Ind. Code § 34-11-2-11

Section 34-11-2-11’s general limitation period for written contracts does not override a shorter suit limitation in an insurance policy.

United Technologies Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. · filed 2000-03-07

Affiliated FM also argues that the longer time period provided by an "applicable statute" cannot be read to incorporate a general statute of limitations for breach of contract actions because this interpretation would render the one-year provision a nullity. We agree.

Section 34-11-2-11 provides a twenty-year limitations period for written contracts entered into before 1982 when no more specific statute applies.

Boracchia v. Biomet, Inc. · filed 2009-10-09

Indiana law provides a general statute of limitations for actions on written contracts not governed by the Indiana UCC or another specific statute of limitations. Indiana’s general statute of limitations for written contracts entered into before 1982 is twenty years.

Section 34-11-2-11 supplies the limitations period for a breach of written contract claim after a seller fails to honor a right of first refusal.

McGehee v. Elliott · filed 2006-06-30

At that point, the Elliotts were not required to act on their right of first refusal before April 1, 2002. Rather, the only time limitation at that point was the statute of limitations on a breach of contract action. See Ind.Code § 34-11-2-11.

Section 34-11-2-11 directly covers actions on written contracts entered before September 1, 1982, but when it overlaps with the real-property limitations provision in § 34-11-2-7(2), the six-year period controls for an action to recover mineral royalties.

Hemenway v. Peabody Coal Company and Peabody Development Company · filed 1998-10-14

Both statutes cover underpayment of mineral royalties under a lease. Because the lease is a “contract in writing other than [one] for the payment of money entered into before September 1, 1982,” the 20-year period of § 34-11-2-11 applies directly. ... Like the district court, we think that § 34-11-2-7(2) must win the conflict between periods of limitations. Otherwise it has become surplusage, and the anti-surplusage canon is in Indiana’s arsenal. ... Still, our best estimate is that Indiana would use the six-year period.

Section 34-11-2-11 gives actions on written contracts, including insurance contracts, a ten-year limitations period that begins when the cause of action accrues, and the discovery rule delays accrual based on discovery of the injury rather than later discovery of a legal theory or change in the law.

Perryman v. Motorist Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2006-04-28

In light of the evidence before us, we favor finality in the presentation of claims. Mindful of the general purpose of a statute of limitations and in line with the case law existing in our sister states, we hold that the discovery of an injury, not the development of new case law, commences the running of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, here, Perryman admitted to having discovered and being aware of his injury in March of 1994. Therefore, pursuant to I.C. § 34-11-2-11, his cause of action should have been brought within ten years of that date. Instead, Perryman did not file his claim until December 3, 2004. Thus, we agree with the trial court that Perryman's claim is time barred.

Section 34-11-2-11 provides a ten-year limitations period for written contracts whose substance is more than merely the payment of money, including agreements involving other obligations or rights.

Chad Folkening, DSL.Com, Inc. and eCorp v. Megan Van Petten n/k/a Megan Van Petten Walton · filed 2014-12-16

The plain language of the statutes is unambiguous and establishes that the limitations period is based on the substance of the contract and not on the substance of the action, as Appellants suggest. ... Consequently, we agree with Van Petten and the trial court that Indiana Code Section 34-11-2-11 applies because the Agreement concerns more than just the payment of money.

Section 34-11-2-11 generally requires actions on certain written contracts to be commenced within ten years after accrual, but that limitation is preempted by the federal eighteen-month period for interstate transportation charges.

Kennedy Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc., and Hemlock Semiconductor Corp., and Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC v. Emmert Industrial Corp · filed 2016-04-22

The Indiana statute of limitations is preempted by the federal statute.

The ten-year limitations period for written contract actions does not bar a claim at the pleading stage when the complaint leaves accrual and any basis for tolling factually unresolved.

Jack Gable and Janet Gable v. Schuler Company, Inc. (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-08-24

Accordingly, the statute of limitations does not bar the Gables’ claim at this juncture.

Section 34-11-2-11 imposes a ten-year limitation on qualifying written-contract actions arising after September 1, 1982, and a twenty-year limitation on qualifying actions arising before that date; the court applied the twenty-year period to bar the claim.

State Ex Rel. Berkshire v. City of Logansport · filed 2010-06-04

Indiana Code section 34-11-2-11 provides that: ... An action upon contracts in writing other than those for the payment of money, and including all mortgages other than chattel mortgages, deeds of trust, judgments of courts of record, and for the recovery of the possession of real estate, must be commenced within ten (10) years after the cause of action accrues. However, an action upon contracts in writing other than those for the payment of money entered into before September 1, 1982, not including chattel mortgages, deeds of trust, judgments of courts of record, or for the recovery of the possession of real estate, must be commenced within twenty (20) years after the cause of action accrues. ... Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the Board with its three members administering Dykeman Park was not the proper replacement board under the agreement, the maximum available twenty-year statute of limitations began to run on February 2, 1917. I.C. § 34-11-24. Alternatively, even if Berkshire could maintain that the transfer of Dykeman Park to the Board in 1979 and the appointment of the five-member Board constituted the violation, the twenty-year period expired in 1999, which was ten years before Berkshire instituted the action. Thus, his claim is also barred under this theory.

Section 34-11-2-11 gives a ten-year limitations period for actions founded on written contracts.

Hamilton National Title, LLC v. Jurus · filed 2025-07-03

Because Jurus’ complaint was one for breach of a written contract, the applicable statute of limitations is ten years. See I.C. § 34-11-2-11.

Section 34-11-2-11 requires an action based on a written contract to be commenced within ten years after the cause of action accrues.

Marvin Hamilton and Linda Hamilton v. Schaefer Lake Lot Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2016-09-13

An action based on a written contract must be commenced within ten years after the cause of action accrues.

Section 34-11-2-11 provides a ten-year statute of limitations for a written contract claim, and it governs Lewis’s claim because the claim seeks relief for breach of contract.

Lewis, Anthony B. v. Methodist Hospital · filed 2003-04-08

Bearing in mind the Supreme Court of Indi- ana’s admonition not to collapse all contract claims into tort, we conclude that under prevailing Indiana law Lewis’s first count in his complaint against Methodist Hospital seeks relief for breach of contract and is thus governed by the ten-year statute of limitations.

The ten-year limitation for written contracts applies to a claim based on a contractual assumption of liability.

Gorski v. DRR, Inc. · filed 2003-12-24

However, as we have characterized Gorski's complaint as a contractual liability, it is governed by a ten-year statute of limitations.

Section 34-11-2-11’s ten-year period does not apply to a written guaranty when parol evidence is required to prove the claim.

V. Ganz Builders and Development Co., Inc., and Vladimir Ganz v. Pioneer Lumber, Inc. · filed 2016-09-08

If so, then the statute of limitations on the Guaranty Agreement according to I.C. § 34-11-2-11, would be ten years – ... not six.[ 10] ... Employing this principle, this Court finds that, despite the Guaranty Agreement itself being in writing, it is still an unwritten contract, because parol evidence is required to prove a claim brought to enforce the Agreement.[ 11] ... We agree with the trial court’s analysis.

Section 34-11-2-11 permits the discovery rule to apply to a written-contract claim, so the limitations period accrues when the plaintiff knew or, with ordinary diligence, could have discovered the breach.

Meisenhelder v. Zipp Express, Inc. · filed 2003-05-28

We must therefore conclude that the discovery rule is applicable to actions for breach of a written contract under I.C. § 34-11-2-11, and that Meisenhelder's cause of action acerued when he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered, that his employment contract had been breached.

The ten-year limitation for written-contract claims begins when the claimant knows, or with ordinary diligence could discover, that the contract was breached.

Strauser v. Westfield Insurance Co. · filed 2005-05-25

We conclude such claims are time-barred regardless of which statute of limitations is applicable because, as explained infra, more than ten years has elapsed since the cause of action accrued. ... In determining when either a claim of breach of a written contract or tort claim acerues, Indiana follows the "discovery rule." In other words, a cause of action for either tort or written contracts begins to run when a party knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could discover, that the contract has been breached or that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another.

Section 34-11-2-11 provides a ten-year limitations period for actions on written contracts, but it does not govern an employment claim when the underlying employment relationship is oral and the claim falls within the two-year employment statute.

Knutson, Roger v. UGS · filed 2008-05-13

This interpretation makes sense because the terms of the oral employment relation out of which the claim of breach of a separate written contract arises will often be relevant to that claim, making it much like a case in which the contract sued upon is partly written and partly oral. The shorter statute of limitations is applied to such claims, Michael v. Rainier, 205 N.E.2d 543 (Ind. 1965); Citizens Progress Co. v. James O. Held & Co., 438 N.E.2d 1016, 1021-22 (Ind. App. 1982), because they fall outside the justification for the longer statute of limitations applicable to suits on a written contract; ... The best evidence of Indiana law, in light of the cases and our analysis, is that the two-year statute of limitations applies.

The ten-year limitation for written contracts does not apply to an employee’s commission claim based on a written compensation plan when the employment contract is oral.

Knutson v. UGS CORP. · filed 2008-05-13

The best evidence of Indiana law, in light of the cases and our analysis, is that the two-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 34-11-2-11 requires the elements of adverse possession to be satisfied continuously for ten years.

Jack L. Yant, III v. Barry L. Payne (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-03-27

The claimant is statutorily required to satisfy each of these elements continuously for ten years. Id. at 486; I.C. § 34-11-2-11. ... Payne began satisfying each of the adverse possession elements in 1963 beginning with the construction of the fence. No evidence suggests that he did not continuously satisfy the elements at least until the end of the ten-year statutory limit in 1973. ... Yant bought the property in 1976. Therefore, Payne adversely possessed the disputed .02 acre for the statutory limit prior to Yant’s purchase.

Section 34-11-2-11 establishes a ten-year statutory period required to acquire property by adverse possession.

Denny Gene Inman and Lois Inman v. Charles L. Turner and Jennifer C. Turner · filed 2014-10-02

In addition to showing control, intent, and notice, Inman was required to show duration—that he satisfied “each of these elements for the required period of time[.]” Id. at 486. The statutory period necessary to achieve adverse possession is ten years. Ballard v. Harman, 737 N.E.2d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-11).

Section 34-11-2-11 requires ten years of continuous satisfaction of the adverse-possession elements for the duration requirement.

Presley v. Daniel S. McCain and Joseph D. DeRozier · filed 2019-10-11

The statutorily required period of time for the duration element is ten years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-11.

Section 34-11-2-11 requires a mortgage-foreclosure action within ten years after the cause of action accrues; for an installment mortgage with optional acceleration, accrual generally occurs when the creditor accelerates, but an unreasonable delay in accelerating cannot postpone the limitations period.

Dean Blair and Paula Blair v. EMC Mortgage, LLC · filed 2019-06-12

Actions to foreclose mortgages “must be commenced within ten (10) years after the cause of action accrues.” Ind. Code § 34-11-2-11. ... Where, as here, an installment contract contains an optional acceleration clause, the statute of limitations to collect the entire debt does not begin to run immediately upon the debtor’s default. ... Instead, the statute generally begins to run only when the creditor exercises its option to accelerate. ... However, “a party is not at liberty to stave off operation of the statute [of limitations] inordinately by failing to make demand.”

The ten-year limitation for written contracts applies when the claim rests on breach of an express or implied contract term, but not when it rests on a duty imposed by law.

Lewis v. Methodist Hospital, Inc. · filed 2002-02-07

If Lewis is claiming that Methodist breached express or implied terms of the contract, .then the ten-year statute of limitations for written contracts applies. If, on the other hand, Lewis is claiming that Methodist did not perform the contract so as to meet the standard of care required by law, then the two-year statute of limitations for injury to property applies. ... Thus, a two year statute of limitations applies to Count I, and Methodist is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 34-11-2-11 allows ten years to bring an action on a judgment debt; a timely action can yield a new judgment with its own ten-year execution period.

Stookey v. Lonay · filed 2004-06-29

If such an action is brought within the relevant statute of limitations (ten years in Indiana, Ind.Code § 34-11-2-11), a new judgment may be issued with its own ten-year period in which to obtain execution, thus in effect “renewing” the old judgment. ... In this case, renewal was properly sought within ten years of the entry of the original judgment, and the district court did not err in granting that renewal.

Section 34-11-2-11’s ten-year limit for actions on judgments does not apply to proceedings supplemental because they continue the original action.

Lewis v. Rex Metal Craft, Inc. · filed 2005-07-28

Because proceedings supplemental are a continuation of the original action, rather than an "action" on a judgment of a court of record, they are not subject to the ten-year statute of limitations within Indiana Code Section 34-11-2-11.

Section 34-11-2-11’s ten-year period for written contracts does not govern a breach-of-lease claim seeking lost rents and costs to restore real property; the six-year period applies.

Bitler Investment Venture II, LLC v. Marathon Ashland Petroleum, LLC · filed 2011-03-11

Indiana statutes set the following time limitations (among others) for bringing causes of action: ten years under the general statute of limitation, Ind.Code § 34-ll-l-2(a); six years for actions for use, rents, and profits of real property and for actions for injuries to property other than personal property, Ind.Code § 34-11-2-7(2) & (3); and ten years for actions upon written contracts, Ind.Code § 34-11-2-11. ... Considering the potentially relevant Indiana statutes of limitation, the Indiana Supreme Court’s application of these statutes, and the substance of the claim asserted by the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract regarding the Sturgis property (Count 27) is governed by the six-year statute of limitation in Indiana Code § 34-11-2-7.

The ten-year limit for written contracts does not govern breach-of-lease claims that, in substance, seek lost rents and compensation for injury to real property.

Bitler Investment Venture II, LLC v. Marathon Ashland Petroleum, LLC · filed 2009-08-31

Indiana statutes set the following time limitations (among others) for bringing causes of action: 10 years under the general statute of limitation, Ind.Code § 34-11-1-2(a); 6 years for actions for use, rents, and profits of real property and for actions for injuries to property other than personal property, Ind.Code § 34-11-2-7(2) & (3); and 10 years for actions upon written contracts, Ind.Code § 34-11-2-11. ... Considering the potentially relevant Indiana statutes of limitation, the Indiana Supreme Court’s application of these statutes, and the substance of the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and waste regarding the Huntington property and the Ligonier property (Counts 5 and 6 and Counts 25 and 26, respectively) are governed by the six-year statute of limitation in Indiana Code § 34-11-2-7.

Section 34-11-2-11 does not apply to an equitable action to reform a contract because that action is not an action at law upon the contract.

City of East Chicago v. East Chicago Second Century, Inc. · filed 2007-12-21

That section does not apply to Count VIII, as an action for reformation is not an action at law brought upon the contract.