Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.190

A spouse's legally enforceable premarital interest must first be assigned to that spouse, while property acquired during marriage and appreciation caused by the spouses' team effort are subject to division as marital property.

Smith v. Smith · filed 1973-06-29

If the court finds that she did, that interest first must be assigned to her and then the marital property divided, if any was acquired during the short period of the marriage (KRS 403.-190; Cf. Colley v. Colley, supra), or if there was an increase in value of property after the marriage due to team effort as contrasted with an increase caused by general economic conditions, she is entitled to share in that increase.

For purposes of § 403.190, property means equity in property, and marital and nonmarital interests may be valued in proportion to their respective contributions to total equity.

Newman v. Newman · filed 1980-02-12

We hasten at this point to add, however, that as used in KRS 403.190 the word “property” includes equity in property. ... We do concur in the formula used by the trial court in arriving at the monetary value of the interest of the parties.

Mixed property is apportioned by applying the respective percentages of marital and nonmarital contributions to the equity at distribution.

Brandenburg v. Brandenburg · filed 1981-06-19

The court therein approved the formula utilized by the lower court, saying that the interests of the parties were “the same percentages as their respective contributions to the total equity in the property.” In other words, there is to be established a relationship between the nonmarital contribution and the total contribution, and between the marital contribution and the total contribution. These relationships, reduced to percentages, shall be multiplied by the equity in the property at the time of distribution to establish the value of the nonmarital and marital properties.

Dissipation may affect a just division only when marital property was spent for a nonmarital purpose while separation or dissolution was impending and with a clear intent to deprive the other spouse of a proportionate share.

Robinette v. Robinette · filed 1987-07-24(1)

We believe the concept of dissipation, that is, spending funds for a nonmarital purpose, is an appropriate one for the court to consider when the property is expended (1) during a period when there is a separation or dissolution impending, and (2) where there is a clear showing of intent to deprive one’s spouse of his or her proportionate share of the marital property.

A vested right to participate in an employment stock plan is marital property to the extent accrued during marriage even when the underlying shares have not vested and may never be fully acquired.

McGinnis v. McGinnis · filed 1995-07-28(2)

the value of appellant’s vested right of future participation in an employment benefit plan was a valuable deferred compensation right even though it might never be fully exercised. It follows, therefore, that the court did not err by finding that the value of appellant’s accrued ownership rights in the nonvested stock constituted marital property.

Veterans' disability benefits lose their federal exemption when converted into a permanent investment, and a residence purchased with commingled benefit funds and marital earnings is divisible marital property.

Bischoff v. Bischoff · filed 1998-08-14(1)

that Marshall’s disability benefits lost their exempt status when invested in the parties’ residence. The residence was marital property subject to division in just proportions under KRS 403.190. Having found that Marshall’s disability payment funds had been co-mingled with Ardith’s earnings and the proceeds of the tobacco enterprise to purchase the property, the trial judge did not err in awarding one-half of the equity in the residence to Ardith.

If a spouse fails to prove what portion of appreciation is attributable to a nonmarital contribution, subsection (3) classifies the increase as marital property.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2006-02-10(3)

By virtue of the KRS 403.190(3) presumption, the failure to do so -will result in the increase being characterized as marital property.

A court must first assign each spouse's nonmarital property to that spouse before dividing the marital property in just proportions.

Willis v. Willis · filed 2012-03-09(1)

court must “assign each spouse’s property to him.” KRS 403.190(1). Once that has been accomplished, the family court must divide the marital property in just proportions after considering several factors.

The court assigns each spouse's nonmarital property before dividing marital property, and need not factor the amount of that nonmarital property into the marital-property division.

Glenn Keith Greenfield, Sr. v. Donna Sue Wallen Greenfield (Now Donna Sue Wallen) · filed 2022-08-04(1)

But KRS 403.190(1) requires the marital property to be divided in just proportions; it does not require the trial court to consider the amount of non-marital property in making this division. The trial court equitably divides the marital property between the parties only after it has assigned each party’s non-marital property to that party.

When spouses cannot agree and numerous marital assets are difficult to value, the court may order a commissioner’s sale and divide the net proceeds.

Childers v. Childers · filed 2023-04-20(1)

In the face of the parties’ inability to agree and the numerous items subject to division, the trial court elected to refer all the marital property to the master commissioner for sale.

A deed naming only one spouse does not by itself determine whether the other spouse retained a marital ownership interest in property acquired during marriage.

Barnette v. Grizzly Processing, LLC · filed 2011-08-22(3)

Thus, the name on the deed alone does not answer the question of whether Sellards retained an interest in the property when he conveyed it to his then-wife Phyllis.

Property acquired during marriage is presumed marital, and the party claiming otherwise bears the burden of tracing it to a statutory exception.

Terwilliger v. Terwilliger · filed 2002-02-11(2), (3)

The presumption in Kentucky is that all property acquired during the course of the marriage is marital property, unless the property can be shown to have originated in one of the excepted ways outlined in KRS 403.190(2). A party claiming that property acquired during the marriage is other than marital property, bears the burden of proof.

A spouse claiming a specific item acquired during marriage is nonmarital must prove a statutory exception by clear and convincing evidence, not merely by counsel's statement.

Tonya Sherrie Hall v. Hall · filed 2022-06-09(2), (3)

Therefore, to merit reversal, Tonya would have to establish that specific items of property were excepted from the marital presumption by clear and convincing evidence. ... Regarding the tractor, the sole support offered for Tonya’s claimed exception as a non-marital gift, pursuant to KRS 403.190(2)(b), is her attorney’s statement to the circuit court that the item originated from her father absent any mention of an agreement. This is not evidence.

Classification and assignment of nonmarital property are mandatory rather than discretionary, and a court may not reclassify it as marital merely to produce an equitable overall distribution.

Jones v. Jones · filed 2008-02-01(1), (2)(e)

As such, the family court erred as a matter of law by classifying the TTPP payments as marital property in order to effectuate a fair distribution of property. The classification of TTPP payments as marital or nonmarital is not discretionary.

A court must restore each spouse's proven nonmarital contribution before equitably dividing the marital interest and may not substitute an equitable property award for maintenance.

Fehr v. Fehr · filed 2008-10-03(1)

The parties are then awarded their non-marital interests without deference to other considerations. The court has no discretion to divide nonmarital property but only to restore the property to the contributing party. In this case, the family court ignored the dictates of KRS 403.190 when it awarded the villa to Maren.

For purposes of restoring each spouse’s property under Section 403.190, property means the spouse’s equity rather than the asset’s gross value.

Nalley v. Nalley · filed 2020-09-03(1)

“[a]s used in KRS 403.190 in referring to restoration of the property of each spouse, the word ‘property’ means equity.”

A spouse’s belief that marital property should later go to the parties’ children does not rebut subsection (3)’s marital-property presumption without sufficient evidence that a gift was actually made.

Fearer v. Fearer · filed 2024-05-02(3)

Additionally, Shannon did not present sufficient evidence that would have rebutted the presumption in KRS 403.190(3) and allowed the circuit court to have designated the Corvette as anything other than marital property. During the hearing, Brian requested the award of the Corvette and testified it was purchased during the marriage with marital funds and titled in his name. (V.R. – Apr. 21, 2023 Hearing, at 2:04:40.) At no point did Brian address whether he intended to convey the Corvette as a gift to the sons, nor was he questioned about it by Shannon’s counsel. Shannon also testified the Corvette was acquired using funds from the sale of one of the parties’ previous marital homes. (V.R. – Apr. 21, 2023 Hearing, at 2:51:00.) ... She later stated that she believed it would only be fair for the parties’ sons to have it because they want to work on it. (V.R. – Apr. 21, 2023 Hearing, at 2:55:50.) This contradicts her position that it was already gifted to their sons.

Appreciation in stock received as a nonmarital gift remains nonmarital when a third party's management, rather than either spouse's significant activities, caused the increase in value.

Krallman v. Krallman · filed 2025-01-17(2)(a)

In the case at hand, the court held that only Mr. Krallman’s father was responsible for any increase in value of the business and stock because he was the company’s owner, owned all of the voting stock, and made all of the decisions for the company. In Allison, Mr. Allison was the primary operator of the business and owned all of the stock; however, in this case, Mr. Krallman was an employee, and ... it was his father who was the owner and primary operator of the business. We believe substantial evidence is present to indicate that this case is distinguishable from Allison. We agree that any increase in value of Mr. Krallman’s nonmarital stock was also nonmarital because it was not attributable directly to him. If the increase in value was not a result of Mr. Krallman’s actions, then Ms. Krallman’s contributions as a homemaker also did not lead to an increase in value.

Property acquired after marriage and before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property.

Becker v. Becker · filed 1979-01-19(3)

Besides the untimeliness of this assertion, the validity of such a contention is brought into question by the provision in KRS 403.190(3) that when, as here, property is acquired after marriage but before a decree of legal separation, it is presumed to be marital property.

Gift or inheritance money invested in a marital residence gives the recipient spouse a nonmarital interest proportionate to that investment after deducting the mortgage and determining the residence's present value.

Farmer v. Farmer · filed 1974-02-15(2)(b)

Applying those enactments to the case at hand, we hold that $10,000 of the money which Jane received by gift or inheritance from her parents and grandmother and which she invested in the residence must be restored to her. To do this, it should be declared that she owns an interest in that residence in proportion to that investment.

Property owned before marriage or acquired by inheritance is treated as nonmarital property at dissolution only when it can be traced into an asset then owned by the parties.

Turley v. Turley · filed 1978-02-17(2), (3)

In this case, Mr. Turley failed to show that any property owned by the parties at the time of the separation was acquired by use of his inheritance or from the proceeds from the sale of the automobile and furniture owned by him prior to the marriage. Because he did not trace the inheritance or the proceeds, if any, from the disposition of the automobile and furniture, it was error for the trial court to award him the value of such items.

A spouse who traces nonmarital funds into replacement property is entitled to the appreciated value of that interest except to the extent appreciation resulted from the parties' joint efforts.

Woosnam v. Woosnam · filed 1979-05-18(2)(b), (2)(e)

These statutes mandate restoration to the spouse having a nonmarital interest in property owned at the date of marriage, the appreciated value of that same interest in any property acquired in exchange during the marriage, not attributable to the joint efforts of the parties. The only requirement is that the spouse prove that the nonmarital funds have been reinvested in the property acquired in exchange.

Nonmarital assets must be traced into assets owned at dissolution, but documentary proof and mathematical precision are not required when credible evidence and the parties' financial history establish the connection.

Chenault v. Chenault · filed 1990-11-08(2)(b), (3)

Accordingly, we shall adhere to the general requirement that nonmarital assets be traced into assets owned at the time of dissolution, but relax some of the draconian requirements heretofore laid down. ... It is unremarkable and less than fatal to her position that Ruby was unable to document every interest payment and reinvestment made during a 16-year period.

A claimant must trace nonmarital assets into specific property rather than merely show that nonmarital property entered the marriage.

Polley v. Allen · filed 2004-04-02(3)

A claimant cannot meet the tracing requirement simply by showing that he or she brought non-marital property into the marriage without also showing that he or she has spent his or her non-marital assets in a traceable manner during the marriage. Under such circumstances, the trial court will not assign the property to the claimant as non-marital property, but it may consider non-marital contribution as a factor when it makes a just division of the parties’ marital property.

A claimant must adequately trace exchanged premarital assets into assets existing at dissolution, and a financially sophisticated claimant may be held to stringent tracing requirements.

Kleet v. Kleet · filed 2007-08-03(2)(b), (3)

The family court did not abuse its discretion in holding Allan to the more stringent tracing requirements, if indeed it did so. However, while noting his professional experience and expertise, the family court never stated that it was holding Allan to a higher standard, and it is not clear that it did so. Rather, it appears that the court held that he did not satisfy any standard to sufficiently trace his premarital assets into assets existing at the time of the divorce.

A spouse claiming property acquired during marriage is nonmarital must trace the acquisition funds to premarital assets by clear and convincing evidence; the other spouse need not prove marital funds were used.

Crawford v. Crawford · filed 2011-12-16(2)(b), (3)

Because the property was purchased and the cabinet shop was built after their marriage in April 2001, it was James’s burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the funds used to purchase the property and build the improvements were traced to his nonmarital assets. And, it is not Virginia’s burden to establish that marital funds were used to purchase the property and improvements, although she did testify that this was the case.

A claimant who cannot document or trace an asserted premarital asset through commingled accounts and successive property exchanges is not entitled to its restoration as nonmarital property.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2014-05-23(2)(e), (3)

Thus, Janet did not meet her evidentiary burden to prove the amount of the non-marital portion or to trace it to the Fidelity IRA. We conclude, as did the trial court, that because the IRA was opened in 1987, it is presumed to be marital. Indeed, the annuity’s earnings or contributions between 1984 and 1987 are definitely marital.

A spouse's testimony alone, without documentary evidence linking premarital purchase funds through successive sales and acquisitions, is insufficient to trace a nonmarital interest into the marital residence.

McVicker v. McVicker · filed 2015-02-06(2)(b), (3)

William’s testimony, alone, is not sufficient to meet his burden of proof that he had a non-marital interest in the marital residence. Therefore, the family court’s findings of fact in this regard are not supported by substantial evidence of record and are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we hold that the family court erred as a matter of law in assigning William a $28,500.00 non-marital interest in the marital residence and reverse its decision.

A spouse may trace a nonmarital gift into the marital residence through substantial corroborating testimony even without producing the original gift instrument.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2016-10-28(2)(a)

Regardless of what the original intent for the CD was, the evidence establishes that the funds Mark and Amy used for the down payment on the Amherst, Ohio marital residence came from cashing in the CD. Substantial evidence in the record supports the family court’s findings on this issue. Therefore, we reject Mark’s claim that Amy failed to sufficiently trace her non-marital contribution to the marital residence.

A down payment made from a spouse's separate account before marriage is a traceable nonmarital contribution to a home acquired after marriage.

Rearden v. Rearden · filed 2009-10-09(1), (2)(b), (3)

Therefore, James clearly established the down payment used to acquire the marital home came from his personal non-marital account prior to the marriage.

A spouse who cannot adequately trace a claimed nonmarital portion of an account fails to overcome the marital-property presumption even if some portion probably originated from nonmarital funds.

Grumblatt v. Grumblatt · filed 2021-01-14(2), (3)

We agree with the family court that although some portion of the Ameriprise account was nonmarital, Robert failed to meet his burden of proving it. As such, based on the evidence presented, the family court properly characterized the entirety of the Ameriprise account as marital property under KRS 403.190.

A spouse claiming that property acquired during marriage is nonmarital must overcome the marital presumption with clear and convincing tracing evidence.

Humphrey v. Humphrey · filed 2021-12-16(2)(b), (3)

Because the burden was on Gleason to prove the Corvette was nonmarital property by clear and convincing evidence, the circuit court found the Corvette was marital property. We find no error in the court’s findings, and the conclusions are reasonable.

A spouse who traces proceeds from premarital property into the marital home must prove the amount of the premarital interest; proof only that some sale proceeds were used is insufficient.

Byrdwell v. Byrdwell · filed 2022-01-27(2), (3)

It is clear that the proceeds of the sale of the condominium went toward the purchase of the marital home, but it is unclear how much of those proceeds are nonmarital. Had Appellant provided proof of how much of the condominium’s mortgage he had paid prior to the marriage, his argument might be more persuasive. We agree with the trial court that Appellant failed to meet his burden in proving his nonmarital interest in the marital home.

Uncontroverted testimony may establish tracing without complete documentary proof when the court detects no deception or exaggeration and other evidence corroborates the nonmarital source.

Harpe v. Harpe · filed 2023-03-02(2)(a), (3)

We hold the family court did not err in determining Wife had adequately traced each item of contested property to her bequests. Wife produced ample evidence tracing her bequests as she moved them to different accounts. ... Because this testimonial evidence was uncontroverted and the family court apparently detected no deception or exaggeration which required it to demand additional proof, it was not error for the family court to rely upon testimony to reach its conclusions.

Nonmarital money remains adequately traced in a commingled account when the account balance never falls below the amount of nonmarital funds deposited.

Allen v. Allen · filed 1979-07-06(2)

We think the requirement of tracing should be fulfilled, at least as far as money is concerned, when it is shown that nonmarital funds were deposited and commingled with marital funds and that the balance of the account was never reduced below the amount of the nonmari-tal funds deposited.

Appreciation attributable to inherited funds that were adequately traced through a marital account remains the contributing spouse’s nonmarital property.

Jones v. Livesay · filed 2018-06-01(2)(a)

The evidence presented was sufficient to require a finding the increase in the value of the farm was due to Sam's expenditure of nonmarital funds and should be assigned to him.

Commingled nonmarital cash is not fully traceable when the joint account balance fell below the deposited nonmarital amount, though specific remaining assets may still be traced separately.

Wolf v. Hamilton · filed 2021-05-06(2), (3)

We cannot agree with Wolf that he properly traced all existing funds and assets to the deposit of his workers’ compensation settlement funds. It is undisputed that the joint account “was reduced below the amount of the nonmarital funds deposited.”

A nonmarital interest remains nonmarital when funds from prior property are adequately traced into construction costs and replacement funds used for the marital residence.

Orbank v. Orbank · filed 2020-08-20(2)(b)

Assigning this property as nonmarital was correct.

Household furniture may be classified as nonmarital when inherited funds are used to pay off the debt incurred to acquire it.

Hall v. Caudill · filed 2023-07-27(2)(b)

We believe there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision to award Appellee the furniture as a nonmarital asset.

An increase in a retirement account’s value during marriage is presumed marital under subsection (3), and the spouse claiming a nonmarital share must rebut that presumption with clear and convincing tracing evidence.

Burdette v. Burdette · filed 2024-02-29(3)

Like Marc, Mary failed to rebut the presumption that all the increase in the value of her non-marital contributions is marital property.

Commingling nonmarital and marital funds does not automatically convert an account to marital property when its balance falls below the premarital balance; tracing may still establish a nonmarital interest in whole or in part.

Jabrazko v. Kleiman · filed 2024-03-21(2), (3)

To be clear, we do not overrule or modify Allen. Rather, we reiterate that when nonmarital funds have been comingled with marital funds – resulting in a balance lower at dissolution than prior to the marriage – tracing may permit a party claiming a nonmarital interest to obtain such, either in whole or in part.

A spouse claiming additional nonmarital property bears the burden of identifying and tracing it, and a family court need not accept conclusory testimony and records as establishing that claim.

Clyncke v. Jodie Verbeten (Clyncke) Pointer · filed 2024-05-16(2), (3)

The parties hotly disputed the designation of Husband’s claims of non-marital assets, and it was his burden alone to establish these claims. As he failed to do so, we therefore decline to address these issues further.

Relaxed tracing rules do not permit a court to award a speculative nonmarital percentage of deferred compensation; without evidence substantiating the premarital percentage, the payout and property acquired from it are marital.

Bryant v. Bryant · filed 2024-06-13(3)

However, tracing requires some evidence, especially where, as here, we are dealing with educated businesspersons with several million dollars’ worth of assets. ... In the absence of any evidence to substantiate Helen’s claim regarding the nonmarital percentage of the DCP payout, the family court should have classified the payout as marital, and therefore, the beach house as marital.

An undisputed nonmarital contribution need not be proven with further documentation when the claimant straightforwardly traces it into the currently owned asset.

Mewes v. Mewes · filed 2026-02-27(2)(b)

“When a nonmarital contribution is undisputed, the party claiming that property as nonmarital is relieved of any obligation to prove otherwise.” ... The tracing involved here was relatively straightforward, and the family court did not clearly err by not requiring further specific documentation from Chris.

Section 403.190's direction to assign each spouse's property was construed with KRS 392.090 to divest a former spouse of an interest as beneficiary of the other spouse's life-insurance policy upon divorce.

Denton v. Travelers Insurance Co. · filed 1977-06-24(1)

We interpret KRS 403.190 and KRS 392.090 together to dictate that under the circumstances of this case the dissolution of marriage divested Iva Ping of any interest she enjoyed as beneficiary of the life insurance policy of her former husband, James Ping.

Section 403.190(1) did not change the rule that divorce terminates a spouse's beneficiary interest in a life-insurance policy on the other spouse.

Kentucky Central Life Insurance Co. v. Willett · filed 1977-10-14(1)

We accordingly hold that KRS 403.-190(1) does not alter or change the rule that divorce bars the spouse’s recovery as a designated beneficiary of life insurance policies on the other’s life.

Section 403.190 does not automatically cancel an unaddressed life-insurance beneficiary designation upon divorce; a decree that leaves the interest undisposed is treated as having adjudicated the parties' interests, and the named beneficiary remains entitled absent a later change.

Ping v. Denton · filed 1978-02-21(1)

Any interest that either James or Iva may have had in or to any property, estate or interest of the other, which remained undisposed of by the trial judge, is in the posture as if the court had so adjudged their respective interests. ... Not having changed the beneficiary at the time of his death, Iva was entitled to receive the proceeds from the policy of insurance.

A term life-insurance policy with no cash or present value is not property subject to division, and its beneficiary has only a defeasible expectancy.

Alley v. Alley · filed 2022-09-08(2), (3)

“[A] term policy with no cash or present value . . . is not property and not subject to division under KRS 403.190(2) and (3).”

A term life-insurance policy with no present or cash-surrender value is not property divisible under Section 403.190, because its proceeds arise only after death and the beneficiary designation is merely a defeasible expectancy.

Davis v. Davis · filed 1989-08-25(2), (3)

Although it cannot seriously be argued that the right to dispose of over $100,000 worth of insurance proceeds is not a valuable right, nevertheless it is not property and not subject to division under KRS 403.190(2) and (3). ... A named beneficiary acquires no right other than a defeasible vested interest, a mere expectancy.

Before applying Section 403.190's property-division factors, the court must develop evidence of the property values, debts, ownership, the parties' income, and other relevant circumstances.

Hoffman v. Hoffman · filed 1977-07-01(1)

KRS 403.190 sets forth the factors to be considered in the division of property. ... We believe the court should require further proof under its direct supervision or that of the master commissioner and at the conclusion thereof, apply the principles of the statute and cases decided thereunder.

A court cannot determine whether a property division is just when the trial court made no findings on the properties' values or on what portions are nonmarital.

Robinson v. Robinson · filed 1977-02-18(1)

This court, however, cannot rectify this apparent inequitable distribution since it cannot from the findings of fact and conclusions of law determine if, in fact, this disposition is inequitable. The trial judge, in his findings and conclusions, did not make specific findings as to the values of the property awarded and did not make a determination as to what portion, if any, of the drive-in and market constituted non-marital property.

A court classifying commingled accounts must make findings identifying the account into which nonmarital funds were deposited and that account's relevant balance before deciding whether the funds were traced.

Mattingly v. Fidanza · filed 2013-09-13(2)(a), (3)

We must agree with Michelle that the factual findings the family court made on this issue were lacking; the family court failed to make any findings related to the actual account into which the inherited funds were deposited or the balance in that account at the time of the hearing. Therefore, we must remand this matter to the family court to enter proper findings of fact and to then determine the proper designation and division of the UBS Accounts by applying the appropriate law to those facts.

Before dividing property, a court must make findings classifying each disputed asset and explaining how the statutory factors support a just division.

Salehi v. Kanjouri · filed 2020-12-17(1)

While admittedly the parties’ assets were not plentiful nor the division complex, a trial court is obligated to make findings on the marital or nonmarital nature of property in dispute and make a just division of the couple’s marital property by considering all relevant factors, including those listed in KRS 403.190(1).

A court dividing property must separate nonmarital property, divide marital property in just proportions under the statutory factors, and make specific findings sufficient for appellate review.

Hollon v. Hollon · filed 1981-11-24(1)

We think KRS 403.190 requires the trial judge to do more when distributing marital property. The statute clearly requires that non-marital property be separated and marital property divided in “just proportions” after considering all factors, including those enumerated in the statute. The trial judge also must find the facts and state them specifically in accordance with CR 52.01.

Section 403.190 requires a court to consider the listed property-division factors but does not itself require factual findings; that findings requirement comes from Civil Rule 52.01.

Anderson v. Johnson · filed 2011-09-22(1)

The statute construed in that simply does not require a trial court to make such findings — only that it “consider” a non-exhaustive list of factors in reaching its ultimate conclusions of law. ... No factual findings are required under the statute. Instead, the findings requirement comes from CR 52.01.

A dissolution order that neither classifies property as marital or nonmarital nor otherwise follows § 403.190 must be reversed for the required classification and division.

Sexton v. Sexton · filed 2022-04-14(1), (2)

The circuit court’s October 23, 2020, order failed to classify the property as marital or non-marital. ... Nor did it comply with other aspects of KRS 403.190. Therefore, we must reverse the circuit court’s findings on those issues.

A party’s weak presentation of evidence does not eliminate the court’s duty to classify and equitably divide marital and nonmarital property with supported findings.

Bradley v. Bradley · filed 2023-09-07(1)

While there were often failings on Polly’s part to present evidence to counter Randy’s, those do not eliminate the family court’s obligation to equitably assign and divide the marital and non-marital property under KRS 403.190.

A court may not award one spouse all equity in the marital residence without analyzing the statutory factors and explaining why the unequal distribution is just.

May v. May · filed 2024-01-18(1)

In attempting to accept James’s proposal, the family court failed to set forth its analysis of the requisite factors in KRS 403.190(1) when considering the Marital Residence equity.

Under subsection (1), a court dividing marital property must make findings about the property's value and the relevant statutory factors sufficient to support a just division; merely reciting those factors is insufficient.

Milliner v. Milliner · filed 2024-07-10(1)

Here, the family court’s decree had no findings at all related to the marital residence – a large asset – that would support its award, making its award both arbitrary as it was not supported by substantial evidence and an abuse of discretion. The court did not make any findings regarding the value of the property, either current or past, that would permit it to make a just division of the marital property as a whole. Likewise, the court did not make any findings related to the relevant factors set forth in KRS 403.190(1), other than reciting the factors and recognizing that a just division did not necessarily require an equal division, citing Cobane v. Cobane, 544 S.W.3d 672, 684 (Ky. App. 2018).

When the parties present grossly insufficient evidence to value property for division under subsection (1), the family court must direct them to submit expert proof, appoint its own expert at their expense, or order the property sold, and any equitable distribution must rest on specific valuation evidence.

Jean v. Jean · filed 2024-11-01(1)

Thus, the Family Court must, at the very least, direct the parties to submit expert testimony of their own at a new trial. Alternatively, it may appoint an expert of its own at the parties’ expense. As a third and final option, it may direct the property to be sold. When obtaining values of the property in order to divide it potentially, the Family Court will need an expert appraisal of the real property as a whole, including separately the land underlying the residence, the residence itself, and any other structures. An equitable distribution – if such distribution is ultimately made – will have to be based upon this type of specific evidence.

When a spouse's interest in a closely held business is marital property, subsection (1)(b) requires the family court to determine its value and devise a means to divide that value between the spouses.

Miller v. Reid · filed 2025-02-28(1)(b)

Pursuant to our Supreme Court’s holding in Gaskill and the specific provisions of KRS 403.190, we conclude that the family court is required to determine the value of Reid’s interest in Axia Women’s Health and to devise a means by which that value can be divided between the parties. Consequently, we ... must remand the matter to the family court for further findings of fact and for the statutorily required valuation.

A party waives an appellate claim that the trial court failed to make specific findings on each subsection (1) factor by failing to request more specific findings under the civil rules.

Mi Hui Salyer v. Salyer · filed 2025-03-28(1)

Moreover, Mi Hui argues that reversal is required because the trial court did not make specific findings as to each of the factors set forth in KRS 403.190. However, she did not move the trial court for more specific findings, calling into question whether Mi Hui waived this argument, thus precluding our review. See CR 52.02; see also Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Ky. App. ... 2004) (citing CR 52.02) (“In the absence of a request for more specific findings on [property-division issues], we conclude that any error has been waived.”).

Record title does not control assignment under Section 403.190, so land conveyed jointly by a spouse's relative as a gift is that spouse's nonmarital property unless the other spouse was named as grantee for a reason independent of the marriage.

Angel v. Angel · filed 1978-02-17(1), (2)(a), (3)

Under KRS 403.190(3), marital property is divided without regard to record title. When the trial court assigns “each spouse’s property” pursuant to KRS 403.190(1), record title should not be controlling. Therefore, the tract conveyed in 1961 by gift from the wife’s brother should be considered as the wife’s nonmarital property unless the trial court finds that Ester Angel was named as a grantee for a reason other than his marriage to Mossie Lee.

Clear and convincing proof that property was given without consideration is required to overcome the presumption that property acquired during marriage is marital.

Adams v. Adams · filed 1978-04-14(2)(a), (3)

The question of whether property is considered marital or nonmarital is dependent on whether the property was a gift or was received as a result of consideration. To overcome the presumption that the property is marital, clear and convincing proof must be presented to show that the property was given as a gift.

A jointly executed deed and contemporaneous evidence of donative intent can convert one spouse's nonmarital realty into marital property owned equally by both spouses.

Shaida v. Shaida · filed 2021-07-01(2)(a), (3)

The family court was entitled to make a finding based on the language of the deed and based on the attorney’s letter that Wency intended to convert what had been her nonmarital property into marital property which she gifted to the two of them with the intention that Punam would own 50% of the properties in the event that their partnership dissolved.

Property shown by the evidence to have been given to a spouse is excluded from the marital estate as a gift.

Ghali v. Ghali · filed 1980-03-07(2)(a)

The trial judge was not clearly erroneous in finding that the two rings were gifts to the wife within the meaning of KRS 403.190. The statute provides that each spouse may be assigned personal property. Here, the evidence supports the determination that the rings were gifts.

A discretionary federal housing grant made solely to accommodate a disabled veteran is a gift and must be restored to that spouse as nonmarital property.

McGlone v. McGlone · filed 1981-03-31(2)(a)

We are of the further opinion the grant to movant was a gift within the meaning of KRS 403.190(2) and should have been restored to him as non-marital property.

Evidence that a jointly titled gift was intended for only one spouse can rebut the marital-property presumption regardless of documentary title.

Hunter v. Hunter · filed 2003-07-03(2)(a), (3)

Even if KRS 403.190(3) were construed to create a marital presumption, the interrelationship between subsection (3) and subsection (2)(a) indicates that the presumption can be rebutted by evidence of a gift intended for one spouse regardless of the documentary title.

Donor intent is the paramount factor in deciding whether property acquired during marriage was a nonmarital gift to one spouse, who bears the burden of proving the exception.

Jewell B. Mason v. Mason · filed 2022-02-17(2)(a), (3)

And, donor intent is considered the paramount factor in determining whether the transfer was a gift to one spouse. ... Additionally, the party claiming a nonmarital interest in property acquired during the marriage bears the burden of proof upon that issue.

How spouses use or report income from property does not control whether the underlying property is a nonmarital gift.

Lucinda May Rogers v. Rogers · filed 2023-10-26(2)(a)

How the parties dealt with income relating to a property does not necessarily control whether the property is marital.

Property bought with marital earnings and transferred between spouses remains marital when the transfer only changes its form or possession rather than making a statutory gift.

O'Neill v. O'Neill · filed 1980-06-06(2)(a)

When the money was exchanged for the purchased items, the marital property merely assumed a different form; it retained its character as marital property. Mere change of possession of the property between spouses during the marital relationship and while the parties were living together would not affect their equities as granted by the statute.

A third party's gift to both spouses during marriage is marital property to be divided in just proportions, rather than either spouse's separate nonmarital property.

Calloway v. Calloway · filed 1992-06-12(1), (2)(a)

Based on the Kentucky legislature’s clear intent that jointly owned property acquired during the marriage be divided upon dissolution in just proportions, we now hold that gifts during marriage from third parties to both spouses shall be treated as marital property upon dissolution.

Money gifted by third parties to both spouses during marriage is marital property, and the spouse claiming an individual gift bears the burden of proving the donor intended it for that spouse alone.

Gertler v. Gertler · filed 2010-01-15(2)(a), (3)

The circuit court found that the monetary gifts from Chad’s parents were given jointly to the parties during their marriage; therefore, those gifts were marital property. Since these determinations are supported by substantial evidence, the circuit court’s ruling on this issue is not clearly erroneous.

Forgiveness of a debt incurred to buy a business is marital property rather than a gift when it was exchanged for the debtor spouse's promise to continue employing and assisting the creditor.

Underwood v. Underwood · filed 1992-07-03(2)(a), (3)

We believe the only logical interpretation of the amended contract is that the parties’ mutual promises were supported by consideration and were not given gratuitously. Consequently, we hold that the trial court clearly erred when it excluded a portion of the insurance agency from marital property.

Nonmarital property does not become marital merely because it is exchanged for property placed in both spouses’ names.

Sexton v. Sexton · filed 2004-01-22(3)

Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s contention that Appellee’s nonmarital interest in the apartment building transmuted into a marital interest solely because the partnership interest was placed in their joint names.

A spouse may gift nonmarital funds to the marital estate by spending them on the marital home while expressly representing that the home will be joint marital property.

Barber v. Bradley · filed 2016-12-15(2)(a), (3)

By repeatedly promising Bradley that the house was “half hers” and executing a deed that reflected that agreement, Barber transferred his nonmarital interest in the home to the marital estate as a gift. Therefore, we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the equity in the home was marital property, and we further find no error in the court’s conclusion that Barber and Bradley each are entitled to a one-half share.

Placing nonmarital property in joint names or a revocable trust does not transmute it into marital property without evidence of a gift to the marital estate or an agreement between the spouses.

Willis v. Rankin · filed 2022-04-07(2), (3)

Thus, this Court must reject Gregory’s argument that, by placing the funds in question in both names, Laura’s nonmarital properly was “transmuted” into marital property.

A spouse claiming jointly acquired property as an individual gift must prove the donor’s intent; unsupported testimony need not overcome the marital-property presumption.

Beets v. Beets · filed 2023-11-29(2)(a), (3)

Other than his own testimony, Andie cites no evidence in the record to show their intent to transfer the property to him as a gift. The court was unconvinced by his testimony. This is not an abuse of discretion.

A deed placing sole title in one spouse does not by itself prove a valid agreement excluding the other spouse’s marital interest under subsection (2)(d).

Rhorer v. Rhorer · filed 2024-02-29(2)(d)

“Kentucky law clearly mandates that how title to property is held is not determinative as to whether the property in question is non-marital or marital.” Muir v. Muir, 406 S.W.3d 31, 36 (Ky. App. 2013). Husband argues in support of the validity of the deed, asserting all legal requirements for a valid deed have been met. But, even if the deed is valid and Husband holds sole title to the house, that would not, without more, negate Wife’s marital interest in the home. The deed alone does not prove the parties intended to exclude the equity from marital property.

Adding a spouse to deeds for inherited real property does not convert the property to marital property when the evidence shows no intent to make a present gift.

Pamela Rena Boone (f/K/A Pamela Rena Baldwin) v. Baldwin · filed 2024-04-18(2)(a)

The family court had evidence before it which adequately supported a finding that the disputed real property was Baldwin’s nonmarital property and that it retained this character even after the new deeds were recorded. ... The family court did not abuse its discretion by making this finding, and its ultimate classification of the real property was correct as a matter of law.

Jointly titling a home purchased solely with inherited funds does not establish a gift to the other spouse without clear and convincing evidence of donative intent.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2024-06-20(2)(a)

To support its classification of the home as a gift, the court cites only to the deed which lists both parties as owners. This is not determinative of Robert’s intent. See Sexton, 125 S.W.3d at 265 (footnote omitted). Therefore, Heather did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Robert intended to gift her the home and the court’s finding thereto was erroneous.

A spouse claiming that property acquired during marriage is nonmarital under the gift exception bears the burden of proof, and testimony from the spouse and alleged donor does not compel a gift finding when credibility and other evidence support treating the property as marital.

William Garrison Thompson v. Thompson · filed 2024-11-01(2)(b), (3)

Furthermore, “[l]ike other nonmarital claimants of property acquired during marriage, a party claiming that property is nonmarital by reason of the gift exception has the burden to prove it.” Sexton, 125 S.W.3d at 267 (footnote omitted). ... Ultimately, the family court concluded that Husband had not met his burden of proof that the gift exception applies. See Sexton, 125 S.W.3d at 267 (footnote omitted). Cf. Lewis v. Fulkerson, 650 S.W.3d 288 (Ky. App. 2022) (affirming trial court’s holding that wife satisfied her burden in demonstrating that a $1,700,000 trust in wife’s name was a gift to wife). We have been presented with no clear legal or factual dictate that necessitates reversal here. Therefore, in consideration of the arguments and record presented on appeal, we cannot ... conclude that the family court committed clear error in its factual findings, or that it ultimately abused its discretion in the disposition of property.

A spouse invoking the gift exception must prove by clear and convincing evidence that property acquired during marriage was gifted solely to that spouse.

Kelli Gwendolyn Wright v. Wright · filed 2025-08-29(2)(a), (3)

The courts have strictly held to the mandate that an exception must apply for property acquired during a marriage to be considered non-marital. Stallings v. Stallings, 606 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Ky. 1980). In asserting the gift exception of KRS 403.190(2)(a), Kelli bears the burden of proving the property in question was a gift made solely to her, to the exclusion of Jeff, and her proof must be “clear and convincing” to overcome the statutory presumption that property owned during the marriage is marital.

Record title alone does not determine whether a residence is marital or nonmarital.

Anderson v. Anderson · filed 2026-02-27(3)

However, the fact that Kristen’s name was not on the deed is not dispositive of the home’s characterization.

Section 403.190 gives the trial court broad discretion to divide marital property after considering all relevant factors, and its supported findings are reviewed for clear error.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1978-03-24(1)

KRS 403.190 vests in the trial court wide discretion in the division of marital property. The court is directed to consider “all relevant factors” including those enumerated within the statute. It is apparent from the court’s findings and from the record, the court complied with this statute in its division of the marital property.

Section 403.190 permits an unequal division of marital property based on the parties' contributions when the resulting allocation is reasonable and supported by the evidence.

Bruton v. Bruton · filed 1978-07-14(1)

We may not disturb the findings of a chancellor in a divorce case unless they are clearly erroneous. ... Appellant’s total award of marital property exceeds forty percent (40%), and we find no basis for concluding that is unreasonable under the circumstances.

Section 403.190(1) requires division of marital property in just proportions after considering all relevant factors, not an equal division.

Wood v. Wood · filed 1986-10-10(1)

Although the appellee argues that the marital estate should have been divided equally, there is no statutory basis for such an argument. Rather, the trial court is to divide the marital property in just proportions, considering all relevant factors. KRS 403.190(1).

A court abuses its discretion by giving disproportionate weight to one statutory factor and must weigh all relevant factors when dividing marital property in just proportions.

Dotson v. Dotson · filed 1993-10-28(1)

We agree that under such circumstances the question of respective contributions by the spouses is simply inapplicable. ... Here, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Bonita 85% of the marital estate merely because it accumulated primarily from her non-marital property. We agree that upon remand the trial court should make a reapportionment of marital property, giving the factor of “contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property” only such weight as is fairly reflected by the evidence in this specific case, while also giving appropriate weight to the other statutory factors.

Section 403.190(1) requires a just division of marital property, not an equal division, and creates no presumption of equality.

Heskett v. Heskett · filed 2008-01-04(1)

Additionally, while we recognize that the trial court attempted to equally divide the parties’ property, KRS 403.190(1) requires courts to divide marital property “in just proportions,” which does not necessarily equate with an equal division of marital property.

An equitable division need not be equal, but an equal division is permissible when supported by the marriage's duration, each spouse's contributions, the property set apart, and their economic circumstances.

Brosnan v. Brosnan · filed 2012-02-03(1)

Moreover, although not required to accomplish an equitable division of property pursuant to KRS 403.190, because of the duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party, the lack of nonmarital property awarded, and the parties’ economic circumstances, the family court found that an equitable division was an equal division.

A just division of marital property lies within the family court's discretion and need not be equal when the court considers the statutory factors.

Hempel v. Hempel · filed 2012-09-21(1)

What constitutes a just division lies within the sound discretion of the family court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

Just proportions does not mean equal shares; the requirement is satisfied when the court considers the statutory factors.

Muir v. Muir · filed 2013-07-26(1)

“Just proportions” does not mean that the property must be equally divided, but only that a consideration of the factors in KRS 403.190 has been made.

Section 403.190 requires a division in just proportions, not an equal division of the marital estate.

Garrett v. Garrett · filed 1989-03-17(1)

KRS 403.190 does not require an equal division of the marital estate but requires the court to divide the property in “just proportions.”

A court dividing marital property must consider all relevant factors, including each factor enumerated in subsection (1)(a) through (d).

Stipp v. Charles · filed 2009-07-02(1)

court followed the statute and considered “all relevant factors,” including those listed in KRS 403.190(l)(a)-(d).

Marital property is divided in just proportions after considering each spouse's contributions, separate property, the marriage's duration, and each spouse's economic circumstances.

Hall v. Glenas Dewey Hall · filed 2021-01-21(1)

Pursuant to the provisions of KRS 403.190, the family court divides marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant factors, including: the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property; the value of the property set apart to each spouse; the duration of the parties’ marriage; and the economic circumstances of each spouse when the distribution of the property is to become effective.

A just division of marital property is equitable but need not be equal, and the family court has broad discretion after considering all relevant factors.

Harmon Jr v. Harmon · filed 2021-08-05(1)

Pursuant to KRS 403.190(1), the family court must divide the parties’ marital property in just proportions after considering all relevant factors. ... And, it should be noted that an equitable division is not necessarily an equal division.

A property division need not be equal and is within the court's discretion when it follows the reciprocal retirement-account rule and leaves neither spouse substantially better or worse off than before the marriage.

Coffey v. Bradley Dwight Coffey, Jr. · filed 2022-01-06(1), (4)

The division of property was not arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.

Section 403.190 does not prescribe the weight for each property-division factor, and a just division need not be equal.

Gallagher v. Gallagher · filed 2022-02-10(1)

However, the statute does not specify how much weight should be given to each factor. Furthermore, a “just” division is not necessarily an equal division.

An equal division of marital-home sale proceeds is equitable when supported by the spouses' contributions, limited other property, marriage duration, and current economic circumstances.

Avery v. Avery · filed 2023-01-26(1)

Thus, the family court was presented with substantial evidence that equal division of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home was equitable under the circumstance based on the factors of KRS 403.190(1).

An equal division of cash and net sale proceeds can satisfy the just-proportions requirement, although equality is not mandatory.

Patton v. Patton · filed 2023-08-17(1)

This distribution satisfies the “just proportions” requirement contained in KRS 403.190(1), even though the court’s division of assets is not required to be equally divided.

Marital property must be divided under the statutory factors without any judicially created presumption of equal or other percentage distribution.

Herron v. Herron · filed 1978-10-31(1)

Thus the courts have a legislative mandate to divide marital property in accordance with the standards set out in the statute. It is significant to us that the statutes do not mention “presumptions”; and in the absence of this, we are of the opinion the legislative mandate is binding upon us and that presumptions in the division of marital property should not be indulged in at all.

Section 403.190 requires division in just proportions under its factors, not an equal division of marital property.

Russell v. Russell · filed 1994-03-18(1)

There is not a presumption or requirement that marital property be equally divided in a dissolution of marriage action.

Neither marriage alone nor one spouse's contribution creates a presumption of equal division; the court must make findings and consider all relevant statutory factors.

Ford v. Perkins · filed 2012-10-25(1)

is not so broad to permit a trial court to order an equal division of marital property without specifically considering the factors under KRS 403.190.

A spouse’s access to a vehicle loaned by her parents is not a relevant factor when dividing the spouses’ marital vehicles.

Keith v. Keith · filed 2018-07-27(1)

We agree with Jolie that her parents' decision to provide her with the use of another vehicle is not a relevant factor in the division of marital property.

The best interests of a child are not a statutory factor in assigning marital property between spouses.

Williams v. Alisha Dawn Williams · filed 2021-03-11(1)

However, as the mother points out, nothing in the statute requires the court to consider the best interests of the child when awarding property in a dissolution action.

Before distributing assets and debts, the court must consider a pension acquired during marriage and a spouse’s withdrawals from the parties’ joint account.

Wattenberger v. Wattenberger · filed 2019-05-03(1)

Upon remand, the circuit court is also directed to consider Flora's pension (acquired during the marriage) and Flora's withdrawal of monies from the parties' joint checking account before distributing the Wattenbergers' assets and debts pursuant to KRS 403.190.

The economic-circumstances factor permits consideration that one spouse maintains the marital residence, supports the children, and assumes the marital debt.

Adair v. Adair · filed 2023-04-27(1)(d)

Indeed, the court was properly considering the “[e]conomic circumstances of each spouse” as required under KRS 403.190(1)(d) and addressing the fact that Brandon had carried the financial obligation of maintaining the marital residence and providing for the parties’ children.

A spouse who earned all reported income is not entitled to the entire joint tax refund because income earned during marriage is marital and homemaking is a statutory contribution.

Paoli III v. Paoli · filed 2021-07-15(1)(a)

Therefore, Julius’s assertion that he is entitled to the entire tax refund because he earned the income is without merit.

When dividing marital assets in just proportions under subsection (1), a court may consider a spouse’s conduct in causing losses to a marital business even without an express dissipation claim.

Luce v. Luce · filed 2024-03-07(1)

Although Appellee did not make an express dissipation claim, the Family Court could legitimately consider Appellant’s conduct in causing the losses to RML. Under these circumstances, the Family Court was not required to accept the 2021 Agreed Order’s characterization of the prior payments as “temporary advance division[s] of property.” Therefore, we cannot find that the Family Court abused its discretion by declining to give Appellant a credit for the partial payments he made under the 2020 and 2021 Agreed Orders.

Subsection (1)’s listed factors are nonexclusive, so a court allocating a marital pet may also consider which spouse was its primary caregiver and used it as an emotional-support animal.

Ward v. Courtney Ward · filed 2024-04-04(1)

Further, family courts are tasked with “considering all relevant factors including” but certainly not limited to the four listed in the statute. KRS 403.190(1) (emphasis added) (see also Johnson v. Johnson, 564 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Ky. App. 1978) (“The court is directed to consider ‘all relevant factors’ including those enumerated within the statute.”)). Accordingly, the family court is permitted to consider additional relevant factors when dividing marital property, depending on the circumstances of the case. The family court did so here. Though Husband disputes the family court’s finding that the parties adopted Ruckus because Wife was home alone while Husband worked, it is not disputed that Wife was Ruckus’ primary and daily caregiver and that Wife considered Ruckus to be her emotional support animal. The court considered Dr. Fallon’s letter stating that Wife needed an emotional support animal.

A spouse’s work caring for children, maintaining the home, and occasionally assisting a business counts as a homemaker contribution when the court divides marital property under subsection (1).

Singh v. Kaur · filed 2024-04-11(1)

The family court considered and made findings related to each of the factors present in KRS 403.190(1)(a)-(d). With regard to the first factor, despite Jaswinder’s argument that Harvinder contributed absolutely nothing to the marriage, the family court found that, although Jaswinder developed most of the businesses prior to marrying Harvinder, she contributed as a homemaker by caring for his two children, maintaining the home, and occasionally working as a clerk in the convenience store. The family court also considered the value of the property awarded to each party, including the home and various businesses awarded to Jaswinder. Regarding the third and fourth factors, the family court acknowledged the brief duration of the marriage. It also found that, despite what Jaswinder reports as his income to the IRS, it is significantly greater. Harvinder, on the other hand, is in poor health, unable to work long hours, and reliant on her friend for many necessities.

Subsection (1) requires marital property to be divided in just rather than equal proportions, so a court may award an entire marital asset to one spouse while awarding other marital assets to the other.

Adkins v. Adkins · filed 2025-01-24(1)

But even if the farms were determined to be marital or predominantly marital in nature, the family court would not be obligated to divide them evenly – but simply in just proportions. KRS 403.190(1); Smith, 235 S.W.3d at 6. ... However, even if the family court explicitly found the farms to be marital property, we would discern no abuse of discretion in awarding the farms to Allison, especially since it awarded other marital assets (including the tow truck business assets) to Michael.

The just-proportions requirement is satisfied when the family court considers each spouse's relevant contributions and income; the statute does not require assigning those factors the weight a party prefers.

Desha Bell v. Ferral · filed 2025-04-11(1)(a)

It is not our role to reweigh the evidence in Bell’s favor. See Muir, 406 S.W.3d at 34 (citations omitted) (“[A] reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the family court unless its findings are clearly erroneous”). Review of the written record and the final dissolution hearing reveals that the family court considered Bell’s project manager contributions and Ferral’s musical income. This is all that was required for the court to divide the marital property in the “[j]ust proportions” required by KRS 403.190. See id. at 35-36.

Section 403.190(1)’s listed division factors are not exclusive; the court must consider them but may also consider other relevant circumstances when dividing marital property in just proportions.

Hazelwood v. Hazelwood · filed 2026-02-20(1)

The statute states, “It also shall divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions, considering all relevant factors, including . . . .” KRS 403.190 (emphasis added). There is no requirement that the listed factors are the only factors a court may consider when making a division of marital property, just that those factors must be considered. The fact that the circuit court considered other factors, such as Shawna’s commute, the division of household labor, and who paid the bills, is not an abuse of discretion.

Section 403.190(1) permits awarding nearly the entire marital estate to one spouse when the court considers the statutory factors, including homemaking contributions and the spouses’ economic circumstances.

Carmine Salerno v. Salerno · filed 2026-05-08(1)

We reiterate that the KRS 403.190 factors encompass far more than mere financial contribution, which appears to be the only way in which Carmine regularly supported the home. ... We cannot say the trial court abused its considerable discretion in awarding the marital estate to Allison.

Section 403.190(1) requires a just division of marital property but does not prescribe the weight of each factor or require equal shares.

Hall v. Heather Leigh Hall (Fannin) · filed 2022-07-21(1)

However, the statute does not specify how much weight should be given to each factor. Furthermore, a “just” division is not necessarily an equal division.

A final dissolution decree that does not dispose of jointly owned property has the same effect as an adjudication leaving each spouse's existing one-half interest intact and cannot later be modified to transfer one spouse's share.

Kidwell v. Mason · filed 1978-04-11(1)

Any interest that either James or Iva may have had in or to any property, estate or interest of the other, which remained undisposed of by the trial judge, is in the posture as if the court had so adjudged their respective interests. ... The judgment of March 22, 1974, has the same effect as if the trial judge had specifically written therein that Julia and Ernie each owned an undivided one-half interest in and to the subject property.

A court may dispose of chattels located within Kentucky without personal jurisdiction over an absent spouse, but it cannot dispose of out-of-state chattels or order the absent spouse to act concerning personal property.

Gaines v. Gaines · filed 1978-05-26(1)

Both KRS 403.190(1) concerning disposition of property and KRS 403.200(1) dealing with maintenance recognize separate actions for both subsequent to a dissolution action where one spouse was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court at the time of the original divorce proceedings. This recognition carries with it the strong implication that when neither the spouse nor the property are before the court, then no disposition can be made, but when the chattels are within the court’s jurisdiction, then it can make appropriate orders disposi-tive thereof. On the other hand, the court cannot enter an in personam order directed to an absent litigant to do some act with reference to personalty which is either within or without the state.

The marital-property presumption establishes rights between spouses upon divorce but does not determine mortgage priority or other creditor rights.

First Union Home Equity Bank, N.A. v. Bedford Loan and Deposit Bank · filed 2003-07-25(3)

In our view, this statute operates only to establish property rights as between spouses in the event of divorce and does not operate to establish rights as between creditors regarding marital property.

A spouse's ownership interest in marital LLC distributions has priority over a creditor's charging-order liens perfected after the dissolution proceeding began.

Perkins v. Perkins · filed 2022-04-28(1)

We conclude that the family court’s decision failed to appreciate the difference in the form of the parties’ interests before giving deference to timing: Lindsey’s ownership interest has priority over the charging order liens because those were perfected after the initiation of the dissolution proceedings.

Section 403.190(1) contemplates a later property-disposition proceeding when a court dissolved the marriage without personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or jurisdiction over the property.

Motter v. Motter · filed 2025-09-12(1)

KRS 403.190 specifically references a situation like we have now, where there has been a dissolution of the marriage, but there was insufficient personal jurisdiction over one spouse to allow for a division of marital property.

For property owned subject to debt before marriage, the premarital equity remains nonmarital in the same proportion to the property's value, while increased equity attributable to the spouses' joint efforts is marital property.

Robinson v. Robinson · filed 1978-05-05(1), (2)(e)

As used in KRS 403.190 in referring to restoration of the property of each spouse, the word “property” means equity. If either spouse was the owner of property subject to indebtedness prior to the marriage, the equity in that property shall be considered nonmarital property at the time of separation in that proportion which this equity bore to the value of the property at the time of the marriage. The increase in equity after the marriage attributable to the joint efforts of the parties, including those efforts of the wife as housewife and mother, shall be treated as marital property.

A spouse claiming appreciation on a nonmarital contribution must prove what portion of the increase is attributable to that contribution or general economic conditions; otherwise the increase is marital property.

Travis v. Travis · filed 2001-11-21(2)(e), (3)

KRS 304.190(3), however, creates a presumption that any such increase in value is marital property, and, therefore, a party asserting that he or she should receive appreciation upon a nonmarital contribution as his or her nonmarital property carries the burden of proving the portion of the increase in value attributable to the nonmarital contribution.

The value of a spouse's life estate in improvements built on nonmarital realty is marital property when the improvements resulted from the spouses' joint efforts.

Walters v. Walters · filed 1989-11-09(2)(e)

The real property here is unquestionably nonmarital, but the value of the life estate in the improvements is marital property as it resulted from the joint efforts of the parties. An appropriate division should be made by the circuit court.

A home purchased entirely with traceable inherited funds is nonmarital, and a spouse claiming a share for improvements must prove both a contribution and a resulting increase in value.

Berwanger v. Berwanger · filed 2023-04-06(2)(a), (3)

Meagan provided evidence, both in her testimony and in the form of checks and deposits, that the house was purchased solely with her inheritance. ... Thus, if Tyler had shown the family court that the shed increased the value of the home, he would have been entitled to a portion of the increase. Again, Tyler provided no evidence of the value of the home at all, with or without the added shed.

Appreciation of premarital property is marital when it results from the parties’ joint efforts rather than solely from general economic conditions.

Croft v. Croft · filed 2007-11-02(2)(e), (3)

The Court requires only a showing that the increase in value of the property was not solely attributable to general economic conditions, but was a result of the joint efforts of the parties in order to qualify property as marital property.

Appreciation of premarital property is marital when improvements during marriage contributed to the increase and the nonmarital claimant failed to prove otherwise.

Mayo v. Mayo · filed 2020-08-20(2)(e), (3)

Thus, in the case herein, the court did not err in determining the increase in value of the parties’ marital home was marital property.

An increase in property value is marital when the nonmarital claimant fails to prove the appreciation came from nonmarital funds or adequately trace those funds into improvements.

Bays v. Bays · filed 2023-09-27(3)

Regardless, because we hold that John failed to prove the $139,447.50 increase in the property’s value was attributable to his non-marital funds, or to adequately trace $101,000 of non-marital funds for improvements, we hold the increase in property value is marital property to be equitably divided between the parties.

Appreciation of mixed-status property during marriage is presumed marital, and the spouse claiming nonmarital appreciation must prove by clear and convincing evidence the portion attributable to the nonmarital contribution.

Pettingill v. Pettingill · filed 2021-09-16(2)(e), (3)

KRS 403.190(3) creates a presumption that any increase in value of property that has both a marital and nonmarital component is marital property; “therefore, a party asserting that he or she should receive appreciation upon a nonmarital contribution as his or her nonmarital property carries the burden of proving the portion of the increase in value attributable to the nonmarital contribution.”

Nonmarital funds applied to mortgage principal during refinancing create additional nonmarital equity in the residence.

Schoenbachler v. Minyard · filed 2003-04-24(2)(a), (b)

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred when calculating Appellant's nonmarital interest in the marital residence because it failed to consider Appellant's $6,294.61 nonmarital contribution in connection with the parties' refinancing of the property in 1993.

A residence purchased after marriage is marital property, and the court may order it sold to accomplish the statutory division.

Ferguson v. Ferguson · filed 2020-09-10(3)

The marital residence was purchased by the parties after their marriage and is clearly marital property. Therefore, the court acted within its authority in ordering the marital residence sold.

When dividing marital property, a court may balance marital funds spent paying debt on one spouse's restored nonmarital property and may account for a large disparity in the spouses' incomes.

Yates v. Yates · filed 2022-04-28(1)(b), (1)(d)

The trial court properly restored the mobile home to Travis, which was his non-marital property. However, the court further noted that the couple had made a payment of $436.00 per month from marital funds towards the debt on the mobile home for the majority of the couple’s marriage. Thus, in awarding the marital home to Rebecca, the court was balancing out the marital funds the couple had expended on the payments to the mobile home during the parties’ marriage.

Section 403.190 does not require a court to classify or divide an asserted marital increase in premarital assets when the claimant offers no proof beyond a vague assertion that the assets accumulated value during marriage.

Gilbert v. Gilbert · filed 2024-04-04(2)(e)

Prior to her post-judgment motion, Morgan did not request that the court take any action regarding the disputed properties. Moreover, she offered no proof sustaining a conclusion that she had any interest therein, as recognized by KRS 403.190, beyond a vague assertion that she believed that John’s accounts had accumulated value during the marriage. Consequently, we are unconvinced that the court failed in its statutory obligation.

A spouse rebuts subsection (3)'s marital presumption for appreciation in mixed-status property by proving that market conditions, rather than the spouses' improvements or joint efforts, caused the increase, after which the appreciation may be apportioned under the Brandenburg formula.

Lyons v. Lyons · filed 2025-07-25(3)

In making this finding, the family court implicitly found that the Oak Creek property’s increase in value was due to general economic conditions. Thus, Kristin presented sufficient evidence to rebut KRS 403.190(3)’s presumption that the increase in the value of the home was marital and substantial evidence supported the family court’s finding that the appreciation was due to market conditions. The family court then properly utilized the Brandenburg formula to assign most of the home’s appreciation to Kristin as her nonmarital property. In this regard, we find no error.

The spouse claiming appreciation of premarital property as nonmarital bears the burden of proof, and failure to carry that burden makes the increase marital property.

Link v. Koch · filed 2026-05-08(2)(e), (3)

Critically important here, the party claiming that the increase in value is to be considered nonmarital, bears the burden of proving it, and failure to do so “will result in the increase being characterized as marital property.”

For a premarital home whose mortgage principal was reduced with marital funds, the court must identify both marital and nonmarital contributions and their relationship, although no particular formula is required.

Hibdon v. Hibdon · filed 2026-06-12(1)-(3)

A court faced with disposing of property having both marital and nonmarital components (such as a home bought before the parties’ marriage for which mortgage payments are made with marital funds) has an obligation to recognize the existence of the marital interest as well as the nonmarital interest. A court in such a situation must determine the marital contribution (including marital funds used to reduce the mortgage principal) as well as the nonmarital contribution (including equity before marriage and nonmarital funds used to reduce the mortgage principal). Id. And even though no specific formula for doing so is required, the court must determine the relationship between the parties’ respective contributions. Id. at 873.

Income accumulated from nonmarital property is marital property subject to division under Section 403.190(1).

Brunson v. Brunson · filed 1978-08-04(1)

Any accumulation of income from the husband’s non-marital property constituted marital property to be divided by the court under KRS 403.190(1).

Income produced by nonmarital property is marital property, rather than a nonmarital increase in the property's value.

Sousley v. Sousley · filed 1981-05-27(2)(e)

We therefore hold that income produced from nonmarital property is, in fact, marital property for purposes of disposition of property pursuant to the directives of KRS 403.190.

Net income from nonmarital property is marital property, but a mere increase in the property’s value remains nonmarital when it did not result from the parties’ efforts.

Daniels v. Daniels · filed 1986-12-12(2)(e)

That case stated simply that net income from non-marital property would be marital property; however, a mere increase in value of non-marital property remains non-marital property. We reject appellant’s novel argument that the appellee’s stock market expertise resulting in the gain was developed during the marriage resulting in the gain being partly marital rather than wholly non-marital.

Dividend income received before dissolution from shares owned or controlled by either spouse is presumptively marital property even when the underlying shares are nonmarital.

Lampton v. Lampton · filed 1986-12-19(2), (3)

We note, moreover, that any dividend income derived from shares owned or controlled by either party prior to dissolution is presumably marital property pursuant to KRS 403.190(3), since such income would not fall under the exceptions set out in KRS 403.190(2).

Accumulated interest earned on nonmarital funds is marital income, not a nonmarital increase in the value of the principal.

Mercer v. Mercer · filed 1992-09-03(2)(e)

It is the holding of this Court that accumulated interest earned from nonmari-tal funds deposited in a savings account is income and is to be treated as marital property and should be appropriately divided between the parties. Such interest is not an increase in value of a nonmarital asset.

Property acquired after an actual separation but before a decree of legal separation is presumed marital, and the spouse claiming otherwise must rebut that presumption.

Culver v. Culver · filed 1978-09-22(3)

KRS 403.190(3) provides that all property acquired by a spouse “after the marriage and before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property.” The actual separation of the parties in July 1973 was not the equivalent of a “decree of legal separation.” Consequently, the statutory presumption of KRS 403.190(3) applies.

Property acquired after an actual separation remains marital unless the spouses obtained a decree of legal separation or another statutory exception applies.

Stallings v. Stallings · filed 1980-09-23(2)(c)

“Separation” means a legal one granted by a decree entered pursuant to KRS 403.140(2).

Post-separation marital property need not be divided equally or in the same proportion as property acquired before separation.

Shively v. Shively · filed 2007-09-07(1)

However, the court did not, as Mary suggests, require that all property acquired after the date of separation be divided in conformity with the division of that acquired prior to the separation or that it be divided equally.

Retirement contributions made after separation remain marital through the dissolution decree, and a caregiving spouse may continue contributing as a homemaker during separation.

Thielmeier v. Thielmeier · filed 2022-12-14(1)(a), (3)

The circuit court further erred in awarding Lisa nothing of the contributions Ken made to the 401(k) account after separation. ... Consequently, under the court’s own finding, Lisa was still contributing to Ken’s ability to contribute to the 401(k) after he left the marital residence by being Samuel’s primary caregiver. It is well-established that “the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker does not necessarily cease when the other spouse leaves, especially when minor children remain with the homemaker-spouse.”

Property acquired between marriage and dissolution remains presumed marital despite physical separation unless evidence establishes a statutory exception.

Micquel Brown v. Jamon Brown · filed 2023-06-08(2), (3)

But the family court may not classify property acquired during the marriage as non-marital unless it fits a KRS 403.190(2) exception.

A marital residence retains its marital character during a long physical separation, and equity contributions made during separation are presumed marital unless proved otherwise.

Weihe v. Weihe · filed 2023-08-17(1), (3)

Although the parties were separated for an unusually long time, the residence retained its marital character. For the same reason, any contributions to the marital equity made during the period of separation are presumed to be made with marital funds unless otherwise shown.

A federal stimulus payment received after dissolution is marital property when it was generated from income reported on the spouses' joint tax return and made payable to both spouses.

Wilder v. Wilder · filed 2009-08-28(1)

While the check was physically sent to Appellant after entry of the parties’ final divorce decree, in view of these unique circumstances, we hold that the funds were nonetheless generated from the marital estate and thus, they were fairly classified as marital property by the trial court.

A court may limit one spouse's share of a business and retirement-account increase to the pre-separation portion when that spouse no longer contributed to the later increase.

Thielmeier v. Thielmeier · filed 2021-09-09(1)(a)

We find no abuse of discretion with the trial court’s decision to only allocate to Appellant a pre-separation portion of ACE.

A spouse's post-separation earnings remain marital property when acquired before a decree of legal separation, and they may be divided in just proportions based on the other spouse's contributions during the marriage.

Dall v. Dall · filed 2024-12-13(2)(c), (3)

Pursuant to the statute, all property acquired after the date of marriage is considered marital property unless one of the exceptions listed in KRS 403.190(2) applies. Notably, KRS 403.190(2)(c) exempts only property acquired by one spouse after the date of a legal separation. See Stallings v. Stallings, 606 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Ky. 1980); see also KRS 403.140(2). The parties were never legally separated. ... Further, when dividing Marcia’s post-separation earnings equally between the parties, the family court found, “[w]hile [Roger] may not technically have assisted [Marcia] in working at [CDI] during this time period, his prior efforts in the marriage, and his sacrifice in abandoning his own career at her request, contributed to [Marcia’s] ability to acquire these assets post separation.” With the exception of the PNC Investment account discussed later in this Opinion, the family court divided the assets, including Marcia’s post-separation earnings, in “just proportions” as mandated by Stallings, supra. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion by the family court.