Statute Annotations › Federal › Pub. L. No. 99-660

Pub. L. No. 99-660

Public Law 99-660 provisions on vaccine compensation and health planning: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
71
Cited in passing
18,508
Citing cases indexed
18,582
Case dates
1987–2026
Screened through
2026-06-25
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

18,579 citing cases reviewed of 18,582 in the citation index: 71 interpreted the section (annotated below), 18,508 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-25 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Pub. L. No. 99-660?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Vaccine-injury compensation and state remedies

The Act creates an alternative no-fault vaccine-injury compensation program while leaving state tort and contract remedies available, as modified by the Act.

Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co. · filed 1988-04-20

Congress, when it addressed vaccines in 1986 and 1987, did not preempt state law. Further, to the extent that the Acts state congressional views about the preemptive effect of earlier legislation, the Acts and their legislative history assume that earlier legislation was of no preemptive effect.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Under the Act, attorneys’ fees are compensation and cannot be paid from Program funds until the petitioner elects to receive compensation under § 21(a).

Ashe-Cline v. Secretary of Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1993-10-29

The court concludes, based on the plain language of the statute, that the term “compensation” means all forms of compensation to a petitioner authorized by the Act, ie., all forms of compensation listed in § 15 (“Compensation”), including attorneys’ fees, which are authorized in § 15(e) (“Attorneys’ fees”). If “compensation” includes “attorneys’ fees,” the § 15(f)(1) prohibition on the payment of “compensation” until a petitioner has elected “to receive compensation” under § 21(a) also bars the payment of attorneys’ fees until such an election is made. Because petitioner indisputably has not elected to receive “compensation” under § 21(a), but, instead, has elected the alternative of filing a civil action, the court holds that petitioner’s attorneys’ fees may not be paid from funds authorized under the Program.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act does not completely preempt state tort remedies for vaccine-related injuries; in some circumstances claimants must first complete the federal compensation proceeding.

Patten v. Lederle Laboratories · filed 1987-02-12

It is clear to the court that the scheme established by the language of the Act itself demonstrates that Congress contemplated that civil tort remedies for vaccine-related injuries have been available, are now available, and will continue to be available under certain circumstances, even after the effective date of the Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act permits state tort remedies for vaccine-related injuries despite compliance with federal vaccine regulations.

Graham Ex Rel. Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories · filed 1987-07-22

The NCVIA further evinces a congressional intent that civil tort actions were— and are — permissible despite compliance with the FDA regulations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Professional peer review—attorney fees

Section 11113 allows a substantially prevailing defendant to seek attorney fees when the professional review action met § 11112(a) standards, even if the defendant prevailed on another defense and did not obtain immunity.

Addis v. Holy Cross Health System Corporation · filed 1996-07-08

In the latter case, where the final disposition is not related to immunity, defendants may still file postjudgment motions for attorney fees under the Health Care Act. The text of § 11113 explicitly states that an award of fees may be appropriate "to the extent that a defendant has met the standards set forth under [sec. 11112(a) ]." It does not link an award of fees to immunity, as might be the case were § 11113 written along the lines of, "to the extent that a defendant has acquired immunity from damages liability as provided for in § 11111(a)." Nothing in § 11112 confers immunity; that section only describes the criteria for a qualifying review action. The plain meaning of § 11113 demonstrates that Congress did not intend immunity to be a prerequisite to an award of attorney fees. The fact that § 11113 is not part of the section conferring immunity reinforces the conclusion that they are indeed independent questions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Proving actual causation

The Act requires a Vaccine Program claimant to prove actual causation by preponderant evidence based on the record as a whole, and bars entitlement based solely on unsubstantiated personal claims.

Sullivan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2015-03-27(a)(1)

Petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating actual causation by preponderant evidence. Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 592 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010); § 300aa-13(a)(1). ... To determine if the petitioner has carried her burden, I must assess “the record as a whole” and may not make an entitlement decision in her favor based solely on her own claims “unsubstantiated by medical records or by medical opinion.” § 300aa-13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires an off-Table Vaccine Program claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a listed vaccine received in the United States caused a condition that persisted for more than six months.

Morgan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2016-01-12(a)(1)(A)

An “off-Table” injury is initially established when the petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) she received a vaccine set forth on the Vaccine Injury Table; (2) she received the vaccine in the United States; (3) she sustained or had significantly aggravated an illness, disease, disability, or condition caused by the vaccine; and (4) the condition has persisted for more than six months. § 13(a)(1)(A).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Bell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2017-01-31(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on her assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires a vaccine-compensation claimant to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars an award based solely on unsupported personal claims.

Harmon v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2017-07-06(a)(1)

Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating actual causation by a preponderance of the evidence. See Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 592 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010); § 300aa-13(a)(1). ... The undersigned must consider the record “as a whole” and may not rule in petitioner’s favor solely based on petitioner’s own claims “unsubstantiated by medical records or medical opinion.” § 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires an off-Table Vaccine Program claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the vaccine caused the injury, but the vaccine need not be the sole or predominant cause; showing that it was a substantial factor and a but-for cause is sufficient.

Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2017-11-20(a)(1)

The Vaccine Act provides two avenues for petitioners to receive compensation. First, a petitioner may demonstrate a “Table” injury—i.e., an injury listed on the Vaccine Injury Table that occurred within the provided time period. § 11(c)(1)(C)(i). “In such a case, causation is presumed.” Capizzano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 440 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see § 13(a)(1)(B). Second, where the alleged injury is not listed on the Vaccine Injury Table, a petitioner may demonstrate an “off-Table” injury, which requires that the petitioner “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the vaccine at issue caused the injury.” Capizzano, 440 F.3d at 1320; see § 11(c)(1)(C)(ii). A petitioner need not show that the vaccination was the sole cause, or even the predominant cause, of the alleged injury; showing that the vaccination was a “substantial factor” and a “but for” cause of the injury is sufficient for recovery.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Carda v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2018-01-11(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on her assertions; ... rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act permits a special master to find a Table injury’s onset period satisfied despite an unrecorded or incorrectly recorded onset, on a preponderance of the evidence.

Schoonover v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2019-03-05(b)(2)

In that regard, the undersigned notes that respondent’s argument is inconsistent with the Vaccine Act insofar as the statute instructs – at least with regard to Table injuries – that the special master may find the time period for the first symptom or manifestation of onset required for a Table injury is satisfied “even though the occurrence of such symptom or manifestation was not recorded or was incorrectly recorded as having occurred outside such a period.” § 13(b)(2). “Such a finding may be made only upon demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that the onset . . . occured within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table.” Id.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program petitioners to prove entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on their assertions; the petition must be supported by medical records or a competent physician's opinion.

Yalacki v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2019-03-06(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program petitioners to prove entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on their assertions; the petition must be supported by medical records or a competent physician's opinion.

Guzman v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2019-07-01(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

McKown v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2019-08-29(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires a Vaccine Program claimant to prove vaccine causation by a preponderance of the evidence based on the record as a whole.

Contino v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2019-10-08(a)(1)

Pursuant to Section 300aa-13(a)(1), in order to reach my conclusion, I have considered the entire record including all of the medical records, statements, expert reports, and medical literature submitted by the parties. This opinion discusses the elements of the record I found most relevant to the outcome. ... To satisfy the burden of proving causation-in-fact, petitioner must “show by preponderant evidence that the vaccination brought about the injury by providing 1) a medical theory connecting the vaccination and injury; 2) a logical sequence of cause and effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for the injury; and 3) a showing of proximate temporal relationship between vaccination and injury.” ... Petitioner’s must establish each Althen prong by the preponderance of the evidence. ... After a review of the entire record, I conclude that petitioner has established a reliable theory that the flu vaccination G.C. received on December 3, 2013 was the cause-in-fact of her urticarial vasculitis. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to compensation.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on their assertions; the petition must be supported by medical records or a competent physician's opinion.

Schultz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2020-03-03(a)(1)

For both Table and Non–Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove either a Table injury or an injury caused by a covered vaccine, and bars compensation based solely on unsupported claims.

Antolick v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2020-03-24(a)(1)

To receive compensation in the Vaccine Program, petitioners have the burden of proving either: (1) that the vaccinee suffered a “Table Injury,” i.e., an injury beginning within a specified period of time following receipt of a corresponding vaccine listed on the Vaccine Injury Table (a “Table injury”) or (2) that the vaccinee suffered an injury that was caused-in-fact by a covered vaccine. §§ 13(a)(1)(A); 11(c)(1). ... Moreover, under the Vaccine Act, the Vaccine Program may not award compensation based on the petitioner’s claims alone. Rather, the petitioner must support the claim with either medical records or the opinion of a competent medical expert. § 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

N. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2020-05-19(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Perekotiy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2020-05-20(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program petitioners to prove entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on their assertions; the petition must be supported by medical records or a competent physician's opinion.

Samuels v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2020-06-02(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Kern v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2020-10-06(a)(1)

Under the Vaccine Act, a petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his claims alone. In this case, there is insufficient evidence in the record for Petitioner to meet his burden of proof, and insufficient reliable scientific proof offered in support of his causation theory. Therefore, Petitioner's claim cannot succeed and must be dismissed. Section 11(c)(1)(A).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Hock v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2020-11-02(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Hughes v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-03-05(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act permits a special master to find that a Table injury's onset occurred within the required period despite an unrecorded or incorrectly recorded onset, when the evidence proves that timing by a preponderance.

Meagher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-04-07(b)(2)

A special master may find that the first symptom or manifestation of onset of an injury occurred “within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table even though the occurrence of such symptom or manifestation was not recorded or was incorrectly recorded as having occurred outside such period.” § 13(b)(2). “Such a finding may be made only upon demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that the onset [of the injury] . . . did in fact occur within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table.” Id. ... Accordingly, I find there is preponderant evidence to establish the onset of Petitioner’s pain occurred within 48 hours of the October 15, 2015 vaccination.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires an off-Table Vaccine Program claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the vaccine caused the injury, but the vaccine need not be the sole or predominant cause; it must be a but-for cause and a substantial factor.

Nifakos v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-04-12(a)(1)

If, however, a petitioner suffered an injury that either is not listed in the Table or did not occur within the prescribed time frame, she must prove that the administered vaccine caused injury to receive Program compensation. § 11(c)(1)(C)(ii) and (iii). In such circumstances, petitioner asserts a “non-Table or [an] off-Table” claim and to prevail, a petitioner must prove her claim by preponderant evidence. § 13(a)(1)(A). This standard is “one of . . . simple preponderance, or ‘more probable than not’ causation.” Althen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referencing Hellebrand v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 999 F.2d 1565, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Federal Circuit has held that to establish an off-Table injury, a petitioner must “prove . . . that the vaccine was not only a but-for cause of the injury but also a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” Shyface v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 165 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed Cir 1999). Id. at 1352. The received vaccine, however, need not be the predominant cause of the injury. Id. at 1351.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Keja v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-05-03(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Loyd v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-07-01(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires a Vaccine Program decision-maker to assess entitlement using the entire record, including medical records, expert testimony, and literature.

Davis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-09-01(a)(1)

Pursuant to Section 13(a)(1), in order to reach my decision, I have considered the entire record, including all of the medical records, expert testimony, and literature submitted by the parties.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act permits a special master to find that a Table injury's onset occurred within the required period despite an unrecorded or incorrectly recorded onset, when the evidence proves that timing by a preponderance.

Drumm v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-10-13(b)(2)

A special master may find that the first symptom or manifestation of onset of an injury occurred “within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table even though the occurrence of such symptom or manifestation was not recorded or was incorrectly recorded as having occurred outside such period.” Section 13(b)(2). “Such a finding may be made only upon demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that the onset [of the injury] . . . did in fact occur within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table.” Id. ... Accordingly, I find there is preponderant evidence to establish the onset of Petitioner’s pain occurred within 48 hours of vaccination.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Kelly v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-11-12(a)(1)

For both Table and Non–Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act allows a special master to find that a Table injury began within the required period even when the onset was not recorded then or was recorded as outside the period, if a preponderance of evidence proves timely onset.

Mahan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-01-19(b)(2)

A special master may find that the first symptom or manifestation of onset of an injury occurred “within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table even though the occurrence of such symptom or manifestation was not recorded or was incorrectly recorded as having occurred outside such period.” Section 13(b)(2). “Such a finding may be made only upon demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that the onset [of the injury] . . . did in fact occur within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table.” Id.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-04-05(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act bars compensation when the injury was caused by factors unrelated to vaccine administration, and the respondent must prove that alternative causation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Maloney v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-04-11(a)(1)(B)

Because the undersigned concludes that petitioner has established a prima facie case, petitioner is entitled to compensation unless respondent can put forth preponderant evidence “that [petitioner’s] injury was in fact caused by factors unrelated to the vaccine.” ... Thus, respondent did not prove by a preponderance of evidence that petitioner’s injury is “due to factors unrelated to the administration of the vaccine.” § 13(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires a Vaccine Program petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the matters required for compensation, with allegations supported by medical records or medical opinion.

Clavio v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-04-11(a)(1)(A)

Before compensation can be awarded under the Vaccine Act, a petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, all matters required under Section 11(c)(1). § 13(a)(1)(A). In making this determination, the special master or court should consider the record as a whole. § 13(a)(1). Petitioner’s allegations must be supported by medical records or by medical opinion. Id.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act places on a Vaccine Program petitioner the burden to show at least one defined and recognized injury.

Davis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-05-24(a)(1)

As the Federal Circuit has made clear, “the statute places the burden on petitioner to make a showing of at least one defined and recognized injury.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Fantini v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-05-31(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act allows a special master to find that a Table injury began within the required period even when the onset was not recorded then or was recorded as outside the period, if a preponderance of the evidence proves timely onset.

Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-08-04(b)(2)

A special master may find that the first symptom or manifestation of onset of an injury occurred “within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table even though the occurrence of such symptom or manifestation was not recorded or was incorrectly recorded as having occurred outside such period.” § 13(b)(2). “Such a finding may be made only upon demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that the onset [of the injury] . . . did in fact occur within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table.” Id. ... After a careful review of the record, I find that the evidence preponderates (albeit barely) in Petitioner’s favor on the disputed onset issue. ... Subsequent records in this case, however, all corroborate the injury and onset, and the Vaccine Act expressly does not obligate claimants to prove onset issues with evidence from within the alleged timeframe in any event. Section 13(b)(2).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove either a Table injury or a non-Table injury caused by a vaccine, by a preponderance of the evidence, and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Chambers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-08-16(a)(1)

To receive compensation in the Vaccine Program, a petitioner must prove either: (1) that he suffered a “Table Injury”—i.e., an injury falling within the Vaccine Injury Table—corresponding to one of the vaccinations in question within a statutorily prescribed period of time or, in the alternative, (2) that his illnesses were actually caused by a vaccine (a “Non-Table Injury”). ... For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act permits a special master to find that a Table injury's onset occurred within the required period despite an unrecorded or incorrectly recorded onset, when the evidence proves that timing by a preponderance.

Jones v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-08-23(b)(2)

A special master may find that the first symptom or manifestation of onset of an injury occurred “within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table even though the occurrence of such symptom or manifestation was not recorded or was incorrectly recorded as having occurred outside such period.” § 13(b)(2). “Such a finding may be made only upon demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that the onset [of the injury] . . . did in fact occur within the time period described in the Vaccine Injury Table.” Id. ... At bottom, the evidence preponderates, although just barely, in favor of a determination that onset began in 48 hours of vaccination.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program petitioners to prove entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on their assertions; the petition must be supported by medical records or a competent physician's opinion.

Martinez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-10-04(a)(1)

To receive compensation in the Vaccine Program, a petitioner must prove either: (1) that he suffered a “Table Injury”—i.e., an injury falling within the Vaccine Injury Table—corresponding to one of the vaccinations in question within a statutorily prescribed period of time or, in the alternative, (2) that his illnesses were actually caused by a vaccine (a “Non-Table Injury”). ... For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove either a Table injury within the prescribed period or a non-Table injury actually caused by a vaccine.

Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-10-04(a)(1)

To receive compensation in the Vaccine Program, a petitioner must prove either: (1) that he suffered a “Table Injury”—i.e., an injury falling within the Vaccine Injury Table—corresponding to one of the vaccinations in question within a statutorily prescribed period of time or, in the alternative, (2) that his illnesses were actually caused by a vaccine (a “Non-Table Injury”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Weaver v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-10-21(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Porch v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2023-01-03(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program petitioners to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars an award based solely on unsupported assertions.

F. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2023-01-18(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Trollinger v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2023-03-15(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Nieves v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2023-05-22(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires a Vaccine Program claimant with a non-Table injury to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the administered vaccine caused the injury.

Walters v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2023-06-01(a)(1)(A)

If, however, a petitioner suffered an injury that either is not listed in the Table or did not occur within the prescribed time frame, she must prove that the administered vaccine caused injury to receive Program compensation. § 11(c)(1)(C)(ii) and (iii). In such circumstances, petitioner asserts a “non-Table or [an] off-Table” claim and to prevail, a petitioner must prove her claim by preponderant evidence. § 13(a)(1)(A).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions, requiring medical records or a competent physician’s opinion.

BECHEL v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES · filed 2023-12-11(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Brancheau v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2024-04-15(a)(1)

Petitioner’s burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. § 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence, showing that the vaccine was a but-for cause and a substantial factor, and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Garris v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2025-08-19(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). ... In particular, a petitioner must demonstrate that the vaccine was “not only [the] but-for cause of the injury but also a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on their assertions; the petition must be supported by medical records or a competent physician's opinion.

Kaczerowski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2025-09-30(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove either a Table injury corresponding to their vaccination or an injury actually caused by a vaccine, and requires support from medical records or a competent physician's opinion.

Derrick v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2026-01-02(a)(1)

To receive compensation under the Program, petitioner must prove either 1) that she suffered a “Table Injury” – i.e., an injury falling within the Vaccine Injury Table – corresponding to her vaccination, or 2) that she suffered an injury that was actually caused by a vaccine. See §§ 13(a)(1)(A) and 11(c)(1). ... Under the Act, a petitioner may not be given a Program award based solely on the petitioner’s claims alone. Rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. § 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove either a Table injury or a non-Table injury actually caused by a vaccine, by a preponderance of the evidence, and to support the claim with medical records or a competent physician's opinion.

Bickel v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2026-02-17(a)(1)

To receive compensation in the Vaccine Program, a petitioner must prove either: (1) that he suffered a “Table Injury”—i.e., an injury falling within the Vaccine Injury Table—corresponding to one of the vaccinations in question within a statutorily prescribed period of time or, in the alternative, (2) that his illnesses were actually caused by a vaccine (a “Non-Table Injury”). ... For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

Bickel v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2026-02-23(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). That is, a petitioner must offer evidence that leads the “trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the judge of the fact’s existence.” ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence and bars awards based solely on unsupported assertions.

S. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2026-02-24(a)(1)

For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. Section 13(1)(a). That is, a petitioner must offer evidence that leads the “trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the judge of the fact’s existence.” ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires Vaccine Program claimants to prove either a Table injury or a non-Table injury actually caused by a vaccine, by a preponderance of the evidence, and to support the claim with medical records or a competent physician's opinion.

Wyble v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2026-03-24(a)(1)

To receive compensation in the Vaccine Program, a petitioner must prove either: (1) that he suffered a “Table Injury”—i.e., an injury falling within the Vaccine Injury Table—corresponding to one of the vaccinations in question within a statutorily prescribed period of time or, in the alternative, (2) that his illnesses were actually caused by a vaccine (a “Non-Table Injury”). ... For both Table and Non-Table claims, Vaccine Program petitioners bear a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. ... A petitioner may not receive a Vaccine Program award based solely on his assertions; rather, the petition must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician. Section 13(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act requires an off-Table Vaccine Program claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the vaccine caused the injury, but the vaccine need not be the sole or predominant cause; it must be a but-for cause and a substantial factor.

Rudzki v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2026-06-15(a)(1)

The second avenue for petitioners to receive compensation, where the alleged injury is not listed on the Vaccine Injury Table, is an “off-Table” injury, which requires that the petitioner “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the vaccine at issue caused the injury.” Capizzano, 440 F.3d at 1320; see § 11(c)(1)(C)(ii). ... A petitioner need not show that the vaccination was the sole cause, or even the predominant cause, of the alleged injury; showing that the vaccination was a “substantial factor” and a “but for” cause of the injury is sufficient for recovery. See Pafford v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 451 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Shyface v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 165 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Statute of limitations

The Act bars filing a compensation petition more than 36 months after the first symptom or manifestation of onset or significant aggravation of the injury.

Thomann v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2016-03-21(a)(2)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2), the Vaccine Act provides that “no petition may be filed for compensation . . . after the expiration of thirty-six months after the date of the occurrence of the first symptom or manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation of such injury.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

the Act's look-back provision can make a non-table, causation-in-fact claim timely when a Table revision significantly increases the claimant's likelihood of obtaining compensation.

Simpson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-03-08(b)

Thus, having reviewed the petition, the parties’ respective filings, the Vaccine Act, and the relevant case law and legislative history, the undersigned holds that § 16(b) applies to petitioner’s non-table GBS claim as alleged in the petition.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Attorneys’ fees and costs

Section 15(e) permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in a Vaccine Act proceeding.

Turner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2016-05-16(e)

The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 15(e)(1) requires a Vaccine Act fee award to be reasonable and permits the special master to determine and reduce the requested amount.

Atnip v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2016-08-15(e)(1)

Whether a fee award is made on an interim basis or after a case’s conclusion, the requested sum must be “reasonable.” Section 15(e)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 15(e)(1) entitles Vaccine Program petitioners to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs even if they do not prevail, provided the claim was brought in good faith and had a reasonable basis.

Rojas v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2017-12-06(e)(1)

First, each of these cases involved a fee-shifting regime that included a prevailing party requirement. It is well established in this Program that direct comparisons between Vaccine Act cases and other fee-shifting schemes are not appropriate because petitioners in this Program are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs – win or lose – provided that the claim is brought in good faith and there is a reasonable basis for the claim. See § 15(e)(1). For this reason, rates outside the Vaccine Program must be adjusted before they can be directly compared.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 15(e) permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Kramer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2018-05-09(e)

The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. § 15(e).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act permits a special master to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs when a Vaccine Act petition is filed in good faith and supported by a reasonable basis, and compensation awarded by stipulation supports entitlement to those fees and costs.

Rosso v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2025-05-20(e)(1)

Under the Vaccine Act, the special master may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for a petition that does not result in an award of compensation but was filed in good faith and supported by a reasonable basis. § 300aa–15(e)(1). Here, because Petitioner was awarded compensation pursuant to a stipulation, he is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act, based on the reasonableness of the billing records and costs submitted.

Lungaro v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2025-05-20(e)

The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. § 15(e). ... In accordance with the Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) (2012), I have reviewed the billing records and costs in this case and finds that petitioner’s request for fees and costs is reasonable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Lost earnings

For a claimant injured by a vaccine before age 18, the Vaccine Act does not require an average work-life expectancy; the special master may determine a reasonable figure from the record.

A. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-10-12(a)(3)(B)

I agree that the determination of an appropriate work-life expectancy is within each special master’s discretion. ... I am not persuaded that the Vaccine Act requires applying an average work-life expectancy (e.g., for all women, all women and men generally, or all women and men weighted by their participation in the work force) to the particular petitioner before me, particularly where she was close to reaching the age of majority when she sustained the vaccine injury and there is credible, relevant evidence about her likely educational attainment.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Filing a petition while a civil action is pending

The Act prohibits a Vaccine Program claimant from filing a petition while a civil action for the same vaccine-related injury or death is pending, and the special master lacks jurisdiction over the prohibited petition.

Williams v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-08-15(a)(5)(B)

If an individual has a pending civil action for a vaccine-related injury or death, such an individual may not file a petition for such injury or death in Vaccine Program. § 300aa-11(a)(5)(B). ... Succinctly stated, petitioner filed her petition while a civil action was pending for her vaccine related injury. Applying a plain reading of Section 300aa-11(a)(5)(B) of the Vaccine Act, petitioner’s filing of her claim was prohibited. Under these circumstances, the undersigned lacks jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim and her claim in the Vaccine Program must be dismissed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The Act bars a claimant from filing a Vaccine Program petition for a vaccine-related injury while a civil action for the same injury is pending, and the court lacks jurisdiction over the barred petition.

Williams v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2024-09-03(a)(5)(B)

An analysis of reasonable basis is therefore unnecessary because the statute is clear that where a civil action is filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim. ... Petitioner’s filing of her petition with a civil action pending for the same claim falls squarely within the statute. §300aa-11(a)(5)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Secondary payer for insurance payments

The Act makes the Vaccine Program a secondary payer only for payments from the funding sources expressly listed in the statute, including payments made under an insurance policy, so payments by an indemnity company are not offset absent proof they were made under an insurance policy.

R. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2023-01-23(g)

Moreover, the settlement proceeds were paid by “Indemnity, LLC.” Section 15(g) of the Vaccine Act states that “[p]ayment of compensation under the Program shall not be made for any item or service to the extent that payment has been made . . . with respect to such item or service . . . under an insurance policy.” No evidence has been filed to show Indemnity, LLC made the payment at issue “under an insurance policy.” While the purpose of Indemnity, LLC may have been to “insure the risks of its Parent,” this alone is not evidence that the payment at issue was made “under an insurance policy.” If Congress had wanted the Vaccine Program to be a secondary payer as to payments made by indemnity companies, it could have included such language in the statute. But it did not. The language of § 15(g) specifically enumerates the types of funding sources that may offset compensation awards. These include payments made “(1) under any State compensation program, under an insurance policy, or under any Federal or State health benefits program . . . , or (2) by an entity which provides health services on a prepaid basis.” Payment “by an indemnity company” is not included. Payments by any source not expressly identified in the statute may not be used to offset awards of compensation. The statute provides that any sources not expressly identified may not be used to offset awards. Thus, it appears that Congress intended the secondary payor provision to be very narrowly construed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Timing of a Table injury

The Act requires a Table-injury claimant to show that the first medically recognized symptom or manifestation of onset occurred within the Vaccine Injury Table’s specified period after vaccination.

Le v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 2023-04-24(c)(1)(C)(i)

The Vaccine Act does not define the meaning of the phrase, “the first symptom or manifestation of the onset.” § (c)(1)(C)(i). The Vaccine Injury Table does not provide guidance either. 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(a) (noting “time period in which the first symptom or manifestation of onset . . . after vaccine administration”). However, there is some guidance from case law. “‘[T]he first symptom or manifestation of onset’ . . . is the first event objectively recognizable as a sign of a vaccine injury by the medical profession at large.” Markovich v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 477 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Further, the Federal Circuit held “the statute of limitations of the Vaccine Act begins to run on the calendar date of the occurrence of the first medically recognized symptom or manifestation of onset of the injury.” Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 654 F.3d 1322, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). Following this guidance, it is appropriate to place onset at the time of a “medically recognized symptom.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
18,508 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a parenthetical identifying the repeal of the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
John R. Tambone, M.D. v. Memorial Hospital for McHenry County, Inc., an Illinois Corporation, the opinion mentions Pub.L. 99-660 in a footnote to explain that the recently enacted Health Care Quality Improvement Act does not apply to this action; the court's decision concerns Illinois state-action antitrust immunity and does not interpret or apply the Act itself. opinion →
Grandview Surgical Center, Inc. v. Holy Spirit Hospital of Sisters of Christian Charity, the opinion mentions Pub. L. 99-660 only in a footnote reporting that Section 701(a) repealed the cited federal provisions; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Abbott v. American Cyanamid Co., the court expressly declined to decide the effect of the 1986 Act and based its holding on the PHSA and FDCA; it therefore did not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Powers v. Pa. Dept. of Health, the opinion merely cites Pub. L. 99-660 in a footnote to identify the repeal of the federal health systems agency and CON provisions; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Wiggins ex rel. Wiggins v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Vaccine Act and its codified provisions; its holding construes the 1987 amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11, not the Act. opinion →
Clark v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, the opinion construes 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(b), including the $30,000 limitation in retroactive vaccine cases, and cites Pub.L. No. 99-660 only as the original source of that Act; it does not construe or apply the Act of the Public Law. opinion →
Doe v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub.L. No. 99-660 only to identify the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in the introductory description; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the Act. The court instead applies the Act’s codified provisions, including §§ 300aa-11 through 15. opinion →
Morris v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub.L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the Vaccine Act; it does not interpret or apply the Act, and its rulings concern codified provisions of the Act. opinion →
Carlson v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act, but it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the Act of that public law. Its analysis concerns the Act’s codified provisions, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11 and 300aa-12. opinion →
Capitol Hill Hospital v. District of Columbia State Health Planning & Development Agency, the opinion mentions Pub.L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote to identify that 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6 was repealed; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Head v. Secretary of Department of Health & Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub.L. No. 99-660 only in a legislative-history footnote to identify the Act and its enactment date; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Austin v. Mcnamara, the court construed Section 416 of HCQIA, not Pub. L. No. 99-660; the Public Law citation only identifies the enactment and is incidental to the court’s holding about when professional review actions commenced. opinion →
Addis v. Holy Cross Health System Corp., the court mentions Pub.L. No. 99-660 only as the enacting citation and background for the Health Care Act; its holding interprets 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111-13, not the Act of the Public Law. opinion →
Frank v. Snyder, Jr. By Teresa L. Snyder, His Legal Guardian v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act; its analysis concerns codified provisions of the Act and does not decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Kaminski v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the Vaccine Act by its Public Law citation in the procedural introduction; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
United States Ex Rel. Joslin v. Community Home Health of Maryland, Inc., the statute is mentioned only as historical background for the repeal of Maryland’s HMO certificate-of-need exemption; the court does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
McCarren v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub.L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Vaccine Act in the opening description of the case; the court construes codified Vaccine Act provisions, not the Act itself. opinion →
O'Connell v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, the opinion cites Pub.L. No. 99-660 only in the opening identification of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Goetz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the opinion cites Pub.L. No. 99-660 only in the opening identification of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Keszler v. Memorial Medical Center of East Texas, the opinion mentions Pub.L. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and expressly states that no issue is raised concerning this contract provision; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Keszler v. Memorial Medical Center of East Texas, the opinion mentions the statute only in a footnote to identify the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and expressly says that no issue was raised concerning this aspect of the contract; the court did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Manville v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in background to identify the Vaccine Act and describe its general purpose; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Goodrich v. Teets, the opinion cites Pub.L. No. 99-660 to identify the Act establishing the NPDB, but the court expressly declined to examine the limits of the regulations in the Act's context; its ruling rested on the DoD and Air Force regulations and administrative-record facts, not on construction or application of the Act. opinion →
Cloer v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Act; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Hokkanen ex rel. Hokkanen v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub.L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Vaccine Act under which petitioners filed a claim; the court analyzes other provisions of the Act and does not construe or apply the Act of the public law. opinion →
Jarvis v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub.L. No. 99-660 only as the Act under which the petition was filed; it does not construe or apply the Act, and its substantive discussion concerns codified provisions of the Vaccine Act. opinion →
Cloer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub.L. No. 99-660 only to identify the enactment of the Vaccine Act; its holding interprets and applies the 36-month limitations provision now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2), not Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the court cited Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to draw an analogy and describe the federal act's general purpose and codified immunity standards; it did not construe, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Montalbano v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only as the general enacting citation for the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and then discusses provisions codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111 and 11112. It does not mention, interpret, or apply the Act of the Act. opinion →
Deribeaux v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only as the Act that established the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Teresa Fresco and Anthony Fresco, as Best Friends of Their Son, Daniel Fresco, a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human, the opinion does not cite Pub. L. No. 99-660 or discuss the Act; it applies codified Vaccine Act provisions, including § 11(c)(1)(C)(i), to deny compensation. opinion →
A.K. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote to identify the enactment underlying the Vaccine Act; the court does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Stephany Shayeghi, Mother and Natural Guardian of Minor, Ava Rose Shayeghi v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Montoya v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 and explaining the citation convention; it decides a settlement and does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Jeffrey Tompkins, as Personal Representative of the Estate of William Bruce Tompkins v. Secretary of the Department of H, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act; the decision addresses the authority to award interim attorney fees under § 15(e)(1), not Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
McLaughlin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act; the court decided attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e), not anything about the Act. opinion →
Bennett v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 1, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Sova v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the source of the Vaccine Act; it decides attorneys’ fees under § 15(b), (e)(1) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Paul Michael Teknus, a Minor, by His Parents Kenneth Teknus and Lisa Teknus v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the Vaccine Act and its codification in a footnote; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Fleming v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in a citation footnote; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Nadine L. Krager and Jeffrey A. Krager, Legal Representatives and Parents of a Minor Child, Casey R. Krager v. Secretary, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and explaining its citation convention; the decision awards attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Kelly Arango, Parent Of, Isabela Orozco, a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Act establishing the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in the procedural background; it does not construe or apply the Act of that public law. The court instead applies the Act’s codified provisions and 42 C.F.R. the Act.3. opinion →
Donnelly v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and explaining its citation convention; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
A.K. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act, and its fee ruling relies on 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e). opinion →
Batten v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the source of the Vaccine Act; the court applies the codified eligibility and jurisdiction provisions and does not decide anything about the Act itself. opinion →
Batten v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is cited only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Act; the court does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health, the opinion merely identifies the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and explains its citation convention; it does not decide what Pub. L. No. 99-660 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Robert V. Davis and Amy M. Phillips-Davis v. Secretary of Health, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Valerie Soto, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Y.D., a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in a citation footnote; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Laura Holt, Parent of Aleigha Holt-Tipton, a Minor v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 0, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Dwares v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the Vaccine Program's statutory source in a footnote; it resolves attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Tatum v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program. The court adopted the parties' damages stipulation and did not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Preston Nigel Sanker, by Leslie Sanker, His Mother and Next Friend v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and then directs section references to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Seykora v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Bishop v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in a footnote and does not construe or apply the Act; the case was resolved by settlement. opinion →
Tocio v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Program in a footnote; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Holmes v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act by its public-law citation; it does not discuss or construe the Act. opinion →
Tatum v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the source and codification of the Vaccine Act; the decision addresses attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Graf v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and explaining that subsequent section references will use the corresponding United States Code provisions. The court approves a settlement and awards compensation under cited provisions, but does not interpret or decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Coddington v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute and its codification; the decision adopts a damages stipulation and does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Citizen v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the citation appears only in a footnote identifying the statute that establishes the Vaccine Program; the decision does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Preston Nigel Sanker, by Leslie Sanker, His Mother and Next Friend v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the source of the Vaccine Act and explains its citation convention; it does not discuss or decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Shirley Tapia, on Behalf of Her Minor Child, Ethan Tapia v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not discuss, construe, or apply the Act. opinion →
Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote as the source of the Vaccine Act and explains its citation convention; it does not discuss or decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Harris v. Secretary of Health, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; the decision resolves attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e), not Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Jacob Henderlong, a Minor by His Next Friend, Susan Henderlong v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the Act codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 et seq.; its analysis applies the codified provisions and does not construe or decide anything about the Act itself. opinion →
Reid v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court mentioned Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. Its analysis applied provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa and did not decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Reid v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion only identifies the Vaccine Program’s statutory source in a footnote and does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Kenzora v. Secretary of Health and Human Services 1, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act; the case approves a settlement and awards fees under cited provisions, but does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Figueroa Ex Rel. Estate of Figueroa v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Vaccine Act and its codification. Its holding construes the codified provisions governing survivorship and who may file a vaccine-injury petition, not Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Wholley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Laura La Joie and Bo Allen Crosby, Parents and Legal Representatives of the Estate of Alexis Crosby v. Secretary of Heal, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act’s codification; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Chervanick v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program's statutory source in a footnote and does not construe, explain, or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Dominique v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the Vaccine Act in a footnote. It does not construe or apply the Act; the award was based on the respondent's concession. opinion →
Shaw v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 0, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660 itself. opinion →
Katea D. Stitt, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Pamela Wanga Stitt v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codified provisions; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Marian Underwood, as Parent of and Legal Representative of the Estate of Cesar Zachary Moreno v. Secretary of Health and, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute codified as the Vaccine Act; it does not discuss, construe, or apply the Act. opinion →
Marian Underwood, as Parent of and Legal Representative of the Estate of Cesar Zachary Moreno v. Secretary of Health and, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Maria Carrino, Spouse and of the Estate of Samuel Carrino v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote to identify the Vaccine Program’s statutory source and codification; it does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Coddington v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the codified source of the Vaccine Act; the decision awards fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Jeffrey Tompkins, as Personal Representative of the Estate of William Bruce Tompkins v. Secretary of the Department of H, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the source of the Vaccine Act and directing citations to its codified provisions; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660 itself. opinion →
Lamona Dodd, Parent of S.S., a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a background footnote identifying the Act and its codification; it does not interpret or apply Public Law the Act. opinion →
Lamona Dodd, Parent of S.S., a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Dillon v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 only as the source of the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Margaret Rouse, Daughter and of the Estate of Henry Sundermeyer v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Servi, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the source of the Vaccine Act and explains its citation convention; it does not discuss or decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Bob and Carmel Mooney, Parents of Elizabeth L. Mooney, a Minor Child v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the source of the Vaccine Act and explains its citation convention; it does not discuss or decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Andrea Botan, as the Mother and Legal Representative of Her Minor Daughter, Evelyn Botan v. Secretary of Health and Huma, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the codified source of the Vaccine Act; the decision awards damages under the Vaccine Program and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Jillian Lowrie, Parent and Next Friend of Emily Paige Lowrie, a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services 0, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Elisha T. Snell, by His Parent, Vanessa Smith v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the statute as the source of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Trainer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program as Part 2 of Pub. L. No. 99-660 and explains its codification; it does not decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Trainer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a background footnote identifying the Act and its codification; it does not interpret or apply Public Law the Act. opinion →
Saurabh v. Amin and Archana Amin, Natural Parents and Guardians of Redacted], a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human S, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the enactment from which the Vaccine Act derives and its codification. The court's decision applies the codified Vaccine Injury Table provisions and does not decide what Pub. L. No. 99-660 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Wagnon v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program’s statutory source; it makes no ruling about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
David Peddy and Alysia A. Peddy, Legal Representatives of Minor Child, David Pierce Peddy Jr. v. Secretary of Health and, the opinion merely identifies the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program as Part 2 of Pub. L. No. 99-660 and explains its codification; it does not decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Vollmar v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; the court did not interpret or apply it. opinion →
Grant v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the codified source of the Vaccine Act; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Terrell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act and its codified provisions; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Erica Fester, Parent of B.A.B., a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and then directs section references to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Anita Roberts and Gary Roberts v. Secretary of Health, the opinion merely identifies the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program as Part 2 of Pub. L. No. 99-660 and explains its codification; it does not decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
N. H., by and Through Jessica Nicole Castaneda, as Parent and Natural Guardian v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660 itself. opinion →
Adam Sucher and Elizabeth Sucher, Parents of Evelyn Sucher, a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act; its fee ruling applies codified provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa and does not decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Michalski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act; the decision resolves the parties’ settlement and does not interpret or apply the Act of the Act. opinion →
Hutcheison v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act as Pub. L. No. 99-660 and explains that its subsequent section references will use the codified 42 U.S.C. provisions; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Saurabh v. Amin and Archana Amin, Natural Parents and Guardians of Sheaa Amin, a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Kerri Speights, Parent of Tyler Speights, a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services 0, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and then directs section references to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
The Estate of Marvin Green, Sr., Decedent, by and Through, Marvin Green, Jr., as Personal Representative v. Secretary of, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute that established the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Rapa v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute that established the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Stephanie Hinton, as the Parent and Natural Guardian of Jefferey O'brien v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Bevis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is cited only in a footnote to identify the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; the decision resolves attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e), not the cited public law. opinion →
Petronelli v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote and explains its citation convention, but it does not interpret or apply the Act; the decision instead applies cited provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa. opinion →
Dennis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The decision itself adopts a parties’ stipulation and awards damages; it does not interpret, define, or apply the Act. opinion →
Everett Johnson, Sr. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute and its codification; the court does not decide anything about the Act, such as its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Bass v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification in a footnote; it does not construe or apply the Act. The decision instead adopts the parties’ stipulation and awards damages. opinion →
Charlene Russell, Parent of Joseph Russell, a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services 0, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; the court does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Allen v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not discuss or apply the Act. opinion →
Debra Comer, Parent Of, J.E.M., a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the enactment containing the Vaccine Program; its ruling applies the codified Vaccine Act statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2), not Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Sandra Steinberg, as the Administrator of the Estate of Isaiah Steinberg v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion only identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the source of the Vaccine Act and does not discuss, interpret, or apply the Act; the damages award rests on the parties’ stipulation. opinion →
Stacey and Renee Wyler, Legal Representatives of a Minor Child, Morgan Alexandra Wyler v. Secretary of Health and Human, the opinion merely identifies the statute as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not discuss or decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
G.L.G., a Minor, by His Parents and Natural Guardians, Ernest Graves and Cheryl W. Graves v. Secretary of Health and Hum, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99–660 only to identify the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in a footnote; the court’s ruling construes the Vaccine Act’s § 16(a)(2), not the Act of the public law. opinion →
Fleming v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not discuss, interpret, or apply the Act. opinion →
Kegler v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the footnote merely identifies the Vaccine Act and its codification; the decision does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act, and instead dismisses the claim for insufficient proof. opinion →
Saeid B. Mojabi and Parivash Vahabi, as Parents and Legal Representatives of Their Minor Son, R.B.M. v. Secretary of Hea, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a background footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Act. Its ruling addresses post-judgment relief, redaction, and public posting, and does not decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Saeid B. Mojabi and Parivash Vahabi, as Parents and Legal Representatives of Their Minor Son, R.B.M. v. Secretary of Hea, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in a footnote; it does not interpret, construe, or apply the Act. opinion →
McGehee v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Rodney Caudillo and Dina Caudillo, Parents of R.P.C., a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Public Law 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret, explain, or apply the Act. opinion →
Demchuk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cites the Act only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Gawaran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660 itself. opinion →
Shives v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Ann McClenaghan, Administrator of the Estate of Madeline MacKay v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion only identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Robert V. Davis and Amy M. Phillips-Davis v. Secretary of Health, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act as the source of the Vaccine Act; it does not discuss or construe the Act. opinion →
Michael Small and Teri Arranga, Parents of I.M.S., a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services 0, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the source of the Vaccine Act, but does not mention or construe the Act; its fee ruling applies other provisions of the Act. opinion →
Nicole Matten, Individually and as Guardian of the Late Km v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not discuss or apply the Act. opinion →
Bundy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Act's source and codification; its ruling construed 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(A), not the Act of the Public Law. opinion →
Batish v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of Part 2 of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. The decision instead concerns insufficient proof of vaccine causation and dismissal under other provisions. opinion →
Hoffman v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the enactment and explaining that citations will use the codified Vaccine Act provisions; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Daniella Castillo and Daniel Ruiz, on Behalf of D.R. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. The decision instead concerns insufficient proof of vaccine causation and dismissal under other provisions. opinion →
Maxie v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act in a footnote; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Jessica Engels and Kain Engels, as Parents of B.E. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and explaining that later section references use the pertinent provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Kristina Miller, Personal Representative of the Estate of A.B. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Steinat v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Angel Blackstone, on Behalf of S.B., a Minor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not discuss, construe, or apply the Act. opinion →
Dingle v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute underlying the Vaccine Act. Its fee award applies 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1) and does not decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660 itself. opinion →
Perkins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services 1, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act as the source of the Vaccine Act; it does not discuss or construe the Act. The entitlement ruling instead applies the codified Vaccine Act and rests on respondent's concession. opinion →
Dingle v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act. Its actual ruling concerns attorneys’ fees under codified 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1), not the meaning or application of enacted the Act. opinion →
Jaclyn Elizabeth Farrar, as Parent and Next Friend Of, Madison Mae Farrar v. Secretary of Health and Human Services 1, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote to identify the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; the court does not construe, apply, or decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Raymo v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion discusses the Vaccine Injury Table and cites § 14 and 42 C.F.R. the Act.3(a), but it does not cite, interpret, or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660; its holding concerns causation and temporal relationship for ATM. opinion →
Damaske v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and explaining its citation convention; it does not construe or apply the Act of the Act. opinion →
Floyd v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the Vaccine Act in a footnote; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Prater v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; the court does not construe, apply, or decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Meylor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; its ruling concerns interim fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(b) and (e)(1), so it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Meylor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program as Part 2 of Pub. L. No. 99-660 and explains its codification; it does not decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
George v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the source of the Vaccine Program; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Strand v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not decide anything about the Act's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
O'Connor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; the court did not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Madey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Dennis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court only identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote; it decides attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e), not what the Act means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Boyer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act while discussing the case's procedural and fee issues; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Roberts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identified the statutory source of the Vaccine Program in a footnote; it adopted the parties' damages stipulation and did not construe or decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Gonzalez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and its citation; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act of the Public Law. Its ruling instead applies the Vaccine Act section 16(a) statute of limitations. opinion →
Curry v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Konar v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; the court decides the petition under codified Vaccine Act provisions and does not interpret or apply the Act itself. opinion →
Kaplan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Cating v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and its citation; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Wallace v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute underlying the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Rivera v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is identified only in a citation footnote, which explains the shorthand used for statutory references; the decision adopts a settlement without construing or applying Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Corum v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in a footnote; it does not interpret, construe, or apply the Act. opinion →
Tompkins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and explaining its citation convention; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Choudry v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the Vaccine Act in a footnote; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Crane v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; the decision construes and applies 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e), not Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Wansaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute that established the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codified provisions; the court did not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Smith v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Hofstetter v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Act establishing the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it decides the petition under the codified Vaccine Act provisions and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Choudry v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. The decision instead addresses an attorney’s-fees award under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e). opinion →
Weil v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; the decision adopts a damages stipulation and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Vogler v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660 itself. opinion →
Bodden v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and explaining citation shorthand; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Bodden v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and does not discuss or construe the Act. opinion →
Will v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Waters v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Searles v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned in a footnote to identify the statutory basis and codification of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; the decision does not interpret or decide what Pub. L. No. 99-660 means or requires. opinion →
Rush v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote to identify the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Simmons v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act in a footnote, but does not interpret or apply the Act; its rulings concern failure to prosecute and insufficient proof of vaccine causation. opinion →
Madey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the Act's title, public-law number, and codification; the decision concerns attorney's fees and costs and does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Dillon v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Corrales v. Hhs, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statute that created the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Catron v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply the Act. Its rulings concern failure to prosecute and insufficient proof of vaccine causation. opinion →
Persinger v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Act underlying the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Oberle v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a background footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program. It does not decide anything about the Act; the damages award is entered pursuant to the parties' stipulation. opinion →
Tomaso v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program in a footnote; it does not construe or apply the Act, and its fee award rests on 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e). opinion →
Tomaso v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is cited only in a footnote identifying the statutory basis of the Vaccine Program; the court resolves damages by adopting the parties’ stipulation and does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Ryng v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a citation footnote identifying the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply the Act, and its ruling concerns settlement compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a) and (e). opinion →
Prince v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act; the decision resolves a settlement and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Olund v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in a footnote; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
MacDougall v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and explain its citation convention; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Curry v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Tate v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is cited only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; the court does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Powell v. Hhs, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Act that created the Vaccine Program. The court's decision applies the codified statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2) and does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Petroff v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; the decision adopts a damages stipulation and does not decide what Pub. L. No. 99-660 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Doenges v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the statutory basis for the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in a footnote; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Vergara v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Vaccine Act and explain that later section references use the codified provisions; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Baldwin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and explaining its citation convention; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Blake v. Hhs, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act that created the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; the court does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Rotterman v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; it does not discuss, construe, or apply the Act, and the decision awards damages pursuant to the parties' stipulation. opinion →
Falcone v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute and its codification; the decision itself awards damages under a stipulation and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Pyne v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Act that established the Vaccine Compensation Program; it does not discuss or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Thompson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 as the statutory source and gives its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Hood v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is cited only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; the court does not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Brockington v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; the court does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Ricard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the footnote merely identifies the governing Act and its codification; the court does not construe, interpret, or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Floyd v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision awards attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Scales v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; the decision adopts a damages stipulation and does not decide what Pub. L. No. 99-660 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Prystalski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Troup v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the footnote merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act; the court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Behie v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program as part of the Act and gives the Act’s public-law citation and codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Searles v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
McCray v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the footnote merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 and explains the opinion's citation shorthand; the decision resolves the case by adopting a settlement and does not decide what the statute means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Moody v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Dahl v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program's statutory source; it decides attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Brown v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Vaccine Act and explain that later section references use the codified provisions; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
McCray v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and explaining the citation convention; the decision adopts the parties’ stipulation and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Black v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the codified source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it decides entitlement under the codified provisions and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Christner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Versland v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Petroff v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute and its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Bombard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Act's source and codification; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Godfrey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote and explains that its § references are to codified Vaccine Act provisions; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Anderson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply the Act. The court’s substantive redaction ruling concerns the codified Vaccine Act provision at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B)(ii). opinion →
Brown v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act itself. opinion →
Barr v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote describing the Act; it does not construe, explain, or apply the Act. The decision instead applies other provisions of the Vaccine Act concerning proof of entitlement. opinion →
Rowan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Corey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and cites the Vaccine Act as background; it does not cite, interpret, or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Cave v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; the decision adopts a damages stipulation and does not decide what Pub. L. No. 99-660 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Schulman v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Schuler v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Davis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and its codified sections; the decision concerns attorneys’ fees and costs and makes no ruling about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Davis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the Vaccine Act and its codification in a footnote; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Dagenhart v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Murdock v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the Vaccine Act in a footnote and explains its citation convention; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Barbera v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and explain its citation convention; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Helman v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion construes Vaccine Act §§ 15(g) and 15(h); the reference to Pub. L. No. 99-660 merely identifies the Act and its codification and does not decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Schmidt v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; the court resolves the case by adopting a damages stipulation and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Russell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the Act and its codification in a footnote; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Louviere v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is cited only in a footnote to identify the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; the decision dismisses the petition for insufficient proof and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Zolnowsky v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the Vaccine Act in a footnote and explains its citation convention; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Castaldi v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Vaccine Act and explain that later section references use the codified provisions; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Medina v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Tomassetti v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the footnote merely identifies the Vaccine Act and its codified provisions as background. The decision adopts a stipulated damages award and does not interpret or apply the Act of Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Murdock v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Kuserk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the Act and its codification; the decision resolves stipulated damages and does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Maddox v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; the decision adopts a stipulated damages award and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Livingston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the footnote merely identifies the Vaccine Act and its codification; the decision applies other provisions of the Act and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Trompczynski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute that established the Vaccine Program; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
La Veck v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute that established the Vaccine Program and its codification; the court does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Eastin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the Vaccine Act and its codification in a footnote; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Kiklis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and explaining its citation convention; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Williams v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in a footnote; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Marquis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Vaccine Act and explain that later section references use the codified provisions; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Fischer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in a footnote; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Engling v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and its codified sections; the decision concerns attorneys’ fees and costs and makes no ruling about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Pozoic v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identified the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification in a footnote; it did not decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Fout v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the Act as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and gives its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Crose v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and its codified sections; the decision makes no ruling about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Doenges v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely describes the Vaccine Act in a footnote and cites Pub. L. No. 99-660; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Valdez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; the court resolves the stipulated damages without deciding anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Russell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the Vaccine Act and its codification in a footnote; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Wilson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and gives its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
St. Pierre v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660, including the Act, only in a footnote identifying the statute's codification; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Prater v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the Vaccine Act and its codification in a footnote; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Brunkan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Noah v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the Act and its codified provisions in a footnote; it does not discuss, interpret, or apply the Act. opinion →
Long v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the citation appears only in a footnote identifying the source of the Vaccine Act; the decision awards interim fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 and does not decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Nolde v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Ellis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; the opinion does not interpret or apply the Act and instead adopts the parties’ stipulation awarding damages. opinion →
Buhler v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Program's statutory source; the decision resolves damages by adopting the parties' stipulation and does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Le v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision awards attorneys’ fees and costs and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Mooneyham v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the Vaccine Act in a footnote and explains its citation convention; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Leggett v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and explaining its codified citation format; it does not decide what the Act means or how it applies. opinion →
Pokorny v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program's statutory source in a footnote; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Memmo v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Dean v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote describing the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; the court does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Bahmanyari v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Edoo v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Pryor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote to identify the source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Hooper v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Criswell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the Vaccine Act in a footnote as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Moody v. Hhs, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Anderson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and citation shorthand; the decision adopts a settlement and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Waye v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Program's statutory source and codification; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Taylor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statute establishing the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Schwartfigure v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. It does not interpret or apply the Act; the decision instead dismisses the petition for failure to prosecute and insufficient proof. opinion →
Powers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in a footnote; it does not cite, construe, or apply the Act. opinion →
Gaynor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. The decision adopts a stipulated damages award under other provisions and makes no ruling about the Act. opinion →
Kennedy Jr. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Sarina v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; the court did not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Weremblewski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute and its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Sweet v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Roberts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision awards attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Scales v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the footnote merely identifies the Vaccine Act and its codification; the decision applies 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) to attorneys’ fees and costs and does not decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Behie v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; the decision concerns attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e), so it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Watkins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Rosa v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; the court decides damages under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15, not Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Burchett v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification. The decision awards attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Gerhardt v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the Vaccine Act; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Public Law the Act itself. opinion →
Gebreyes v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the Vaccine Act in a footnote as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Best v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Public Law 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
MacAulay v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Compensation Program in a footnote; it does not interpret or apply the Act, and its fee ruling concerns §§ 15(b) and (e)(1). opinion →
Laster v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Act as the source of the Vaccine Program; it does not discuss or apply the Act. opinion →
Vasquez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Act as the source of the Vaccine Program; it does not discuss or apply the Act. opinion →
Roberts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the Vaccine Act in a footnote; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Wides v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Act as the source of the Vaccine Program; it does not discuss or apply the Act. opinion →
Sweet v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the Act in a footnote; its decision awards attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Schulman v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; the court does not construe, explain, or apply the Act. opinion →
Russell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote to identify the Vaccine Act and explain that later section references use the codified provisions; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Prater v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; the court did not interpret or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Qutub v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is cited only in a footnote to identify the Act establishing the Vaccine Program; the decision awards compensation by adopting the parties' proffer and does not decide what the Act means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Benton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; the decision adopts the parties' stipulation on damages and attorneys' fees and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Terry v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act; its fee ruling applies 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e), not the Act. opinion →
Corey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Watkins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Simpson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and directing citation to its codified provisions; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Schuler v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the citation appears in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Act and does not construe or apply the Act; the decision instead adopts the parties' joint stipulation on damages. opinion →
Perry v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the statute establishing the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement of the Act; it resolves the case by adopting the parties' joint stipulation on damages. opinion →
Griffin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660, including its codification, only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program. The court adopts a joint stipulation on damages and does not construe or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Getman v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote as the source of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Deyear v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the Vaccine Act and explain that later section references use the codified provisions; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Nazaka v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Dixon-Robinson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; the court does not construe or apply the Act and resolves the case by adopting the parties' stipulation on damages. opinion →
Clowser v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Cartwright v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its codification; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Lebel v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Hambleton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act's source and codification; it does not discuss or construe the Act. opinion →
Hambleton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the Vaccine Act in a footnote as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Carroll v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the statute as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; it does not construe, explain, or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
McElroy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the Act's source and describes its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
James v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; the decision adopts the parties’ stipulation on damages and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Hamilton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; the court did not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Strand v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Mullins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Jesrani v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act, and the decision instead adopts the parties' stipulation on damages. opinion →
Boykin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Turiano v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision awards compensation and attorneys’ fees under provisions of the codified Vaccine Act and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
R.T. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote and explains its citation convention, but does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Kraus v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote to identify the Vaccine Act and explain that its section references will use the codified provisions; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Keller v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; the court adopts the parties' damages stipulation and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Hehl v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the Act underlying the program; the court does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Rainone v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Kramolis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; it does not interpret or apply the Act. The decision instead adopts the parties’ stipulations and awards damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. opinion →
Godfrey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; the court does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Vavrik v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision awards compensation based on the parties’ stipulation and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Strout v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
McCarter v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory program; the decision adopts the parties' stipulation and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Thompson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision awards compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Dixon v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the footnote merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; the court does not discuss, construe, or apply the Act. opinion →
Cooper v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the source of the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or apply the Act, and instead adopts the parties' stipulation on damages. opinion →
Wides v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the Vaccine Act and its codified sections in a footnote; it does not construe or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Myer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act and gives its codification; it decides only the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fees and costs award under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e), without construing the Act. opinion →
Manzella v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Vessey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the Vaccine Act and gives its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Sipos v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the source of the Vaccine Act in a footnote; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Rich v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the source of the Vaccine Act in a footnote; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Rich v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is cited only in a footnote identifying the source and codification of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; the court does not decide what the Act means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Petrucelli v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the source of the Vaccine Act in a footnote; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Pass v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Krehnbrink v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote and explains its citation convention; the decision itself approves the parties’ settlement and does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Fox v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and explaining that citations will use 42 U.S.C. § 300aa; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Fox v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and explaining its citation convention; it does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Cox v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in a footnote; it does not discuss, interpret, or apply Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Brown v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and explaining its citation shorthand; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Sewell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only to identify the Vaccine Act and its codification; the decision does not construe or apply the Act and instead awards fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e). opinion →
Sewell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the broader Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Petrucelli v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court mentioned Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act; it did not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Thompson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codified provisions. It does not construe or decide anything about the Act; the decision instead approves an attorneys’ fees award under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e). opinion →
Newman v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Moses-Batts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act. The decision adopts the parties’ stipulation and awards damages under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a). opinion →
Moran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision awards attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Kratzer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites the Act only to identify the statutory source of the Vaccine Program in a footnote; it does not discuss or apply the Act. opinion →
Noah v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in a footnote, but does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Faoro v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision addresses interim expert fees under the Vaccine Act but does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Richardson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision discusses entitlement and causation under codified §§13 and 11, but does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Lee v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statute's codification and program background; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Roberts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Carlisle v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statute underlying the Vaccine Program and its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Richardson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statute underlying the Vaccine Act; it does not construe or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Hofstetter v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory program and does not discuss, construe, or apply the Act. opinion →
Fox v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Act; the decision awards attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Crabtree v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote to identify the Vaccine Act and its codification; the decision adopts the parties' stipulation on damages and does not construe or apply the Act. opinion →
Weil v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is mentioned in a footnote only to identify the Act and its codification; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Moses-Batts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act; the ruling addresses stipulated attorneys’ fees and costs and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Gorman v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Act and explaining citation shorthand; it does not construe or apply the public law. opinion →
Sankaran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Karbusheva v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only to identify the statutory source of the Vaccine Act in a footnote; it does not construe or apply the Act, and the dismissal rests on insufficient proof under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1). opinion →
Reid v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision awards attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Reed v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act and explaining its citation convention; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
R.T. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 and explains that its substantive provisions will be cited through 42 U.S.C. § 300aa; it does not decide anything about the Act. opinion →
Perry v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the statutory source and codification of the Vaccine Program. The decision awards attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) and does not interpret or apply the Act. opinion →
Kelley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 as the source of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in a footnote; it does not interpret, explain, or apply the Act. opinion →
Heckle v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court merely identifies the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and its codification in a footnote; it does not decide anything about Pub. L. No. 99-660. opinion →
Harris v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion merely identifies Pub. L. No. 99-660 in a footnote and explains its codification; it does not construe or apply the Act itself. opinion →
Haft v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion cites Pub. L. No. 99-660 only in a footnote identifying the Vaccine Act; it does not discuss, construe, or apply the Act. opinion →
…and 18,108 more.

Which of these rulings fit your facts?

Describe your situation under Pub. L. No. 99-660. Ezel checks it against the cases on this page and answers with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace