Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6

Section 34-51-2-6(a) makes recovery turn on comparative fault: it reduces damages by the claimant's contributory fault and bars recovery when that fault exceeds the fault of all other responsible persons; incurred risk is treated as fault rather than a complete defense.

Smith v. Baxter · filed 2003-09-23(a)

Where the Comparative Fault Act applies, it operates to diminish a claimant's recovery by the amount of the claimant's contributory fault, and bars recovery altogether in situations where the claimant's contributory fault is found to be greater than the fault of all other persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant's damages. I.C. § 34-51-2-6(a). ... Significantly, however, we did not hold that consideration of incurred risk as "fault" necessarily precluded a plaintiff's knowledge of risks from also being evaluated in deciding whether a breach of that duty occurred. While a plaintiff's conduct constituting incurred risk thus may not support finding a lack of duty, such conduct is not precluded from consideration in determining breach of duty. ... We conclude that our analysis in Douglass has not been altered by the Comparative Fault Act. The comparative knowledge of a possessor of land and an invitee regarding known or obvious dangers may properly be taken into consideration in determining whether the possessor breached the duty of reasonable care under Sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Section 34-51-2-6(a) bars a plaintiff from recovering when her fault is greater than the defendant's.

HOGAN v. United States · filed 2020-04-17(a)

The United States also argues that Ms. Hogan’s claims are barred by the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, Ind. Code § 34-51-2-1 et seq. ... Under this Act, a plaintiff is barred from recovery if her fault is greater than the defendant’s. Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6(a).

Section 6 bars a claimant’s recovery in an action based on fault when the claimant’s contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.

Brown v. Ameristar Casino East Chicago, LLC · filed 2024-08-08

Ameristar also argues that Brown bore more than 50% of the fault for the incident which caused her injuries, which would bar any recovery under the Indiana Comparative Fault Act. See Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6 (“In an action based on fault . . . the claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant’s contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.”). ... Brown is correct that, in general, the degree of comparative fault is a fact sensitive question most appropriately left to the jury. ... Here, if a jury were to find that Ameristar breached its duty to Brown to adequately and safely maintain its restrooms, the jury would next need to consider whether Brown was more than 50% negligent in causing the fall. ... Because there is a factual dispute as to whether the floor was wet, as well as whether there was a cautionary sign, summary judgment on this issue would also be inappropriate. When viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Brown, the Court finds that a jury could find that the cause of Brown’s fall was a breach of a duty owed to her by Ameristar and that she may not have been more than 51% at fault.

Section 34-51-2-6(a) reduces a claimant's recovery by the claimant's contributory fault and bars recovery when that fault exceeds the fault of all other persons who proximately contributed to the damages.

Horine v. Homes by Dave Thompson, LLC · filed 2005-09-14(a)

"Where the Comparative Fault Act applies, it operates to diminish a claimant's recovery by the amount of the claimant's contributory fault, and bars recovery altogether in situations where the claimant's contributory fault is found to be greater than the fault of all other persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant's damages." Smith v. Baxter, 796 N.E.2d 242, 244-45 (Ind.2003) (citing Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6(a)).

Section 34-51-2-6 requires the parties' fault to be apportioned in a comparative-fault action, and it permits the claimant to receive a zero percentage of fault.

St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Centers, Inc. v. Poland · filed 2005-05-31

We find that pursuant to Section 4(b)(1)(2), onee the jury reached a verdict that St. Margaret had breached a statutorily imposed duty to use reasonable care, the jury was compelled to proceed to the provisions of Indiana Code § 34-51-2-6, for apportionment of fault among the parties. ... We hold that the jury's verdict apportioning zero percentage of fault to Poland is supported by the evidence and the law.

Section 34-51-2-6 bars a claimant from recovering when the claimant's contributory fault exceeds the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the damages, including a parent's derivative medical-expense claim based on the child's injury.

Hockema v. J.S. Ex Rel. Secrest · filed 2005-08-08

The Indiana statute is a type of modified fifty percent comparative fault law that requires, in some cases, consideration of the degree of fault of non-parties to the action as well as the fault of the parties. See Ind.Code §§ 34-51-2-6; 34-51-2-7; 34-52-2-14. Thus, if a claimant is deemed to be more than fifty percent at fault, then the claimant is barred from recovery. See I.C. § 34-51-2-6 ("In an action based on fault that is brought against ... one (1) defendant or ... two (2) or more defendants who may be treated as a single party; the claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant's contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant's damages.").

Section 34-51-2-6(b) bars recovery in an action against two or more defendants when the claimant's contributory fault exceeds the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the damages.

TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. v. Moore · filed 2010-10-13(b)

One provision declares, "In an action based on fault that is brought against two (2) or more defendants, the claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant's contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant's damag-es." Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6(b). If we were to ignore the unallocated fault resulting from our de-cision today and literally apply only this provision, it would appear to require a final judgment in favor of the defendant Ford, whose 31% fault allocation was exceeded by the 33% allocated to the plaintiff's decedent.

In an action based on fault against one defendant, a claimant is barred from recovery when the claimant’s contributory fault exceeds the fault of all persons who proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.

Kimbrough v. Anderson · filed 2016-05-20(a)(1)

In an action based on fault that is brought against one defendant, the claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant’s contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons who fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages. Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6(a)(1).

Section 34-51-2-6 bars a plaintiff from recovering when the plaintiff's percentage of fault is greater than 50 percent.

Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Holmes · filed 2008-05-15

Under Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act, a fifty-one percent allocation of fault to Gerald would have produced a judgment for Speedway. Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6 (2004).

Subsection (b) bars a claimant from recovering in an action against two or more defendants when the claimant’s contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.

Isa v. Catherine A. Adams, Christopher J. Perry, and State Farm Insurance Company · filed 2014-03-12(b)

The Comparative Fault Act, Indiana Code Section 34-51-2-6, provides a complete defense if contributory fault is “greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.” See Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6(b) (“In an action based on fault that is brought against two (2) or more defendants, the claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant’s contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.”). But as a general rule “[f]ault apportionment under the Indiana Comparative Fault Act is uniquely a question of fact to be decided by the jury.” Coffman v. PSI Energy, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 522, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. We think the trial court’s reliance on the Comparative Fault Act was mistaken on these facts.

Section 34-51-2-6 applies comparative negligence in most tort cases, so fault is apportioned among the parties rather than treating a plaintiff’s contributory negligence as an automatic complete defense.

Kader v. State of Indiana, Department of Correction, and The Geo Group, Inc. · filed 2013-12-11

Indiana has adopted, in most tort cases, a comparative negligence scheme whereby the negligence of a plaintiff, which contributed to the complained-of injury, does not of itself afford a complete defense to liability for a defendant. See Ind. Code § 34-51-2-1 et seq. Rather, the relative levels of fault among the parties are assessed, and a defendant may be found to be partly or entirely liable or not liable for a plaintiff’s injuries. I.C. § 34-51-2-6. ... Private prison operators like GEO and its employees do not fall within any of these categories. ... GEO, a private business, is thus not entitled to relief from liability under a contributory negligence defense. ... And upon remand, we instruct the trial court to treat Kader’s claims against GEO as within the scope of comparative, not contributory negligence.

Section 34-51-2-6(a) reduces a claimant’s recovery by the claimant’s contributory fault and bars recovery when that fault exceeds the fault of all other persons whose fault proximately contributed to the damages.

Marquez v. Kobler · filed 2014-03-31(a)

Where the Act applies, it operates to diminish a claimant’s recovery by the amount of the claimant’s contributory fault and bars recovery altogether in situations where the claimant’s contributory fault is found to be greater than the fault of all other persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages. Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6(a).

Section 34-51-2-6(a)(1) bars recovery when a claimant's contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the damages, while conflicting inferences about the apportionment of fault require a jury to decide the issue.

Ramos v. Walgreen Co · filed 2025-08-13(a)(1)

Under Indiana law, “[i]n an action based on fault that is brought against . . . one (1) defendant . . . the claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant’s contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose ... fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.” Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6(a)(1). As with determining negligence, determining “[c]ontributory negligence is generally a question of fact and is not an appropriate matter for summary judgment ‘if there are conflicting factual inferences.’” Funston v. Sch. Town of Munster, 849 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ind. 2006) (citation omitted). An exception is “where the facts are undisputed and only a single inference can reasonably be drawn therefrom.” Id. (citation omitted). In this case, the Court finds that there are conflicting factual inferences regarding the apportionment of negligence that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence in the record. ... Thus, this is the kind of issue that Indiana law dictates the jury must decide as a question of fact.

Section 34-51-2-6 bars a claimant from recovery when the claimant’s contributory fault exceeds the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the damages, but the comparative-fault scheme does not apply when a governmental entity is the defendant.

M.S.D. of Martinsville v. Rebecca Jackson, et al. · filed 2014-05-19

But “the claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant’s contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.” Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6. However, the legislature specifically provided that the new comparative fault scheme would not apply to governmental entities. See Ind. Code § 34-51-2-2. “This exemption for governmental entities from comparative fault means that the common law contributory negligence principles apply when a governmental entity is the defendant in negligence litigation.” Penn Harris Madison Sch. Corp. v. Howard, 861 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2007).

Section 34-51-2-6 bars a plaintiff’s recovery when the fault attributed to the plaintiff is greater than the fault attributed to the defendants.

Barnard v. Saturn Corp. · filed 2003-06-30

Under the comparative fault scheme, Yvonne would be precluded from recovering from General Motors and Seeburn if the amount of fault attributed to Mark was greater than the fault attributed to General Motors and Seeburn. See Ind.Code § 34-51-2-6. As discussed above, we have determined that Mark misused the jack. We also believe that under these particular circumstances no reasonable trier of fact could find that Mark was less than fifty percent at fault for the injuries that he sustained. Because Mark misused the jack and no reasonable trier of fact could find that Mark was less than fifty percent at fault for his injuries, we hold that General Motors and Seeburn are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 34-51-2-6 requires a defendant to pay only its pro rata share of damages based on its attributed fault when the plaintiff is less than fifty percent at fault.

Hill-Jackson v. FAF, INC. · filed 2011-08-10

Under the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, if the plaintiff is more than fifty percent at fault, he is not permitted to recover. If the plaintiff is less than fifty percent at fault, a defendant is only required to pay his prorata share based on the fault attributed to him. Ind.Code § 34-51-2-6; § 34-51-2-7 (2011).