisiana Civil Code article 2644 and did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Fernandez v. Chubb European Group SE, the statute appears only in the background as the legal basis Plaintiff asserted for a bad-faith claim. The Court dismissed the suit for failure to prosecute and did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Rayne Memorial United Methodist Church v. Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I., the statute is mentioned only in the background as a basis for Plaintiff’s claims. The court decided motions to exclude or limit expert testimony and did not construe, explain, or apply La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Belmere, L.P. v. Steadfast Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the introductory description of Belmere’s claims. The order decides an evidentiary motion concerning expert testimony and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892. opinion →
Ramos v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, the statute appears only in a paragraph from Ramos’s proposed draft pretrial order that the opinion reports while resolving the timeliness of Hartford’s motion; the court did not construe, apply, or adopt any rule about § 22:1892. opinion →
Batiste v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, the statute appears only in the background description of Plaintiff's claims. The order decides a discovery motion and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Hermes Health Alliance, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only to identify a bad-faith claim pleaded by Hermes and later adopted by Girod. The court decided whether the claims had to be arbitrated, not what § 22:1892 means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Ashton R. O'dwyer, Jr. and Alexis O'Dwyer Navarro Versus The Metairie Towers Condominium Association Board President Ronald T. Carter, Individually, and Board Member Jennifer Fagan, Individually, Advanced Property Restoration Services, LLC and Its Owner Jason Houp, Individually, Strategic Claim Consultants, LLC and Its Owner Brandon Lewis, Individually, Gno Property Management, LLC and Its President Robert Kirk Phillips, Individually, Jack K. Whitehead, Jr (A Professional Law Corporation) and Jack K. Whitehead, Jr., Individually, and Cynthia Bologna, Individually, and the Loeb Law Firm, LLC, J.bartholomew Kelly III, Individually, and Alvendia, Kelly & Demarest, LLC, Charles E. Sutton, Indivdually, and Sutton Law Firm, LLC, Brian D. Grubb, Individually, and Gravis Law Pllc, and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London Subscribing to Commercial Lines Policy No. Pxa0001321-01, the statute is mentioned only as part of Underwriters’ arguments and the procedural history. The court decided the appeal on the no-right-of-action issue and expressly pretermitted the remaining assignments, so it did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 22:1892. opinion →
Allstate Construction, Inc. v. Ohio Security Insurance Company, the court described conflicting interpretations of La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892 concerning whether an assignor retains bad-faith claims after assigning policy rights, but it denied the motion without prejudice and expressly deferred deciding the issue pending Fifth Circuit guidance. Thus, the opinion does not hold what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Alexander, the statute appears only in the background as a cause of action Plaintiff alleged; the court decided the case on contractual standing and third-party-beneficiary status under the insurance policy, without construing or applying § 22:1892. opinion →
Armstrong, the court only mentioned § 22:1892 while recounting that Armstrong had asserted Louisiana bad-faith claims; it did not analyze or decide any issue under the statute, and those claims had already been dismissed by consent. opinion →
Our Place Condominiums Inc v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, the court did not interpret or apply § 22:1892 in this order; it merely characterized the governing standards as settled while denying reconsideration of its prior ruling and addressing the defendant’s disagreement with that prior application. opinion →
Castro-Rochez, the court mentioned § 22:1892(B)(1)(c) only in the background to characterize Hurricane Francine as a catastrophic loss. Its ruling interpreted and applied § 22:1892.2, not § 22:1892. opinion →
ACE American Insurance Co., et al. v. Gray Insurance Co., the statute is mentioned in Gray's argument and counterclaim, but the court does not adopt or analyze that argument and makes no ruling about what § 22:1892 means or requires. opinion →
Beyond Words Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the statute is mentioned only as part of the complaint's allegations describing the damages sought; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 22:1892. opinion →
Charles Smith, et al. v. Clear Blue Insurance Company, the court cited § 22:1892 only for the general background proposition that a liability insurer owes its insured a good-faith duty. It did not construe or apply the statute in resolving the motion, which concerned assignment validity and an offset or credit for an underinsured-motorist payment. opinion →
Jacques, the opinion mentions § 22:1892 only when describing the claims Plaintiff asserted in the pleadings. The court decided the motion based on relation-back and timeliness, and did not interpret or apply § 22:1892. opinion →
Barrios, the court mentions § 22:1892 only to identify the plaintiffs’ bad-faith claim; its remand ruling concerns federal jurisdiction and the amount in controversy, not the meaning or application of the statute. opinion →
D'Amico, the court mentioned § 22:1892 only while describing the bad-faith claims and the Fifth Circuit’s prior discussion; it decided the case on res judicata and did not interpret, define, or apply any substantive requirement of § 22:1892. opinion →
Doty v. Goauto Insurance Company, the court cites the section while reporting the trial court’s penalty award, without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
Doty v. Goauto Ins. Co., the court cites the section when describing the trial court’s penalty award, but the opinion does not state its own decision about the section’s rules. opinion →
STMB Properties, LLC v. Certain Underwriters LLoyd's London, the court sent the claim for penalties and attorney’s fees under the section to arbitration based on the insurance policy’s delegation clause. opinion →
Troung v. Marcus Dewayne Sanders and Old American Indemnity Company, the court decided penalties under former La. R.S. 22:1973 and cited § 22:1892 to identify where that provision now appears. opinion →

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