Statute Annotations › Kentucky › Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140

Actions to be brought within one year: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Kentucky
Case notes
349
Cited in passing
135
Citing cases indexed
648
Case dates
1943–2026
Screened through
2026-06-25
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-21
Courts' treatment: partly invalid
A reviewed case holds part of this section invalid or unenforceable. The Kentucky Supreme Court held only the five-year medical malpractice cutoff in subsection (2) unconstitutional. The one-year limitations period and discovery rule were not invalidated.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

484 citing cases reviewed of 648 in the citation index: 349 interpreted the section (annotated below), 135 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-25 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1970-06-05 Tomlinson v. Siehl adopted the discovery rule for an inherently unknowable medical injury under the one-year malpractice period, displacing the earlier rule that accrual occurred on the operation date. Source
  • 1979-04-10 Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. extended the discovery rule to personal injury from latent disease caused by exposure to a harmful substance. Source
  • 1985-04-17 Wilson v. Garcia required § 1983 claims to borrow the state personal-injury limitations period rather than select an analogous state cause of action claim by claim; Kentucky courts consequently apply § 413.140(1)(a)'s one-year period. Source
  • 1990-10-18 McCollum v. Sisters of Charity of Nazareth Health Corp. held subsection (2)'s five-year outer cutoff for medical malpractice claims unconstitutional; its one-year period and discovery rule remain. Source
  • 2000-07-14 Acts 2000, ch. 309 renumbered the usury and stolen-property clauses of subsection (1), and their accrual provisions, without changing their operative deadlines. Source
  • 2002-07-15 Acts 2002, ch. 11 added subsection (1)(k)'s one-year period for actions arising from detention-facility disciplinary proceedings and subsection (7)'s accrual rule tied to the warden's appeal decision. Source
  • 2013-06-25 Acts 2013, ch. 48 added subsection (1)(l)'s one-year period for claims against licensed land surveyors concerning a survey or plat, with discovery-based accrual in subsection (3). Source
  • 2017-01-09 Acts 2017, ch. 5 added a one-year period for actions alleging violation of the Act's abortion provision, later codified at § 311.782, and accrual after the act or attempt. Source
  • 2019-03-19 Acts 2019, ch. 37 added subsection (1)(n)'s one-year period for actions alleging violation of § 311.731, with accrual under subsection (8). Source
  • 2019-06-27 Acts 2019, ch. 135 added licensed real estate brokers and sales associates to subsection (1)(f)'s one-year professional-services period. Source
  • 2026-07-15 Acts 2026, ch. 172 changed the appraiser designation in subsection (1)(f) from “real estate appraiser” to “real property appraiser”; its one-year period remained. Source

One-year limitation for personal injury actions

Section 413.140’s one-year limit for personal injury actions applies to a claim against a parent whose liability arises from a minor child’s negligent driving.

Robinson v. Hardaway · filed 1943-03-19

The statute under which appellee’s liability is asserted merely imposes responsibility on the father for the son’s negligence. A right of action, a liability for the negligence, was in existence. The statute created no new type of liability but only brought others into the area of responsibility. We think it is clear that section 2515 was not intended to embrace such a situation as this and that the one year limitation provided by section 2516 as to an action for injury to the person applies.
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Section 413.140’s one-year limit for personal injuries does not bar a claim for diminished use of real estate, which is a property injury.

Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Lafferty · filed 1949-05-02

Complainants’ claims for damages for diminution of value of the use of the property, being based upon a property injury, would, therefore, not be barred by the Kentucky one-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injuries.
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Section 413.140(1)(e) sets a one-year limitations period for malpractice actions.

Adams v. Ison · filed 1952-06-20(1)(e)

The statute of limitation in a malpractice action is one year. KRS 413. 140(1)(e).
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Section 413.140 requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Boughton v. Shoulders · filed 1953-10-30

KRS 413.140 provides that an action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues. ... It is thus established on the face of the record that this action is barred by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed.
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Section 413.140’s one-year limitation does not bar a compensation insurer’s direct recoupment claim against an employee who also recovered damages from a third party; the five-year period in § 413.120(2) applies.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Snyder · filed 1956-03-23

The statute creating this liability, KRS 342.055, fixed no time within which the action created by it must be brought, therefore KRS 413.120(2) applies. As appellant brought this action within five years after it accrued, the court erred in applying the one year statute of limitation and in holding the action was barred.
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Section 413.140 requires personal injury suits to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Sigler v. Youngblood Truck Lines, Inc. · filed 1957-02-11

Suits for personal injuries must, be instituted within one year from the date the cause of action accrues under the Kentucky statutes.
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Section 413.140 gives a plaintiff one year to bring a personal injury action; a clerk’s delay in issuing summons does not bar an action when the plaintiff timely filed and did everything reasonably possible to obtain process.

Hagy v. Allen · filed 1957-05-31

The statute requires that actions for personal injuries shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. ... While the matter of good faith may not be taken into consideration in all cases, the Kentucky authorities imply that under the extreme circumstances reflected by the facts here, where the good faith of the plaintiffs is not questioned, it should save the plaintiffs’ cases from being dismissed. The failure to issue the summonses was due solely to a matter over which the plaintiffs had no control.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) requires a personal injury action to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues; settlement negotiations alone do not prevent the defendant from asserting that deadline.

Burke v. Blair · filed 1961-09-29(1)(a)

KRS 413.140(1) (a) requires an action of this nature to be commenced within one year from the day the cause of action accrued. ... Mere negotiations looking toward an amicable settlement do not afford a basis for estoppel to plead limitations.
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Section 413.140 requires a personal injury action to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues; KRS 446.030 governs computation of that period.

Randall v. L. L. Morris Transport Co. · filed 1964-06-12

On January 17, 1963, the court dismissed that part of the claim pertaining to personal injuries on the appellees’ plea of KRS 413.140, which provides that an action for injuries to the person shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. ... Under KRS 446.030, a statute of general application, the cause of action in this case was barred before the suit was filed and thus before the rules became operable.
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Section 413.140 sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1965-04-30

KRS 413.140 provides a one year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... In Kentucky the limit is one year. Applying the law of the forum, the action was brought too late and was properly dismissed.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for personal-injury actions and bars claims brought after that period.

Carson v. U-Haul Co. · filed 1969-12-30(1)(a)

Defendants’, U-Haul Co. and Arcoa, Inc., affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, KRS 413.140(1) (a), as a complete bar to the actions of plaintiffs, John, Betty Lou and Fred William Carson, for personal injuries is correctly pleaded and should be granted.
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A parent’s action for loss of services and medical expenses arising from injury to a child must be brought within one year under Section 413.140(1)(a).

Blackburn v. Burchett · filed 1960-05-06(1)(a)

KRS 413.140(1) (a) fixes a one year limitation for the bringing of an action for injury to the person of the plaintiff or to his child. Plaintiff takes the position that an infant has one cause of action for his injuries and his parent has a separate cause of action for loss of services and medical expenditures. This is true. However, the parent’s cause of action arises out of an injury to his child. The statute says such action must be brought within one year.
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Section 413.140 requires a personal injury action to be commenced within one year after accrual; deliberately withholding the summons from service until that period expires does not satisfy the deadline.

Whittinghill v. Smith · filed 1977-10-28

KRS 413.140 provides that an action for personal injury to the person of plaintiff shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. ... The intention to go forward with the service of process was not reached until the limitation period had expired and thus the ... action was not commenced within the limitation period.
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Section 413.140 continues to govern general tort claims with a one-year filing period; the No Fault Act did not extend that period for an accident predating the Act.

Everman v. Miller · filed 1979-12-21

In the present case, however, the general statute of limitation for tort has not been repealed. Assault and battery, attractive nuisance, defamation, slip and fall, and other causes which sound in tort continue to be governed by this one-year statute of limitation of KRS 413.140; it is only the limitation of time for filing personal injury suits under the No Fault Act which has been changed.
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Section 413.140 sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury and wrongful death actions.

Smith v. Elliard · filed 1981-10-06(1)(a)

As noted above, Kentucky provides a limitations period of one year for personal injury actions. KRS 413.140. ... Thus, the Kentucky statute of limitations bars both plaintiffs’ individual causes of action for personal injury and the wrongful death action brought on behalf of the estate of Herman Smith.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within one year after it accrues.

MHC, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers · filed 1988-03-02(1)(a)

The pendant state claim involving an individual's allegation of personal injury is governed by KRS § 413.140(l)(a), which provides that an action for injury to the person must be commenced within one year after the action accrues. ... Although the third party plaintiff was cutting it close, the complaint was filed within one year of the alleged tortious activity and was therefore within the limitations period.
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Section 413.140 gives personal injury actions a one-year limitations period; a complaint filed and summons issued in good faith within that period timely commence the action even if service occurs later.

Halderman v. Sanderson Forklifts Co. · filed 1991-05-10

All that is required is that the complaint be filed within the statute of limitations period and that a summons be issued in good faith. CR 3 does not require that actual service on the defendant be effectuated within the statute of limitations period. ... The one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies. The appellant filed his complaint on April 4, 1988. Therefore, the action was deemed commenced within the one-year statute of limitations period and should not have been dismissed on this ground.
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Section 413.140’s one-year limitations period applies to an ordinary personal-injury claim arising from a golf cart accident on a golf course.

Kenton County Public Parks Corp. v. Modlin · filed 1995-04-07

The one-year statute of limitations was applicable, which necessitates a finding of fact by the jury of the date the accident occurred.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year filing period for personal injury claims; the court applied that period after determining when the plaintiff had notice of his claim.

James R. Hazel, Jr. v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1996-04-23(1)(a)

Kentucky has a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 413.140(1)(a) (Baldwin 1995). This limitations period was tolled until plaintiff reached his eighteenth birthday in April of 1989. See Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 413.170(1), 2.015 (Baldwin 1995). Plaintiff was therefore required to file a claim for personal injuries by April of 1990.
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Section 413.140’s one-year limitations period bars a personal injury claim arising from an ATV accident when the MVRA’s two-year period does not apply.

Manies v. Croan · filed 1998-02-27

Manies filed his complaint against Croan and the Clarks on July 29,1995, timely if the MVRA applies, but otherwise barred by KRS 413.140.
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Section 413.140(1)(a)'s one-year deadline is satisfied when a pro se prisoner places a complaint in the prison mail system before the period expires.

Higgenbottom v. McManus · filed 1994-01-10(1)(a)

Plaintiff accordingly exceeded, by one day, the deadline imposed on Plaintiffs lawsuit by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Ky.Rev. Stat. 413.140(l)(a). ... The material issue, however, is not the precise date Plaintiff mailed his Complaint, but whether Plaintiff deposited his Complaint in the EKCC mail system on any date prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. ... The fact that the parties may never be able to determine precisely when Plaintiff mailed his Complaint should not prevent the application of the mailbox rule in this litigation.
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Section 413.140 imposes a one-year limit on a personal injury action; filing a complaint does not meet that limit if the action is not commenced before the year expires.

Gibson v. EPI CORP. · filed 1997-03-21

The action was dismissed by the trial court as being commenced outside the one-year period of limitations contained in KRS 413.140. This appeal followed; we affirm. If the summons was not issued until May 3, 1995, then appellant has totally failed to comply with CR 3 and KRS 413.250; the action was not “commenced” prior to the expiration of the limitations period.
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Section 413.140’s one-year limitations period applies to a personal injury claim arising from a forklift accident when the forklift is not a motor vehicle under the MVRA.

O'Keefe v. North American Refractories · filed 2002-05-31

O’Keefe argues that her claim was governed by the two-year statute of limitations provided by the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA), specifically KRS 304.39-230, rather than the one-year statute of limitations contained in KRS 413.140. We disagree, and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint as untimely.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a plaintiff one year to file a personal injury claim, beginning when the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury and its cause.

Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. · filed 2003-12-30(1)(a)

In Kentucky, personal injury actions must be filed within one year from the date of injury. KRS § 413.140(l)(a). The cause of action accrues when the potential plaintiff becomes aware of his injury and the cause of that injury.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a personal-injury negligence claim a one-year filing period even when a statute supplies the standard of care.

Stivers v. Ellington · filed 2004-07-16(1)(a)

As with common-law negligence, causation and injury must still be proved in negligence per se claims. As such, we do not believe the Colorado Ski Safety Act created any new liability. Rather, the act merely substituted the legislature’s determination of the standard of care for the common-law standard of care in such negligence actions. Accordingly, we are of the opinion the applicable limitation period is one year as enunciated in KRS 413.140.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a claimant one year to bring a personal injury action even when the claim invokes a statute that merely codifies common law liability.

Toche v. American Watercraft Ass'n · filed 2005-11-04(1)(a)

In the present case, KRS 235.300 merely codifies common law liability and does not create a new theory of liability. Toche’s claim is still a basic personal injury claim under common law. We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly found that the one-year statute of limitations of KRS 413.140(1)(a) applied.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims arising in Kentucky.

Carter v. Porter · filed 2008-11-12(1)(a)

The statute of limitations for personal-injury torts in Kentucky is one year. KRS 413.140(1)(a). ... Therefore, the plaintiffs claims under Kentucky law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding wrongful arrest and false imprisonment would be time-barred if they were filed more than one year after the cause of action accrued.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 and Title IX claims brought in Kentucky.

Anderson v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF FAYETTE COUNTY · filed 2009-05-01(1)(a)

The appropriate general personal injury statute of limitations in Kentucky measures one year. ... Accordingly, a one year statute of limitations applies to the causes of action alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
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Section 413.140(1) provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims arising from asbestos exposure.

Combs v. Albert Kahn & Associates, Inc. · filed 2006-01-06(1)

We hold that KRS 413.140(1) is the appropriate statute of limitations for personal injury claims due to asbestos exposure.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

In Re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation · filed 2007-03-22(1)(a)

Kentucky employs a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims.
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Section 413.140 applies a one-year limitations period to Kentucky negligence and product liability claims.

Flint v. Target Corporation · filed 2010-01-21

Furthermore, any further consideration of the August 28 motion to amend would be futile, as the one-year limitations period that applies to product liability and negligence claims in Kentucky had run before the motion was filed. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) applies a one-year limitations period to personal injury claims arising during vehicle unloading when the MVRA’s two-year period does not apply.

Interlock Industries, Inc. v. Rawlings · filed 2011-10-27(1)(a)

Therefore, for the reasons previously stated, the trial court correctly applied the one-year personal injury statute of limitations found in KRS 413.140(l)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) requires a personal injury action to be filed within one year of the injury.

Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Co. v. Yamaha Motor Manufacturing Corp. of America · filed 2012-10-26(1)(a)

A direct action by Helton must have been filed within one year after the cause of action accrued, the date of Helton’s injury on April 28, 2006. KRS 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including Kentucky personal injury claims and § 1983 claims arising in Kentucky.

Gilley v. Dunaway · filed 2014-07-08(1)(a)

Gilley’s sexual-abuse claims are personal-injury claims, raised under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or state law, and in Kentucky, all personal-injury claims must be “commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued.” KRS § 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) imposes a one-year limit on nursing home residents’ statutory claims that seek recovery for injuries covered by a common law personal injury action.

Overstreet v. Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership · filed 2015-08-20(1)(a)

Pursuant to the rule enunciated in Toche and Stiv-ers, the enactment of KRS 216.515(6) did not supplant the one-year limitation of KRS 413.140(l)(a) in favor of the five-year limitation of KRS 413.120(2), even in the context of nursing home injuries.
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Section 413.140 gives a plaintiff one year from accrual to bring a negligence claim for personal injuries.

Adams v. Family Dollar Stores of Kentucky, LP · filed 2019-10-30

Because Plaintiff seeks recovery for personal injuries, the one-year statute of limitations applies to his negligence claim.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) bars personal injury and products liability claims filed more than one year after they accrue.

Cutter v. Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2020-01-09(1)(a)

Thus, KRS § 413.140(1)(a) bars the relevant products liability and personal injury claims.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a plaintiff one year to commence a negligence action for personal injury.

George v. Lowe's Cos. · filed 2020-07-07(1)(a)

Under Kentucky law, he had one year within which to commence his negligence action against Lowe’s. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a negligence claim causing personal injury a one-year limitations period.

Faulkner v. Martin · filed 2020-07-08(1)(a)

In Kentucky, a state law action for negligence that causes personal injury is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, KRS 413.140(1)(a), and an action for negligence that causes damage to personal property is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, KRS 413.125. ... As such, regardless of whether KRS 413.140 or KRS 413.125 is applied, Faulkner’s negligence claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) imposes a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Sizemore v. Manchester Square Associates, LLC. · filed 2020-09-01(1)(a)

In fact, it appears that any claim against Capital Cleaning would be futile because the one-year limitations period for personal injury claims has expired. KRS § 413.140(1)(a). Sizemore’s fall occurred on September 26, 2017. (DE 1-2, Complaint ¶ 4.) She did not seek to assert a claim against Capital Cleaning until October 10, 2019.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a plaintiff one year to bring a personal injury or products liability claim; awareness of the injury and its cause starts the period even if the plaintiff learns the full extent of the injury later.

Walker v. Martin · filed 2020-12-03(1)(a)

KRS § 413.140(1)(a) requires potential plaintiffs to commence personal injury actions within one year after the cause of action accrued. ... Moreover, the same statute of limitations applies to her products liability claims. ... Although Walker was not aware of the potentially lifelong injury to her kidney and the hematoma until a later date, she was aware on October 5, 2018 that the stent caused her pain because Defendant Dr. Martin removed the stent. That awareness was enough to trigger the statute of limitations. Therefore, Walker’s claims are time-barred.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives personal injury actions a one-year limitations period.

Bell v. Nlb Properties, LLC · filed 2021-02-04(1)(a)

Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court and Appellees that Bell’s claims against NLB and FLCW were governed by KRS 413.140(1)(a) as a personal injury action making it subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Hence, as a matter of law, her claims were time-barred when she filed them.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions in Kentucky.

SMITHERS v. TOWN OF CLARKSVILLE · filed 2021-02-08(1)(a)

Kentucky law imposes a one-year statute of limitations on personal injury cases. KRS 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims brought in Kentucky.

Mallory v. Bolton · filed 2021-04-29(1)(a)

“Under Kentucky law, personal-injury claims must be filed within one year of the tort.” Hall v. Spencer Cty., Ky., 583 F.3d 930, 933 (6th Cir. 2009); see also KRS 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including § 1983 claims brought in Kentucky.

Stucker v. Louisville Metro Government · filed 2021-08-24(1)(a)

Personal injury actions in Kentucky “shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued . . . .” KRS 413.140(1)(a); Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990).
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Section 413.140 gives one year to bring personal injury claims, including the limitations period applied to § 1983 claims in Kentucky.

England v. Perkins · filed 2022-06-17

For the state law claims and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Kentucky’s relevant statute is KRS 413.140, which prescribes that any actions sounding in personal injury are to be brought within one year.
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Section 413.140 requires personal injury and medical malpractice actions to be brought within one year.

Dianna Lynn Davenport, in Her Capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Penny Ann Simmons v. Kindred Hospital · filed 2022-12-21

Pursuant to KRS 413.140, personal injury and medical malpractice actions must be brought within one year.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a person one year from accrual to file a personal injury claim.

Hurd v. O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc. · filed 2022-10-13(1)(a)

Here, Hurd’s personal injury claim against O’Reilly accrued on May 29, 2019. Thus, he had until May 29, 2020, to file his claim pursuant to KRS 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a plaintiff one year from an assault to file a personal injury claim; a later complication does not start a new period.

Hightower v. Reed · filed 2023-01-19(1)(a)

It was the assault itself, not the formation of scar tissue years later, that was the genesis of the injury. Thus, the trial court correctly held that the claim, even had it been viable, was out of time as Hightower had only one year from the assault in which to file the claim, pursuant to KRS 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a plaintiff one year to bring personal injury claims, including § 1983 excessive force claims.

O'Boyle v. Madison County, Kentucky · filed 2024-04-29(1)(a)

Applicable law indicates that these claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Section 1983 actions in Kentucky are limited by the one-year statute of limitations found in § 413.140(1)(a)”); see also KRS 413.140(1)(a) (actions for personal injury).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) requires personal injury actions to be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Barath v. Walmart Stores East, Limited Partnership · filed 2024-06-06(1)(a)

Actions for personal injury must be brought within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a plaintiff one year after accrual to bring a personal injury claim, including one based on negligent maintenance of property.

T & J Land Co., LLC v. Dakota Miller · filed 2024-09-26(1)(a)

First, KRS 413.140(1)(a) governs personal injury/negligence actions in the Commonwealth and establishes a one-year statute of limitations: “The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued: (a) An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff.” Accordingly, a claim for personal injury arising from negligent maintenance of property carries a one-year limitations period.
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Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year limitations period governs a personal injury claim arising from alleged negligence involving car wash machinery when the MVRA does not apply.

Smith v. Childers Oil Co. · filed 2025-07-18(1)(a)

Thus, the circuit court correctly determined that Smith’s claims were governed by KRS 413.140(1)(a), and not the MVRA. Accordingly, as in Bell, Smith’s claims were time-barred when he filed them.
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Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year limitation applies to claims involving physical injury to a person, including claims brought under KRS 446.070.

Stovall v. Ky 120 United Aft · filed 2025-10-17(1)(a)

The circuit court erroneously concluded that the one-year limitation period of KRS 413.140(1)(a) applied. This statute applies to injuries “to the person” of a plaintiff or his or her child. Such claims must involve some physical injury.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) imposes a one-year limitations period on a claim whose essence is bodily injury, including a claim brought under KRS 446.070.

McPherson · filed 2026-03-31(1)(a)

Because the essence of McPherson’s allegations is bodily injury, his claim is essentially a common law personal injury claim and therefore should be subject to the one-year statute of limitations of KRS 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) bars a battery claim filed after its one-year limitations period.

Jones v. Lou Metro · filed 2020-08-31(1)(a)

Nashayla’s battery claim is time-barred. KRS § 413.140(1)(a). This claim is dismissed.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) requires a personal injury action against a home builder to be brought within one year of the injury; the separate builder statute adds an outer deadline.

Carley R. Lee v. Fister · filed 1969-07-30(1)(a)

In particular, upon examination of all the subsections of KRS 413.135, the intent of the legislature is shown to be that all actions for personal injury are to be brought within one year from the date of the injury, but that when the cause of action for personal injury is against a builder of a home or other improvement, there is the added limitation that the action cannot be brought at all more than five years after the completion of the home or other improvement (or six years if the injury occurred in the fifth year following the completion of the home).
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Amendments and parties

Section 413.140’s one-year limitation bars a claim against a partnership first sued after the year expired, even when the plaintiff timely sued a dissolved corporation, unless the partnership is estopped from pleading the limitation.

Lingar v. Harlan Fuel Co. · filed 1944-09-29

Clearly appellant’s cause of action was against the partnership, and its assertion against the non-existent corporation within a year after its accrual, could not, in the absence of an estoppel, prevent the partnership, when sued after the year had expired, from pleading the one year Statute of Limitation.
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Section 413.140(a) bars a personal injury action against defendants first named in an amended complaint more than one year after the injury.

Gilbert v. Harlan County Board of Education · filed 1958-01-31(a)

The defendants in the amended complaint differed from those in the original complaint. The action against the parties named in the amended complaint was instituted more than one year following the date of the alleged injury. The Statute of Limitations was a bar to an action against the parties named in the amended complaint. KRS 413.140 (a).
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Section 413.140’s one-year limitation does not bar a wrongful death claim when an amendment correcting the plaintiff’s capacity relates back to the timely original complaint.

Modern Bakery, Inc. v. Brashear · filed 1966-05-13

However, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective July 1, 1953, we think there can be little doubt that the amendment in the case now before us relates back to the original filing. ... This means, of course, that even if to this date Nathan Brashear has not secured a valid appointment as administrator of his son’s estate, and if the judgment were set aside for that reason, he could still remedy the omission and proceed by further amendment notwithstanding the statute of limitations.
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Section 413.140 does not bar substituting the real party in interest as plaintiff after the limitations period when the original suit was for that person's benefit and the amendment does not change the cause of action.

McBride v. Moss · filed 1969-02-14

In Modern Bakery, Inc. v. Brashear, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 742 (1966) we pointed out that when a “ * * * plaintiff seeks to change the capacity in which the action is brought * * * ” and the “opposing party is reasonably informed of the general wrong complained of and the background out of which the claim arose * * * the statute of limi-itations should not constitute a bar” and substitution of the real party in interest should he permitted. Donna was the person for whose benefit the suit was filed and she was the real party in interest. Even though the objection was timely made, since the cause of action was not changed the court did not commit error in permitting the amendment.
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A subsequent valid appointment of an administrator relates back to the filing of a wrongful death action and prevents the one-year limitations period from barring it.

Carter v. Southern Railway Co. · filed 1973-09-28(1)(a)

Dismissal of the complaint was in error. Conceding that the orders were not valid until signed on November 6, 1969, it was categorically held in Modern Bakery, Inc., v. Brashear, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 742 (1966), that a subsequent valid appointment will relate back to the original filing of the action and save it against the intervention of limitations.
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Section 413.140(a)’s one-year limit does not bar an amended complaint against a defendant individually when a timely complaint named the same person as executor and trustee and the amendment relates back.

Cook v. Holland · filed 1978-06-30(a)

The amended complaint made no change in the parties before the court. ... The amended complaint did no more than change the manner in which they intended to satisfy their judgment against Cook. ... The amended complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations.
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Scope of the one-year period

Section 413.140’s one-year period does not apply to conversion of personal property; the court applies a five-year period.

Eline v. Commercial Credit Corporation · filed 1948-03-26

Appellants insist that since this was a theft, limitation of 1 year as provided in KRS 413.140 had run and the action could not be maintained. ... It could be nothing more nor less than a conversion by Ward and the 5 year statute applies in cases of conversion of personal property.
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Section 413.140 gives personal injury actions a one-year limitations period, which applies in Kentucky even when the injury occurred in a state with a longer period.

Wethington v. Griggs · filed 1965-06-18

KRS 413.140 provides a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Applying the law of the forum, this action was brought too late and was properly dismissed.
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Section 413.140(a)'s one-year limit does not bar a compensation carrier from joining an employee's timely filed personal-injury action for reimbursement after the year expires.

Roberts v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1954-11-19(a)

We are therefore drawn to the conclusion that where an insurance carrier has paid compensation benefits to an injured employee and relieved the employer of all liability therefor, and this is the situation here, the insurance carrier, for the purpose of reimbursement, may become a par-: ty plaintiff to a suit commenced within the period of limitations by the employee or his heirs, although the addition of this party is effected after the running of the period of limitations.
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Section 413.140’s one-year limitation does not govern an action to recover for mental pain and anguish from injury to graves; the five-year limitation applies.

Fergerson v. Utilities Elkhorn Coal Company · filed 1958-02-28

It was held in Resthaven Memorial Cemetery v. Volk, 286 Ky. 291, 150 S.W.2d 908, that such actions to recover for mental pain and anguish were barred by the five-year statute of limitations, KRS 413.— 120, rather than the one-year limitation statute. Appellant is barred because she discovered the condition of the graves in 1945 and did not commence action until 1952.
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Section 413.140’s one-year limit for personal injury actions does not govern a claim for breach of a written agreement to provide workers’ compensation coverage.

Margie Reliford, Administratrix of the Estate of Henderson G. Reliford, Deceased v. Eastern Coal Corporation · filed 1958-11-10

The District Court's error was not in applying the Kentucky statute but, in our opinion, for reasons given above, in applying the one-year limitation covering injuries to the person rather than the fifteen-year limitation applicable to written contracts.
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Section 413.140(1) applies to personal injury actions; an action on a written contract is governed by a different limitations period.

Blankenship v. Majestic Collieries Co. · filed 1966-02-25(1)

KRS 413.140 (1) applies to actions for personal injury. This action, being on a written contract, is governed by the 15-year statute, KRS 413.090(2).
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Section 413.140’s one-year personal injury limitation does not govern an action for contribution arising from the injury.

Baker v. Richeson · filed 1969-05-02

And by reference to 18 Am.Jur.2d, Contribution, secs. 92, 93, pp. 128, 129, and the annotation, 20 A.L.R.2d 925, we find the general rule to be that a statute of limitations governing the liability of a tortfeasor to the injured person does not apply to the liability for contribution resulting from the injury. Accordingly, we are persuaded that the five-year statute is applicable in the instant case.
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The one-year period for filing a personal injury action excludes the day of the accident.

Derossett v. Burgher · filed 1977-09-16

The legislature has now clearly spoken. The day of the accident should be excluded in computing the limitation period.
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Section 413.140(1)(c) gives a plaintiff one year from the last wrongful act to bring a claim for tortious interference with a marriage; later discovery does not extend that period.

Plummer v. Summe · filed 1984-11-23(1)(c)

We decline to apply the “time of discovery” doctrine to the statute of limitation pertaining to tortious interference with a marriage, because there must be some limitation on when an action can be commenced. Instead, we look to the time of the last act prior to discovery. ... In this case, however, there were continuing unlawful acts, including the one committed on July 23,1982. If this was the last act or only act, the suit could be brought at any time within the one-year limitation. The one year would run from that date, even though the activity was not discovered until a later time. In no event would the limitation extend beyond one year following the last wrongful act.
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Section 413.140(1) provides a one-year limitations period for a personal-injury claim arising from loading a trailer when the two-year no-fault period does not apply.

Clark v. Young · filed 1985-06-28(1)

The trial court erred in applying the two-year no-fault statute of limitations and should have applied the one-year statute of limitations mandated in KRS 413.-140(1).
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Section 413.140's one-year limit applies to a parent's individual claim for loss of a child's affection and companionship after an alleged wrongful death, unless a statutory tolling provision applies.

Southeastern Kentucky Baptist Hospital, Inc. v. Gaylor · filed 1988-09-08(1)(a), (1)(e)

The alleged wrongful death occurred on March 1, 1982, and the one-year statute of limitations had expired by almost eight months unless tolled by one of the statutory provisions as forwarded by the respondent and cross-movant, Linda Gaylor, individually.
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Section 413.140(1)(a)'s one-year limit for injury to the person does not bar a claim alleging no injury to the person.

Eliza Chapman GARNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Buel STEPHENS Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1972-06-01(1)(a)

She does not claim any injury to her person and, therefore, is not barred by the one year statute as interpreted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
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Section 413.140 does not govern actions on police officers’ official bonds for alleged assaults during arrests; the fifteen-year period in KRS 413.090 applies.

Coy v. Hardin · filed 1977-10-07

The same rationale applies to the subject actions. Appellant brought his actions upon the official bonds of the appellees. Those official bonds are specifically required by KRS 95.750 to cover unnecessary assaults in making arrests. The applicable statute of limitations is, therefore, KRS 413.090.
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Section 413.140’s one-year period does not bar a federal maritime loss-of-society claim; the court allowed three years.

Burden v. Evansville Materials, Inc. · filed 1982-09-29

As we mentioned earlier, the defendant contended that Mrs. Burden’s claim should be barred because it should have been brought within the one year period established by Kentucky law for personal injury actions, KRS 413.140, including loss of consortium claims, KRS 411.145. We disagree and would not bar Mrs. Burden’s claim for two reasons. ... To begin with, we hold that the appropriate period within which Mrs. Burden could have brought her action was three years, not one.
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Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year limit does not apply when the gist of the tort is interference with a person’s rights causing emotional distress, regardless of resulting bodily harm.

Craft v. Rice · filed 1984-06-14(1)(a)

The crucial issue is whether KRS 413.120(7), the five-year statute of limitations for an action for an injury "not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated" applies to this situation rather than the one-year limit of KRS 413.140(1)(a) for injury "to the person of the plaintiff." ... This Court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court because the five-year statute of limitations applies when the gist of the tort is the claimed interference with the plaintiff's rights causing emotional distress generating a cause of action regardless of whether the plaintiff suffers any bodily harm resulting from the emotional distress.
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Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year limit for personal injury actions does not limit back pay awards under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.

Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. City of Owensboro · filed 1988-03-03(1)(a)

The respondents contend that KRS 413.-140(1)(a), the one-year statute of limitations for the commencement of a personal injury action, must be applied as a limit on back pay awards. ... We disagree.
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Section 413.140 supplies the one-year limitations period for a § 1983 action governed by Kentucky law.

Holbert v. West · filed 1990-02-02

Plaintiffs contention that Kentucky's five year "catch all" limitations period applies in § 1983 actions is without merit. The applicable statute of limitations is one year.
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Section 413.140’s one-year limitation bars claims filed more than one year after military discharge, even when military service tolled the period.

Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville · filed 1993-05-14

Nevertheless, this action was brought more than one year after his discharge from the military; therefore, those claims otherwise barred by KRS 413.140 would not be saved by the federal statute.
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Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year period bars wrongful imprisonment claims but does not necessarily apply to negligent supervision claims.

Grego v. Meijer, Inc. · filed 2001-03-28(1)(a)

This Court agrees with Mr. Haynes’ analysis and finds, therefore, that the wrongful imprisonment claim is barred by the one year limitations period of Kent. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 413.140(l)(a). ... Because the tort of negligent supervision does not necessarily derive from employee’s torts that cause physical injury, it does not fall within the one year limitations period of section 413.140(l)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year period for personal injury actions does not apply to common law indemnity claims.

Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp. · filed 2000-05-18(1)(a)

Degener asserts and the trial court held that the one-year period of limitations set forth in KRS 413.140(1)(a) for "[a]n action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff" bars Hall's third-party complaint for indemnity. However, a claim for indemnity is not a claim in which the claimant seeks damages for his/her own personal injuries, but is one in which the claimant seeks restitution for damages he/she was required to pay for injuries sustained by another and which were entirely or primarily caused by the party against whom indemnity is sought. Crime Fighters Patrol v. Hiles, supra, at 939-40. The five-year period of limitations set forth in KRS 413.120(7) for "[a]n action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated" is the applicable period within which to commence an action for common law indemnity.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Kentucky.

Watson v. Baxter · filed 2002-03-27(1)(a)

Alternatively, Watson’s complaint is time-barred. In Kentucky, § 1983 actions are limited by the one-year statute of limitations found in Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 413.140(l)(a); Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir.1990). ... Watson, however, filed his complaint on February 20, 2001, which falls outside the one-year limitations period.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies the one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Kentucky.

Duff v. Yount · filed 2002-10-22(1)(a)

Duff filed his action in state court on November 29, 2001, more than one year after his cause of action accrued. Thus, his claim was time-barred. See Ky.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1)(a); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir.1990).
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Section 413.140 supplies the one-year limitations period for a § 1983 claim characterized as a wrongful death action.

Shepherd v. Wellman · filed 2002-12-23

In this case, the § 1983 action is properly characterized as a wrongful death action, making it subject to a one year statute of limitations, accruing from the date that the representative of the estate was appointed.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for Kentucky personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims arising in Kentucky.

Marsh v. Rich · filed 2004-02-04(1)(a)

The appropriate statute of limitations for personal injury actions arising in Kentucky is one year from the date the cause of action accrues. ... Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants because Marsh’s complaint was time-barred.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for Kentucky § 1983 claims; a claim for denial of a name-clearing hearing accrues when the hearing is denied.

Kelly v. Burks · filed 2005-07-20(1)(a)

In the present case, therefore, the one-year statute of limitations began to run when Kelly had reason to know of the alleged constitutional injury. ... We conclude that the alleged constitutional injury occurred on the date that the name-clearing hearing was denied, which was on April 14, 2003.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives a plaintiff one year to bring a § 1983 claim; for a denied name-clearing hearing, the period begins when the hearing is denied.

Kelly v. Ishmon F. Burks, Jr. · filed 2005-07-20(1)(a)

We conclude that the alleged constitutional injury occurred on the date that the name-clearing hearing was denied, which was on April 14, 2003. ... This conclusion, however, is qualified by the fact that only the claims brought with regard to a name-clearing hearing were timely. Any claims that Kelly might have raised about the constitutionality of his actual termination are time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations, since that event took place on September 25, 2002.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Kentucky.

Dixon v. Clem · filed 2007-07-10(1)(a)

Dixon does not dispute that the statute of limitations on a § 1983 claim, as determined by Kentucky law, is one year. ... Dixon’s claims against Clem, Lawson, and Say-lor—none of whom, incidentally, even attended the second hearing—were therefore properly dismissed by the district court on the ground that they were barred by the governing one-year statute of limitations.
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Section 413.140 gives actions sounding in tort a one-year limitations period; actions commenced after that period are barred.

Steadman v. Gentry · filed 2010-06-04

Pursuant to KRS 413.140, the statute of limitations for actions sounding in tort is one year. Actions not commenced within that time limit are forever barred.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) bars a claim filed more than one year after the cause of action accrues.

3M Co. v. Engle · filed 2010-12-27(1)(a)

Once a plaintiffs cause of action has accrued, he has one year in which to file suit, after which his claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 413.140 supplies a one-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims filed in Kentucky.

Click v. Thompson · filed 2012-10-18

The Sixth Circuit has determined that the relevant statute of limitations in Kentucky is one year. Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 181-82 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that the one-year period in KRS § 413.140 governs, not the five-year period in KRS § 413.120(6)). ... Click’s Section 1983 claims based on the 2009 termination and 2011 failure to rehire are therefore time-barred. However, because the 2012 failure to rehire is a , discrete act that falls within the one-year limit, Click may proceed to discovery on that claim.
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Section 413.140(1)(d) sets a one-year limitations period for defamation claims.

Eddins v. FSB · filed 2013-08-12(1)(d)

Cenlar next argues that the Kentucky one year statute of limitations for defamation claims bars Eddins’ defamation claims. See Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 413.140(l)(d). Eddins posits a reasonable argument that the defamation was ongoing, such that the one year statute of limitations did not accrue until the publication of the damaging statement ceased— that is, November 5, 2012 at the earliest, which is the last date upon which Eddins accessed his credit report prior to filing suit. However, as explained above, the only defamation claims that escape preemption predate the time when Cenlar received notice of the inaccuracy of the Disputed Item, which was December 15, 2010 at the latest, well outside the one year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the entirety of Count VI must be dismissed.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 actions in Kentucky.

Helm v. Eells · filed 2016-03-01(1)(a)

The relevant statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is governed by state law, which in this case is Kentucky’s one-year limitations period for personal injury claims. See Hall v. Spencer Cty., 583 F.3d 930, 933 (6th Cir. 2009); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1)(a). ... His complaint filed more than one year later is therefore untimely.
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The one-year limitations period for claims arising from a custody evaluation began when the plaintiff received the custody report and participated in a conference about it.

Nave v. Feinberg · filed 2017-07-28

While we need not reach Nave's further arguments related to whether her claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in KRS 413.140 or failed to state a claim upon which relief could be based, we nevertheless hold that the circuit court did not err in those conclusions. The limitations period began to run when Nave received the custody report and participated in a conference related to that report on August 2, 2011. Nave did not file her complaint until March 21, 2014, well past the time the one-year limitations period had expired.
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Section 413.140 sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury, negligence, and intentional tort claims.

Kendall v. Godbey · filed 2017-12-15

The statute of limitations for personal injury, negligence, and intentional torts is governed by the one-year statute of limitations. KRS 413.140.
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Section 413.140 provides a one-year limitations period for Kentucky personal injury claims, including negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death claims, and supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Kentucky.

Tonya Ford, PR of the Estate of James Ford v. Eastern State Hospital · filed 2019-12-04

Plaintiff’s claims for violations of her son’s constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as her claims for wrongful death, medical malpractice, and negligence, are subject to Kentucky’s one-year personal injury statute of limitations, which began to run when she was appointed to be her son’s personal representative.
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Section 413.140(1)(a)’s one-year limitations period applies to a minor child’s claim for loss of parental consortium.

Bradford v. Bracken County · filed 2011-01-14(1)(a)

Count Seven, which alleges loss of parental consortium on behalf of N.B., decedent’s minor child, is less clear, but also subject to a KRS § 413.140(l)(a)’s one-year statute of limitations.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) imposes a one-year limitations period on loss of consortium claims.

Hammers v. Plunk · filed 2011-10-21(1)(a)

Instead, loss of consortium claims are subject to the one-year statute of limitations under KRS 413.140(l)(a).
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Section 413.140 does not govern a recovery claim under § 360.020, which has its own two-year limitations period.

Tolliver v. Bank of America (In Re Tolliver) · filed 2012-02-02(1)(h)

K.R.S. § 413.140(l)(h) is not applicable because K.R.S. § 360.020, the statute that the Plaintiff cites in Count I for her recovery, contains its own statute of limitations that requires an action be commenced within two years from the time the usurious transaction took place.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Wagner v. Drees Co. · filed 2013-07-26(1)(a)

KRS 413.140(1)(a) also provides for a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.
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Section 413.140(1)(e)’s one-year limitation period applies to an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against a physician.

Litsey v. Allen · filed 2012-06-01(1)(e)

The limitation period of KRS 413.140(l)(e) applies to all claims against physicians “for negligence or malpractice[.]” ... Based on this authority, Litsey’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not timely.
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Section 413.140(1)(j)’s one-year limit does not establish fraudulent joinder when the two-year limit for injury to personal property also arguably applies.

CPC Livestock, LLC v. Fifth Third Bank, Inc. · filed 2013-04-08(1)(j)

While Fifth Third broadly and unequivocally states that the one-year period in KRS § 413.140(1)(j) applies, it seems to the Court that the two-year period in KRS § 413.125 arguably applies. ... Indeed, because both statutes arguably apply, the Court will construe the law in favor of Plaintiffs, the non-removing parties.
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Section 413.140(1)(d)’s one-year limit for libel or slander does not apply to slander of title claims.

Ballard v. 1400 Willow Council of Co-Owners, Inc. · filed 2013-11-21(1)(d)

Based on the preceding, we conclude that slander of title is not a subcategory of slander, which is a personal injury action. Rather, it is an action for injury to real property rights resulting from disparagement of title to real estate. Therefore, KRS 413.140(? )(d), which the Court of Appeals relied on, does not apply.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) imposes a one-year limitations period on products liability claims.

Laffoon v. Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2017-12-13(1)(a)

Ms. Laffoon failed to bring her products liability claims within the one-year statute of limitations and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this matter.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives negligent supervision claims a one-year limitations period.

Comer v. McCracken County Detention Center · filed 2019-08-23(1)(a)

The Plaintiffs’ federal and state claims are governed by one-year statutes of limitations. ... A.R. ex rel. M.R. v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 2004-CA-002377-ME, 2007 WL 127775, at *4, n. 20 (Ky. App. Jan. 19, 2007) (“A negligent supervision tort claim is governed by the one-year limitations period in KRS 413.140(1)(a).”). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on January 26, 2018. The second attack occurred in February of 2017. Thus, to the extent the Plaintiffs’ claims relate to the 2017 attack, they are timely.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for negligence and wrongful death claims.

Crawford v. Tilley · filed 2020-06-08(1)(a)

Plaintiff’s state law negligence and wrongful death claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations provided in KRS § 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)’s one-year period bars negligence, battery, and abuse of process claims when the plaintiff knows of the injury and the defendant did not conceal or misrepresent his identity.

Cornelius v. City of Mount Washington, Kentucky · filed 2020-10-30(1)

In this instance, Cornelius has neither argued nor identified any way in which Ford’s identity was concealed or mispresented. Thus, Cornelius’ claims for negligence, battery and abuse of process against Ford are barred by the one-year statute of limitations, and the motion will be granted as to these claims.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Kentucky; § 413.140 also governs common-law negligence claims.

Robinson v. Butler County, Kentucky · filed 2020-12-16(1)(a)

The applicable statute of limitation for § 1983 actions in Kentucky is the one-year statute of limitations found in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) § 413.140(1)(a). Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir.1990). Robinson’s claims for common-law negligence is also governed by KRS § 413.140.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 constitutional tort claims arising in Kentucky.

Lott v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2021-03-17(1)(a)

For constitutional torts committed in Kentucky, the one-year limitation period under KRS § 413.140(1)(a) for bringing general personal injury actions applies.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Kentucky.

Smith v. Tyler · filed 2021-03-29(1)(a)

In sum, the one-year statute of limitations under KRS § 413.140(1)(a) applies to Smith’s § 1983 claims.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies the one-year limitations period for § 1983 constitutional tort claims arising in Kentucky.

Robinson v. Butler County, Kentucky · filed 2021-05-11(1)(a)

Constitutional torts committed in Kentucky are subject to the one-year limitation period under KRS § 413.140(1)(a) for bringing general personal injury actions. ... Thus, the statute of limitations bars Robinson’s claims related to his second incarceration from July to October of 2017.
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Section 413.140 provides a one-year limitations period for § 1983 and conspiracy claims.

Archie v. Budget Rent a Car System, Inc. · filed 2021-09-07

The problem for Archie, however, is that each of these causes of action have a one-year statute of limitations.1 ... Thus, the time to file his claims against the Airport defendants has lapsed.
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Section 413.140(1) provides a one-year limitations period for Kentucky personal-injury and specified tort claims, as well as § 1983 claims brought in Kentucky.

Curtis v. Sumerall · filed 2022-02-25(1)

For both the § 1983 and Kentucky claims, the statute of limitations is one year.
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Section 413.140(d) requires a defamation action to be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Simon Property Group, L.P. v. CASDNS, Inc · filed 2020-02-03(d)

However, to the extent this cross-claim against CORE arises from communications it allegedly had with SPG at or around the time of the events in 2013 giving rise to the action, or close in time to the domain name transfers which apparently occurred shortly after the filing of the complaint in 2014,6 the claim is clearly time-barred by KRS 413.140(d) which requires a defamation action be commenced within one year from the time the cause of action accrues.
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Section 413.140 sets a one-year limitations period for defamation and false light claims.

Porter v. Sergent · filed 2020-08-04

Under Kentucky law, defamation and false light claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.
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Section 413.140(1)(d) gives defamation claims a one-year limitations period.

Shehata v. Blackwell · filed 2021-09-20(1)(d)

Defamation claims in Kentucky are governed by a one-year statute of limitations. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1)(d).
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Section 413.140(1)(d) gives a plaintiff one year to bring defamation and libel claims.

Thomas v. Bernhardt · filed 2020-09-11(1)(d)

As discussed above, the statute of limitations for defamation and libel claims is one year.
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Section 413.140(1) gives one year to bring a product liability claim based on negligence or strict liability.

Zachry Industrial, Inc. v. Siemens Energy, Inc. · filed 2021-08-12(1)

In Kentucky, product liability claims, whether based on negligence or strict liability, are governed by KRS § 413.140(1)’s one-year statute of limitations.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for assault and battery claims.

Clem v. Zerbee · filed 2021-12-14(1)(a)

In Kentucky, the statute of limitations period for assault and battery is one year. Jones v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 482 F. Supp. 3d 584, 591 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (citing KRS § 413.140(1)(a) and Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 70 (Ky. 2007)).
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Section 413.140(1) requires malicious prosecution claims to be filed within one year after they accrue.

Graham v. Todd County · filed 2022-03-15(1)

Suit was filed on December 17, 2020, within one year of the dismissal of the criminal action and was therefore timely.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including the Kentucky tort claims and § 1983 claims governed by that period.

Napper v. Jaynes · filed 2022-07-08(1)(a)

So both the constitutional claims and the state tort claims are governed by the one-year limitations period set forth in KRS § 413.140.
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A claimant seeking an exception to the one-year limitations period must show why it applies.

Borders v. Conrad · filed 2022-08-11(1)(a)

It is incumbent upon Borders to demonstrate why an exception to the one-year statute of limitations (KRS 413.140(1)(a)) should apply, and thus far she has been unable to do so.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for Kentucky personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims filed in Kentucky.

Smith v. Tyler · filed 2023-02-22(1)(a)

In Kentucky, § 1983 claims like those asserted by the Plaintiffs here are subject to the one-year statute of limitations found in the state’s general personal injury statute: KRS § 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to Bivens claims arising in Kentucky.

Helton v. Whitson · filed 2023-02-24(1)(a)

Helton complains about events occurring in Kentucky, therefore the Court applies the state’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims: KRS § 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) imposes a one-year limitations period on assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

Petrey v. Scott County Fiscal Court · filed 2023-02-28(1)(a)

Petrey’s states law claims of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress likewise carry one year statutes of limitations. KRS 413.140(1)(a); Childers v. Geile, 367 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Ky. 2012). ... Because the events giving rise to Petrey’s claims took place more than 10 years before he filed the present action, all of his claims—on their face—fall well outside the applicable statutes of limitations.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for Bivens claims arising in Kentucky.

Rudd v. United States of America · filed 2023-08-01(1)(a)

Under Kentucky law, Bivens claims have a one-year statute of limitations.
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Section 413.140(1)(d) gives a defamation claim one year from publication before it is time-barred.

Averett v. Hardy · filed 2022-06-09(1)(d)

Even assuming a publication date as late as December 2018 or early 2019, the statute of limitations bars the claim. KRS § 413.140(1)(d).
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Section 413.140(1)(d)’s one-year defamation limitations period applies to a tortious-interference claim when the underlying wrong is defamatory statements.

Dorn v. Dominique · filed 2022-06-23(1)(d)

So the same conduct that could give rise to a defamation claim underlies Dorn’s claims for tortious interference. The statute of limitations governing the former therefore applies to the latter.
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Section 413.140(1)(d) gives defamation claims a one-year limitations period that begins when the statement is published.

Mock v. Panera Bread Company · filed 2022-09-29(1)(d)

The statute of limitations for a defamation claim is one year. Caslin v. Gen. Elec. Co., 608 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Ky. App. 1980) (citing KRS 413.140(1)(d)). It begins to run from the date of “publication.” Id. ... Clearly, the trial court did not err in dismissing Mock’s claim for defamation on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives loss of consortium claims a one-year limitations period.

Estate of Charles G. Howard v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2022-07-21(1)(a)

However, loss of consortium claims are subject to the one-year statute of limitations under KRS 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1) applies a one-year limitations period to product liability claims based on negligence or strict liability.

Community Association Underwriters of America, Inc. v. Techtronic Industries Power Equipment · filed 2023-12-21(1)

Instead, Counts I and II of CAU’s complaint are governed by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including Kentucky § 1983 excessive-force claims and battery claims.

O'Boyle v. Madison County, Kentucky · filed 2024-03-01(1)(a)

Applicable law indicates that these claims are subject to a one- year statute of limitations. See Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Section 1983 actions in Kentucky are limited by the one-year statute of limitations found in § 413.140(1)(a)”); see also KRS 413.140(1)(a) (actions for personal injury).
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Section 413.140(1)(d) gives defamation claims a one-year limitations period.

Willis v. 8UP Elevated Drinkery & Kitchen · filed 2024-03-18(1)(d)

A defamation claim has a one-year statute of limitations. KRS 413.140(1)(d).
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Section 413.140 provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury and malicious prosecution actions.

Graham v. Todd County · filed 2024-04-03(1)(a), (1)(c)

Under Kentucky law there is a one-year limitations period for personal injury and malicious prosecution actions.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies the one-year limitations period for Section 1983 and negligence claims.

Oh Huff v. Casey County, Kentucky · filed 2024-04-25(1)(a)

Each of those claims has a one-year statute of limitations. See Thomas v. Mayo, No. 3:21-CV-549-RGJ, 2024 WL 116424, at *2, *7 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 10, 2024) (citations omitted) (noting that Section 1983 and negligence claims are subject to the one-year personal injury statute of limitations in KRS 413.140(1)(a)); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (establishing a one-year statute of limitations).
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Section 413.140 provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including § 1983 excessive force claims brought in Kentucky.

Pate v. City of Georgetown Kentucky · filed 2024-07-08

In Kentucky, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is one year after the cause of action accrued. KRS § 413.140.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims arising in Kentucky.

Bain v. Jeffersontown Police Department · filed 2024-07-10(1)(a)

The relevant statute of limitations in Kentucky is one year. KRS § 413.140(1)(a).
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Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for Kentucky personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims brought in Kentucky.

O'Boyle v. Madison County, Kentucky · filed 2024-07-15(1)(a)

Applicable law indicates that these claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Section 1983 actions in Kentucky are limited by the one-year statute of limitations found in § 413.140(1)(a)”); see also KRS 413.140(1)(a) (noting Kentucky law provides that personal-injury torts have a one-year statute of limitations). ... Therefore, her remaining claims against Tussey were filed outside the statute of limitations.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to Bivens and § 1983 claims arising in Kentucky.

Morgan v. Hopkinsville Police Department · filed 2024-12-12(1)(a)

In Kentucky, a one-year statute of limitations applies to personal-injury claims.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applies to Rehabilitation Act Section 504 and ADA Title II claims.

Conley v. Board of Education of Clark County Schools · filed 2025-08-05(1)(a)

Section 413.140(1)(a) provides that a personal injury action must commence “within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued.”
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Section 413.140(1)(a) gives plaintiffs one year to file negligence, assault, and battery claims for personal injury.

Adkins v. Fields · filed 2025-09-19(1)(a)

The same one-year statute of limitations applies to negligence, assault, and battery claims.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) requires a false imprisonment claim to be filed within one year after it accrues.

Davis v. Southeastern Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 2025-09-22(1)(a)

The statute of limitations for a false imprisonment claim is one year. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 413.140(1)(a) (West 2025); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 70 (Ky. 2007) (applying KRS 413.140(1)(a) to a claim of false imprisonment). ... Because the complaint was filed more than a year after the cause of action accrued, the false imprisonment claim is time-barred.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including Section 1983 claims brought in Kentucky.

Easley v. County of Warren, Kentucky · filed 2025-09-30(1)(a)

The Kentucky statute of limitations for personal injury actions is applicable to claims brought under Section 1983 is one year.
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Section 413.140(1)(d) requires a libel claim to be brought within one year of publication of the offending statement.

Maxie · filed 2026-02-03(1)(d)

A libel claim in Kentucky must be brought within one year of the publication of the offending statement. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(d).
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Section 413.140 provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury, defamation, and professional negligence claims.

Arnold v. University Medical Center, Inc. D/B/A U of L Health · filed 2026-02-06

Thus, we discern no reversible error in the trial court’s concluding that to the extent the complaint may have stated claims against these defendants for malpractice or personal injury or defamation, see KRS 413.140, such claims were time-barred since the original complaint was not filed until December 14, 2023, and therefore, Dr. Arnold failed to state claims for which relief could be granted.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) supplies the one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Kentucky.

Abbot Family Dynasty Trust v. City of Wilmore · filed 2026-04-14(1)(a)

Applicable law imposed a one-year statute of limitations on these claims. See Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Section 1983 actions in Kentucky are limited by the one-year statute of limitations found in § 413.140(1)(a)”); see also KRS § 413.140(1)(a) (noting Kentucky law provides that personal-injury torts have a one-year statute of limitations).
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Section 413.140 sets a one-year limitations period for defamation claims, including libel and slander, and for the negligence and misrepresentation claims arising from professional services addressed here.

Chaney v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. · filed 2026-04-24(1)(d), (1)(f)

These claims are governed by KRS 413.140(1)(f) and 413.245, both of which have a one-year statute of limitations for claims stemming from the rendering of a professional service. ... KRS 413.140(1)(d) sets a one-year statute of limitations for actions for defamation, which includes both libel and slander.
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Section 413.140(1)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for statutory unlawful imprisonment claims because they codify common-law false imprisonment liability.

Aliff v. Mayfield Consumer Products, LLC · filed 2026-06-18(1)(a)

Thus, the statutory unlawful imprisonment claim under KRS 509.020 or KRS 509.030 does not create a new theory of liability; rather, it merely codifies the liability available at common-law for false imprisonment. As a consequence, we conclude that the applicable statute of limitation is one year as provided in KRS 413.140(1)(a).
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Notes 1–150 of 349, oldest cases first.

135 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Adm'r v. Poehlman, the court decided whether the summons commenced the action in good faith under KRS 413.250. Its citation to § 413.140 reports the trial court’s ruling. opinion →
Karagiannis v. Shaffer, the court reports Fulkerson’s use of the Kentucky statute; its own decision applies Alabama’s limitation period. opinion →
Dexter v. Beaver Dam Deposit Bank, the court decided whether the note was transferred or renewed; it did not decide a rule of § 413.140. opinion →
Norman v. Judy, the court mentioned the limitation period to explain why no claim for the usurious excess was made; it did not decide a claim under the section. opinion →
Adm'r v. Adm'x, the court recounts prior decisions about § 413.140 while deciding venue under § 74; it does not decide § 413.140 in this case. opinion →
Inland Gas Corp. v. Flint, the court decides the filing deadline under KRS 342.270 and cites KRS 413.140 as an analogous rule from an earlier case. opinion →
Albanese v. Ohio River-Frankfort Cooperage Corp., the court states § 413.140’s one-year period as background, but decides which state’s limitation period applies under KRS 413.320. opinion →
Reliford v. Eastern Coal Corp., the court describes the deadline for a possible common-law action but decides the contract claim under the workers’ compensation election rules, not § 413.140. opinion →
Johnson v. Holbrook, the limitations defense was Holbrook’s argument; the court affirmed solely on the release and did not decide the statute’s application. opinion →
Koeppe v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., the court decides which state's limitation period applies under KRS 413.320; it does not decide a rule of KRS 413.140 itself. opinion →
Rockwood v. Huey, the court decides whether KRS 413.290 suspends limitations; it does not decide a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Wenneker v. Bailey, the court decides whether the tolling provision in KRS 413.170 covers a married minor; it does not decide a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Schuster v. Steedley, the court mentions the limitations period as background but decides the indemnity claim, not a rule under KRS 413.140. opinion →
Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Company, the court decides relation back under CR 15.03, rather than construing a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing Co., the court mentions Kentucky’s one-year period as background to the earlier suit; it decides whether Virginia law bars this suit. opinion →
Gore v. Debaryshe, the court's ruling on the limitations motion is conditional on whether the plaintiffs amend their complaint. opinion →
Shackleford v. Barnette, the discussion of § 413.140 is quoted from an earlier case and reports a trial court ruling; this court decides how to compute the answer deadline in an election contest. opinion →
Rucker v. Rainwater, the court mentioned the limitation period but decided the sufficiency of the amended complaint; the defendants did not contest dismissal on limitations grounds. opinion →
Rigdon Ex Rel. Rigdon v. Rigdon, the court mentions the one-year period as background for its decision on the prospective effect of abolishing parental immunity; it does not decide a rule under § 413.140. opinion →
Fann v. McGuffey, the statement appears in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Daugherty v. Runner, this sentence reports the trial court’s ruling; the appellate court did not decide a rule under § 413.140. opinion →
Adams v. Preece, this statement appears in a concurrence explaining the majority’s decision to vacate review, not in a decision by the court about § 413.140. opinion →
Fundermann v. Mickelson, the Iowa court cites Kentucky’s limitation period as background while deciding whether to abolish Iowa’s alienation-of-affections action; it does not decide a question under the Kentucky section. opinion →
Myrick v. James, the Kentucky provision appears only in a comparative list of statutes; this court does not decide its application or meaning. opinion →
Kiser v. Bryant Electric, the court mentions § 413.140 only in a conditional statement while deciding whether § 413.135 applies. opinion →
In Re Khan, the court mentions the one-year period to explain when the parties signed their agreement, but does not decide any rule under this section. opinion →
Brown v. Physicians Mutual Insurance Co., the citation states a party's position; the opinion does not expressly adopt a ruling about § 413.140. opinion →
Northwestern National Insurance v. Osborne, the court decides when a legal malpractice claim accrues under KRS 413.245. Section 413.140 appears only in the quoted text of that statute; the court does not decide any rule of § 413.140. opinion →
Williams v. Fulmer, the court decides whether the U.C.C. warranty claim is available, without deciding a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Tabler v. Wallace, the court decides the constitutionality and effect of KRS 413.135; it mentions KRS 413.140 only as an existing limitation that KRS 413.135 does not alter. opinion →
Goodin v. Overnight Transportation Co., the court decided whether the MVRA's two-year period applied; it did not decide a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Plaza Bottle Shop, Inc. v. Al Torstrick Insurance Agency, Inc., the court mentions § 413.140 in passing but decides which other limitations statute applies to the insurance-agent claim; it does not decide a rule of § 413.140. opinion →
Moore v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., the court mentions compliance with the section but decides the insurance policy limit, not a rule of § 413.140. opinion →
Ashby v. Money, the court decides the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act’s two-year limitations rule, not a rule of KRS 413.140 itself. opinion →
Hurley v. Downing, the supplied opinion is a dissent. It reports the majority’s ruling but does not itself decide the section’s application. opinion →
Howard v. Hicks, the court decides that the MVRA’s two-year limit applies. Its references to § 413.140 report the trial court’s ruling and a party’s argument, without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
Vandevelde v. Falls City Builders, Inc., the court decides the scope of KRS 413.245. KRS 413.140 appears only in the quoted text of that statute. opinion →
Underhill v. Stephenson, the court mentions § 413.140(1) as background but decides the amendment and discovery issues under Civil Rule 15.03(2) and § 413.245. opinion →
Alcorn v. Gordon, the court decides whether the attorneys had probable cause for the earlier suit, not what § 413.140 requires or covers. opinion →
Bell v. Ronald Cooper and Louisville Police Department, the court decides whether KRS 413.310 tolls the limitations period; it does not decide a rule of § 413.140. opinion →
Mason v. Wathen, the citation describes the district court's application of § 413.140; the appellate court decides tolling under § 413.310. opinion →
Dennis v. Fiscal Court of Bullitt County, the opinion reports the federal court’s application of the section; this court decides res judicata, not the section’s rules. opinion →
Maney v. Mary Chiles Hospital, the court decided the Attorney General notice requirement under KRS 418.075, not a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Crenshaw v. Weinberg, the court decides the deadline under KRS 304.39-230(6); it mentions KRS 413.140 only as the prior general limitation period. opinion →
Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, the discussion of § 413.140(2) quotes the court’s earlier decision in McCollum; this opinion decides the constitutionality of § 413.135 and applies the discovery rule. opinion →
Prasad Palakurthy, M.D., Uma Palakurthy, M.D., and Thomas Corcoran, Claudia Corcoran v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., the court reports the Kentucky Supreme Court’s ruling on § 413.140(2); it does not make its own decision about that section. opinion →
Jones v. Cox, this is a quotation from the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Troxell; the Colorado Supreme Court did not decide the Kentucky section’s rules. opinion →
Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Laboratory, the court identifies KRS 413.140 as the applicable limitation period, but its ruling concerns estoppel under KRS 413.190(2), not a rule of KRS 413.140 itself. opinion →
Elkins v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., the court mentions § 413.140 as the general personal injury deadline but decides the applicable limit under the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. opinion →
Adamson v. City of Provo, Utah, the court cites § 413.140 in a multistate string citation but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Lynch v. Betty J. McFarland and Charles L. McFarland, the court expressly declined to decide which limitations period governed the statutory claims; the discussion of § 413.140 reports the district court’s ruling and the parties’ positions. opinion →
Edmonds v. Cytology Services of Maryland, Inc., the court lists the Kentucky provision for comparison in an appendix; it decides the meaning of Maryland’s limitations statute, not § 413.140. opinion →
Brotherton v. Map Enterprises, Inc., the quoted application of § 413.140 reports the district court's ruling. The appellate court's own analysis decides whether the Act's two-year period applies. opinion →
Gray v. COM., TRANSP. CABINET, DEPT. OF HWY, the court mentions § 413.140(4) as background but decides the limitations rule under KRS 44.110, not this section's rule. opinion →
Gray v. Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways, the court mentions § 413.140(4) as background but decides the limitations rule under KRS 44.110. opinion →
Rodgers v. Apple South, Inc., the court decides whether § 1658 supplies the limitations period; it does not decide a rule of § 413.140. opinion →
Lucchese v. Sparks-Malone, P.L.L.C., the court applies KRS 413.245; KRS 413.140 appears only as an exception in the quoted text of that statute, and the court does not decide any rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Reyes v. Hardin County, the limitations statement describes a hypothetical consequence of an argument the court rejected; the court decided the insurance issue under KRS 67.186. opinion →
Long v. Holland America Line Westours, Inc., Index false positive: the full opinion does not mention Kentucky or § 413.140; it decides Alaska contract and tort limitations law. opinion →
Walker v. Lifeskills, Inc., the citation reports the district court’s earlier ruling; this opinion decides a Rule 60(b) motion, not the statute’s application. opinion →
Fields v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., the court decided whether the MVRA's two-year period applied, not a rule of § 413.140 itself. opinion →
Walker v. Lifeskills, Inc., the opinion reports the district court’s earlier limitations ruling; this court decides only whether to allow another Rule 60 motion. opinion →
Rockwell International Corp. v. Wilhite, this sentence reports an earlier court’s ruling; the opinion does not itself decide a rule under § 413.140. opinion →
Schwindel v. Meade County, the court decides whether the amended complaint relates back under CR 15.03, not a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Grubbs Ex Rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Center, P.S.C., the discussion applying § 413.140 appears in a dissent. The majority expressly declined to review the statute of limitations analysis. opinion →
Walker v. Lifeskills, Inc., the section-specific ruling is reported as the magistrate judge’s earlier recommendation; this court decides Walker’s Rule 60(b) appeal. opinion →
Gaither v. Commonwealth, the court decides how KRS 413.180 and KRS 44.110 govern the filing period before the Board of Claims; its discussion of KRS 413.140 quotes Conner rather than deciding this section’s own rule. opinion →
Roman Catholic Bishop of Louisville v. Burden, the court reports the lower court’s ruling on KRS 413.140 but dismisses the appeal without deciding that statute’s application. opinion →
Pedigo v. Breen, the court decides when a claim accrues under KRS 413.245; it mentions KRS 413.140 only as an exception in the quoted statute. opinion →
Bryant v. Howell, the court decided whether a habeas petition affects the limitation period under KRS 413.245; it did not decide a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Basham v. Penick, the court cites § 413.140 to describe Kentucky’s limitations period, but decides how Indiana’s Journey’s Account Statute measures timeliness. opinion →
Matherly Land Surveying, Inc. v. Gardiner Park Development, LLC, the court decides the application of KRS 413.245; KRS 413.140 appears only as an exception in the quoted text of that statute, and the court does not decide any rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Queensway Financial Holdings Ltd. v. Cotton & Allen, P.S.C., the court decided the limitations rules of KRS 413.245. KRS 413.140 appears only as an exception in the quoted text of that statute. opinion →
Papa John's International Inc. v. McCoy, the discussion of § 413.140 reports the circuit court's conclusions; this court decides the claim on other grounds. opinion →
Peoples Bank of Northern Kentucky, Inc. v. CROWE CHIZEK AND CO., the reference to § 413.140 appears only in the quoted text of § 413.245, not in this court’s own decision about § 413.140. opinion →
Bariteau v. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., the court mentions § 413.140 as a comparison while deciding whether the discovery rule applies to a claim governed by § 413.120(7). opinion →
Joel A. Harper And Kathy L. Harper Vs. Pella Corporation, the court did not decide the limitations issue involving § 413.140; it expressly declined to consider the cross-appeal. opinion →
Hitachi Automotive Products USA, Inc. v. Craig, the references to § 413.140 appear only in footnote summaries of earlier cases, not in this court’s decision about that section. opinion →
Methodist Healthcare System of San Antonio, Ltd., L.L.P., W.C. Schorlemer, M.D., and Robert Schorlemer, M.D. v. Rankin, the court cites the Kentucky section only to compare repose periods while deciding a Texas statute; it does not decide the Kentucky section’s rules. opinion →
Bennett v. Malcomb, the court decides whether a claim for outrage is available; it does not decide a rule of KRS 413.140. The quoted application of the section reports the lower court's ruling. opinion →
Ragland v. Estate of Digiuro, the court declined to reconsider § 413.140 because the prior ruling was law of the case; it decided the law-of-the-case issue, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Thornton, the court mentions the one-year period as background to its attorney-discipline decision; it does not decide a rule or claim under § 413.140. opinion →
Prather v. Abbot Laboratories, the court expressly declined to decide the limitations argument under § 413.140. opinion →
Abel v. Austin, the court decides which limitation period governs attorney malpractice under KRS 413.245; it does not decide a rule under KRS 413.140. opinion →
Falkenrath v. Candela Corporation, the court cites the Kentucky section only to compare limitations periods while deciding whether to toll Utah’s statute. opinion →
McCarrell v. Hoffman-La Roach, Inc.(076524), the court uses § 413.140(1)(a) as a comparison while deciding New Jersey’s choice-of-law rule; it does not decide the Kentucky section’s own rules. opinion →
Saalwaechter v. Carroll, No. The reference to § 413.140 appears only in the quoted text of § 413.245; the court makes no decision about § 413.140. opinion →
Middleton v. Sampey, the court cites § 413.140(2) as an example while deciding whether the discovery rule applies to claims governed by § 413.120; it does not decide § 413.140’s rules. opinion →
Cabrera v. JBS USA, LLC, the court decided whether the amended complaint related back under CR 15.03, without deciding a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Burns v. Kentucky Department of Corrections, the court stated the one-year rule but only expressed doubt about timeliness; it did not decide that § 413.140 barred the claim. opinion →
Seiller Waterman, LLC v. Rlb Properties, Ltd., the court decides the scope of KRS 413.245; it mentions KRS 413.140 only in quoted language defining professional services and does not decide a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Wright v. Fayette County Detention Center, the limitations ruling is conditional on hypothetical individual-capacity claims; the court dismissed the claims Wright actually brought on another ground. opinion →
Seiller Waterman, LLC v. Rlb Properties, Ltd., the court decides the scope of KRS 413.245 and cites KRS 413.140 only as an exception in the definition of professional services; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Rlb Properties, Ltd. v. Seiller Waterman, LLC, the court decides the scope of KRS 413.245; it mentions KRS 413.140 only as an exception in the quoted statutory language and does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Seiller Waterman, LLC v. Rlb Properties, Ltd., the court decides the scope of KRS 413.245; it mentions KRS 413.140 only as an exception in the quoted definition from KRS 413.243. opinion →
Rlb Properties, Ltd. v. Seiller Waterman, LLC, the court decides the scope of KRS 413.245; it does not decide a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Crawford v. Tilley, the court recounts its earlier application of § 413.140(1)(a), but the present ruling decides how Federal Rule 6 treats the filing deadline. opinion →
Mark Smith and Chinena Smith v. Wynetta Fletcher, Aprn, the court decided whether KRS 413.270 saved the claims; it did not decide a rule of KRS 413.140. The quoted reference reports a party’s argument. opinion →
Frazier v. Department of Corrections, the court treated the limitations ruling as waived and did not itself decide how § 413.140 applies. opinion →
Deters v. Hammer, this is a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, with no district judge adoption shown. opinion →
Holt v. Thompson Hine, LLP, the court decides whether KRS 413.245 governs the claim. KRS 413.140 appears only in the quoted text of that statute; the court does not decide any rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →
Molnar v. Tack House Pub, LLC, the court decided whether an agreement extended the limitations period under KRS 413.265; it did not decide a rule of KRS 413.140(1)(a). opinion →
Sweeten v. United States, the footnote reports an earlier Kentucky Supreme Court ruling about § 413.140(2); this court decides the timeliness issue under Montana law. opinion →
Sanchez v. Rodney McMillin, M.D., the court used § 413.140(1)(e) to identify claims covered by § 411.167’s certificate of merit requirement; it did not decide a rule of § 413.140 itself. opinion →
Scheper v. Wilson, No. The court applied KRS 413.245’s discovery rule; KRS 413.140 appears only as an exception in the quoted text of that statute, and the court did not decide any rule of Section 413.140. opinion →
Snowden v. Kevin Snyder Art M.D., the court decided whether the savings statute made the complaint timely, not a rule of § 413.140. The citation to § 413.140(1) describes the defendants’ motion. opinion →
Mekuria v. Martin, the court affirmed the limitations dismissal because Mekuria did not brief it; it did not decide a rule of § 413.140. opinion →
Sebolt v. Pindelski, the court gives an upper bound drawn from several states’ limitations periods but does not decide the rule of § 413.140 itself. opinion →
Sebolt v. Pindelski, the court decides the limitations period for a Bivens claim and cites § 413.140(1)(a) among several state statutes; it does not decide this section’s own rule. opinion →
Leonard v. Mercy Regional Emergency Medical System, L.L.C., the court expressly declined to decide whether § 413.140 applied; its discussion of that section was conditional. opinion →
Dotson v. Versailles Farm Home & Garden, the court mentions § 413.140(1)(b) while recounting Carr; its own limitations ruling applies § 413.125. opinion →
Halsey v. Holbrook Implement Co., LLC, this statement appears in the circuit court’s quoted order. The Court of Appeals does not decide the application of § 413.140. opinion →
Steven Rush Romines v. Honorable Timothy R Coleman, the court quotes the section in a footnote but decides no rule under it; its decision concerns venue and the availability of a writ. opinion →
Sandmann v. Rolling Stone, LLC, this statement appears in a dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
Milby v. Underwood, the court decided whether KRS 411.167 required a certificate of merit; it did not decide a rule under § 413.140 governing actions brought within one year. opinion →
City of Richmond, Kentucky v. Integrated Engineering, Pllc, the court decided the application of KRS 413.245. Section 413.140 appears only in the quoted text of that other statute, and the court did not decide any rule of Section 413.140. opinion →
Rodney McMillin, M.D. v. Sanchez, the court decides the certificate-of-merit requirements of KRS 411.167. Section 413.140(1)(e) only identifies an action to which those requirements apply. opinion →
Thompson v. Killary, the citation appears in this court’s account of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, not in its own decision about § 413.140. opinion →
louisville/jefferson County Metro Government v. Marlowe, the § 413.140 ruling is reported from the separate Render appeal; this opinion does not decide that section. opinion →
Johnny Reedy v. Bratcher, the limitations ruling was the Trial Court’s. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. opinion →
Webb v. Kentucky Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, Department of State Police, the court cited § 413.140 when considering prejudice from late service, but expressly declined to decide the limitations issue. opinion →
Boston v. Commonwealth Health Corporation, Inc., the court decided the scope of KRS 411.167’s certificate-of-merit requirement. It cited § 413.140(1)(e) as a cross-reference without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
Manley v. Franklin County, Kentucky, the court treats the limitations period as undisputed and decides relation back under Rule 15, without deciding a rule of § 413.140. opinion →
Pryor v. Baptist Health Medical Group, Inc., the court decides whether the certificate-of-merit requirement in KRS § 411.167 applies; it does not decide a rule of § 413.140. opinion →
Eitel v. Stoll, Keenon, Ogden PLLC, the court decides the limitation period under KRS 413.245. It mentions KRS 413.140 only as an exception and does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
O'Brien v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, the court mentions the possible time bar while weighing a Rule 4(m) service extension; it does not decide a rule of § 413.140. opinion →
Mulligan v. Baker, this sentence reports the U.S. District Court’s ruling; the appellate court does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Baker v. Mulligan, the opinion reports the federal district court’s limitations ruling; this court does not decide Section 413.140’s rules. opinion →
Buckner v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the court treated the one-year period as a conditional alternative; it dismissed the claim under the four-year period. opinion →
Tew v. MCML Limited, the court decides whether common law tolling applies. Its only reference to § 413.140(2) appears in a quotation from another case; it does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Wright v. Deaconess Union County Hospital, the court quotes § 413.140(1)(e) to identify the actions subject to § 411.167, but decides the certificate-of-merit requirement under § 411.167. opinion →
Meade v. Tackett, the cited ruling was the circuit court’s. The Court of Appeals declined to decide which statute of limitations applied. opinion →
Carl Edwin Stone, of the Estate of Catherine Stone v. Dean Dairy Holdings, LLC, D/B/A Dean Milk Company, LLC, the court does not decide whether § 413.140 applies; it resolves the limitations issue under § 413.245. opinion →
Wilson v. 3m Company F/K/A Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, the ruling under § 413.140(1)(a) was the circuit court’s; this court did not review it and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. opinion →
Mercy Regional Emergency Medical System, LLC v. The Estate of Joshua Adam Fuson, by Administratrixes, Amy Hickman and Da, the court decides tolling under KRS 413.170(1), not a rule of KRS 413.140. opinion →

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