Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342.730

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 provides a threefold increase in permanent partial disability benefits when an injury prevents a worker from performing tasks of the work the worker performed at the time of injury.

Two Chicks, LLC v. Lunte · filed 2016-06-14(1)(c)1

In determining whether to apply the three multiplier, the ALJ must review all of the tasks that the claimant performed at the time of her injury and then determine whether she maintains the ability to perform those tasks.

The three multiplier applies when an injury prevents an employee from performing tasks of the job held at the time of injury, even if the employee can still perform other tasks in that job classification.

Two Chicks, LLC v. Lunte · filed 2016-07-11(1)(c)1

We also note that even if Lunte can perform some of the tasks of being a sales clerk, the three multiplier has been applied when the claimant returns to the same job classification but is precluded from performing some of the tasks associated with it.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 can apply when an employee returns to work at an equal or higher weekly wage with job modifications or accommodations.

Blaine v. Downtown Redevelopment Authority, Inc. · filed 2017-08-24(1)(c)2

To the extent Blaine is requesting that we employ Ira A. Watson to superimpose an individualized reading of “work” onto the statute - “returns to work doing everything she did before in the same way she did before” without any accommodation or job modification - we decline.

Section 342.730(1)(c)(2) allows double income benefits when employment at the same or a greater wage ends, unless the worker's intentional, deliberate conduct recklessly disregards the consequences to themselves or another.

Middletown Heating and Air v. Klimko · filed 2018-04-26(1)(c)(2)

KRS 342.730(1)(c)(2) permits a double income benefit for any period that employment at th~ same or a greater wage ceases "for any reason, with or without cause."

Section 342.730(1)(c)(1) triples permanent partial disability benefits when an injury leaves a worker unable to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Plumely v. Kroger, Inc. · filed 2018-04-26(1)(c)(1)

As such, we cannot say that the ALJ’s application of the “1” modifier was unreasonable because Plumley did “retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work that [he] performed at the time of injury....”

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 provides a two-multiplier for permanent partial disability benefits when a worker voluntarily retires, even if the retirement is not solely related to the work injury.

Active Care Chiropractic, Inc. v. Rudd · filed 2018-09-27(1)(c)2

Thus, when an individual voluntarily chooses to retire, a decision made for reasons not solely related to that individual’s work-related injury, that individual is entitled to the two-multiplier listed in KRS 342.730(l)(c)2.

Section 342.730(1)(c) permits the threefold permanent partial disability benefit when an injured worker cannot return to the former type of work and cannot sustain a wage equal to the pre-injury wage, even after a temporary return at that wage.

Dr Larry W. Lynn v. Ramey · filed 2018-12-13(1)(c)

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the ALJ correctly applied Fawbush. He clearly determined that Ramey could not continue to earn a wage that equaled or exceeded her pre-injury wage.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 allows double permanent partial disability benefits when an employee returns to work at the same or greater wage and later ceases employment, even voluntarily and despite retaining the physical capacity for the prior work, unless the cessation results from intentional, deliberate conduct with reckless disregard of the consequences.

Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Parks v. Rucker · filed 2019-03-14(1)(c)2

This evidence supports application of the two-multiplier under KRS 342.730(l)(c)2, and the ALJ correctly concluded that Rucker would be entitled to receive the two-multiplier during any period of cessation of that employment, temporary or permanent, unless of course the reduction in income is shown to be due to her “intentional, deliberate action with a reckless disregard of the consequences either to herself or to another” as described in Livingood.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2. doubles permanent partial disability benefits when employment paying at least the worker’s pre-injury wage ceases, even if the worker remains with the same employer at lower wages.

Pc Metro Bottling (Pepsico) v. Feltner · filed 2020-09-10(1)(c)2.

The statute is clear: if the employment at which the employee earns an equal-to or greater pre-injury AWW ceases, for any reason, the employee is entitled to the double benefit.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 triples permanent partial disability benefits when an injury prevents an employee from returning to the actual job performed at the time of injury, even if the employee can perform other jobs.

General Motors Corporation v. Dunn · filed 2020-10-15(1)(c)1

KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. requires the ALJ to determine whether Dunn could return to the “type of work” being “performed at the time of injury.”

The three-multiplier applies when an injury leaves an employee unable to perform the actual tasks of the job held at the time of injury.

Lhc Group, Inc. v. Floyd · filed 2021-01-28(1)(c)1

The Board did not err in its determination that the ALJ was entitled to rely on that evidence in determining Floyd was unable to return to the type of work that she performed at the time of injury, qualifying her for the three- multiplier under KRS 342.730(1)(c)1.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 requires post-injury average weekly wages to be calculated under KRS 342.140, including its employer-knowledge requirement for concurrent employment.

French v. Rev-A-Shelf · filed 2021-04-08(1)(c)2

We conclude Ball is applicable, and “KRS 342.140 must be utilized to determine a worker’s post-injury wages under KRS 341.730(1)(c)(2).”

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 permits the three-times multiplier on separate disability awards when the evidence supports its application to each injury.

Apple Valley Sanitation, Inc. v. Stambaugh · filed 2021-05-20(1)(c)1

Contrary to Apple Valley’s assertion, the medical proof set out by the ALJ was sufficiently detailed to constitute substantial evidence that the cumulative trauma resulted in a new disability to Stambaugh not already present as a consequence of the April 17, 2017 acute injury.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 allows the three-multiplier for each successive injury that independently leaves a worker unable to perform the type of work done before that injury; a brief return to work between injuries does not bar its application.

Apple Valley Sanitation, Inc. v. Stambaugh · filed 2022-04-27(1)(c)1

We find neither evidence nor precedent to support Apple Valley’s position. KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 concerns whether an employee has the physical capacity at the time of the benefits hearing to perform the type of work performed pre-injury. ... We do not find that Stambaugh’s continuation of work between his April 17 and July 11 injuries constitutes a “return to work” that reflects the capacity to continue the type of work performed at the time of the injury for the indefinite future.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 requires a cessation followed by a resumption of work for the two-times multiplier to apply; continuing the same job until a layoff does not qualify.

Helton v. Rockhampton Energy, LLC · filed 2021-05-27(1)(c)2

The only fact relevant to this issue is that Helton continued working from the date of manifestation until his layoff. Accordingly, there was no cessation followed by a resumption, constituting a “return to work.”

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 allows double benefits when an injured employee’s wages fall below the pre-injury average, even if the employee remains with the same employer.

Pc Metro Bottling (Pepsico) v. Feltner · filed 2021-06-17(1)(c)2

Our analysis of KRS 342.730 requires us to reject PepsiCo’s proffered definition of “cessation,” requiring a severing of the employee/employer relationship to trigger double benefits.

The three-multiplier applies when an injury prevents an employee from performing the type of work done at the time of injury; a later termination does not defeat eligibility.

Tractor Supply v. Wells · filed 2021-06-24(1)(c)1.

We decline to extend the Livingood reasoning to KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. Whether Wells continued in her employment with Tractor Supply is irrelevant when it comes to the three-multiplier because the increase in benefits is not tied to continued employment.

The three-multiplier applies when an injury leaves a worker unable to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury, regardless of why the worker stopped working.

Trane v. Barnett · filed 2022-06-02(1)(c)1.

Nevertheless, we agree with the Board that the pivotal inquiry is not the reason Barnett stopped working but whether he retains the capacity to perform his customary employment.

The three-times multiplier depends on whether the worker can still perform the work done at the time of injury, regardless of why the worker stopped working.

Trane v. Higgins · filed 2022-07-07(1)(c)1.

Nevertheless, the pivotal inquiry is not the reason Higgins stopped working but whether he retains the capacity to perform his customary employment.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1. allows a threefold increase in permanent partial disability benefits when an injury prevents an employee from performing the type of work done at the time of injury; the reason the employee stopped working does not control.

Clariant Corporation v. Everett · filed 2022-09-08(1)(c)1.

Nevertheless, the pivotal inquiry is not the reason Everett stopped working but whether he retains the capacity to perform his prior employment.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1. allows a threefold permanent partial disability benefit when an injury prevents a worker from returning to the actual type of work performed at the time of injury, even if the worker returns to a less demanding job in the same occupation.

Ruan Transportation v. Grier · filed 2021-10-14(1)(c)1.

Even though Grier has returned to truck driving generally, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that he is unable to perform the specific type of work he previously performed–the more physically demanding flatbed truck driving job which entails heavy lifting he is no longer able to perform and which pays higher wages than less physically demanding jobs.

The three-multiplier applies when an injured employee cannot return to the specific work performed at the time of injury; the employee’s broader job title does not control.

Tractor Supply Company v. Johnson · filed 2022-01-27(1)(c)1.

This Court confirmed that KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. refers to the specific acts an employee performed prior to an injury, not a broad reference to a job title they once held.

An employee whose injury prevents a return to the type of work performed at the time of injury qualifies for a threefold multiplier on permanent partial disability benefits.

Trane Co. v. Parson · filed 2022-04-28(1)(c)1

While another fact-finder may have reached a different conclusion, there is certainly substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Parson did not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work he performed at Trane, which qualified him for the application of the 3x multiplier in this case.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 permits tripling disability benefits when an injury leaves a worker without the physical capacity to perform the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Murray Energy v. Renfrow · filed 2023-03-02(1)(c)1

Appellant also challenges the tripling of Renfrow’s benefits because, due to his injury, he lacked the physical capacity to perform the type of work he performed at the time of his injury pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. Again, though conflicting evidence exists on this point, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s application of the multiplier.

The three-multiplier applies when an injured worker can no longer perform all the required tasks of the work performed at the time of injury.

Jane Todd Crawford Hospital v. Bush · filed 2023-03-02(1)(c)1.

A worker who can no longer perform all his required job tasks lacks the ability to return to the “type of work” performed at the time of injury.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 applies the three multiplier to the entire permanent partial disability award when the worker lacks the physical capacity to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Sysco Food Service v. Heckel · filed 2022-02-17(1)(c)1

We agree with the Board that the plain language of the statute simply does not contemplate an application of the multiplier to only a portion of the PPD award.

For the two-times permanent partial disability multiplier, post-injury wages may include concurrent employment without the employer’s pre-injury knowledge, but the ALJ must determine whether those earnings are covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act.

French v. Rev-A-Shelf · filed 2022-02-23(1)(c)2

Thus, if only her earnings from Rev-A-Shelf are considered, her weekly wage post-injury was not “equal to or greater than the average weekly wage at the time of injury” to qualify her for the two-times multiplier in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2. ... By its plain language, KRS 342.140(5) only applies to pre-injury wages. ... As such, we vacate the ALJ’s enhancement of Robbins’s PPD benefits by the two-times multiplier and remand for further factual findings on this issue.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 bases the three-multiplier on a worker’s inability to return to pre-injury work; later workplace misconduct does not bar it.

Tractor Supply v. Wells · filed 2022-06-10(1)(c)1

KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 does not provide for consideration of post-injury conduct at work when applying the three-multiplier. It calls only for a determination of whether the claimant could return to the type of work performed pre-injury.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 requires a worker to stop working and then return to work at an equal or higher wage before a later cessation can trigger doubled benefits.

Helton v. Rockhampton Energy, LLC · filed 2022-06-10(1)(c)2

Pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)2, no “return” to work occurred because there was no cessation followed by a resumption.

Returning to work at equal or greater wages does not preclude permanent partial disability benefits.

Kellogg's v. Lawrence · filed 2023-04-26(1)(c)(2)

The Worker’s Compensation statute states, “If an employee returns to work at a weekly wage equal to or greater than the average weekly wage at the time of injury, the weekly benefit for permanent partial disability shall be determined under paragraph (b) of this subsection for each week during which that employment is sustained.” KRS 342.730(1)(c)(2). Obviously then, the return of Lawrence to work at equal or greater wages cannot preclude an award of PPD.

Section 342.730(1)(c)(2) does not bar permanent partial disability benefits when an employee returns to work at equal or greater wages.

Kellogg's v. Lawrence · filed 2023-06-26(1)(c)(2)

Obviously then, the return of Lawrence to work at equal or greater wages cannot preclude an award of PPD.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1. triples permanent partial disability benefits when an injury leaves an employee physically unable to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Ford Motor Company v. Dixie · filed 2023-04-27(1)(c)1.

The touchstone of KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. is whether the employee is physically capable of returning to “the type of work that the employee performed at the time of the injury[.]”

A psychological injury caused by physical trauma can support the three multiplier for permanent partial disability when it prevents an employee from returning to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Disabled American Veterans v. Sears · filed 2026-02-13(1)(c)1.

DAV next argues that the ALJ erred in enhancing Sears’ benefits by the three-multiplier under KRS 342.730(1)(c)1., claiming that none of the accommodations mentioned by Dr. Simon related to Sears’ physical capacity to return to her pre-injury work but rather addressed Sears’ chronic depression and anxiety. ... Thus, under West, we must keep in mind that her psychological injury is on an equal basis with any other “physical” injury for all relevant purposes. Id. ... We agree with this analysis. ... Therefore, we affirm on this issue.

For a cumulative trauma injury, the three-multiplier considers the type of work that caused the injury, rather than only the work performed on the employee’s last day.

Trane Co. v. Hammons · filed 2023-11-29(1)(c)1

[T]he time of injury referred to in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 must logically refer to the type of work that caused the cumulative trauma, and not just work that was performed on a specific date. ... We perceive no such error in the case before us. To the contrary, we agree with the Board that the sound reasoning of the ALJ was correct.

Section 342.730(1)(c)2 doubles permanent partial disability benefits when a worker who returned at the same or greater wage later stops working for any reason. On reopening, the enhancement can begin when work ceased, even if the motion was filed later.

Ford Motor Co. v. Badall · filed 2025-02-21(1)(c)2

Moreover, the plain language of KRS 342.730(1)(c)2. clearly provides that if claimants return to work at the same or greater wages than their average weekly wages at the time of injury, PPD benefits must be enhanced by the two-multiplier during any cessation of work “for any reason” during the period for which benefits are awarded. ... So, we do not perceive that the Board overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes and precedent in affirming the ALJ’s awarding enhanced benefits commencing when Badall ceased working in May 2016, prior to the filing of his motion to reopen.

An ALJ awarding the three-multiplier must identify the specific evidence supporting its application; general reliance on a doctor is insufficient.

Russell v. International Automotive Components · filed 2025-05-30(1)(c)1.

The ALJ is required to recite the specific evidence he relied upon in finding the three-multiplier applicable. A general statement of reliance upon a particular doctor is insufficient, as more detail is required. ... We perceive no such error in the case before us. To the contrary, we agree with the Board’s thorough analysis. Accordingly, we affirm.

An ALJ may apply the three-times permanent partial disability multiplier based on a worker’s credible testimony that she cannot sustain her prior type of work, even without physician-imposed restrictions.

International Automotive Components v. Corpus · filed 2026-02-19(1)(c)1

It was appropriate for the ALJ to credit Corpus’s testimony that she had not applied for other factory jobs because she did not think she could perform such work, and that she had taken a lower paying job with fewer hours which allowed her to rest as needed. Additionally, it was Corpus’s condition at the time of the hearing that was key, and her condition could have worsened from that reflected in Dr. Gilbert’s assessment in the interim between his examination and her testimony, as reflected in her indication that she was uncertain that she could continue in her current, less strenuous employment indefinitely. Therefore, the ALJ acted appropriately within his discretion in determining to apply the three-times multiplier.

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 allows the three-multiplier only when an employee is physically unable to return to the type of work performed at the time of injury.

Russell v. International Automotive Components · filed 2026-04-23(1)(c)1

KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 requires that, before a claimant be awarded the three-multiplier, he or she must be physically incapable of returning to the type of work that the employee performed at the time of the injury. ... As it stands, without greater support from the record, the ALJ’s findings here suffer from a dearth of evidence and are therefore clearly erroneous, and the award of the three-multiplier was an abuse of discretion.

Section 342.730(4)(a) directs unpaid disability benefits to the widow when an employee filed a valid claim and died from an unrelated cause before the compensable period ended.

Yocom v. Chapman · filed 1976-10-15(4)(a)

Chapman having filed a valid claim and having died from causes other than the injury before the expiration of the compen-sable period, the award should be paid to the widow.

Section 342.730(4) allows qualifying dependents to receive disability benefits after a worker dies from an unrelated cause, including benefits that were not yet accrued or due at death.

Amburgey v. Daniel Construction Co. · filed 1979-12-04(4)

The Legislature would not have used the phrase “. . . whether or not accrued or due at his death . . .’’in KRS 342.-730(4) if they had not anticipated payments beyond the death of the claimant. The use of the life-expectancy table in workmen’s compensation cases is a creation of the Legislature and we find its application here to be appropriate and within the legislative intent.

Section 342.730(3) allows survivor benefits after an unrelated death only if the employee had a compensable disability and could have filed a timely valid claim while alive. An employee who continued working for the same employer until death had no such claim.

Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Easterling · filed 1989-07-21(3)

We are not dealing with KRS 342.750, which governs income benefits for death caused by the work-related injury or disease; the applicable statute is KRS 342.730, governing situations where the employee sustained a disability within the meaning of the statute and could have timely filed a claim before he died from causes other than the occupational injury or disease. Even under this statute, there can still be no claim for disability by anyone unless there is, in fact, a disability.

Section 342.730 does not govern a widow’s claim for a coal worker’s remaining pneumoconiosis benefits when his last exposure occurred on or after January 1, 1973, but before July 1, 1976.

Yocom v. Dotson · filed 1980-05-02

In both instances, the claimant is making a “claim” for benefits, and the legislature has mandated that such a claim must be computed pursuant to the pre-1972 law, and not pursuant to the more favorable provisions of KRS 342.730.

Section 342.730(3)(a) allows a widow to receive a worker’s remaining disability benefits if she qualifies at his death, even if she married him after his disability award.

Palmore v. Jones · filed 1989-05-04(3)(a)

Plainly KRS 342.730(3) sets out classes of persons entitled to a continuation of benefits and states that benefits shall be paid to persons within the class at the time of death. Mrs. Jones is without question within an appropriate class and is fully entitled to the benefits provided by the statute.

Section 342.730(3) allows eligible survivors to receive income benefits after a worker’s death, but does not continue retraining incentive benefits.

Stephens v. Denairo Mining Co. · filed 1992-06-25(3)

We think it is clear that under the pre-amended version of KRS 342.730, decedent’s RIB award does not continue after his death. Furthermore, the amended version still encompasses only income benefits.

Section 342.730(3) does not authorize survivors to receive a deceased worker’s retraining incentive benefit.

Tackett v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc. · filed 1992-11-19(3)

Therefore, neither the present nor the pre-1990 version of KRS 342.730(3), the version which applied in the present case, authorizes either the award or the continuation of a retraining incentive benefit to the worker’s survivors after his death.

Section 342.730(3)(a) entitles a widow to income benefits specified and unpaid under her husband’s award when he dies from causes unrelated to his work injury and has no child under eighteen or incapable of self-support.

Whittaker v. Smith · filed 1999-08-26(3)(a)

On January 6, 1984, the date of Mr. Smith’s injury, KRS 342.730(3)(a) provided that where an injured worker died from causes unrelated to. the work injury and where there was no child under the age of eighteen or incapable of self-support, his widow was entitled to receive “income benefits specified and unpaid at [his] death, whether or not accrued or due at his death.” We view that provision as implicit in the terms of this litigated award.

The 1990 amendment to subsection (3) governs claims pending when it took effect and permits continuation of income benefits awarded under KRS 342.732 after a worker dies from unrelated causes.

Newberg v. Davis · filed 1993-12-22(3)

This meant that because KRS 342.730(3) was limited in application to disability compensable under that section, awards rendered pursuant to KRS 342-732 could not be continued when the worker died from causes unrelated to his employment. There is no rational basis for the legislature to have intentionally treated beneficiaries under these two statutes differently. This anomaly was remedied by the 1990 amendment. Therefore, any claim filed pursuant to KRS 342.730(3) and pending as of the effective date of the amendment is governed by the amended version.

Section 342.730(3) permits dependents to receive continued disability benefits when a worker dies from causes unrelated to the compensable injury, including an unrelated suicide.

Advance Aluminum Co. v. Leslie · filed 1994-01-31(3)

If, as in this case, the compensable condition is a work-related back injury and the suicide is unrelated to that injury, then the suicide is irrelevant and benefits may be continued pursuant to KRS 342.730(3).

The 1990 amendment to Section 342.730(3) extends survivor benefits to pending occupational disease claims under Section 342.732, and the worker’s known date of death does not cut off those benefits.

Williamson v. Island Creek Coal Co. · filed 1995-05-05(3)

His workers’ compensation claim was pending at the time the statute was amended, and it is just this situation that the amendment was designed to address. Therefore, the decision of the Board affirming the ALJ in the discontinuation of surviv- or’s benefits for the occupational disease is reversed. ... We do not believe a different result should obtain merely because the ALJ had the advantage when making his decision of knowing exactly how long a claimant’s life span would be. This would totally eviscerate the purpose of survivors’ benefits. KRS 342.730(3) and KRS 342.750. Thus we reverse that aspect of the Board’s opinion.

The 1990 amendment to KRS 342.730(3) applies to pneumoconiosis income benefit claims arising on or after October 28, 1987, allowing survivors’ benefits for claims that predate the amendment.

Bowling v. Special Fund · filed 1994-06-23(3)

Under these circumstances we believe the amendment to KRS 342.730(3) substituting the word “chapter” for “section” applies to claims for income benefits pursuant to KRS 342.732 which arose on or after October 28, 1987.

Section 342.730 provides continuation benefits to surviving dependents but sets no procedure or deadline for claiming them.

Hammons v. Tremco, Inc. · filed 1994-09-01

KRS 342.730 and KRS 342.750 were enacted to provide for the continuation of workers’ compensation benefits to surviving dependents. Unlike KRS 342.111, neither of these statutes addresses the procedure by which or the time period during which surviving dependents may assert their right to receive a continuation of the injured worker’s award. In the absence of a specific provision within Chapter 342 regarding the revival of workers’ compensation actions after the injured worker’s death and in view of the precedent for limiting the period during which a surviving dependent’s claim could be filed, we believe that the general law regarding the abatement, survival, and revival of actions should apply to workers’ compensation cases.

An amendment reducing a surviving spouse’s share of a worker’s disability award applies prospectively because survivors’ potential rights vest when the worker is injured.

Federal Materials Co. v. Baker · filed 1994-10-27(3)(a)

Although the identity of the class of dependents or survivors was not formed until Mr. Baker’s death, their rights (or potential rights) vested at the time of his injury and may not be impaired by the retrospective application of this amendment. For this reason, the amendment under consideration is not remedial and must be applied prospectively.

Section 342.730(3) directs benefits payable after a disabled employee’s death to the employee’s surviving child, rather than to the estate.

Crittendon v. Saxon · filed 1999-11-24(3)

Rather, KRS 342.730(3) clearly provides that the benefits are to be paid directly to Amber as the decedent’s child.

Section 342.730(3) provides death benefits to surviving spouses and children without requiring them to prove dependency.

Brusman v. Newport Steel Corp. · filed 2000-05-18(3)

We believe our decision in White v. Stewarts Dry Goods Co., supra, misconstrued the intent of the legislature in repealing KRS 342.070 and enacting KRS 342.750 and KRS 342.730(4)[now (3) ]. We now hold with respect to death benefits for widows, widowers and children that the provisions of KRS 342.075 were superseded by the enactment of the latter two statutes.

Section 342.730(3) permits a dependent to seek continuation of a deceased worker’s award only while the award remains in effect and the dependent remains a qualified beneficiary.

Whittaker v. Brock · filed 2002-04-25(3)

Thus, the period of an individual’s entitlement to “continuation” benefits under a deceased worker’s award is limited by both the duration of the award, itself, and the duration of the individual’s status as a qualified beneficiary. After either of those periods expires, the employer is no longer required by KRS 342.730(3) to continue paying benefits to the individual, and the individual no longer has a claim for “continuation” benefits that is subject to resolution by an ALJ.

Section 342.730(3)(a) applies to approved settlement agreements and pays a widow without a qualifying child 50% of the award rate when the employee dies from an unrelated cause.

Bell v. CONSOL OF KENTUCKY, INC. · filed 2009-09-04(3)(a)

We find that KRS 342.730(3) is applicable to settlement agreements and affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board.

Section 342.730(3) lets a surviving spouse continue receiving disability benefits owed to a worker who dies from a cause unrelated to the workplace injury.

Family Dollar v. Mamie Baytos Widow of Stephen Baytos · filed 2017-08-22(3)

The Tackett benefits are indeed accurately considered to be derivative of the injured worker’s claim. KRS 342.730(3) benefits provide surviving spouses a continuation of benefits the worker was currently receiving from his or her employer due to an unrelated death before the expiration of his specified compensable period.

Section 342.730(3) allows a surviving spouse to receive remaining disability benefits owed to a worker who dies from a cause unrelated to the work injury.

Mamie Baytos Widow of Stephen Baytos v. Family Dollar · filed 2017-08-24(3)

KRS 342.730[3) benefits provide surviving spouses a continuation of benefits the worker was currently receiving from his or her employer due to an unrelated death before the expiration of his specified compensable period.

Section 342.730(3) lets a surviving spouse receive remaining disability benefits owed to a worker who dies from a cause unrelated to the work injury.

Mamie Baytos Widow of Stephen Baytos v. Family Dollar · filed 2017-09-18(3)

KRS 342.730(3) benefits provide surviving spouses a continuation of benefits the worker was currently receiving from his or her employer due to an unrelated death before the expiration of his specified compensable period.

Section 342.730(3) allows a surviving spouse to receive remaining income benefits when a worker dies from a cause unrelated to the workplace injury; the spouse’s entitlement depends on benefits owed to the worker.

Family Dollar v. Mamie Baytos Widow of Stephen Baytos · filed 2017-09-18(3)

The Tackett benefits are indeed accurately considered to be derivative of the injured worker’s claim. KRS 342.730(3) benefits provide surviving spouses a continuation of benefits the worker was currently receiving from his or her employer due to an unrelated death before the expiration of his specified compensable period.

Section 342.730(3) continues part of a worker’s unexpired income benefits to certain dependents when the worker dies from a cause unrelated to work, including when the benefits arise from a settlement.

Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance Authority, Formerly Kentucky Coal Workers Pneumoconiosis Fund v. Fleming · filed 2023-12-07(3)

If the worker dies from a “non-work-related” cause before the award expires, KRS 342.730(3) directs the continuation of portions of the workers’ income benefits to certain dependents.

Section 342.730 calculates income benefits for the worker's whole disability before any required apportionment under Section 342.120.

Transport Motor Express, Inc. v. Finn · filed 1978-09-19(1)

In our view, the proper approach, whether the disability is total, as here, or partial is to employ the methodology of KRS 342.730 to determine the amount to which the claimant is entitled by the whole of his disability. If apportionment is required by operation of KRS 342.120, the formulas provided therein are then applied to the total amount therefore determined to give effect, in terms of dollar amounts payable or nonpayable, to the apportionment between the interested parties, the employer, the employee, and the Special Fund.

Section 342.730's formula governs the calculation of temporary total disability benefits.

Yocom v. West · filed 1979-08-24

The Board applied the “lost wages” method rather than the formula set out in KRS 342.730. This approach has clearly been discredited by the Finn case, supra.

Section 342.730 limits total disability benefits according to the worker’s average weekly wage and the extent to which the disability is compensable.

Arch of Kentucky, Inc. v. Halcomb · filed 1996-07-25(1)(a)

The maximum benefit which a worker may receive for total, occupational disability is a function of the worker’s average weekly wage and extent to which the disability is compensable. ... Like the worker in Sullivan, claimant was awarded the maximum benefit set forth in KRS 342.730 to which he was entitled.

Section 342.730(1)(a) requires proof that a worker’s condition would not improve before survivors can recover permanent total disability benefits after the worker’s death.

Robinson v. Newberg · filed 1993-03-18(1)(a)

We disagree with appellants’ assertion that because KRS 342.730(l)(a) addresses “total disability,” as opposed to permanent total disability, the claimant bears no burden to prove permanency in order to be awarded benefits “during such disability” or for life.

Section 342.730(1)(b) permits periods of temporary total disability within a period of permanent partial disability.

KI USA Corp. v. Hall · filed 1999-10-21(1)(b)

TTD exists only until a worker’s condition stabilizes so that the extent and duration of any perma nent occupational disability can be determined, and KRS 342.730(l)(b) contemplates that periods of TTD may occur within a period of permanent, partial disability.

Section 342.730(1)(a) limits income benefits, but that limit does not include a 15% safety penalty added to compensation.

Apex Mining v. Blankenship · filed 1996-03-21(1)(a)

Regardless of whether the penalty is computed as a function of an income benefit or other compensation, the penalty clearly is not an income benefit and presents no conflict with the limitation on income benefits which is contained in KRS 342.730(1)(a).

Prior work-related disability may be considered when determining whether an employee is totally disabled.

Kern's Bakery v. Tackett · filed 1998-03-13(1)(a)

As the prior disability suffered by Tackett in this case was a work-related disability rather than a nonwork-related disability, it may be considered in determining whether Tackett was totally disabled.

Section 342.730(1)(a) permits total disability income benefits when a work-related harmful change warrants an AMA impairment and permanently prevents the worker from performing any work.

Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp. · filed 2001-11-21(1)(a)

We conclude that in order for a worker to receive income benefits for a work-related harmful change under KRS 342.730(l)(a), the harmful change must warrant an AMA impairment, and the worker must have a complete and permanent inability to work due to one or more work-related harmful changes other than coal workers’ pneumoconiosis or hearing loss.

Permanent total disability benefits under § 342.730(1)(a) are calculated without the factor table used for permanent partial disability benefits under § 342.730(1)(b).

Copar, Inc. v. Rogers · filed 2003-12-18(1)(a)

We note, however, that KRS 342.730(l)(b) is the statute for calculating a permanent partial disability benefit. Neither KRS 342.730(l)(b) nor the table contained therein has any bearing on the calculation of a permanent total disability benefit under KRS 342.730(l)(a).

Section 342.730(1)(a) excludes nonwork-related impairment when determining whether a worker is totally disabled.

McNutt Construction/First General Services v. Scott · filed 2001-01-25(1)(a)

Consistent with the 1994 amendment to KRS 342.730(1)(a), which legislatively overruled the decision in Teledyne-Wirz v. Willhite, Ky.App., 710 S.W.2d 858 (1986), the 1996 version of KRS 342.730(1)(a) provides that nonwork-related impairment is not to be considered when determining whether a worker is totally disabled.

Section 342.730 leaves the ALJ to weigh lay and medical evidence when deciding whether a worker is permanently and totally disabled; vocational opinions are not binding.

Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v. Guffey · filed 2001-04-26(1)(b)

Although the Act underwent extensive revision in 1996, the ALJ remains in the role of the fact-finder, and it is among the functions of the ALJ to translate the lay and medical evidence into a finding of occupational disability. Although the ALJ must consider the worker’s medical condition when determining the extent of his occupational disability at a particular point in time, the ALJ is not required to rely on the vocational opinions of either the medical experts or the vocational experts.

Section 342.730(1) authorizes income benefits for temporary total disability but provides no benefits for temporary partial disability.

Robertson v. United Parcel Service · filed 2002-01-17(1)

As enacted by the legislature, KRS 342.730(1) authorizes income benefits for temporary total disability, but it does not provide benefits for temporary partial disability. Applying the standard that is set forth in KRS 342.0011(ll)(a), it cannot be said that the evidence compelled a finding of temporary total disability on these facts.

Section 342.730(1)(a) requires an exclusion from a total disability award to be based on pre-existing disability; pre-existing impairment alone does not require an exclusion.

Roberts Bros. Coal Co. v. Robinson · filed 2003-08-21(1)(a)

We conclude, therefore, that an exclusion from a total disability award must be based upon pre-existing disability, while an exclusion from a partial disability award must be based upon pre-existing impairment. For that reason, if an individual is working without restrictions at the time a work-related injury is sustained, a finding of pre-existing impairment does not compel a finding of pre-existing disability with regard to an award that is made under KRS 342.730(l)(a).

Section 342.730(1)(a) permits a permanent total disability award based on occupational hearing loss even when the worker has not lost all hearing.

Webster County Coal Corp. v. Lee · filed 2003-10-10(1)(a)

We agree with the Board’s analysis concerning the interpretation of KRS 342.730(l)(a) and 342.7305. ... If the Legislature had intended to prohibit a finding of permanent total disability based on factors other than a total loss of hearing, it could have clearly included the statutory language prohibiting such an award.

Section 342.730(1)(a)'s maximum weekly benefit applies to combined payments under overlapping partial disability awards.

Lewis v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2012-03-22(1)(a)

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the maximum benefit permitted by KRS 342.730(l)(a) applies only to individual awards. We affirm because we conclude that it does not.

Only work-related impairment counts toward the impairment rating required for permanent-total disability benefits; a claimant whose impairment is entirely unrelated to work is ineligible.

Thornsberry v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2019-02-14(1)(a)

Instead, the portion of nonwork-related impairment may not be considered in determining permanent-total disability in the sense that only work-related impairments count toward a person’s permanent impairment rating, which is a baseline requirement for permanent-total disability.

Section 342.730(1)(a) excludes non-work-related impairment when determining entitlement to permanent total disability benefits.

Ky Fuels Corp. v. Cole · filed 2020-10-15(1)(a)

KRS 342.730(1)(a) prohibits the consideration of non-work-related impairment in determining if a worker is totally disabled for purposes of determining entitlement to PTD benefits.

Section 342.730(1)(a) excludes nonwork-related conditions when determining whether an employee is permanently totally disabled.

Cole v. Ky Fuels Corp · filed 2023-06-12(1)(a)

What remains missing, however, is a designation of medical evidence within the record which would support a finding that Cole’s permanent and total disability has resulted from a worsened work-related injury exclusive of any consideration of nonwork-related conditions as required by KRS 342.730(1)(a).5 Without a specific citation to required medical evidence of record establishing such a causal connection, no award of PTD benefits is permissible because the ALJ would be unable to complete the five-step process mandated in Stumbo.

Section 342.730(3) prevents a second total and permanent disability award for the same condition when it would duplicate benefits from a prior award.

Stovall v. Stumbo · filed 1984-02-24(3)

Clearly the Board failed to take into consideration this statute and the prior award for total and permanent disability for pneumo-coniosis and/or silicosis which would prevent the Board from awarding an additional total and permanent disability award for the same condition or disability of the same function.

Section 342.730(1)(a) caps concurrent income and retraining incentive benefits at the maximum benefit for permanent, total, occupational disability.

McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Sullivan · filed 1993-09-30(1)(a)

We, therefore, hold that claimant may not receive a concurrent income benefit and retraining incentive benefit, pursuant to KRS 342.730(l)(a) and KRS 342.732(l)(a), that exceeds the maximum benefit for permanent, total, occupational disability as set forth in KRS 342.730(l)(a).

Section 342.730(1)(a) permits a total disability award when a later work injury renders a worker totally disabled, with overlapping payments for an earlier partial disability offset against the award.

Spurlin v. Brooks · filed 1997-04-24(1)(a)

Therefore, when the holding of Campbell is properly applied to the present facts, claimant is entitled to an award pursuant to KRS 342.730(l)(a), as of the date of the 1990 injury, for the entire amount of his disability which is not excluded as a prior, active condition. To the extent that permanent, partial disability benefits paid pursuant to the 1986 award overlap the period of total disability, they will offset the liability of GAB and the Special Fund for benefits which would otherwise be due pursuant to the total disability award.

Disability ratings for separate, successive work injuries are calculated separately, even when the injuries affect the same body part.

Plumley v. Kroger, Inc. · filed 2018-05-08(1)(b)

Because Plumley suffered three separate and distinct injuries, even though to the same body part, we find no error in the ALJ's decision to apportion Dr. Snider's WPI rating over the three injuries as opposed to treating the injury as one total injury.

Section 342.730(4)'s age-based reduction applies only to benefits attributable to injuries after its effective date, and the reduced projected award must be valued before liability is apportioned between the employer and the Special Fund.

Leeco, Inc. v. Crabtree · filed 1998-04-16(4)

Since KRS 342.730(4) was not in effect at that time, it may not be applied in order to reduce benefits attributable to the 1992 injury. In contrast, since KRS 342.730(4) became effective before May 24, 1994, it does apply to benefits attributable to the 1994 injury. Therefore, under the particular facts of this case, KRS 342.730(4) applies to half of each weekly payment. ... Consistent with KRS 342.120(6) and (7), ... apportionment of the projected award should not occur until after its value has been computed.

Section 342.730(4)’s age-70 limit on income benefits is rationally related to avoiding duplicative benefits and maintaining funding for the workers’ compensation system.

Flynn v. Buyers Paradise Furniture, Inc. · filed 2020-08-27(4)

Thus, curtailing workers’ compensation income benefits at age 70 is not arbitrary. Rather, the amended version of KRS 342.730(4) is rationally related to the legitimate legislative objective of avoiding the payment of duplicative income benefits and maintaining adequate funding of the workers’ compensation system.

Subsection (4) terminates income benefits at age 70 or four years after injury or last exposure, whichever is later, and its age distinction satisfies rational basis review.

Jackson v. Phoenix Transportation · filed 2021-04-01(4)

Applying the rational basis test, we conclude that this version of the statute is constitutional. ... Accordingly, we hold the statute, as enacted, does not treat similarly situated persons differently. The statute allows for the benefits to terminate upon reaching the age of 70, or four years after the employee’s injury, whichever occurs last.

Section 342.730(4)’s age-based limit on income benefits survives equal protection review and may be applied retroactively.

Dornacher v. Covington Public Schools · filed 2021-12-02(4)

Consequently, the statutory limitation of Dornacher’s benefits on the basis of her age and its retroactive application were not unconstitutional.

Section 342.730(4)’s age-based limit on income benefits does not violate equal protection because the age classification is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.

Jackson v. Phoenix Transportation · filed 2022-01-13(4)

In Cates, we held “the current version of KRS 342.730(4) is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause because the age classification is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.” 626 S.W.3d at 871. There is nothing in this case that distinguishes Jackson’s appeal from the issue presented and settled in Cates. As such, we hold Cates to be dispositive in this matter.

The 2018 limit on the duration of income benefits does not violate the federal or Kentucky Contracts Clause because workers’ compensation benefits are statutory rights, not contractual rights.

Gloria Dowell, Widow of William Bruce Dowell v. Matthews Contracting · filed 2021-08-24(4)

For the reasons explained above, we hold that 2018 amendment to KRS 342.730(4) does not violate the Contracts Clause of the Federal or Kentucky Constitutions.

Section 342.730(4)’s age-based limit on income benefits satisfies equal protection because it rationally serves a legitimate state purpose.

Cates v. Kroger · filed 2021-08-24(4)

So the current version of KRS 342.730(4) is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause because the age classification is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.

Section 342.730(4)’s age-based termination of workers’ compensation benefits satisfies equal protection under rational-basis review.

Massey v. Paccar D/B/A Dynacraft · filed 2021-12-15(4)

Again, today, we hold the statute passes the rational basis test as it “treats alike all those who receive workers’ compensation benefits.” Id. at 871.

Section 342.730(4)’s rule terminating workers’ compensation benefits is constitutional as written and as applied to pending claims.

Coffey v. McCreary County Fiscal Court · filed 2021-12-15(4)

For the following reasons, we hold that KRS 342.730(4) is constitutional as written and as applied and affirm the Court of Appeals.

Section 342.730(4)’s 2018 termination of income benefits withstands equal protection and Contracts Clause challenges, including challenges to its retroactive application.

Howard v. Stericycle · filed 2022-04-21(4)

This appeal followed, in which Appellant claims that KRS 342.730 (4) and its retroactive application constitute violations of the Equal Protection and Contracts Clauses of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. ... As the Court finds that the Cates and Dowell cases are dispositive of the issues presented by Appellant, we affirm.

Section 342.730(4) ends benefits at age seventy or four years after the injury or exposure, whichever is later; that rule satisfies equal protection.

Mullins v. Publishers Printing Company LLC · filed 2021-12-15(4)

Again, today, we hold the statute passes the rational basis test as it “treats alike all those who receive workers’ compensation benefits.” Id. at 871.

Section 342.730(4) terminates workers’ compensation benefits at age seventy or four years after the injury or last injurious exposure, whichever is later; the rule and its retroactive application are constitutional.

Darnell v. Saputo Dairy · filed 2021-12-15(4)

For the following reasons, we hold that KRS 342.730(4) is constitutional as written and as applied and affirm the Court of Appeals.

Section 342.730(4)’s age-based termination of benefits is rationally related to preventing duplicate benefits and preserving workers’ compensation funds, so it does not violate Kentucky’s prohibition on arbitrary power.

Helton v. Tm Power Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2021-12-15(4)

KRS 342.730(4) does not amount to an absolute and arbitrary exercise of power.

For claims arising before the 1996 amendments, § 342.730 did not permit an offset of income benefits for payments from an employer-funded disability pension plan.

Williams v. Eastern Coal Corp. · filed 1997-10-02

Our workers’ compensation act mandates an award of income benefits to a worker who suffers death or occupational disability as a result of a work-related accident or occupational disease. KRS 342.730; KRS 342.750. At the time of Williams’s injury, there was no provision in the act permitting a reduction of that award simply because he was also eligible for benefits from a collateral source.

Section 342.730(6) permits an offset for employer-funded disability benefits only if the plan covers the same disability as workers’ compensation.

Dravo Lime Co., Inc. v. Eakins · filed 2005-02-17(6)

It is apparent, therefore, that because the plan does not extend income benefits for a disability that is covered by Chapter 342, it is not the type of plan for which KRS 342.730(6) provides an offset. Therefore, no offset is permitted on these facts.

Section 342.730 does not authorize an offset against income benefits for bona fide post-injury wages.

MILLERSBURG MILITARY INSTITUTE v. Puckett · filed 2008-04-24

KRS 342.730 provides certain offsets against income benefits but does not include post-injury wages.

Section 342.730(6) permits an offset for disability retirement benefits only to the extent they exceed the retirement benefits the worker could otherwise receive.

Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Stone · filed 2009-01-22(6)

As the Board noted, disability retirement plans are a hybrid, combining attributes of both a disability plan and a retirement plan. When such a plan is at issue, KRS 342.730(6) permits an offset to the extent that the disability retirement benefit exceeds the retirement benefit for which the worker would have been eligible because only that portion of the benefit is attributable to the same disability covered by Chapter 342.

Section 342.730(6) allows an employer to offset overlapping income benefits for the same disability paid through an exclusively employer-funded plan, but does not allow overpaid voluntary benefits to offset future income benefits.

UPS AIRLINES v. West · filed 2012-05-24(6)

Stated plainly, KRS 342.730(6) entitles an employer to credit disability or sickness and accident benefits that it funds exclusively against its liability under KRS 342.730(1) for overlapping past-due or future income benefits that are based on the same disability. It does not entitle an employer to credit the overpayment of voluntary income benefits against future income benefits.

Section 342.730 permits offsets for unemployment benefits and payments under qualifying employer-funded disability plans, but does not permit an offset for light duty wages.

quad/graphics, Inc. v. Holguin · filed 2015-04-24

KRS 342.730 provides two circumstances where an employer can receive a credit against its TTD benefits obligation. KRS 342.730(5) allows an offset for unemployment benefits paid during a period in which TTD or permanent total disability benefits were paid. KRS 342.730(6) provides for an offset for payments made under a qualifying employer-funded disability or sickness and accident plan. ... While Quad makes a good Public policy argument in favor of receiving an offset, the workers' compensation statutes do not allow for a credit like the one requested in this situation.

Section 342.730 allows offsets for specified unemployment benefits and qualifying employer-funded disability plan payments, but does not authorize an offset for light duty wages.

quad/graphics, Inc. v. Holguin · filed 2015-03-30

KRS 342.730 provides two circumstances where an employer can receive a credit against its TTD benefits obligation. KRS 342.730(5) allows an offset for unemployment benefits paid during a period in which TTD or permanent total disability benefits were paid. KRS 342.730(6) provides for an offset for payments made under a qualifying employer-funded disability or sickness and accident plan. ... While Quad makes a good public policy argument in favor of receiving an offset, the workers' compensation statutes do not allow for a credit like the one requested in this situation.

Section 342.730(5) offsets temporary total and permanent total disability benefits by unemployment benefits paid during the disability period; it does not govern the preinjury wages used to calculate average weekly wage.

Jewell v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2015-06-08(5)

First, KRS 342.730(5) provides that "[a]ll income benefits pursuant to this chapter otherwise payable for temporary total and permanent total disability shall be offset by unemployment insurance benefits paid for unemployment during the period of temporary total or permanent total disability." ... It has nothing to do with AWW, which is based on wages earned before an injury occurred.

Section 342.730(5) offsets disability income benefits by unemployment benefits paid during the disability period; it does not affect the calculation of average weekly wage from preinjury earnings.

Jewell v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2015-07-09(5)

This part of KRS Chapter 342 addresses liability for benefits due to disability that results after an injury has occurred. It has nothing to do with AWW, which is based on wages earned before an injury occurred.

Section 342.730(7) requires an employer seeking an offset against temporary total disability benefits to prove the employee’s post-injury gross wages minus applicable taxes before the award is issued.

Dart Container Company, Inc. v. Bailey · filed 2024-04-18(7)

The reality is that Dart failed in its burden of timely producing the records showing Bailey’s post-injury net wages pursuant to the plain language of KRS 342.730(7).

An employer seeking a credit against temporary total disability benefits for wages paid during light-duty or alternative work must prove the employee’s gross income minus applicable taxes.

General Motors, LLC v. Giovanni Smith · filed 2024-07-11(7)

It was GM’s burden to provide proof of the employee’s gross income minus applicable taxes and its failure to do so is fatal to its claim for credit.

Section 342.730(1)(a) permits total disability benefits at reopening when a permanent worsening of work-related impairment causes a worker previously awarded partial disability benefits to become totally disabled, without requiring a higher permanent impairment rating.

Colwell v. Dresser Instrument Division · filed 2006-11-22(1)(a)

But KRS 342.730(l)(a) and KRS 342.0011(ll)(c) require a worker who was partially disabled at the time of the initial award and totally disabled at reopening to show only that a worsening of impairment due to the injury is permanent and causes the worker to be totally disabled.

Disability under KRS 342.730 includes temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits, so listing the extent and duration of disability as a contested issue preserves a claim for additional temporary total disability benefits.

United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Stoudemire · filed 2008-02-15

UPS’s preservation argument ignores that the term “disability” as used in KRS 342.730, encompasses both temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits.

Section 342.730(1)(b) requires evidence of a higher permanent impairment rating to support a higher income benefit at reopening.

Dunn v. Gary Slater D/B/A Carol Dale Contracting · filed 2008-06-19(1)(b)

KRS 342 .730(1)(b) requires evidence of a greater permanent impairment rating to support a greater income benefit at reopening .

Section 342.730(1)(b) requires evidence of a greater permanent impairment rating to support a greater income benefit at reopening.

Gary Slater D/B/A Carol Dale Contracting v. Dunn · filed 2008-06-19(1)(b)

KRS 342 .730(1)(b) requires evidence of a greater permanent impairment rating to support a greater income benefit at reopening .

Section 342.730(1)(c)1 permits tripling the entire partial disability benefit after reopening when the work-related injury leaves the worker unable to perform the type of work performed at the time of injury.

James T. English Trucking v. Beeler · filed 2012-08-23(1)(c)1

KRS 342.730(l)(c)l authorizes a triple income benefit based on a finding that the work-related injury causes the worker to lack the physical capacity to perform the type of work performed at the time of the injury. Moreover, nothing in Chapter 342 restricts the statute’s application to the portion of the worker’s income benefit that is attributable to the increased impairment rating present at reopening.