Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342.730

Section 342.730’s increased benefits for permanent total disability were deferred for black-lung claims until the federal program expired, regardless of the outcome of an individual federal claim.

Maggard v. International Harvester Company · filed 1974-04-12

The increase provided by KRS 342.730 is totally deferred until expiration of the Federal Black Lung Program, and we are of the opinion that the outcome of a federal black-lung claim filed by a miner does not enter into the question of deferment.

Section 342.730(1)(b), as it stood when the worker was injured, governs the amount of the award despite a later amendment.

Yocom v. Gantley · filed 1978-02-17(1)(b)

We cannot hold Apache unconstitutional as it was the logical interpretation of KRS 342.730(l)(b) as that statute read before amendment. The statute in effect at the time of Gantley’s accident and its interpretation in Apache governs the amount of the award he is to receive.

Section 342.730’s disability benefits formula applies as written when the work-related injury occurred.

Wells v. Craddock · filed 1985-01-25

In particular, we note that in summarizing the testimony of the numerous medical experts, the Board repeatedly couched its comments in terms of “impairment,” a terminology that could reasonably infer an improper reliance on the post-1979 versions of KRS 342.730.

The 1994 amendments to § 342.730(1) changed substantive income benefit rights and do not apply to claims arising before their effective date.

Spurlin v. Adkins · filed 1997-03-27(1)

In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the changes in the rights and obligations of the parties embodied in the 1994 amendments to KRS 342.730(1) constituted substantive rather than remedial or procedural changes. ... Therefore, we are not persuaded that the amendments should be applied to causes of action which arose before their effective date.

The 1994 amendments to § 342.730(1)(b) do not apply to injuries that occurred before the amendments.

Mosely v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1998-05-15(1)(b)

First, since the law of the date of injury is generally controlling, ... and since the 1994 amendments to KRS 342.730(1) have been held not to have retroactive effect, ... the 1994 amendments to KRS 342.730(1)(b) have no bearing on this case since Mosely’s injuries occurred in October 1993.

For additional income benefits on reopening, the version of Section 342.730 in effect on the injury date governs the merits.

Dingo Coal Co., Inc. v. Tolliver · filed 2004-03-18

The merits of a worker’s right to receive additional income benefits at reopening are governed by the ... version of KRS 342.730 that was effective on the date of injury.

The 2018 amendment to subsection (4) applies retroactively to qualifying pending claims and sets the duration of income benefits.

Holcim v. Swinford · filed 2019-08-29(4)

Since the newly-enacted amendment applies retroactively, it must be used to determine the duration of Swinford’s benefits. We remand this matter to the ALJ to apply the time limits set out in the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4).

Section 342.730(4)’s limit on the duration of disability benefits applies retroactively.

Coffee v. McCreary County Fiscal Court · filed 2020-09-24(4)

We believe retroactive application of KRS 342.730(4) is reasonable and appropriate.

The 2018 version of Section 342.730(4) applies retroactively to determine when income benefits terminate.

Dunbar v. Jennie Stuart Medical Center · filed 2020-09-24(4)

For the reasons stated, we vacate the award and remand for a re- calculation of benefits based on the 2018 version of KRS 342.730(4).

Section 342.730(4) may be applied retroactively to limit the duration of income benefits without violating the federal or Kentucky Contract Clause.

Marks v. Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. · filed 2021-01-07(4)

Accordingly, we are of the opinion that retroactive application of KRS 342.730(4) does not offend the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution or the Kentucky Constitution.

The amended subsection (4) applies retroactively to permanent total disability awards for injuries that occurred before the amendment took effect.

Spurgeon v. Mastersons Catering · filed 2021-02-10(4)

She argues that the ALJ erred in applying the amended version of KRS 342.730(4) to her PTD award. However, as the Board explained, Holcim unequivocally holds that the amended statute applies retroactively. Because we are persuaded that Holcim is dispositive of this case, we decline to address the sub-issue of the constitutionality of the statute’s retroactive application.

The 2018 amendment to subsection (4) applies retroactively to pending workers’ compensation claims.

O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc. v. Ernspiker · filed 2021-02-10(4)

In accordance with the holding of Holcim, 581 S.W.3d 37, KRS 342.730(4) has retroactive application to all pending claims.

The 2018 version of subsection (4) does not apply retroactively to an award that became final before the amendment took effect.

Lone Mountain Processing, Inc. v. Brewer · filed 2021-04-15(4)

Because Harold’s award became final over twelve years before the effective date of the current version of KRS 342.730(4), it does not apply retroactively in this instance.

The 2018 amendment to Section 342.730(4) applies retroactively to claims for injuries on or after December 12, 1996 that were still pending when the amendment took effect.

French v. Reagent Chemical & Research · filed 2021-10-14(4)

French raises no factual matters about why KRS 342.730(4) would not apply retroactively based on the aforementioned LRC note–for example, his injury undisputedly occurred after 1996 and his case had not been fully and finally adjudicated prior to July 14, 2018.

The 2018 amendment to subsection (4) may apply retroactively to pending benefit claims without violating equal protection.

Flynn v. Buyers Paradise Furniture, Inc. · filed 2021-12-15(4)

Here, this Court declared one version of the statutory subsection unconstitutional and the legislature passed a new subsection, providing for retroactive effect—and the legislature was within constitutional bounds in so doing.

The 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4) may apply retroactively to pending workers’ compensation claims.

Pickett v. Ford Motor Company (Lap) · filed 2021-12-15(4)

Here, this Court declared one version of the statutory subsection unconstitutional and the legislature passed a new subsection, providing for retroactive effect—and the legislature was within constitutional bounds in so doing.

The 2018 amendment to section 342.730(4) applies to claims whose appeal period had not expired when the amendment took effect, even if no appeal was filed.

O'Bryan v. Zip Express, Correctly Identified as Ramp Logistics, Llc. · filed 2021-12-15(4)

As we held in Holcim, the statute “applies to those cases which ‘have not been fully and finally adjudicated, or are in the appellate process, or for which time to file an appeal [h]as not lapsed, as of the effective date of this Act.’” 581 S.W.3d at 44. The legislature did not limit this directive only to cases which had been appealed; rather, it applied to all cases for which the appeals period had not lapsed.

The 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4) applies to claims that have not been fully adjudicated.

Decker v. Control Systems · filed 2022-01-18(4)

At bottom, Decker appears to be seeking a reconsideration of our holding in Holcim which specifically held the 2018 amendment applied retroactively to all matters not fully adjudicated. We decline his invitation and find his argument to be without merit.

Section 342.730(4) applies retroactively to workers’ compensation claims that were not fully and finally adjudicated when the 2018 amendment took effect.

Spurgeon v. Mastersons Catering · filed 2022-01-18(4)

We have already held the current version of KRS 342.730(4) is retroactive to all workers’ compensation claims that were not “fully and finally adjudicated . . . as of the effective date of this Act.”

The 2018 amendment to subsection (4), which terminates income benefits at age seventy, applies to claims that were not fully and finally adjudicated when it took effect.

Johnson v. Prescotech Industries, Inc · filed 2022-03-10(4)

Consequently, her case had not been fully and finally adjudicated and the amendment terminating her benefits when she reaches the age of seventy must be applied.

The current version of section 342.730(4) applies to claims and awards that were still open when it took effect.

Stewart v. Good Samaritan Center · filed 2022-03-24(4)

Appellant’s claim was still open when the current version came into effect; therefore, the ALJ and Board properly applied that statute.

The 2018 amendment to § 342.730(4) applies to pending permanent total disability awards and does not violate the Kentucky Constitution’s equal protection or contracts clauses.

Hardin v. Brown Forman Corporation · filed 2022-04-07(4)

Appellant, Michael Hardin, appeals from the May 15, 2020, opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board which held that the Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ), correctly determined that KRS1 342.730(4) effective July 14, 2018, applies to Hardin’s award of permanent total disability benefits.2 After our review, we affirm.

The 2018 amendment to § 342.730(4) applies to an award still in litigation when the worker’s injury occurred after 1996.

Lee v. Four Star Blasting Mats · filed 2022-04-14(4)

Because Lee’s injury occurred after 1996 and her award of benefits is still being litigated, the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4) controls in this case.

The 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4) applies to claims involving injuries after 1996 when the benefits award is still being litigated.

Conn v. Micro · filed 2022-04-14(4)

Because Conn’s injury occurred after 1996 and her award of benefits is still being litigated, the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4) controls in this case.

The 2018 amendment to § 342.730(4) governs the duration of benefits when the injury occurred after 1996 and the award is still being litigated.

Roberts v. Commonwealth Dodge · filed 2022-04-21(4)

Because Roberts’ injury occurred after 1996 and his award of benefits is still being litigated, the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4) controls in this case.

The 2018 amendment to subsection (4) applies to benefit awards for injuries after 1996 while those awards are still being litigated.

Metcalf v. Advanced Paving & Construction · filed 2022-04-28(4)

Because Metcalf’s injury occurred after 1996 and his award of benefits is still being litigated, the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4) controls in this case.

The 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4) applies to benefit claims that were not fully adjudicated before July 14, 2018.

Davis v. Central Bridge · filed 2022-07-07(4)

Accordingly, because Davis’s injury occurred after 1996 and his award of benefits is still being litigated, the 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4) controls in this case.

When a worker’s award became final before the 2018 amendment took effect, the 1994 version of subsection (4) governs the survivor’s derivative benefits.

Yamamoto Fb Engineering, Inc. v. Kacie Elrod, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Kimberly Allen · filed 2022-08-11(4)

We vacate the portion of the Board’s opinion affirming the opinion of the chief administrative law judge (CALJ) to the extent that the Board agreed that the amended 2018 version of KRS 342.730(4) retroactively applied, and for the reasons provided below, require that instead the 1994 version of KRS 342.730(4) be applied.

The 2018 version of subsection (4) applies retroactively to a surviving spouse’s continuation-benefits claim when the worker’s injury falls within the statutory window and the claim was not fully adjudicated when the amendment took effect.

Yamamoto Fb Engineering, Inc. v. Kacie Elrod, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Kimberly Allen · filed 2023-08-23(4)

Nonetheless, we conclude Kimberly’s request for surviving spouse benefits also falls within the class of “claims” entitled to retroactive application of the current version of KRS 342.730(4).

Section 342.730(1)(b) can provide the maximum weekly benefit for a 75% injury disability, even when occupational disease separately causes total disability.

Kyanco Coal Co. v. Prater · filed 1980-07-18(1)(b)

In this case applying KRS 342.730(l)(b) 75% disability resulted in maximum benefits to Prater of $96.00.

Section 342.730(1)(b) limits total benefits for permanent partial disability to 75% of the state’s average weekly wage, even when the award combines injury and pneumoconiosis benefits.

Mooney v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. · filed 1993-03-18(1)(b)

We believe that regardless of whether a claimant’s award is for benefits pursuant to KRS 342.732(l)(b), or to KRS 342.-730(l)(b), or to a combination thereof, he may receive for permanent, partial disability a total benefit which is no greater than 75% of the state’s average weekly wage.

Section 342.730(1)(b) does not give an ALJ discretion to shorten the duration of a permanent partial disability award based on the perceived strength of a claim.

Chisholm Coal Co. v. Downey · filed 1993-11-24(1)(b)

We note that an ALJ is without discretion to vary the duration of other permanent, partial, occupational disability awards except in those few reopenings where the worker has recovered from the effects of his injury and no longer suffers from an occupational disability. ... We conclude that the term “not to exceed,” as utilized in KRS 342.732, is the functional equivalent of “for a maximum period ... of,” as utilized in KRS 342.730.

Section 342.730(1)(b) allows 425 weeks of partial disability benefits from the date of a motion to reopen when a prior total disability award is reduced to partial disability.

Whittaker v. Allen · filed 1998-04-16(1)(b)

It was not until August 14, 1995, the date of the motion to reopen, that he became partially disabled for the purposes of Chapter 342. Therefore, it was from that date that his award was reduced in order to permit only an additional 425 weeks of benefits calculated pursuant to KRS 342.730(l)(b) instead of lifetime benefits calculated pursuant to KRS 342.730(l)(a).

Under the 1996 amendments to § 342.730, permanent partial disability awards depend on the worker’s AMA impairment rating, the statutory multiplier, and the ability to return to pre-injury employment.

Ira A. Watson Department Store v. Hamilton · filed 2000-10-26(1)(b), (1)(c)1

Pursuant to the 1996 amendments to KRS 342.730, awards for permanent, partial disability are a function of the worker’s AMA impairment rating, the statutory multiplier for that rating, and whether the worker is capable of returning to the pre-injury employment; thus, it is clear that the ALJ has very limited discretion when determining the extent of a worker’s permanent, partial disability.

Section 342.730(1)(b) makes the functional impairment rating controlling when an employee returns to work at the same or a higher wage, unless the employee establishes a greater percentage of occupational disability under KRS 342.0011(11).

City of Paintsville v. Ratliff · filed 1994-12-22(1)(b)

We also recognize that this decision comports with the 1994 legislative amendments to KRS 342.730(l)(b) which reiterate that the functional impairment rating is controlling when the employee returns to work at a wage equal to or greater than the employee’s pre-injury wage, unless a greater percentage of disability can be established under KRS 342.0011(11). Claimant failed to so establish in this case.

Section 342.730(1)(b) limits benefits after a return to equal or higher pay only if the worker can remain in the job permanently or indefinitely.

Ashland Exploration, Inc. v. Tackett · filed 1998-07-02(1)(b)

As with other 1994 amendments to the Act, KRS 342.730(l)(b) was aimed at curbing economic abuses of the workers’ compensation system. Thus, the Legislature intended to limit the amount of workers’ compensation benefits an able-bodied claimant may receive if he, at least, returns to work at his pre-injury wage and is physically capable of remaining in the job he returns to permanently or indefinitely.

Section 342.730(1)(b) compares a worker’s pre- and post-injury average weekly wages to determine whether the limit on permanent partial disability benefits applies.

Whittaker v. Robinson · filed 1998-10-15(1)(b)

Since the formulae for average weekly wage which are contained in KRS 342.140 more accurately measure a worker’s actual income from a particular employment than the worker’s pay rate, we conclude that for the purposes of KRS 342.730(l)(b); it is the injured worker’s pre- and post-injury average weekly wages which should be compared.

The 1994 version of subsection (1)(b) requires a worker to have at least some occupational disability to receive permanent partial disability income benefits, even if the worker returns to work at equal or higher wages.

Whittaker v. Johnson · filed 1999-03-25(1)(b)

Just as KRS 342.730(1)(e) [formerly KRS 342.730(1)(b) ] requires the worker to have sustained at least some occupational disability as a threshold requirement for becoming entitled to an award of income benefits for permanent, partial disability, the amended version of KRS 342.730(1)(b) requires the worker to have sustained at least some occupational disability before becoming entitled to such an award.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 increases permanent partial disability benefits when an injured worker lacks the physical capacity to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury; the employer’s decision whether to rehire the worker does not decide eligibility.

Carte v. Loretto Motherhouse Infirmary · filed 2000-05-19(1)(c)1

Clearly, the issue of a claimant’s retained capacity and the application of the 1.5 multiplier is, as a majority of the Board recognized, one of fact based on the evidence, both lay and medical, and is not solely determined, as a matter of law, by the employer’s decision whether or not to re-hire its injured employee.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 reduces permanent partial disability benefits by one half while the worker remains employed at a post-injury average weekly wage equal to or greater than the pre-injury average weekly wage.

Ball v. Big Elk Creek Coal Co. · filed 2000-08-24(1)(c)2

In view of the foregoing, we read KRS 342.730(l)(c)2. as providing that the pre-and post-injury average weekly wages should be compared and that, in those instances where the post-injury average weekly wage equals or exceeds the pre-injury average weekly wage, benefits for permanent, partial disability should be reduced by one half for so long as that post-injury employment is sustained.

Section 342.730(1)(b) bases permanent partial disability income benefits on impairment determined under the AMA Guides.

AK Steel Corp. v. Johnston · filed 2005-01-20(1)(b)

KRS 342.730(l)(b) addresses the calculation of income benefits for permanent partial disability. It bases the amount of the benefit on the extent of the impairment caused by the injury as determined by the latest available edition of the Guides.

For an injury governed by the 1978 version, weekly income benefits are calculated from the worker’s average weekly wage and percentage of compensable disability, subject to the statutory maximum.

Whittaker v. Reeder · filed 2000-11-22(1)(b)

At reopening, claimant was entitled to an award for a 60% occupational disability, of which a 45% disability was compensable. Under the law in effect on the date of injury, claimant’s average weekly wage of $382.89 and his 45% compensable disability entitled him to a total weekly income benefit of $112.00.

Section 342.730(1)(d) caps permanent partial disability benefits at 75% of the state’s average weekly wage, or 100% when the worker cannot return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Stewart v. Kiah Creek Mining · filed 2001-04-26(1)(d)

Second, it limits the maximum benefit for partial disability to 99% of 66 2/3% of the worker’s average weekly wage and also limits it to 75% of the state’s average weekly wage unless KRS 342.730(l)(c)l applies, in which case the benefit is limited to 100% of the state’s average weekly wage.

When both permanent partial disability benefit provisions may apply, the ALJ must determine whether the worker can continue earning at least the preinjury average weekly wage and choose the provision appropriate to the facts.

Kentucky River Enterprises, Inc. v. Elkins · filed 2003-06-12(1)(c)

Here, the ALJ determined only that the claimant could not return to the type of work that he was performing at the time of his injury and, on that basis, concluded that his weekly benefit must be multiplied by 3 under KRS 342.730(l)(c)l. For that reason, the claim must be remanded for further consideration. ... What remains to be decided, however, is whether he is able to work at least the same number of hours as before the injury and, therefore, to earn an average weekly wage that equals or exceeds his average weekly wage at the time of his injury. See Whittaker v. Robinson, Ky., 981 S.W.2d 118 (1998). If he is, the ALJ must then apply the standard that was set forth in Fawbush v. Gwinn, supra, to determine from the evidence whether he is likely to be able to continue earning such a wage for the indefinite future and whether the application of paragraph (c)l or 2 is more appropriate on the facts.

Section 342.730(1)(b) and (c) uses impairment ratings and statutory factors to calculate permanent partial disability benefits, with adjustments for a worker’s ability to return to work and post-injury wages; that formula is constitutional.

Adkins v. R & S BODY CO. · filed 2001-10-25(1)(b) and (c)

We conclude, therefore, that the formula that is employed in KRS 342.730(l)(b) and (c) is not arbitrary and that it is constitutional.

Section 342.730(1)(b) gives an ALJ limited discretion as factfinder to determine an impairment rating from the medical evidence when the applicable AMA Guides model does not address multiple fractures.

Thomas v. United Parcel Service · filed 2001-10-25(1)(b)

Under those circumstances, we are not persuaded that the ALJ misunderstood Dr. Nickerson’s testimony but rather that she was both applying KRS 342.315(2) and exercising her limited prerogative as the finder of fact under KRS 342.730(l)(b) when she determined from ... the available evidence that the four fractures caused a 19% impairment.

Section 342.730(1)(b) permits an ALJ to translate an AMA Class 1 through 5 mental impairment into a percentage when calculating permanent partial disability benefits.

Knott County Nursing Home v. Wallen · filed 2002-05-16(1)(b)

For that reason, we conclude that when a mental injury is at issue, an ALJ is authorized to translate a Class 1 through 5 AMA impairment into a percentage impairment for the purpose of determining the worker’s disability rating and calculating the income benefit.

Section 342.730(1)(c) lets an ALJ choose between the alternative permanent partial disability benefit provisions. The triple benefit under paragraph (c)1 is appropriate when a worker cannot return to the prior type of work and is unlikely to sustain wages at or above the pre-injury level.

Fawbush v. Gwinn · filed 2003-04-24(1)(c)1 and 2

We conclude, therefore, that an ALJ is authorized to determine which provision is more appropriate on the facts. If the evidence indicates that a worker is unlikely to be able to continue earning a wage that equals or exceeds the wage at the time of injury for the indefinite future, the application of paragraph (c)1 is appropriate.

Section 342.730(1)(b) requires a permanent partial disability benefit to be calculated using an impairment rating under the latest AMA Guides edition available when proof closes.

George Humfleet Mobile Homes v. Christman · filed 2004-01-22(1)(b)

For that reason, we are convinced that although an ALJ is free to choose among impairments that were assigned under the latest edition available at the closing of proof, an ALJ is not free to rely upon an impairment that was assigned under an earlier edition.

Section 342.730(1)(b) bases permanent partial disability benefits on an impairment rating under the latest available edition of the AMA Guides, even when that edition was certified after the injury.

Jewish Hospital v. Ray · filed 2004-03-12(1)(b)

Pursuant to KRS 342.730(l)(b), an injured workers impairment rating is to be determined by utilizing the latest available edition of the AMA Guides. ... The Fifth Edition of the AMA Guides was certified by the Commissioner of the Department of Workers’ Claims as being the “latest edition available” on March 1, 2001. As previously discussed, Ray filed her claim for benefits on December 30, 2002. Thus, the “latest edition available” at that time was the Fifth Edition.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 permits the three-times permanent partial disability multiplier when a worker who cannot return to the former type of work is unlikely to keep earning at least the pre-injury wage indefinitely; the inquiry considers more than the worker’s ability to perform the current job.

Adkins v. Pike County Board of Education · filed 2004-07-30(1)(c)1

Thus, in determining whether a claimant can continue to earn an equal or greater wage, the ALJ must consider a broad range of factors, only one of which is the ability to perform the current job. Therefore, we remand this case to the ALJ for a finding of fact as to Adkins’ ability to earn a wage that equals or exceeds his wage at the time of the injury for the indefinite future. If it is unlikely that Adkins is able to earn such a wage indefinitely, then application of Section c(l) is appropriate.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 bases the enhanced benefit on whether the worker can physically return to the actual jobs performed at the time of injury, rather than on a collective bargaining job classification.

Ford Motor Co. v. Forman · filed 2004-08-26(1)(c)1

When used in the context of an award that is based upon an objectively determined functional impairment, “the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury” was most likely intended by the legislature to refer to the actual jobs that the individual performed. ... On remand, the ALJ must analyze the evidence to determine what job(s) the claimant performed at the time of injury and to determine from the lay and medical evidence whether she retains the physical capacity to return to those jobs.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 measures a volunteer firefighter’s capacity to return to work against the regular employment used to calculate the firefighter’s average weekly wage.

Highland Heights Volunteer Fire Department v. Ellis · filed 2005-04-21(1)(c)1

We conclude, therefore, that the work to be considered for the purpose of KRS 342.730(l)(c)l. is the individual’s regular work, the work from which their average weekly wage is derived.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 doubles permanent partial disability benefits during a cessation of employment only if the worker first returned to work at the same or a higher weekly wage.

AK Steel Corp. v. Childers · filed 2005-06-24(1)(c)2

We conclude that the language in KRS 342.730(l)(c)2 is clear and unambiguous, and the statute requires a claimant to return to work to qualify for the 2 multiplier benefit. Hence, Childers’s retirement from employment and his failure to return to work removed him from eligibility for the 2 multiplier.

A claimant seeking income benefits must prove the amount of AMA impairment caused by the work injury.

Lanter v. Kentucky State Police · filed 2005-08-29(1)(b)

Nonetheless, an injured worker has the burden to prove every element of a claim for benefits, one of which is the amount of AMA impairment that it caused. See KRS 342.0011(11); KRS 342.730(l)(b); Roark v. Alva Coal Corporation, 371 S.W.2d 856 (Ky.1963); Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky.App.1984); Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky.App.1979).

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 does not allow a triple benefit when an injury prevents a worker from performing a different type of work at a concurrent job but the worker can still perform the work held when injured.

Lowe's No. 0507 v. Greathouse · filed 2006-01-19(1)(c)1

KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 provides a triple benefit for a loss of the physical capacity to perform "the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury." It does not refer to the capacity to perform other types of work.

A worker with a GED does not qualify for the two-tenths education enhancement merely because the worker completed fewer than twelve years of school.

Lane v. S & S Tire, Inc., No. 15 · filed 2006-02-23(1)(e)3

The claimant asserts that the ALJ erred by refusing to enhance Douglas’s award by two-tenths because although he had a GED, he had only nine years of education. She argues that the statute permits the enhancement if the injured worker has less than 12 years of education, has a GED, or has both. In contrast, the ALJ, Board, and Court of Appeals were convinced that the words “had less than” were meant to be applied to both of the phrases that followed, meaning that a worker entitled to the enhancement must have less than 12 years of education or less than a GED. Although we acknowledge that either interpretation is grammatically correct, we are convinced that the legislature is not likely to have intended to equate a GED with less than 12 years of education. Mindful that a GED certificate is widely-viewed as being the equivalent of a twelfth-grade education, we agree with the Court of Appeals’interpretation.

An ALJ cannot base permanent partial disability benefits on an impairment rating that falls outside the range specified by the applicable AMA Guides category.

Jones v. Brasch-Barry General Contractors · filed 2006-03-10(1)(b)

But an ALJ cannot choose to give credence to an opinion of a physician assigning an impairment rating that is not based upon the AMA Guides. In other words, a physician’s latitude in the field of workers’ compensation litigation extends only to the assessment of a disability rating percentage within that called for under the appropriate section of the AMA Guides.

Section 342.730(1)(b) requires impairment to be measured using the latest available edition of the AMA Guides.

Tricon Global Restaurant v. Johnson · filed 2006-06-15(1)(b)

KRS 342.730(1)(b) is explicit. It requires impairment to be measured using the latest available edition of the AMA Guides .

Permanent partial disability benefits begin when the permanent impairment or disability arises, regardless of when the worker reaches maximum medical improvement.

Sweasy v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 1269 · filed 2009-10-29(1)(d)

KRS 342.730(l)(b)-(d) entitle a partially disabled worker to permanent income benefits from the date that the permanent impairment or disability that they compensate arises.

Section 342.730(1)(b) bases permanent partial disability income benefits on the worker’s disability rating and permits benefits when the permanent impairment rating exceeds 0%.

Quebecor Book Co. v. Mikletich · filed 2010-09-23(1)(b)

KRS 342.730(l)(b) bases the amount of income benefits awarded for permanent partial disability on the injured worker’s disability rating, which is the product of the permanent impairment rating produced by the injury and the corresponding statutory factor. It permits income benefits to be awarded based on the extent to which a permanent impairment rating exceeds 0%.

Section 342.730(1)(b) calculates permanent partial disability benefits using two-thirds of the worker’s average weekly wage, the impairment rating, and a statutory factor.

Richey v. Perry Arnold, Inc. · filed 2012-03-22(1)(b)

KRS 342.730(l)(b) entitled the claimant to receive weekly benefits for 425 weeks in an amount equal to 66 2/3% of his average weekly wage, multiplied by the agreed-upon 9% permanent impairment rating, and multiplied again by the statutory factor of 0.85.

An award under subsection (1)(c)2 is appropriate when the evidence supports a finding that a partially disabled worker can return to regular employment at the same or greater wages.

Adams v. NHC HEALTHCARE · filed 2006-08-24(1)(c)2

The evidence provided a sufficient basis for the ALJ to determine that the claimant would be able to return to regular employment at the same or greater wages than he earned at the time of his injury and that an award under KRS 342.730(l)(c)2 was appropriate.

Section 342.730(1)(b) and (e) compensates impairment caused when a work injury arouses a dormant pre-existing condition into disability.

Manalapan Mining Company, Inc. v. Morgan · filed 2006-08-24(1)(b) and (e)

Under KRS 342.730(1)(b) and (e), disability resulting from the work-related arousal of a pre-existing dormant condition is compensable, but only to the extent that the arousal of the dormant condition causes impairment .

A prior injury and impairment rating do not require a deduction from permanent total disability benefits when the worker was not disabled before a later injury that alone caused total disability.

Brown Loe Neace v. Asplundh Tree Expert Company, Inc. · filed 2008-04-24(1)(a)

Although the 1995 and 2005 injuries affected the claimant's cervical and lumbar spine and although Dr. Templin attributed a 15% permanent impairment rating to the 1995 injury, the record contained substantial evidence from which the AU could reasonably find that the claimant was not disabled for the purposes of KRS 342.730(1)(a) until the cumulative trauma injury became manifest .

Section 342.730(1)(a) permits a permanent total disability award without deducting a prior impairment when the worker was not disabled before the later injury and that injury alone caused total disability.

Asplundh Tree Expert Company, Inc. v. Brown Loe Neace · filed 2008-04-24(1)(a)

Although the 1995 and 2005 injuries affected the claimant's cervical and lumbar spine and although Dr. Templin attributed a 15% permanent impairment rating to the 1995 injury, the record contained substantial evidence from which the AU could reasonably find that the claimant was not disabled for the purposes of KRS 342.730(1)(a) until the cumulative trauma injury became manifest . The record also contained substantial evidence that the cumulative trauma injury was sufficient, by itself, to cause permanent total disability.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 permits enhanced benefits while an injured worker continues to earn the same or a greater wage when that subsection is appropriate under the facts.

Caritas Medical Center v. Lynda Stout · filed 2006-08-24(1)(c)1

Caritas's second argument is that the ALJ erred by awarding benefits under KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 during the 2'/2 years that the claimant continued to work. Citing no authority, it asserts that regardless of whether KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 or 2 applies, enhanced benefits should only be paid for the portion of the compensable period that remained when the claimant ceased working . This argument ignores the plain language of KRS 342.730(1)(c).

Section 342.730(1)(b) bases partial disability benefits on a percentage of impairment under the AMA Guides, and an ALJ may use a psychologist's assessment of moderate psychological impairment to support a 25% rating.

Dairy Queen v. Noe · filed 2006-09-21(1)(b)

Since 1996, KRS 342.730(1)(b) has based partial disability awards on a percentage of impairment as determined under the latest edition of the Guides. ... Under the circumstances, substantial evidence supported the finding that the claimant's psychological condition caused a 25% impairment .

Section 342.730(1)(a) and (b) treats a permanent impairment rating as disability sufficient to warrant permanent income benefits.

FEI Installation, Inc. v. Williams · filed 2007-02-22(1)(a) and (b)

In other words, KRS 342.730(1)(a) and (b) equate the existence of a permanent impairment rating with disability that is permanent and appreciable enough to warrant income benefits.

Section 342.730(1) requires a worker with a traumatic injury to prove a permanent impairment rating to receive benefits.

Durham v. Peabody Coal Co. · filed 2008-10-23(1)

Workers who sustain a traumatic injury may submit various types of proof, but they must prove a permanent impairment rating in order to receive any benefits under KRS 342.730(1).

An ALJ must find whether the worker lacks the physical capacity to return to the work performed at the time of injury before deciding whether the triple benefit applies.

Crawford v. University of Louisville · filed 2007-12-20(1)(c)1

KRS 342.285 clearly specifies that an ALJ is the finder of fact; therefore, the claim must be remanded for a finding under KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 and if the finding favors the claimant, for analysis under Fawbush and its progeny.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 considers all jobs a worker performed for the same employer at the time of injury when assessing eligibility for the triple benefit.

Miller v. Square D Co. · filed 2008-04-24(1)(c)1

He performed two different jobs at the time of injury, each with different duties. KRS 342.730(l)(c)l includes both sets of duties.

Section 342.730 requires impairment ratings caused by one injury to be combined for the basic income benefit, with the applicable multipliers applied to the entire benefit.

R & L Carriers v. Gregory Jr · filed 2008-05-22(1)(b), (1)(c)1 and (1)(c)3

KRS 342 .730(1)(b) requires the permanent impairment ratings that an injury causes to be combined into a single permanent impairment rating for the purpose of calculating the worker's disability rating and income benefit . KRS 342 .730(1)(c)1 and 3 apply to the benefit calculated under KRS 342 .730(1)(b) and, therefore, to the entire disability that the injury causes .

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 provides a basic income benefit while a partially disabled worker earns at least the pre-injury average weekly wage and a double benefit if that employment ceases.

Pendygraft v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2008-08-21(1)(c)2

KRS 342.730(l)(c)2 provides a financial incentive for partially disabled workers to return to the most remunerative work that they are able to perform. It entitles an individual who returns to work at a weekly wage equal to or greater than the average weekly wage at the time of injury to receive the basic income benefit while working but to receive a double benefit if the employment ceases for any reason. It requires the ALJ to compare the worker’s pre- and post-injury average weekly wage.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 applies when an injured worker earns at least the pre-injury average weekly wage, regardless of whether the worker returns to the original employer or works for another employer.

Toy v. Coca Cola Enterprises · filed 2008-12-18(1)(c)2

Although KRS 342.710(1) expresses a preference for a return to the same employment, KRS 342.730(l)(c)2 requires only that the injured worker “returns to work at a weekly wage equal to or greater than the average weekly wage at the time of injury.” Thus, it applies without regard to whether the worker returns to the employment in which the injury occurred or to other employment.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 allows double benefits when employment ceases because of the disabling effects of a previous work-related injury, even if that injury is not the one being compensated.

Hogston v. Bell South Telecommunications · filed 2010-11-18(1)(c)2

... we hold that KRS 342.730(( )(c)2 includes a cessation of employment due to the disabling effects of previous work-related injuries as well as the injury being compensated.

Section 342.730(1)(b) bases partial disability benefits on a permanent impairment rating determined under the AMA Guides, but the diagnosis itself need not meet the Guides’ diagnostic criteria.

Tokico (USA), Inc. v. Kelly · filed 2009-04-29(1)(b)

KRS 342.730(¿ )(b) bases partial disability benefits on a permanent impairment rating, which KRS 342.0011(35) defines as being the “percentage of whole-body impairment” that an injury causes “as determined by” the latest edition of the Guides. Neither statute refers to a physician’s diagnosis.

Income benefits for permanent partial disability must be based on the impairment rating remaining after subtracting the rating for a pre-existing active condition.

Audi of Lexington v. Elam · filed 2012-06-21(1)(b)

The Board and the Court of Appeals determined correctly that the ALJ erred by failing to subtract the 5% impairment rating that physicians assigned based on the back condition as it existed immediately before the claimant’s accident from the 21% impairment rating that existed when he reached MMI after the work-related lumbar fusion. The ALJ must award income benefits based on the 16% impairment rating that remains.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 permits a double income benefit when a worker returns to work after the compensable injury at the same or a greater wage.

Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc. v. Lawson · filed 2009-10-28(1)(c)2

The ALJ did not err by awarding a double benefit because the claimant returned to work after the shoulder injury earning the same or a greater wage than she earned at the time of the injury .

Section 342.730(1)(b) allows an ALJ to select a reasonable impairment rating supported by the medical evidence when calculating partial disability benefits.

Pella Corp. v. Bernstein · filed 2011-04-21(1)(b)

KRS 342.730(l)(b) requires a partial disability benefit to be based on the injured worker’s disability rating, which is the product of the permanent impairment rating “selected by” the ALJ and the corresponding factor set forth in the table found in KRS 342.730(l)(b). ... We conclude that the ALJ was free under the circumstances to consider the relevant medical evidence and select a reasonable impairment rating to be used to calculate income benefits.

Section 342.730 requires proof and a finding of actual impairment before non-coal pneumoconiosis claimants can receive disability income benefits.

Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner · filed 2011-12-22

In contrast, KRS 342.730 does not offer equivalent benefits for non-coal ... claimants without proof and a finding of an actual impairment.

When the threefold benefit multiplier applies, § 342.730(1)(d) caps combined weekly benefits at the lesser of 99% of two-thirds of the worker’s average weekly wage or 100% of the state’s average weekly wage.

SIDNEY COAL CO., INC. v. Kirk · filed 2012-04-26(1)(d)

The ALJ erred by limiting the claimant’s weekly benefits to 75% of the state’s average weekly wage because KRS 342.730(l)(c)l applied to his awards. Based on the parties’ stipulation, 99% of 66 2/3% of his average weekly wage was $775.27, but 100% of the state’s average weekly wage was $631.22. Although KRS 342.730(l)(d) entitled him to receive combined weekly benefits of $631.22 rather than $473.42, he failed to raise the error by filing a petition for reconsideration or appealing.

Section 342.730 excludes nonwork-related impairment when selecting the injury-caused impairment rating, calculating permanent partial disability benefits, and setting their duration.

Tudor v. Industrial Mold & Machine Co. · filed 2012-08-23(1)(b)-(e)

They prohibit “impairment” from a non-work-related disability from being considered when selecting the permanent impairment rating caused by an injury; when calculating the disability rating and permanent partial disability benefit; and when determining the duration of the benefit.

Identifying benefits under KRS 342.730 as a contested issue preserves the type of permanent disability benefit, allowing an award of permanent total disability even when the worker requested only permanent partial disability.

Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance v. Burnett · filed 2014-05-16

We agree the ALJ was not precluded from awarding PTD benefits because Burnett only requested PPD benefits. While such a result is unusual, the award and type of permanent disability benefits to which he was entitled was sufficiently preserved at the BRC through the contested issue of “benefits per KRS 342.730.”

Permanent partial disability benefits begin when the impairment and disability arise, regardless of when a physician assigns a disability rating.

McDonald v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2015-02-18(1)

Accordingly, the date Dr. Loeb assigned McDonald a disability rating is irrelevant in deciding the time her PPD benefits are to begin.

Permanent partial disability benefits begin when the impairment and disability arise, regardless of when a doctor assigns a disability rating.

McDonald v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2015-03-16(1)

Accordingly, the date Dr. Loeb assigned McDonald a disability rating is irrelevant in deciding the time her PPD benefits are to begin.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 permits a threefold permanent partial disability benefit when a worker cannot return to the actual work performed before injury, even if the worker currently earns the same wage but is unlikely to sustain it indefinitely.

Voith Industrial Services, Inc. v. Gray · filed 2017-03-24(1)(c)1

Although Gray was able perform janitorial tasks after his injury, he was no longer able to tolerate the presence of Purge solvent as he had pre-injury. ... After reviewing the record, we find no error on this issue. ... After reviewing the record, we conclude the ALJ’s determination Gray was unlikely to earn the same or greater wage indefinitely was supported by substantial evidence; accordingly, the Board properly affirmed the ALJ’s decision on this issue.

Section 342.730(1)(b) requires a whole person impairment rating assigned under the AMA Guides before permanent partial disability income benefits may be awarded.

Miller v. Go Hire Employment Development, Inc. · filed 2015-10-09(1)(b)

Without a whole person impairment rating — properly assigned pursuant to the AMA Guides — an award of PPD income benefits is prohibited. KRS 342.730(l)(b); KRS 342.0011(35).

Section 342.730(1)(c)(1) provides a threefold permanent partial disability benefit when an injured worker cannot return to the type of work performed at the time of injury and has not returned to employment.

Bryant v. Jessamine Car Care · filed 2019-02-14(1)(c)(1)

Under this Court’s precedent, an employee is entitled to the 3 multiplier if he cannot return to the type of work he was performing at the time of the injury; this is clear from the plain language of KRS 342.730(l)(c)(l). ... If the claimant has not returned to employment, then the analysis ends, and the 3 multiplier applies.

Section 342.730(1)(b) requires a permanent partial disability award to use an impairment rating determined under the Guides, based on the employee’s condition at maximum medical improvement.

Ormsco, Inc. v. Blackburn · filed 2019-08-29(1)(b)

While the ALJ has discretion in determining which medical evidence is most persuasive, Kentucky River Enters, v. Elkins, 107 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Ky. 2003), the ALJ is constrained by KRS 342.730(l)(b) which requires an impairment rating to be determined by the Guides.

The three-multiplier depends on whether the worker can physically perform the tasks of their pre-injury work; the ALJ must identify those tasks and the evidence of the worker’s capacity to perform them.

Jbs Swift v. Ana Mabel Dumois Bueno · filed 2020-08-20(1)(c)1

On remand, the ALJ shall make findings specifically identifying the job tasks performed by Bueno prior to her injury and specifically identifying all evidence relied upon regarding Bueno’s physical capacity to perform these job tasks before determining whether Bueno is therefore entitled to application of the three-multiplier in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1.

Section 342.730 does not provide permanent total disability benefits when the worker remains capable of regular, sustained work.

Myers v. Merit Electronic, LLC · filed 2020-10-08

Finally, we are unconvinced by Myers’ argument asserting the ALJ erred in finding she was only partially disabled and not totally permanently disabled.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 triples permanent partial disability benefits when an injury leaves a worker unable to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Tractor Supply Company v. Roberts · filed 2020-10-29(1)(c)1

We agree with the Board’s reasoning and find no error therein. Thus, we conclude that the ALJ properly applied the three multiplier of KRS 342.730(1)(c)1.

Section 342.730 requires a claimant seeking permanent partial disability benefits to prove a work-related harmful change that resulted in permanent disability measured by an AMA impairment.

Shoemaker v. Kelly Services, Inc. · filed 2021-01-21

“[I]n order to qualify for an award of permanent partial disability under KRS 342.730, the claimant was required to prove not only the existence of a harmful change as a result of the work-related traumatic event, he was also required to prove that the harmful change resulted in a permanent disability as measured by an AMA impairment.” Id. Therefore, a claimant can suffer a temporary work-related injury, but fail to prove a permanent injury.

The three multiplier applies when an injured worker cannot return to the preinjury type of work and the evidence does not show that the worker can continue earning the same or greater wages.

Bluegrass Oakwood, Inc. v. Morgan · filed 2021-04-26(1)(c)1

The three multiplier must be applied since Morgan cannot return to her preinjury employment and there is no evidence that she could continue to make her post-injury wages with her medical accommodation.

Section 342.730 distinguishes disability from impairment; a pre-existing impairment does not necessarily establish a pre-existing disability when the worker was working without restrictions before the injury.

Ford Motor Company v. Teno · filed 2018-03-22(1)(a), (1)(b)

This reasoning is supi:>orted by the fact that Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342.730(1)(a) "requires the AW to determine the worker's disability, while KRS 342. 730 (l)(b) requires the AW ~o determine the worker's impairment." ·Id. "For that r~ason, if an individual is working without restrictions at the time a work-related injury is sustained, a finding of pre-existing impairment does not compel a finding of pre-existing disability with regard to an award that is made under KRS 342.730(l)(a)." Id.

Section 342.730(1)(e) excludes impairment from a nonwork-related condition when calculating permanent partial disability benefits, even if that condition was asymptomatic before the work injury.

Viwin Tech Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Ivey · filed 2021-03-22(1)(e)

Under KRS 342.730(1)(e), for permanent partial disability, impairment due to a nonwork-related disability may not be considered. ... Although he was asymptomatic, under the AMA Guides, he had an impairment rating because of the prior surgeries.

A claimant must prove the extent of disability to receive benefits under KRS 342.730.

Gregory v. a & G Tree Service · filed 2019-04-18

A workers’ compensation claimant has the burden of proving every element of his claim, Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 1984), including the extent of his disability for benefits purposes pursuant to KRS 342.730.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1. triples permanent partial disability benefits when an injury prevents an employee from returning to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Dixie v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2021-10-21(1)(c)1.

We conclude that the opinions of these three medical doctors, coupled with Appellant’s testimony, constitute substantial evidence sufficient to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Appellant could not return to the same type of work he engaged in before the injuries. As such, the application of the three multiplier was warranted and we find no error.

Section 342.730 provides permanent total disability benefits only when the claimant establishes that the injury prevents regular and sustained work; advanced age alone does not compel that finding.

Skidmore v. Tkc holdings/keefe Group · filed 2022-06-23

As noted above, however, no one factor is determinative. ... While the evidence Skidmore cites may have supported a finding of permanent total disability, the evidence as a whole does not compel such a finding, and we can discern no error in the ALJ’s application of the law to the facts.

Section 342.730(1)(a) requires an ALJ to separate work-related disability from nonwork-related conditions when awarding permanent total disability benefits.

Cole v. Ky Fuels Corp · filed 2022-08-24(1)(a)

However, in its opinion vacating and remanding, the Board noted that the ALJ has failed once again to address Cole’s “nonwork-related conditions,” properly segregating them from the PTD determination as required by KRS 342.730(1)(a). ... Once again, the ALJ has failed to make the requisite findings and this Court finds that the Board has neither “overlooked or misconstrued” the law nor has it erred in its assessment of the evidence.

Section 342.730(1)(b) requires an award to exclude active spinal impairment attributable to a prior non-work-related injury.

quad/graphics, Inc. v. Bartolomeo · filed 2022-01-19(1)(b)

In ViWin Tech, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the AMA Guides and KRS 342.730(1)(b) require the fact finder to carve out any active spinal impairment attributable to a non-work-related injury. 621 S.W.3d at 158. ... In this case, however, the ALJ found on reconsideration that 13% of Bartolomeo’s impairment rating was attributable to his prior surgeries. ... Therefore, we find that the ALJ acted within her discretion in assessing the evidence, and the Board properly affirmed the ALJ’s findings.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1. triples permanent partial disability benefits when an injury leaves an employee physically unable to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Dixie v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2023-04-24(1)(c)1.

The touchstone of KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. is whether the employee is physically capable of returning to “the type of work that the employee performed at the time of the injury[.]”

Section 342.730(1)(c)1. triples permanent partial disability benefits when an injury leaves an employee physically unable to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Dixie v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2023-06-26(1)(c)1.

The touchstone of KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. is whether the employee is physically capable of returning to “the type of work that the employee performed at the time of the injury[.]”

Section 342.730(1)(c)1. triples permanent partial disability benefits when a work injury leaves an employee unable to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Tygrett v. Norton Healthcare · filed 2024-01-11(1)(c)1.

That statute provides that if, due to a work-related injury, an “employee does not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury, the benefit for [PPD] shall be multiplied by three (3) times[.]” Id. ... Here, Dr. Schaper, Tygrett’s own treating orthopedic physician, did not believe that she was unable to return to work due to her hip replacement. Tygrett had in fact returned to work in a nursing position with no restrictions due to her hip injury.

Section 342.730(1)(b) requires a permanent partial disability impairment rating to be caused by the work injury.

Ellis Joiner v. Mac Construction & Excavation · filed 2026-02-19(1)(b)

An award of permanent partial disability requires that the assessed impairment rating be “caused by the injury” as “determined by the ‘Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.’” KRS 342.730(1)(b). If the impairment rating were not caused by the work injury, it would not be compensable. Therefore, Joiner was still required to prove a compensable cervical injury and cannot merely rely on a perceived stipulation by his employer.

Section 342.730(1)(b) uses the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury to calculate permanent partial disability benefits; an ALJ may rely on a rating conditioned on no further treatment when the evidence supports that condition.

Columbus Steel Erectors Inc. v. Marshall · filed 2023-05-18(1)(b)

The amount of PPD benefits is calculated based on factors including “the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury[.]” KRS 342.730(1)(b). ... In sum, the Board properly deferred to the ALJ’s weighing of conflicting medical evidence and there is no reason for us to correct its affirmation of the ALJ’s award of PPD benefits based on Dr. Fadel’s report.

Section 342.730(1)(e) excludes impairment from nonwork-related disabilities when determining the extent of permanent partial disability.

Marquis Carter v. Webasto Roof Systems · filed 2024-04-18(1)(e)

KRS 342.730(1)(e) specifically precludes “impairment for nonwork-related disabilities” from being considered in determining the extent of a claimant’s partial permanent disability.

Section 342.730(1)(b) ties the extent of permanent partial disability to the claimant’s permanent impairment rating.

Lklp Cac Inc. v. Fleming · filed 2017-06-15(1)(b)

This is so because KRS 342. 125 requires a claimant to show an increase of impairment on reopening and the extent of a claimant’s permanent partial disability is inexorably tied to the claimant’s permanent impairment rating. Id. Seelalso, KRS 342.730(1)(b).

Section 342.730(1)(e) excludes pre-existing active impairment from a partial disability award.

Willis v. Family Home Health Care, Inc. · filed 2009-05-20(1)(e)

Consistent with KRS 342.730(1) (e), Robinson explains that pre-existing active impairment must be excluded from a partial disability award .

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 permits the three multiplier when a worker cannot return to the work performed at the time of injury and is unlikely to sustain current higher earnings.

Epi Corporation v. Boling · filed 2014-11-18(1)(c)1

Further, we find that the ALJ's Fawbush analysis did not lead to an erroneous outcome. EPI contends that since Boling has been working for over two years she should not be entitled to the three multiplier in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. ... Because of this evidence, it was not unreasonable for the AU to find that it would be unlikely fOr her to maintain her current full time position as a result of her health issues.

The three multiplier does not apply merely because an injury prevents a claimant from returning to a particular employer.

Penny Berry v. Cedar Lake Park Place · filed 2015-07-09(1)(c)1

But a claimant is not eligible to receive the three multiplier just because she cannot return to work at a particular employer due to a work-related injury.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 triples permanent partial disability benefits when an injury leaves an employee unable to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Campbell v. International Coal Group, Inc. · filed 2015-10-27(1)(c)1

The evidence in this matter is not so strong to compel a finding in Campbell's favor and the AU did not abuse his discretion in declining to apply the three multiplier.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 measures capacity to return to prior work by the specific jobs or tasks performed at the time of injury, rather than the job title.

Sonya Lamb Middleton v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. , Et Al · filed 2015-10-28(1)(c)1

As used in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1, the phrase "the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury" refers to the specific jobs or tasks that the individual performed, rather than the title of the position or the job classification.

The three multiplier applies when an injury leaves an employee unable to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Campbell v. International Coal Group, Inc. · filed 2015-11-30(1)(c)1

The evidence in this matter is not so strong to compel a finding in Campbell's favor and the AL I did not abuse his discretion in declining to apply the three multiplier.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 measures eligibility for the three multiplier against the tasks the employee performed at the time of injury, rather than the job title.

Sonya Lamb Middleton v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. , Et Al · filed 2015-11-30(1)(c)1

As used in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1, the phrase "the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury" refers to the specific jobs or tasks that the individual performed, rather than the title of the position or the job classification.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 allows a three multiplier when an injured worker cannot return to the pre-injury job.

Ford Motor Company (Lap) v. Burt · filed 2016-03-14(1)(c)1

The ALJ's determination that Burt cannot return to his pre-injury job is supported by substantial evidence. ... The ALJ's finding that Burt is eligible for the three multiplier is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 permits the three multiplier when an injured worker cannot return to pre-injury work.

Ford Motor Company (Lap) v. Burt · filed 2016-04-14(1)(c)1

The ALJ's finding that Burt is eligible for the three multiplier is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 342.730(1)(c) requires an ALJ considering the three times multiplier to compare post-injury wages with pre-injury wages and, if they are equal or greater, decide whether the employee is likely to keep earning that amount.

Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Tudor · filed 2016-06-16(1)(c)

If the ALJ determines that the employee is not likely to do so, then the employee is entitled to receive benefits at three times the rate otherwise payable. If the ALJ determines that the employee is likely to continue earning the equal or greater post-injury wage, then the employee is not entitled to the three times multiplier.

A worker who cannot return to the former type of work receives the three times benefit unless the worker earns at least the pre-injury wage and is likely to continue earning it.

Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Tudor · filed 2016-07-11(1)(c)

If the ALJ determines that the employee is not likely to do so, then the employee is entitled to receive benefits at three times the rate otherwise payable. If the ALJ determines that the employee is likely to continue earning the equal or greater post-injury wage, then the employee is not entitled to the three times multiplier.

When both disability benefit multipliers apply, speculation about possible future job loss does not support choosing the three multiplier.

Ford Motor Company v. Grant · filed 2014-12-12(1)(c)

Fawbush provides that if both the multiplier provided in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 and 342.730(1)(c)2 are applicable to a claimant's award, then the ALJ has the discretion to choose which of the multipliers to apply. ... While Grant does have physical limitations in regard to the type of work he can perform, the ALJ's analysis of whether he can earn the same or greater wage for the foreseeable future is speculative. The ALJ's analysis is based on events which may never occur. ... Therefore, we reverse the determination that Grant was entitled to have his award enhanced by the three multiplier, and remand this matter for the ALJ to reconsider his findings.

Section 342.730(1)(c) denies the three multiplier when a claimant can still perform the same type of work, even if she cannot return to a particular employer, and requires a return to work at an equal or higher average weekly wage for the two multiplier.

Penny Berry v. Cedar Lake Park Place · filed 2015-06-08(1)(c)1 and (1)(c)2

But a claimant is not eligible to receive the three multiplier just because she cannot return to work at a particular employer due to a work-related injury. ... But, to receive the two multiplier the claimant must return to work at a weekly wage equal to or greater than her average weekly wage at the time of the occupational disease and injury. KRS 342.730(1)(c)2.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 permits a double income benefit when employment at the same or a greater wage ends, except when it ends because of the employee’s intentional conduct in reckless disregard of the consequences.

Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC · filed 2015-08-20(1)(c)2

We hold that KRS 342.730(l)(c)2 permits a double income benefit during any period that employment at the same or a greater wage ceases “for any reason, with or without cause,” except where the reason is the employee’s conduct shown to have been an intentional, deliberate action with a reckless disregard of the consequences either to himself or to another.

Under § 342.730(1)(c)2, the employer bears the burden of proving employee wrongdoing that would bar the two multiplier.

Reece v. Integral Structures, Inc. · filed 2016-01-13(1)(c)2

Because a finding that the employee engaged in certain wrongdoing is a defense to an employer's payment of the two multiplier, the burden is on the employer to show that such acts occurred.

The employer bears the burden of proving that the worker's termination resulted from misconduct that bars the two multiplier.

Fuertes v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2016-03-15(1)(c)2

Because of this, and since proving that type of misconduct occurred is a defense against application of the two multiplier, the burden of proof is upon the employer to show the claimant's termination was caused by the type of behavior described in Livingood.

The 2000 amendment to § 342.730(1)(c)2 did not change the method for calculating a worker's post-injury weekly wage; KRS 342.140 supplies that method.

Garcia v. Central Kentucky Processing, Inc. · filed 2016-05-02(1)(c)2

There is no indication that the General Assembly intended to change the method in which the worker's post-injury weekly wage is calculated. Indeed, since Ball has been rendered sixteen years ago, the legislature has not amended the Workers' Compensation Act to change the method for calculating the post-injury weekly wage. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Ball is still controlling and that KRS 342.140 is the proper statute to use when calculating weekly wages.

The 2000 amendment did not change how post-injury weekly wages are calculated for the two multiplier; KRS 342.140 supplies the method.

Garcia v. Central Kentucky Processing, Inc. · filed 2016-06-03(1)(c)2

There is no indication that the General Assembly intended to change the method in which the worker's post-injury weekly wage is calculated. Indeed, since Ball has been rendered sixteen years ago, the legislature has not amended the Workers' Compensation Act to change the method for calculating the post-injury weekly wage. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Ball is still controlling and that KRS 342.140 is the proper statute to use when calculating weekly wages.