Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.270

Section 403.270 supplies the best-interest standard for evaluating a motion to modify timesharing.

Rachel Petrie (Now Gibney) v. Petrie · filed 2023-10-19

In contrast, pursuant to KRS 403.320, a motion to modify timesharing may be filed at any time as it is evaluated according to the best interest standard set forth in KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270(2) requires a custody determination to be made after the parties have a meaningful opportunity to be heard and the court considers the statutory best-interest factors.

Kutter v. Tara Cutter · filed 2024-06-27(2)

Before a custody decree is entered the trial court must determine what custody arrangement will be “in accordance with the best interests of the child.” KRS 403.270(2). In order for the Court to consider the child’s best interests, the parties, including any de facto custodian, are given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. KRS 403.270(2) also sets out nine specific factors which the court must consider in determining the best interests of the child.

Section 403.270(2) provides a nonexclusive set of relevant factors that courts may use as a statutory starting guideline when determining a child's best interest, including in visitation-modification proceedings.

Jamison Burns v. Burns · filed 2024-07-11(2)

KRS 403.320(3) does not expressly state how best interests are to be determined. The child custody statute, KRS 403.270, does set out factors which may be considered in determining a child’s best interest. ... After closely examining the record and the law, we find no error in the DRC’s application of the KRS 403.270(2) factors to Appellee’s motion for a change of visitation. The factors set out in KRS 403.270(2) are a statutory guideline enacted by the General Assembly for determining a child’s best interest, which we believe are equally applicable to a modification of visitation proceeding as they are to establishing or changing a custodial arrangement. These factors are not all-inclusive (“[t]he court shall consider all relevant factors including . . . ”). Rather, they are a starting point for the court’s determination of what constitutes the child’s best interest.

Section 403.270(2) requires a Family Court determining a child's best interests to consider all relevant factors, including the statute's non-exhaustive list, and explain its reasoning.

Taylor v. Teanna Leigh Taylor (Now Moore) · filed 2025-01-31(2)

The best-interests-of-the-child standard is found in KRS 403.270, which directs a Family Court “to ‘consider all relevant factors’ and provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that are relevant to the best interests of the child.” ... On remand, if the matter is not moot, the Family Court shall enter an order that clearly considers all relevant factors, including but not limited to those contained in KRS 403.270(2), when determining the best interests of Child regarding the administration of further doses of the COVID-19 injection.

Section 403.270 requires a circuit court entering a final custody order to determine the child’s best interests.

Henson v. Tudor · filed 2025-05-09

In a civil custody case such as this one, the circuit court is required to determine best interests of the parties’ child when entering a final custody order.

Section 403.270(2) requires a court deciding permanent custody in a DNA proceeding to consider the statutory best-interests factors, including the wishes of the child, the parents, and any de facto custodian.

P.B. v. Commonwealth of Kentu Cky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services · filed 2025-12-05(2)

A court ruling on a permanent custody motion in a DNA proceeding must consider not only the best interests factors listed in KRS 403.270(2), but also relevant factors listed in KRS 620.023. See generally L.D., 350 S.W.3d at 832-33.

Section 403.270(2) requires Kentucky courts making custody determinations to apply the child’s best-interests standard and consider the statute’s listed factors.

Ratcliff v. Wethington · filed 2026-03-06(2)

Under KRS2 403.270, Kentucky courts shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child, guided by eleven factors, including: (a) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents, and any de facto custodian, as to his or her custody; . . . (c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or parents, his or her siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests; . . . (e) The child’s adjustment and continuing proximity to his or her home, school, and community; (f) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved; . . . [and] (h) The extent to which the child has been cared for, nurtured, and supported by any de facto custodian[.] KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270(2) requires consideration of all relevant custody factors, but the court need not expressly match each factor to a particular finding if its findings sufficiently address the child's best interests.

Wedding v. Harmon · filed 2026-05-22(2)

While the family court did not outline the factors specifically, it did reference the appropriate statute and gave enough detail to support its conclusion. ... It is not a requirement for the family court to perfectly match each statutory factor with a particular finding of fact. The family court’s findings clearly relate to the best interest of the children.

Section 403.270 makes the mental and physical health of a child’s parent a relevant factor for a court to consider in custody matters.

Yeager v. Dickerson · filed 2013-01-11

KRS 403.270 provides that the mental and physical health of a child’s parent is a relevant factor for a court to consider in custodial issues.

Section 403.270 requires a full hearing to determine the child’s best interest and adjudicate the statutory custody factors before a default judgment may be entered in a custody proceeding.

Crews v. Shofner · filed 2014-03-07(1)

As expressed in the majority view, however, we hold that a full hearing to determine the child’s best interest and to adjudicate the other factors expressed in KRS 403.270 (and modification under KRS 403.340, where applicable) is a prerequisite to the entry of a Default Judgment.

Section 403.270(2)(b) requires a court making a custody determination to consider the child's wishes about who should be the child's custodian.

Morgan v. Getter · filed 2014-09-18(2)(b)

Indeed, the law requires that a court making a custody determination “shall consider ... [t]he wishes of the child as to his custodian.” KRS 403.270(2)(b).

A child’s wish to change custodians does not, by itself, establish that remaining with the current custodian is against the child’s best interests.

Fitzpatrick v. Calloway · filed 2023-03-09(2)(b)

It is true that C.F. expressed a desire to live half the time with her mother and half with her father. KRS 403.270(2)(b). ... Simply because an adolescent wants to live in a home she perceives as less stringent, or is having problems with her custodians, does not establish that it is not in the child’s best interest to remain in that home.

The amended § 403.270, together with § 403.315, bars a court from presuming joint custody when a domestic-violence order has been entered against one party by the other.

Brown v. Brown · filed 2021-01-14(2)

The legislature amended and re-enacted KRS 403.270 after Chalupa was decided.

Section 403.270(2)(g) does not require the court to repeat its domestic-violence-related best-interest analysis absent a subsequent DVO, new domestic violence, or newly discovered evidence that the prior domestic violence affected the child and the child’s relationship with each parent.

Stephanie Rose (f/N/A Ayo) v. Ayo · filed 2025-03-07(2)(g)

Absent a subsequent DVO, or some new evidence of subsequent domestic violence as defined in KRS 403.720(2), or at the very least newly discovered evidence that the original “domestic violence and abuse has affected the child and the child’s relationship to each party,” KRS 403.270(2)(g), there is no justification for expending limited judicial resources repeating a process already undertaken. ... Responding to Rose’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate the August 1, 2023 order, the family court explained that, because Rose failed to produce such evidence as just described, the factor described in KRS 403.270(2)(g) was no longer relevant. We agree.

Section 403.270(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof that a person was the child's primary caregiver and financial supporter for the specified residency period, excluding time after a parent begins a custody proceeding to regain custody.

Lemaster v. Stiltner · filed 2023-07-13(1)(a)

KRS 403.270 defines a de facto custodian as follows: ... First, any time a parent is pursuing a case to regain custody of the child tolls the timing requirement. KRS 403.270(1)(a). “Any direct participation in a child custody proceeding that demonstrates a parent’s desire to regain custody of their child is sufficient to toll the de facto time requirement under KRS 403.270.” ... Likewise, once Kendra filed the current circuit action to regain custody of M.S., this tolled the time requirement. ... This does not mean David also obtained de facto custodian status. ... This Court has determined that de facto custodian status is not necessarily a permanent status. It must be addressed each time the status is asserted.

The 2021 amendment to Section 403.270(1)(a) allowing aggregation of residence periods for de facto-custodian status is substantive and cannot be applied retroactively to earlier periods.

Rigdon v. England · filed 2024-07-11(1)(a)

We conclude that the amendment to KRS 403.270(1)(a) allowing a third party to aggregate periods of time to qualify for de facto custodian status is substantive. It changes the burden of proof and gives past conduct new substantive legal consequences.

Section 403.270(1)(a) does not toll the de facto custodial period for a parent’s custody action that lacked service on the relevant parties and was dismissed for lack of prosecution.

Z.R. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services · filed 2025-10-31(1)(a)

We agree with the Bullitt Family Court that because there was no service on Mother or the Cabinet in the Florida case, and as it was dismissed for lack of prosecution, it does not operate to stay the de facto custodial period for purposes of KRS 403.270(1)(a).

Section 403.270(1)(a) excludes from the de facto-custodian residence calculation any period after a parent commences a proceeding to regain custody.

Harris v. Baker · filed 2025-12-19(1)(a)

Crucially, the statute is clear that “[a]ny period of time after a legal proceeding has been commenced by a parent seeking to regain custody of the child shall not be included in determining whether the child has resided with the person for the required minimum period.”

Section 403.270(l)(a) permits the singular terms in its de facto-custodian definition to apply to more than one person when the context requires it, so an unmarried couple may qualify together.

Krieger v. Garvin · filed 2019-09-25(l)(a)

Since the Legislature knew of KRS 446.020(1) at the time it enacted KRS 403.270 and used no language indicating it meant its singular language not to extend to more than one person, we hold that the language utilized does not limit a minor’s de facto custodian to one person.

Section 403.270(2) creates a rebuttable presumption favoring joint custody and equal parenting time, while allowing courts to deviate based on the child’s best interests and consider relevant factors beyond its eleven listed factors.

Little v. Little · filed 2021-03-11(2)

We believe the trial court properly chose not to award equal parenting time to Appellant. The trial court was extremely concerned with Child 1’s separation anxiety. That, along with Appellant not having local family members available to help with the children, were appropriate factors to consider. The trial court is not limited to considering only the eleven factors listed in KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270(2) creates a rebuttable presumption favoring joint custody and equally shared parenting time, but the presumption does not apply to a party subject to a domestic violence order.

Lawson v. Kleinman · filed 2022-12-15(2)

However, an examination of that provision demonstrates that no such presumption applied under the circumstances. ... Accordingly, by the plain language of KRS 403.315, the presumption indicated in KRS 403.270(2) did not apply here. ... As discussed above, however, equal timesharing is a presumption, not a right; and no such presumption applied here.

Section 403.270(2) authorizes Kentucky judges to decide custody based on the child's best interests and requires giving custody priority to the child's parent.

A. G. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2021-03-24(2)

Kentucky judges still have the authority under KRS 403.270(2) to make custody determinations based on the best interests of a child and priority for custody must be given to the parent of the child.

Section 403.270(2) authorizes custody determinations based on the child’s best interests and requires priority for custody to be given to the child’s parent.

A. G. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2021-04-27(2)

Kentucky judges retain the authority under KRS 403.270(2) to make custody determinations based on the best interests of a child and priority for custody must be given to the parent of the child.

Section 403.270(2) requires custody decisions to follow the child’s best interests, presumes joint custody and equally shared parenting time, and requires a schedule maximizing each parent’s time when equal time is not feasible.

Puszczewicz v. Puszczewicz · filed 2021-05-06(2), (2)(k)

The statute creates a presumption, rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence, “that joint custody and equally shared parenting time is in the best interest of the child.” KRS 403.270(2). The statute provides a lengthy list of factors for the court to consider in determining the best interests of the child. ... James argues that the family court failed to give adequate weight to KRS 403.270(2)(k), one of the statutory factors for assessing the best interest of the child, which requires the court to consider “[t]he likelihood a party will allow the child frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with the other parent[.]” ... Nonetheless, the family court had to resolve a situation in which it could not award equally shared parenting time in accordance with the rebuttable presumption contained in KRS 403.270 because the parents are too geographically distant. ... The family court’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and it exercised its discretion in full accordance with the statutory directive that “[i]f a deviation from equal parenting time is warranted, the court shall construct a parenting time schedule which maximizes the time each parent . . . has with the child and is consistent with ensuring the child’s welfare.” KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270(2) requires an initial custody determination based on the child’s best interests and creates a rebuttable presumption that joint custody and equal parenting time are in the child’s best interests.

Marshall v. Marshall · filed 2025-06-27(2)

While the circuit court conducted an appropriate consideration of factors relating to the best interests of the children under KRS 403.270(2), it clearly erred in applying KRS 403.320 and Pennington, and failed to explain why it deviated from the presumption of equal timesharing contained in KRS 403.270. See Anderson v. Johnson, 350 S.W.3d 453, 457 (Ky. 2011); see also Childress v. Hart, 592 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Ky. App. 2019).

Section 403.270(2) directs courts making an initial custody decision to apply the child’s best-interest standard, presumes joint custody and equal parenting time, and allows consideration of relevant factors beyond its listed examples.

Haeberlin v. Zachary Thomas Herald, a Minor · filed 2026-04-24(2)

KRS 403.270(2) provides a statutory framework to guide a family court’s initial decision concerning child custody. ... Pursuant to KRS 403.270(2), joint custody and equal parenting time are presumed to be in the child’s best interest. ... As noted above, KRS 403.270(2) does not provide an exhaustive list of factors for the court to consider. Evidence of a parent’s decision-making skills is necessarily relevant to the best-interest analysis.

Section 403.270(2) presumes equal parenting time unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that equal time is not in the child's best interest.

Amber Henson v. Henson · filed 2025-05-23(2)

A presumption of equal timesharing applies in all custody determinations unless the court finds by a preponderance of evidence that it is not in the best interest of the child. KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270(2) creates a rebuttable presumption that joint custody and equal parenting time are in the child’s best interest, and a deviation requires a best-interest determination supported by written findings.

Nichols v. Nichols · filed 2021-09-23(2)

The statute creates a presumption, rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence, “that joint custody and equally shared parenting time is in the best interest of the child.” KRS 403.270(2). The statute provides a lengthy list of factors for the court to consider in determining the best interests of the child. If the court determines that a deviation from equal parenting time is appropriate, it must set forth a parenting time schedule maximizing the time each parent has with the child and “consistent with ensuring the child’s welfare.” KRS 403.270(2). ... On remand the circuit court must apply the presumption in favor of equal parenting time. After considering all the evidence in relation to the best interest factors, the circuit court should only deviate from the presumption if it concludes that equal parenting time is not in Child’s best interest. It must then render written findings of fact to support its ultimate conclusions.

Section 403.270(2) creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of equal timesharing and requires best-interest findings supporting any deviation.

George v. George · filed 2021-09-23(2)

KRS 403.270(2) creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of equal timesharing. We are unable to ascertain from the face of the circuit court’s order whether the circuit court applied the presumption, and there are no best interest findings to support that Stephanie rebutted the presumption.

Section 403.270(2) permits a court to deviate from equal timesharing when equal time is not in the child's best interests, provided the court makes supporting findings and conclusions.

Crouch v. McClure · filed 2022-01-13(2)

Upon review of the April 29, 2019, Order, we conclude the circuit court properly considered the statutory presumption set forth in KRS 403.270(2). After such consideration, the circuit court determined that equal timesharing was not in the child’s best interests and made specific findings of fact and conclusions ... of law in support thereof.

Section 403.270(2)'s presumption favoring equal timesharing applies only to an initial timesharing determination, not to a modification.

Dunaway v. Misti Madison Cork · filed 2021-06-17(2)

However, the equal timesharing presumption set forth KRS 403.270(2) is only applicable to an initial determination of timesharing and not to a modification of timesharing.

Section 403.270(2) creates a rebuttable presumption that equal parenting time is in the child’s best interest, permits deviation when the evidence supports a different best-interest determination, and requires a schedule that maximizes each parent’s time with the children.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2022-01-27(2)

More generally, Father argues the family court did not adequately explain why it was deviating from the “presumption, rebuttable by a preponderance of evidence, that . . . equally shared parenting time is in the best interest of the child.” KRS 403.270(2). We disagree with Father. ... The family court’s decision to deviate from the rebuttable presumption of equal timesharing is supported by a preponderance of substantial evidence of record. Furthermore, the family court’s award of timesharing based on the standard visitation schedule satisfies the court’s statutory obligation to “construct a parenting time schedule which maximizes the time each parent . . . has with the child[ren] . . . .” KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270(2) creates a rebuttable presumption that joint custody and equally shared parenting time are in the child’s best interest, and requires a schedule maximizing each parent’s time when equal parenting is not warranted.

Gallagher v. Gallagher · filed 2022-02-10(2)

While it would have been preferable if the trial court had acknowledged the statutory presumptions, the trial court made sufficient findings to support its conclusion that joint custody and equal timesharing would not be in the Child’s best interest. ... KRS 403.270(2) would seem to require more specific findings regarding the appropriate amount of timesharing. ... But since David did not request additional findings pursuant to CR 52.04, we deem the issue to have been waived.

Section 403.270(2)'s equal-timesharing presumption does not apply to a modification of visitation or timesharing.

Whitney Lee Lutz (Now Beeler) v. Armstrong · filed 2022-03-17(2)

the presumption does not apply to the modification of visitation or timesharing.

Section 403.270(2) requires the court to apply the equal-parenting-time presumption and craft a schedule maximizing each parent’s time when the statutory presumption is at issue.

Carr v. Carr · filed 2022-03-17(2)

The crux of Mark’s argument is that the circuit court failed to apply the statutory presumption that equal parenting time was in the child’s best interest or craft a parenting time schedule that would maximize his time with the child. We agree with Mark.

Section 403.270(2) presumes joint custody and equally shared parenting time are in the child’s best interest, requires consideration of the listed factors, and requires an adequate basis for deviating from equal parenting time.

Stephen Grant Porter, Jr. v. Abbott · filed 2022-04-07(2)

Herein, the family court stated that it considered “all factors concerning equal shared parenting time” but determined equal timesharing was “not workable in the current situation[] because of differences between the parties’ residences, work schedules and other household occupants.” R. at 120. The court did not elaborate on these findings nor does it explain how they relate to the factors defined in KRS 403.270(2). Furthermore, the court did not address what evidence presented at the hearing overcame the presumption of equal timesharing. These findings are insufficient under the statute.

Section 403.270 creates a rebuttable presumption of joint custody and equal parenting time for initial custody determinations, but the presumption does not apply to modifications of visitation or timesharing.

McDaniel v. Dolleris · filed 2022-07-07

Here, instead of applying the best interest standard of KRS 403.320, the family court applied the rebuttable presumption standard for initial custody and timesharing determinations under KRS 403.270. This is in contravention of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s recent holding in Layman v. Bohanon, 599 S.W.3d 423 (Ky. 2020). Therein, the Court held that while the presumption applies in initial custody/timesharing decisions, it does not apply when only modification of timesharing is sought.

Section 403.270 applies to an initial custody determination and carries a rebuttable presumption favoring joint custody and equal timesharing; it does not govern a modification of visitation.

Valandingham v. Marsh · filed 2022-12-01(2)

KRS 403.270 and KRS 403.320 address separate stages of custody proceedings: (1) “the initial custody determination[,]” and (2) “modification of visitation or timesharing.”

Section 403.270(2) presumes joint custody and equal timesharing, but that presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence, after which the trial court retains broad discretion to determine the child’s best interests and whether to deviate from 50/50 timesharing.

Garcia v. Coronado · filed 2023-03-09(2)

“While the new version of KRS 403.270(2) puts a finger on the scale in favor of joint custody and equal timesharing by requiring only a preponderance of evidence to overcome, such a preference is a slight burden and the trial court continues to possess broad discretion in determining the best interest of the child as to who should have custody and where the child shall live. . . . That discretion is not altered by the change in KRS 403.270(2) once an appropriate ground is established in favor of deviation from 50/50 timesharing.”

When custody departs from the presumed joint custody and equal-parenting-time arrangement, the court must consider the statutory best-interest factors and make a schedule maximizing each parent's time consistent with the child's welfare, supported by specific findings.

Heekin v. Heekin · filed 2023-06-29(2)

The statute goes on to provide a list of factors for the court to consider in determining the best interest of the child. If the court determines that a deviation from equal parenting time is appropriate, it must set forth a parenting time schedule maximizing the time each parent has with the child and “consistent with ensuring the child’s welfare.” KRS 403.270(2). ... Moreover, as discussed above, KRS 403.270(2) requires more specific findings when deviating from equal parenting time. Consequently, we must reverse this single holding and remand for additional factual findings setting out whether mid-week overnight parenting time with Husband would be in the best interests of the children.

Subsection (2) creates a rebuttable presumption that joint custody and equally shared parenting time are in the child’s best interest, requires consideration of relevant factors, and requires maximizing each parent’s time if equal parenting time is rejected.

Carr v. Carr · filed 2023-11-08(2)

The circuit court did what it was instructed to do by this Court. It started with the presumption that equal parenting time was in the child’s best interests, then reviewed its findings to determine if Jessica had overcome that presumption. The fact that the circuit court changed its mind when it looked at the facts from a different starting point does not make the decision an abuse of discretion. ... Jessica further argues that the circuit court should have outlined the findings it relied upon when determining she had not overcome the statutory presumption. However, it is not a requirement of a court to detail the findings it made when finding a presumption had not been rebutted. ... To conclude that a presumption has been overcome, as opposed to when it has not “the trial court must provide written findings of fact with reference to the specific evidence supporting its determinations.”

Subsection (2) creates a rebuttable presumption that joint custody and equal parenting time are in the child’s best interests, permitting a different parenting-time arrangement when the presumption is rebutted.

Romaine v. Jessica Rose Romaine · filed 2025-10-10(2)

Here, the family court exercised its broad discretion in determining that equal parenting time was not appropriate, and the court explicitly stated the KRS 403.270(2) presumption was rebutted. The court noted that at the time of the 2023 Mediation Agreement, Jessica was working at Son’s school and thus, mother and child saw each other every school day. However, as Son has aged out of that school, they do not see each other every school day anymore. Further, the court considered the testimony of Son’s counselor that it was not in Son’s best interest to be away from his mother for the majority of a month.

Section 403.270 creates a rebuttable presumption that equal parenting time is in a child's best interest for custody determinations, but the presumption does not apply to modifications of timesharing.

Mangine v. Mangine · filed 2024-02-29

He merely points to KRS 403.270’s rebuttable presumption that equal parenting time is in a child’s best interest, but this presumption only applies to custody determinations, not modifications of timesharing, as conceded by Robert. Layman, 599 S.W.3d at 431.

Section 403.270(2)’s presumption of joint custody and equal parenting time applies to initial custody determinations, not modifications of parenting time.

Watkins v. Wiley · filed 2022-01-13(2)

But the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the presumption set forth in KRS 403.270(2) applies only in the context of an initial custody determination, whereas the timesharing modification statute, KRS 403.320(3), “does not impose a presumption of joint custody and equal parenting time.” Layman, 599 S.W.3d at 430.

Section 403.270 supplies the presumption of joint custody and equal timesharing for custody awards; that presumption does not apply to a motion to modify timesharing.

Quinn v. Quinn · filed 2022-05-19

The Kentucky Supreme Court has addressed the presumption of joint custody and equal parenting time and held that the modification of timesharing statute, KRS 403.320, “does not impose a presumption of joint custody and equal parenting time.” Layman v. Bohanon, 599 S.W.3d 423, 430 (Ky. 2020). Rather, the Court noted that the presumption of joint custody and equal timesharing is only included in the award of custody statute (KRS 403.270), and the modification of custody statute (KRS 403.340). Id. at 430.

Subsection (1) recognizes de facto-custodian status as a basis for a nonparent to pursue custody; a nonparent relative who is not a de facto custodian cannot obtain standing from the family relationship alone.

Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. Batie · filed 2022-05-13(1)

To begin, Baker does not analyze the same question presented in this appeal – whether a nonparent relative who is neither a de facto custodian, KRS 403.270(1), nor a person acting as a parent, KRS 403.800(13), has standing to sue for a child’s custody based on the relationship alone. ... Unable even to assert the interest that permitted intervention in Baker, the Baties have no standing to claim the right to pursue custody of the twins.

A custody-modification decision must contain specific written findings supporting a best-interest determination under Section 403.270 when that statute supplies the basis for the change.

Farley v. Willis · filed 2023-04-20(2)

Those findings must be made in a good faith effort of the family court and must be included in a written order.

A custody court must comply with Section 403.270’s best-interest requirements and make appropriate findings when entering an initial custody decree.

Massacci-Miller v. Miller · filed 2025-10-24(2)

the circuit court also failed to conduct any sort of evidentiary hearing in 2017 and otherwise failed to make specific findings regarding Child’s best interests under KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270(2) requires the court to consider all relevant best-interest factors, and a custody order that fails to do so must be remanded for findings.

Sharp v. Jamiracle Watts · filed 2026-05-29(2)

failed to follow the mandates of KRS 403.270(2) (“The court shall consider all relevant factors”) and KRS 403.315 (“The court shall weigh all factors set out in KRS 403.270”) in determining the best interest of the child.

Section 403.270(2) requires the court to closely consider the relevant statutory custody factors when determining the child’s best interests, but it need not list each factor in a rote or serial fashion.

Thrall v. Al Thrall · filed 2023-09-14(2)

While Appellant correctly notes that the Monroe Circuit Court did not list each KRS 403.270(2) factor in a rote or serial fashion, it is clear that the court closely considered the relevant statutory factors in reaching its conclusion that custody being placed with Appellee rather than Appellant is in R.T.’s best interests. This satisfies the statutory standard.

Section 403.270(2) requires consideration of the relevant best-interest factors, but a court need not recite the statutory language verbatim when its findings substantively address those factors.

Monroe v. Wright · filed 2024-01-25(2)

The family court may not have employed the exact language used in KRS 403.270(2) in determining the child’s best interest. But it substantively discussed the parents’ wishes, the relationships between the parents and child, the motivation of the parents, the child’s adjustment and proximity to her home and daycare, the mental and physical health of the parents and the child, and the likelihood either party would allow the other contact with the child. Thus, it appropriately considered KRS 403.270(2) factors relevant to this case.

Section 403.270 supplies partially listed factors that courts must consider, along with all relevant facts, when deciding whether a timesharing modification serves the child’s best interests.

Wilburn v. Wilburn · filed 2024-06-13(2)

There are several factors courts must consider in determining whether a modification of timesharing is in a child’s best interest, which are partially listed in KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270(2) requires courts deciding a child’s best interests to consider all relevant factors, including the parents’ wishes, family relationships, the adults’ motivations, the child’s adjustment, the parties’ health, and domestic violence.

Rodriguez v. Quiggins · filed 2024-07-26(2)

When determining whether a modification of custody or parenting time is in a child’s best interest, KRS 403.270(2) requires a court to consider “all relevant factors,” including the wishes of the child’s parents; the interrelationship of the child with her parents; the motivation of the adults participating in the custody proceeding; the child’s adjustment to her home, school, and community; the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; and evidence of any domestic violence. Although the family court did not specifically reference the KRS 403.270 best interest factors when denying the motions to modify custody and parenting time, we are convinced it properly considered them. The family court’s findings of fact clearly relate to the statutory best interest factors.

Section 403.270(2) requires the court to consider the listed best-interest factors but does not require specific findings on every factor.

Rice v. Collins · filed 2025-01-24(2)

KRS 403.270 merely requires that ... the court consider the listed best interest factors and not that it render specific findings on each one.

Section 403.270(2) sets out the factors that must be analyzed when a court modifies custody under KRS 403.340.

White v. Aiesha White (Now Cole) · filed 2025-08-29(2)

The relevant inquiry under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 403.340 is whether there has been a change in the circumstances of the child or custodian and then whether the modification of custody is in the best interests of the child. That statute also requires an analysis of the factors for an initial award of custody under KRS 403.270(2).

Section 403.270(2)’s best-interest factors guide custody decisions and may be considered when resolving an educational decision that is a custody matter.

Elmer J. George, Jr. v. Meredith Booth George (Now Thompson) · filed 2026-01-30(2)

Finally, we reject Father’s argument that the family court misapplied the best interest factors in KRS 403.270. That statute is designed to guide a court when making child custody decisions.

Section 403.270's presumption of joint custody and equal parenting time applies to custody determinations, but not to modifications of visitation or timesharing.

Fuller v. Trista Fuller · filed 2023-09-28

Accordingly, the . . . presumption of joint custody and ... equal parenting time in KRS 403.270 applies to custody determinations, but it does not apply to modifications of visitation or timesharing.

Section 403.270 governs initial custody determinations, while Section 403.320 governs visitation or timesharing modifications and does not import the Section 403.270 factors or equal-timesharing presumption.

Barnes v. Renzelli · filed 2024-03-07(2)

While KRS 403.270 addresses the initial custody determination, KRS 403.320 governs modification of visitation or timesharing.

A ruling increasing visitation must follow Section 403.320’s best-interest standard, with the relevant timesharing factors partially listed in Section 403.270.

Adair v. Terry Lee Adair, Jr. · filed 2024-07-11(2)

There are several factors the courts must consider in determining whether a modification of timesharing is in a child’s best interest, which are partially listed in KRS 403.270.

Section 403.270 requires a custody court to consider the listed best-interest factors, and a history of domestic violence rebuts the presumption of equal parenting time, requiring a full best-interest hearing.

Nichani v. Nichani · filed 2024-02-08(g) and (k)

KRS 403.270 provides that the court must consider numerous statutory factors, not just psychological evaluations. ... The family court properly noted that the presumption of equal parenting time envisioned by KRS 403.270 was rebutted by the history of the DVO. This required a full hearing to determine the best interests of the Child, which the family court conducted. The family court then applied the correct law, acted within its discretion, and did not abuse that discretion in determining that joint custody was in the best interest of the Child.

A domestic violence order removes the presumption of joint custody and equal parenting time for the protected party, while the court must still weigh the relevant Section 403.270 factors.

Antwan Miles v. Skaggs · filed 2023-12-14(2)(g),(2)(k)

Accordingly, because of the DVO, Lyndsay did not have a burden to overcome a presumption of joint custody and equal parenting time, and the family court did not presume that joint custody and equal parenting time was in Child’s best interest.

Section 403.270(2)(g) permits a Family Court to consider domestic violence when determining the child’s best interests in a DNA proceeding.

S.B. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services · filed 2026-02-20(2)(g)

KRS 403.270(2)(g) permits the Family Court to consider domestic violence when evaluating the best interests of the child.

Section 403.270(2) requires a court to set a timesharing schedule consistent with the children’s welfare and to maximize parenting time when deviating from equal timesharing for joint custodians.

Sarah Kathleen Graff (Kna Riley) v. Bowman · filed 2025-10-03(2)

Moreover, KRS 403.270(2) expressly provides that a court must establish a timesharing schedule consistent with the children’s welfare in addition to requiring that the court maximize parenting time when deviating from equal timesharing for joint custodians.

Section 403.270 requires clear and convincing evidence that a person was the child’s primary caregiver and financial supporter for the required period before a court may recognize that person as a de facto custodian.

Jordan Rein Kline v. Cole · filed 2025-10-10(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)

In short, KRS 403.270(1)(a) requires a de facto custodian to show by clear and convincing evidence they have been the primary caregiver for and financial supporter of the child for a required period of time. That statutory provision is read in tandem with KRS 403.270(1)(b), which specifies that a person shall not be a de facto custodian until a court determines by clear and convincing evidence that a person meets the definition in KRS 403.270(1)(a).

Section 403.270(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof that a nonparent was the child’s primary caregiver and financial supporter for the required period to qualify as a de facto custodian.

York v. Hamlet · filed 2026-06-05(1)(a)

Because substantial evidence supported the family court’s determination that Grandparents failed to establish de facto custodian status under KRS 403.270, we find no reversible error.

Section 403.270(2)(f) requires a court determining a parenting schedule in the child's best interest to consider the mental and physical health of all individuals involved and permits the court to order a mental-health assessment when a parent's psychological state is questioned.

Higgins v. Clark · filed 2026-04-10(2)(f)

KRS 403.270(2) outlines some of the relevant factors a court is to consider when determining a parenting schedule that is in a child’s best interest. Subsection (f) of this statute is “the mental and physical health of all individuals involved[.]” A circuit court is explicitly required to consider the mental health of the parents, and it necessarily follows that the court has the discretion to order a mental health assessment when a parent’s psychological state is questioned.