Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270

Section 403.270(1)(e) requires the court, when determining a child’s best interests, to consider the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

Atwood v. Atwood · filed 1976-11-12(1)(e)

In every custody proceeding (KRS 403.270) and in every proceeding for the modification of a custody decree (KRS 403.-340), the mental and physical health of not only the parents but of the child is of great concern and importance to the court. Whenever custody of infants is in dispute, the parties seeking custodial authority subject themselves to extensive and acute investigation of all factors relevant to the permanent and, hopefully, proper award of custody. Of major importance is the mental and physical health of all of the parties and whether the child is in an environment likely to endanger his physical, mental, moral or emotional health. ... The latter statutes place the mental conditions of all family members squarely in issue.

Section 403.270(1) supplies the standards for determining a child's best interests when deciding whether to enjoin a proposed name change.

Burke v. Hammonds · filed 1979-10-12(1)

The injunction should not issue unless the court finds that it is in the “best interest” of the child. This determination should be based on the standards contained in KRS 403.270(1) and any other relevant considerations.

Section 403.270(3) permits joint custody only when it serves the children’s best interests; parents’ inability to cooperate and disruptive residence and school changes can make joint custody infeasible.

Hardin v. Hardin · filed 1986-06-13(3)

In light of the particular circumstances of this case, we agree that the trial court’s division was not in the children’s best interest. KRS 403.270(3). ... It would seem obvious that joint custody cannot be in the best interests of the children where the parents are not sufficiently understanding and mature enough to cooperate in such an arrangement. ... Moreover, we believe the logistical problems, mandating a change in the children’s school and residence every six months, would be extremely disruptive and detrimental to these children.

Section 403.270(1) requires the trial court to consider all relevant custody factors, including the factors specifically enumerated in the subsection, when determining the child's best interests.

McFarland v. McFarland · filed 1991-03-01(1)

In child custody cases, the trial court must consider all relevant factors including those specifically enumerated in KRS 403.270(1) in determining the “best interests of the child.”

Section 403.270 directs courts to decide custody according to the child's best interests and give each parent equal consideration; the opinion states that this standard applies to custody disputes between parents.

Shifflet v. Shifflet · filed 1995-01-19

The “best interests of the child” standard is set out in KRS 403.270, and applies to a custody dispute between parents: “the court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child and equal consideration shall be given to each parent.”

Section 403.270 permits joint custody within the custody statute but limits it by the child’s best-interest test, with major decisions shared equally by the joint custodians.

Aton v. Aton · filed 1995-12-08

In theory, the child would continue to be reared by both parents and have the benefit of shared decision-making with respect to important matters, with neither parent being designated as the primaiy custodian and the other relegated to a secondary status. Clearly, it was this ideal which motivated the General Assembly to declare that trial courts may grant joint custody, but place it within the context of the entire custody statute, KRS 403.270, and limit it by the best interest test.

Section 403.270(1) requires custody decisions to follow the child’s best interests, give equal consideration to each parent, and apply the statute’s relevant custody factors.

Williams v. Phelps · filed 1998-02-06(1)

Generally in deciding which parent should have custody, Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.270(1) provides that a court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child and equal consideration shall be given to each parent. ... The court must consider the evidence presented and apply the appropriate factors set out in KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270 makes the child's best interests the overriding consideration in any custody determination.

Dull v. George · filed 1998-11-20

The overriding consideration in any custody determination is the best interests of the child.

Section 403.270(1) requires a trial court to decide custody according to the child’s best interests, give equal consideration to each parent, and consider all relevant statutory factors.

Polley v. Allen · filed 2004-04-02(1)

KRS 403.270(1), requires a trial court to “determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child” and to give “equal consideration” to each parent. In making this determination, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including: (a) the wishes of the child’s parents; (b) the wishes of the child; (c) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parents, siblings, and any other persons who may significantly affect the child’s best interests; (d) the child’s adjustment to his home, school and community; (e) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; and (f) information, records, and evidence of domestic violence.

Section 403.270 requires custody disputes to be decided according to the child's best interests, which guides custody determinations.

S.R.D. v. T.L.B. · filed 2005-09-02

KRS 403.270 states that custody disputes shall be determined “in accordance with the best interests of the child.” This standard is the guiding principle in custody determinations.

Section 403.270 requires custody disputes to be decided according to the best interests of the child, which is the guiding principle in custody determinations.

Srd v. Tlb · filed 2005-10-14

KRS 403.270 states that custody disputes shall be determined "in accordance with the best interests of the child." This standard is the guiding principle in custody determinations.

Section 403.270 requires courts determining child custody to consider all relevant factors, and those factors may support divided custody between the parents.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1974-05-17

The trial court used the “relevant factors” as outlined in KRS 403.270 and those factors established in Parker v. Parker, Ky., 467 S.W.2d 595 (1971). From the record it appears that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this matter.

Section 403.270 requires the trial court to consider all factors affecting the child’s best interests, including existing living conditions, when determining custody.

Jones v. Jones · filed 1979-03-09

KRS 403.270 requires that all factors affecting a child’s best interests be evaluated in determining custody. ... Since, as stated above, KRS 403.270 requires the trial court to evaluate all relevant factors surrounding the child, the court must, in part, base its decision on the existing living conditions.

Section 403.270(a) requires custody decisions to account for the listed best-interest factors, including parental and child preferences, family interaction, the child’s adjustment, and the mental and physical health of the persons involved.

Poe v. Poe · filed 1986-03-28(a)

Under KRS 403.270, the relevant factors which determine child custody, and upon which findings of fact must therefore be made, are the wishes of the child’s parents as to his custody, the wishes of the child as to his custodian, the interaction of the child with his parents and siblings, the child’s adjustment to his home, school and community, and the mental and physical health of all persons involved. ... Therefore, no clear error necessitating reversal is present with respect to any of the first four factors of KRS 403.270(a)-(d).

Section 403.270 requires individualized custody determinations based on the child’s best interests.

Pennington v. Marcum · filed 2008-10-24

Though the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to adopt the Chalupa preference for joint custody over sole custody in Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Ky.1993), and KRS 403.270 mandates that custodial determinations are to be made individually in light of the child’s best interests, joint custody has emerged as the most prevalent custodial arrangement.

A custody award requires a determination of the child's best interests and must be supported by substantial evidence.

Kerr v. Osborne · filed 2010-02-26(2)

Furthermore, an award of custody must be made following a determination of the best interests of the child. KRS 403.270(2). According to the record presented to us, the trial court has heard no evidence at all.

Section 403.270 requires a custody court to determine the child’s best interests and consider all relevant statutory factors, including domestic-violence and neglect evidence.

Jolie v. Jolie · filed 2018-02-23(2)

In determining custody of a child, KRS 403.270 requires the court to determine the best interest of the child.

Section 403.270 governs initial custody determinations, requiring consideration of the child’s best interests and creating a rebuttable presumption favoring joint custody and equal parenting time.

Layman v. Bohanon Jr · filed 2020-03-26(2)

Under KRS 403.270, an initial determination of custody requires consideration of the best interests of the child, with a rebuttable presumption that joint custody and equal parenting time is in the child’s best interests.

Section 403.270(2)(k) requires the court to consider the likelihood that each party will allow the child meaningful and continuing contact with the other parent.

V.L.K.H. v. V.L.K.H. · filed 2020-10-08(2)(k)

KRS 403.270(2)(k) directs the court to consider the “likelihood a party will allow the child frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with the other parent . . . .”

Section 403.270(2) establishes the best-interests standard and equal-parenting-time framework for an initial custody and timesharing decision.

Nelson v. Knight · filed 2020-10-15(2)

Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.270(2) establishes the standard for a trial court’s initial child custody and timesharing decision.

Section 403.270(2) requires written findings supporting the court’s consideration of the custody factors and best-interest determination.

Joviniano Albino Santiago v. Berry · filed 2021-03-11(2)

Our review of the October 31, 2019, hearing reflects that the family court made several oral findings related to the factors listed in KRS 403.270(2); however, these oral findings were not included in the written order.

Section 403.270(2) requires a custody court to consider each relevant statutory best-interest factor when deciding custody.

Boyd-Gill v. Verol Gill · filed 2022-09-22(2)

In considering the issue of custody, the Hardin Circuit Court expressly considered each of the factors set out in KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270 governs a final custody decree’s best-interest determination and its rebuttable joint-custody presumption.

Kotzbauer v. Sohnlein · filed 2023-01-05(2)

In making a final custody decree, the deciding court must apply KRS 403.270 to ascertain the children’s best interests.

Section 403.270(2) mandates that custody be determined according to the child’s best interests and requires findings applying the relevant factors.

Gant v. Gant · filed 2024-12-06(2)

KRS 403.270 mandates that custody be determined in accordance with the best interests of the child.

Section 403.270 is a governing guide for awarding a minor’s care, custody, and control to one parent over the other, but it does not establish a precise quantum of proof.

Cherry v. Cherry · filed 1982-06-15

Other than this guideline and the provisions of KRS 403.-270, we are not prepared to define precisely the quantum of proof necessary to justify awarding the care, custody and control of a minor to one parent over the other.

Section 403.270 governs custody matters determined according to the child's best interests, but a parent's petition to change a child's name is not a custody matter under the statute.

Blasi v. Blasi · filed 1983-03-30

The Kentucky General Assembly has made it clear that the change of name of a child by a parent is not a “custody matter” for the purposes of KRS 403.270.

When joint custody is awarded and the parties later disagree, a custody change is decided anew under § 403.270 rather than under the statutory rules governing modification of a sole-custody award.

Benassi v. Havens · filed 1986-03-28(3)

It is our view that when joint custody is awarded under KRS 403.270(3) and the parties subsequently disagree, neither KRS 403.340 nor KRS 403.350 applies. Those sections are applicable to modification of a sole custody award. In the case at hand, modification should be made anew under KRS 403.270 as if there had been no prior custody determination. As a practical matter, joint custody is no award at all when considering modification of the arrangement.

For a joint-custody award, a later custody modification is decided anew under the child’s best-interest standard, with equal consideration given to each parent, rather than under the statutes governing modification of sole custody.

Erdman v. Clements · filed 1989-11-17(3)

In Benassi v. Havens, Ky.App., 710 S.W.2d 867 (1986), we held that where joint custody had been granted pursuant to KRS 403.270(3) and the parties subsequently disagreed, neither KRS 403.340 nor KRS 403.-350 applied. ... Thus, where there has been an award of joint custody under KRS 403.270, a hearing de novo should be held to determine custody as if no prior custody determination had been made. KRS 403.270 provides that custody should be determined in accordance with the best interest of the child and that equal consideration should be given each parent. ... Given these facts we find that the trial court incorrectly denied Donna’s request for a hearing for modification of the custody decree. As held in Benassi, supra, a modification of a joint custody award should be made anew under KRS 403.270 as if there had been no prior custody determination. This case is reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to grant an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining custody pursuant to KRS 403.-270.

Section 403.270(3) permits joint custody when it is in the child's best interest and requires the trial court to consider joint custody before sole custody.

Chalupa v. Chalupa · filed 1992-05-01(3)

Under KRS 403.270(3), effective July 15, 1980, the court is allowed to grant joint custody if it is in the best interest of the child. ... The difficult and delicate nature of deciding what is in the best interest of the child leads this Court to interpret the child’s best interest as requiring a trial court to consider joint custody first, before the more traumatic sole custody.

Section 403.270 requires a court modifying a joint-custody award without consent to find an inability or bad-faith refusal to cooperate, then determine the children's best interests using the statute's factors.

Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer · filed 1994-05-27(4) and (1)

As we view the matter, in nonconsen-sual modification situations involving joint custody, such as the situation here, the trial court may intervene to modify a previous joint custody award only if the court first finds that there has been an inability or bad faith refusal of one or both parties to cooperate. Any court-ordered modification must then be made in light of the best interest of the children and based upon the factors which are enumerated in KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270(l)(c) requires a custody court to consider the child’s interactions and relationships with parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests.

Reichle v. Reichle · filed 1986-11-06(l)(c)

KRS 403.270 provides that the court must consider numerous factors, not just psychological evaluations. KRS 403.270(l)(c) requires that the court consider the interaction and interrelationships of. the child with his parents or parent, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests.

Section 403.270(2) provides that a spouse's forced departure from the marital home under threat of physical violence does not constitute abandonment of the children.

Davis v. Collinsworth · filed 1989-06-08(2)

Of course, there can be no abandonment when, as here, the wife was forced to leave the home under threat of physical violence. KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270 requires custody to be decided according to the child's best interests, with each parent given equal consideration.

Basham v. Wilkins · filed 1993-01-08

Last, but not least, KRS 403.270 itself leaves little doubt that the “best interest of the child” standard should be applied as it provides, “[T]he court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child and equal consideration shall be given to each parent." (Emphasis added). ... Accordingly, the “best interests of the child” standard applies in determining custody of children born out of wedlock and gone is our preference for the mother of the illegitimate child.

Section 403.270(1) directs custody decisions according to the child’s best interests with equal consideration for each parent; the best-interests standard applies to custody disputes between parents, not between a parent and a non-parent.

Greathouse v. Shreve · filed 1995-01-19(1)

There appears to be no serious argument for an award of custody to Sookie Shreve, using the best interests test that applies between parents (KRS 403.270). ... Joining Sookie Shreve with her mother as a basis for applying the best interests test between grandmother and natural father was a purely technical device, a method for evading the natural father’s superior claim to custody “if suited to the trust” as against the grandmother, as specified in KRS 405.020(1).

In a custody determination, the mental or physical health of all individuals involved is relevant, but cohabitation with an HIV-infected stepparent does not alone justify modifying custody when casual contact poses no recognized risk of transmission and no exposure through primary transmission modes is shown.

Newton v. Riley · filed 1995-06-09(3)

KRS 403.270(3), which addresses the mental or physical health of all individuals involved, is the provision around which the issue at bar centers. ... Having concluded that there is no recognized risk that Brittany and Caleb will become HIV-positive through casual contact with James, and as there is nothing in the record indicating that the children will be exposed to HIV through the primary modes of transmission, the sole remaining question is whether the lower court erred in concluding that the best interest of the children is served via the existing custodial arrangement. We find no error.

Section 403.270 authorizes a court to award joint custody when it is in the child’s best interest and treats joint custody as a form of custody.

Scheer v. Zeigler · filed 2000-06-23(3), now (5)

In 1980, the General Assembly enacted KRS 403.270(3) which gave trial courts the right to grant joint custody to a child’s parents “if it is in the best interest of the child.” KRS 403.270(3). ... When the Benassi court held that joint custody is not an award of custody at all, that KRS 403.340 and KRS 403.350 do not apply to joint custody modifications, and that joint custody modification motions should be heard de novo in accordance with KRS 403.270, it ignored the reality that joint custody is, in fact, a form of custody. Not only has joint custody been awarded by courts as a form of custody for a number of years, but it has also been recognized and authorized by the General Assembly as a form of custody since 1980. KRS 403.270(5).

Section 403.270 treats joint custody as a custody award with the same legal dignity as sole custody; modification of that award is governed by the separate custody-modification statutes.

Fenwick v. Fenwick · filed 2003-10-08(4)

We therefore recognized that an award of joint custody is indeed a custody award just the same as an award of sole custody because both are custody awards under the same statute — KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270 requires the court to determine de facto custodian status before considering a custody modification, but it does not require a separate hearing for that determination.

French v. Barnett · filed 2001-04-06(l)(a) and (b)

Although the statute makes it clear that the court must determine de facto custodian status prior to considering custody modification, we find no statutory requirement that a separate hearing be held.

The statute does not let foster parents use de facto-custodian status to challenge the Cabinet’s custody when the Cabinet placed the child, and it requires proof that they were both the primary caregiver and primary financial supporter.

Swiss v. Cabinet for Families and Children · filed 2001-04-20(l)(a) and (b)

We hold that foster parents such as the Swisses may not use the de facto custodian statutes to challenge the cabinet’s custody of the child where the child was placed with the foster parents by the cabinet.

Section 403.270(1) requires a de facto custodian to be the primary caregiver and financial supporter standing in the place of the natural parent, not merely one of multiple caregivers.

Consalvi v. Cawood · filed 2001-12-14(1)

We are bound by the plain language of the statute, and words not defined must be given their ordinary meanings. In this case, it is clear that the statute is intended to protect someone who is the primary provider for a minor child in the stead of a natural parent; if the parent is not the primary caregiver, then someone else must be. The de facto custodian statute does not, contrary to Cawood’s position at oral argument, intend that multiple persons be primary caregivers. The court’s finding that he was “a primary caregiver” and “a financial supporter” is not sufficient to establish that he was indeed “the primary caregiver” within the meaning of the statute. It is not enough that a person provide for a child alongside the natural parent; the statute is clear that one must literally stand in the place of the natural parent to qualify as a de facto custodian.

Section 403.270(1)(b) gives a de facto custodian standing in the present custody matter, but the status must be determined anew whenever it is later asserted and does not create conclusive standing in future disputes.

Sullivan v. Tucker · filed 2000-08-04(1)(b)

This language {“the court,” not “every court thereafter”), rather than implying the radical result urged by Linda and Robert, suggests that the determination of de facto custodianship is a matter that must be addressed anew whenever the status is asserted.

Section 403.270(1) recognizes de facto-custodian status when a third party proves by clear and convincing evidence that the child has primarily lived with, been cared for by, and financially supported by that person for the statutory period; voluntary relinquishment by the parent is not required.

Diaz v. Morales · filed 2001-07-13(1)

We disagree with the trial court that there must be a voluntary relinquishment of custody to a third party. To the contrary, KRS 403.270 specifically applies to cases where the child is placed by the Department for Social Services. Whether the child has been cared for by a third party because of the parent’s intentional acts or an uncontrollable force such as illness, it remains that, after a child has been cared for and financially supported by a third party for the specified time period, the child’s interests become the court’s focus.

Section 403.270(1)(a) excludes from the de facto-custodian residency calculation only time after a parent commences a legal proceeding seeking to regain custody; merely defending a proceeding does not suspend the period.

Sherfey v. Sherfey · filed 2002-01-18(1)(a)

The pertinent provision of KRS 403.270(l)(a) specifies that “[a]ny period of time after a legal proceeding has been commenced by a parent seeking to regain custody of the child shall not be included in determining whether the child has resided with the person for the required minimum period” [emphasis added]. We believe that this language is clearly stated and specific in its terms. In order to suspend a period of residency with a “de facto custodian,” the statute sets forth two requirements. First, the statute requires that the action be “commenced” by the parent — not merely defended. Second, the statute requires the court appearance to be an action in which the parents seek to “regain custody.”

In custody determinations, § 403.270(2) requires the court to apply the child’s best-interests standard while giving each parent and any de facto custodian equal consideration.

Allen v. Devine · filed 2005-02-04(2)

We hold that the trial court erred in concluding that KRS 403.270, the “equal consideration” requirement, was not the applicable law and that it only applies to custody between parents, as it plainly states that it also applies to de facto custodians. Since the trial court’s findings that the Allens were de facto custodians were supported by substantial evidence, the trial court was required to give the Allens “equal consideration” under KRS 403.270(2) when applying the best interests standard. Put simply, the trial court should have given Krystal, Kevin, and the Allens equal consideration, and only upon finding that all of them were unfit to have custody of the children or that all of them had relinquished them superior parental or de facto custodial rights should it have considered the Devines or anyone else as custodians of the children.

Section 403.270(2) requires custody to be determined by the child's best interests, with equal consideration for each parent and de facto custodian and consideration of all relevant factors.

Bc v. Bt · filed 2005-12-29(2)

Our Legislature, through KRS 403.270(2), commands the family court to determine custody based on the best interests of the child, while considering all appropriate parties equally and considering all relevant factors.

Section 403.270 defines a de facto custodian as someone proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been both the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter for the statutory residence period.

Bf v. Td · filed 2006-06-15(1)

With respect to who may be a de facto custodian, Kentucky statutory law is comprehensive. The General Assembly has legislated fully in this area and this court is bound to apply those statutes. KRS 403.270 defines "de facto custodian" as "a person who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for a period of . . . one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years of age."

Section 403.270(1) requires a de facto custodian to be the primary caregiver and financial supporter, not merely someone who provides care alongside a natural parent.

Boone v. Ballinger · filed 2007-05-04(1)

The statute requires that a person be “the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child ... for a period of one (1) year. or more.... ” ... We are bound by the plain language of the statute, and words not defined must be given their ordinary meanings. In this case, it is clear that the statute is intended to protect someone who is the primary provider for a minor child in the stead of a natural parent; if the parent is not the primary caregiver, then someone else must be. The de facto custodian statute does not, contrary to Ca-wood’s position at oral argument, intend that multiple persons be primary caregivers. ... Applying this authority to the matter now before us, we agree with Melinda and Boone that Kelly is not eligible for defacto custodian status.

Section 403.270(l)(a) requires a child placed by the Department for Community Based Services to reside with the purported de facto custodian for at least one year, excluding time after a parent's custody-restoration proceeding begins; the tolling ends when that proceeding is decided.

J.G. v. J.C. · filed 2009-03-27(l)(a)

Since S.G. was placed with the Uncle and Aunt on January 6, 2006, and the petition for custody was filed November 9, 2006, the Uncle and Aunt had not met the one-year time requirement set forth by KRS 403.270(l)(a). S.G. had only been with the Uncle and Aunt for 10 months when they filed their petition. For this reason, we reverse the determination that the Uncle and Aunt were the de facto custodians of S.G. and remand for further custody proceedings. ... In Stiffey, a previous panel of this Court specifically held that motions to terminate temporary custody orders invoke this tolling provision. Additionally, the tolling of time ends once the motion has been ruled upon. In the case at hand, only a few days passed between the filing of the motion and a ruling on it, but even so, these days do not count toward the de facto custodian time requirement.

When a child has been placed by the Department for Community Based Services, § 403.270(1)(a) requires one year of residence, excluding time after a parent's proceeding to regain custody until the proceeding is decided.

Jg v. Jc · filed 2009-06-19(1)(a)

Since S.G. was placed with the Uncle and Aunt by Social Services, S.G. must have resided with the Uncle and Aunt for one year. ... Since S.G. was placed with the Uncle and Aunt on January 6, 2006, and the petition for custody was filed November 9, 2006, the Uncle and Aunt had not met the one-year time requirement set forth by KRS 403.270(1)(a). S.G. had only been with the Uncle and Aunt for 10 months when they filed their petition. For this reason, we reverse the determination that the Uncle and Aunt were the de facto custodians of S.G. and remand for further custody proceedings. ... In Stiffey, a previous panel of this Court specifically held that motions to terminate temporary custody orders invoke this tolling provision. Additionally, the tolling of time ends once the motion has been ruled upon. In the case at hand, only a few days passed between the filing of the motion and a ruling on it, but even so, these days do not count toward the de facto custodian time requirement.

Section 403.270(l)(a) defines a de facto custodian through the required caregiving and financial-support showing, but a non-parent who receives joint custody on that basis need not continuously maintain de facto-custodian status to retain standing as a joint custodian.

Williams v. Bittel · filed 2009-11-25(l)(a)

While Bittel’s de facto custodian status was the basis for the trial court’s award of joint custody, Bittel’s standing to participate in the custody proceedings is derived from his status as a joint custodian. There is no requirement under Kentucky law that a non-parent who is granted custodial rights due to his or her designation as a de facto custodian must maintain the de facto custodian status in order to maintain standing as a joint custodian. Such a requirement would place an unfair burden upon the non-residential joint custodian.

For the de facto-custodian residency period, a parent's compliance with a permanency plan is not a legal proceeding to regain custody.

Ld v. Jh · filed 2011-07-01(1)(a)

We simply cannot conclude that the legislature intended mere compliance with a permanency plan to equate to a legal proceeding under KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270(1)(a) requires a de facto custodian to be the child’s primary caregiver and financial supporter for the statutory period; co-parenting alongside a natural parent does not satisfy that standard.

Mullins v. Picklesimer · filed 2010-11-24(1)(a)

At the outset, we note that to qualify as a de facto custodian in Kentucky, one must be “the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for a period of six (6) months or more if the child is under three years of age.... ”

Section 403.270(1)(a) requires a de facto custodian to prove primary, not sole or exclusive, caregiving and financial support for the child.

Ball v. Tatum · filed 2012-03-30(1)(a)

Importantly, the statute requires a person seeking to be named a de facto custodian to prove he is the child’s primary caregiver and pnmary financial supporter — not that he is the child’s sole, only or exclusive provider, as Ball contends.

A motion to set aside a guardianship is not a legal proceeding to regain custody and therefore does not toll the de facto-custodian residency period under § 403.270(1)(a).

Hicks v. Halsey · filed 2013-02-01(1)(a)

Because guardianship is not the same as custody, we cannot agree that Hicks’s motion to set aside the guardianship fulfilled the requirement of initiating a legal proceeding for the purpose of regaining custody.

Section 403.270(1)(a) excludes time after a parent commences a custody proceeding from the one-year de facto-custodian period, so a contested divorce custody proceeding tolls that period.

Robison v. Theele · filed 2015-04-24(1)(a)

“de facto custodian” means a person who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for ... a period of one (1) year or more.... Any period of time after a legal proceeding has been commenced by a parent seeking to regain custody of the child shall not be included in determining whether the child has resided with the person for the required minimum period.” ... In Heltsley v. Frogge, 350 S.W.3d 807 (Ky.App.2011), our Court held that contest of custody issues in a divorce proceeding is sufficient to toll the calculation of time regarding de facto custodianship. ... In harmony with that reasoning, we are persuaded .that Chip’s efforts to gain custody tolled the de facto custodianship time period. ... Thus, the court erred in denying Chip’s motion to dismiss.

Section 403.270 allows a person who has served as a child’s primary caregiver for the statutory period to qualify as a de facto custodian and stand on equal footing with biological parents in custody determinations.

Glodo v. Evans · filed 2015-10-23

The statute setting forth the requirements for de facto status is Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.270. This statute permits someone who has acted as a child’s' primary caregiver to be deemed the de facto custodian of the child and stand on an equal footing with the child’s biological parents in custody determinations. Here, the family court determined that the Evanses did not qualify as de facto custodians because the children had not lived with them for the requisite time period. Further, the youngest child has been living with non-relatives. We agree that the Evanses do not qualify as de facto custodians.

Section 403.270(1)(a) requires a de facto custodian of a child under three to show six months of residence before filing, excluding time after a parent begins a legal proceeding to regain custody; physical possession at filing is unnecessary.

Jones-Swan v. Luther · filed 2015-11-20(l)(a)

While the statute does not require physical possession at the time the petition is filed, it does require the Appellants establish that the children, both under three, resided with them for a period of six months prior to the filing of the petition. The statute is clear that “[a]ny period of time after a legal proceeding has been commenced by a parent seeking to regain custody of the child shall not be included in determining whether the child has resided with the person for the required minimum period.” KRS 403.270(l)(a).

For a child placed by CHFS, § 403.270(1)(a) requires at least one year of residence with the prospective de facto custodian, regardless of the child's age, before de facto custodian status may be sought.

Cherry v. Carroll · filed 2016-12-22(1)(a)

With respect to this latter scenario—a child placed by the CHFS—a plain reading of KRS 403.270(l)(a) requires that the child, regardless of age, who is placed by CHFS reside with the custodian for a period of a year or more before defacto custodian status may be sought.

A nonparent qualifies as a de facto custodian only if clear and convincing evidence shows the person was the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter for the statutory period; a nonparent who co-parents with the natural parent does not qualify.

Kingcade v. Sherwood · filed 2020-11-19(1)(a), (1)(b)

KRS 403.270(1)(b) provides that a person whom a trial court has found by clear and convincing evidence to be a de facto custodian has the same standing as a parent in custody matters under that statute and specified others. And KRS 403.270(1)(a) provides in pertinent part that a de facto custodian is one shown by clear and convincing evidence “to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for a period of six (6) months or more if the child is under three (3) years of age . . . .”

Section 403.270(1)(a) treats the primary caregiver and financial supporter requirement as requiring a singular caregiver; co-parenting with the natural parent does not confer de facto-custodian status.

Crouch v. Crouch · filed 2017-04-07(1)(a)

The phrase “the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of’ has consistently been interpreted to mean a singular caregiver — someone who is the primary provider for a minor child.

Section 403.270(1)(a) does not confer de facto-custodian status on a nonparent who provides care and financial support while parenting alongside a natural parent who continues exercising parenting time and providing for and making decisions for the child.

Samantha Burgess (Now Phillips) v. Chase · filed 2021-07-22(1)(a)

Our precedent states: “parenting the child alongside the natural parent does not meet the de facto custodian standard in KRS 403.270(1)(a).” ... We agree with Samantha that despite Joyce’s generous provision of care and financial support, under these facts Joyce was simply parenting Child alongside Samantha due to Samantha’s continuing to exercise her parenting time and to provide for and make decisions for Child during such parenting time. So, it was error to accord Joyce de facto custodian status.

Section 403.270 requires de facto-custodian status to be established anew each time it is asserted; the status is not permanent.

Maynard v. Pinson · filed 2021-09-09(1)(a)-(b)

The status of de facto custodian is not permanent and must be established each time the status is asserted.

Section 403.270(1)(a) requires a nonparent seeking de facto custodian status to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the nonparent was the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter, rather than sharing those roles with a natural parent.

Stump v. Spencer · filed 2022-02-24(1)(a)

“Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 403.270(1) requires a court to determine by clear and convincing evidence whether a person meets the statutory definition of a de facto custodian.” ... The family court ruled that Stump failed to show she was the primary caregiver and financial supporter of the minor children because she was parenting alongside Spencer. Thus, she did not qualify as a de facto custodian under KRS 403.270(1)(a) and Kentucky case law. We agree. ... “Kentucky Courts have also repeatedly held that when a nonparent shares the parenting responsibilities with a natural parent, the nonparent cannot, as a matter of law, acquire de facto custodian status.” ... Stump was required by KRS 403.270(1)(a) to prove her claim “by clear and convincing evidence[.]”

Section 403.270(1) gives a qualifying de facto custodian the same standing in custody matters as a parent once the statutory requirements are met.

Corbin v. Mullins · filed 2022-09-22(1)(a)-(1)(b)

The family court’s findings of fact are clearly supported by substantial evidence. Grandmother met her burden under KRS 403.270(1)(a) to be named the children’s de facto custodian.

A person qualifies as a de facto custodian only by clear and convincing evidence that they were the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter for the required period, which entails that the biological parent abdicated that role.

White v. Tiara M. Fowler · filed 2023-02-23(1)(a)

While we do not endorse the court’s summation of the law, contrary to the grandparents’ contention, it is not without support. In applying KRS 403.270, our courts have consistently recognized that parents have a superior, constitutionally protected right to the care, custody, and control of their children. ... Before a purported de facto custodian may be afforded the same standing as a parent, we have held that “the court must determine that the biological parent has abdicated the role of primary caregiver and financial supporter of the child for the required period of time. In other words, one must literally stand in the place of the natural parent to qualify as a de facto custodian.” Brumfield, 368 S.W.3d at 118 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As the court’s statement is consistent with these principles and does not bias the grandparents’ position, we find no error.

Section 403.270(1)(a) excludes time after a parent begins legal proceedings to regain custody when calculating the residence period required for de facto custodian status; direct participation in such proceedings tolls that period.

Gonzales v. Murillo · filed 2023-08-31(1)(a)

Guillermo’s appearance and direct participation in the DNA action demonstrated his desire to gain custody of the children and was sufficient to toll the time required under KRS 403.270(1) to qualify as a de facto custodian. See Meinders, 572 S.W.3d at 59. Therefore, we agree with Guillermo that Maria did not satisfy the time requirement of KRS 403.270(1)(a). Thus, we conclude that the circuit court erred by determining that Maria qualified as a de facto custodian of E.G.-L. and S.L.

Section 403.270(1)(a) permits de facto-custodian status when a person has been the child’s primary caregiver and financial supporter for the required period, even if the parent remains involved; subsection (2) presumes joint custody and equal parenting time and requires express justification for any deviation.

Sizemore v. Hutton · filed 2023-11-29(1)(a), (2)

Rachel is correct in that “[a] grandparent who co-parents a child with the natural mother or father does not make the grandparent the primary caregiver. It has been held that parenting the child alongside the natural parent does not meet the de facto custodian standard in KRS 403.270(1)(a).” ... The Huttons very clearly met the one-year statutory requirement to be considered de facto custodians. ... The question we must then answer is whether this was enough involvement by Rachel to compel a finding by the family court that she was a co-parent of the Child to defeat a de facto custodian claim. It was not. ... KRS 403.270(2) contains a rebuttable presumption that joint custody and equal parenting time is in a child’s best interest. ... On remand, the family court must apply KRS 403.270(2) as amended in July 2018 (or any later revisions by the time the family court proceeds further in this case). The family court must specifically apply the rebuttable presumption in favor of equal timesharing with the Child. Should the family court conclude the presumption has been rebutted, it must expressly state its reasoning and craft a parenting time schedule that maximizes the Child’s time with Rachel while also ensuring the Child’s best interests.

Section 403.270(1) requires a nonparent seeking de facto custodian status to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they were the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter for at least one year when the child was placed by the Cabinet; time in the Foster Program is excluded and the one-year clock stops when a parent initiates a custody action.

Patterson v. Allen · filed 2024-03-21(1)

In relevant part, KRS 403.270(1) requires non-parents – who are attempting to establish de facto custody – to show by clear and convincing evidence that they have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, the child for one year or more if that child was placed with them by the Cabinet. Time within the Foster Program cannot be counted toward that one-year requirement. T.C. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Services, 652 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Ky. App. 2022) (citing Swiss v. Cabinet for Families & Children, 43 S.W.3d 796, 797 (Ky. App. 2001)). Also, that one-year custody clock stops ticking when a parent initiates a custody action. KRS 403.270(1); Jones-Swan v. Luther, 478 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Ky. App. 2015).

Section 403.270(1)(a) allows a person proven by clear and convincing evidence to be a de facto custodian to seek custody under the child’s best-interest standard.

Gebell v. Appleman · filed 2024-02-29(1)(a)

Once the court finds clear and convincing evidence that the person seeking custody is a de facto custodian, it may utilize the best interest of the child standard to determine custody.

Section 403.270 requires a court to determine by clear and convincing evidence that a person meets the statutory definition before recognizing de facto custodian status, and that status must be redetermined whenever asserted.

R.S. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services · filed 2025-07-25(1)(b)

To the contrary, “a finding of de facto custodianship does not thereafter have . . . conclusively presumptive effect.” Sullivan, 29 S.W.3d at 808. Rather, “determination of de facto custodianship is a matter that must be addressed anew whenever the status is asserted.” Id. “[T]his Court has consistently held that the status of a de facto custodian is not permanent and must be revisited on a case-by-case basis each time the status is asserted.” Gross v. Herrington, No. 2016-CA-001132-ME, 2017 WL 1041229, at *2 (Ky. App. Mar. 17, 2017). We, therefore, conclude that the family court erred as a matter of law by determining that Mr. & Mrs. P. became the child’s only custodians by virtue of the November 29, 2018, Order when father died in 2024.

Once a party qualifies as a de facto custodian, Section 403.270 gives that party the same custody standing as a natural parent and requires custody to be decided under the child’s best interests.

L.P. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2025-10-31(1)(b),(2)

Once a family court has determined a party has established their status of de facto custodian, that party is due the same standing in custody matters as a natural parent and the family court’s determination of custody is made in accordance with the best interests of the child.

Section 403.270(1)(a) defines de facto-custodian eligibility and permits the required residency period to be calculated by aggregating qualifying periods, subject to the statute's exclusion for periods after a parent commences a proceeding to regain custody.

Sutton v. Higdon · filed 2025-12-19(1)(a)

If we subtract the periods during that time that she sought a return of custody, the aggregate time remaining still exceeds the six-month time specified by the statute for attaining de facto custodian status. As a matter of law, the circuit court did not err in ruling that the Higdons qualified as de facto custodians of Child.

Section 403.270 requires a de novo custody determination, after the joint-custody modification threshold is met, to be based on the child’s best interest and the statute’s enumerated factors.

Jacobs v. Edelstein · filed 1998-01-23

Once this threshold requirement is met, the trial court may then make a de novo determination of custody in accordance with the child’s best interest, utilizing the factors set forth in KRS 403.270.

Subsection (2) requires custody decisions to serve the child's best interest, give equal consideration to each parent, and consider all relevant statutory factors; subsection (5) permits joint custody when it is in the child's best interest.

Chappell v. Chappell · filed 2010-04-16(2), (5)

The provisions of KRS 403.270(2) require a trial court to determine custody in accordance with the child’s best interest, giving equal consideration to each parent. ... The provisions of KRS 403.270(5) authorize the trial court to grant joint custody if and when that designation is in the child’s best interest.

Section 403.270(2) authorizes a family court to assess whether joint custody should continue and resolve post-petition decision-making impasses, using nonexhaustive best-interest factors such as the child’s relationships and adjustment to home, school, and community.

Joleen Brenda Gonzalez Formerly Known as Joleen B. Dooley v. Dooley · filed 2020-10-15(2), (2)(c), and (2)(e)

The applicable statute here, KRS 403.270(2), authorizes a family court to assess the propriety of continuing joint custody as recognized by KRS 405.020(1). Additionally, government participation through KRS 403.270(2) provides the means to resolve post-petition impasses in the joint custodians’ decision-making going forward. ... As it considered the list of factors, and specifically those listed in KRS 403.270(2)(c) and (2)(e), the family court analyzed the relationships Child has developed with family members in Kansas City, as well as those with other family members in Kentucky. ... As noted above, KRS 403.270(2) does not provide an exhaustive list of factors to consider. Evidence of a parent’s decision-making skills certainly impacts the best-interest analysis.

The de facto-custodian provisions apply only when a biological parent has abdicated primary caregiving and financial support for the required period, and a court must make a clear-and-convincing finding before granting the custodian equal standing in custody matters.

London v. Collins · filed 2007-11-30(l)(a), (l)(b), (2)

The provisions of this statute are not triggered unless the biological parent has abdicated the role of primary caregiver and primary financial supporter to the person who claims to be the de facto custodian for the required period of time. There must be a finding that the “de facto custodian” has been the primary caregiver and financial supporter of the child. ... Therefore, while LaTonya may have become a de facto custodian, the trial court lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for such a finding. ... If LaTonya is then found to be a de facto custodian, the Family Court will be required by KRS 403.270 to determine custody between Steven and LaTonya based on the best interests of J.T., giving equal consideration to both parties, and using the factors set out in KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270 requires clear and convincing proof that a person was the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter for the statutory period, and requires an independent finding of de facto custodian status before the person receives a parent's standing and custody is decided under the child's best interests.

Baker v. Combs · filed 2008-02-29(1)(a), (1)(b), (2)

Once it determines that such a person is a de facto custodian, “the court shall give the person the same standing in custody matters that is given to each parent under this section[,]” KRS 403.270(1)(b), and “determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child[.]” KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270(1)(a) requires de facto-custodian status to be based on primary—not sole—caregiving and financial support, permits public assistance that supplements rather than replaces that support, and excludes time after a parent commences a separate custody-recovery action from the required residence period.

Spreacker v. Vaughn · filed 2012-11-30(1)(a)

The language of KRS 403.270 requires that a de facto custodian serves as the “primary” — not the “sole” — caregiver and financial supporter. Although public assistance may have provided medical care for the child, substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the Greenup Family Court that Vaughn was B.C.’s primary caregiver and financial supporter. ... We note that Spreacker admitted in a pleading that she “did not commence a separate action to regain custody of her child, as required by KRS 403.270(l)(a) to toll the six-month period[.]” TR 71. Furthermore, CR 3.01 provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with *423the court and the issuance of a summons[.]” Spreacker admits that she has not commenced any proceedings, and we cannot conclude that she has done so when she expressly acknowledged that she has not.

Section 403.270(1) requires a nonparent to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the nonparent was the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter for the statutory period to qualify as a de facto custodian.

Jones v. Jones · filed 2017-01-20(1)

A de facto custodian is a person who proves by clear and convincing evidence to have been a child’s primary caregiver and financial supporter, for a period of six months (if the child is under three years old) or one year (for older children). KRS 403.270(1).

Section 403.270(1)(b)-(2) gives de facto custodians equal standing and requires equal consideration for custody alongside a parent.

Tapp v. Garner · filed 2021-01-28(1)(b)-(2)

Asten may also seek a permanent custody order rendered in his favor pursuant to KRS 403.270. We caution that at this juncture the Garners have equal standing and are entitled to equal consideration for custody as Asten. KRS 403.270(1)(b)-(2).

Section 403.270(1)(b) gives de facto custodians the same standing as parents only in the statute's enumerated custody proceedings, not in a separate grandparent-visitation action.

Cooper v. Ivey · filed 2021-05-27(1)(b)

The dictate of KRS 403.270(1)(b) to afford de facto custodians the same standing ... as parents is expressly limited to custody proceedings under certain enumerated statutory provisions. As such, the statute has no application to the visitation action at issue.

Section 403.270(2) gives equal consideration in custody proceedings to parents and qualifying de facto custodians, not to a person who merely meets the UCCJEA definition of acting as a parent.

Amber Littleton v. Stewart · filed 2021-10-15(2)

But the statute does not say that. Instead, it begins with ... language that disqualifies Amber: “The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child and equal consideration shall be given to each parent and to any de facto custodian.” KRS 403.270(2). Amber is neither a parent nor a de facto custodian.

Section 403.270 gives a de facto custodian the same standing as a parent in custody determinations, but a parent seeking to modify an existing custody decree is not entitled to a joint-custody presumption when the modification requirements are not met.

Rose v. Ronnie Joe Bright, Jr. · filed 2022-05-12(1)(b), (2)

Therefore, as de facto custodians, the Brights were given the same standing as a parent in any custody determination. See Sullivan v. Tucker, 29 S.W.3d 805, 807-08 (Ky. App. 2000); KRS 403.270(1)(b). ... As such, we do not believe that Kevin was entitled to a presumption of joint custody per KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270 defines a de facto custodian as a person who has been the child’s primary caregiver and financial supporter for the required period, and gives that person the same standing as a parent once the definition is met.

White v. Tiara Fowler · filed 2022-11-03(1)(a), (1)(b)

“While we do not endorse the court’s summation of the law, contrary to White and Paris’s contention, it is not without support. In applying KRS 403.270, our courts have consistently recognized that parents have a superior, constitutionally protected right to the care, custody, and control of their children. ... We have also held that before a purported de facto custodian is afforded the same standing as a parent, “the court must determine that the biological parent has abdicated the role of primary caregiver and financial supporter of the child for the required period of time. In other words, one must literally stand in the place of the natural parent to qualify as a de facto custodian.” Brumfield, 368 S.W.3d at 118 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As the court’s statement is consistent with these principles, we find no error.”

Section 403.270(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof that a person was the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter for the statutory period, and subsection (1)(b) permits custody to be decided under the child's best-interest standard once de facto-custodian status is established.

Massong v. Semple · filed 2025-05-23(1)(a), (1)(b)

De facto custodian status exists by virtue of the provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 403.270(2). Pursuant to that statute, a de facto custodian is one who has been “the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who . . . has resided with the person” for a statutory period computed based on the age of the child. KRS 403.270(1)(a). Once the court finds through clear and convincing evidence that the person seeking custody is a de facto custodian, it may utilize the best-interest-of- the-child standard to determine custody. KRS 403.270(1)(b).

Once a court determines that a person is a de facto custodian, the person has the same standing in custody matters as each parent.

Sharbono v. Sharbono · filed 2024-03-28(1)(b)

Pursuant to KRS 403.270(1)(b), “[o]nce a court determines that a person meets the definition of de facto custodian, the court shall give the person the same standing in custody matters that is given to each parent . . . .”

Section 403.270 does not give a claimed de facto custodian standing to bring a custody action against CHFS, and temporary custody obtained through that action does not cure the defect.

Elliott v. Bobbie Smith · filed 2021-12-02

In Swiss, this Court held that KRS 403.270 does not permit custody actions to be brought against CHFS, as the plain language of the statute limits its application to actions arising between parents and one who qualifies as a de facto custodian. ... However, such a distinction is fallacious where the Elliotts only gained temporary legal custody of the child through the ... very action which they had no standing to bring. To allow such a distinction would serve no purpose than to circumvent both precedent and the plain language of the statute. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in holding that the Elliotts lacked standing and dismissing the action.

Section 403.270(2) cannot be used to disregard an Ohio custody order because its findings do not satisfy Kentucky custody standards.

Campbell v. Campbell · filed 2021-01-14(2)

The family court evaluated the Ohio order under KRS 403.270(2) and found that it did not qualify as a custody decree under Kentucky law. ... However, it is entirely inappropriate for a Kentucky court to evaluate the sufficiency of the findings in an Ohio order under Kentucky law and, upon determining those findings are insufficient, disregard the order and proceed as if it were never entered.

Section 403.270(2) sets the best-interests and equal-consideration standards for custody decisions, but it does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction over custody proceedings or standing to seek custody or visitation in a case not involving dissolution of marriage.

J.N.R. v. O'Reilly · filed 2008-04-24(2)

KRS 403.270(2) provides that a court shall determine custody in the child’s best interests and that “equal consideration shall be given to each parent.” But nowhere in KRS Chapter 403 is the word “parent” defined. Furthermore, KRS 403.270 does not govern whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction over custody proceedings in this type of case or whether an alleged biological father has standing to pursue custody or visitation in this situation. KRS Chapter 403 is entitled “Dissolution of Marriage — Child Custody.” The statutes in Chapter 403 generally give courts of general jurisdiction the power to grant dissolutions and annulments of marriages and decrees of legal separation — in general, the power to terminate marriages. As part of its jurisdiction to dissolve marriages, the family court may also divide property, order spousal maintenance, and order child support for any children born of the marriage. Also, when granting a divorce, the trial court must determine the custody of children born to the marriage in accordance with the standards enunciated in KRS 403.270. But KRS 403.270 does not govern whether .a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine custody of children in cases not involving a dissolution of marriage.

Section 403.270(2) supplies the custody standards, including the child's best interests and equal consideration of each parent, but it does not itself confer subject-matter jurisdiction over custody proceedings outside a dissolution of marriage.

J.N.R v. Hon Joseph O'Reilly Judge, Jefferson Family Court · filed 2008-04-24(2)

KRS 403.270(2) provides that a court shall determine custody in the child's best interests and that "equal consideration shall be given to each parent." ... But KRS 403.270 does not govern whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine custody of children in cases not involving a dissolution of marriage .

Section 403.270 is not mandatory for determining custody in this setting, but it provides the family court with the best guidance for deciding custody, visitation, and support.

S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S. · filed 2008-09-12

Though utilization of KRS 403.270 and the rest of Chapter 403 is not mandated, it provides the family court with the best guidance for determining appropriate custody, visitation and support, even in this unusual, we pray unique, case.

A temporary juvenile-court custody order is not a custody order under Chapter 403, so a later custody action is an initial determination governed by Section 403.270 rather than a modification under Section 403.340.

Hayse v. Martin · filed 2023-08-31(2)

Therefore, this matter was properly treated as an initial custody determination under KRS 403.270, rather than a modification of custody under KRS 403.340.

Section 403.270 gives a person who meets the statutory definition of de facto custodian the same standing in custody matters as a parent, but it does not apply to guardianship proceedings under KRS Chapter 387.

McCary v. Mitchell · filed 2008-08-01(1)

Moreover, KRS 403.270(1) itself contains language expressly limiting its application to KRS Chapter 403. It states in relevant part: (b) A person shall not be a de facto custodian until a court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the person meets the definition of de facto custodian established in paragraph (a) of this subsection. Once a court determines that a person meets the definition of de facto custodian, the court shall give the person the same standing in custody matters that is given to each parent under this section and KRS 403.280, 403.340, 403.350, 403.822, and 405.020. Had the legislature intended for the statute to apply in proceedings other than those specifically listed, it certainly could have done so. Because it did not include actions brought pursuant to KRS Chapter 387, we cannot construe it otherwise.

In a custody-modification decision, the court must make findings showing that it considered the best-interests factors listed in § 403.270(2).

Murphy v. Murphy · filed 2008-10-10(2)

Park’s third allegation of error is that the trial court modified custody without finding a change of circumstances in the children and/or their custodian and that modification was in the best interests of the children as required by KRS 403.340(3). Additionally, in determining the best interests of the children, the court did not indicate it had considered any of the factors enumerated in KRS 403.340(3) or KRS 403.270(2). ... We agree with Park and reverse and remand for a hearing and the statutorily required findings.

When applying § 403.270(2)'s custody factors, a trial court must state its findings in writing.

Keifer v. Keifer · filed 2011-10-27(2)

We again state with emphasis that compliance with CR 52.01 and the applicable sections of KRS Chapter 403 requires written findings, and admonish trial courts that it is their duty to comply with the directive of this Court to include in all orders affecting child custody the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its decisions. ... She referenced facts pertinent to the applicable factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2). ... As emphasized above, the trial judge’s duty is not satisfied until the findings have been reduced to writing.

Section 403.270(2) sets out the factors courts use to determine a child's best interests in custody matters.

Addison v. Addison · filed 2015-06-08(2)

The trial court listed all the factors of KRS 403.340 and 403.270. The court clearly explained that given Dr. Marvin's recommendation the children should stay together, that M.A. should reside with her father, and given the harmful role played by their mother, it is in the best interests of both children to be in the sole custody of their father. ... The trial court properly considered the statutory factors and determined what was in the best interests of each child.

Section 403.270(2) supplies factors that a trial court must address when making custody findings and conclusions.

Retherford v. Monday · filed 2016-09-02(2)

We vacate the trial court’s order of October 9, 2015, and remand with instructions that the trial court make its own findings of fact from the evidence and its own conclusions of law in accordance with the mandate of Keifer, CR 52.01, and the factors set forth at KRS 403.270(2).

Subsection (2) requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors and lists non-exclusive factors for determining a child's best interests in custodial determinations.

Newhouser v. McCleese · filed 2021-12-02(2)

The statutory guidelines of KRS 403.270 do not include a definition of the best interests of the child standard; however, KRS 403.270(2) requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors and provides a list of non-exclusive, demonstrative factors to be considered in custodial determinations.

Section 403.270(2) requires a court deciding custody to consider all relevant best-interest factors, but it may affirm a custody decision when the findings encompass the factors relevant to that decision even without specific findings on every listed factor.

Bailey v. Bailey · filed 2022-10-06(2)

KRS 403.270(2) requires a court making a custody determination to consider “all relevant factors” including: ... However, it made no specific findings as to this factor, nor did the court make findings as to KRS 403.270(f), (g), and (i). ... The trial court’s findings were clearly adequate pursuant to CR 52.01, encompassing all the factors “relevant” to its determination that it is in the best interest of S.S. to remain in the permanent custody of the Baileys, denying Tatum’s petition.

Section 403.270(2)(d) makes the parties’ motivation a relevant factor when evaluating a child’s best interests in custody and visitation proceedings.

Fitzgerald v. Shafer · filed 2024-06-13(2)(d)

KRS 403.270(2)(d) identifies the motivation of the parties as a relevant factor when considering the best interest of a ... child for the purposes of evaluating custody and visitation. Consequently, the court did not err in eliciting this testimony.

Section 403.270(2) supplies a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors for determining children’s best interests, including family relationships, health, and domestic violence.

Felisha Burns (Formerly Felisha White) v. Jarrod White · filed 2025-03-21(2)

KRS 403.270(2) supplies a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors for determining children’s best interests.

Section 403.270(2) requires a family court deciding a child's custody best interests to consider eleven statutory factors and explain its consideration of them in specific findings rather than merely state a conclusion.

Sparks v. Sparks · filed 2025-12-05(2)

Furthermore, KRS 403.270(2) sets forth eleven factors that a Family Court must consider when deciding the best interests of a child in custody matters. It is insufficient simply to state in an order, with no elaboration, that those factors have been considered. See, e.g., Hicks v. Halsey, 402 S.W.3d 79 (Ky. App. 2013).

Section 403.270(2) requires a court making an initial custody determination to apply the child's best-interests standard, give each parent equal consideration, and consider all relevant factors, including the statute's non-exclusive demonstrative factors.

Frances v. Frances · filed 2008-10-23(2)

As the trial court in this case properly noted, its custody ruling was not entered in response to a motion to modify a permanent order of custody; rather, it was actually the custody determination. As such, the court properly considered the standard required by KRS 403.270, the custody determination statute, which states that custody shall be determined in accordance with the best interests of the child giving each parent equal consideration. The statutory guidelines of KRS 403.270 do not include a definition of the best interests of the child standard; however, KRS 403.270(2) requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors and provides a list of non-exclusive, demonstrative factors to be considered in custodial determinations.

The court must determine custody based on the child’s best interests and consider all relevant factors, not only the factors listed in the statute; a proposed custodian’s conduct is relevant when it affects that person’s relationship to the child.

Miller v. Harris · filed 2010-08-27(2)

Close reading of the statute reveals the trial court must consider ALL relevant factors, not just those listed in KRS 403.270(2). ... KRS 403.270 directs the trial court to consider “relevant factors.” Importantly, it does not restrict the court’s consideration to events occurring within the children’s lives or within a particular span of time. Thus, any factor that affects a potential custodian’s “relationship to the child” is to be considered.

Section 403.270 requires the court to consider all relevant factors, including its non-exhaustive list of best-interest factors, but does not itself require factual findings.

Anderson v. Johnson · filed 2011-09-22

Similarly, KRS 403.270 directs the court to “consider all relevant factors” and provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that are relevant to the best interests of the child. The statute includes no requirement to make findings of fact. Again, any such requirement comes from CR 52.01.

Section 403.270(2) requires custody to be determined according to the child’s best interests, with equal consideration for each parent and any de facto custodian, after considering all relevant statutory factors.

N.L. v. W.F. · filed 2012-05-25(2)

In order to grant permanent custody via a custody decree in a dependency action arising under KRS Chapter 620, the court must comply with the standards set out by the General Assembly in KRS 403.270(2): ... We must agree with the Mother that the family court failed to sufficiently consider and make findings related to the factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270(2) governs an initial custody determination, not a modification of visitation or parental timesharing.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 2021-01-07(2)

KRS 403.270 deals with an initial custody determination, which is “a separate stage of a custody dispute” from a modification of visitation or timesharing. ... Having clarified the correct application of KRS 403.320(3), as opposed to KRS 403.270(2), to the case sub judice, we next note that the circuit court has broad discretion in modifying parental timesharing.

Section 403.270(2) requires custody determinations to focus on the child’s best interests and permits consideration of any relevant factor affecting a potential custodian’s relationship with the child.

Baker v. Kuffner · filed 2022-05-12(2)

KRS 403.270 directs the trial court to consider “relevant factors.” Importantly, it does not restrict the court’s consideration to events occurring within the children’s lives or within a particular span of time. Thus, any factor that affects a potential custodian’s “relationship to the child” is to be considered.

Section 403.270(2) requires custody courts to consider all relevant, nonexclusive factors in determining the child’s best interests, and subsection (2)(f) makes mental health a factor without requiring a specific diagnosis.

Dusing v. Bakker · filed 2023-06-15(2), (2)(f)

“The statutory guidelines of KRS 403.270 do not include a definition of the best interests of the child standard; however, KRS 403.270(2) requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors and provides a list of non-exclusive, demonstrative factors to be considered in custodial determinations.” ... While not specifically attaching each finding to one factor in KRS 403.270, we conclude the family court took all relevant factors of the statute into account when making its ruling. The factual findings of the family court are more than adequate to show the family court considered all the statutory factors, and the facts considered support the exercise of the family court’s discretion to award Jill sole custody of L.D. ... A parent’s mental health is always a factor in custody determinations regarding the best interests of a child. KRS 403.270(2)(f). ... Whether Ben is or has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder is not controlling, as it is not required for the family court to confirm a specific diagnosis to find Ben has mental health issues impacting custody or visitation.

Subsection (2) requires an initial custody determination, including designation of a primary residential parent, to be based on the child's best interests.

Goodwin v. Mason · filed 2024-06-27(2)

Additionally, since this case looks to an initial custody determination, the designation of Mother as primary residential parent is governed by the best interests of the child standard of KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270 requires an initial custody decision, including designation of a primary residential parent, to apply the child’s best-interest standard, give each parent equal consideration, and consider all relevant factors.

Goodlett v. Bolin · filed 2025-06-27(2)

When making its initial child custody decision (including designation of a primary residential parent when parents are granted joint custody), the family court must determine the best interests of the child pursuant to KRS 403.270, giving each parent equal consideration and considering all relevant factors.

Section 403.270 requires an initial custody decision, including designation of a primary residential parent, to apply the child’s best-interest standard, give each parent equal consideration, and consider relevant factors.

Sewell v. Reese · filed 2025-06-13(2)

the trial court must determine the best interests of the child pursuant to KRS2 403.270, giving each parent equal consideration and considering all relevant factors.

Section 403.270 governs an initial custody determination, including designation of the primary residential parent, under the child’s best-interest standard.

McNitt v. McNitt · filed 2025-09-19(2)

residential parent designation is also governed by the best interests standard of KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270 governs an initial custody determination, requiring consideration of the child’s best interests and creating a rebuttable presumption favoring joint custody and equal parenting time.

Anderson v. Anderson · filed 2026-02-27(2)

Under KRS 403.270, an initial determination of custody requires consideration of the best interests of the child, with a rebuttable presumption that joint custody and equal parenting time [timesharing] is in the child’s best interests.

In a custody-modification proceeding, § 403.270(2) requires the court to consider all relevant best-interest factors, but not necessarily every factor listed in the statute.

Spratt v. Gordon · filed 2026-04-10(2)

Mother also points out KRS 403.270(2) directs courts to “consider all relevant factors”—but does not expressly require that courts consider all listed factors. We agree with Mother. The court made sufficient findings of relevant KRS 403.270(2) factors.

Section 403.270 governs initial custody determinations, not modifications of an existing custody order.

Perry Dearfield, Intervening v. Mikquan Johnson, Intervening · filed 2024-07-11

KRS 403.270 was also not the proper standard, as this was not an initial custody order.

Section 403.270 permits custody under Chapter 403 for parents and de facto custodians, and a de facto custodian must have had the child reside with and be supported by them for six months or more.

Mauldin v. Bearden · filed 2009-08-27

Their petition also stated it was filed pursuant to KRS 403.270 and KRS 405.020. However, these statutes do not apply to the Appellants’ position at that time. KRS 403.270 applies to parents and de facto custodians. KRS 405.020 applies to the father or the mother and de facto custodians. ... The portions of Chapter 403 on which they rely provide that only a father, mother or de facto custodian can be granted custody under this chapter. The Appellants, obviously not the father or mother, also did not qualify as de facto custodians because the child, being only eight days old, had not resided with them nor been supported by them for “a period of six months or more” as required by KRS 403.270. Thus Appellants had no standing at that time to bring a custody action under Chapter 403.

The tolling provision excludes time after a parent commences a legal proceeding seeking to regain custody, and a parent need not file a new separate lawsuit because a qualifying response or motion in an existing proceeding can suffice.

Heltsley v. Frogge · filed 2011-06-17(1)(a)

We conclude, as did the family court, that neither KRS 403.270(l)(a) nor Sherfey requires a parent to file a new and separate lawsuit in order to suspend the running of time needed to confer standing as a defacto custodian. ... We see no reason for failing to construe Father’s pro se response as Father’s commencement of a legal proceeding to regain the custody of his child.

Section 403.270(1)(a) requires a nonparent to be the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter, and co-parenting alongside a natural parent does not satisfy the de facto custodian standard.

Brumfield v. Stinson · filed 2012-03-30(1)(a)

Although the Stinsons were undoubtedly caregivers, they did not — in the language of Consal-vi — literally stand in the place of Brum-field, the natural parent. Accordingly, we must conclude that the family court misinterpreted the requirements of KRS 403.270, in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the Stinsons were de facto custodians as defined by KRS 403.270 and our case law.

Section 403.270 requires clear and convincing evidence that a person was the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter for the specified residence period, and allows support provided through public benefits or by the person's spouse to count.

S.S. v. Commonwealth · filed 2012-07-06

KRS 408.270 defines a de facto custodian as any person: shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for a period of six (6) months or more if the child is under three (3) years of age and for a period of one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years of age or older or has been placed by the Department for Community Based Services. ... Rather, the trial court was absolutely correct in stating that there is no authority in the Commonwealth which holds that a de facto custodian cannot be credited with financial support which is in fact provided by the government through public benefits, or their spouse, merely because such monies are not earned through employment. ... Such a result was not intended by the General Assembly.

Section 403.270(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof that a nonparent was the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter for the statutory period; shared caregiving or support with a biological parent does not establish de facto custodian status.

Joviniano Albino Santiago v. Berry · filed 2021-03-11(1)(a)

Even if a non-parent provides care or financial support for a child, if such care and support is in conjunction with a natural parent, then the non-parent will not qualify as a de facto custodian. ... Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that Berry qualified as a de facto custodian under KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270(1) requires a nonparent to be the actual primary caregiver and financial supporter, not merely a primary caregiver who shares those roles with a natural parent, to qualify as a de facto custodian.

Shelton v. Starnes · filed 2024-06-06(1)(a),(1)(b)

However, in order to be a de facto custodian, the nonparent must not simply be a primary caregiver, but must, in fact, be the primary caregiver.

Section 403.270(1) does not confer de facto-custodian status on a nonparent who co-parents alongside a biological parent; the nonparent must literally stand in the parent’s place.

Mickie Knuckles (Formerly Turner) v. Turner · filed 2025-07-03(1)

As the family court correctly concluded, Kentucky law is clear that parenting a child alongside the biological parent does not satisfy the statutory standard for de facto custodian status; “[r]ather [a] nonparent must ‘literally stand in the place of the natural parent.’”

Section 403.270(1) does not require a de facto custodian to be the sole caregiver or supporter, but co-parenting alongside a parent who provides significant care and financial support does not confer the status.

Smallwood v. Jade Alexander Smallwood · filed 2025-07-18(1)

However, Kentucky precedent also clearly states that co-parenting children alongside a parent who provides significant care and financial support to the children does not transform a non-parent into a de facto custodian.

Section 403.270(2) requires courts deciding custody between parents to determine the child’s best interests by considering the listed factors, including parental and child wishes, relationships, adjustment, health, and domestic-violence evidence.

Rice v. Rice · filed 2012-07-06(2)

Custody decisions involving two parents are governed by the best interests of the child standard and the applicable factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2). Relevant factors in this case include: the wishes of the children’s parents; the wishes of the children; the interaction of the children with their parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the children’s best interests; the children’s adjustment to their home, school, and community; the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; and the information, records, and evidence of any domestic violence. KRS 403.270(2). Since both parents desire to be residential custodians and the wishes of the children are either unclear or divided, the best interests of the children are determined based on the remaining factors in KRS 403.270(2). Each applicable factor was specifically addressed in the DRC’s report and unless one of the DRC’s findings is shown to be “clearly erroneous,” the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by deferring to the DRC’s recommendations. Frances, 266 S.W.3d at 756.

Section 403.270(2) requires courts deciding a child’s best interests to consider all relevant statutory factors, including the listed custody, relationship, adjustment, health, domestic-violence, and de facto-custodian considerations.

Williams v. Frymire · filed 2012-08-31(2)

Regarding the best interests standard, “any factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; any decisions based upon said facts are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.”

Section 403.270(2) makes a child’s wishes only one factor in determining the child’s best interests.

Oster v. Oster · filed 2014-07-18(2)

While the boys themselves have expressed a desire to see their mother, a child’s wishes are but one factor to consider. KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270(2) requires the court to consider all relevant best-interest factors, including the parents’ and child’s wishes, family relationships, the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community, and everyone’s mental and physical health.

A.G. v. T.B. · filed 2014-10-17(2)

In determining the best interests of the child, the court must consider all relevant factors, including the wishes of the child’s parents; the wishes of the child as to his custodian; the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests; the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community; the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270(2) requires courts to consider the relevant statutory factors when determining a child's best interests.

Addison v. Addison · filed 2015-07-09(2)

Kevin notes that the trial court listed all the factors of KRS 403.340 and 403.270. ... The trial court properly considered the statutory factors and determined what was in the best interests of each child.

Section 403.270 directs courts to decide custody matters according to the child’s best interests, considering broad statutory factors and allowing wide fact-finding to obtain needed testimony.

May v. Harrison · filed 2018-11-01(2)

KRS 403.270 gives the judge direction to make these critical determinations for the best interest of the child. That statute enumerates several broad and encompassing factors to be considered in that decision making. KRS 403.270(2). This gives the judge wide fact-finding responsibility. Inherent with that statutory mandate is the authorization to seek out testimony from the child involved, as need be.

Section 403.270(2) requires meaningful consideration of the statutory factors relevant to the child’s best interests, which may be shown by detailed factual findings even without an express best-interest finding.

Moore v. Moore · filed 2020-10-08(2)

Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.270(2) addresses this standard. It is clear from our review of the record that the trial court heard sufficient evidence to meaningfully consider the statutory factors relevant to the children’s best interest in this case. In its orders, the trial court gave lengthy and detailed finding of facts. The findings of fact that satisfy the statutory requirements can be found in numbered paragraphs 4, 7, 9, 12, 14, and 17 of the trial court’s September 3, 2019 order.

Section 403.270(2) requires the court to give equal consideration to both parents, decide custody in the child’s best interests, and consider all relevant statutory factors.

Robles v. Simms · filed 2020-10-08(2)

When determining an award of child custody, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.270(2) instructs the court to give equal consideration to both parents and to award custody in accordance with the best interests of the child. ... In this case, the trial court properly recited the evidence it relied upon in making its findings of fact, analyzed the factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2), and determined under the totality of the circumstances that they weighed in favor of awarding Garry sole custody.

In deciding whether to modify custody, the court must consider the KRS 403.270(2) best-interest factors as part of the required statutory analysis.

Carver v. Carver · filed 2020-10-22(2)

Although there may be grounds for modifying the shared custody arrangement or awarding Father sole custody in this instance, the DRC must demonstrate that it adhered to the requirements under KRS 403.340(3) and made the required considerations under KRS 403.340(3)(a)-(f) and KRS 403.270(2) if it intends to do so.

Section 403.270(2) requires custody decisions to serve the child’s best interests and permits consideration of any factor affecting a potential custodian’s relationship with the child.

Baker v. Kuffner · filed 2022-03-24(2)

KRS 403.270(2), which explains how custody should be determined, hinges such determinations on the best interest of the child. ... In interpreting this statute, the Court in Miller explained: KRS 403.270 directs the trial court to consider “relevant factors.” Importantly, it does not restrict the court’s consideration to events occurring within the children’s lives or within a particular span of time. Thus, any factor that affects a potential custodian’s “relationship to the child” is to be considered.

Section 403.270(2)(c) requires a custody court to consider the child’s interactions with the parents and other significant people as a best-interest factor.

Laura Jane Bovee (Now Jacobson) v. Bovee · filed 2022-03-31(2)(c)

In contrast, the conduct considered herein directly pertained to Jacobson’s interactions with the child and her motivations relating to the custody action, both of which are best interest factors a court is required to consider. KRS 403.270(2)(c)-(d).

Subsection (2)(b) requires the court to consider the child’s wishes about his or her custodian as one of several factors in deciding the child’s best interests.

Sexton v. Sexton · filed 2022-07-14(2)(b)

The statutory language confirms that subsection (2)(b), relating to the child’s wishes as to his or her custodian, is one of several factors the court must consider in determining whether a modification of custody is in the child’s best interests. The court properly weighed subsection (2)(b), the wishes of C.R.S. against attendance records and grade improvements under Father’s care, along with the arrests of Mother.

Section 403.270(2) sets out statutory best-interest factors that a court must specifically address when determining whether visitation is in a child's best interests.

Sizemore v. Beckie Brown · filed 2022-10-06(2)

Although the family court’s order is couched in terms of visitation being in the children’s best interests, nowhere in the order does the family court make specific findings related to the statutory best interest factors, KRS 403.270(2), or the additional factors our Supreme Court has determined are relevant in disputes related to grandparent visitation. Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Ky. 2012). ... Because it is impossible for us to review the family court’s order without knowing the findings of fact it reached in support of its best interest conclusion, we must also vacate the order as it relates to the four older children and remand for additional findings of fact on the best interest factors.

Section 403.270(2) requires the court to consider all relevant factors, including the subsection’s listed factors, when determining a child’s best interests.

Bennett v. Wirawan Klahan Bennett (Now Wilburn) · filed 2022-12-08(2)

In determining the best interests of the child, the court must consider all relevant factors -- including those set forth in KRS 403.270(2). ... After a thorough review of the record, we are not persuaded that the findings of the circuit court are clearly erroneous. It considered many relevant factors -- including those enumerated by KRS 403.270. We cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion by modifying the timesharing schedule.

Section 403.270(2) lists non-exclusive best-interest factors and requires the family court to consider the factors it deems relevant in a custody determination.

King v. Harrod · filed 2022-08-24(2)

However, the statute also provides that the family court need only consider those factors that it deems “relevant.”

Section 403.270(2) requires consideration of the statutory best-interest factors, but an order may satisfy that requirement through findings that implicitly address the factors without expressly citing the statute.

Stowers v. Stowers · filed 2022-12-08(2)

We are convinced the DRC’s order reflects an adequate consideration of the statutory best interest factors and appropriately sets forth which evidence it relied upon in making its custody determination.

In determining a child's best interests, the court considers all relevant factors, including the parties' mental and physical health; a parent's criminal history is weighed in context and is not by itself determinative.

Michael Smith, Jr. v. Asher · filed 2023-09-14(2)(f)

The court must determine what is in the child’s best interest by considering all relevant factors, including those listed in KRS 403.270(2). ... Here, the family court took judicial notice of Asher’s criminal history, considered it in the context of the requirements of KRS 403.270(2), and awarded joint custody to the parties. This was not an abuse of the court’s discretion. ... The court made multiple findings about Asher’s substance use and unsuccessful completion of inpatient treatment. These findings indicate the court’s consideration of KRS 403.270(2)(f).