Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140

Section 413.140 sets a one-year limitations period for negligence and unlawful imprisonment claims.

DeLong v. Arms · filed 2008-05-20

The statute of limitations has run on the causes of action against the two Doe Defendants that arose on April 9, 2005. ... Cissell v. KFC Corp., 2007 WL 3227571, at *2 (Ky. App. November 2, 2007) (“the one-year statute of limitations in KRS 413.140 applies to [] claims for negligence [and] unlawful imprisonment. ...”). Thus the claims against the Doe Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 413.140(1)(a) and (c) require covered claims to be commenced within one year after they accrue.

Estep v. Combs · filed 2018-08-02(1)(a) & (c)

Here, the relevant statute surely is the one-year limitation period provided by KRS 413.140. ... The pleading itself, the Complaint, shows filing within one year of the earliest accrual date.

Section 413.140 requires personal injury actions to be filed within one year, counting the day the cause of action accrued.

Fannin v. Lewis · filed 1952-11-21

The courts of this state are firmly committed to the rule that when the computation of time is to be made from a particular day, that day is to be excluded, but when time is computed from an act done, the day on which the act occurs is to be included in the -computation. KRS 413.140 provides that actions for injuries to the person of the plaintiff shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. -Computation is made -from the event of the accrual of the cause of action, rather than from the day upon which it accrued.

Section 413.140’s one-year limitations period bars a claim for annoyance and discomfort from a permanent nuisance when the suit is filed more than one year after the injuries occurred.

Kentucky West Virginia Gas Company v. Matny · filed 1955-05-20

Even were we to assume that an independent suit for annoyance and discomfort could be brought in the first instance under circumstances here shown, such injuries were caused at the -time of or soon after the completion of the plant and pumping station in 1941, and the one year statute of limitations, KRS 413.140, is a complete bar to this action commenced in 1952.

Section 413.140’s one-year limit bars a personal injury action when summons is not issued until after the year expires.

Delong v. Delong · filed 1960-05-20

Since no summons was issued against the appellant until the one year statute of limitations (KRS 413.140) had run, the action is barred as to him and the judgment must be reversed.

Section 413.140’s one-year period for a continuing conspiracy begins after the last overt act committed to advance the conspiracy.

District Union Local 227, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America v. Fleischaker · filed 1964-10-02

KRS 413.140 provides that actions for conspiracy shall be commenced within one year after a cause of action accrues. ... We believe that a conspiracy which contemplates a series of overt acts is a continuing conspiracy and the statute does not commence to run until the last overt act performed in compliance with the objective of the conspiracy has been accomplished.

Section 413.140(1)(a)'s one-year period for personal injury actions begins when the injury occurs, even if the plaintiff learns its full extent later.

Caudill v. Arnett · filed 1972-06-09(1)(a)

The appellant’s cause of action came into existence or accrued on the day he was injured in the school-bus accident, and limitations began to run from that date even though he was not made fully aware of the extent of his injury until several years later.

For injury from a latent disease caused by exposure to a harmful substance, the one-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the injury and its possible connection to the defendant’s conduct.

Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. · filed 1979-04-10(1)

We therefore overrule Columbus Mining Co. v. Walker, Ky., 271 S.W.2d 276 (1954) and extend the Tomlinson rule as explicated herein to tort actions for injury from latent disease caused by exposure to a harmful substance whether the action be based on negligence or on a products liability theory. As there is no dispute concerning the operative facts concerning the time elements involved, we conclude as a matter of law that the Sampson estate’s action was timely filed and not barred by limitations.

Section 413.140(1)(a)'s one-year period began when the university's tenure decision became final upon official notice.

Board of Trustees of U. of Ky. v. Hayse · filed 1989-11-09(1)(a)

In Kentucky, a claim must be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues. KRS 413.140(1)(a). ... It was on this date that the University's decision became final and the statute began to run. Since Hayse filed his Complaint within a year of May 5, 1978, the statute of limitations was met.

Section 413.140(1)(b)’s one-year limit for injuries to livestock by a corporation is not extended by the discovery rule in a property damage action.

G & K Dairy v. Princeton Electric Plant Board · filed 1991-09-25(1)(b)

For the following reasons, the Court holds that the “discovery rule” is not applicable to this property damage action and that, even if it was applicable, it would not change the Court’s decision.

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives personal injury claims one year from accrual; the discovery rule does not delay accrual for a sexual-abuse injury the plaintiff knew about.

Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter · filed 1998-04-03(1)(a)

KRS 413.140(l)(a) provides that a personal injury action must be commenced within one year “after the cause of action accrued.” ... Thus, his injury would not fall within the discovery rule under Rigazio, supra.

Section 413.140(2)’s discovery rule applies to claims against physicians, surgeons, dentists, or hospitals, but not to claims against a medical equipment supplier.

Davis v. All Care Medical, Inc. · filed 1999-03-25(2)

The language of KRS 413 140(2) relates to claims against physicians, surgeons, dentists or hospitals. This is clearly not such a claim and KRS 413.140(2) has no application to this case.

Section 413.140(1)(c)’s one-year limit for conspiracy claims is subject to Kentucky’s discovery rule and reasonable-diligence requirement.

McAnly v. Middleton & Reutlinger, P.S.C. · filed 1999-12-10(1)(c)

As the Court has already determined above, Plaintiff did not fail to exercise “reasonable diligence” by not spontaneously checking his credit report within two years of the alleged civil conspiracy. Therefore, the one-year statute of limitation does not toll until Plaintiffs discovery, and this suit is timely.

Section 413.140(1)’s one-year period runs once a plaintiff exercising reasonable diligence should have discovered the possible cause of the injury.

Blanton v. Cooper Industries, Inc. · filed 2000-03-29(1)

With all of the information available to these two plaintiffs, particularly Mrs. Blanton, the court finds that a person exercising reasonable diligence would have discovered the cause of the injuries prior to October 16, 1996 or one year prior to the date this suit was filed.

Section 413.140(2)’s medical malpractice limitations period begins when the patient discovers or reasonably should discover the injury, including the physician’s wrongful conduct; unexplained pain alone does not start it.

Wiseman v. Alliant Hospitals, Inc. · filed 2000-11-22(2)

In order to trigger the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must discover the injury — the invasion of a legally protected interest. Appellant filed her medical malpractice complaint within one year from the date she became aware she had been injured as a result of Dr. Ulfe’s negligence.

Section 413.140(1) gives a product liability plaintiff one year to sue after discovering the injury and the instrumentality that caused it.

Hazel v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1994-09-30(1)

The limitations period for Plaintiffs action is one year. Ky.Rev. Stat.Ann. § 413.140(1). ... Therefore, a product liability plaintiff has one year, after the date he becomes aware of his injury and the offending instrumentality, to file suit.

Section 413.140 gives a plaintiff one year to bring a personal injury claim; in a products liability claim, awareness of the injury and the instrumentality causing it starts the limitations period.

Reese v. General American Door Co. · filed 1998-11-25

On April 17, 1995, the last day to file suit given Kentucky’s one-year limitations period for personal injury lawsuits (KRS 413.140), the Reeses filed suit in federal court against Overhead Door of Covington, Inc. and an affiliated company, Overhead Door Corporation. ... In the products liability context, a potential plaintiffs awareness of an injury and of the instrumentality causing the injury is enough to trigger the limitations clock and to impose on the plaintiff the duty to discover the responsible parties.

Section 413.140’s one-year period is not tolled while an injured plaintiff discovers the wrongdoer’s identity unless the defendant fraudulently concealed or misrepresented its role.

McLain v. Dana Corp. · filed 1999-10-15(1)(a)

However, the discovery rule does not operate to toll the statute of limitations to allow an injured plaintiff to discover the identity of the wrongdoer unless there is fraudulent concealment or a misrepresentation by the defendant of his role in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.

The one-year period for a lung cancer claim begins when the cancer is diagnosed, even if the person was diagnosed with the separate disease of asbestosis years earlier.

Carroll v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. · filed 2001-03-22(1)(a)

After reviewing the record and hearing oral argument, we conclude that while Kentucky has never been a “two disease” state (which would allow for recovery following the discovery of each disease), because asbestosis and lung cancer are separate and distinct diseases, both arising from asbestos exposure, Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations should not bar Appellant’s cancer claim simply because Carroll did not pursue a potential claim for the fear or the enhanced risk of developing cancer following an asbestosis diagnosis seven years earlier.

Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year period for personal injury claims involving allegedly harmful substances begins after the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover the causal relationship between the substance and the injury.

Johnson v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. · filed 2001-12-28(1)(a)

In products liability cases arising from exposure to allegedly harmful substances, Kentucky law requires that a plaintiff be given a reasonable opportunity to discover the causal relationship between the substance and her injury before the statute of limitations clock begins to run against her.

Section 413.140(1)(a) requires a personal injury action to be filed within one year after the claim accrues; under the discovery rule, accrual depends on when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its cause.

Michals v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation and Baxter International, Inc. · filed 2002-05-06(1)(a)

Hence, the date of accrual for purposes of the statute of limitations is March 9, 1977, at the latest, and the statutory period ran on March 9,1978, thereby rendering Plaintiffs 1993 complaint and the allegations made therein untimely.

Section 413.140(2)’s discovery rule does not extend the limitations period beyond the time when reasonable diligence would have revealed the alleged injury.

Meunier v. Wyeth · filed 2004-12-01(2)

In short, due to the widespread publicity surrounding the withdrawal of the diet drugs, plaintiff should have known about her alleged injuries at the very latest by the end of March, 2000. Thus, there is “no reasonable basis in fact” that plaintiff can rely on the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations for her claims against Dr. Bichon beyond that point in time.

The one-year medical malpractice period begins when the patient knows or should know of the injury and its possible connection to the physician’s conduct; the patient need not know the claim is actionable.

Vannoy v. Milum · filed 2005-08-26(2)

In short, based on the Conway and Graham cases, we reject Vannoy’s argument that the one-year period did not begin to accrue until he learned he had an actionable claim.

Section 413.140(1) gives asbestos personal injury claims one year from accrual, with the discovery rule applying when the injury or its cause was unknown.

RT Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v. Franklin · filed 2009-02-06(1)

KRS 413.140(1) is applicable to personal injuries caused by asbestos exposure; to be timely filed, the action must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. ... Because of the unfairness of precluding a claim filed more than one year after the date of the exposure when it was not known to exist or its cause unknown, the discovery rule is applicable to personal injuries arising from asbestos exposure.

Section 413.140 gives one year to bring these claims; a false imprisonment claim arising from an arrest accrues when detention pursuant to legal process begins, while an excessive force claim accrues at the arrest.

Dunn v. Felty · filed 2007-06-21(1)(a), (1)(c)

As observed by the Court of Appeals, the parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations on both the false imprisonment and the excessive force claims is one year as provided by KRS 413.140(l)(a),(c). ... The statute of limitations on a false imprisonment claim stemming from an arrest, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the plaintiff becomes detained pursuant to legal process. Since in the present case this occurred more than one year before the complaint was filed, the suit was not timely. The statute of limitations on an excessive force claim stemming from an arrest begins to run at the time of the arrest. Since in the present case this occurred more than one year before the complaint was filed, the suit was not timely.

Section 413.140’s one-year limit for personal injury claims is subject to the discovery rule only for latent injuries.

Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc. · filed 2010-03-03(1)(a)

In this regard, Kentucky law is clear that the new plaintiffs may invoke the discovery rule only if their injuries were latent.

Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year period for personal injury claims begins when a nonlatent injury is inflicted, even if its full extent becomes known later.

Asher v. Unarco Materials Handling, Inc · filed 2010-03-03(1)(a)

Although the new plaintiffs complain that they did not know until some unspecified date after the onset of their symptoms that their injuries were permanent, Kentucky law is clear that, absent a latent injury, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the injury is inflicted even where the injury is slight initially and its full extent is not known until years later.

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives negligence claims a one-year limitations period, which begins when the plaintiff discovers or should discover the legal injury.

Franzman v. Wyeth Inc. · filed 2014-08-26(1)(a)

Negligence actions in Kentucky are governed by KRS 413.140(1(a)), which provides for a one- year statute of limitations. ... We agree with Franzman that the date of her tardive dyskinesia diagnosis is not determinative of when her cause of action accrued.

Section 413.140(3) starts the one-year limitations period for an action against a real estate appraiser when the injured party reasonably should have discovered the cause of action.

Victory Community Bank v. Socol · filed 2017-01-13(3)

The statute further provides that a cause of action brought pursuant to this subsection “shall be deemed to accrue within one (1) year from the date of the occurrence or from the date when the cause of action was, or reasonably should have been, discovered by the party injured.” KRS 413.140(3). ... In this case, the statute of limitations began to run no later than February 3, 2011, the date of Kenkel’s detailed inquiry about problems with the original appraisal.

Section 413.140 does not bar a claim filed within its limitations period when the plaintiff intends in good faith to serve the summons in due course, despite delayed service.

Pasley v. Biggs (In re Pasley) · filed 2019-01-24

The Court further finds the Plaintiff attempted to serve the summons in good faith, and that the claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 413.140 gives a plaintiff one year to bring a product liability personal injury claim once the injury and offending instrumentality are known or reasonably discoverable.

Morales v. Hardin County, Kentucky · filed 2020-02-28

Personal injury actions “shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140 (West). ... Because she knew a needle was left inside her, she was aware of her “injury” and the “offending instrumentality.” Fluke, 306 S.W.3d at 60. For that reason, the statute of limitations on her product claim began to run on May 27, 2017.

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a plaintiff one year from accrual to bring a personal injury claim; under the discovery rule, accrual may wait until the plaintiff knows or should know the injury may have resulted from the defendant’s conduct.

Wells v. Boston Scientific Corporation · filed 2020-10-19(1)(a)

Under Kentucky law,2 an action for personal injury to a plaintiff or her spouse must be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued. KRS 413.140(1)(a). ... The statute of limitations may not have begun to run at that point to the extent Janet did not have reason to believe her injuries were the result of Defendant’s conduct.

Constructive notice from a deed and other recorded documents can start the discovery period for claims against real estate professionals under § 413.140(3).

Hamburg Properties, LLC v. The Gibson Company · filed 2022-02-24(3)

Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that the statute of limitations commenced when Hamburg obtained constructive notice of his ownership interests in the premises since no fraud was alleged.

The one-year period for a defamation claim begins when the allegedly defamatory matter is published and is not tolled while related criminal proceedings are pending.

Thomas N. McKinney, Jr. v. Kentucky Neighborhood Bank, Inc. · filed 2020-12-03(1)(d)

Also, McKinney’s contention that the limitations period associated with his claims of defamation was tolled pending the outcome of his criminal proceedings is without merit. As the circuit court correctly noted, publication of the allegedly defamatory matter causes injury, thus commencing the running of the one-year statute of limitations.

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a plaintiff one year to bring a products liability claim once the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that the product may have caused the injury.

Ashbrook v. Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2021-01-25(1)(a)

In Kentucky, potential plaintiffs must commence personal injury actions within one year after the cause of action accrued. Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) § 413.140(1)(a). ... Either of the dates, in March or April of 2012, was enough to trigger the statute of limitations. Ashbrook’s claims are time-barred.

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives personal injury product liability, negligence, and strict liability claims a one-year limitations period; the discovery rule applies to claims involving allegedly defective implanted products.

Mills v. Codman & Shurtleff, Inc. · filed 2021-03-19(1)(a)

Pursuant to KRS § 413.140(1)(a), a plaintiff must bring “[a]n action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff” one year after the cause of action accrued. ... The Court finds that, at the latest, the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations until July 9, 2018. ... Since Mills did not file her initial complaint for over one year later on July 25, 2019, the statute of limitations bars Mills’ product liability, negligence, and strict liability claims.

Section 413.140(2)’s discovery rule allows a claim to accrue when the plaintiff knows of the injury and its possible connection to the defendant’s conduct; the plaintiff need not know that a legal claim exists.

Leila Salisbury, as of the Estate of Holly Buckner Salisbury v. Scott Roth, Md · filed 2023-01-05(2)

The estate admits it knew Dr. Roth injured Holly when he damaged her artery during the initial surgery, and she tragically died a few days later. That is all the discovery rule requires for a claim to accrue. Thus, the circuit court correctly determined the estate’s claims against Dr. Roth were time barred.

Section 413.140(1)(e) and (2) apply the discovery rule to a battery claim that depends on a physician’s professional judgment because the claim is treated as medical malpractice.

Wiley v. Allen · filed 2023-10-19(1)(e), (2)

Consistent with Andrew, the Court concludes that Wiley’s battery claim is really for medical malpractice which is statutorily subject to the discovery rule pursuant to KRS § 413.140(1)(e) and (2).

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives personal injury claims a one-year limitations period; for latent injuries, the discovery rule can delay accrual.

WALKER v. 3M COMPANY · filed 2023-06-17(1)(a)

Walker’s personal injury claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations period, KRS § 413.140(1)(a), and his fraud claims are subject to a five-year limitations period. ... Since Walker’s injuries are latent, the discovery rule applies as a matter of law, see Cutter, 2021 WL 3754245, at *3 (quoting Fluke, 306 S.W.3d at 60), and the question of when Walker knew or should have known through the exercise of due diligence that his injuries were caused by the CAEv2 is for the jury.

Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for general personal injury claims.

Killary v. Thompson · filed 2022-06-23(1)(a)

By the time the 2021 amendments were enacted, the third-party defendants had “vested rights” in the running of the only applicable statute of limitation in place at the time of the filing, to wit, the statute pertaining to general personal injury liability, for which there is a one-year limitations period pursuant to KRS 413.140(1)(a).

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a negligent hiring claim one year from the underlying tort to be filed.

Heston v. Warren County, Kentucky · filed 2023-08-04(1)(a)

Kentucky law provides a one-year statute of limitations for actions involving injury to a plaintiff, and “an action is generally said to ‘accrue’ when the injury occurs.” KRS 413.140(1)(a); B.L. v. Schuhmann, 380 F. Supp. 3d 614, 642 (W.D. Ky. 2019) (citing Caudill v. Arnett, 481 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Ky. 1972)). A claim for negligent hiring is dependent upon and derivative to an underlying tort committed by a subordinate, so it accrues at the same time as the tort claim and is subject to the one-year statute of limitations.

Section 413.140(1)(c) gives a Kentucky malicious prosecution claim one year from the termination of the underlying litigation.

Carroll v. Young · filed 2023-09-20(1)(c)

The statute of limitations for malicious prosecution under Kentucky law is one year, accruing at the time the underlying litigation has been terminated.

Section 413.140 does not extend the discovery rule to defamation claims.

Hicks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2024-04-05

The Kentucky General Assembly has not extended the discovery rule to claims for defamation.

Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year limit for personal injury claims begins when negligence and injury occur; the discovery rule does not extend it to ordinary nonprofessional negligence claims.

Iddings v. A Classic Touch · filed 2024-05-09(1)(a)

Although KRS 413.140(2), (3), and (6) extend the discovery rule to certain medical malpractice or other claims, those sections do not extend the discovery rule to personal injury actions contemplated in KRS 413.140(1)(a) such as the ones now before us involving nonprofessional3 ... negligence.

Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year limitations period is not tolled by the discovery rule when reasonable diligence could have revealed the alleged negligence of a known potential defendant.

The Estate of Joshua Adam Fuson, by Administratrixes, Amy Hickman and Daffeny Sneed Fuson v. Mercy Regional Emergency Me · filed 2024-07-10(1)(a)

At that time, the Estate knew about the involvement of Mercy Regional and Mr. Hendrickson in Mr. Fuson’s medical emergency. Appellees were even mentioned in the original complaint. The Estate had a duty to investigate Appellees’ involvement at that time and could have, with reasonable diligence, discovered any alleged negligent activity on Appellees’ part. The discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations for over three years in this case.

Section 413.140(1)’s limitations period runs from discovery of the injury; later discovery of a tortfeasor does not extend it absent fraud or misrepresentation.

Pryor v. Anderson · filed 2025-02-11(1)

Absent fraud or misrepresentation, the discovery rule does not apply to late-discovered tortfeasors.

Section 413.140(1)(e) gives medical negligence, informed consent, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims one year from accrual; accrual occurs when the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Crowder v. Marvin Yussman, M.D. · filed 2025-10-24(1)(e)

Pursuant to KRS 413.140(1)(e), Crowder’s medical negligence (Count II), failure to obtain informed consent (Count IV), battery (Count VI), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII) are subject to a one-year limitations period commencing upon the accrual of the subject causes of action. On this issue, a cause of action under KRS 413.140(1)(e) accrues upon “discovery of the injury, or from the date it should, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have been discovered.” Wiseman v. Alliant Hosps., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Ky. 2000).

Section 413.140(2) starts the limitations period for medical malpractice claims when the injury is discovered or should have been discovered through reasonable care; filing an earlier complaint can establish that discovery preceded a later expert opinion.

McDaniel v. Braxton Adkins, M.D. · filed 2026-02-20(2)

As the circuit court stated in his order, McDaniel first discovered her injury on August 10, 2022, when Dr. Hummell informed her about the risk of RSD, meaning that the statute of limitations expired one year later, on August 10, 2023. She filed the first action in July 2023, prior to receiving the letter from Dr. Henshaw in September of that year, which negates her argument that she had not discovered her injury until she received that letter.

Section 413.140’s one-year limit bars affirmative recovery on a late personal injury counterclaim, but the claim may still be used as a defense.

Winkle v. Jones · filed 1954-03-05(a)

Since it must be treated as an original proceeding, we believe it is subject to the same limitations as to time of filing as govern an original petition. ... So, in the instant case, the , appellee had the right to take full advantage of his cause of action, if any, insofar as it constituted a defense but he is denied the right to affirmatively recover damages on account of it.

Section 413.140(1)(d) gives defamation claims a one-year limitations period; a timely complaint tolls that period for a compulsory counterclaim arising from the same transaction or occurrence.

Peach v. Hagerman · filed 2024-04-23(1)(d)

In Kentucky, the statute of limitations for a defamation claim is one year. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ Counterclaims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as Peach’s claims, making them timely compulsory Counterclaims. ... As a result, the tolling rule outlined in Armstrong properly applies to the Court’s analysis, and the Court DENIES Peach’s motion to dismiss.

KRS 413.140’s one-year personal-injury filing period is not extended enough to save a claim when the alleged obstruction lasted at most two months and the suit was filed more than sixteen months after the injury.

Jackson v. Jackson · filed 1958-05-23

We concur in the views expressed by the trial court. The action was filed too late.

Section 413.140(1)(a) requires a personal injury action to be filed within one year of accrual; the alleged insurance adjuster representations did not toll that period or estop the defendant from asserting it.

Pospisil v. Miller · filed 1961-02-17(1)(a)

KRS 413.140(1) (a) requires that actions of this nature be commenced within one year from the day the cause of action accrued. ... It appears from the cases that the representations averred do not constitute grounds of estoppel and do not toll the statute of limitation.

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives adults one year to file a personal injury claim; an insurance adjuster’s promise to settle does not toll that period.

Black v. Maglinger · filed 1969-09-12(1)(a)

Heretofore this court has been called upon to decide whether the promise of the insurance adjuster to settle the claims is of a character sufficient to toll the statute of limitation, and the following cases deny the tolling of the statute in tort actions. ... The trial court did not err in dismissing the personal injury tort claims of the adults.

Section 413.140(1)(a) and (b) bars an action filed after the one-year period when an insurance adjuster’s assurance that the insurer would take care of everything does not establish estoppel.

Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. · filed 1964-04-24(1)(a), (1)(b)

We find in this case that álthough viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellants, to-wit: “he wanted her to get well, and they would take care of everything,” still the action is barred by the statute of limitations, KRS 413.140(1) (a) (b).

Section 413.140(1)(a) imposes a one-year limit on personal injury claims; ignorance of that limit, without false representations or fraudulent concealment, does not establish estoppel against a limitations defense.

Brown v. Noland Company · filed 1966-05-20(1)(a)

We have no difficulty agreeing with the trial court on the point that the complaint as amended fails to allege facts sufficient to warrant an estoppel against a plea of the one-year statute of limitation on the tort claims of the appellants. Without reciting the allegations in full, it is fair to say of them that they simply amount to the assertion that the appellants did not realize that Kentucky’s limitation period for personal injury actions is one year, as opposed to Iowa’s limitation period of two years. There is no allegation that the adjuster for the liability carrier misrepresented any fact, nor indeed that he made any representations about a limitation period.

Section 413.140’s limitation period for personal injury claims is not tolled as to a county by timely suing individual members of its fiscal court.

Rather v. Allen County War Memorial Hospital · filed 1968-06-28

The complaint was filed one day before the statute of limitations would have run out on her claim for personal injuries. See KRS 413.140. ... The county was not made a party until after the statute of limitations had run, so clearly the action against the county was barred by limitations unless somehow the original suing of the individual members of the fiscal court could be considered to have tolled the running of the statute as against the county. By analogy from the decision in Gilbert v. Harlan County Board of Education, Ky., 309 S.W.2d 771, there was no tolling, and we so hold.

Section 413.140’s one-year deadline for personal injury actions may be subject to estoppel when an insurer’s misleading statements justify a delay and the plaintiff sues within a reasonable time after learning the insurer will invoke the deadline.

Miller v. Thacker · filed 1972-05-12

In view of the total circumstances, which include: differing statutes of limitations, different statutes prescribing the age of majority, coupled with misrepresentations, either intentionally or negligently made, that the plaintiff was a minor, and that the authorized plastic surgery eliminated any time element in concluding a settlement, we hold that the plaintiff was justified in delaying the institution of the action until a reasonable time after the insurer gave notice of its intention to rely upon the expiration of the statutory limitations. This notice was communicated in February 1969 in Mississippi. Suit was thereafter filed in May of 1969 in Kentucky. This constituted reasonable diligence under the circumstances. We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff was entitled to try her lawsuit and the defendant was estopped to rely upon the expiration of the Kentucky limitations period.

Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year limit does not bar an action when the plaintiff’s military service tolls the period under federal law.

Kilfoile v. Sherman · filed 1975-10-03(1)(a)

It is our opinion that the federal statute is valid, and by its unambiguous terms appellant’s right of action was not barred by KRS 413.140(l)(a).

Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year period for personal injury actions is tolled while the defendant’s active concealment prevents discovery of the claim.

Emberton v. GMRI, Inc. · filed 2009-10-29(1)(a)

Accordingly, we hold that KRS 413.140(l)(a) was tolled for the effective time of the concealment, ending in May of 2004. Therefore, Emberton’s suit, filed three months later, was timely and not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year period for personal injury claims begins to run when the injury and the product’s possible role are apparent; delayed accrual or tolling requires exceptional circumstances.

Fluke Corp. v. LeMaster · filed 2010-03-18(1)(a)

Given this duty, the statute of limitations will begin to run immediately because delaying the accrual of the cause of action or tolling the running of the statute of limitations by operation of the discovery rule or the equitable estoppel doctrine is reserved for truly exceptional circumstances, such as where the injury itself is not immediately discoverable or the product’s potential role in causing an accident is actively obscured by the defendant’s concealment or false representations.

Fraudulent concealment, when sufficiently pleaded, can defeat a limitations challenge to a Kentucky conspiracy claim under § 413.140 at the pleading stage.

In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litigation · filed 2015-03-13

As to this count, Defendants assert that it is “barred entirely or substantially limited by the statute of limitations. Because a one year statute of limitations applies to GE’s conspiracy claim (Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 413.140) and GE filed its Complaint more than one year after GE’s discovery of the conspiracy in February 2009, such claim is barred by the statute of limitations.” (Defs.’ Br. at 25). ... Given the Court’s ruling that GE has sufficiently pleaded fraudulent concealment for purposes of its conspiracy claim *672under the Sherman Act, it also finds this challenge without merit.

Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims not based on breach of warranty; equitable tolling may apply in rare circumstances.

Nicely v. PLIVA, Inc. · filed 2016-08-18(1)(a)

Kentucky recognizes a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims that are not based on breach of warranty. ... While the remedy of equitable tolling is admittedly a rare one, the Court finds this to be the rare case wherein such relief is appropriate.

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives plaintiffs one year to bring a personal injury claim; for putative class members, the limitations clock resumes when class certification is denied.

Modern Holdings, LLC v. Corning, Inc. · filed 2020-09-11(1)(a)

In Kentucky, personal injury actions must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues. KRS § 413.140(1)(a). ... The limitations clock on the individual Plaintiffs’ claims resumed when their class action ceased to exist after their proposed class certification was denied. Newly added Plaintiffs filed their personal injury claims arising from the same cause of action within a year of that date. Therefore, their personal injury claims are timely.

The one-year limitations period can be equitably tolled when diligent efforts to identify defendants are hindered by incomplete or inaccurate records responses; a factual dispute on that issue prevents dismissal at the pleading stage.

Lewis v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2020-10-30(1)

Like federal law, however, Kentucky law recognizes equitable tolling. ... While Individual Defendants would dispute the sufficiency of Lewis’ efforts to identify them, that factual dispute makes it inappropriate for the Court to dismiss the state law claims at this time.

Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year period applies to personal injury, assault, and battery claims and is tolled while an inmate pursues required prison grievances, even if the inmate sues after release.

Means v. Bearden · filed 2022-09-16(1)(a)

Thus, Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations applies to personal injury claims under KRS 413.140 and its applicable tolling provisions applies to Mean’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... A more reasonable interpretation tolls the statute of limitations for anyone who is an “inmate” when they pursue administrative remedies, regardless of their status when they file their lawsuit.

Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year limit for personal injury claims is subject to equitable estoppel when the defendant’s concealment prevents the plaintiff from discovering the claim.

White v. Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., D/B/A Baptist Health Lexington, F/K/A Central Baptist Hospital · filed 2024-04-25(1)(a)

“An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff” must “be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued[.]” KRS 413.140(1)(a). ... Therefore, equitable estoppel prevents invocation of the relevant statutes of limitation.

Section 413.140(1)(b) gives a person one year to bring an action against a corporation for injury to livestock, even when the claim is framed as a contract claim.

Carr v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation · filed 1961-03-17(1)(b)

We have in this jurisdiction a statute which limits the time for bringing an action against a corporation for a livestock loss to one year. The Columbus Mining Co. •case in effect decided that such a specific •statute is applicable to all actions whose real •purpose is to recover for an injury to cattle, whether based upon contract or tort, in •preference to a general statute limiting the time for bringing actions fex contractu.

Section 413.140’s one-year period does not govern a claim arising in another state when that state provides a longer limitations period.

Collins v. Clayton & Lambert Manufacturing Company · filed 1962-02-09

Did the one year statute of limitations of Kentucky, KRS 413.140, govern or was the two year statute of limitations of Indiana made applicable by Kentucky law? ... This Court has twice considered this question and ruled that under Kentucky law the time provided by the statute of limitations of another state, if longer, is applicable. ... We are not persuaded that they are wrong and abide by them.

Section 413.140(1)(a) bars a wrongful death action one year after the injury.

Totten v. Loventhal · filed 1963-12-13(1)(a)

This action under KRS 413.140(1) (a) is barred after one year from the date of the injury, and it does not come under the provisions of KRS 413.180(1) which bar an action after one year from the appointment of a representative (if the appointment is made within one year following death).

Section 413.140(1)(a) bars a wrongful-death claim against defendants added after the one-year period when the amended complaint does not relate back and no other fact prevents the statute’s application.

Massie v. Persson · filed 1987-03-06(1)(a)

Since the amended complaint does not relate back to the original complaint and no other fact is present to prevent application of KRS 413.140(l)(a), the Bureau’s and McCauley’s reliance on the one year statute is well taken, and the summary judgment in their favor is otherwise proper.

Section 413.140(1)(a) imposes a substantive one-year limit on Kentucky wrongful death actions; the right of action expires if suit is not filed within that year.

Sam Siroonian, Administrator of the Estate of Sheryl Lynn Siroonian, Deceased v. Textron, Inc. · filed 1988-05-11(1)(a)

Our reading of the Kentucky courts persuades us that they construe the limitations period applicable to the Kentucky wrongful death statute to be substantive law. If no suit is filed within one year, any right of action for wrongful death dies.

Section 413.140(1) sets a one year limitations period for wrongful death claims.

Conner v. George W. Whitesides Co. · filed 1992-06-04(1)

KRS 413.140(1) and its predecessors have been recognized for over 100 years as establishing a one year statute of limitations for wrongful death claims. See Carden v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 101 Ky. 113, 39 S.W. 1027 (1897). We reaffirm the applicability of this statute to wrongful death claims.

Section 413.140 supplies a one-year limitations period for wrongful death actions because section 411.130 specifies no time period.

Everley v. Wright · filed 1993-12-22

KRS 413.140sets forth what actions must be brought within one year. Included are personal injury claims and actions for medical negligence. KRS 413.140(l)(a), (e). KRS 413.140has been interpreted to supply a limitations period in wrongful death actions since KRS 411.130 does not mention a time period.

Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a general one-year limit for personal injury and wrongful death actions; the MVRA’s two-year limit governs motor vehicle wrongful death actions.

Worldwide Equipment, Inc. v. Mullins · filed 1999-04-16(1)(a)

Moreover, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury or wrongful death, KRS 413.140(l)(a), operates as a general statute of limitations. ... It does not make mention of motor vehicle accidents. ... Pursuant to the authority set forth above, the two-year statute of limitations must necessarily apply.

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives wrongful-death claims a one-year limitations period beginning when the claim accrues.

The Estate of Christina Wittich by and Through Judith Wittich and Frederick Wittich in Their Duly Appointed Capacities a · filed 2017-06-15(1)(a)

We have long held that wrongful-death claims fall within the purview of the limitations period established in KRS 413. 140(1)(a] and must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Section 413.140(1)(e) requires an action against a hospital for negligence or malpractice to be brought within one year after the claim accrues.

Spring View Hospital, LLC v. Karen Jones (Now Epley) · filed 2017-10-31(1)(e)

An action against a hospital for negligence or malpractice shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued. KRS 413.140(1)(e).

Section 413.140(1)(e) requires a hospital negligence or malpractice action to be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Joyce Spalding of the Estate of Joseph Paul Spalding v. Spring View Hospital, LLC · filed 2017-10-31(1)(e)

An action against a hospital for negligence or malpractice shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued. KRS 413.140(1)(e).

Section 413.140(1) sets a one-year limitations period for assault, harassment, and battery claims.

B.L. v. Schuhmann · filed 2019-05-02(1)

The applicable statutes of limitations for the claims in Counts I for assault, harassment, and battery is Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations for personal injuries in KRS 413.140(1).

Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for § 1983 civil rights claims in Kentucky.

Douglas v. Greenup County, Ky · filed 2019-12-12(1)(a)

Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations, KRS § 413.140(1)(a), applies to civil rights claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 413.140 gives a patient one year after a medical malpractice claim accrues to sue a physician or surgeon; a mistaken diagnosis alone does not suspend that limit.

Turner v. Rust · filed 1964-12-18

KRS 413.140 provides that an action against a physician or surgeon for negligence or malpractice shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued. ... At most, the allegations of the complaint as amended, when considered with the deposition, disclose that Dr. Rust may have been mistaken in his diagnosis and treatment. The record fails to disclose any affirmative act by which he attempted to restrain appellant from filing suit at a time within the year’s limit.

Section 413.140(1)(e) gives a patient one year to bring a physician malpractice claim, even when the claim alleges a special contract for treatment.

Jones v. Furnell · filed 1966-04-29(1)(e)

In our view, it becomes academic whether the gravamen of the cause of action stems from negligence or contract, express or implied— in final analysis the claim for damages is based upon “malpractice.” ... We conclude that the trial court properly held that the present action was barred by the one-year statute of limitation. KRS 413.140(1) (e).

Section 413.140(1)(e)'s one-year period for medical malpractice begins when the patient discovers the injury, rather than on the operation date.

Tomlinson v. Siehl · filed 1970-06-05(1)(e)

It may be thought that changing the rule in this jurisdiction so that the cause of action does not accrue under the statute until the discovery of the injury may result in great hardship to physicians and surgeons because of the possibility that the cause of action may accrue long after the operation, but when measured against total loss of plaintiff’s cause of action barred under the former rule, we think the change is less likely to produce injustice.

Section 413.140(1)(e) applies to claims against physicians and surgeons whether pleaded in tort or contract, and its limitation period begins when the injury was or should have been discovered through ordinary care and diligence.

Hackworth v. Hart · filed 1971-12-17(1)(e)

It may be appropriate here and now to say that there should have been added to the rule in Tomlinson a further statement that the statute begins to run on the date of the discovery of the injury, or from the date it should, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have been discovered. ... As we interpret the statute, it governs all causes of action against physicians and surgeons regardless of whether the claim be alleged in tort or in contract.

Section 413.140(2)’s five-year cutoff for negligence and malpractice actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, and hospitals violates the Kentucky Constitution’s open courts provisions.

McCollum v. Sisters of Charity of Nazareth Health Corp. · filed 1990-10-18(2)

Thus, we hold that portion of 413.140(2) which purports to cut off negligence and malpractice actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, and hospitals at five years to be unconstitutional under sections 14, 54, and 241 of the Kentucky Constitution.

Section 413.140 starts the one-year period for a medical malpractice claim when the patient discovers the injury, even if the patient learns its cause later.

Gregory v. Marshall Poor, M.D. · filed 1995-11-29(2)

A cause of action accrues in Kentucky at the time the injury or damage is first discovered. See KRS 413.140(2); Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ky.1971). ... Accordingly, Mr. Gregory was required to file his action within one year of his discovering his injury, and not within one year of his discovering the cause of his injury.

Section 413.140(2) provides that a medical malpractice claim accrues when the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Richard v. Dr. Edward Ray, Jr. Samaritan Hospital, A/K/A Columbia Hospital Lexington · filed 2002-05-21(2)

A medical malpractice action accrues “at the time the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.” Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 413.140(2) (Michie 2001). ... It is undisputed that Richard became aware of his bladder injury when Dr. Shappley removed the portion of catheter from his bladder on May 20, 1999. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run on May 20, 1999, and expired one year later.

Section 413.140(2)'s medical malpractice limitations period is tolled during a good-faith continuous course of treatment for the injury and begins to run when that treatment ends.

Harrison v. Valentini · filed 2006-03-23(2)

However, where a patient relies, in good faith, on his physician's advice and treatment or, knowing that the physician has rendered poor treatment, but continues treatment in an effort to allow the physician to correct any consequences of the poor treatment, the continuous course of treatment doctrine operates to toll the statute of limitations until the treatment terminates at which time running of the statute begins.

Section 413.140(2) requires a jury to resolve a disputed factual question about when a malpractice plaintiff discovered or should have discovered an injury.

Elam v. Menzies · filed 2010-02-04(2)

In Kentucky, when there is a disputed issue of fact as to when a plaintiff “discovered or should have discovered” his cause of action, that factual issue should be resolved by the jury in cases in which the plaintiff has asked for a jury.

Section 413.140(1)(e) requires an action against a hospital for negligence or malpractice to be brought within one year after the claim accrues.

Spring View Hospital, LLC v. Spalding · filed 2017-10-31(1)(e)

An action against a hospital for negligence or malpractice shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued.

Section 413.140(1)(e) gives a claimant one year after accrual to bring a negligence or malpractice action against a hospital.

Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital, LLC v. Adams · filed 2017-10-31(1)(e)

An action against a hospital for negligence or malpractice shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued.

The one-year period for medical malpractice claims is not tolled merely because the patient continues treatment at the same hospital with different physicians.

Sneed v. University of Louisville Hospital · filed 2020-04-30(1)(e)

In conclusion, we decline to extend our continuous treatment doctrine to the facts of this case and hold that it did not toll the statute of limitations for the claims against Drs. Franklin and Allen.

Section 413.140(1)(e) sets a one-year limitations period for negligence or malpractice claims against physicians.

Peppy Martin v. Callen · filed 2022-12-21(1)(e)

That statute sets a one-year limitations period for several civil actions. ... Section (1)(e) pertains to actions “against a physician, surgeon, dentist, or hospital licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 216, for negligence or malpractice[.]” KRS 413.140.

Section 413.140(1)(e) sets a one-year limitations period for claims under KRS § 620.040(5)(b) against hospitals and physicians.

Schulkers v. Kammer · filed 2022-03-23(1)(e)

KRS § 413.140(1)(e) states that “an action against a physician, surgeon, dentist, or hospital licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 216, for negligence or malpractice . . . shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued.” Given that KRS § 620.040(5)(b) applies only to hospitals and physicians, the Court holds that the statute of limitations is one year.

Section 413.140(1)(e) does not expressly list physical therapists among the medical providers it covers.

Mattingly v. Jewish Hospital and St. Mary's Healthcare, Inc. D/B/A Frazier Rehab · filed 2023-01-05(1)(e)

KRS 413.140(1)(e) does not list “physical therapists” as among the medical providers to which it applies.

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a claimant one year to file a personal injury claim; when continuous-treatment tolling applies, the period resumes after treatment for the alleged injury ends.

The Parkway Extended Care Center, Inc. D/B/A Parkway Medical Center A/K/A Parkway Rehabilitation and Nursing Center v. L · filed 2023-08-31(1)(a)

So, even assuming the continuous treatment doctrine could apply to claims against a skilled nursing facility like Parkway, the statute of limitations would have started running again in early 2012. This means that a personal injury claim based on the heel pressure ulcer would have to be filed by early 2013 to be timely, since a one-year statute of limitations applies to personal injury claims. KRS 413.140(1)(a).

Section 413.140(1)(e) gives medical malpractice and informed-consent claims a one-year limitations period; continued treatment tolls that period only while the allegedly negligent physician treats the patient for the injury.

Walker v. Martin · filed 2023-09-15(1)(e)

But simply remaining on the books as the plaintiff’s doctor (even assuming the record supports this characterization) does not trigger the “continuing course of treatment” rule; the doctor must be treating the plaintiff “for the injury caused by the negligent act or omission” for the tolling rule to apply.

Section 413.140(1)(e) does not include a jailer sued for negligent staffing among its listed health care professionals.

O'Hara v. Laurel County Correctional Center · filed 2023-09-05(1)(e)

The Court finds a Certificate of Merit is not required for Count V against Jailer Mosley because he is not one of the expressly enumerated health care professionals listed in KRS 413.140(1)(e).

Section 413.140(2) starts the medical malpractice limitations period when the patient discovers or reasonably should discover the injury and who caused it.

Combs v. Bluegrass Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery P.S.C. · filed 2026-02-06(2)

At this point, Combs had knowledge of her alleged injury as of October 13, 2016, through CT imaging, conversations with multiple medical providers, and by process of elimination as to the source of the retained drains.

Section 413.140’s medical malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the malpractice, rather than when the resulting harm became apparent.

Estate of Harlow Stewart, by and Through Its Administratrix, Brittany D. Sexton (Aka Brittany D. Cook) v. Coy Alden Flow · filed 2026-02-20(2)

So, to trigger the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must have known or reasonably should have known of the injury as opposed to the harm.

Section 413.140(2) measures accrual of a medical negligence claim from when the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered; a belief that cancer recurred did not itself start the one-year period.

Runkle v. Fleming · filed 2014-03-14(2)

The means by which courts identify the accrual of a cause of action, particularly in light of an injury that is not readily discoverable, is outlined in what Kentucky courts term the “discovery rule,” which states as follows: “the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue at the time the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered[.]” Id. at § 413.140(2). ... Applying that standard to the facts of this case, we think it clear that Runkle’s belief, as stated in his October 14, 2006 letter to the Department of Corrections, that his cancer had ... recurred—irrespective of the issue that he was later told that the tumor was benign—did not trigger the statute of limitations for his medical negligence claim.

Section 413.140’s stolen property provisions do not apply to a defendant who neither possesses the property when sued nor is the thief or a criminal accessory.

Amlung v. Bankers Bond Company · filed 1967-02-17(1)(h), (1)(i)

The words “stolen” and “thief” connote criminality as distinct from civil tort. Used in the same connection, the word “accessory” must be taken in the same sense— that is, an accessory to the crime. Though Bankers Bond was physically an “accessory” in the sale of Mrs. Amlung’s stock, it was not an accessory to the crime, because it was innocent of any criminal knowledge or intent. Since Bankers Bond was neither thief nor criminal accessory, and since obviously it did not have possession of the stolen property when the suit was brought, KRS 413.140 could not be applicable.

Section 413.140(1)(h) gives an owner one year to sue a person possessing the owner's stolen property for its recovery.

Lang v. Ft. Thomas Bellevue Bank · filed 1986-09-05(1)(h)

In the present case, the bracelet was stolen and the bank was in possession of it. Under those circumstances, the one year statute must apply.

Section 413.140(5) starts the one-year period to recover stolen property when its owner finds the property, rather than when the owner discovers it is missing.

Memorial Hall Museum, Inc. v. Cunningham · filed 2020-04-17(5)

Kentucky’s legislature expresses an accrual standard for stolen property that turns on when the property is found by its owner, not discovery that the items is missing.

Section 413.140(1)(c) and (d) impose one-year limits on conspiracy and defamation claims, and imprisonment does not toll those limits.

Smith v. Gordon · filed 2022-09-22(1)(c), (1)(d)

They also cite KRS 413.140(1)(c), which contains a one-year statute of limitation for conspiracy actions. Similarly, the media appellees point out that defamation claims must be brought within one year pursuant to KRS 413.140(1)(d). ... The expired statutes of limitation on Smith’s claims provide sufficient grounds to affirm the circuit court’s order dismissing Smith’s complaint.

Section 413.140 imposes a one-year limit on actions for interference with the marriage relation, including alienation of affections.

Skaggs v. Stanton · filed 1975-11-14(1)(c)

The one year statute specifically mentions and applies to criminal conversation. We are of the opinion that when the legislature chose to specifically mention criminal conversation in the one year statute it evidenced a legislative intent that the one year statute apply to all actions founded on interference with the marriage relation.

Section 413.140(1)(d) gives a plaintiff one year from publication of allegedly libelous material to file a libel action.

Caslin v. General Electric Co. · filed 1980-11-07(1)(d)

Absent publication, there can be no libel, ... and it is the publication of the alleged libelous matter that causes the defamation or injury thus commencing the running of the one year statute of limitations provided by KRS 413.140(1)(d).

Section 413.140(1)(a) applies a one-year limitations period to personal-injury products liability claims.

Teel v. American Steel Foundries · filed 1981-12-28(1)(a)

There is no substantial doubt, however, that the one-year limitations period of § 413.140(1)(a) should be applied to the products liability claim stated in Count II of the complaint.

Section 413.140(a) requires an action for loss of consortium to be brought within one year after the injury.

Floyd v. Gray · filed 1983-08-31(a)

An action for loss of consortium is required to be brought within one year after the injury. KRS 413.140(a). The claim of the intervening plaintiff, Ruby A. Gray, for loss of consortium is barred by the one year statute of limitations because the claim was brought nearly fifteen (15) months after the injury.

Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period in Kentucky for an action alleging a violation of First Amendment rights.

Creech v. McQuinn · filed 1997-02-21(1)(a)

However, that action would have been time barred in the present case since the statute of limitations for such an action in Kentucky is one year pursuant to KRS 413.140(l)(a).

Section 413.140(1)(c) requires a conspiracy claim to be filed within one year after it accrues.

Farm Credit Bank v. United States Mineral Products Co. · filed 1994-08-26(1)(c)

FCB had information available to it in 1985, if not sooner, that its building contained asbestos, that asbestos had been found to have dangerous propensities, and that USMP was its manufacturer. This was well over one year before this action was filed. Therefore, any conspiracy claim is barred by the statute of limitations. KRS 413.140(l)(c). Summary judgment will be GRANTED for the defendant on this claim.

Section 413.140(1)(c) gives a slander-of-title claim one year from the recording of the instrument that disparages title, even if the full damages are not yet foreseeable.

Montgomery v. Milam · filed 1995-11-22(1)(c)

The limitation of action statute, KRS 413.140, provides that an action for libel or slander shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. ... The statute of limitations governing actions for libel and slander is applicable to actions for slander of title. ... We hold that the full measure of damages that might ultimately result from the Rogers and appellee's wrongful acts, if any, may not have been immediately foreseeable, but appellants' cause of action accrued when the instrument was filed for public record and the statute of limitations began to run at that time.

Section 413.140(1)(c) limits the time to bring a breach-of-promise-to-marry claim but does not legislatively approve that common law cause of action.

Gilbert v. Barkes · filed 1999-03-25(1)(c)

We find no merit in the first argument that the General Assembly affirms a common law cause of action, such as BPM, by placing a statute of limitations upon it. No legislative approval or disapproval of this court-created claim is indicated by such proceedings. Rather, KRS 413.140(1)(c) merely restricts the time span in which such a claim can be brought before the Court of Justice.

Section 413.140's one-year limitations period applies to declaratory judgment claims alleging federal constitutional violations in prison disciplinary proceedings.

Million v. Raymer · filed 2004-06-17(1)(a)

We are of the opinion that application of the one-year statute of limitations period under KRS 413.140 for constitutional claims such as those made herein is consistent with federal law governing essentially the same types of claims.

Section 413.140(1)(d)’s one-year limit for libel claims applies to Internet postings under the single publication rule.

Mitan v. Davis · filed 2003-02-03(1)(d)

After carefully examining the issue, we can find no basis for treating defamatory Internet communication differently than any other form of aggregate communication. Therefore, we will apply the single publication rule to the statements in this case which were published on the Internet. As such, we find that plaintiffs libel claims based on statements defendants posted on the Internet before December 29, 1999 are barred by Kentucky’s one year statute of limitations.

Section 413.140(1)(d) starts a new one-year limitations period for libel when substantive, related changes to a website republish allegedly defamatory material.

Mitan v. Davis (In Re Davis) · filed 2005-12-07(1)(d)

Having found that the changes to the Website relate to the original allegedly defamatory material and that such changes altered both the substance and the form of the original material, this Court finds that a republication of the original material has occurred. The republication resulted in application of a new one-year limitations period, within which Plaintiffs indisputably brought this Adversary Proceeding.

Section 413.140(1)(d) gives a plaintiff one year to bring a claim based on allegedly false statements about property; the claim accrues no later than when the plaintiff learns of the statements.

Keith v. Laurel County Fiscal Court · filed 2008-05-16(1)(d)

KRS 413.140(l)(d) provides that an action for libel or slander must be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued. We believe that the cause of action stated by Keith falls within this provision. As previously noted Keith alleged in his complaint that the statements made by Karr occurred in August 2005. Bloom told Keith about the statements in October 2005. Thus, Keith’s cause of action accrued no later than October 2005.

Section 413.140(1)(d) gives a plaintiff one year from publication to bring a defamation claim; linking to an unchanged online article does not restart that period.

Salyer v. SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, INC. · filed 2009-12-07(1)(d)

In an April 23, 2009 Memorandum Opinion (DN # 19), this Court found that all actions for defamation in Kentucky must be brought within one year of the defamatory material’s publication date. ... Traditional republication occurs when the substance of the previously published defamatory statements are altered or the defamatory statements themselves are put forth in a new form. Neither of those methods of republication occurred in this case. The hyperlinks, while adding a new method of access to “A New Bad Men,” did not restate the allegedly defamatory statements and did not alter the substance of that article in any manner.

Section 413.140(1)(c) gives Kentucky civil conspiracy claims a one-year limitations period.

Burnett v. Transit Authority · filed 2013-09-05(1)(c)

The statute of limitations on a civil conspiracy claim in Kentucky is also one year. KRS 413.140(1)(c); Montgomery v. Milam, 910 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Ky.1995) (declaring that the statute of limitations for conspiracy is one year). Thus, Plaintiffs conspiracy claim is barred by the statute of limitations because Plaintiff filed this action more than one year after his employment with LexTran was terminated.

Section 413.140(1)(c) gives a false imprisonment claimant one year to sue, beginning when the detention ends upon being held pursuant to legal process.

Walden v. Pryor · filed 2019-10-28(1)(c)

Pursuant to Kentucky case law, Mr. Walden’s alleged false imprisonment ended when he was arraigned on the charges. Therefore, the statute of limitations for Mr. Walden’s false imprisonment claim began running on September 28, 2016. See Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Ky. 2007). Since Mr. Walden did not file his false imprisonment claim until nearly two years later on October 22, 2018, his claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

Section 413.140(1)(c) provides a one-year limitations period for conspiracy claims, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Horton v. Kolb · filed 2019-12-20(1)(c)

The same limitations period applies to conspiracy claims, whether asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 or directly under Kentucky law.

Section 413.140(1)(c) supplies a one-year limitations period for conspiracy claims under Kentucky law and 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Harrison v. Crick · filed 2020-01-06(1)(c)

It has long been established that the limitations period to assert a civil rights claim under § 1983 for events occurring in Kentucky is one year. ... The same limitations period applies to conspiracy claims, whether asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 or directly under Kentucky law.

Section 413.140(1)(a) imposes a one-year limitations period on § 1983 civil rights claims.

McHargue v. Pickard · filed 2020-06-05(1)(a)

Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a), applies to civil rights claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies the one-year limitations period for § 1983 personal injury claims arising in Kentucky.

Patton v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2021-02-25(1)(a)

Thus, the Court will apply Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury under KRS 413.140 and its applicable tolling provisions to Patton’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for Section 1983 civil rights claims in Kentucky.

Gardner v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government · filed 2021-10-04(1)(a)

In Kentucky, civil rights claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by a one-year statute of limitations.

Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for abuse of process claims.

Trent v. Trulock · filed 2021-03-05(1)(a)

Pursuant to KRS 413.140(1)(a), Kentucky has a one-year statute of limitations for abuse of process claims. ... Accordingly, as Defendants charged and allegedly extorted Grider on December 12, 2017, over a year before the action here, Grider’s claim for abuse of process is time-barred.

Section 413.140 requires an action arising from a prison disciplinary proceeding to be filed within one year after the institutional warden decides the disciplinary appeal.

Smith v. Scott Jordan, Warden · filed 2021-08-25(1)(k), (7)

In Kentucky, an action arising out of a prison disciplinary proceeding must be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued. KRS 413.140(1)(k). The statute of limitations for such a cause of action commences on the date an appeal of the disciplinary proceeding is decided by the institutional warden. KRS 413.140(7).

Section 413.140(1)(c) gives civil conspiracy claims a one-year limitations period.

McNally v. The Kingdom Trust Company · filed 2022-01-25(1)(c)

Thus, the Court finds that McNally’s claim of civil conspiracy against Kingdom Trust is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in KRS § 413.140(1)(c).

Section 413.140(1) requires a false imprisonment claim to be brought within one year after the imprisonment ends.

McIlwain v. Dodd · filed 2022-02-17(1)

Under Kentucky Law, claims for false imprisonment must be brought within one year of termination of imprisonment under KRS § 413.140(1).

Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 civil rights claims brought in Kentucky.

Stull v. Elkins · filed 2023-10-25(1)(a)

Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a), applies to civil rights claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 413.140 gives malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims a one-year limitations period.

Render v. Marlowe · filed 2022-03-31(1)(a)

As previously stated, there is a one-year SOL for malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims.

Section 413.140 gives an action arising from a detention facility disciplinary proceeding a one-year limitations period that begins when the warden decides the disciplinary appeal; a claim challenging restitution imposed in that proceeding falls within it.

Maynard v. Cookie Crews, Kentucky Department of Corrections · filed 2023-08-31(1)(k), (7)

We believe KRS 413.140(1)(k) is applicable as this action emanated from the decision to impose restitution in the prison disciplinary proceeding in 2014. And, KRS 413.140(7) clearly provides that an action arising out of a detention facility disciplinary proceeding must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. The cause of action shall be deemed to accrue on the date an appeal of the disciplinary proceeding is decided by the warden.

Section 413.140(1)(a) and (c) impose a one-year limitations period on false arrest and battery claims.

Thomas v. Mayo · filed 2024-01-10(1)(a), (1)(c)

In Kentucky, the statute of limitations for false arrest and battery is one year. KRS 413.140(1)(a) & (c). ... Because Thomas “did not file the action within one year of his arrest” his claims for both false arrest and battery are untimely.

Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a negligence claim one year from accrual; a negligence claim based on malicious prosecution accrues when the criminal proceedings terminate favorably.

Dizney v. Back · filed 2025-05-22(1)(a)

Under Kentucky law, a neghgence claim must be brough within one year after the cause of action accrued. KRS 413.140(1)(a). ... Like their mahcious prosecution claim, the Plaintiffs’ negligence claim was not a complete cause of action until the favorable termination of their criminal proceedings.

Section 413.140 imposes a one-year limitations period on Kentucky common-law assault and battery claims.

Boswell v. USA · filed 2024-01-12

However, “a common law claim for assault and battery carries a one-year statute of limitations in Kentucky pursuant to KRS 413.140.” ... This claim will be dismissed as time barred.

Section 413.140(1)(a) and (c) give Kentucky false arrest and battery claims a one-year deadline that generally runs from the arrest.

Codrington v. Dolak · filed 2024-04-26(1)(a), (1)(c)

In Kentucky, the statute of limitations for false arrest and battery is one year. KRS 413.140(1)(a) & (c). State law claims for false arrest and battery arising out of an arrest generally accrue at the time of the arrest. ... As a result, Codrington’s claims for both false arrest and battery are time barred, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to these claims is GRANTED.

Section 413.140 provides a one-year limitations period for false arrest claims in Kentucky, which the court applies to a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Van Aelstyn v. Sparks · filed 2025-01-08

In Kentucky, the statute of limitations for false arrest is one year. See KRS § 413.140.

Section 413.140(1)(a) imposes a one-year limitations period on abuse-of-process claims.

Johnny Reedy v. Bratcher · filed 2025-07-11(1)(a)

The federal district courts in Kentucky have consistently held that abuse-of-process claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations under KRS 413.140(1)(a). ... Based on the clear guidance indicated by the federal courts interpreting this issue as well as the tenor of unpublished Kentucky state court cases, we are persuaded that the abuse-of-process claims are subject to a one-year period of limitations.

Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies the one-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions in Kentucky.

Fowler v. City of Louisville · filed 1985-10-31(1)(a)

The applicable statute in Kentucky is KRS 413.140(l)(a) which establishes a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for a § 1983 claim challenging a school administrator’s demotion.

Frisby v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyle County · filed 1986-04-04(1)(a)

KRS 413.140(l)(a) provides that actions for an injury to the person of the plaintiff be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued. ... We nevertheless conclude that the one-year personal injury limitation should be applicable in this situation and the trial court correctly dismissed her claim.

Section 413.140(a) provides a one-year filing deadline for § 1983 claims analogous to personal injury actions.

William Walker, Jr. v. City of Bowling Green, Kentucky Policeman Scott Bowerman and W.C. Brooks · filed 1986-09-25(a)

Plaintiff's action is analogous to one for personal injury and governed by the applicable state statute of limitations, Kentucky Revised Statutes 413.140(a).

Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1981 and § 1983 claims treated as personal injury actions.

Bass v. NKC, Inc. · filed 1985-12-16(1)(a)

In Kentucky personal injury actions must be brought within one year of their accrual. KRS 413.140(l)(a). ... Thus, Bass’s claims are both barred by the one year statute of limitations and they will be dismissed.

Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies the one-year limitations period for Bivens claims brought in Kentucky.

McSurely v. Hutchison · filed 1987-07-24(1)(a)

Plaintiff also contends that, even if Wilson applies to Bivens cases, the applicable period should not be the one-year limitation of Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 413.140(l)(a) (Baldwin 1981), for an “action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff, or of her husband, his wife, child, ward, apprentice or servant” but, instead, should be the five-year limitations period of Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 413.120(7) (Baldwin 1981), for an “action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated.” Both the Supreme Court and this court have previously rejected similar arguments.

Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims; under the discovery rule, the period depends on when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the injury.

Hardin v. Irvin H. Roberts, Jr. · filed 1988-07-15(1)(a)

The parties are in agreement that the one-year personal injury limitations period contained in KRS 413.140(1)(a) applies to this section 1983 action by virtue of the rule announced in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). The parties further agree that the "time of discovery" rule articulated in Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky.1971) governs the question of when Hardin's cause of action accrued. Our sole inquiry is whether the district court erred in concluding via summary judgment that Hardin either discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, his alleged injury prior to December 4, 1985. ... Under this standard, the district court erred in concluding that Hardin's action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 413.140(1)(c) supplies the one-year limitations period for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) because its rule for conspiracy actions is the most analogous.

Bedford v. University of Louisville School of Medicine · filed 1989-10-19(1)(c)

The District Court applied KRS 413.140(1)(c) which provides: ... This statute is the most analogous to Sec. 1985(3) in that it is directed at conspiracies. Under the analysis developed in the two preceding sections, Plaintiff's Sec. 1985 claim is time-barred because he filed this suit outside the applicable one-year limitations period.

Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for federal civil rights claims brought in Kentucky.

Leonard v. Corrections Cabinet · filed 1992-04-03(1)(a)

The applicable statute of limitations period in Kentucky for a federal civil rights claim is one year.

Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for civil rights claims arising in Kentucky, including Bivens claims.

Garzon v. Luttrell · filed 2001-12-03(1)(a)

The district court properly found that Garzoris Bivens action is time-barred. Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations found in Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 413.140(l)(a) applies to civil rights claims arising in Kentucky.

Section 413.140(1)(a) provides Kentucky’s general one-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including § 1983 actions filed in Kentucky.

Hambrick v. Davies · filed 1989-04-26(1)(a)

Applying these principles to Kentucky practice, it is clear that KRS 413.140(l)(a) is the “general provision which applies to all personal injury actions with certain specific exceptions” which the Owens opinion requires be applied in Kentucky personal injury cases. ... Therefore, the court holds that the applicable limitations period for § 1983 actions filed in Kentucky continues to be one year, even after the decision in Owens, supra.