Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1

Section 9-30-5-1 does not treat a person asleep in a parked vehicle with its engine running as operating the vehicle on these facts.

Mordacq v. State · filed 1992-01-21

We hold that Mor-dacq was not operating her vehicle within the meaning of I.C. 9-30-5-1 when Rozzi wakened her.

A farm tractor is a vehicle for purposes of Section 9-30-5-1, so an OWI charge cannot be dismissed solely because the alleged vehicle was a farm tractor.

State v. Laker · filed 2010-12-09(a)

Because the definition of "vehicle" in Ind.Code § 9-30-5 does not exclude farm tractors, the court could not dismiss Counts II, III, and IV on the ground the farm tractor was not a "vehicle."

Entering a truck, starting it, and attempting to back it out of a ravine is sufficient to prove operation of the vehicle under subsection (b).

Jones v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-10-25(b)

In light of the evidence that was presented at trial, we find that Jones’s action of entering the truck, starting it, and attempting to back it out of the ravine was sufficient to prove that he was the driver.

Section 9-30-5-1(b) requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of at least 0.15.

Castillo v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-12-31(b)

Castillo’s only sufficiency argument challenges the element of both crimes requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Castillo operated a vehicle. See Ind. Code §§ 9-30-10-17, 9-30-5-1(b). ... This evidence alone is sufficient to show that Castillo operated a vehicle. We therefore conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions.

Subsection (b) requires the State to show that the person operated a vehicle.

Herron v. State of Indiana · filed 2015-10-14(b)

Both Indiana Code sections 9-30-5-1(b) and -2(a) require the State to show that a person “operate[d] a vehicle.”

A person operates a vehicle under subsection (b) when he has actual physical control of it, including while trying to drive it out of a snow bank.

Simons v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-11-10(b)

This evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that Simons was in actual physical control of the vehicle and that he was trying to navigate the vehicle out of the snow bank.

The operation element may be proved by officers’ testimony that the defendant was the sole occupant in the driver’s seat and no one entered or exited the vehicle while they observed it.

Holloway v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-03-12(b)

To convict Holloway of Operating While Intoxicated, the State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Holloway operated a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least fifteen-hundredths (0.15) gram of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of his blood or two hundred ten (210) liters of the person’s breath. I.C. § 9-30-5-1. ... The officers’ combined testimony provides sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Holloway drove the red Pontiac.

A driver’s admissions, the vehicle’s position, and evidence of intoxication can support a finding that the driver operated a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15.

Neal v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-04-08(b)

To convict Neal of Operating a Vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 as charged, the State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a vehicle on or about December 17, 2011 and that his BAC was at least .15 while operating the vehicle. ... Neal’s admissions and testimony combined with the manner in which his car was situated, his condition when Officer Sechrist arrived at the scene, and his high level of intoxication could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find that Neal drove while intoxicated. ... Officer Sechrist’s testimony offers substantial evidence of probative value which would allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Neal was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Operating a Vehicle with a BAC of at least .15.

Section 9-30-5-1(b)(2) requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle with a breath alcohol concentration of at least 0.15 grams per 210 liters of breath.

Miller v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-02-17(b)(2)

In order to convict Miller of operating a vehicle with a BAC over 0.15 as a Class A misdemeanor, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller operated a vehicle with a BAC of at least 0.15 grams of alcohol per 210 liter of his breath. ... Pompey’s testimony was sufficient to support Miller’s conviction.

Section 9-30-5-1(b) requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of at least 0.15 gram per 100 milliliters of blood; a running vehicle stopped in the travel portion of the road can satisfy the operation element.

Ramirez-Vera v. State of Indiana · filed 2020-03-17(b)

In order to convict Ramirez, the State was required to prove that she had operated a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.15 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b) (2019). ... Based on the fact that Ramirez was the only person to have driven the car that night and the fact that the vehicle was stopped on the travel portion of the road with its engine running when Deputy Hoppock arrived on the scene at 10:53 p.m., the State presented sufficient evidence to show that Ramirez was operating her vehicle at that time.

A properly administered breath test showing .15% blood alcohol after driving, together with evidence that the person drove, can support an inference that the person operated with a prohibited blood alcohol level.

Regan v. State · filed 1992-04-21

With regard to the charge of operating a vehicle with .10% of alcohol in the blood, the record reveals that the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the operator were both properly certified, that proper procedures were followed in administering the test, that Regan admitted driving the Jeep, and that his blood alcohol content registered .15 subsequent to operating the vehicle. This evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to draw the inference that Regan operated his vehicle with a blood alcohol content in excess of .15.

A chemical breath test showing a BAC of .12 can support a conviction for operating a vehicle with a BAC between .08 and .15.

Wire v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-03-08

A chemical breath test showed that Wire had a BAC of .12. This evidence is sufficient to sustain her convictions.

Section 9-30-5-1 requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of at least .15 grams per 210 liters of breath.

Scott v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-08-08

To support Scott’s class D felony OWI conviction, the State was required to prove that Scott operated a vehicle with an ACE of at least .15 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath and had a previous OWI conviction that occurred within the 5 years immediately preceding the current offense. I.C. § 9-30-5-1; I.C. § 9-30-5-3. The State provided evidence that Scott had an ACE of .18 and Scott admitted that he was driving the vehicle. Scott had a prior OWI conviction in 2010. This evidence is sufficient to support Scott’s OWI conviction.

Evidence that a person operated a vehicle and had an alcohol concentration of 0.129 gram per 210 liters of breath supports a conviction under § 9-30-5-1(a).

Early v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-12-20(a)

We conclude that the State presented evidence of a probative nature from which a reasonable trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Early committed operating a vehicle with an ACE of .08 as a class C misdemeanor.

Section 9-30-5-1(b) requires proof that a person operated a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of at least 0.15; the State may prove those elements through reasonable inferences from the evidence.

Corbin v. State of Indiana · filed 2018-10-31(b)

Here, the fact finder was allowed to deduce that Corbin’s last alcoholic beverage was consumed at 10:30 p.m. and after that, Corbin got behind the wheel and drove her vehicle before it broke down on I-74. Since Corbin’s chemical breath test was administered at 12:20 a.m., it may be inferred from the evidence that a presumption existed that Corbin had an ACE of at least 0.15 at the time she operated the vehicle. Therefore, we conclude that the State met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and we affirm Corbin’s conviction for operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor.

A conviction for operating with an alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.08 or more requires sufficient evidence that the prohibited concentration existed while the defendant operated the vehicle.

Lord v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-01-23(a)

Here, Lord challenges only the sufficiency of evidence to support the temporal element of each of her OWI offenses. ... Lord’s chemical breath test, time-stamped 11:34 p.m., showed an ACE of 0.11. ... The evidence is sufficient to support Lord’s OWI convictions.

Section 9-30-5-1 requires proof of alcohol by weight in whole blood; a plasma test result must be converted to that measure to support a conviction.

Melton v. State · filed 1992-08-11

To obtain a conviction under IC 9-11-2-1 (now IC 9-30-5-1), the State must prove the defendant operated a vehicle with ten-hundredths percent (10%), or more, by weight of alcohol in his blood. ... The record shows the State did not produce any evidence which would allow the factfinder to convert the result of the plasma test into an amount of alcohol by weight in the whole blood.

An Intoxilyzer breath test result is expressed as a percentage by weight and needs no conversion to establish the blood alcohol content required by section 9-30-5-1.

Daum v. State · filed 1993-12-21

Therefore, no conversion is necessary to establish BAC supporting a conviction under I.C. 9-30-5-1.

Section 9-30-5-1 requires the State to prove the amount of alcohol by weight in the driver's blood; an unexplained breath-test value is insufficient.

Nasser v. State · filed 1994-03-17

Unless the State puts forth evidence of the amount of alcohol by weight in a person's blood, a conviction for this offense cannot stand.

In a jury trial under Section 9-30-5-1, the court must expressly take judicial notice of the breath test regulations and instruct the jury when those regulations establish that the test measures blood alcohol content by weight.

Godar v. State · filed 1994-11-30

Godar correctly asserts that the trial court did not expressly take judicial notice of the regulations and instruct the jury accordingly. We are compelled by Baran to reverse Godar's conviction for operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content of at least .10% and remand for a new trial.

Section 9-30-5-1 requires proof of alcohol concentration in whole blood; a serum test alone is insufficient without qualified evidence establishing the corresponding whole blood concentration.

Newcomb v. State · filed 2001-11-14

However, as in Melton, the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the BAC of Newcomb's whole blood, as required by statute. ... Because the State failed to present testimony establishing Spaugh as an expert qualified to testify regarding Newcomb's BAC based on the results of a serum blood test, there was a failure of proof on this element, and the evidence is insufficient to sustain Newcomb's conviction for driving with a BAC in excess of 10%.

The version of subsection (a) effective in July 2001 makes operating a vehicle with a BAC of .08% or more a Class C misdemeanor.

Disbro v. State · filed 2003-07-14(a)

However, the Chronological Case Summary (CCS) entered Count II as operating a vehicle with a BAC of .08 or more, a Class C misdemeanor, I.C. § 9-30-5-1 (a). After reviewing I.C. § 9-30-5-1 (a), we will apply the Count II that was entered on the CCS. I.C. § 9-30-5-1 was amended and the change was made effective in July of 2001. This incident took place after July of 2001.

Section 9-30-5-1(a) requires proof of alcohol concentration in whole blood; a serum test can support a conviction when expert testimony converts the result to a whole-blood percentage by weight.

Datzek v. State · filed 2005-12-14(a)

Thus, the State presented expert testimony concerning conversion of the serum test results into whole blood percentage by weight. Therefore, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to show that Datzek operated a vehicle with a blood alcohol content greater than .08% but less than 15%.

Section 9-30-5-1(b) permits proof of the prohibited alcohol concentration through breath test results without expert testimony in every case.

Rembusch v. State · filed 2005-11-08(b)

And another statute, Indiana Code section 9-80-5-1(b), specifically provides that "[a] person who operates a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least fifteen-hundredths gram of alcohol per: (1) one hundred (100) milliliters of the person's blood or (2) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person's breath; commits a Class A misdemeanor." In our view, it is apparent that the policy of the statutory scheme is to provide for the prosecution of intoxicated drivers without the need for expert testimony in every case.

Section 9-30-5-1(a) requires proof that a person operated a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of at least .08% but less than .15%.

Concepcion v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-02-20(a)

To convict Concepcion of this offense, the State was required to prove that Concepcion operated a vehicle with a BAC level of at least .08% but less than .15%.

Section 9-30-5-1(a)(1) requires proof that a driver’s alcohol concentration equivalent was at least .08 when the driver operated the vehicle.

Garcia v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-04-18(a)(1)

To convict Garcia of operating with an unlawful blood-alcohol concentration, the State was required to prove that his ACE was .08 or higher at the time he operated a vehicle.

Subsection (b) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver had the prohibited alcohol concentration while operating the vehicle.

Tyrone Stokes v. State of Indiana · filed 2026-01-30(b)

In order to prove Stokes operated a vehicle with an ACE to at least 0.15 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stokes “operate[d]” the vehicle with the requisite ACE.

Section 9-30-5-1 protects the general public on highways, not paramedics rescuing intoxicated drivers; violating it alone is not per se willful or wanton conduct toward a paramedic.

Heck v. Robey · filed 1995-12-22

Even assuming arguendo that Heck violated the statutory prohibition against driving while intoxicated, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Ind.Code § 9-30-5-1 is intended to benefit the general public on the State's highways, not paramedics attempting to rescue intoxicated drivers. Therefore any violation of this statute alone would not constitute per se willful or wanton behavior.

Under the 1997 version of Section 9-30-5-1(a)(2), operating a vehicle with .10 grams of alcohol in 210 liters of breath can be prosecuted.

Sales v. State · filed 2000-02-07(a)(2)

We hold that prosecutions under this section, which has since been amended to eliminate any ambiguity, may proceed upon proof of operating a vehicle with .10 grams of alcohol in 210 liters of the person’s breath.

Section 9-30-5-1 does not require proof of a culpable mental state for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

Albaugh v. State · filed 1999-12-17

Here, the State was not required to prove Albaugh’s culpability given that the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated has been held to lack a mens rea element.

A charge alleging both the blood and breath alternatives of section 9-30-5-1 is a charge under the section generally, rather than under the breath alternative alone.

Berry v. State · filed 1999-12-20(a)

Nevertheless, the State is correct. Berry was charged and convicted under Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1 generally, and not under the alcohol-breath or the alcohol-blood provision specifically.

Section 9-30-5-1(c) criminalizes operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in one's body, but does not cover schedule III, IV, or V substances.

State v. Isaacs · filed 2003-09-03(c)

Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-1(c) only eriminalizes the operation of a vehicle while one has a schedule I or II controlled substance in one's body. Operating a vehicle with a schedule III, IV, or V controlled substance in one's body is not a crime per se.

Section 9-30-5-1 allows urine screens to show that controlled-substance metabolites are present in a driver's body.

Bennett v. State · filed 2003-12-08

The legislature responded in 1997 by amending § 1 and substituting "body" for "blood." In 2000, it made the same amendment to § 5. With these amendments, the legislature clearly intended to broaden the scope of the respective statutes by sanctioning the use of urine sereens to show metabolites in the "body."

Subsection (c) makes operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the body a Class C misdemeanor; evidence that the driver had THC in his system supports a conviction.

Radick v. State · filed 2007-03-27(c)

The offense of operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor is governed by Ind.Code § 9-30-5-l(c), which is a lesser included offense of Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5 and provides: “A person who operates a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II of IC 35-48-2 or its metabolite in the person’s body commits a Class C misdemeanor.” The State presented evidence that Radick operated the vehicle with THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, in his system. Marijuana is a controlled substance listed in schedule I of Ind.Code § 35-48-2-4. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Radick’s conviction for operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II as a class C misdemeanor.

Section 9-30-5-1(c) requires proof that a person operated a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the body.

Wilkinson v. State of Indiana · filed 2017-01-27(c)

To convict him of operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in his body, as a Class C misdemeanor, the State was required to prove he operated a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II of Indiana Code section 35-48-2 or its metabolite in his body.

Section 9-30-5-1(c) requires proof that a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite was in the driver’s body while operating a vehicle; earlier marijuana use and a later positive blood test can support that inference.

Webster v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-08-30(c)

Regarding the challenged conviction, the State was required to prove that Webster operated a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in schedule I or schedule II of Indiana Code Section 35-48-2 or its metabolite in his body. ... Based on the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably infer that the THC and its metabolite detected in Webster’s blood five to six hours after the accident was from marijuana that he admitted to smoking prior to the accident, and therefore was in his blood at the time he was driving. There is sufficient evidence to support Webster’s conviction for operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in his body.

Section 9-30-5-1(c) makes it a crime to operate a vehicle with marijuana in the operator’s body even without intoxication.

Honeycutt v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-09-05(c)

Notably, it is a crime to operate a vehicle with marijuana in your body, even if you are not “intoxicated.” I.C. § 9-30-5-1(c).

Section 9-30-5-1(b) applies to driving on private property, including the driver's own property.

State v. Manuwal · filed 2009-04-08(b)

Thus, regardless of where the defendant's driving occurred, whether on public or private property, and even if on the defendant's own property, the State is authorized to charge him with intoxicated driving offenses pursuant to Indiana Code §§ 9-30-5-1 and 9-30-5-2.

Subsection (b) requires operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.15 gram per 100 milliliters of blood or 210 liters of breath.

Barber v. State · filed 2009-08-17(b)

We note that the Abstract of Judgment shows that Barber was convicted under this section, which requires her to operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.15 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of her blood or 210 liters of her breath. ... Because Barber did not submit to a chemical test and a blood draw was not done, we are perplexed as to why the trial court entered judgment of conviction under Indiana Code § 9-30-5-1.

Section 9-30-5-1(a) requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of at least .08 but less than .15 percent.

ALCORN II v. State · filed 2006-09-01(a)

To convict Alcorn of class A misdemeanor OWI, the State was required to prove that he operated a vehicle with a BAC of .08-.15 percent in a manner that endangered a person. I.C. §§ 9-30-5-1, -2.

Section 9-30-5-1(a) makes operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 but less than 0.15 a Class C misdemeanor.

Dorsett v. State · filed 2010-02-19(a)

To show that Dorsett operated a vehicle while intoxicated, as a Class C misdemeanor, the State needed to prove that Dorsett "operate[d] a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol but less than fifteen-hundredths (0.15) gram of alcohol" per 100 milliliters of the person's blood or per 210 liters of the person's breath. I.C. § 9-30-5-1(a). Nothing in our opinion today affects the court's conclusion on the Class C misdemeanor charge. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court with instructions that it vacate Dorsett's Class A misdemeanor conviction and sentence and enter a judgment and an appropriate sentence for the Class C misdemeanor.

Operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.15 grams per 100 milliliters of blood is a Class A misdemeanor without a death enhancement.

Scott v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-03-27

The fact of Mitchell’s death was used to enhance both of Scott’s convictions to Class B felonies,2 without which enhancement Scott’s BAC conviction would have been a Class A misdemeanor and his resisting law enforcement conviction would have been a Class D felony.

Section 9-30-5-1(b)(2) requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle with at least .15 gram of alcohol per two-hundred ten liters of breath.

Hoskins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-03-18(b)(2)

To sustain Hoskins’s convictions, the State was required to prove that Hoskins operated a vehicle while intoxicated and in a manner that endangered a person (Count I) and that she operated a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of at least .15 gram of alcohol per two-hundred ten liters of breath (Count II).

Subsection (b) makes operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.15 gram per 100 milliliters of blood a Class A misdemeanor.

Medley v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-10-16(b)

Thus, to convict Medley under Count II, the State was required to prove that he operated a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least fifteen-hundredths grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of his blood.

Section 9-30-5-1(b) makes it a Class A misdemeanor to operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of at least 0.15 at the time of operation.

Jackson v. State of Indiana · filed 2017-01-18(b)

In order to convict Jackson of a Class A misdemeanor, the State was obligated to prove that she “operate[d] a vehicle with an [ACE] to at least fifteen-hundredths (0.15) gram of alcohol per: (1) one hundred (100) milliliters of the person’s blood; or (2) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person’s breath.” I.C. § 9-30-5-1(b).

Section 9-30-5-1(a) requires proof that the driver’s alcohol concentration met the statutory threshold; visible signs of intoxication do not establish that measurement.

Artigas v. State of Indiana · filed 2019-04-26(a)

From this evidence, a fact-finder could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Artigas’s blood alcohol concentration was at least .08 g/100mL when he operated the vehicle. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction as charged under Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-1(a).

Section 9-30-5-1 sets a .08 alcohol concentration threshold for operating a vehicle when a prior conviction for operating while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury supports the felony charge.

Alexander v. State of Indiana · filed 2019-10-11(a)

The requisite alcohol concentration equivalent for operating a vehicle with a prior conviction for operating while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury is .08, not .15.

Operating a vehicle with a blood-alcohol content of at least .15 percent under Section 9-30-5-1(b) is a class A misdemeanor and is not a lesser included offense of class C misdemeanor operating while intoxicated.

Stutz v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-07-05(b)

We therefore conclude that class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent is not a lesser included offense of class C misdemeanor operating while intoxicated.

Operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .08 percent but less than .15 percent is an inherently lesser-included offense of operating with a BAC of at least .15 percent.

Watson v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-08-09(a)

Accordingly, we find that operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .08 percent but less than .15 percent is an inherently lesser-included offense of operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent.