Statute Annotations › Federal › Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 2

Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 2

Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local governments: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
15
Cited in passing
20
Citing cases indexed
40
Case dates
1987–1994
Screened through
2014-11-14
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

35 citing cases reviewed of 40 in the citation index: 15 interpreted the section (annotated below), 20 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2014-11-14 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 2?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Compensatory time for public employees

Section 2(a), which added 29 U.S.C. § 207(o), allows a public employer to enter into individual agreements providing compensatory leave for overtime when state law prohibits agreements with employee representatives.

Abbott v. City Of Virginia Beach · filed 1989-07-19(a)

However, after considering all pertinent factors, we conclude that the district court properly interpreted the statute as allowing public employers to enter into individual overtime compensation agreements with individual employees where state law prohibits the agency from entering into agreements with employee representatives.
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Section 2(a) permits a public employer to use compensatory time instead of overtime pay only after a prior agreement with the employees’ designated representative; otherwise it must pay overtime monetarily.

Wilson v. City of Charlotte NC · filed 1988-11-21(a)

If the public employer does not achieve an agreement — or if it does not or cannot enter into such an agreement — then it is statutorily bound to pay monetary compensation for FLSA overtime work.
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Deferred payment of overtime

Section 2(c)(2) allowed state and local governments that began complying with the FLSA on April 15, 1986, to defer paying overtime compensation until August 1, 1986, but did not eliminate liquidated damages for employers that continued violating the FLSA.

D'CAMERA v. District of Columbia · filed 1989-10-11(c)(2)

In addition, and central to our discussion here, section 2(c)(2) of the 1985 amendments authorized state and local governments to defer until August 1, 1986, actual payment of compensation for overtime worked after April 14, 1986. Pub.L. No. 99-150, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 787, 789. ... Section 2(c)(2) benefitted only those employers who began complying with the FLSA on April 15, 1986, but who deferred payment of compensation until August 1,1986. For those employers, liability was limited to the payment of unpaid compensation accruing since April 15, 1986, but no more. Section 2(c)(2) had no other effect on the FLSA’s mandatory liquidated damages provision, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). As we have indicated, the District did not comply with the FLSA in a timely manner. Therefore, section 2(c)(2) is not applicable and the District must pay liquidated damages for the full period of violation.
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Section 2(c)(2) allowed state and local governments to defer payment for overtime worked after April 14, 1986, until August 1, 1986.

Wyland v. District of Columbia Government · filed 1990-01-10(c)(2)

To accommodate the fiscal years of many state and local governments, Congress authorized these governments to defer until August 1, 1986, actual payment of compensation for overtime worked after April 14, 1986.
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Temporary public-employer liability shield

Section 2(c)(1) temporarily shields state and municipal governments from liability for pre-April 15, 1986 overtime and related recordkeeping violations, but shields them from minimum-wage liability only when they are territories or possessions.

Adams v. City Of Mcminnville · filed 1989-11-29(c)(1)

That interpretation was incorrect insofar as it determined that section 2(c)(1) postponed the liability of state and municipal governments for violations of the minimum wage provision. The language of the statute only postpones that liability for territories and possessions. Reading the amendment to exempt state and municipal governments from liability until April 15, 1986, would render meaningless the parenthetical phrase, "in the case of a territory or possession of the United States," following the words "section 6." Since "State" is defined to include territories and possessions, the parenthetical phrase must be read to exempt only territories and possessions from liability for violations of section 6, the minimum wage provision, until April 15, 1986.
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Section 2(c)(1) immunizes a state from liability for specified pre-April 15, 1986 FLSA violations involving employees who would not have been covered under the Secretary of Labor's January 1, 1985 special enforcement policy.

Bayh v. Sonnenburg · filed 1991-06-12(c)(1)

With respect to the maximum hours provision, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988), the State is clearly not liable to the plaintiff class. Shortly after the Garcia decision, Congress amended FLSA to immunize certain pre-1986 violations. That amendment reads: (c) Liability and deferred payment. — (1) No State, political subdivision of a State, or interstate governmental agency shall be liable under section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 for a violation of section 6 [29 U.S.C. § 206] (in the case of a territory or possession of the United States), 7 [29 U.S.C. § 207], or 11(c) (as it relates to section 7) of such Act occurring before April 15, 1986, with respect to any employee of the State, political subdivision, or agency who would not have been covered by such Act under the Secretary of Labor's special enforcement policy on January 1, 1985, and published in sections 775.2 and 775.4 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub.L. No. 99-150, § 2(c)(1), 99 Stat. 787, 788-89 (1985) (emphasis added). The Department of Labor's special enforcement policy referred to by Congress recognized that state hospitals were within the scope of "traditional governmental functions" and that employees working in such hospitals were thus not protected by the FLSA prior to the Garcia decision.
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Section 2(c)(1) shields a state from liability under the FLSA for violations occurring before April 15, 1986.

Fleck v. STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF CORR. · filed 1994-12-15(c)(1)

The amendment reads: "No State ... shall be liable under section 16 [the penalties and civil and criminal liability provision] of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 for a violation ... of such Act occurring before April 15, 1986... ." Pub.L. No. 99-150, § 2(c)(1), 99 Stat. 787. ... The award of back pay for the period of time prior to April 15, 1986, is clearly contrary to the 1985 FLSA amendment.
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Section 2(c)(1) delayed state and local governments’ liability for FLSA overtime violations occurring before April 15, 1986.

Fleck v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 1994-08-30(c)(1)

According to the terms of the amendment, state and local governments would not be liable to their employees for nonpayment of overtime until April 15, 1986.
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Section 2(c) protects governmental employers that relied on Usery from pre-April 15, 1986 backpay liability, but does not insulate private corporations that are not governmental employers.

Conway v. Takoma Park Volunteer Fire Department Inc. · filed 1987-07-30(c)

the 1985 FLSA Amendments do not insulate the defendant corporations from backpay liability prior to April 15, 1986.
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Delayed application of the FLSA

Section 2(c)(1) postponed the District of Columbia government’s obligation to comply with the FLSA overtime provisions until April 15, 1986.

Harrison v. District of Columbia · filed 1987-10-21(c)(1)

The District’s obligation to comply with the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act began on April 15, 1986.
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Section 2(c)(1) delayed application of the FLSA to states and local governments until April 15, 1986.

Harris v. District of Columbia · filed 1990-10-30(c)(1)

Congress enacted legislation effectively delaying application of FLSA to states and localities until April 15, 1986. Pub.L. No. 99-150, § 2(c)(1), 99 Stat. 787, 788-89 (1985). The Court declines to read plaintiffs’ pre-1985 inquiries as raising issues under FLSA.
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Section 2(c) delayed application of the FLSA to municipal fire fighters until April 15, 1986, so wage calculations made before that date were not governed by the Act.

L.R. Wethington v. City of Montgomery · filed 1991-07-09(c)

This case, however, does not present an issue of whether the Act barred the calculation of the regular rate based on artificial hours, because here Congress delayed application of the Act until April 15, 1986, ten months after the calculation took place. The City was not under any regular rate obligation in 1985, and the salary system did not have to comport with any hourly conversion under the Department of Labor’s regulations. Because the calculation occurred prior to the Act’s effective date, the appellees cannot argue that the Act governs those calculations.
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Traditional governmental functions

Section 2(c)(1) shields governmental employers from pre-April 15, 1986 FLSA liability for traditional governmental functions covered by the Secretary of Labor’s special enforcement policy.

Bester v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1987-12-09(c)(1)

Congress clearly meant these services to be exempt until April 15, 1986.
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Section 2(c)(1) limits suits for pre-April 15, 1986 minimum-wage and overtime violations in traditional governmental functions, using the definitions in 29 C.F.R. §§ 775.2 and 775.4.

Ronald Ridings and Darvin D. Salyers v. Lane County Oregon · filed 1988-12-01(c)(1)

Section 2(c)(1) of the 1985 amendments provides that workers in areas of traditional governmental functions can sue only for minimum wage and overtime violations occurring after April 15, 1986.
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Section 2(c)(1) does not make the Labor Department’s § 775.3 classification controlling; whether mass transit is a traditional government function is for courts to decide.

Bester v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1989-10-04(c)(1)

However, Section 2(c)(1) does not incorporate Section 775.3 of the Secretary of Labor’s Special Enforcement Policy.
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20 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion cites Pub. L. 99-150 § 2(a)(l) only to identify the 1985 amendment that liberalized compensatory-time rules. It does not construe, apply, or decide what that public law provision requires. opinion →
State Of Nevada Employees' Association, Inc. v. Bryan, the court's holding construes and applies the codified FLSA § 7(o), not Pub. L. 99-150 § 2(a) itself; the session-law citation merely identifies the amendment that added § 7(o). opinion →
State of Nevada Employees' Ass'n v. Bryan, the opinion cites Pub.L. 99-150, § 2(a) only in a footnote to report the historical amendment that added 29 U.S.C. § 207(o). The court interprets and applies § 207(o), not the public law provision itself. opinion →
Jackson v. City Council of Augusta, the opinion mentions § 2(c) in a footnote only to identify the delayed effective date of the FLSA for municipalities. It does not interpret or decide what § 2(c) means, requires, or covers; the court's holding concerns compliance with the FLSA overtime provisions. opinion →
Alex v. City of Chicago, Michael M. McKittrick v. City of Chicago, the statute is mentioned only to identify the compliance deadline in the background. The court does not construe or decide anything about § 2; its holding concerns the FLSA § 7(k) exemption and implementing regulations. opinion →
Robert Reich, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor v. Department of Conservation and Natural Resources,, the court cites § 2(c)(1) in a footnote only as historical background concerning when state employers became subject to the FLSA; it does not interpret or apply that provision in deciding the appeal. opinion →
McGrath v. City of Philadelphia, the court mentions § 2(c) only as historical background for the delayed applicability of the FLSA to states; it does not construe or decide any issue under that provision. opinion →
Adams v. Department of Juvenile Justice, the opinion mentions § 2(c) only in a footnote describing the historical grace period for public employers. It does not construe or decide what § 2(c) means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Adams v. Department Of Juvenile Justice Of The City Of New York, the statute appears only in a footnote as background describing the history of the FLSA's application to public employers. The court did not construe § 2(c), decide its legal effect, or rely on it to resolve the appeal. opinion →
Freeman v. City of Mobile, Alabama, the statute is cited only as background for the effective date of the FLSA’s overtime protections and as support for an argument about the intended meaning of Rule 3.1(c); the court does not construe or decide anything about § 2(c)(1). opinion →
Freeman v. City of Mobile, Alabama, the concurrence cites § 2(c)(1) only to identify when FLSA overtime protections became effective for non-exempt local-government employees; it does not interpret or apply this provision. opinion →
Freeman v. City of Mobile, Alabama, the statute is cited only in a special-concurrence footnote as contextual support for an argument about the timing and purpose of Rule 3.1(c); the court does not decide what § 2(c)(1) means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Acton v. City of Columbia, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote as historical background explaining when public employers had to comply with the FLSA; the court does not construe or apply § 2(c). opinion →
Acton v. City Of Columbia, Missouri, the opinion mentions § 2(c) only in a historical footnote to state when public employers had to comply with the FLSA; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 2(c). opinion →
Parth v. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, the court cited § 2(c) only as historical support for the date when the FLSA began applying to municipal employers; it did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under that provision. opinion →
Parth v. Pomona Valley, the statute appears only in a citation parenthetical while the opinion recounts the Eleventh Circuit's discussion of when the FLSA became applicable to municipal employers. The Ninth Circuit does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 2(c). opinion →
Calvao v. Town of Framingham, the opinion cites § 2(c) only in its legislative-history background to report that Congress delayed FLSA enforcement; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under that provision. opinion →
Parth v. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, the court mentions § 2(c) only while recounting statutory background from another case; it does not interpret or apply § 2(c). The decision concerns an FLSA pay-plan issue. opinion →
Parth v. POMONA VALLEY HOSP. MEDICAL CENTER, the opinion cites § 2(c) only in recounting Wethington’s historical account of when Congress delayed FLSA coverage for municipal employers. The Ninth Circuit did not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 2(c); its holding concerns the legality of the hospital’s pay plan under the FLSA. opinion →
Misewicz v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, the court cited § 2(a) only as an example in legislative background supporting its interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 553.226; it did not construe, apply, or decide what § 2(a) requires. opinion →

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