42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex-based hostile work environment claim to allege harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions.

Ancrum v. New York City Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2024-12-06(a)(1)

For these reasons, Ancrum’s Complaint fails to plausibly allege facts tending to show that she was subject to severe or pervasive sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment based on race or national origin to be objectively hostile and sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions for a hostile work environment claim.

Nabhan v. Indiana State Police · filed 2024-12-17(a)(1)

However, he has failed to create a genuine dispute of fact that Sgt. Burgett’s conduct was objectively hostile based on his race or national origin or that the conduct based on his race or national origin was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment.

An investigation based on an allegation of an employee’s racism, standing alone, does not establish a discriminatory hostile work environment under § 2000e-2.

Walker v. United States Army Secretary of · filed 2024-12-18

Moreover, the Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation to find that the AR 15-6 investigation based on an allegation of Plaintiff’s racism, standing alone, created a discriminatory hostile work environment under the standards set forth above.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits employer liability for a hostile work environment caused by students when the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take corrective action.

French v. Denver Public Schools · filed 2024-12-19(a)

Assuming that the harassment by Bruce Randolph students alleged by Mr. French was sufficiently severe and sustained to plead a cognizable claim for hostile work environment, his proposed amendments fail to plausibly allege facts sufficient to show that DPS was aware of the harassment he was experiencing at Bruce Randolph. Mr. French’s allegations thus fail to establish a factual basis to impute the students’ harassing behavior to DPS.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment claimant to allege a workplace that is both subjectively and objectively hostile or abusive.

Young v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2025-01-27(a)(1)

To sufficiently allege this element, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts showing that the work environment ‘is both subjectively and objectively hostile or abusive[.]’” Brown v. LaFerry’s LP Gas Co., 708 F. App’x 518, 520 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lounds, 812 F.3d at 1222).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that alleged workplace harassment was based on a protected class to support a hostile work environment claim.

Waters v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore · filed 2025-01-28(a)(1)

However, aside from messages fom an anonymous sender that Plaintiffhas been unable to link to any of his coworkers, none of these alleged exchanges include evidence that Plaintiff was targeted for harassment based on his protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a hostile work environment when discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions.

Vannier v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Services · filed 2025-01-30(a)(1)

One such exception is a claim for a hostile work environment: under Title VII, a hostile work environment is one which is “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive work environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). ... In consideration of all of plaintiff’s factual allegations, the Court finds that plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he endured a hostile work environment at GMCF.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment claim to allege harassment based on membership in a protected group.

Jandreski v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc. · filed 2025-01-30(a)(1)

Absent some protected status, or facts to support alleged harassment based on a protected status this claim fails to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits related acts of racial harassment to form one hostile work environment claim, even when the acts occur years apart.

Lowe v. Holmes Motors Inc · filed 2025-02-06(a)

The court finds that these specific facts are sufficiently related to constitute a single incident of racial harassment and that Mr. Lowe pleads factual content allowing the court to draw the reasonable inference that Holmes Motors is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Sexual comments alone do not establish a hostile work environment under § 2000e-2(a)(1); the alleged harassment must be because of the employee’s sex.

Barzyk v. Benvenuti Arts, Inc. · filed 2025-02-10(a)(1)

While showing one’s intimate items to a coworker or expressing sexual desire for a different coworker is clearly inappropriate, there are no allegations that Knapp did these actions or made these comments because of Barzyk’s sex, just that they generally had to do with the topic of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim based on repeated sex-based mistreatment and undesirable assignments by a supervisor.

Baughman v. Marathon Petroleum Logistics Services, LLC · filed 2025-02-13(a)(1)

Thus, the Court finds that Baughman’s hostile work environment claims are sufficient at this stage in the litigation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive.

Parke v. Assist Ambulance · filed 2025-02-17(a)(1)

Based on “the totality of the circumstances, including the severity of the discriminatory conduct,” the allegations do not support a finding of hostile work environment that was so severe or pervasive.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an alleged hostile work environment to be tied to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Cherry-El v. Martin · filed 2025-02-26(a)

But even with that benefit, the complaint does not allege that the “hostile work environment” was the product of Plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

For hostile work environment liability, an employee is a supervisor only if the employer empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim.

Rodriguez v. Parks · filed 2025-02-26(a)(1)

Like in Hall and Rhodes, the record in this case lacks facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that Parks was a “supervisor” for Title VII liability purposes. While Parks clearly provided input into plaintiffs’ evaluations, was charged with training them, and managed aspects of their work assignments, Parks was not empowered to affect plaintiffs through tangible employment actions such as hiring, firing, or disciplining.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a racially hostile work environment when persistent slurs make the workplace objectively abusive.

Fowler v. Caesars Virginia, LLC · filed 2025-03-03(a)(1)

Based on Fowler’s allegations, the court concludes that a work environment that was marred by persistent racial slurs directed at Fowler for three months is objectively hostile.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), facially neutral conduct can support a racially hostile work environment claim when the evidence permits an inference that it was based on race.

Jones v. Fluor Facility & Plant Servs. · filed 2025-03-05(a)(1)

The district court erred in this conclusion. We conclude that Jones has established, at the very least, a factual dispute as to whether this seemingly neutral conduct was race-related.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a hostile work environment when alleged mistreatment of a mother is plausibly tied to her sex.

CONNOR v. UNC HEALTH CARE SYSTEM · filed 2025-03-06(a)(1)

Under this standard, the complaint plausibly alleges that Connor was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her status as a mother rather than simply as a parent, and thus ties the allegations of mistreatment to her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires workplace harassment to be severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim.

De Piero v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY · filed 2025-03-06(a)(1)

No rational trier of fact could view occurrences such as receiving campus-wide e-mails about the murder of George Floyd, Juneteenth, and the hiring of police officers; being invited to review scholarly materials and engage in conversations about antiracist approaches to teaching and learning; and, discussing allegations of harassment levied by and against him as sufficiently “extreme” to sustain his charge of “severe” harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious hostile work environment claim to allege specific severe or pervasive conduct aimed at the employee’s religion.

Riser v. St. Charles Health System, Inc. · filed 2025-03-07(a)(1)

Because Plaintiffs fail to allege with specificity that they faced severe or pervasive verbal or physical conduct aimed at their religious status, their claim fails.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a hostile work environment to involve severe or pervasive conduct connected to a protected characteristic.

Jones v. Regan · filed 2025-03-19(a)

In sum, Jones has neither plausibly alleged conduct severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment nor offered facts suggesting that any such environment was created because of a protected characteristic or activity. The Court will thus dismiss this prong of the claim.

A hostile work environment claim requires plausible allegations of severe or pervasive harassment that alters the conditions of employment.

THEOPHANE v. HOMELAND INTELLIGENCE, LLC · filed 2025-03-21(a)

Further, Theophane’s hostile work environment allegations do not sufficiently allege that the harassment was so severe or pervasive that it altered his conditions of employment.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex-based hostile work environment claim when disputed facts could establish sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment and employer liability.

Black v. Verizon Communications, Inc. · filed 2025-03-22(a)

Plaintiff Angela Black (“Black”) brings this action against her employer Verizon Communications, Inc. (“Verizon”), alleging that Verizon exposed her to a hostile work environment based on her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. ... For the reasons set forth below, I find that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to these issues. Accordingly, I deny Verizon’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a sex-based hostile work environment when severe or pervasive harassment alters employment conditions and there is a basis for employer liability.

Nieves v. McDonough · filed 2025-03-26(a)(1)

Plaintiff has pled a viable claim of hostile work environment under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim when the employer’s conduct, viewed as a whole, is sufficiently pervasive to alter employment conditions.

Magassouba v. Prince George's County · filed 2025-03-27(a)(1)

A reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ conduct, when viewed as a whole, was sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment claim to allege sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment connected to a protected trait.

Byas v. Yonkers Public Schools · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

Accordingly, because this one incident cannot support Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, the totality of the allegations is not sufficiently severe or pervasive, and Plaintiff makes no plausible allegation connecting the conduct to her race, Defendant’s Motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory hostile work environment to alter the conditions of employment; isolated rude treatment and offhand comments do not suffice.

Jordan v. Lonza Walkersville, Inc · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

The foregoing alleged incidents were not so hostile, abusive, or frequent, over Plaintiff’s three-year period of employment, as to alter the conditions of her employment. The incidents consist largely of isolated instances of interpersonal conflict, rude treatment, and offhand comments that are not actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) supports a hostile work environment claim when alleged race-based harassment plausibly affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Bush v. Duncan Aviation, Inc · filed 2025-04-09(a)(1)

These allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to state a plausible hostile work environment claim under Title VII.

An isolated racially or sexually charged remark, without more, does not establish a Title VII hostile work environment claim.

Robinson v. AMERICAN READING COMPANY · filed 2025-04-29(a)(1)

As such, that comment is not actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment claim to be based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Finch v. Village of Sauk Village · filed 2025-05-05(a)(1)

As the defendants correctly point out, there are no allegations in the complaint that the plaintiff’s “hostile work environment claim is attributable to race, religion, color, sex, or national origin.” (R. 29 at 9.)

A single incident can support a hostile work environment claim under § 2000e-2(a) only if it is severe.

Qamar v. Board of Trustees of Gov. State Uni. (GSU) · filed 2025-05-06(a)

Single occurrences may support a hostile work environment claim, but only where they are severe.

The continuing violation doctrine can preserve a Title VII hostile work environment claim based on related conduct outside the limitations period.

Smith v. National Grid USA · filed 2025-04-30(a)(1)

The “continuing violation” doctrine applies to Smith’s hostile work environment claims under Section 1981 and Title VII, and thus no portion of those claims is time-barred.

Section 2000e-2 covers a racially hostile work environment when race-based harassment affects employment conditions and makes the workplace objectively and subjectively abusive.

Reddick v. Maryville University · filed 2025-05-15(a)(1)

Reviewing her current “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff has not alleged that the workplace at Maryville University was filled with such a racially charged environment in that six-year time that the actions were so severe and pervasive that a reasonable person could view such actions as abusive toward plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment supporting a hostile work environment claim to be objectively severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions.

Smith v. Ace Towing and Recovery LLC · filed 2025-05-30(a)(1)

Title VII requires harassment to be “both subjectively and objectively severe and pervasive.” Id. ... Smith no doubt perceived the harassment as severe and persuasive, but her allegations cannot satisfy the requirements for objectively severe and pervasive harassment.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence of severe or pervasive race-based harassment to sustain a hostile work environment claim.

Gipson v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center · filed 2025-06-02(a)(1)

Applying these rules, Plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude that she was subject to severe and pervasive harassment that was racially motivated.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim; ordinary supervisory actions do not suffice.

Regis v. Mayorkas · filed 2025-06-04(a)(1)

At bottom, Mr. Regis’s complaints of typical “work-related actions by supervisors” are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits hostile work environment discrimination based on sex or national origin; a claim fails without evidence of unwelcome harassment tied to either trait.

Nakanwagi v. Executive Office of the Trial Court · filed 2025-06-06(a)

Thus, even viewing the undisputed record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, she was not subjected to unwelcome harassment by Woodley based on her sex or national origin. Summary judgment will therefore be granted in defendant’s favor as to the hostile-work- environment claims in Counts 1 and 2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex-based hostile work environment claim to reach a jury when evidence could show pervasive harassment and employer negligence in controlling working conditions.

MUTHARD v. PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD · filed 2025-06-10(a)(1)

In order to establish a Title VII hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination because of her sex; (2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected her; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) respondeat superior liability exists. ... This court has already explained that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to allow her hostile work environment claim to go to a jury.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make isolated, nonsevere incidents of sexual harassment actionable as a hostile work environment.

Miller v. U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs · filed 2025-06-11(a)(1)

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the specific isolated incidents she cites (the “Candy Man” comment and the alleged “ogling”) do not meet the objective “severe and pervasive” standard.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment plaintiff to plausibly plead discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions and create an abusive workplace.

Junius Joyner, III v. Morrison and Foerster LLP · filed 2025-06-20(a)(1)

Joyner also lodges hostile work environment claims against the corporate defendants under Section 1981 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... To make out a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must plausibly plead that “he ... was exposed to ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires specific facts supporting a hostile work environment claim; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Harless v. City of Raleigh · filed 2025-06-25(a)(1)

However, Harless pleads no specific facts alleging “the kind of ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that characterizes a hostile work environment claim.” ... Accordingly, Harless’ hostile work environment claim under Title VII is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a sexually hostile work environment when harassment is severe or pervasive and there is a basis to hold the employer liable.

HERRERA v. QUALITY CHEVROLET GMC OF ENGLEWOOD, INC. · filed 2025-06-30(a)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff sufficiently pled a cause of action for a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment under Title VII and the LAD.

Section 2000e-2 permits employer liability for a sexually hostile work environment when the employer fails to take prompt and appropriate action reasonably calculated to end the harassment.

Beran v. VSL North Platte Court LLC · filed 2025-07-17(a)(1)

Therefore, the evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s finding that Linden Court did not take prompt and appropriate remedial action that was reasonably calculated to end the harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers a hostile work environment when unwelcome harassment based on a protected class is severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions and there is a basis for employer liability.

Stieglitz v. Chicago · filed 2025-07-23(a)

To state a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was subject to unwelcome harassment, (2) the harassment was based on his membership in a protected class, (3) the harassment was severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment, and (4) a basis exists for employer liability. ... Finally, as discussed above, see supra Section II.B, he has sufficiently pled severe and pervasive harassment to support the claim.

A single gendered insult is insufficient to establish a sex-based hostile work environment under Section 2000e-2(a)(1).

WATKINS v. MACK TRUCKS, INC. · filed 2025-07-24(a)(1)

Unlike in the race context, the one-time use of the word “bitch” is insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment.

A hostile work environment claim under Section 2000e-2 requires evidence of unwelcome conduct; a conclusory allegation of sexual harassment is insufficient.

Arnold v. Huntington Ingalls Industries · filed 2025-07-29(a)(1)

The single reference to “Gatling’s physical and verbal sexual harassment” is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact such that a reasonable jury could find that Gatling engaged in unwelcome conduct toward Ms. Amold.

An employer cannot be liable for a hostile work environment if it neither knew nor reasonably could have known about the alleged harassment.

Romero v. Kansas Heavy Construction, L.L.C. · filed 2025-08-06(a)

But regardless, his claim cannot survive summary judgment because Defendant did not know, and could not have reasonably known, about Gragg’s alleged misconduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination; a hostile work environment claim requires conduct that is objectively offensive and severe or pervasive.

RACHWALSKI v. GARLAND · filed 2025-08-21(a)(1)

Rachwalski's hostile work environment claim fails on elements one and three because Brooks' actions were neither objectively offensive nor severe or pervasive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment claimant to show sex-based discrimination severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment.

Yahne v. City and County of Denver Department of Human Services · filed 2025-08-26(a)(1)

Thus, based on the evidence presented, Plaintiff has failed to raise a question for a jury as to whether the discrimination she allegedly faced was severe or pervasive enough that it altered the terms or conditions of her employment or created an abusive working environment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination or hostile work environment claim to allege membership in a protected class and more favorable treatment of people outside that class.

Clark v. Exxon · filed 2025-08-26(a)

Her discrimination and hostile work environment claims under Title VII and Arkansas Civil Rights Act fail, too. Nowhere in her papers does Clark allege that she is a member of a protected class or that others outside of that class were treated more favorably, a pre-requisite for either claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim against an employer when a supervisor’s sex-based harassment plausibly alters an employee’s working conditions.

Tardiff v. Laborers International Union of North America, Local 609 · filed 2025-08-15(a)(1)

Furthermore, Ms. Tardiff has plausibly alleged that Local 609 is vicariously liable under Chapter 151B and Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires alleged harassment to be based on sex; emails without a gender-related connotation or supporting context do not establish sex-based harassment.

Maxwell v. Tuskegee University (MAG+) · filed 2025-08-29(a)(1)

Ruffin’s emails of July 27, 2022 and August 21, 2022 cannot be deemed gender-based so as to amount to Title VII harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race-based hostile work environment claim when harassment because of the employee’s race is severe or pervasive.

Garcia v. Westhampton Primary Care · filed 2025-08-30(a)(1)

With respect to Garcia’s claim that she faced a racially hostile work environment, the Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that she faced harassment that was both severe and pervasive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging a race-based hostile work environment to show that race caused the hostile conditions.

Garcia v. Westhampton Primary Care · filed 2025-09-10(a)(1)

To plead a race-based hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must allege that her membership in a protected class caused her to experience a hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2 requires a hostile work environment claim to allege harassment because of a protected trait.

BROWN v. PORT AUTHORITY TRANSIT CORPORATION · filed 2025-09-11(a)(1)

Brown fails to state a plausible claim because he does not allege sufficient facts to support at least three of these elements. First, he fails to show intentional discrimination because of race or sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a hostile work environment when an employer’s response to a reported sexual assault plausibly subjects an employee to pervasive harassment based on sex.

Villalobos v. Aquascape Designs, Inc. · filed 2025-09-12(a)(1)

Because the conduct was in response to an inherently sex-based action, the reasonable inference, in favor of plaintiff, is that the actions of her supervisor and HR were based on sex. Taken as true, these facts plausibly allege that Villalobos was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits nonsexual conduct to support a sex-based hostile work environment claim only when evidence links that conduct to the employee’s sex.

White v. The Galt House · filed 2025-09-15(a)(1)

Because White has not shown that an anti-female animus rooted her being compelled to leave dayshifts early, those incidents are not probative of harassment based on sex and cannot be considered in the Court’s hostile environment analysis.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex-based hostile work environment claims when alleged workplace conduct amounts to more than petty slights.

Bassett v. The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2025-09-16(a)(1)

They support an overall picture that Bassett encountered more than “petty slights” in the workplace.

A hostile work environment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment.

Desire v. VineBrook Homes LLC · filed 2025-09-17(a)(1)

Still, the conduct was not objectively severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires gender-based harassment to be severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim.

Feather v. Wisconsin State Fair Park Police Department · filed 2025-09-19(a)(1)

The six alleged relevant incidents (five involving Malasuk and one involving Pileggi), even weighed cumulatively, do not rise to the level of a severe or pervasive degree of harassment.

An employer’s investigation can violate Title VII when it departs from protocol and is conducted in a harassing or humiliating manner.

Dins, Jamie v. State of Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources · filed 2025-09-26(a)(1)

Employers violate Title VII when their investigations are conducted contrary to protocol and in a harassing or humiliating manner. ... Augle’s conduct is not harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim when sexual harassment of correctional officers is sufficiently pervasive to alter their working conditions.

Good v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction · filed 2025-09-26(a)(1)

The record evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sexual harassment they faced was sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim when sex and national origin discrimination, considered together, is severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions.

Trujillo v. Rio Grande County Sheriff's Office · filed 2025-09-29(a)(1)

The Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Sheriff McDonald’s comments amounted to discrimination based on national origin, and that RGSO’s alleged uniform and night shift policies amounted to discrimination based on sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sex-based discrimination to create a hostile or abusive work environment for a Title VII hostile work environment claim.

Leonard v. Driscoll · filed 2025-09-29(a)(1)

To establish a violation of Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act, Leonard must prove that the alleged discrimination based on sex or disability created a hostile or abusive work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment claim to plausibly connect the alleged hostility to a protected characteristic.

Watkins v. City of Chicago, The · filed 2025-09-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege enough facts to allow for a plausible inference that her allegedly hostile work environment was related to any of her protected characteristics.

Harassment is race based under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when the alleged conduct is explicitly tied to the employee’s race.

Comeaux v. Kleinpeter Farms Diary, LLC · filed 2025-10-08(a)(1)

In each instance, Plaintiff alleges that Watson explicitly said these actions were being taken because Plaintiff was Black or made direct comments about Plaintiff’s skin color. (Id. at 2–3.) Therefore, these incidents are based on Plaintiff’s protected class (i.e., his race).

Section 2000e-2(a) requires sexual harassment to be severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment; flirtation alone does not suffice.

Cliff · filed 2025-10-14(a)

Because the conduct Plaintiff alleges is little more than flirtation, and flirtation standing alone is not a basis for finding a hostile work environment, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege severe or pervasive conduct to sustain a hostile work environment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination by employers, including sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environment.

Davidson · filed 2025-10-20(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex. ... TDOC does not argue that Davidson’s claim under Title VII for sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. TDOC’s Motion will be denied as to the Complaint’s claim for hostile work environment under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim based on coworker harassment when the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take prompt, appropriate corrective action.

King · filed 2025-10-22(a)(1)

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing reasonable inferences in his favor, a reasonable jury could conclude that Rae “knew or should have known” of Tennant’s harassing conduct by February 22, 2022, and that its response over a month later in April 2022 was neither prompt nor appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires hostile work environment conduct to be severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions; Muldrow did not remove that requirement.

Russell v. Driscoll · filed 2025-11-05(a)(1)

In short, an inquiry into the severity or pervasiveness of the complained-of conduct is integral to determining whether any actionable Title VII injury occurred.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment claim to allege intentional discrimination based on a protected trait that is severe or pervasive.

BROWN · filed 2025-12-12(a)(1)

Brown fails to state a plausible claim for at least two of the reasons the Court previously explained: He does not allege sufficient facts to support that he suffered intentional discrimination because of race that was severe or pervasive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires workplace harassment to be severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment and affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Taylor · filed 2025-12-22(a)(1)

Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim fails because none of the facts she has alleged—even if true—constitute conduct that was so severe or pervasive as to create an abusive working environment, nor does she raise a genuine issue that the harassment affected a “term, condition, or privilege” of her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment plaintiff to show that the harassment was based on sex and was severe or pervasive.

SEDGWICK · filed 2025-12-29(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Sedgwick has not presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the alleged harassment was based on her sex or that the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires conduct to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions for a hostile work environment claim.

Rivera v. Attorney General Pennsylvania · filed 2026-01-09(a)(1)

Rivera’s other allegations, even if true, do not evince discriminatory animus and, in any event, were insufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile-work-environment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions when the employer is responsible for the hostile work environment.

Boigenzahn · filed 2026-01-12(a)(1)

Accordingly, because the Plaintiff has established the elements of a hostile work environment claim, she is entitled to default judgment on Count I.

Race-based harassment can support a hostile work environment claim when a reasonable factfinder could find it severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions.

Nelson v. Crane Service Co. · filed 2026-01-15

Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Nelson, as the nonmovant, the Court concludes that a reasonable factfinder could find that the alleged harassment was severe and pervasive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a gender-based hostile work environment claim to allege facts supporting a reasonable inference of severe or pervasive discrimination that made the workplace objectively hostile or abusive.

Dash v. Meridian Public Charter School · filed 2026-01-16(a)(1)

In particular, Dash does not plead facts that, if true, would support a reasonable inference that she suffered discrimination based on her gender that was “severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race-based hostile work environment claim to show severe or pervasive harassment based on race.

Jones v. Das · filed 2026-01-22(a)(1)

But here, we hold that because Jones cannot show perva- sive, race-based harassment, her hostile work environment claim fails.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment claim to connect the alleged harassment to a protected characteristic.

HAMARNEH · filed 2026-01-23(a)(1)

The Amended Complaint does not adequately connect the harassment Plaintiff alleges to his national origin, race, or religion. As before, Plaintiff’s claims are based solely on the “Italian intimidating look” comment, the Israeli cultural training, interactions stemming from interpersonal conflicts, and incidents arising from his duties as an employee. (See Am. Compl.) None of those events, however, have any apparent connection to his national origin, ethnicity, or religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers hostile work environment sex discrimination when unwelcome conduct is severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions.

Larson · filed 2026-01-23(a)(1)

Because a jury will have to determine which version of the facts is the truth, summary judgment is not appropriate. Larson’s summary judgment motion on her Title VII hostile work environment claim is DENIED.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment to be based on a protected characteristic to support a hostile work environment claim.

Leath v. Collins · filed 2026-01-28(a)(1)

Leath has not established facts on which a reasonable jury could conclude that her treatment was based on her race or sex, in satisfaction of the third factor.

An employer that knows or should know of workplace sexual harassment avoids liability by promptly taking remedial action reasonably calculated to end it.

Zirpel v. Toshiba American · filed 1997-04-10(a)(1)

Whatever Cunningham said and did, the district court properly granted summary judgment because Toshiba promptly took “remedial action . . . reasonably calculated to end the harassment” once it knew or should have known about Cunningham’s behavior.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits workplace sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.

Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc. · filed 1997-05-08(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of sex with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). It is well established that this prohibition encompasses sexual harassment in the workplace.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer liable for a co-worker’s sexual harassment when the employer knew or should have known of it and failed to take appropriate corrective action.

Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc. · filed 1995-12-12(a)(1)

The plaintiff thus must show that the employer knew or should have known of, but failed to take appropriate action to correct, the co-worker’s harassing conduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1)’s prohibition on sex discrimination includes workplace sexual harassment.

Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc. · filed 1996-01-19(a)(1)

Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination includes sexual harassment in the workplace.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make an employer liable for coworker sexual harassment when the employer had no knowledge of the misconduct or opportunity to correct it.

Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. · filed 1994-01-24(a)(1)

We conclude as a matter of law that because Plaintiff never brought to defendant’s attention all other alleged incidents of harassment, and because Plaintiffs coworkers do not act as the employer’s agents, Donnelley should not be held hable for the incidences of sexual harassment when it had not been given an opportunity to remedy the situation.

An employer is liable for coworker racial harassment when it knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take corrective action.

Charles JEFFRIES, Jr., Appellant, v. METRO-MARK, INC., a Minnesota Corporation, Appellee · filed 1995-02-17(a)(1)

Since an employer may be held liable only for events of which it knows or should have known, either directly or constructively, and with respect to which it fails to take corrective action, ... the trial court found that no grounds existed for holding Metro-Mark liable for racial harassment of Mr. Jeffries. ... We therefore affirm that decision by the trial court.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not automatically shield an employer from sexual harassment liability because employees failed to use its grievance procedure.

Cross v. State of Alabama · filed 1995-04-06(a)(1)

Requested jury instruction number 23 instructs the jury that if it finds that the Department had a clear policy against sexual harassment containing an established grievance procedure, and none of the appellees chose to pursue the grievance procedure, then the jury must find for appellants on appellees' claims of sexual harassment under Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank expressly rejects this statement as the law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer that knows or should know of sexual harassment to take prompt, effective action to remedy it.

Fuller v. City of Oakland, California George Hart Antonio Romero · filed 1995-04-24(a)(1)

Once an employer knows or should know of harassment, a remedial obligation kicks in.

An employer is not liable for sexual harassment under Title VII when it takes prompt and adequate remedial action after learning of the harassment.

Rivera v. Telefonica De Puerto Rico · filed 1995-06-23(a)(1)

In the instant case, we find that the defendants took prompt and adequate action in investigating the plaintiffs’ claims against co-defendant Varela, the alleged harasser.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose employer liability for isolated coworker harassment when the employer responds promptly and effectively and the conduct stops.

Spicer v. Virginia · filed 1995-10-02(a)(1)

In this case, the Virginia Department of Corrections responded both promptly and effectively, eliminating completely the offensive conduct of the kind directed at Spicer. In these circumstances we hold that the employer is not liable for the isolated but offensive conduct of its employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make an employer liable for coworkers’ sexual harassment when the employer responds promptly and effectively and the harassment stops.

Spicer v. Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 1995-10-02(a)(1)

When presented with the existence of illegal conduct, employers can be required to respond promptly and effectively, but when an employer's remedial response results in the cessation of the complained of conduct, liability must cease as well.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to be held liable for a hostile work environment when it knew or should have known about sexual harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action.

Munn v. MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF SAVANNAH · filed 1995-10-26(a)(1)

This Court agrees that, because Defendant may have had actual or constructive knowledge of incidents of harassment involving other women, a factual issue is raised as to whether Defendant acted appropriately in light of that knowledge.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require proof that an employer failed to take prompt remedial action when the harasser was himself an employer.

Chavez v. KOSA Television · filed 1995-12-29(a)

Obviously, respondeat superior is not applicable when, as here, sexual harassment is by the employer, rather than by a co- worker or supervisor.

An employer may be liable under Title VII for a supervisor’s sexual harassment if it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Codrington v. Virgin Islands Port Authority · filed 1996-01-17

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Codrington, as we have recited them above, we cannot say as a matter of law that VIPA's actions consisting of two meetings in 1987 and 1990, and an investigation and two week suspension of Hanley in 1992, represent prompt, remedial action.

An employer avoids liability for a hostile work environment when its prompt corrective measures stop the sexual harassment.

Maher v. Associated Services for the Blind · filed 1996-05-28(a)(1)

Upon review of the evidence submitted by the parties viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Maher, we conclude that even if Ms. Maher could show that she endured a hostile working environment, the corrective steps taken by ASB were effective and prevented further objectionable conduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits workplace sexual harassment, but an employer that takes prompt remedial action after learning of harassment is not liable for a hostile work environment.

Clark v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. · filed 1996-06-24(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Clark, the non-movant, the Court concludes that World Services took prompt remedial action to resolve the sexual harassment complaint Clark asserted. Summary judgment for World Services will be GRANTED on Clark’s sexual harassment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging coworker racial harassment to show that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take remedial action.

Ridley v. District of Columbia · filed 1996-11-18(a)(1)

When a discriminatory hostile work environment is created by non-supervisory co-workers, the plaintiff also must show that the employer knew, or should have known, of the harassment and failed to take remedial action. ... Based on the facts as alleged and this record, the Court does not find that the employer in this case actually or constructively knew of the alleged discriminatory conduct. Therefore, the defendant shall not be held liable under Title VII for the allegedly discriminatory conduct of the plaintiffs co-workers.

An employer may be liable for sexual harassment by an upper level manager who uses actual or apparent authority to further it.

Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc. · filed 1996-11-22

Ortho is liable for the sexual harassment perpetrated by Moreland, its upper level manager. Moreland used his actual or apparent authority at Ortho to further his sexual harassment of Ms. Todd, or he was otherwise aided in accomplishing harassment by virtue of the position he had with Ortho.

An employer may be charged with notice of coworker harassment through an employee who has substantial authority over employment decisions or substantial responsibility for relaying complaints to management.

Lamb v. Household Credit Services · filed 1997-01-29(a)(1)

Taken as a whole, the cases demonstrate that for purposes of Title VII, “management-level employees” encompass two groups of persons: first, supervisors possessing substantial authority and discretion to make decisions concerning the terms of the harasser’s or harassee’s employment; and second, non-management employees charged with substantial responsibility for relaying employee complaints to management, particularly where management is located away from the workplace.

For a hostile work environment claim, employer liability requires actual or constructive knowledge of harassment and a failure to remedy it.

Watts v. Kroger Co. · filed 1997-02-03(a)(1)

Liability may be imposed upon an employer for the discriminatory acts of an employee only if the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s offensive conduct and failed to take steps to repudiate that conduct and eradicate the hostile environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits hostile work environment claims based on race or sex, but an employer that promptly remedies isolated harassment after learning of it is not liable.

Williams v. Westwood One Radio Networks, Incorporated · filed 1997-03-04(a)(1)

Racial and/or sexual harassment which creates a "hostile work environment" is actionable under Title VII because it amounts to discrimination in the conditions of employment. ... The actions in question were relatively isolated occurrences, and as soon as Westwood officials became aware of them, they took prompt remedial action. In short, Westwood remedied every complaint Williams lodged. Accordingly, the district court properly granted Westwood's motion for summary judgment on this claim, and we affirm.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits employer liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment when the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to respond adequately.

Harrison v. Eddy Potash · filed 1997-05-08(a)(1)

Under this theory of employer liability, the plaintiff must establish "that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the hostile work environment," but "did not adequately respond to notice of the harassment." 48 Vand.L.Rev. at 1080.

An employer with a comprehensive, well-known, vigorously enforced anti-discrimination policy that offers alternate avenues of redress is insulated from hostile-environment liability based on constructive knowledge of harassment.

Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. · filed 1997-06-30(a)(1)

In sum, we hold that an employer is insulated from liability under Title VII for a hostile environment sexual harassment claim premised on constructive knowledge of the harassment when the employer has adopted an anti-discrimination policy that is comprehensive, well-known to employees, vigorously enforced, and provides alternate avenues of redress.

An employer that responds to coworker sexual harassment is liable only if its remedy shows indifference amounting to discrimination.

Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc. · filed 1997-08-22(a)(1)

When an employer implements a remedy, it can be liable for sex discrimination in violation of Title YII only if that remedy exhibits such indifference as to indicate an attitude of permissiveness that amounts to discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits employer liability for coworker sexual harassment when the employer's remedy shows indifference amounting to discrimination.

Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers · filed 1997-08-22(a)(1)

When an employer implements a remedy, it can be liable for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII only if that remedy exhibits such indifference as to indicate an attitude of permissiveness that amounts to discrimination.

An employer that learns of workplace sexual harassment is not liable under § 2000e-2(a)(1) if it takes immediate and appropriate corrective action.

Fleming v. Boeing Company · filed 1997-08-25(a)(1)

Boeing's response to Alexander's complaint constituted immediate and appropriate corrective action and Boeing is not liable to Alexander under Title VII.

An employer is not liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment when it takes immediate and appropriate corrective action after learning of the harassment.

Fleming v. Boeing Company · filed 1997-08-25(a)(1)

We conclude that Boeing's actions constituted immediate and appropriate corrective action and that therefore Boeing is not liable for Fleming's claim.

An employer that knows or should know of sexual harassment must take appropriate remedial action to avoid liability under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Smith v. Brown · filed 1997-09-26(a)(1)

Ms. Smith’s sexual harassment claim must fail, however, because the defendant took steps to rectify the situation. The defendant is responsible for Mr. Curry’s conduct only if it “knew or should have known about [Mr. Curry’s] acts of harassment and fail[ed] to take appropriate remedial action.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a supervisor's harassment can be attributed to the employer under agency principles.

Pfau v. Reed · filed 1997-10-27(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from, among other things, "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Thus, the actions of one who constitutes an agent of an employer may be considered the actions of the employer for purposes of imposing Title VII liability on the employer. ... We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that Gonzales was not Pfau's employer for purposes of determining the DCAA's liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose liability on an employer for a supervisor’s alleged sexual harassment when the employer takes prompt and adequate action to end it.

Yancey v. National Center on Institutions & Alternatives · filed 1997-12-05(a)(1)

Accordingly, I find that reasonable minds could not disagree that NCIA took prompt and adequate remedial action designed to end the harassment when informed of Yancey’s allegations against Johnson, and liability cannot be imputed to NCIA for Johnson’s alleged acts.

An employer may be liable under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) for an agent's sexual harassment, but a supervisor's authority to assign work and recommend personnel actions alone does not establish agency.

Pfau v. Reed · filed 1998-01-06(a)(1)

The case law in this circuit indicates that this degree of authority is, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish that a supervisor is an agent within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can make an employer liable for a nonemployee’s sexual harassment when the employer knows the conduct creates a hostile work environment and fails to take appropriate corrective action.

Ligenza v. Genesis Health Ventures of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1998-02-20(a)(1)

Without any prior awareness that the misconduct created a hostile work environment for Plaintiff in particular, Genesis had no duty to take any further remedial action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an employer to defeat a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim by taking timely and appropriate remedial action, even when the harasser is a supervisor.

Todd v. Biotech · filed 1998-03-05(a)(1)

Rather, the error here is more far-reaching, for it deprived the employer of a complete defense -- that it took timely and appropriate remedial action to correct serious, one-time misconduct occurring outside the workplace -- merely because the offender was a “supervisor” who had no direct authority over the victim. We conclude Instruction No. 37 was reversible error.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an employer to be liable for a hostile work environment when a supervisor uses authority over an employee to facilitate sexual harassment.

Dahdal v. Thorn Americas, Inc. · filed 1998-03-19(a)(1)

If the harasser holds actual power over the plaintiff in the work place, then the employer is liable if the harasser misuses that power to create a hostile work environment for the plaintiff. ... Despite defendant’s arguments to the contrary, this creates a genuine issue of fact as to whether Martinez’ harassment was facilitated by his authority. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to this claim.

An employer avoids liability for a coworker’s sexual harassment when it provides a reasonable way to complain and takes effective action after learning of the harassment.

Schiraldi v. AMPCO System Parking · filed 1998-03-31(a)(1)

Since the plaintiffs have not demonstrated either that the defendant employer provided no reasonable avenue of complaint, or that it knew of the harassment and did nothing, to stop it, the plaintiffs’ claims for hostile work environment sexual harassment must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer to know or have reason to know of coworker sexual harassment before it can be liable for failing to address it.

Dorricott v. Fairhill Center for Aging · filed 1998-04-21(a)(1)

Where the Center was not informed of the harassment, this Court cannot find the Center hable for failure to take action on matters it knew nothing about.

An employer may be liable for coworker sexual harassment when it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to respond adequately.

Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1998-05-18(a)(1)

Because an employer is only potentially liable for negligence in remedying and preventing harassment of which it negligently failed to discover, courts must make two inquiries: first, into the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of harassment, and second, into the adequacy of the employer’s remedial and preventative responses to any actually or constructively known harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer vicariously liable for a supervisor’s actionable harassment, subject to an affirmative defense based on the reasonableness of the employer’s and employee’s conduct.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton · filed 1998-06-26(a)(1)

We hold that an employer is vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, but subject to an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct as well as that of a plaintiff victim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to avoid liability for a supervisor’s hostile work environment when no tangible employment action occurs, the employer has effective complaint procedures and responds to the harassment, and the employee unreasonably fails to use those procedures.

Sconce v. Tandy Corp. · filed 1998-07-09(a)(1)

She suffered no tangible employment action. ... In this case, it is undisputed that Defendant had an effective policy in place. ... It follows that a threat of termination, without more, is not enough to excuse, an employee from following procedures adopted for her protection. ... Once Defendant did learn about the allegations from the EEOC complaint, it conducted an investigation and enforced discipline. Plaintiff does not dispute the adequacy of this response. Under these circumstances, Defendant cannot be liable for the sexual harassment by one of its employees as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats a harassment complaint to someone the employer authorizes to receive it as notice to the employer.

77 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 613, 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,451 Linda Williamson v. The City of Houston, Texas v. The Cit · filed 1998-07-22(a)(1)

If the employer has structured its organization such that a given individual has the authority to accept notice of a harassment problem, then notice to that individual is sufficient to hold the employer liable. Thus, we find that notice to Bozeman can be imputed to the City of Houston for purposes of liability under Title VII.

A supervisor’s harassment triggers automatic employer liability under Title VII when it causes a significant change in employment status; extra work alone does not qualify.

Reinhold v. Commonwealth of Virginia Virginia School for the Deaf and Blind · filed 1998-08-04(a)(1)

In this case, Reinhold’s evidence does not support the conclusion that she suffered a “tangible employment action” sufficient to give rise to the automatic imputation of liability against Appellants for Martin’s actions. ... While Reinhold alleges that she was assigned extra work and suffered other harm as a result of her rejection of Martin’s sexual advances, she does not allege that she experienced a change in her employment status akin to a demotion or a reassignment entailing significantly different job responsibilities.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), notice of coworker harassment to a supervisor authorized to receive complaints can be imputed to the employer.

Williamson v. The City of Houston · filed 1998-08-12(a)(1)

If the employer has structured its organization such that a given individual has the authority to accept notice of a harassment problem, then notice to that individual is sufficient to hold the employer liable.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) ordinarily requires an employer to receive notice of objectionable coworker conduct before it can be liable for failing to correct it, in cases without vicarious liability.

Whitmore v. O'Connor Management · filed 1998-08-18(a)(1)

We believe that in cases not involving vicarious liability, employees have some obligation to inform their employers, either directly or otherwise, of behavior that they find objectionable before employers can be held responsible for failing to correct that behavior, at least ordinarily.

For coworker sexual harassment outside vicarious liability, an employer ordinarily must have notice of objectionable conduct before it can be liable for failing to correct it.

Whitmore v. O'COnnOr Management, Inc., and General Growth Management, Inc. · filed 1998-10-17(a)(1)

We believe that in cases not involving vicarious liability, employees have some obligation to inform their employers, either directly or otherwise, of behavior that they find objectionable before employers can be held responsible for failing to correct that behavior, at least ordinarily. Absent some showing of negligence on the part of General Growth, Ms. Whitmore cannot prevail in the circumstances of this case.

An employer cannot use the affirmative defense to supervisor sexual harassment liability when the supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the employee.

Kelley v. Worley · filed 1998-12-14(a)(1)

In this case, however, Plaintiff was discharged, suffering a tangible employment action which she claims was caused by her refusal to accede to Defendant Worley’s improper sexual advances. Because Defendant Worley took tangible employment action against Plaintiff, his subordinate, Famgher’s affirmative defense is inapplicable.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) holds an employer vicariously liable for a supervisor’s hostile work environment harassment when the employer fails to establish its affirmative defense.

Hollis v. City of Buffalo · filed 1998-12-30(a)(1)

The court finds that Pendolino’s conduct subjected plaintiff to a hostile work environment and that the City did not take reasonable care to prevent or correct Pendolino’s harassment. Furthermore, the City failed to demonstrate that there were any preventive or corrective opportunities available to plaintiff. Accordingly, defendant is found vicariously liable for Pendolino’s conduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose vicarious liability on an employer for a supervisor’s sexual harassment when the employee promptly complains and the employer promptly disciplines the supervisor and stops the harassment.

Constance Chaix INDEST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FREEMAN DECORATING, INC. and Larry Arnaudet, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1999-01-19(a)(1)

Applying the foregoing analysis to Indest’s case, we hold that because she promptly complained of Arnaudet’s harassing conduct, and because the company promptly responded, disciplined Arnaudet appropriately and stopped the harassment, the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to Freeman. Even if a hostile work environment claim had been stated, which is dubious, Freeman’s prompt remedial response relieves it of Title VII vicarious liability.

An employer may be directly liable under Title VII for sexual harassment it knew or should have known about and failed to stop, even if it has a defense to vicarious liability.

Janowicz v. Martin, et al. · filed 1999-02-05(a)(1)

"An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it." ... As neither Burlington nor Faragher resolved claims of direct employer negligence, that theory of liability remains intact.

An employer may be liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment when it knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take corrective action.

Dees v. Johnson Controls World Svs. · filed 1999-02-23(a)(1)

A jury could reasonably infer from each of these allegations that World Services knew before Dees filed her complaint in August 1994 that Fire Department supervisors were sexually harassing employees, yet failed to take any corrective action. We thus conclude that these allegations are sufficient to raise an issue of material fact as to whether World Services is both directly and vicariously liable for Dees' abuse, and that the district court inappropriately granted summary judgment in favor of World Services.

An employer may be liable for supervisors’ sexual harassment when it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take corrective action.

Mashell C. DEES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHNSON CONTROLS WORLD SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1999-02-23(a)(1)

A jury could reasonably infer from each of these allegations that World Services knew before Dees filed her complaint in August 1994 that Fire Department supervisors were sexually harassing employees, yet failed to take any corrective action. We thus conclude that these allegations are sufficient to raise an issue of material fact as to whether World Services is both directly and vicariously liable for Dees’ abuse, and that the district court inappropriately granted summary judgment in favor of World Services.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer liable for a hostile work environment created by co-workers when the employer fails to take reasonable steps to discover and remedy the harassment.

Donnie M. WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1999-03-31(a)(1)

Liability for co-worker harassment requires a showing of negligence on the part of the employer. ... Thus, a plaintiff must show that her employer failed to take reasonable steps to discover and remedy the harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer presumptively liable for a hostile work environment created by an employee’s immediate supervisor.

Sowemimo v. D.A.O.R. Security, Inc. · filed 1999-04-19(a)(1)

Islam was Sowemimo’s immediate supervisor, and thus D.A.O.R. is presumptively liable under Title VII for his acts of harassment.

An employer is not liable for coworker sexual harassment when its response after receiving notice stops the harassment.

Karen A. KUNIN, v. SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., Appellant · filed 1999-04-28(a)(1)

Our precedents provide that when an employer’s response stops harassment, there cannot be Title VII liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment claim based on coworker harassment to allege facts that make the employer liable for the harassment.

Manikhi v. Mass Transit Administration · filed 1999-07-19(a)(1)

We conclude that the allegations of appellant’s amended complaint, when construed in accordance with the applicable standard of review, fail to satisfy the pleading requirements under the fourth element of a hostile environment claim. Assuming that appellant appropriately alleged that she was a victim of sexual harassment by her co-worker, Ovid, appellant fails to allege facts from which the MTA could be held liable for Ovid’s harassment.

An employer’s liability for a supervisor’s hostile environment sexual harassment can turn on its knowledge of earlier harassment and its reasonable care to prevent it.

Brooks v. H.J. Russell & Co. · filed 1999-07-26(a)(1)

Genuine issues of material fact exist, therefore, as to whether the Company is vicariously liable for Brown’s misconduct. Accordingly, the Company is not entitled to summary judgment with regard to the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits employer liability for sexual harassment by nonemployees when the employer knew of the conduct and failed to take prompt corrective action.

Vargas v. Colon · filed 1999-09-07(a)(1)

Thus, MSJ can only be held liable if it had knowledge of the sexual harassment by Colón and Rodriguez and failed to rectify the situation. The employer could be held liable for the actions of non-employees if it had knowledge of the conduct and did not promptly take corrective action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a basis to impute a supervisor’s discriminatory acts to the employer before the employer can be held liable.

Thomason v. Hitachi Electronic · filed 1999-09-27(a)(1)

Thus, Thomason failed to demonstrate any basis on which to impute liability for Steinmetz's acts to Hitachi.

When supervisor harassment causes no tangible employment action, an employer may avoid liability by showing reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassment and the employee’s unreasonable failure to use available safeguards.

Montero v. Agco Corporation, Glenn Carpenter, and Russ Newmann · filed 1999-09-28(a)(1)

We hold that AGCO is not precluded from asserting the Faragher affirmative defense simply because Carpenter and Newmann were the only AGCO Parts Distribution supervisors in California. Because Plaintiff failed to establish that she suffered a tangible adverse employment action, and because AGCO successfully established an affirmative defense to liability, the district court properly granted summary judgment to AGCO.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits employer liability for a co-worker’s sexual harassment when the employer knew or should have known of it and failed to take prompt, appropriate corrective action.

Curry v. District of Columbia · filed 1999-11-09(a)(1)

An employer may be held liable for the harassment of one employee by a fellow employee (a non-supervisor) if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action.

An employer can avoid liability for a supervisor's hostile environment harassment if it reasonably prevents and promptly corrects harassment and the employee unreasonably fails to use available corrective measures, provided no tangible employment action resulted from refusing sexual demands.

Watkins v. Professional Security Bureau · filed 1999-11-15(a)(1)

In summary, we affirm the grant of judgment as a matter of law to PSB on Watkins' claim of sexual harassment. Although Watkins established the existence of a hostile environment, we conclude that no rational jury could have failed to find that PSB established the ele- ments of the affirmative defense to liability set forth in Burlington Industries.

An employer can avoid vicarious liability for a supervisor’s sexual harassment by exercising reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment when the employee unreasonably fails to use the available protections.

Myer v. Younce · filed 2000-01-24(a)(1)

The court concluded that Defendants had established an affirmative defense against vicarious liability for Tay- lor's alleged sexual harassment because ECU exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, and Myer unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities that ECU provided to avoid harm from the harassment. ... Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

An employer is not liable for a coworker’s alleged hostile work environment when it investigates the employee’s complaints and the conduct cannot be imputed to the employer.

Kodengada v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 2000-03-13(a)(1)

Furthermore, Kodengada complained to IBM’s Human Resources Department, which investigated his complaints and arranged meetings to address his problems. Kodengada has provided no evidence that IBM encouraged or approved the alleged acts by Basehiera. Thus, the conduct cannot be imputed to IBM. Accordingly, Ko-dengada cannot sustain a claim of racially discriminatory hostile work environment under Title VII or New York Human Rights Law § 296.

An employer is not liable for a hostile work environment arising from an off-duty coworker assault when it provided reasonable ways to complain and had no notice of the assault.

P. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2000-06-29(a)(1)

Having provided reasonable avenues for complaint and having had no notice of the off-duty, non-work related sexual assault, Delta cannot be held liable for any anxiety plaintiff experienced during the flight from Rome.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employer to raise an affirmative defense to supervisor harassment, but a factual dispute over whether the employee reported the harassment can preclude that defense on summary judgment.

Gauthier v. NH Dept. of Corrections · filed 2000-08-28(a)(1)

Consequently, the court holds that the record as presently developed precludes defendant from availing itself of the two- part affirmative defense identified in Burlington Industries.

An employer may avoid liability for supervisor sexual harassment when it reasonably prevents and corrects harassment and the employee unreasonably fails to use available remedies.

Lunde v. Big B, Inc. · filed 2000-09-27(a)(1)

Accordingly, the court concludes that the plaintiffs subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate her duty under Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile environment. For these reasons, the court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that Big B, the defending employer, established the affirmative defense to liability or damages of the plaintiffs sexual harassment claims.

An employer is not liable for co-worker sexual harassment when it responds promptly and takes steps reasonably likely to prevent further harassment.

Fuller v. Caterpillar, Inc. · filed 2000-10-04(a)(1)

We find that, because Caterpillar’s actions in addressing Fuller’s complaints were prompt and reasonably likely to prevent future harassment, Caterpillar cannot be held liable for its employees’ alleged misdeeds.

An employer is not liable for racial harassment when it responds reasonably to reported incidents and has no notice of other alleged harassment.

Hollins v. Delta Airlines · filed 2001-01-29

Under these circumstances, Delta’s responses were reasonable, and it may not be held liable for any racial harassment that may have occurred in the workplace.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows employer liability for coworker sexual harassment when the employer has actual or constructive notice of a hostile work environment and fails to respond adequately.

Rahn v. Junction City Foundry, Inc. · filed 2001-02-07(a)(1)

Under Title VII, an employer may be held liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment committed by one employee against another if the employer negligently or recklessly fails to respond to the harassment. ... Based on all of the evidence which plaintiff has presented, the record reveals a factual question whether defendant had actual or constructive notice of the hostile work environment and whether it failed to respond adequately to that notice.