Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507

A second § 60-1507 petition requires consideration of new grounds when an earlier informal petition filed before Rule No. 121 did not present them.

Jackson v. State · filed 1968-12-07

The first petition presented to the district court was in letter form and did not raise the questions presented in the second formal opinion. ... We conclude that the trial court should have considered the second petition on the merits.

Section 60-1507(c) treats a motion for rehearing that reasserts a claim already decided in a final judgment as a successive motion.

Collins v. State · filed 1970-01-24(c)

The point was raised in petitioner’s original motion and determined adversely to his contention. No appeal was taken from that judgment and it became final. Petitioner’s motion for a rehearing, reasserting the same point, actually amounted to a successive motion.

A court need not entertain a successive § 60-1507 motion that repeats grounds already decided on the merits when reconsideration would not serve the ends of justice.

Robinson v. State · filed 1972-06-10

The trial court was not required in this case to entertain the petitioner’s second motion for relief under K. S. A. 60-1507 or to grant a rehearing thereon more than ten months later.

Section 60-1507(c) permits a sentencing court to decline to entertain a second or successive motion for relief by the same prisoner.

Cantrell v. State · filed 1972-11-04(c)

K. S. A. 60-1507 (c) provides that the sentencing court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for relief by the same prisoner.

Section 60-1507 permits dismissal of a successive motion to vacate a sentence as an abuse of remedy.

Kinnell v. State · filed 1972-12-09

The motion presently asserted by the petitioner to vacate his sentence under 60-1507, supra, is an abuse of remedy and was properly dismissed.

Section 60-1507(c) permits a successive motion raising a new ground when the prisoner shows changed circumstances or another reasonable explanation for omitting it from the first motion.

Brizendine v. State · filed 1974-07-17(c)

We agree with petitioners interpretation of the section in this respect that where a second or successive motion raises a point not raised in the previous motion and supports such action by showing a change of circumstances, such as a change in applicable law or some other reasonable explanation for not having raised the issue in the first motion, the trial court should hear the new motion on its merits.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a successive motion raising a ground the prisoner knew about but omitted from an earlier motion when no unusual circumstances justify the omission.

Walker v. State · filed 1975-01-25(c)

Accordingly, petitioner’s further use of K. S. A. 60-1507 to obtain a hearing constituted an abuse of remedy, and the motion was properly dismissed by the sentencing court.

A second motion under § 60-1507 may be dismissed as an abuse of the remedy when the movant had a full and fair opportunity to present the claim in the first proceeding and shows no unusual circumstances warranting another hearing.

Schoonover v. State · filed 1978-08-04

In short, we agree with the trial court that petitioner had a full and fair opportunity in the first 1507 proceeding to present all her contentions concerning trial counsel’s performance, and she did so. There were no unusual circumstances requiring a new evidentiary hearing on that issue. The trial court properly dismissed this second 1507 petition as an abuse of the remedy and its judgment is affirmed.

Section 60-1507(c) gives the sentencing court discretion to decline a second or successive motion for similar relief by the same prisoner.

Jamesion v. Roberts · filed 1992-03-20(c)

The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner. ... Given the clearly stated position of the state district court when it denied petitioner’s second petition, there is no reason to believe that the court would exercise its discretion and entertain a third petition.

A successive § 60-1507 motion need not receive reconsideration of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim already decided in an earlier § 60-1507 motion.

Bruner v. State · filed 2004-04-23

Because Bruner already raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in his previous K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the district court was not required to consider the issue again in Bruner’s subsequent K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a successive motion seeking similar relief when earlier motions raised the same ineffective assistance claim.

Holt v. State · filed 2010-05-06(c)

In addition to ruling that Holt failed to establish the need for an evidentiary hearing, we hold that Holt’s present 1507 motion is successive. See K.S.A. 60-1507(c). His first three motions all alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, as does his present one.

A court need not entertain a successive § 60-1507 motion when the prisoner shows no circumstances justifying the failure to raise the ground in an earlier motion.

State v. Trotter · filed 2013-03-08(c)

First, under K.S.A. 60-1507(c), a court is not required to entertain successive motions on behalf of the same prisoner. ... Trotter has not argued any circumstances that warrant this successive motion, especially in light of the subject matter and relief granted in Trotter II.

A motion for relief under § 60-1507 may be denied when it is both untimely and successive.

State v. Warren · filed 2015-01-08(c), (f)

In this regard, the district judge interpreted Warren's motion as a motion for habeas relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. However, the judge found that grounds for relief were also unavailable because Warren's motion was both untimely and successive. See K.S.A. 60-1507(c) (noting, "[t]he sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner"); K.S.A. 60-1507(f) (setting forth time limits for such motions). We agree.

A court may decline to treat a motion to correct an illegal sentence as a § 60-1507 motion when the movant previously omitted the claim from a direct appeal and two § 60-1507 motions, because the successive challenge would be denied.

State v. Donaldson · filed 2015-09-11

Furthermore, although we have, at times, treated pro se motions to correct an illegal sentence as K.S.A. 60-1507 motions, we decline to do so here. See State v. Swisher, 281 Kan. 447, 449, 132 P.3d 1274 (2006). A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion "is not typically an acceptable vehicle for a nonconstitutional claim of error that could have been addressed on a direct appeal." 281 Kan. at 449. Donaldson has already filed a direct appeal in this case and two motions pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507 without making any challenge to the district court's alleged failure to comply with K.S.A. 22-3302. If he had attempted a K.S.A. 60-1507 challenge, it would have been denied. See State v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, 904, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013) (court not required to consider successive motions).

Section 60-1507(c) does not require a district court to hear a second or successive motion seeking similar relief for the same prisoner.

State v. Sellers · filed 2015-09-25(c)

A district court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.

A later K.S.A. 60-1507 motion focused solely on prior habeas counsel’s effectiveness is not successive when that issue was left undecided in the appeal of the first motion.

Wilson v. State · filed 2015-12-11(c)

Regarding successiveness, we note that we declined in the appeal of Wilson's initial habeas case to take up the issue of the effectiveness of his attorney's representation. In these circumstances, then, a later habeas claim focused solely on the effectiveness of the prior attorney's representation is not successive.

Section 60-1507(c) permits denial of a successive motion when the movant could have raised its grounds in an earlier motion.

Holt v. State · filed 2016-01-15(c)

Although it is unclear whether Holt previously raised this issue, we decline to address the merits because we find it also is successive; Holt could have raised it in any of the previous motions he filed after his initial motion.

A successive 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective counsel on appeal from an earlier motion warrants an evidentiary hearing if the movant identifies omitted arguments and shows they might have succeeded.

Rojas v. State · filed 2016-02-26

Here, the Strickland test would require Rojas to point to legal arguments the lawyer handling the appeal of the earlier 60-1507 motion should have made but didn't and at least some showing that those arguments might have been successful. With such a demonstration, Rojas would have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his current 60-1507 motion to explore why his former lawyer did not pursue those arguments.

Section 60-1507(c) allows a court to reach the merits of a second or successive motion when justice would be served by doing so.

Novotny v. State · filed 2016-05-06(c)

Thus, even if we were to consider this current K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as a second or successive motion, we could not say justice would not be served by reaching the merits of this subsequent motion. In fact, we are satisfied that the interests of justice do require such a hearing on the merits, particularly in light of the fact that Ney was removed from the case by the trial court and replaced by Osburn.

A § 60-1507 motion can be successive when it raises claims similar to an earlier motion to withdraw a plea, even if the claims are not identical.

Taylor v. State · filed 2017-06-23(c)

But his claim was similar enough to those he raised in his earlier motion to withdraw plea to make the present motion successive. In both motions, Taylor essentially claims that his attorney was ineffective in litigating the motion to suppress by failing to bring to light the allegedly false and misleading statements in the search warrant affidavit. While the claims were not identical, the later motion is successive even when the claims are only similar to the claims in a previous motion.

Section 60-1507(c) permits a district court to decline to hear a successive motion.

Wilson v. State · filed 2017-08-25(c)

And, in any event, a district court need not hear successive 60-1507 motions. See K.S.A. 60-1507(c).

A successive motion under § 60-1507 need not be considered when the movant gives no reason for failing to raise the claim in an earlier motion.

State v. Reed · filed 2018-02-02

The court did not err in denying his motion to alter or amend judgment because Reed was aware of the difference between a motion to correct an illegal sentence and a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, and a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion would have been successive.

A claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is not successive under § 60-1507 when it could not have been raised in an earlier motion or on direct appeal.

Mattox v. State · filed 2018-02-09(c)

At the outset, we find this claim is not successive because Mattox could not have raised an ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim in his previous K.S.A. 60-1507 motion or on direct appeal.

Section 60-1507 permits dismissal of a successive motion as an abuse of remedy.

Hartfield v. State · filed 2018-11-30(c)

Courts may dismiss a successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as an abuse of remedy.

A court may summarily deny a successive § 60-1507 motion seeking relief on an issue already decided when the movant shows no reason for omitting additional grounds from the first motion.

Carter v. State · filed 2019-08-09(c)

Because this is a successive 60-1507 motion, seeking relief on the same issue which was previously heard and determined against Carter, the district court properly summarily denied the 60-1507 motion without reaching the merits.

A colorable claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence may excuse the bar on successive motions under § 60-1507(c); without that showing, a successive claim remains procedurally barred.

Francis v. State · filed 2020-03-20(c)

It is true that our Supreme Court in Beauclair found that a colorable claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence may qualify as an "unusual event" that is an exceptional circumstance that excuses the procedural bar of successiveness under K.S.A. 60-1507(c). 308 Kan. 284, Syl. ¶ 2. However, as we have just discussed in the context of Francis' untimely motion, we are persuaded that he has failed to show a colorable claim of actual innocence. As a result, his successive claim is procedurally barred, and the district court did not err in denying Francis' motion to amend and motion for relief.

A successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is barred when the movant does not allege circumstances that prevented the issues from being raised in the prior motion.

State v. White · filed 2020-03-27(c)

His motion would be barred as successive because he filed a prior K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and did not allege any circumstances that prevented him from raising these issues in the prior motion.

Section 60-1507 does not permit a movant to reserve claims against appellate counsel for a second motion as part of a planned two-stage challenge.

Kidd v. State · filed 2020-04-10(c)

Essentially, Kidd argues that his failure to raise claims against his appellate counsel in his first 60-1507 motion should allow him to raise those "unexhausted claims" in a second 60-1507 motion. In other words, he would like to file piecemeal appeals. That is not permitted.

A second habeas motion seeking consideration of the same issue is successive even when it presents different supporting arguments.

Frost v. State · filed 2020-05-08(c)

Generally, a second habeas motion supported by different arguments is still successive when it seeks consideration of the same issue.

Section 60-1507(c) does not require a sentencing court to entertain a successive motion for similar relief merely because the prisoner offers a different argument for an ineffective-assistance claim that could have been raised in the first motion.

Brown v. State · filed 2020-09-25(c)

The fact that the argument he now offers in support of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is different than the argument he previously offered in support of the claim is immaterial. The language in K.S.A. 60-1507(c) is clear: a sentencing court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.

Section 60-1507 permits denial of an untimely, successive motion unless a colorable claim of actual innocence based on new evidence overcomes both procedural bars.

Swanner v. State · filed 2021-03-05

A colorable claim of actual innocence based on new evidence can establish both the manifest injustice and exceptional circumstances needed to overcome the procedural bars of untimeliness and successiveness. ... Swanner has not made a colorable claim of actual innocence. He has shown us no exceptional circumstances that would permit a second motion for habeas relief. The district court correctly denied his 60-1507 motion as untimely and successive.

Section 60-1507 does not provide relief for a successive, untimely motion based on Alleyne’s prospective-only rule, even if a motion to correct an illegal sentence is treated as a 60-1507 motion.

State v. Appleby · filed 2021-04-30(c), (f)

Yet, consistent with Coleman and Kirtdoll, converting his motion to correct an illegal sentence to a 60-1507 motion would not benefit Appleby because he has no right to relief under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507.

A motion challenging a sentence imposed after resentencing is not successive merely because the prisoner filed an earlier § 60-1507 motion challenging the original sentence.

Steele v. State · filed 2021-06-11(c)

Steele is correct that this is the first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion he has filed challenging his 2015 sentence as an unconstitutional sentence. Thus, the district court erred in finding that Steele's 2003 K.S.A. 60-1507 motion caused his current motion to be successive. Steele's current motion is not a successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, so Steele need not establish exceptional circumstances to avoid the bar on successive motions.

Section 60-1507 permits denial of a successive motion used to relitigate claims already rejected in an earlier proceeding.

Elnicki v. State · filed 2021-08-06

And because the trial court had no duty to consider any argument previously raised by Elnicki and rejected by us, the trial court properly denied Elnicki's pro se motion to amend his pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 motion under K.S.A. 60-215(c) as an attempt to file an impermissible successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is procedurally barred when it is untimely and successive.

State v. Ross · filed 2022-06-10

Ross also did not request his pleading be construed as a K.S.A. 60- 1507 motion. Indeed, such a motion would have been procedurally barred as untimely and successive.

A second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion challenging the effectiveness of counsel on the first motion is timely and not successive when filed within one year after the mandate on the first motion.

Nelson v. State · filed 2022-10-21

Nelson's one-year time limitation to challenge Whalen's ineffectiveness began on December 29, 2017, when the mandate issued on his first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. See Rowell v. State, 60 Kan. App. 2d 235, 241, 490 P.3d 78 (2021). Nelson filed his second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, alleging ineffective assistance of habeas counsel on June 15, 2018—within one year from the mandate of the first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. We find Nelson's motion is timely and not successive because he timely challenged the effectiveness of Whalen's performance as counsel for Nelson's first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(c) gives a district court discretion to consider a successive motion seeking similar relief.

Kleypas v. State · filed 2022-12-16(c)

And K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-1507(c) merely provides that the district court "shall not be required" to entertain a successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner, but it still has discretion to do so.

Section 60-1507 permits a district court to deny a successive motion for similar relief by the same prisoner.

State v. Woods · filed 2022-12-16(c)

A district court is not "required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-1507(c). ... Thus, the district court properly denied Woods' motion because it was successive and barred by res judicata.

Section 60-1507(c) permits a sentencing court to decline a second or successive motion seeking similar relief.

Warren (ID 64442) v. Kansas, State of · filed 2024-04-17(c)

There is no reason to believe future K.S.A. 60-1507 motions would meet a different fate. See K.S.A. 60-1507(c) (“The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”).

Section 60-1507(c)’s limit on second or successive motions for similar relief can provide an independent and adequate state procedural ground for anticipatory procedural default in federal habeas review.

Cox (ID 98253) v. Williams · filed 2024-06-06(c)

K.S.A. 60-1507(c) and Rule 183(c)(3) are the type of “independent and adequate state procedural grounds” that support a finding of anticipatory procedural default of a claim.

Section 60-1507(c) may bar a successive motion raising a claim omitted from an earlier motion.

Walker (ID 122256) v. Geither · filed 2024-06-12(c)

At this point, any K.S.A. 60-1507 motion doing so likely would be barred as successive.

Section 60-1507(c) permits a court to decline a second or successive motion for similar relief, so a claim omitted from an earlier motion may be barred if raised later.

Walker (ID 122256) v. Geither · filed 2024-08-19(c)

At this point, if Petitioner returned to state court to file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and attempt to exhaust this claim, her efforts would likely be procedurally barred. Petitioner has already sought relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. Subsection (c) of that statute provides: “The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”

A later § 60-1507 motion seeking to present unexhausted claims may be barred as successive and untimely.

Ross (ID 116253) v. Williams · filed 2024-09-19(c)

At this point, any K.S.A. 60-1507 motion doing so likely would be barred as successive and untimely. See K.S.A. 60-1507(c). Thus, the claims in these Grounds are barred by anticipatory procedural default.

A later motion under § 60-1507 raising a new ineffective-assistance ground after an earlier such motion would likely be barred as successive under subsection (c) and untimely under subsection (f).

Taylor (ID 40516) v. Easley · filed 2024-09-20

Thus, any 60-1507 motion Petitioner pursues at this point in state court would likely be barred as successive under K.S.A. 60-1507(c) and untimely under K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

A second or successive § 60-1507 motion repeating claims raised in an earlier motion is subject to dismissal.

Ross (ID 55837) v. Peterson · filed 2025-06-30(c)

Thus, any future K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that contained these arguments would be subject to dismissal under K.S.A. 60-1507(c), which states: “The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”

Section 60-1507 imposes time limits on post-conviction motions and permits state district courts to decline successive motions.

Novotny (ID 93873) v. Peterson · filed 2025-08-12(c), (f)

Because any attempt to return to state court to exhaust these arguments would be barred by K.S.A. 60-1507’s time limitations and its provision that states district courts are not required to entertain successive motions, the arguments in Ground Five appear barred by anticipatory procedural default and subject to dismissal.

A later § 60-1507 motion challenging alleged trial errors may be barred as successive under subsection (c) and untimely under subsection (f).

Vigil (ID 68260) v. Snyder · filed 2025-09-12

Any future K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding Petitioner brings to challenge alleged trial errors such as those now asserted in his federal habeas petition would likely be barred as a successive motion, see K.S.A. 60-1507(c), and as untimely, see K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

Section 60-1507(c) can bar a successive motion even when the prior motion was not resolved on the merits.

Torrence v. State · filed 2025-09-19(c)

But this court has held that the limitation on successive motions in K.S.A. 60-1507(c) does not rely on previous motions being resolved on the merits.

A bare allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel does not establish exceptional circumstances permitting a second or successive motion under § 60-1507.

Armstrong v. State · filed 2025-10-10(c)

But merely stating that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel does not establish exceptional circumstances to warrant consideration of a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A prior summary denial does not itself establish exceptional circumstances for a successive Section 60-1507 motion when the movant failed to seek timely review of that denial.

Phillips v. State · filed 2025-10-31(c)

In other words, Phillips was not denied the right to seek habeas relief for the claims raised in his motion but abandoned any claims he had by failing to timely request review. Accordingly, we find that the district court correctly determined Phillips failed to show exceptional circumstances to reach the merits of his successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(c) and (f) can bar a later motion challenging alleged trial errors as successive and untimely.

Schnurr · filed 2025-11-12

Any future K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding Petitioner brings to challenge alleged trial errors such as those now asserted in his federal habeas petition would likely be barred as a successive motion, see K.S.A. 60-1507(c), and as untimely, see K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

Section 60-1507(c) bars a second post-conviction motion seeking relief similar to the first.

Brown · filed 2025-11-24(c)

State law also bars Brown from filing a second post-conviction motion that seeks similar relief as his first motion.

Section 60-1507(c) and (f) may bar a later motion raising trial errors when the motion is successive and untimely.

Williams v. Williams · filed 2025-12-08(c), (f)

Any future K.S.A. 60-1507 action Petitioner might bring to raise trial errors such as those now asserted in Grounds Three and Four of the second amended federal habeas petition would likely be barred as a successive motion, see K.S.A. 60-1507(c), and as untimely, see K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

Section 60-1507(c) allows a court to decline a successive motion seeking similar relief unless exceptional circumstances justify it; repeating a previously rejected claim does not qualify.

State v. Tiger · filed 2025-12-19(c)

Repeating the same claim that has been rejected in the past is not an exceptional circumstance warranting consideration of a successive motion.

A claim that counsel in a first § 60-1507 motion was ineffective is not successive when it was not raised and could not have been raised sooner.

Calhoun v. State · filed 2026-02-06(c)

Calhoun's conclusory claim that his counsel in his first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was ineffective for failing to argue that aggravated criminal sodomy was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the crime of aggravated robbery or aggravated burglary was not successive because Calhoun had not raised this claim before and could not have raised it sooner.

A second motion claiming that counsel on the first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was ineffective is not successive because that claim could not have been raised on direct appeal or in the first motion.

Dunerway v. State · filed 2026-02-20(c)

Next, we turn to Dunerway's claim concerning the performance of his first K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel. This claim is not successive because it could not have been previously raised either on direct appeal or in his first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Hence, we find that this claim has been properly presented by way of Dunerway's second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Subsection (c) allows the sentencing court to decline a second or successive motion seeking similar relief for the same prisoner.

Geither · filed 2026-05-18(c)

The Court agrees. K.S.A. 60-1507(c) provides: “The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.” Thus, any future K.S.A. 60-1507 motion by Petitioner would likely be denied as successive.

Section 60-1507 does not require Kansas district courts to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief from the same prisoner.

Clary (ID 96959) v. Cline · filed 2020-07-07

Additionally, Kansas district courts are “not required to entertain a second or successive 60-1507 motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”

A second § 60-1507 proceeding may challenge counsel’s effectiveness in an earlier proceeding, but it is a separate collateral proceeding, not a direct appeal of the first.

Marler (ID 91974) v. Langford · filed 2022-06-10

Although a second K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding may challenge the effectiveness of counsel in a prior 60-1507 proceeding, this does not render the second action a “direct appeal.”

Section 60-1507(c) permits the sentencing court to decline a second or successive motion seeking similar relief for the same prisoner.

Sellers (ID 99071) v. Langford · filed 2022-07-14(c)

K.S.A. 60-1507(c) states: “The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.” ... Because the KCOA has already held that Petitioner’s most recent 60-1507 motion was untimely and successive, it is likely that it would find any future 60-1507 motions to be the same.

A second § 60-1507 motion that repeats a claim from an earlier motion is subject to dismissal on state procedural grounds when the petitioner did not appeal the first denial.

Fagan v. Kansas Parole Board · filed 1999-05-27

Given petitioner’s failure to appeal the state district court’s denial of the first 1507 motion, the second motion is clearly repetitive and subject to dismissal on state procedural grounds.

A prisoner who fails to raise an available ineffective assistance claim on post-conviction review may have no later Kansas remedy under subsection (c).

Woodberry v. Hannigan · filed 2002-04-17(c)

Moreover, Mr. Woodberry could have raised his ineffective assistance claim on post-conviction review. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507; see also Lumley v. State, 34 P.3d 467 (Kan.Ct.App.2001) (evaluating a post-conviction ineffective assistance claim). His failure to do so now leaves him without an available remedy in Kansas. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507(c); Brooks v. State, 25 Kan.App.2d 466, 966 P.2d 686, 688 (Kan.App.1998).

Section 60-1507(c) allows a sentencing court to decline a second or successive motion for similar relief.

Carter v. Werholtz · filed 2011-07-18(c)

These unexhausted claims are procedurally defaulted because Defendant could not now raise them in state court. Defendant has already pursued relief under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507. And under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507(c), “The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”

Section 60-1507(c) and (f) can bar a later post-conviction motion as successive and untimely.

Ruff (ID 114009) v. Snyder · filed 2022-04-21(c), (f)

At this point in time, the state court would find the claim regarding Dent procedurally barred because Petitioner has already pursued one 60-1507 motion and any future 60-1507 motion would be deemed untimely and successive. See K.S.A. 60-1507(c) and (f).

Section 60-1507(c) permits courts to decline second or successive applications for similar relief.

Hasty v. Crouse · filed 1968-10-16(c)

To ask Hasty to file a second 1507 application would be futile for the reason that the law of Kansas is to the effect that second or successive applications for similar relief need not be entertained. See K.S.A. 60-1507(c); State v. Foulk, 195 Kan. 349, 404 P.2d 961 (1965).

Section 60-1507(c) permits a sentencing court to reject a successive motion raising a ground that could have been presented earlier, absent unusual circumstances or an intervening change in law.

Lee v. State · filed 1971-04-10(c)

K. S. A. 60-1507 (c) and Rule 121 (d) of this court (205 Kan. xlv) provide that a sentencing court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for relief on behalf of the same prisoner. ... No unusual circumstances nor intervening change in the law have been presented which would justify further use of our post-conviction remedy. ... Under all the facts and circumstances presented in this record, appellant’s further use of K. S. A. 60-1507 constituted an abuse of remedy.

A successive motion under § 60-1507 may be considered when it raises a new constitutional issue supported by an intervening change in law.

Cox v. State · filed 1974-05-11

In Lee v. State, supra, we indicated that unusual circumstances or intervening changes in the law may well justify successive use of the postconviction remedy provided by 60-1507 where a new constitutional issue is involved. The district court might well have entertained the present 60-1507 motion on the basis that a constitutional ground not previously determined has been raised and an intervening change of law has been shown. Since there are no disputed issues of fact and the questions of law have been well briefed by the parties, we find that the interests of justice require that the case be determined on its merits at this time.

A second successive § 60-1507 motion abuses the remedy when the claims were raised on direct appeal or could have been raised then without an intervening change in law, and the new claim lacks merit.

Yurk v. State · filed 1974-07-17

Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief under K. S. A. 60-1507 was properly denied in summary fashion. There were no unusual or intervening changes in the law which prevented him from raising the alleged errors in the direct appeal. ... The filing of this second successive motion under the foregoing circumstances constitutes an abuse of the remedy provided in K. S. A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a second or successive motion unless constitutional-rights errors and exceptional circumstances justify hearing it.

Dunlap v. State · filed 1977-01-22(c)

The sentencing court should not entertain a second or successive motion for relief under K. S. A. 60-1507 on behalf of the same person unless the errors affect constitutional rights and there are exceptional circumstances which justify entertaining a second or successive motion.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a successive motion when the prisoner had a full opportunity to raise claims in an earlier proceeding that he voluntarily dismissed and shows no exceptional circumstances.

Brooks v. State · filed 1998-09-04(c)

Brooks had full opportunity to raise any and all appropriate issues attacking the conviction and sentence in the first 60-1507 proceeding that he voluntarily dismissed after a successful appeal to this court and a mandate that required a full evidentiary hearing. Under these circumstances, K.S.A. 60-1507(c) is applicable. ... Brooks has failed to show there have been any unusual events or intervening changes in the law that would constitute exceptional circumstances precluding dismissal under K.S.A. 60-1507(c).

Section 60-1507(c) generally bars a second or successive motion for similar relief unless exceptional circumstances justify it.

Butler v. State of Kansas · filed 2002-12-30(c)

In addition, Mr. Butler is generally not entitled to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief.

A sentencing court may dismiss a successive § 60-1507 motion as an abuse of remedy unless the movant shows exceptional circumstances warranting its consideration.

Woodberry v. State · filed 2004-02-13(c)

Unless exceptional circumstances are shown, the sentencing court may properly dismiss a second or successive motion on the ground its use constitutes an abuse of remedy.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a successive motion that repeats an issue previously decided on the merits when the movant shows no exceptional circumstances.

McPherson v. State · filed 2007-08-10(c)

K.S.A. 60-1507(c) provides that a sentencing court is not required to entertain a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that raises the same or substantially the same issues as a previous motion that was decided on the merits. ... Twice before the issue was decided on the merits adversely to McPherson. Furthermore, he has made no showing of any exceptional circumstances concerning this case. Thus, the current motion is successive and McPherson’s jurisdictional argument must be dismissed.

Section 60-1507(c) permits a court to decline a successive motion unless the prisoner shows exceptional circumstances, such as an intervening change in law that prevented raising the claim in the first motion.

Wimbley v. State · filed 2011-08-12(c)

The district court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief filed by the same prisoner absent a showing of exceptional circumstances. ... Because Holmes was filed before Wimbley’s first 1507, it could not be an intervening change in the law between the first and second 1507 motions and could not have prevented Wimbley from raising any issues derived from Holmes in the first 1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a second or successive habeas motion absent exceptional circumstances.

Gant v. State · filed 2015-09-11(c)

First, a defendant doesn't have a right to file more than one habeas motion for similar relief; K.S.A. 60-1507(c) provides that the district court may dismiss a second or successive motion absent exceptional circumstances.

Section 60-1507(c) permits a court to decline review of a successive motion when the prisoner shows no exceptional circumstances justifying another motion.

State v. Mathis · filed 2015-10-02(c)

Absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, the district court can dismiss a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as an abuse of remedy. Kelly, 291 Kan. at 872. ... The filing of the successive motion constituted an abuse of remedy. The district court properly declined to review Mathis' claims because they were advanced in a successive motion under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a successive motion raising claims that were or could have been raised in an earlier motion, absent exceptional circumstances.

Keesee v. State · filed 2015-12-18(c)

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the prohibition against successive motions under K.S.A. 60-1507(c) bars not only claims actually raised in prior motions but also those claims that could have been raised in a prior motion.

Section 60-1507 permits successive motions upon a showing of exceptional circumstances and permits an extension of its one-year filing deadline to prevent manifest injustice; these filing limits do not unconstitutionally suspend habeas corpus relief.

Manco v. State · filed 2015-07-10(c), (f)(2)

Successive motions can be filed if the movant establishes exceptional circumstance, but Manco failed to present any exceptional circumstances for the district court to consider. Likewise, the 1-year deadline for filing K.S.A. 60-1507 motions can be extended after termination of all appellate review on the direct appeal if the movant shows the denial of the motion would result in manifest injustice under subsection (f)(2). All of these provisions reflect the right to file for habeas corpus relief under K.S.A. 60-1507 if the movant qualifies, but that right is not unlimited.

Claims of ineffective trial counsel repeated in an amended § 60-1507 motion are successive absent exceptional circumstances.

Zeiner v. State · filed 2016-04-29(c)

We agree with the findings of the district court that the claims in Zeiner's amended K.S.A. 60-1507 motion concerning the ineffectiveness of trial counsel are successive and there is no showing of exceptional circumstances.

A second motion repeating previously reviewed claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is successive and requires a showing of exceptional circumstances for review.

Sperry v. State · filed 2016-05-20(c)

In summary, we hold that Sperry's second motion alleging trial counsel's ineffectiveness is successive without a showing of exceptional circumstances.

A movant cannot use a § 60-1507 motion to relitigate an ineffective assistance claim resolved on the merits in a prior plea withdrawal proceeding without showing exceptional circumstances.

Anderson v. State · filed 2016-05-20(c)

Thus, the question of whether Anderson's trial counsel was ineffective had already been determined on the merits through the denial of Anderson's motion to withdraw his plea. Anderson cannot now seek to have this question reanalyzed through his 60-1507 motion absent a showing of exceptional circumstances.

Section 60-1507 permits a court to consider a late or successive motion to prevent manifest injustice.

State v. Fraley · filed 2016-06-10(c), (f)

A court may consider a serially or late filed 60-1507 motion to prevent manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a second or successive motion seeking similar relief unless exceptional circumstances justify considering it.

Burden v. State · filed 2016-12-16(c)

First, a defendant doesn't have a right to file more than one habeas motion for similar relief; K.S.A. 60-1507(c) provides that the district court can dismiss a second or successive motion unless exceptional circumstances justify considering it.

Section 60-1507(c) does not require a court to consider a successive motion unless exceptional circumstances justify it.

Hongphakdy v. State · filed 2017-05-12(c)

Pursuant to K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(c), we are not required to entertain a successive motion unless exceptional circumstances justify considering it.

Section 60-1507 does not allow Alleyne's prospective change in the law to establish the exceptional circumstances needed for a successive motion or the manifest injustice needed for an untimely motion.

Kirtdoll v. State · filed 2017-05-12

Likewise, we agree that, for 60-1507 motions to be considered hereafter, Alleyne's prospective-only change in the law cannot provide the exceptional circumstances that would justify a successive 60-1507 motion or the manifest injustice necessary to excuse the untimeliness of a 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(c) allows a court to deny a successive habeas motion unless the movant shows exceptional circumstances justifying its consideration.

Hood v. State · filed 2017-06-09(c)

Here, since Hood had already filed two K.S.A. 60-1507 motions, he had to show exceptional circumstances to prevent the denial or dismissal of his third motion as successive and an abuse of remedy.

A prisoner generally must bring collateral constitutional challenges in one § 60-1507 motion within one year of final disposition; an untimely, successive motion may be summarily dismissed absent manifest injustice or exceptional circumstances.

Stafford v. State · filed 2017-06-23

Typically, a prisoner in custody under sentence of the court must bring all of his or her collateral constitutional challenges to a conviction in a single K.S.A. 60-1507 motion filed within 1 year of the final disposition of the criminal case. ... Because Stafford has shown neither manifest injustice nor exceptional circumstances to justify his untimely and successive motion, we conclude that the district court did not err in summarily dismissing Stafford's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(c) permits a court to dismiss a second or successive motion for similar relief unless exceptional circumstances justify considering it.

Davis v. State · filed 2017-08-25(c)

Under the statute, a defendant doesn't have a right to file more than one habeas motion for similar relief; K.S.A. 60-1507(c) provides that the district court "shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." Our Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that the district court can dismiss a second or successive motion unless exceptional circumstances justify considering it.

The Alleyne rule does not supply exceptional circumstances to excuse a successive and untimely motion under § 60-1507.

Johnson v. State · filed 2017-09-01

He also argued that the rule in Alleyne furnished exceptional circumstances to support his 60-1507 motion, which was both successive and untimely. ... The twin holdings of Kirtdoll address the same legal arguments Johnson makes and unequivocally reject them. We necessarily must follow the legal trail the court blazed in Kirtdoll.

A court need not consider a successive Section 60-1507 motion when the movant shows no exceptional circumstance excusing the failure to raise the claim earlier.

Walker v. State · filed 2017-09-22(c)

Because we have shown that Walker's aggravated robbery charge did not present an alternative means issue under Brown, we cannot hold that Brown constituted an intervening change of law—or an exceptional circumstance. And because Brown does not constitute an exceptional circumstance excusing the successiveness of Walker's motion, the trial court was not required to consider its merits.

Section 60-1507 generally bars successive motions unless exceptional circumstances, such as unusual events or material changes in substantive law, justify considering another motion.

White v. State · filed 2017-10-27(c)

White's current motion is also impermissibly successive for basically the same reasons. A district court may consider a successive 60-1507 motion for "exceptional circumstances," entailing "unusual events" or material changes in the substantive law.

Ineffective assistance by counsel in an earlier § 60-1507 proceeding can be an exceptional circumstance permitting a successive motion when counsel failed to raise an issue.

Calvin v. State · filed 2017-11-09(c)

We acknowledge that ineffective assistance of a prior 60-1507 counsel in failing to raise an issue can rise to the level of an exceptional circumstance to permit a successive 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(c) generally bars successive motions unless exceptional circumstances, such as a new factual event or change in law, prevented the movant from raising the claim in the first motion.

Jones v. State · filed 2017-12-08(c)

But the courts may consider successive motions based on exceptional circumstances, such as "unusual events or intervening changes in the law" that prevented a movant from raising all of his or her claims in an initial motion.

Section 60-1507(c) treats claims previously raised in a Van Cleave proceeding as successive even when the prisoner has not filed an earlier 60-1507 motion, so exceptional circumstances are required for review.

Allen v. State · filed 2017-12-08(c)

Although Allen had not filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion prior to the current motions at issue, he did raise numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the Van Cleave proceedings. Typically these claims are raised in K.S.A. 60-1507 motions. Thus, the rule regarding successive motions is applicable here. Allen must therefore show exceptional circumstances in order to warrant review of the issues raised in his motions.

A successive motion under § 60-1507(c) may be summarily denied when the movant shows no unusual events or intervening changes in law that prevented the claims from being raised in the first motion.

Mitchell-Pennington v. State · filed 2018-05-25(c)

Because Mitchell-Pennington has not alleged any unusual events or intervening changes in the law which prevented him from being able to raise his current claims in his first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the district court properly summarily denied his motion as successive under K.S.A. 60-1507(c).

Section 60-1507 permits a second or successive motion in exceptional circumstances, including inadequate representation in an earlier 60-1507 proceeding.

Stotts v. State · filed 2018-11-21

Further, a convicted criminal defendant may bring a second or successive 60-1507 motion in exceptional circumstances. Those circumstances include inadequate legal representation in an earlier 60-1507 motion, such as Stotts alleges here.

Section 60-1507(c) allows a court to consider a second or successive motion when exceptional circumstances justify reaching its merits.

Nguyen v. State · filed 2018-12-21(c)

Earlier this year we again confirmed that a movant could avoid having a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion dismissed as an abuse of remedy by establishing exceptional circumstances.

A movant seeking consideration of a second or successive motion under § 60-1507 must show exceptional circumstances that prevented the claims from being raised in the first motion.

Gaona v. State · filed 2019-04-05(c)

Again, such an argument fails to address why the claims he raises in his current K.S.A. 60-1507 motion could not have been raised in his first motion. In short, Gaona's arguments do not establish exceptional circumstances warranting our consideration of his second and successive motion under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507(c) allows a court to decline a second or successive motion for relief unless exceptional circumstances justify it.

State v. Robertson · filed 2019-04-19(c)

A court need not entertain a second or successive motion for relief under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(c) in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

A successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion may be dismissed as an abuse of the remedy unless the movant establishes exceptional circumstances.

State v. Coppage · filed 2019-05-03(c)

This is significant because courts may dismiss a successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as an abuse of the remedy. To prevent dismissal of a successive motion, a movant must establish exceptional circumstances.

A movant filing a successive § 60-1507 motion must show exceptional circumstances that explain the failure to raise the claim in an earlier motion.

Dawson v. State · filed 2019-07-12(c)

But Dawson must also establish some causal connection between the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and the delay in asserting the postconviction claims, i.e., the exceptional circumstances must explain or justify the failure to assert a claim in a prior 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507 permits a court to decline a successive motion absent exceptional circumstances and bars a motion filed after one year unless manifest injustice warrants an extension.

State v. Robertson · filed 2019-04-19(c), (f)(1), (f)(2)

First, Robertson had earlier pursued relief under 60-1507, and that statute is clear that a district court is not "required to entertain a second or successive motion." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(c); see Trotter, 296 Kan. at 904. Robertson has argued no exceptional circumstances warranting a successive motion. Nor do we see any. Robertson could have raised these arguments in an earlier proceeding. He did not. The district court did not have to entertain Robertson's motions had he raised them under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507. Second, Robertson's motions were filed outside the one-year period for seeking 60-1507 relief and Robertson does not argue manifest injustice would support extending this limitation. See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1), (2). Thus, Robertson would be procedurally barred from relief even if we convert it to a motion under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507. See Trotter, 296 Kan. at 904-05.

Section 60-1507(c) requires a movant filing a second or successive motion to show exceptional circumstances justifying review of the merits, including whether justice would be served.

Littlejohn v. State · filed 2019-08-23(c)

The test should have been whether Littlejohn had presented exceptional circumstances to justify reaching the merits of the motion, factoring in whether justice would be served by doing so.

A successive motion under § 60-1507(c) requires exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of claims that could have been raised earlier.

Loggins v. State · filed 2019-08-30(c)

Thus, in order to avoid dismissal of his current motion as an abuse of remedy under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(c), Loggins must establish exceptional circumstances exist that warrant consideration of his current claims.

Section 60-1507 bars successive motions unless an exceptional circumstance, such as an unusual event or intervening change in the law, prevented the movant from raising the issue earlier.

Betts v. State · filed 2019-10-25(c)

Absent an exceptional circumstance based on an unusual event or an intervening change in the law, the procedural bar against successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motions applies here.

Section 60-1507(c) permits summary denial of a successive motion when the prisoner fails to show exceptional circumstances for not raising the claim earlier.

Wheeler v. State · filed 2020-01-03(c)

Because Wheeler fails to establish exceptional circumstances to bypass the statutory bar to successive claims, the district court did not err in summarily denying his motion as successive.

Section 60-1507(c) allows a successive motion when exceptional circumstances justify reaching its merits, including when justice would be served by doing so.

Littlejohn v. State · filed 2020-01-10(c)

Accordingly, we find there are exceptional circumstances shown to allow Littlejohn to bring a successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A court may summarily deny a successive § 60-1507 motion when the prisoner fails to show exceptional circumstances that prevented raising the matter in an earlier motion.

State v. Alger · filed 2020-03-06(c)

Under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(c), a sentencing court need not entertain a successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner. ... Because Alger failed to show that exceptional circumstances prevented him from raising the evidence in Bonnell's 2015 affidavit in his 2016 K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, he is procedurally barred from raising it in his current motion.

Section 60-1507(c) allows a court to decline a second or successive motion for similar relief unless the movant establishes exceptional circumstances.

Bloom v. State · filed 2020-03-06(c)

Under K.S.A. 60-1507(c), a sentencing court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner. Beauclair, 308 Kan. at 304. To avoid a dismissal of a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the movant bears the burden of establishing exceptional circumstances. 308 Kan. at 304. However, no exceptional circumstances are asserted or argued on appeal.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a successive motion seeking similar relief unless the movant shows exceptional circumstances justifying another motion.

Loggins v. State · filed 2020-06-12(c)

Under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(c), district courts need not consider more than one habeas motion seeking similar relief. Because a movant is presumed to have listed all grounds for relief in his or her initial K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, "exceptional circumstances" must be shown to justify the filing of successive motions.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a successive motion for similar relief unless the movant establishes exceptional circumstances justifying another filing.

Davis v. State · filed 2020-07-31(c)

A district court need not entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner. Beauclair, 308 Kan. at 304 (citing K.S.A. 60-1507[c]). Likewise, a district court may dismiss a successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as an abuse of the remedy. To prevent dismissal of a successive motion, a movant must establish exceptional circumstances. 308 Kan. at 304. Here, Davis fails to allege any exceptional circumstances that would excuse his successive filing.

A successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion may be dismissed unless the movant establishes exceptional circumstances that prevented raising the claim in an earlier motion.

Merrills v. State · filed 2020-08-07(c)

To avoid dismissal of a successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the movant bears the burden of establishing exceptional circumstances. Exceptional circumstances are unusual events or intervening changes in the law that prevented the movant from raising the issue in a prior K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A court need not consider a successive § 60-1507 motion seeking similar relief unless the movant establishes exceptional circumstances.

Jackson v. State · filed 2020-09-04(c)

A district court is not required to entertain a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion for similar relief on behalf of the same movant. ... Jackson fails to establish exceptional circumstances warrant consideration of his successive claims.

A movant filing a successive § 60-1507 motion must show exceptional circumstances to avoid summary dismissal.

Davis v. State · filed 2021-01-22(c)

Because Davis has previously filed multiple K.S.A. 60-1507 motions, he was required to show exceptional circumstances to prevent summary dismissal of his motion.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a successive motion seeking similar relief unless the prisoner shows exceptional circumstances justifying another motion.

Crawford v. State · filed 2021-02-26(c)

Under K.S.A. 60-1507(c), district courts need not consider more than one habeas motion seeking similar relief filed by the same prisoner. Because a movant is presumed to have listed all of the grounds for relief in his or her initial K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, a prisoner must show "exceptional circumstances" to justify the filing of successive motions.

A successive § 60-1507 motion requires exceptional circumstances, and an untimely motion requires manifest injustice; Alleyne's prospective change in law supplies neither exception.

State v. Trotter · filed 2021-04-30(c), (f)

Coleman also discussed and rejected another mechanism that can lead to post-judgment relief from a sentence: a motion for habeas relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. ... A court can allow a second motion if the movant establishes exceptional circumstances, and the one-year limitation does not apply if a court finds it necessary to lift the bar to prevent a manifest injustice. ... Yet, consistent with Coleman and Kirtdoll, converting his motion to a 60-1507 motion would not benefit Trotter because he has no right to relief under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507.

A successive, untimely § 60-1507 motion cannot obtain relief based on Alleyne’s prospective-only change in the law because that change supplies neither exceptional circumstances nor manifest injustice.

State v. Johnson · filed 2021-04-30(c), (f)

There, this court had held "for 60-1507 motions to be considered hereafter, Alleyne's prospective-only change in the law cannot provide the exceptional circumstances that would justify a successive 60-1507 motion or the manifest injustice necessary to excuse the untimeliness of a 60-1507 motion." Kirtdoll, 306 Kan. at 341. ... Yet, consistent with Coleman and Kirtdoll, converting Johnson's motion ... to a 60-1507 motion would not benefit Johnson because he has no right to relief under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507.

A colorable claim of actual innocence established at a threshold evidentiary hearing supplies exceptional circumstances to excuse a successive motion under § 60-1507.

Nichols v. State · filed 2021-07-09(c)

Beauclair teaches us that if a movant is successful in demonstrating a colorable claim of actual innocence at an evidentiary hearing devoted to that issue only, the movant has satisfied the exceptional circumstances standard to excuse successiveness.

A movant must show exceptional circumstances to avoid dismissal of a second or successive § 60-1507 motion.

Harris v. State · filed 2021-09-24(c)

To avoid having a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion dismissed, the movant must establish exceptional circumstances. ... Thus, his successive 60-1507 motion should not be considered because no exceptional circumstances warrant its consideration.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a successive motion unless the movant shows exceptional circumstances, such as unusual events or intervening changes in law that prevented raising the claim earlier.

Barnes v. State · filed 2021-11-24(c)

To avoid dismissal of a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the movant must show that exceptional circumstances exist. To make this showing, the movant must point to unusual events or intervening changes in the law that prevented him or her from raising the issue in the preceding K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A successive § 60-1507 motion that repeats earlier claims may be denied when the movant shows no exceptional circumstances.

Brown v. State · filed 2021-12-10(c)

Because this K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is repetitive and raises no exceptional circumstances or claims of actual innocence, we decline to proceed further in addressing the issues raised by Brown in his supplemental pro se brief.

Section 60-1507(c) permits denial of a successive motion unless the movant shows exceptional circumstances excusing the failure to raise the claim in the earlier motion.

Marks v. State · filed 2022-02-04(c)

Thus, to avoid dismissal of a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as an abuse of remedy, the movant must establish exceptional circumstances. ... Marks' motion was successive and is properly denied as such.

Section 60-1507(c) permits denial of a successive motion unless the movant shows exceptional circumstances justifying review, such as a change in law or a reason the claim could not have been raised earlier.

Angelo v. State · filed 2022-02-25(c)

As Angelo fails to point to any change in the law or advance any argument explaining why he did not raise errors from the consideration of his 2009 motion in his second 60-1507 motion, we are unpersuaded that any exceptional circumstances exist to justify consideration of his third 60-1507 motion.

A prisoner seeking successive relief under Section 60-1507 must show exceptional circumstances that prevented raising the grounds in the initial motion.

State v. Mitchell · filed 2022-03-11(c)

Because a movant is presumed to have listed all grounds for relief in his or her initial K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, a prisoner must show exceptional circumstances to justify the filing of a successive motion.

Section 60-1507(c) permits summary denial of a second or successive motion seeking similar relief unless the prisoner shows exceptional circumstances.

State v. Adkins · filed 2022-07-29(c)

Even if Adkins' motion were construed as one brought under K.S.A. 60-1507, the district court could summarily deny relief because it is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner absent a showing of exceptional circumstances.

Section 60-1507(c) permits dismissal of a successive motion unless the movant establishes exceptional circumstances for raising the issue later.

State v. Tiger · filed 2022-09-09(c)

To avoid dismissal of a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the movant bears the burden of establishing exceptional circumstances.

Section 60-1507 does not permit a successive motion to raise trial errors that should have been addressed on direct appeal absent exceptional circumstances.

Robinson v. State · filed 2022-09-09

By launching a cumulative error argument in a successive 60-1507 motion, Robinson has raised a claim rooted in trial errors appropriately considered on direct appeal. In turn, he is impermissibly deploying a habeas corpus proceeding as a second direct appeal.

A successive § 60-1507 motion requires exceptional circumstances, which previously presented evidence that does not create reasonable doubt fails to establish.

Bell v. State · filed 2022-12-23(c)

Therefore, Bell fails to establish an exceptional circumstance that defeats the procedural bar of his successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(c) allows a court to summarily deny a successive motion raising claims that were or could have been raised in an earlier motion absent exceptional circumstances.

Little v. State · filed 2024-02-09(c)

Based on our review of the motion, files, and record on appeal, we find that Little fails to allege any exceptional circumstances to justify the inclusion of claims in his most recent K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that were or could have been asserted in his first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Consequently, we conclude that the district court was correct in summarily denying most of the claims asserted in Little's second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion on the grounds that they are successive.

A second or successive motion under § 60-1507 may be summarily denied unless the prisoner establishes exceptional circumstances.

Schaeffer v. State · filed 2024-10-25(c)

As a result, unless Schaeffer established exceptional circumstances to file his successive motion before the Shawnee County District Court, the district court did not err by summarily denying Schaeffer's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as successive.

Section 60-1507(c) permits a court to decline a successive motion seeking similar relief unless exceptional circumstances justify raising the claims later.

Butler v. State · filed 2025-03-07(c)

Along the same line, the law directs that we need not consider more than one habeas motion seeking similar relief filed by the same prisoner. K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(c). A movant is presumed to have listed all grounds for relief in an initial K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and, therefore, "must show exceptional circumstances to justify the filing of a successive motion." Mitchell, 315 Kan. at 160. ... Butler's motion is successive and his claims are alleged trial errors that should have been raised on direct appeal. He has shown no exceptional circumstances to excuse the failure to raise the claims earlier.

Section 60-1507 requires a movant seeking review of a successive, untimely motion to show exceptional circumstances and manifest injustice.

Cregut v. State · filed 2025-05-16

All in all, Cregut has not shown manifest injustice or exceptional circumstances permitting a review of an untimely and a successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, so we affirm the district court's denial of his motion.

Section 60-1507 bars relitigation of claims raised in Van Cleave proceedings absent exceptional circumstances.

Allen (ID 40572) v. Meyer · filed 2022-01-25

Petitioner failed to present it in the direct appeal despite raising it in the Van Cleave proceedings, and under state precedent, he is not allowed to relitigate the claim in a 1507 action absent a showing of exceptional circumstances.

A proceeding under § 60-1507 cannot ordinarily serve as a second appeal to revisit an issue already resolved on direct appeal.

Caldrone v. State · filed 1974-07-17

The question of res judicata or collateral estoppel arising from the larceny acquittal was adequately considered-and disposed of on the appellant’s direct appeal from his conviction in State v. Caldrone, 205 Kan. 828, 473 P. 2d 66, cert. den. 401 U. S. 916, 27 L. Ed. 2d 817, 91 S. Ct. 896. Hence, it will not again be reviewed in this action. Supreme Court Rule 121 (c) (3), 211 Kan. xliv, provides that a proceeding under K. S. A. 60-1507 cannot ordinarily be used as a substitute for a second appeal, and is controlling.

A 60-1507 proceeding generally cannot replace a direct appeal; constitutional trial errors omitted from appeal require exceptional circumstances excusing the omission.

Tillman v. State · filed 1974-07-17

“[A] proceeding under section 60-1507 cannot ordinarily be used as a substitute for direct appeal involving mere trial errors or as a substitute for a second appeal. Mere trial errors are to be corrected by direct appeal, but trial errors affecting consitutional rights may be raised even though the error could have been raised on appeal, provided there were exceptional circumstances excusing the failure to appeal.”

An intervening change in law between direct appeal and a § 60-1507 collateral proceeding excuses a petitioner’s failure to raise a constitutional issue on direct appeal.

Lassley v. State · filed 1978-03-31

This is a proceeding under K.S.A. 60-1507 in which petitioner seeks to set aside his convictions in two separate cases because in each there was evidence that upon his arrest he refused to talk to the arresting officers. ... Where there is such an intervening change in the law between a direct appeal and a collateral attack, the failure to raise a constitutional question on direct appeal is excused. ... We therefore conclude that if Doyle is applicable, petitioner’s previous failure to raise the issue does not preclude him from raising it in this proceeding.

Section 60-1507 permits a challenge to a sentence when no direct appeal attacked it, but generally bars relitigation of an identical issue raised on direct appeal absent changed or unusual circumstances.

State v. Green · filed 1983-07-15

We hold, however, that if a direct appeal is taken under those circumstances, the identical issue may not be raised again in a subsequent proceeding brought under K.S.A. 60-1507 in the absence of changed or unusual circumstances. We further hold that K.S.A. 60-1507 is an alternative remedy which may be used to challenge a sentence, if no direct appeal was taken by the defendant attacking the sentence imposed.

Constitutional trial errors may be raised in a § 60-1507 motion despite their omission from a direct appeal when exceptional circumstances excuse that omission.

Crease v. State · filed 1993-01-22

Objections to the ex parte communication were raised for the first time in Crease’s K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. ... Here, there were exceptional circumstances. When advised of the communication, Crease’s trial counsel did not object or ask for a mistrial. ... Crease’s appellate counsel at the time of the direct appeal was not aware of the error.

A § 60-1507 motion may raise a constitutional trial error omitted from direct appeal when exceptional circumstances excuse the failure to raise it there.

Johnson v. State · filed 2001-06-01

“[A] proceeding under K.S.A. 60-1507 cannot ordinarily be used as a substitute for direct appeal involving mere trial errors or as a substitute for a second appeal. Mere trial errors are to be corrected by direct appeal, but trial errors affecting constitutional rights may be raised even though the error could have been raised on appeal, provided there were exceptional circumstances excusing the failure to appeal.” Rule 183(c)(3) (2000 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 210-11). ... Here, Johnson provides no exceptional circumstances regarding his failure to include this constitutional issue in his 1995 direct appeal.

A prior denial of a motion to docket an appeal out of time does not bar a subsequent Section 60-1507 motion seeking the same relief when the earlier denial did not necessarily decide the issues raised.

Fowler v. State · filed 2007-03-30

We hold that on the facts of the case, whether analyzed under res judicata or collateral estoppel, this court’s denial of Fowler’s motion to docket an appeal out of time does not bar his subsequent 60-1507 motion requesting the same relief.

A movant raising a constitutional trial error under § 60-1507 for the first time must show exceptional circumstances excusing the failure to raise it in the direct criminal proceedings.

SHAHA v. State · filed 2010-08-06

Where a trial error of constitutional stature is challenged in a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507, the movant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances that excused the failure to raise the issue in the direct criminal proceedings.

Section 60-1507 permits a constitutional error omitted from direct appeal to be considered when exceptional circumstances excuse the omission.

Eddy v. State · filed 2016-08-12

When a defendant's constitutional rights have been violated, the error causing the violation may be considered in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding provided exceptional circumstances exist excusing the failure to raise the issue on direct appeal.

Section 60-1507 generally bars issues that should have been raised on direct appeal, but permits a claim that prior counsel improperly failed to raise the issue.

Gordon v. State · filed 2016-10-21

While the State is correct that issues which should have been raised on direct appeal typically are res judicata and therefore barred in a subsequent K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding, one exception to that rule is when the movant alleges that prior counsel improperly failed to raise the issue.

A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion ordinarily cannot raise a challenge omitted from prior direct appeals unless exceptional circumstances excuse the failure to appeal.

Morningstar v. State · filed 2018-01-05

Although this issue pertains to the effects of his lifetime postrelease supervision, Morningstar fails to suggest any exceptional circumstances which excuse his failure to raise the issue on either of his prior direct appeals, thereby once again running afoul of Supreme Court Rule 183(c)(3).

A § 60-1507 movant may raise constitutional trial errors omitted from direct appeal if exceptional circumstances excuse the omission; ineffective assistance of counsel may qualify if presented as that excuse.

Smith v. State · filed 2018-08-10

Though ineffective assistance of counsel may be an exceptional circumstance permitting review of constitutional issues in a habeas motion, Smith failed to present it as such. The district court properly determined Smith should have addressed the claim previously.

A 60-1507 motion cannot simply extend or repeat a direct criminal appeal.

Smith v. State · filed 2020-12-18

The district court correctly stated that a 60-1507 motion cannot simply extend or repeat a direct criminal appeal.

De novo review under § 60-1507(b) does not require an appellate court to address issues raised in the motion but omitted from the appellant’s brief.

Roeder (ID 65192) v. Schnurr · filed 2021-07-09(b)

To clarify, the Court disagrees with Petitioner’s belief that the KCOA, by exercising de novo review under K.S.A. 60-1507(b), was required to consider and address every issue Petitioner raised in his 60-1507 motion to the state district court, irrespective of whether Petitioner raised them on appeal.

Section 60-1507 cannot be used for a second appeal or to raise issues already litigated or that should have been raised on direct appeal.

Samek v. State · filed 2022-08-05

A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion cannot be used to seek a second appeal or to raise issues which have already been litigated or should have been argued on direct appeal.

A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion cannot be used to relitigate an issue decided adversely on direct appeal.

Dunerway v. State · filed 2022-09-16

Dunerway cannot use his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to relitigate an issue adversely decided on direct appeal.

Section 60-1507 does not permit a movant to relitigate an issue already decided on direct appeal.

Brown v. State · filed 2023-11-22

Again, Brown cannot use his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to relitigate an issue already decided on direct appeal.