Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.190

Property acquired after physical separation but before divorce remains marital unless a statutory exception applies, such as acquisition after a decree of legal separation.

Davis v. Davis · filed 2025-08-08(2)(c)

Though the parties physically separated at least three years prior to the divorce decree, they did not obtain a decree of legal separation. See KRS 403.190(2)(c) (assets acquired after marriage but prior to divorce are marital assets unless subject to a statutory exception such as assets acquired after a decree of legal separation). Moreover, given the broad definition of marital assets in KRS 403.190, we discern no error in the family court’s declining to classify the funds used for post-separation mortgage payments or the reduction in the mortgage balance as nonmarital assets to be assigned to James.

A post-dissolution increase in home equity directly attributable to one spouse’s payments is nonmarital and must be assigned to that spouse when there is no proof that marital funds were used.

Mitchell v. Mitchell · filed 2025-12-12(2)(c)

Given the lack of substantial evidence presented on the horse boarding business, and that the increase in equity was directly attributable to Billy’s payments, the circuit court erred in characterizing the $90,083.60 as marital property. It should have been characterized as nonmarital and therefore it should have been assigned to Billy pursuant to the second step of Travis.

Property acquired during an actual but not legal separation remains marital absent a subsection (2) exception, although the court may divide such property unequally in just proportions.

Bridgett F. Wells v. Wells · filed 2026-04-17(1)-(3)

As the family court essentially recognized, this property was acquired while the parties were still married despite their actual, but not legal, separation and no KRS 403.190(2) exception applied, so the property is marital. ... Despite this case being distinct from Shively in many respects, the principles expressed in Shively—that assets acquired during separation may be treated differently than assets required prior to separation and that a court does not have to divide marital assets 50/50 to divide them in just proportions—still apply.

A professional license may be treated as marital property when doing so is the only way to achieve an equitable result for a spouse who supported its acquisition.

Inman v. Inman · filed 1979-02-23(2)

In spite of these reservations, however, we feel that there are certain instances in which treating a professional license as marital property is the only way in which a court can achieve an equitable result.

A professional license need not be treated as marital property when maintenance and other awards can equitably compensate the spouse who supported its acquisition.

Leveck v. Leveck · filed 1981-04-10(2)

In this case, an equitable result was able to be reached without treatment of the license as marital property, because Judith was entitled to maintenance. The trial court was not clearly erroneous in failing to find the medical license as marital property.

The marital investment in a professional degree includes the marital contribution to direct support and school expenses with interest and inflation, but not the holder's future license or earning potential.

Moss v. Moss · filed 1982-03-12(3)

Under our holding Mrs. Moss is entitled to a return on her portion of the marital contribution to the cost of Mr. Moss’s education. This division in no way reaches the license and the dividends it may carry in the future. ... The extent of the return upon this investment is to be “the amount spent for direct support and school expenses during the period of education, plus reasonable interest and adjustments for inflation.”

A professional degree and license are not property divisible under Section 403.190, although they may be considered when awarding maintenance.

Lovett v. Lovett · filed 1985-04-11

The trial court and the Court of Appeals, relying principally upon decisions of the latter and the dicta in Inman II, held that the proper solution of this "diploma dilemma" was to treat the professional degree and license as a source of maintenance and not as property capable of division under KRS 403.190. It is our position that this is correct.

Section 403.190 permits an unequal property division that accounts for a spouse’s contribution to the other spouse’s professional degree even though the degree itself is not marital property.

McGowan v. McGowan · filed 1983-12-30(1)(a)

Thus, if a divorce occurs shortly after a professional spouse has acquired a degree, an award of the lion's share of the parties' marital property to the working spouse can be justified under KRS 403.190(1)(a) because that spouse will have contributed more to its acquisition. Moreover, if the divorce occurs some years later, the court can still consider the working spouse's contribution to the professional degree in determining how to divide their marital estate.

Although a professional degree is not marital property, it is an asset of the marriage that may be considered when evaluating each spouse's contribution and dividing marital property and debts.

Schmitz v. Schmitz · filed 1990-09-21(1)(a)

Although the professional degree cannot be viewed as marital property under Kentucky law, it can be considered as an asset of the marriage in looking at the parties’ respective contributions when the court is dividing marital property and allocating responsibility for marital debts.

A professional degree is not divisible marital property, but one spouse's contribution to the other's degree may be considered in maintenance and property distribution.

Little v. Little · filed 2021-03-11(1)(a)

Appellant is incorrect that a professional degree can be marital property. Kentucky law is clear that it is not, and such a degree cannot be divided upon divorce.

A nonvested pension earned during marriage is marital property, but its division should be deferred until it vests rather than offset immediately with other marital assets.

Glidewell v. Glidewell · filed 1993-04-09(1)(d), (2)

that a non-vested pension is marital property, but should not be divided until it has vested. We feel this solution is more equitable for both parties in that the non-pensioner spouse will receive exactly that portion of the pension to which she is entitled (instead of perhaps receiving an inadequate amount of marital property), while the pensioner spouse will not be unjustly penalized by the unequal distribution of marital property in the event his pension does not vest.

A spouse’s vested interest in an ERISA plan is marital property, but its division may be delayed until the benefits become payable to avoid severe economic consequences.

Owens v. Owens · filed 1984-06-29(1)(d)

On remand, the trial court is directed to determine the amount of James’ interest in the plans in which he had a right to the proceeds at the time of the decree, such amount to be marital property, and to delay division of James’ interest in the plans until such time as they would be otherwise payable.

Military retirement pay accumulated entirely during the marriage is marital property subject to division.

Jones v. Jones · filed 1984-12-06(2)

The military retirement pay here was accumulated entirely during the marriage, and by any test we can think of is property within the meaning of KRS 403.-190(2). Thus the pay is subject to division by the court as marital property.

A nonvested military pension earned during marriage may be divided as marital property by making the nonemployee spouse’s share contingent on the employee spouse ultimately receiving benefits.

Poe v. Poe · filed 1986-03-28(2)

Thus, a nonvested pension is not overly speculative where courts such as the Hardin Circuit Court are willing to delay the actual division of those benefits until they are capable of distribution and have in every sense of the word “vested.” This type of creative distribution of the award silences any complaints concerning the speculative nature of future pension benefits. As in the present case, Joanne’s entitlement to a portion of those benefits representing her marital contribution is contingent upon Robert’s entitlement to those benefits.

A vested military pension is a marital asset, and the nonemployee spouse may receive the marital share when retirement payments begin.

Spratling v. Spratling · filed 1986-12-12

Obie’s retirement pay is vested. It is a valuable marital asset. Gladys has earned an entitlement to a portion of this retirement pay from and after the time it is received.

A vested but unmatured pension interest is marital property subject to fair disposition under Section 403.190.

Duncan v. Duncan · filed 1987-02-13

His rights in the pension plan can properly be described as vested, but not matured. As such it is marital property.

When one spouse's retirement benefits are excluded from marital-property classification or economic-circumstance consideration, the other spouse's retirement benefits receive the same treatment.

Waggoner v. Waggoner · filed 1992-12-17(4)

If retirement benefits of one (1) spouse are excepted from classification as marital property, or not considered as an economic circumstance during the division of marital property, then the retirement benefits of the other spouse shall also be excepted, or not considered, as the case may be . . . The combination of KRS 161.700(2) and KRS 403.190(4) protects the spouse of a teacher covered by the TRS plan.

Military voluntary-separation incentive payments are marital property to the extent earned during marriage because they are early-retirement benefits rather than compensation for future lost earnings.

Lykins v. Lykins · filed 2000-11-17(2)

The asset at issue is intended to be, and is in the nature of, either severance pay or early retirement. The proper characterization of the asset is not dependent upon the service member’s motives, good or bad, for opting to take advantage of the programs. ... For the foregoing reason, we hold that the trial court did not err in characterizing the VSI payments as marital property.

When a dissolution decree awards a percentage of the marital portion of a federal pension by deferred distribution and does not exclude future cost-of-living adjustments, the former spouse's percentage includes those adjustments.

Brown v. Brown · filed 2015-01-16(2)

Thus, we conclude that where the original dissolution decree used the deferred distribution method and made no mention of the exclusion of any future COLAs, the circuit court was correct in holding that the former spouse was entitled to inclusion of the COLA on her marital percentage of the retirement payout upon distribution.

The marital portion of vested military retirement is a marital asset whose division cannot be treated merely as temporary maintenance or terminated early without stated reasons supporting a just division.

Hays v. Larry Bracken Hays · filed 2020-08-27(1)

For purposes of remand, the marital portion of Larry’s military retirement shall be treated as a marital asset subject to division by the court. The family court shall set forth its division of Larry’s retirement, including any reasons to reduce Shirley’s share of the asset through an early termination of benefits.

A former spouse may share only in the marital portion of military retirement pay and has no right to its nonmarital portion.

Snodgrass v. Snodgrass · filed 2009-10-16(1)

Lisa is not entitled to share in any of the nonmarital portion of Guys’ retired pay.

When one spouse’s teacher-retirement account is exempt, subsection (4) also requires the other spouse’s retirement account to be exempted in accordance with its reciprocal limits.

Boone v. Ballinger · filed 2007-05-04(4)

We also reverse the trial court’s original Property Supplemental Decree to the extent that Melinda’s 401(k) retirement account was not exempted from property division in accordance with KRS 403.190(4).

An employer-funded SEP-IRA is an ERISA-regulated plan that triggers subsection (4)’s reciprocal retirement-benefit exemption rules.

Shown v. Shown · filed 2007-09-20(4)

Thus, unlike IRAs, SEP-IRAs, being employer funded, do trigger the divisionary rules of KRS 403.190(4).

The reciprocal retirement-benefit rule is not triggered when the spouse of a teacher has no retirement account, so the teacher's KTRS account remains entirely nonmarital and cannot be considered as an economic circumstance.

Brooks v. Brooks · filed 2011-06-24(4)

Yolanda has no retirement account and thus, the divisionary rule under KRS 403.190(4) is not triggered. Thus, under KRS 161.700, Charles’ KTRS account is nonmarital property and cannot be treated as an economic circumstance for purposes of dividing marital property.

Before dividing a teacher's retirement account against a nonteacher spouse's retirement plan, the court must take evidence, value the teacher's hypothetical Social Security benefit, deduct that offset, and then divide the remaining marital pension in just proportions.

Shown v. Shown · filed 2015-12-18(1), (4)

On remand, the trial court must compute the present value of a Social Security benefit that Robert would have received had he contributed to Social Security. That value should be deducted from the present value of Robert’s teachers’ retirement pension, prior to division of the parties’ pension plans.

When one spouse has an exempt Teachers' Retirement System pension and the other has an ERISA plan, the ERISA-plan spouse receives a reciprocal, commensurate exemption after the teacher's pension is reduced by replacement Social Security value.

Bradford v. Bradford · filed 2021-04-15(4)

Where one spouse has a TRS pension and the other has a retirement plan governed by ERISA, such as the case herein, KRS 403.190(4) instructs that the spouse with the ERISA plan is entitled to a reciprocal, commensurate exception.

Non-prospective Social Security disability benefits cannot themselves be divided or offset, but they may be considered when assessing the overall fairness of a marital-property division.

Gross v. Gross · filed 1999-12-17(1)(d)

Thus, we conclude that the Bracken Circuit Court was at liberty to consider Dennis’s award of non-prospective Social Security benefits in assessing the over-all fairness of the parties’ property settlement agreement.

Federal law excludes veterans' disability benefits received in place of waived military retirement pay from divisible marital property, though a court may address resulting inequity through other property or maintenance awards.

Davis v. Davis · filed 1989-09-28(1)

However, after much consideration, we further hold that pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4), ‘amounts waived in order to receive compensation under title 38,’ or, VA benefits received in lieu of military retirement pay, are specifically excluded from division as marital property. ... Furthermore, if an inequity arises in an individual case, the trial court can resolve the problem according to our statutes by making an appropriate award of spousal support and/or marital property. KRS 403.190, KRS 403.200.

Disability benefits are marital or nonmarital according to the property they replace, so benefits replacing post-dissolution earnings are nonmarital.

Holman v. Holman · filed 2002-06-13(2)

We hold that disability retirement benefits are properly classified as marital or nonmarital property according to the character of the property they replace. Accordingly, Appellant's future, post-dissolution disability retirement benefits, which replace his future nonmarital earnings as a firefighter, constitute Appellant's separate nonmarital property.

A 401(k) begun and funded during marriage is marital property unless a statutory exception is proved; physical separation alone does not change its classification.

Hayden v. Hayden · filed 2023-04-13(2), (3)

In the present case, Victor did not prove that his 401(k) fell within any of the enumerated exceptions, the circuit court did not find that it fell within any of the exceptions, and we cannot glean from the findings of fact made that a 401(k) started and contributed to during the marriage is anything but marital.

A pension is valued as of dissolution and includes post-separation contributions unless the court makes statutory-factor findings explaining why another division is just.

Ferguson v. Chad Toy Ferguson · filed 2023-05-04(1), (3)

On remand, we direct the circuit court to divide equally the pension as valued on the date of dissolution unless the court makes a finding why it is just to effectively divide the pension as of another date – such as explaining why it is just not to give Shannon the benefit of Chad’s post-separation contributions to his pension with specific findings discussing KRS 403.190(1) factors.

Retirement benefits that accrue in definable amounts before and during marriage do not require asset tracing; only the portion accrued during marriage is marital.

Kositzky v. Kositzky · filed 2023-07-20(2), (3)

Accordingly, Neil was not required to provide tracing for the retirement accounts.

Section 403.190 creates no presumption that debts incurred during marriage are marital debts; their nature depends on benefits received and each spouse's participation.

Bodie v. Bodie · filed 1979-11-30(3)

The statute itself does not create a presumption as to marital debts and we do not believe one can be judicially implied. All debts incurred during marriage are not necessarily marital debts. Consideration should be given to the nature of the debts based upon the receipt of benefits and the extent of participation.

Section 403.190 creates no presumption that debts incurred during marriage are marital, equally divisible, or divisible in the same proportions as marital property.

Neidlinger v. Neidlinger · filed 2001-08-23(3)

To the extent that Daniels v. Daniels, supra , and Underwood v. Underwood, supra , hold that there is a presumption with respect to debts incurred during a marriage, they are overruled. Nor is there any presumption that debts must be divided equally or in the same proportions as the marital property.

There is no presumption that a debt incurred during marriage is marital, and the spouse who incurred the debt bears the burden of proving its marital character.

Rice v. Rice · filed 2011-03-24

However,- the statute does not create a presumption in regard to debt, though as a practical matter, the assignment of debts acquired during the marriage speaks to whether a debt is marital or nonmarital, and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Marital debt need not be divided equally and may be assigned entirely to the spouse whose financial circumstances and earning ability make that allocation just.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2022-02-17(1)

The allocation of debt may be a burden upon Gregory, but he is the only one of the two able to carry this burden; therefore, we find that the family court’s assignment of debt was based on substantial evidence and not an abuse of discretion.

A court may divide home-equity debt unequally when the allocation is equitable in the context of the entire marital estate, including one spouse's dissipation of other assets.

Sarin M. Shah v. Bhajana Sarin Shah · filed 2022-05-19(1)

The division of the HELOC debt was equitable to the parties when viewed in the context of the entire marital estate and consequently it was not an abuse of discretion.

Subsection (3)’s presumption that property acquired during marriage is marital does not extend to debt.

Bowers v. Bethany A. Bowers · filed 2024-02-08(3)

While KRS 403.190 creates a presumption that property acquired during a marriage is marital, that presumption does not extend to debt.

A custodial spouse may occupy the family home, but a spouse whose post-decree mortgage payments reduce principal is entitled to reimbursement before later sale proceeds are divided.

Gibson v. Gibson · filed 1980-04-04(1)(d)

The cost of paying taxes, providing insurance and payment of interest on the loan can properly be imposed upon appellant as a part of his responsibility to provide a home for his children, but to the extent that his mortgage payments reduce the principal of the indebtedness he is entitled to reimbursement.

A court may award the marital home to the primary residential parent when credible valuation evidence exists and the custodial spouse paid the home's expenses and upkeep.

Garcia v. Coronado · filed 2023-03-09(1)(d)

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its valuation of the property or in granting the marital residence to Irma.

Section 403.190 treats the right to live in the family home as marital property that can be credited against a property division award.

Shirley R. Green, (86-1897), Larry W. And Judy Maynard, (86-1958) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (86-1897), (86-1958) · filed 1988-08-22(1)(d)

Since Kentucky considers the right to live in the family home marital property, we view the fact that Larry could credit $700 for each month Shirley remained in the home against his obligation to pay $72,-500, as evidence that the lump sum award was intended to be a division of the marital property.

Section 403.190(2) treats a workers’ compensation settlement received during the marriage as marital property because it is not among the statutory exceptions.

Quiggins v. Quiggins · filed 1982-09-03(2)

Under Section (2) of the statute, all property is to be considered marital property unless it falls within one of the enumerated exceptions. There is no exception for property acquired by way of a worker’s compensation settlement.

A lump-sum workers’ compensation award received during a pending divorce is marital property because it is property acquired during the marriage and falls within no statutory exception.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1982-09-21(2)

Though an award of workers’ compensation may be intended to replace lost wages which otherwise would have been earned in the future, it nevertheless is money in hand and it is not within the exceptions to KRS 403.190, which is the controlling statute.

Workers’ compensation payments received or accrued by dissolution are marital property, but payments that accrue after dissolution are the worker’s nonmarital future income.

Mosley v. Mosley · filed 1985-01-04(2)

Payments that are received, or weekly benefits that have actually accrued but have not yet been paid as of the date of the dissolution of the marriage, are to be included as marital property, just as earned income. But, payments which accrue and are paid after the dissolution of the marriage are not part of the marital property any more than the worker's future earnings would be.

A workers' compensation lump sum is nonmarital to the extent it replaces earnings from before marriage and marital to the extent it represents years during the marriage, but it must still be divided under the statutory factors rather than automatically prorated.

Jessee v. Jessee · filed 1994-08-26(1), (2)

we are of the opinion that the portion of money which represents the years that Chris was not married to Barbara is nonmarital and any personalty which was purchased with that money is likewise non-marital provided it can be properly traced. However, we are unwilling to find that the entire $74,633.50 was nonmarital. Because this is a workers’ compensation settlement and not a personal injury settlement we are of the opinion that the portion of the award which represents those years that the parties were married is marital.

Workers' compensation benefits received before dissolution are marital property, and their division must be made in just proportions under the statutory factors.

Day v. Day · filed 2009-12-11(1), (2)

In the present case, Mr. Day received his entire workers’ compensation award prior to dissolution. ... Trial courts are vested with broad discretion when dividing marital property. ... It is apparent from the amended findings and conclusions entered on December 21, 2007, that the trial court considered each of the KRS 403.190 factors.

A personal-injury award replacing earnings lost during the marriage is marital property, while the portion attributable to post-dissolution years is nonmarital.

Weakley v. Weakley · filed 1987-06-11(2)

To the extent that a personal injury award for loss of earnings and permanent impairment of ability to earn money is applicable to the years while the marriage existed, it is marital property. To the extent that the award can be prorated to the remaining years of life expectancy following the dissolution of the marriage, it is nonmarital.

An unallocated personal-injury settlement received during marriage is presumed marital when no statutory exception applies, but a just division must account for the spouses' contributions and circumstances.

Reeves v. Reeves · filed 1988-05-06(1), (2), (3)

Property is presumed to be marital. The presumption is countered by five exceptions, none of which are pertinent here. Thus we conclude that the award is marital property. ... We hold that any disposition of the award to the appellee above the $7,500 voluntarily paid to her would be an abuse of discretion under the statute.

Personal-injury proceeds compensating pain and suffering are nonmarital property because they replace premarital good health rather than earnings that would have accrued during marriage.

Bond v. Bond · filed 2021-09-30(2)(b)

As such, the pain and suffering award should be treated as nonmarital property pursuant to KRS 403.190(2)(b).

The existing cash, accounts receivable, and equipment of a professional practice acquired during marriage are marital property rather than part of the owner’s professional license.

Heller v. Heller · filed 1984-07-20(3)

Under the language of KRS 403.-190(3), all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage is marital property. Given such language, we find that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in not ruling that the existing assets comprising the appellee’s practice — the cash in hand, the accounts receivable, and the depreciated equipment — constituted marital property. Clearly, such assets have a clearly definable value on an open market and are distinguishable from the value of a professional degree or license.

Under the source-of-funds rule, corporate shares are acquired as they are paid for, so shares redeemed with corporate earnings during marriage are presumed marital and growth from the spouses' joint efforts is marital appreciation.

Allison v. Allison · filed 2008-02-15(2)(b), (2)(e), (3)

Under this analysis, the shares of stock sold to the corporation in the 1996 stock redemption agreement were not “acquired”, within the meaning of KRS 403.190 and the determination of marital/nonmarital interest, until they were paid for. These shares were paid for during the marriage over a period of years by corporate earnings. Thus, they were “acquired” during the marriage.

Only transferable enterprise goodwill is divisible marital property; goodwill attributable to an owner's personal skill, reputation, work ethic, and relationships is nonmarital future earning capacity.

Gaskill v. Robbins · filed 2009-02-19(1), (2)

In this manner, these attributes constitute nonmarital property that will continue with her regardless of the presence of any spouse. To consider this highly personal value as marital would effectively attach her future earnings, to which Robbins has no claim. ... If the value of goodwill can be reasonably determined at all, the amount of enterprise goodwill, which is all that can be considered as marital property, can be determined.

Only transferable enterprise goodwill is divisible marital property; goodwill attributable to an owner's personal skill, reputation, work ethic, and relationships is nonmarital future earning capacity.

Robbins v. Gaskill · filed 2009-02-19(1), (2)

In this manner, these attributes constitute nonmarital property that will continue with her regardless of the presence of any spouse . To consider this highly personal value as marital would effectively attach her future earnings, to which Robbins has no claim. ... If the value of goodwill can be reasonably determined at all, the amount of enterprise goodwill, which is all that can be considered as marital property, can be determined .

A business valuation must separate divisible enterprise goodwill from the owner's nonmarital personal goodwill even when the business is not a professional practice.

Maginnis v. Maginnis · filed 2021-06-17(2), (3)

Pursuant to Gaskill v. Robbins, 282 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2009), there is a distinction between enterprise goodwill, which is a marital asset and can be divided in a dissolution, and personal goodwill, which is nonmarital. We agree with Thomas that the judgment must be vacated on this basis.

A spouse’s investment of time and labor in building a business can support classifying its inventory and equipment as marital property and awarding that spouse a share.

Keeney v. Keeney · filed 2007-03-16(1)

The trial court also found that Barbara’s investment of time and labor contributed toward the building of K-Bar as a business and entitled her to an interest in the business’ inventory and equipment. Having found the K-Bar inventory to be marital property, the trial court was well within its authority to award Barbara half of the proceeds of the sale of that inventory.

A spouse's uncompensated work in the other spouse's premarital business and care of the parties' farm supports an equal division of marital bank accounts.

Cummings v. Cummings · filed 2023-02-16(1)(a)

The Family Court found that Wife “worked diligently for the clinic” and also cared for the parties’ cattle on their farm. There was no evidence that she was formally compensated for these services during the marriage. ... Consequently, we cannot find that the Family Court clearly erred or abused its discretion in its equal division of most marital assets.

Income and growth produced by a spouse's active operation of a premarital business are marital property, while only the business's proven value at marriage remains nonmarital.

Marcum v. Marcum · filed 1989-11-09(2)(e), (3)

There is a distinction between an increase in value of property which occurs without effort on the part of the owners and the increase in the value of property that occurs as a result of the efforts of the parties. This business was the principal employment of the husband and pursuant to Sousley, supra , the income produced from the business is marital property and must be divided accordingly.

Brief periods of homemaking do not make the appreciation of a spouse’s premarital business marital property without proof that those efforts contributed to the increase in value.

Lewis v. Fulkerson · filed 2017-09-29(2)(e)

Here, Laura was a "homemaker" for a few months over the course of the marriage, and the parties had multiple sources of income. Therefore, the family court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the entirety of the proceeds from the sale of Maximum ASP were Wade's nonmarital property.

An equitable division may include selling a marital business that is no longer a going concern and applying the proceeds to marital debts.

Keen v. Keen · filed 2023-09-14(1)

We find that there was substantial evidence to support the family court’s finding that the marital business was not a going concern. We find no abuse of discretion in the family court’s conclusion that an equitable distribution included the sale of the marital business.

Separate property awarded in an earlier divorce remains separate upon the parties' remarriage, and replacement property received in a like-kind exchange for it is excluded from marital property.

Gray v. Gray · filed 1988-01-15(2)(b)

KRS 403.190(2) defines marital property and subsection (b) excludes “[PJroperty acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage....” The second Dat-sun clearly fits this definition. Marlia Gray brought the first automobile with her into the second marriage. There was a like-kind exchange which in no way can be construed as an attempt to annul the first divorce judgment. It remained in effect and awarded Marlia Gray the rights to the Datsun. KRS 403.190(2)(b) preserves her rights in the replacement.

An interest acquired after marriage by exchanging a premarital credit remains nonmarital property.

Brewick v. Brewick · filed 2003-11-14(2)(b)

As Harold’s portion of the successful $150,000 bid at the commissioner’s sale was derived from the credit he and his sister held on the $200,000 owed them by the Clines, the one-half interest in question was nonmarital property.

An antenuptial agreement may govern property and maintenance upon divorce if there was full disclosure and the agreement is not unconscionable when enforcement is sought.

Edwardson v. Edwardson · filed 1990-11-08(2)(d)

The first limitation upon parties to an antenuptial agreement is the requirement of full disclosure. ... The second limitation to be observed is that the agreement must not be unconscionable at the time enforcement is sought.

Spouses may use an otherwise valid antenuptial agreement to define their rights in each other's property and exclude property acquired during marriage from statutory marital-property treatment.

Gentry v. Gentry · filed 1990-11-08(2)(d)

We hold that a husband and wife in Kentucky may define by agreement their rights in each other's property, regardless of any rights which would otherwise have been excluded or conferred by KRS 403.190. Such agreements, provided they are otherwise valid contracts, are entitled to enforcement upon dissolution of the marriage.

Realty validly transferred to a partnership whose interests were irrevocably gifted to a family trust is removed from the marital estate when the spouses knowingly joined the plan and the transfer was neither fraudulent nor dissipative.

Gripshover v. Gripshover · filed 2008-02-21(2)(d)

We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, that the estate plan validly established both the Gripshover Family Limited Partnership # 1 and the George Gripshover Family Trust. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the realty was subject to division as marital property.

Assets validly and irrevocably transferred to an estate-planning trust are no longer part of the marital estate absent fraud or dissipation and cannot be divided on dissolution.

Ensor v. Ensor · filed 2013-07-26(1)

We have carefully reviewed the voluminous record and the law and believe the trial court erred in including the GRAT in the marital estate and subject to division. Furthermore, as there was no finding or showing of a fraudulent or dissipative transfer, the trial court was without authority to find Debbie retained an equitable interest in the GRAT assets.

Distributions received during marriage from a premarital family trust remain nonmarital when paid because of the spouse's remainder-beneficiary status, even if marital funds helped litigate and formalize that status.

Maclean v. Middleton · filed 2014-01-03(2)(a)

The distributions were paid to Middleton based upon his status as a remainder beneficiary under the Daughters’ Trust. Middleton’s expenditure of marital funds for the litigation does not change the source of the distributions from the Trust.

Dissipation may be found when marital property is spent while separation or dissolution is impending with a clear intent to deprive the other spouse of a proportionate share.

Brosick v. Brosick · filed 1998-07-24(1)

The court may find dissipation when marital property is expended (1) during a period when there is a separation or dissolution impending; and (2) where there is a clear showing of intent to deprive one’s spouse of her proportionate share of the marital property.

Intentionally forfeiting marital restricted stock units shortly before they vest may constitute dissipation of marital assets.

Duffy v. Duffy · filed 2018-01-19(3)

We are of the opinion that the trial court's finding that Matthew dissipated marital assets by forfeiting his right to RSUs just two months prior to their vesting date is supported by substantial evidence.

A court may counteract a bad-faith transfer of marital real estate by including its supported value in the estate and dividing that value between the spouses.

Kelly v. Kelly · filed 2023-05-04(1)

We agree with Nora that the trial court acted within its discretion to accept $867,500.00 as the value of the Nonny Lynn Drive property based upon the testimony presented at trial. The trial court divided that value equally between the parties.

Compensation for annual leave and compensatory time accumulated during marriage is divisible marital property once the employee’s right to payment becomes certain at retirement.

Overstreet v. Overstreet · filed 2003-12-12

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court on this issue as well. On remand, Janet’s marital interest in the annual leave and compensatory time accumulated by Randy during the marriage should be divided as a part of the trial court’s division of the marital property.

A contingent-fee contract existing during marriage is marital property, with distribution delayed until the fee is received.

Grasch v. Grasch Jr · filed 2017-12-12(2)

We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that a contingent-fee contract in existence during the· marriage does constitute marital property to be divided · in a dissolution proceeding. Additionally, we hold that trial courts shall apply the delayed-division method to determine the distribution to the attorney and non-attorney ex-spouses.

Encumbered employee-transition loan proceeds whose forgiveness will occur after dissolution are unearned future income rather than divisible marital property.

Cobane v. Cobane · filed 2018-03-23(2)

Thus, Marc's right to forgiveness of the ETP loans does not arise until after the entry of the decree of dissolution. In this respect, the funds are more akin to unearned future income than an unvested benefit. Consequently, we must conclude that the trial court erred by classifying the encumbered ETP funds as marital and subject to division.

Restricted stock units are presumptively earned over the period from grant to vesting, so the marital share equals the portion of that vesting period occurring during marriage unless contrary plan evidence rebuts the presumption.

Normandin v. Normandin · filed 2020-12-15(2), (3)

We decide, as a default rule, that RSUs are “earned” over the period between grant and vesting.

Restricted stock units are presumptively earned over the period from grant to vesting, so the marital share equals the portion of that vesting period occurring during marriage unless contrary plan evidence rebuts the presumption.

Normandin v. Normandin · filed 2021-04-29(2), (3)

We decide, as a default rule, that RSUs are “earned” over the period between grant and vesting.

Pension and profit-sharing plans must be valued as of the date of the dissolution decree, not the date of a later qualified domestic relations order.

Clark v. Clark · filed 1990-01-05

Thus, the pensions and profit sharing plans here should have been valued as of March 27, 1986.

A retirement account must be valued as of the dissolution decree, and property acquired through the decree date remains presumptively marital despite an earlier separation.

Phelps v. Phelps · filed 2021-06-17(2)

However, such date is not legally significant, and “KRS 403.190 and Stallings . . . both clearly indicate that the correct date for such valuation is the date of the dissolution decree.”

A later profitable resale does not make an earlier property division inequitable when the residence was divided using its known value at the time of distribution.

Lusardi v. Lusardi · filed 2023-10-05(1)

The marital residence was divided equitably based on the known value at the time of the distribution. As the law favors finality, we cannot accommodate a regret that came to fruition after an equitable distribution of marital assets.

In dividing marital property under subsection (1), a family court may select a well-reasoned business-valuation date supported by the evidence when the parties cannot agree on reliable data and a spouse's movement of marital funds makes other dates unreliable.

Delk v. Delk · filed 2024-07-11(1)

Similarly, we cannot say the family court erred when it determined a valuation date of December 31, 2019. The Order Regarding Valuation Date gave a well-reasoned explanation why the court chose that date. The parties could not agree on anything, so the court determined a year-end date would provide the least amount of disagreement between them. Jeremy repeatedly moved marital funds, created new entities, and purchased assets. The family court stated in its decree of dissolution: “The Court found there was simply no other viable date for the Court to reliably utilize, as Jeremy continually moved funds and opened and closed new endeavors, and the accountant for the business and the parties was unable to complete tax returns on the entities in a timely fashion.” Jeremy’s acts forced the family court to draw a line in the sand. The court also heard the testimonies of Roller and Cranfill and gave Roller’s testimony and report more weight. What credibility to give to a witness is for the family court to decide. The family court did not abuse its discretion in setting the valuation date for Delk Enterprises.

Temporary maintenance may be paid from marital funds, but the recipient must still receive a full share of marital property in the final decree.

Horvath v. Horvath · filed 2008-04-24(2), (3)

Thus, there is no statutory requirement that temporary maintenance be paid out of non-marital property, so long as each party receives his or her full share of marital property on entry of decree.

An agreement made during separation cannot exclude property under § 403.190(2)(d) unless it meets § 403.180’s requirements for a written, signed separation agreement.

Bratcher v. Bratcher · filed 2000-08-18(2)(d)

To apply 403.190(2)(d) but not KRS 403.180 would negate the legislature’s intent in passing specific legislation to place additional requirements on separation initiated agreements. KRS 403.180 requires separation agreements be in writing and signed by the parties.