42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discrimination by employers and does not impose liability on an individual supervisor who is not the employer.

Weathers v. Houston Methodist Hospital · filed 2023-10-10(a)

Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... It is well established that individuals that are no employers “are not lable under Title VII in either their individual or official capacities.” ... The record establishes that Defendant Sunali Ali is an individual who was Plaintiff's supervisor, not her employer. ... Therefore, Plaintiff's Title VII claims against Sunali Ali must be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) imposes employment discrimination liability on employers, not individual supervisors.

MURRAY v. COUNTY OF HUDSON · filed 2023-10-13(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an “employer” from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs have no Title VII claim against Eady individually.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination by employers and does not impose individual liability on coworkers or supervisors.

GREEN v. VAN AUSDALL AND FARRAR · filed 2023-11-02(a)(1)

Title VII applies only to "employers"; it is well established that Title VII claims cannot be brought against individuals in their individual capacity. ... Therefore, to the extent that Ms. Green intends to assert Title VII claims against Ms. Dutywood, Ms. Cabrera, Ms. Clark, and Ms. Stevens, those claims are DISMISSED.

Section 2000e-2 permits Title VII claims against employers and other covered entities, but not individuals.

Jimenez v. Bank of Nova Scotia · filed 2023-11-03

She cannot, however, bring claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) against this defendant, because individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not impose employment discrimination liability on individual employees.

Phillips v. Mattress Firm Inc. · filed 2023-12-05(a)

Because Title VII does not provide for individual liability, Plaintiff cannot state a Title VII claim against Defendant Williams.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to employers and does not impose individual liability on employees or supervisors.

DENHAM v. AMCOR FLEXIBLE NORTH AMERICA · filed 2024-01-08(a)(1)

The statute applies only to "employers"; it is well established that Title VII claims cannot be brought against individuals in their individual capacity. ... Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Denham intends to assert Title VII claims against Mr. Godare, Mr. Rider, Mr. Frye, Mr. Griffey, Chrissy the Nurse, and Mr. Mitchell, those claims are DISMISSED.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits labor organizations from discriminating based on race or national origin, but does not impose liability on individual union members or officers.

Gaston v. American Association of University Professors · filed 2024-01-16(c)

Plaintiffs have provided no reason to depart from that presumption here, so the Court finds that use of “agent” in the definition of “labor organization” does not create liability against individual union members or officers.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) imposes liability on employers, not individual supervisors or coworkers.

Scorpio v. Sodexo, Inc. etat. · filed 2024-02-08(a)(1)

Because “Title VII addresses the conduct of employers only and does not impose liability on co-workers,” Powell v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 445 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2006), and because Title VII “does not provide for an action against an individual supervisor,” Van Horn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 526 F.3d 1144, 1147 (8th Cir. 2008), Plaintiff’s claims against individual Defendants Reynolds, Pamela, and Smith will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to employers, not coworkers or supervisors.

MARQUIS v. MANDILLO · filed 2024-02-22(a)(1)

Title VII does not apply to coworkers and supervisors, only to an employer.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose individual liability for employment discrimination under Title VII.

Ivey v. County of Albany · filed 2024-03-27

Plaintiff similarly cannot maintain his claim against Defendant for discrimination in violation of Title VII. As the Second Circuit has routinely noted, “individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII.” Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 315 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004)). The Court therefore dismisses this claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) governs employer discrimination; employees are not personally liable under Title VII, and claims against them in their official capacities are redundant when the employer is already sued.

Christians in the Workplace Networking Group v. National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC · filed 2024-03-28(a)(1)

Because Sandia is already subject to suit in its own name, it would be unnecessary and redundant to sue the Individual Defendants in their official capacities under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose liability on individual defendants.

Harte v. Pace University · filed 2024-03-29(a)(1)

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the individual defendants Krislov, Hsu, Baumann, and Bundor must be dismissed because “individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to employers and does not permit individual-capacity claims against supervisors.

TARRANCE v. FRANCISCAN ALLIANCE INC. · filed 2024-04-05(a)(1)

It is well established that Title VII claims cannot be brought against individuals in their individual capacity.

Section 2000e-2(a) provides relief against employers, not supervisory employees sued in their individual capacities.

Pilato v. Samaniego · filed 2024-04-10(a)

Sheriff Samaniego contends that he cannot be liable in his individual capacity under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. (Doc. 13 at 4–5). The court agrees. ... “Individual capacity suits under Title VII are . . . inappropriate” because “[t]he relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees.” ... Accordingly, the court WILL GRANT Sheriff Samaniego’s motion and WILL DISMISS any claims pleaded against him in his individual capacity WITH PREJUDICE.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to employers, not individual employees or supervisors.

Baker v. Strategic Therapy Associates · filed 2024-04-24(a)

Both Title VII and the ADEA apply to employers, not individuals.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose individual liability for employment discrimination.

DAVIS v. THERIAULT · filed 2024-08-07

Furthermore, because there is no individual liability for employment discrimination, Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009), Plaintiffs cannot proceed on their claim against the Defendants Golieb, Madore, Pelletier, Jackson, and Padilla.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits employment discrimination claims against employers, but not individual employees.

MACDOUGALL v. RHULING · filed 2024-08-28(a)

As an initial matter, Title VII and the ADA do not provide a cause of action against individual employees, as opposed to the employer (here, The Buck Hotel), so MacDougall cannot sue Brian Rhuling, Sr. and Brian Rhuling, Jr. under these statutes.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination by employers but does not make individual supervisors liable under Title VII.

ENTY v. BENNETT · filed 2024-10-04(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an “employer” to discriminate. ... The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has declined to extend liability under Title VII to individuals, such as Shannon, Bennett, and Spotofor, holding the term “employer” as used in Title VII does not encompass individual employees. ... Accordingly, the Title VII claims against Shannon, Bennett, and Spotofor must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not impose individual liability on employees for Title VII discrimination claims.

VANDERVOORT v. NORTH ALLEGHENY SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2024-10-07(a)

Vandervoort’s Title VII claims against Treacy are improper as Title VII does not impose individual liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits discrimination claims against employers, but does not make individual employees or supervisors personally liable.

Arnold v. United Parcel Service Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. · filed 2024-10-24(a)(1)

Arnold has raised Title VII claims against Huenke, Brown, and Osborn—his supervisor and other individual employees of UPS. Because they are not subject to suit under Title VII, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss with prejudice as to these three defendants.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discriminatory employment practices by employers but does not make individual employees or supervisors personally liable.

Valenzuela v. Alvandi · filed 2024-10-28

Thus, individual employees, including supervisors, are not construed as employers for purposes of the statute and may not be sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is DISMISSED with prejudice against Defendant employees because he cannot sue individual employees/manager under the statute.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose individual liability on supervisors for employment discrimination.

Tow v. Harris · filed 2024-11-15

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against Defendants fail as a matter of law because there is no basis for individual liability.

Section 2000e-2 allows employment discrimination claims against an employer, but does not impose individual liability on supervisors who are not the plaintiff’s employer.

Ozuruigbo v. City Of Evanston · filed 2024-12-03

So, as a matter of law, there is no basis for claims against Cummings and Gandurski in their individual capacities, and there is no need to keep the individual defendants in the case in their official capacities—that would indeed be redundant with suing the City of Evanston.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose individual liability under Title VII.

Vernon v. South Oxford Management · filed 2024-12-12

First, Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim must be dismissed as to the individual defendants because there can be no individual liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a Title VII sex discrimination claim against the employer, but does not impose personal liability on individual owners.

GRAHAM v. CUCINA · filed 2024-12-12(a)(1)

As a matter of law, the Court holds that Mr. and Mrs. Pasquarelli, as the owners of Abruzzi’s, cannot be held personally liable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 permits Title VII claims against an employer, but not against the employer’s individual agents.

Rose v. Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) · filed 2025-01-23

Title VII does not authorize suits against the employer’s agents, even those who are sued in their official capacities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employer discrimination based on race or sex; individual supervisory employees cannot be sued in their individual capacities under Title VII.

SMITH v. COLUMBUS TECHNICAL COLLEGE · filed 2025-01-30(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an “employer” to discriminate against any individual in the terms and conditions of employment because of her race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining “employer” as a person or entity who has fifteen or more employees). “The relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, individual capacity Title VII suits against supervisory employees are “inappropriate.” Id. The Court thus dismisses Smith’s Title VII claims against Wilkes and Burgan in their individual capacities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination by employers; coworkers and supervisors are not individually liable under it.

Edwards v. Bland Management · filed 2025-02-04(a)(1)

Title VII only prohibits discrimination by an “employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Co-workers or supervisors “are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations.” Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998). Because the undisputed material facts establish an employment relationship only between Plaintiff and Bland Management, summary judgment is warranted as to the individual defendants, regardless of whether the evidence supports a claim against Bland Management.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discrimination by employers and does not make individual managers or executives liable when they are not the employee’s employer.

Washington-Cunningham v. Myers · filed 2025-02-19(a)

A plaintiff cannot use Title VII to sue individual managers or executives at his or her employer.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose liability on individual supervisors for employment discrimination.

Daramola v. Dungarvin Incorporated, Minnesota · filed 2025-02-25

However, there is no individual supervisor liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits recovery against employers, but does not impose individual liability for Title VII discrimination.

Fishbeck v. Lavaca County, Texas · filed 2025-02-28(a)(1)

Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA only permit recovery against employers and, in the case of the ADA, related entities.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits Title VII claims against employers, but not individual employees.

UNDERWOOD v. BALDWIN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS · filed 2025-03-14(a)

A Title VII claim may be brought only against an employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (providing employment practices that are unlawful "for an employer"). ... Thus, Underwood cannot state a Title VII claim against the individuals that she names in the Complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make individuals liable for Title VII discrimination.

Gopal v. University of Connecticut · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

Thus, he cannot pursue liability against Herbst, Kennedy, Elliott, Gelston, or Reitz pursuant to Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose liability on individuals for employment discrimination.

James v. Port Authority Police Department · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

“Title VII does not impose liability on individuals[, however].” ... Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Defendants Cetnar and McNerney.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes employment discrimination unlawful for employers, not individual employees.

BOOTH v. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2025-04-07(a)(1)

Finally, Booth’s Title VII retaliation claims against Defendant Drissel is dismissed with prejudice for the additional reason that Title VII only makes it unlawful for an “employer” to discriminate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose individual liability on employees for unlawful employment discrimination.

Nevins v. DCH Health Systems · filed 2025-05-21(a)(1)

The individual Defendants – Ellison, Boutwell, and Wingo – are entitled to summary judgment on Count I because Title VII does not give rise to individual liability.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose personal liability for employment discrimination on individual coworkers or supervisors.

Walker v. Saracen Casino Resort LLC · filed 2025-06-06

Walker’s individual coworkers and supervisors cannot be held personally liable for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor who is not an employer.

DeJesus v. UnitedHealthcare Group · filed 2025-07-03

Further, the court’s ruling in Padway v. Palches notes that “42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 speaks of unlawful practices by the employer, and not of unlawful practices by officers or employees of the employer.” 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982). I find no flaw in the magistrate judge’s conclusion. I therefore overrule DeJesus’s objection and accept Judge Youchah’s recommendation that I dismiss the claims against Quesenberry with prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make supervisors individually liable for Title VII employment discrimination.

Blackburn v. Ineos Automotive Americas LLC · filed 2025-07-21(a)(1)

For decade's, the law in the Fourth Circuit has been clear that “supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations.” Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998). Thus, the court dismisses Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against Clark.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discrimination by employers; individual employees are not personally liable under Title VII.

Romano v. The Methodist Hospital · filed 2025-07-31(a)

A thorough review of Romano’s complaint in this matter reveals no allegation that any of the Individual Defendants satisfy the requirements under Title VII or the ADEA to be considered an employer.

Section 2000e-2(a) imposes liability on employers, not supervisors or coworkers in their individual capacities.

Ranson v. Ratliff · filed 2025-08-12(a)

That is, while Title VII covers the conduct of employers, it does not impose individual liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose Title VII liability on an individual employee who is not an employer.

Booth v. Philadelphia Police Department · filed 2025-09-04(a)(1)

In its opinion supporting dismissal, the District Court explained as follows: Booth’s retaliation claims were defective for reasons given in our opinion resolving the prior appeal; his Title VII retaliation claim against Drissel was also defective because Drissel is not an “employer” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); ... and amendment of the complaint would be futile. ... For substantially the reasons given by the District Court in its April 7, 2025 opinion, dismissal of the complaint—with prejudice and without leave to amend—was proper.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination by employers; individual employees are not liable under Title VII.

ALLEN-MURPHY v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2025-09-25(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an “employer” to discriminate. ... Courts have declined to extend liability under Title VII to individuals, holding the term “employer” as used in those statutes does not encompass individual employees. ... Accordingly, the Title VII claims against McGrody, Craighead, Testa, Shrunk, Blango, Tucker, Hines, and Mulvey must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2 allows employment discrimination claims against employers, but not individual employees.

THOMAS v. SOLERA SENIOR LIVING, LLC · filed 2025-10-10

Title VII only creates liability for employers that violate its provisions, and individual employees may not be sued under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose individual liability on managers or human resources employees who are not the plaintiff’s employer.

Williams v. Remington Hospitality · filed 2025-10-14(a)(1)

Courts have declined to extend liability under Title VII to individuals, such as Sheets and Rivera, holding the term “employer” as used in those statutes does not encompass individual employees. ... Accordingly, the Title VII claims against Sheets and Rivera must be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits discrimination claims against an employer, but individual employees and supervisors are not personally liable.

Aguilera · filed 2025-11-04(a)(1)

Individual employees or supervisors are not subject to suit under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(n) limits collateral attacks on employment discrimination judgments by people who had notice and a reasonable opportunity to object, but it does not apply to parties or represented class members.

United States v. City of New York · filed 2015-06-05(n)

This provision is inapt. Section 703(n) establishes a bar to collateral attack of any employment practice that implements, and is within the scope of, a litigated or consent judgment or order resolving an employment discrimination claim, by any person who had actual notice of the proposed order and a reasonable opportunity to present objections. ... Because class members are the only persons who have received notice of the Intent Stipulation, and an opportunity to object thereto, it does not make sense to invoke this provision here.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1)(A) limits challenges to employment practices that implement discrimination decrees; it does not bar a complainant's additional individual claims against the employer.

Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc. · filed 1994-02-24(n)(1)(A)

The legislation simply does not address the issue of whether a complainant, the victim of an employer's discriminatory practices, may pursue additional individual Title VII claims against an employer despite entry of a Title VII decree between the employer and the EEOC.

When an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a promotion decision, a plaintiff claiming gender discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Bailey v. Huntsville, City of · filed 2013-04-25(a)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that Bailey has failed to show that Reyes’s proffered reasons for selecting Izzo over her were a pretext for age and gender discrimination.

In a race discrimination claim based on non-selection, a plaintiff may support an inference of discrimination through comparative qualifications if she was significantly better qualified than the selected candidate.

Bell v. Donley · filed 2013-03-08(a)(1)

Bell is correct that, in a non-selection case, a jury can infer discrimination based on the candidate’s relative qualifications, but only where the plaintiff can establish that she was “significantly better qualified for the job” than the selectee.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars race and sex discrimination in employment; a failure-to-select claim cannot survive summary judgment without sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Montgomery v. Gotbaum · filed 2013-02-01(a)(1)

Here, since the PBGC has advanced a legitimate reason for its decision—that it simply selected a better-qualified candidate for the Accountant position—the Court proceeds directly to the ultimate question and asks whether Montgomery has adduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the PGBC’s proffered reason for its decision is pretextual, and that its real motivation was discrimination based on Montgomery’s race, sex, and/or age. The Court concludes he has not.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim based on denial of a position that offers greater status, training, supervisory duties, and promotion opportunities.

Wyckoff v. Maryland · filed 2007-10-01(a)(1)

Wyckoffs allegations that the detective position was a “status” promotion and that she lost training, supervisory, and future promotion opportunities as a result of MDSP’s denial of her application state a Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-promote plaintiff to show that the position remained open and the employer continued seeking applicants to establish a prima facie discrimination case.

Blackstone v. Jerry Daughtry Nationwide Insurance Company Nationwide Insurance Company, Chairman, CEO · filed 1994-02-25(a)(1)

Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1), prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee with respect to the employee's terms or conditions of employment because of the employee's race. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was not promoted; (3) that she was qualified for the position sought; and (4) that the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons having the same qualifications. ... We conclude that Blackstone did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she could not establish that the position of regional benefits counselor remained open after she was told that she would not be given the position, and that Nationwide continued to seek applicants for that position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits employers to choose whom to hire so long as they do not discriminate because of race or color.

Gary S. KIRK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and Weyerbacher Terrace, Defendants-Appell · filed 1994-04-12(a)(1)

Title VII certainly allows employers to hire anyone they want, so long as they do not discriminate against anyone because of certain statutorily enumerated categories like race or color. There are no facts in this record that even hint that the FPMC and Weyerbacher discriminated against Kirk because of his race or color.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex affected a promotion decision; a different staffing decision in the past does not, by itself, show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Harrison v. Larue D. Carter Memorial Hospital · filed 1994-07-12(a)(1)

The Court finds that merely because the State may have filled an Adult Services RT III position by promoting someone from outside the division is not evidence that the current explanation it gives for not promoting Harrison is pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in promotions; a claim fails when the employee does not prove that the employer's legitimate reasons were pretextual.

Marshall v. District of Columbia · filed 1995-02-22(a)(1)

We hold that Marshall waived the recusal claim before the trial began, and that there is no basis to set aside the district court's findings that District of Columbia officials had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for their actions and that Marshall failed to carry his burden of proving discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employee claiming discriminatory failure to promote to show that he was qualified for the position.

Vazquez v. Maryland Port Administration · filed 1995-06-01(a)

Plaintiff has thus failed to establish the essential threshold element for his claim of discriminatory failure to promote, i.e., that he was qualified for the position in question.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee challenging a promotion decision to show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual after establishing a prima facie case.

Harrison v. Larue D. Carter Memorial Hospital · filed 1995-07-25(a)(1)

After the employer has provided a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, the burden of production shifts back to the employee to show that the articulated reasons are pretextual. ... Harrison is unable to carry her burden of showing that Carter Hospital's nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee challenging a denied promotion to produce evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons are pretexts for racial discrimination.

Khan v. State of Md. · filed 1995-09-29(a)(1)

In summary, this Court concludes that Khan has failed to meet her burden of producing evidence that MVA’s articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting her for the assistant chief investigator position are merely pretexts for forbidden racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require a failure-to-promote plaintiff to have formally applied when the employer’s discriminatory practices made applying futile.

Winbush v. Iowa · filed 1995-10-04(a)

It is well settled, however, that plaintiffs need not prove they formally applied for a position if they allege facts which, if proven, would be sufficient to establish that application was futile due to the defendants’ discriminatory practices.

A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in promotion must show that he was qualified for the position, including that his performance met the employer’s legitimate expectations.

Zenni v. Hard Rock Cafe International, Inc. · filed 1995-11-15(a)(1)

Therefore, the issue becomes whether Zenni’s performance met Hard Rock’s legitimate expectations. Review of the facts of the case reveals that it did not.

A failure-to-promote plaintiff need not have formally applied when the employer's discriminatory practices made applying futile.

Winbush v. State of Iowa · filed 1995-11-13(a)

It is well settled, however, that plaintiffs need not prove they formally applied for a position if they allege facts which, if proven, would be sufficient to establish that application was futile due to the defendants' discriminatory practices.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory failure to promote establishes a prima facie case by showing membership in a protected class, qualification and application for the promotion, denial of the promotion, and selection of someone outside that class.

Terry v. Gallegos · filed 1996-05-16(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination based on failure to promote, a plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: (1) he is a member of the protected class; (2) he was qualified and applied for a promotion; (3) despite his qualifications, he was denied the promotion; and (4) the employer filled the position with another person who was not a member of the plaintiffs protected class.

A failure-to-promote plaintiff can establish that she applied for a position through an employer’s promotion review process without submitting a formal application.

Price v. Taco Bell Corp. · filed 1996-06-19(a)(1)

Plaintiff was invited to the review board and the “round table” to be reviewed for potential promotion at some time in the future. This evidence permits an inference that defendant knew that plaintiff was interested in advancement. Furthermore, defendant does not actually contend that plaintiff was required to fill out an application to be considered for an RGM position, and it does not appear from the record that other candidates are required to fill out applications before being considered. Therefore, I conclude that there is sufficient evidence that plaintiff applied for an RGM position to meet the requirements of McDonnell Douglas and Lowe.

A Title VII failure-to-promote claim fails at the prima facie stage when the applicant cannot show she was qualified for the position.

Miranda v. Wisconsin Power & Light Company · filed 1996-08-01(a)

The undisputed facts demonstrate that her score for the interviews placed her at the bottom of the applicant pool and disqualified her from consideration regardless of whether higher-scoring applicants accepted the offered positions. These facts are fatal to Miranda’s case under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for denying a promotion was a pretext for sex discrimination.

Locke v. Gas Research Institute · filed 1996-08-06(a)(1)

Thus, she has not demonstrated that GRI’s stated reasons for denying her promotion were pretextual. As such, no reasonable jury could find in her favor.

A failure-to-promote plaintiff can show pretext by showing that discrimination likely motivated the employer or that the employer's stated reason is unworthy of credence.

Rooks v. Girl Scouts of Chicago · filed 1996-08-09(a)(1)

She may meet her burden either directly by showing that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer, or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. ... Ms. Rooks is unable to carry her burden of showing that the Girl Scouts's reasons for not promoting her were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a failure-to-promote plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that includes being qualified for the position sought.

Spears v. DSM Copolymer Inc · filed 1996-11-19(a)

Lastly, turning to Spears' Title VII claim of race discrimination, a plaintiff may prove a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he sought and was qualified for an available employment position, (3) that he was rejected for that position, and (4) that the employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff's qualifications. ... We agree, based on the record before us, that Spears failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a race discrimination claim over a denied promotion to proceed when the evidence creates a genuine dispute about whether the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Bickhem v. United Parcel Service · filed 1996-12-06(a)(1)

Based on the record before it, this court finds that plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the real reason defendant did not promote him to Account Executive in January 1993 was his race. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Section 1981 and Title VII claims relating to this decision is denied.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in promotion decisions, and an employee’s voluntary resignation does not by itself defeat a failure-to-promote claim.

McCoy v. Oscar Mayer Foods, 1 · filed 1997-03-06(a)

Title VII establishes that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race in making employment decisions or in providing employment opportunities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... We do not express any view as to the ultimate merit of McCoy's failure to promote claim; we merely find that his voluntary resignation does not entitle Oscar Mayer to summary judgment on the theory that the promotion could not have benefited him.

A Title VII failure-to-promote claim requires circumstances supporting an inference of race discrimination.

Smith v. Planas · filed 1997-08-18(a)

As such, Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination because he cannot show that the adverse employment action taken against him occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat an employer’s selection of better qualified candidates, by itself, as evidence of discrimination in a failure to promote claim.

Wade v. Norfolk Southern Co · filed 1997-08-27

In short, we find that the magistrate judge properly found that the selection of better qualified candidates did not give rise to an inference of discrimination.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory failure to promote must show she was qualified for the position; her subjective belief alone is insufficient.

Keenan v. Louisiana Ex Rel. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical College · filed 1997-12-12(a)(1)

As noted earlier, plaintiff has, however, failed to prove that she was qualified for the Admissions Counselor IV position. Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she was qualified, but plaintiff has offered no evidence to support her claim other than her own subjective belief. Such evidence is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a failure-to-promote claim to proceed when evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Godinet v. Management & Training Corp. · filed 1998-02-11(a)(1)

The court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this justification for appointing Johnson to the RLS position is pretextual.

In a discriminatory promotion claim, an employer can rebut a prima facie case by showing that the person promoted was better qualified.

McPhail v. Town of LaGrange · filed 1998-02-13

A prima facie case is successfully rebutted if the white person promoted was better qualified for the position.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits denying an employee a promotion because of sex; a jury may infer discrimination from comparisons with male candidates and the employer's promotion history.

Williams v. Pharmacia · filed 1998-02-26(a)

A rational jury could conclude from the comparison between Williams and the male candidates who were interviewed, as well as from the timing of the only promotion of a female salesperson to a management position, that Pharmacia discriminated against Williams because of her sex in failing to promote her.

A failure-to-promote plaintiff must present evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for gender discrimination; a later statement that the hire advanced EEO objectives does not, by itself, create a jury issue.

Ibrahim v. Jackson · filed 1998-03-05(a)

Major's statement--made after he completed his selection process--that the selection would further the NRC's EEO objectives does not by itself create a jury issue as to whether gender or age were factors in the decision.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory denial of promotion must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual.

Stewart v. Houston Lighting & Power Co. · filed 1998-03-19(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s reasons are a pretext of promotion discrimination under Title VII, because she has failed to rebut Defendant’s evidence that she was not qualified for the RO or Head Operator position.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a failure-to-promote race claim to go to trial when the employee’s evidence supports a reasonable inference of intentional discrimination.

McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc. · filed 1998-04-03(a)

In short, McCullough presented evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Real Foods’ failure to promote her to the position of deli manager was motivated by racial animus. That inference is enough to prevent summary judgment for the employer.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie Title VII failure to promote claim by showing protected status, qualification for and denial of a promotion, and more favorable treatment of people outside the protected class.

Hines v. Ohio State University · filed 1998-04-01(a)

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a University setting under Title VII in a failure to promote ease, Plaintiff must show the following: a) that she is a member in a protected class (race, gender); b) that she applied and was qualified for a promotion; c) despite her qualifications, that she was rejected; and d) that non-members of the protected class were treated more favorably than plaintiff.

An employee challenging a promotion decision must show that the employer's stated reason was false and that gender discrimination was the real reason.

Roth v. MD · filed 1998-04-22(a)(1)

Roth and Nash did not submit sufficient evidence to create a fac- tual dispute that MCDC's proffered reason -- that Roth and Nash lacked the requisite interpersonal skills for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant -- was false or that a discriminatory reason actually moti- vated MCDC's promotion decisions.

A plaintiff challenging a promotion decision under Title VII must raise a genuine factual issue that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Wilhite v. Bell County, Texas · filed 1998-07-02(a)

We, therefore, are forced to conclude that Wilhite has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the County's non-discriminatory reason for hiring Johnson as director of the PR Bond Office; consequently, she cannot avoid summary judgment on her gender and age discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a failure-to-promote plaintiff to establish a prima facie discrimination case by showing that she belonged to a protected class, was qualified, was rejected, and the position went to someone outside that class.

Silverman v. Progressive Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1998-07-08(a)

In such a case, a plaintiff must show (1) that she was a member of a protected class, (2) that she was qualified for the position, (3) that she was rejected, and (4) that the position was filled by someone who was not a member of the protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a failure-to-promote sex discrimination claim when sex was a motivating factor, even if the employer considered the selected candidate stronger.

Marshall v. New York Division of State Police · filed 1998-08-06(a)(1)

Plaintiff can prevail by showing that her gender was one of the motivating factors that led Defendants to hire Mr. Callahan, notwithstanding the fact that they considered him a stronger candidate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on evidence of bias to show that the bias influenced the challenged promotion decision.

Jones v. Oklahoma Employment · filed 1998-10-07(a)(1)

For Jones’ argument to be considered valid, she must present evidence that Griffith’s or Winn’s biases influenced the promotion decision.

A failure-to-promote plaintiff relying on comparative qualifications cannot prevail where the record does not show she was better qualified than the selected applicants.

Nguyen v. Runyon · filed 1998-11-30

Even assuming that Nguyen could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, he could not prevail in this case without estab- lishing that he was better qualified for the relevant position than the individuals actually selected.

Section 2000e-2 requires sufficient evidence of racial discrimination to sustain a failure-to-promote claim.

Hardy v. Simpson County School District · filed 1999-01-26

In sum this lawsuit, whether viewed under Title VII, § 1981, or § 1983, charges race discrimination, that McAlpin in his rating and recommendation, and that the School Board in its vote in favor of Neely, practiced racial discrimination. Plaintiff just has not presented evidence sufficient to withstand defendants’ motion showing that either McAlpin or the Board was actuated by racial animus.

Section 2000e-2 requires a discriminatory failure-to-promote plaintiff to show that they were qualified and rejected under circumstances suggesting unlawful discrimination.

Whitehead v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco · filed 1999-02-08

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote the plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) is a member of a protected group; (2) applied for the position in question; (3) was qualified for the position; and (4) was rejected for the position under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in promotions; circumstantial evidence must support an inference of intentional discrimination to defeat summary judgment.

Bickerstaff v. Nordstrom, Inc. · filed 1999-05-03(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal “to fail or refuse to hire or to- discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Troupe’s “bits and pieces” evidence, therefore, does not provide circumstantial evidence sufficient to defeat Defendant’s motion.

A failure-to-promote plaintiff cannot establish an inference of discrimination by comparing employees who were not similarly situated in material respects.

Martinez v. United Technologies Corp., Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division · filed 1999-05-12(a)(1)

The fact that these employees’ promotions evolved out of a grievance process related to a promotion Martinez was not even eligible for is a material, difference which undercuts Martinez’s claim that employees one, two and three were similarly situated to him. Thus, Martinez cannot demonstrate that he was passed over for a promotion under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

A coworker’s faster promotion does not establish discriminatory failure to promote when the employees’ relevant duties and promotion qualifications are materially different.

Barbour, Joyce A. v. Browner, Carol M. · filed 1999-07-13(a)(1)

The first question is whether "all of the relevant aspects of [Barbour's] employment situation were nearly identical" to those of Janette Peterson, and therefore whether Peterson's more rapid promotion could be said to indicate racial bias on the part of the EPA. ... In this case, however, we agree with the Government that no fair comparison can be drawn between Barbour and Peterson; hence, the jury's verdict cannot stand.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based promotion decisions; a failure-to-promote claim requires evidence that the position went to someone outside the employee’s protected group.

St. Hilaire v. the Pep Boys-Manny, Moe and Jack · filed 1999-09-02(a)(1)

St. Hilaire’s conclusory assertion that three of these positions were given to white applicants is without support in the record (Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2, 5). Therefore, St. Hilaire cannot make out a prima facie case of promotion discrimination.

A Title VII failure-to-promote claim requires the employee to show that she was qualified for the position.

Lynne S. Taylor, and Keisha Johnson v. Virginia Union University, Keisha Johnson, and Lynne S. Taylor v. Virginia Union · filed 1999-09-27(a)(1)

Because there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find that Taylor was qualified for the rank of corporal, the district court properly granted VUU’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Taylor’s failure to promote claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) generally requires a claimant alleging discriminatory failure to promote to have applied for the position; a secretive or informal hiring process may excuse that requirement.

Harris v. Warehouse Services, Inc. · filed 1999-11-29(a)

To the contrary, Title VII clearly requires that a claimant apply for the position for which he was denied. ... Moreover, the court finds that Plaintiff was not excused from applying for the job openings because they were posted in an open manner, according to a well-articulated company policy. Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to meet the second prima facie element of a failure to promote claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) supports a failure-to-promote claim when the evidence permits a jury to find that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual and that sex motivated its decision.

Rutherford v. Harris County Texas · filed 1999-12-20(a)(1)

Because we conclude that it did, we hold that the district court did not err in denying Harris County’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in denying its motion for new trial with respect to Rutherford’s failure to promote claim.

A Title VII failure-to-promote claim requires the employee to prove that he was qualified for the position sought.

Smith v. Libbey Glass · filed 2000-01-14

To make out a failure to promote claim, Smith must prove that he was qualified for the position he sought.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee alleging discriminatory denial of a promotion must show that the employer's legitimate reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Payne v. NC Housing Finance · filed 2000-04-26(a)(1)

However, we agree with the district court that the Agency offered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Payne and for promoting a male employee. We further agree with the district court that Payne did not show that the Agency's proffered reasons for not promoting her were a pretext for discrimina- tion.

Section 2000e-2 requires a failure-to-promote plaintiff to present evidence of pretext when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

James v. International Paper · filed 2000-05-26

Even if we assume that he was qualified, Interna- tional has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its fail- ure to promote him, in that Bowles did not receive a positive recommendation from James's supervisor. There is no evidence that this reason was pretextual.

A race-based failure-to-promote claim under § 2000e-2 cannot survive summary judgment when the plaintiff offers insufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Campbell v. Coastal Mart · filed 2000-06-27

We agree and conclude that, assuming Campbell presented a prima facie case of discrimination, she did not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude Coastal Mart’s reasons were pretextual.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory failure to promote must show that he was qualified for the position to establish a prima facie case under § 2000e-2(a).

Khadivi v. Jackson State University · filed 2000-08-29(a)

Accordingly, this court finds that plaintiff has not established his prima facie case of race or national origin discrimination because he has not presented proof that he was qualified for the position of Professor.

A plaintiff claiming sex discrimination in a failure to promote must show that she was qualified and rejected, and that someone outside her protected class with similar or lesser qualifications received the position.

Kielczynski v. Village of LaGrange, Ill. · filed 2000-11-15(a)(1)

More specifically, in the context of establishing a sex discrimination case in a failure-to-promote case, the plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for the position sought; (3) she was rejected for the position; and (4) someone not in the protected class was given the position who had similar or lesser qualifications.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a failure-to-promote plaintiff to offer evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.

Murungi v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2001-02-08(a)

Plaintiff, however, has offered no evidence other than his own opinion of his qualifications to suggest that defendant’s reasons were false and that the true motivation behind defendant’s failure to promote him was discriminatory.

A qualified employee can establish a prima facie sex discrimination claim for failure to promote when the employer rejects her and selects similarly qualified men.

Imhoff v. KMart Stores of Indiana, Inc. · filed 2001-05-25(a)(1)

The Court finds that the Plaintiff was qualified for the position, yet despite her qualifications, she was rejected, and persons not in the protected class, males, were given the promotions.

A failure-to-promote claim under § 2000e-2(a) fails to establish a prima facie case when the employee did not submit a required application and was therefore neither considered nor rejected.

Washington v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. · filed 2001-06-12(a)

Plaintiff cannot meet element numbers two (2) and three (3). He never properly applied for the positions at issue; hence, he was neither considered, nor rejected.

When an employer has a formal application process, an employee who does not use it cannot establish the application element of a Title VII failure-to-promote claim.

Rapp v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2001-06-25

As the Plaintiff failed to comply with the formal application procedures outlined in the National and the Fab Plant’s local CBAs, the Plaintiff cannot establish that she applied for the pipefitter position which became available in June 1998. Consequently, the Plaintiff cannot establish the second element of her prima facie case under Title VII.

A race-based failure-to-promote claim under § 2000e-2 fails when the applicant does not show she met the position’s availability requirement or that a similarly situated person outside her protected class was treated better.

Grant-Mack v. S & A Restaurant Corp. · filed 2001-08-16

We affirm the district court on this issue because Plaintiff failed to make her prima facie case. Plaintiff did not show that she was qualified for the position, which required unrestricted availability to work. Plaintiff also did not show that a similarly situated person from outside the protected class was treated better. Finally, even if Plaintiff made a prima facie case, she did not show that Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason of requiring unrestricted availability was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a failure-to-promote plaintiff to establish a prima facie race-discrimination case even when the selected applicant shares her race, if other evidence supports race as a motivating factor.

Harris v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2001-09-13(a)(1)

Harris can still establish a prima facie case by offering evidence, other than her subjective belief, that race was a motivating factor in State Farm’s failure to promote her to the Life Health Trainee position.

In a failure-to-promote claim, a qualifications disparity supports an inference of pretext only if it is so great that a reasonable decisionmaker could not have chosen the other candidate.

Humphrey v. Potter · filed 2001-09-14(a)(1)

A comparison of Avello’s and Humphrey’s respective qualifications reveals that any disparity that may have existed was not of such magnitude as to “jump off the page” and give rise to an inference of pretext.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory failure to promote must show that she was qualified for the position to establish a prima facie case.

Patrick v. Principi · filed 2001-10-09(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory non-promotion, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she belongs to a protected group, (2) she was qualified for the position in question, (3) she was not promoted, and (4) the position was filled by someone outside the protected class. ... However, Patrick fails to establish the remaining element, i.e., that she is qualified for a promotion to Nurse III.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex-discrimination failure-to-promote claim to proceed when evidence of disparate treatment and pretext creates a genuine factual dispute.

Morgan v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2001-11-16(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to Morgan, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist, thus precluding summary judgment. The Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the Title VII and ICRA claims of sexual discrimination through disparate treatment.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory failure to promote cannot show pretext merely by proving that she was better qualified than the selected candidate.

Rogers-Libert v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2001-12-18(a)(1)

Ms. Rogers-Libert cannot however, show pretext merely by proving that she was better qualified for the position than Mr. Parjus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars race discrimination in promotions, and a plaintiff must show pretext when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

Carter v. Farmers Rice Milling · filed 2002-03-01(a)(1)

Assuming arguendo that Carter established a prima facie case of promotion discrimination, he did not show that FRMC’s nondiscriminatory reasons for denying him the promotion were a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based promotion decisions; a failure-to-promote claim cannot survive summary judgment without a genuine dispute about whether the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Mustafa v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services · filed 2002-03-06(a)(1)

After review of the evidence, however, I conclude Mustafa has failed to advance facts demonstrating a genuine dispute regarding pretext.

Section 2000e-2 does not make a promotion decision based on friendship or politics actionable without evidence of discrimination.

Candillo v. North Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2002-03-18

Finally, although it may be an unfair decision, a promotion decision based on friendship or politics is not actionable under Title VII.

A discriminatory failure-to-promote claim requires a plaintiff to show membership in a protected class, an application for a position for which the plaintiff was qualified, denial of the promotion, and selection of a similarly qualified candidate outside the protected class.

Ulmer v. Dana Corp. · filed 2002-05-02(a)(1)

To establish a claim for discriminatory failure to promote, Plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) Mr. Ulmer is a member of a protected class; (2) Mr. Ulmer applied for and was qualified for the position to which he was not promoted; (3) Mr. Ul-mer was considered for and denied the promotion; and (4) the position ultimately was filled by a similarly qualified candidate from someone outside the protected class.

Section 2000e-2 requires a failure-to-promote plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to show that she was qualified for the positions she sought.

Chanita Farmer v. Cleveland Public Power and City of Cleveland · filed 2002-06-28

We therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion that Farmer has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based upon race or gender, because she did not present evidence that she was qualified for any of the positions to which she applied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim based on a denied promotion to proceed when evidence of pretext and discriminatory motive creates an issue for trial.

Heap v. County of Schenectady · filed 2002-08-13(a)(1)

Such evidence is unquestionably sufficient to demonstrate pretext, and is also sufficient to create an issue of fact for the fact finder as to whether defendants’ true motive was discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2 requires a religious-discrimination plaintiff alleging failure to promote to show that he was qualified for the position and that someone outside his protected group received it.

Rossi v. Troy State University · filed 2002-09-03

In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote, Rossi must show that (1) he was in a protected group; (2) he was not given the promotion; (3) he was qualified for the position and (4) someone outside of the protected group was given the position.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats the absence of an available position as a legitimate reason to deny a promotion.

Perez v. Region 20 Education Service Center · filed 2002-09-20(a)

The nonexistence of an available position is a legitimate reason not to promote.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a plaintiff challenging a denied promotion must offer evidence that permits a factfinder to disbelieve the employer’s stated reason or find that discrimination more likely motivated its decision.

Kidd v. MBNA America Bank, N.A. · filed 2002-09-30(a)

The court finds that plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that would allow a factfinder to reasonably either disbelieve defendant’s articulated legitimate reason, or believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating cause of defendant’s action.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require an employer to promote an employee to a position that does not exist.

Perez v. Regn 20 Educ Svc Ctr · filed 2002-10-08(a)

The nonexistence of an available position is a legitimate reason not to promote.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a qualified employee who was denied a promotion filled by someone with comparable qualifications to establish a prima facie discrimination case, but the employee must ultimately show intentional discrimination.

Dubuche v. Emery Worldwide Airlines · filed 2002-10-09(a)(1)

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Dubuche, I conclude that he has established a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from denying promotions because of race.

Wendell Lyons Donald Tate Robert L. Claiborne Rosevelt Willson v. Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy · filed 2002-10-09(a)(1)

With regard, to appellants’ properly presented failure-to-promote claims arising out of incidents occurring before and after their charges were filed, we reverse summary judgment and remand for trial as to all appellants.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a failure to promote claim when the position sought would require a substantial loss in salary.

McMillan v. Regeneration Technologies, Inc. · filed 2002-11-14(a)

Accordingly, upon due consideration, the Court concludes that the Telecommunications Specialist position, which would require the Plaintiff to suffer a substantial loss in salary, is not a “promotion” as a matter of law sufficient to state a claim under Title VII.

Subjective promotion interview scores do not establish pretext without evidence that the criteria or scoring masked discrimination.

Hall v. City of Chicago · filed 2002-11-20(a)(1)

Her claim that the subjective nature of the interview scores implies pretext is legally untenable, given her lack of evidence that the interview criteria and scoring system were a “mask” for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires a failure-to-promote plaintiff to show circumstances supporting an inference of race or gender discrimination; errors in a candidate list do not suffice when the list’s point totals had no effect on hiring.

Young v. Barnhart · filed 2002-12-03

Even if the points were miscalculated, leading to an erroneous compilation of the BQL, the list does not give rise to an inference of discrimination. As a result, Young has failed to establish a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim for a denied promotion when the evidence could allow a jury to find the employer’s stated reasons pretextual.

Lust v. Sealy, Inc. · filed 2002-12-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that defendant’s reasons for not promoting plaintiff are pretexts for discrimination. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied with respect to plaintiffs claim under Title VII.

A plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of race discrimination in a promotion decision shifts the burden to the employer to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

Gaddis v. Russell Corp. · filed 2003-01-22(a)

Having determined that the Plaintiff met her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the Defendant to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the decision not to promote the Plaintiff to the senior analyst position.

Under Section 2000e-2, a failure-to-promote plaintiff generally must show that she applied for the position.

Perez v. Norwegian-American Hospital · filed 2003-02-04(a)(1)

Perez cannot establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote. Perez, a female, certainly is a member of a protected group under Title VII. However, Perez has failed to establish that she applied for the Lieutenant position.

A failure-to-promote race discrimination claim fails when the employee cannot raise a genuine factual dispute that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Gee v. Liebert Corp. · filed 2003-02-12(a)(1)

Gee has adduced no evidence to demonstrate that the proffered rationale for awarding the job to Murphy was pretextual. As he has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding his ability to meet this burden, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was appropriate.

A sex-based failure-to-promote claim fails when the evidence does not create a genuine dispute that the employer’s stated reason for its decision was a pretext for discrimination.

Norrell v. Waste Away Group, Inc. · filed 2003-02-26(a)

The court has determined that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether that decision was a pretext for gender discrimination.

A plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie failure-to-promote claim under Title VII if the applicable collective bargaining agreement makes her ineligible for the position.

Rapp v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2003-03-04

As to the pipe-fitter positions that came open in June 1999, the district court correctly held that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case because she was no longer employed in the plant where the promotions occurred and was therefore not qualified for the positions under the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement between her union and General Motors.

A race discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when evidence that an employer applied a promotion requirement to a Black employee but not white employees permits a jury to find the stated reason for denying promotion pretextual.

White v. GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES · filed 2003-04-22(a)(1)

It is hard to imagine a greater contradiction or inconsistency as here, where Gallagher Bassett did not require white employees that were promoted to the Claims Supervisor position to possess three years supervisory experience, but did require Ms. White to have such experience.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-promote plaintiff relying on comparators to show that similarly qualified employees outside the protected class received the promotion when the plaintiff was denied it.

Mehr v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2003-07-23(a)(1)

The fact that employees outside the protected class received promotions at some point in time (in the case of Imafidon and Ruffier, several years prior to the commencement of this litigation), and in some cases to positions Mehr never even applied for, is not sufficient to satisfy the prima facie test.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in promotion to show that they were qualified and denied promotion while similarly qualified employees outside the protected class were promoted.

Johnson v. City of Memphis · filed 2003-08-04(a)

In order to establish a prima facie claim of racial discrimination based on a failure to promote under Title VII, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) they are members of a protected class; (2) they applied and were qualified for a promotion; (3) they were considered for and denied the promotion; and (4) other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the protected class received promotions.

A Title VII failure-to-promote claim fails under the indirect method when the plaintiff cannot identify a similarly situated person who received the promotion.

Thomas v. Chrysler Financial, LLC · filed 2003-08-25(a)(1)

But under the present facts Thomas has failed to identify any similarly situated individual who was promoted to the Credit Analyst position.

A Title VII failure-to-promote claim ordinarily requires the employee to apply for the position.

Westry v. North Carolina AT & T State University · filed 2003-09-25(a)(1)

Because Westry did not volunteer to assume the duties at the Help Desk, he cannot be said to have “applied” for the position. Thus, Westry has not satisfied the second prong of his prima facie case in regard to the Help Desk promotion.

A failure-to-promote sex discrimination claim requires evidence that an employee outside the protected group with similar qualifications received the promotion.

Chandler v. Vulcan Materials Co. · filed 2003-11-13(a)(1)

Assuming arguendo that Chandler was qualified for this promotion, she still fails to make her prima facie case, because, as Chandler herself admitted, the male co-worker was better qualified in terms of seniority and experience. Hence, the male co-worker did not have similar qualifications.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a sex-based failure-to-promote claim to proceed when evidence could allow a fact finder to disbelieve the employer’s stated reasons or find discrimination more likely than not.

Shesko v. City of Coatesville · filed 2003-11-20(a)

We find that Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of pointing to some evidence from which a fact finder could reasonably believe that “an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” ... Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is therefore denied as to Plaintiffs claim for failure to promote.

A failure-to-promote plaintiff must offer evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could disbelieve the employer’s stated reason or find that racial animus more likely than not motivated its decision.

Taylor v. Cherry Hill Board of Education · filed 2004-01-13(a)(1)

In sum, we do not find that Taylor introduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve the Board’s stated reason for hiring Spoto or to conclude that the Board’s decision was, more likely than not, motivated by racial animus.

A bare allegation that race or color caused a denied promotion, without supporting facts, fails to state a Title VII claim.

Russell v. Tennessee Department of Correction · filed 2004-04-16

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Russell’s complaint. The complaint simply stated that Russell was denied a promotion because of his race and color. The complaint contained neither details surrounding the alleged denial of a promotion nor any facts supporting such claim. Russell did not allege that he applied for a promotion, was qualified for a promotion, was considered for a promotion, or that a similarly-qualified employee who was not a member of the protected class received a promotion.

A discriminatory nonpromotion claim based on an employer’s diversity policies requires evidence linking those policies to the promotion decision.

Schamann v. O'KEEFE · filed 2004-04-21(a)(1)

Schamann’s argument that the competing affidavits are sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact is wholly undermined by the lack of evidence of any nexus between the continued classification of Schamann’s position as a GS-13 and any affirmative action plan.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a failure-to-promote plaintiff must show that she was qualified for an available promotion and that a similarly situated employee outside her protected group was promoted instead.

Younts v. Fremont Cty. · filed 2004-06-04(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee with respect to terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of an employee’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Based on the scant record before us, we conclude Rasmussen has presented insufficient evidence to prove (1) she was qualified for the DPC position; or (2) she was similarly situated to Emberton.

A failure-to-promote claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that the employee was qualified for the position and that a similarly situated employee outside her protected group was promoted instead.

Younts v. Fremont County, Iowa · filed 2004-06-04(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a failure-to-promote case, Rasmussen must show "(1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified and applied for a promotion to an available position; (3) she was rejected; and (4) similarly situated employees, not part of the protected group, were promoted instead." ... Based on the scant record before us, we conclude Rasmussen has presented insufficient evidence to prove (1) she was qualified for the DPC position; or (2) she was similarly situated to Emberton.

A Title VII failure-to-promote plaintiff must produce direct evidence or specific and substantial circumstantial evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretext for discrimination.

Walker v. Value Options, Inc. · filed 2004-06-28(a)(1)

Walker had the burden to produce direct or specific and substantial circumstantial evidence to show that the ValueOptions’ non-discriminatory reason for not promoting her was pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying a qualified employee a promotion because of her sex.

Shesko v. City of Coatesville · filed 2004-06-29(a)(1)

We think it is clear, however, that Plaintiff did make out her prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that she is a woman; (2) that she applied for and was qualified for the lieutenant’s position; (3) that she was rejected; and (4) that a man received the promotion to the lieutenant’s position.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a failure-to-promote claim without direct evidence uses the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Rios v. Rumsfeld · filed 2004-07-06(a)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it shall be illegal to discriminate against any individual based on “his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... In order to establish a prima facie case of “failure to promote” discrimination based on national origin, Plaintiff must show that: (1) Plaintiff belongs to a protected class, (2) he qualified for the position in question, (3) he was not hired despite his qualifications; and (4) the job was given to someone outside the protected group with roughly equivalent or lesser qualifications.

A discriminatory non-promotion claim requires evidence that an available position existed.

Hayslett v. Perry · filed 2004-08-16(a)(1)

Lacking evidence of an available position, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on non-promotion.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer is entitled to summary judgment on a discriminatory failure-to-promote claim when it gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and the employee offers no evidence of pretext.

Williams v. Potter · filed 2004-08-19(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that defendant’s stated reason for not promoting her to the Olathe position was a pretext for race or gender discrimination. The Court therefore finds that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim that in failing to promote her to the Olathe position, it discriminated against her on the basis of sex and/or race.